Notes Re: Command Responsibility
Notes Re: Command Responsibility
RESPONDENT IS GUILTY
Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the
manner in which the committee performed its tasks for it was he who in fact
signed the deed of sale prepared by the committee. By signing the deed of
sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee, he in
effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally guilty with those
members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake
tax declarations and made false certifications regarding the use and value of
the Agleham property (Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 81563 & 82512,
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True, this Court has held in several cases that in the absence of substantial
evidence of gross negligence of the petitioner, administrative liability could not
be based on the principle of command responsibility (Montallana v. Office of
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the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 179677, [August 15, 2012], 692 PHIL 617-632)
Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the
respondents liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence
of the respondents, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of
command responsibility. 37 Without proof that the head of office was negligent,
no administrative liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates
cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the
latter's own negligence. While it may be true that certain PCAMRD employees
were sanctioned for negligence and some other administrative infractions, it
does not follow that those holding responsible positions, like the respondents in
this case, are likewise negligent, especially so when the contentions of
petitioner remain unsubstantiated. (De Jesus v. Guerrero III, G.R. No.
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Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability
may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be
ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latter's own
negligence. While Arriola might have been negligent in accepting the spurious
documents, such fact does not automatically imply that Nicolas was also. As a
matter of course, the latter relied on the former's recommendation. Petitioner is
not mandated or even expected to verify personally from the Bureau of
Customs — or from wherever else it originated — each receipt or document
that appears on its face to have been regularly issued or executed. (Nicolas v.
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Desierto, G.R. No. 154668, [December 16, 2004], 488 PHIL 158-173)