1. INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION vs INTERPHIL LABORATORIES, INC.

G.R. No. 142824, Dec. 19, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file EEs of
respondent. They had a CBA effective from April 1, 1990 to July 31, 1993.

Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the union president and a director
requested VP Salazar for a meeting to discuss whether the company would be
amenable to make the new CBA effective for 2 years. VP Salazar declared that
it would be premature to discuss the said matter and that the company cannot
make a decision at the moment.

The next day, all rank-and-file EEs refused to follow their two-shift work
schedule. They stopped working and left the workplace without securing the
raw materials they were working on. A union director told VP Salazar that the
EEs would only return if the company would allow their demands as to the
effectivity and duration of the new CBA. Since the union was apparently
unsatisfied with the company’s answer, the boycott continued and
substantially delayed the company’s production.

ISSUE:
Whether the “overtime boycott” and “work slowdown” engaged by petitioners
is justified.

HELD:
No.

It is evident from the provisions of the CBA that the working hours may be
changed, at the discretion of the company, should the change be necessary for
its operations, and that the EEs shall observe such rules as have been laid down
by the company. The respondent company had to adopt a continuous 24-hour
work daily schedule by reason of the nature of its business and the demands of
its clients. The EEs adhered to the said work schedule since 1988. The EEs are
deemed to have waived the 8-hour schedule since they followed, w/o any
question or complaint, the two-shift schedule while their CBA was still in force
and even prior thereto. The two-shift schedule effectively changed the working
hours stipulated in the CBA. As the EEs assented by practice to this
arrangement, they cannot now claim that the overtime boycott is justified
because they were not obliged to work beyond 8 hours.

It is undisputed that the union members by their own volition decided not to
render overtime services in April 1993. The overtime boycott or work
slowdown by the EEs constituted a violation of their CBA, which prohibits them
to stage a strike during the existence of the CBA.
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2. UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION vs UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN
G.R. No. L-63122, Feb. 20, 1984

FACTS:
Petitioner is a labor union composed of faculty members of the respondent
University. It filed a complaint at the NLRC for payment of their Emergency
Cost of Living Allowances.

Respondent claims that teachers are not entitled thereto because the
semestral break is not an integral part of the school year and there no being no
actual services rendered during said period, the principle of “no work, no pay”
applies.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to ECOLA during the semestral break of
the 1981-1982 SY

HELD:
Yes. These semestral breaks are in the nature of work interruptions beyond the
employees’ control. As such, these breaks cannot be considered as absences
within the meaning of the law for which deductions may be made from
monthly allowances. The “no work, no pay” principle does not apply to the
instant case.

The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that:

“(d) The time during which an EE is inactive by reason of interruptions in his

work beyond his control shall be considered time either if the imminence of the
resumption of work requires the employee’s presence at the place of work of if
the interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and gainfully in the employee’s
own benefit.”

The semestral break scheduled is an interruption beyond the petitioner’s

control and it cannot be used “effectively nor gainfully in the employee’s
interest. Thus, the semestral break may be considred as “hours worked.”

3. PAL vs NLRC
G.R. No. 132805, Feb. 2, 1999

FACTS:
Private respondent was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company. On
Feb. 17, 1994, at around 7:00 pm, he left the clinic to have dinner at his
residence. A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from PAL
Cargo Services. One of its EEs had a heart attack. Nurse Eusebio informed
respondent of the emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 and
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 Nurse Eusebio immediately rushed him to the hospital. When respondent
reached the clinic at 7:51, Nurse Eusebio had already left with the patient. The
patient died the following day.

Management charged respondent with abandonment of post and decided to

suspend him for 3 months. Thus, respondent filed for illegal suspension against
petitioner.

Petitioner argues that being a full-time EE, respondent is obliged to stay in the
company premises for not less than 8 hrs and may not leave the premises
during such time, even to take his meals.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Dr. Fabros’ suspension was illegal

HELD:
Yes.

Art. 83, LC provides that the normal hours of work of any EE shall not exceed 8
hrs. a day.
Art. 85, LC and Sec. 7, Rule I, Book III of the IR provide that every ER shall give
his EE not less than 1 hr time-off for regular meals.

The 8-hr work period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law
may it be inferred that EEs must take their meals within the company
premises. EEs are not prohibited from going out of the premises as long as they
return to their posts on time. Private respondent’s act of going home to take
his dinner does not constitute abandonment. His suspension was illegal.

4. JOSE RIZAL COLLEGE vs NLRC

G.R. No. L-65482, Dec. 1, 1987

FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution. It employed
collegiate faculty who are paid on the basis of student contract hour. Private
respondent NATOW, on behalf of the faculty and personnel of JRC, filed with
the Ministry of Labor a complaint against the said college for alleged non-
payment of holiday pay.

ISSUE:
Whether the school faculty who are paid per lecture hour are entitled to
unworked holiday pay

HELD: No. The law is silent with respect to faculty members paid by the hour and who
are paid for work actually done, by virtue of their contracts. Regular holidays
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 specified as such by law are known to both school and faculty members as “no
class days”. Certainly the latter do not expect payment for said unworked days,
and this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the teaching
contracts.

Exception: When a special public holiday is declared and when classes are
called off or shortened on account of typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like,
these faculty members paid by the hour are deprived of their income and must
be likewise be paid, whether or not extensions of school days are ordered.

5. SAN MIGUEL CORP. vs. CA

G.R. No. 146775, Jan. 30, 2002

FACTS:
DOLE conducted a routine inspection in the premises of SMC in Iligan City. It
discovered that there was underpayment by SMC of regular Muslim holiday to
its EEs. An order was issued directing SMC to consider Muslim holidays as
regular holidays and to pay both its Muslim and non-Muslim EEs holiday pay.

ISSUE:
Whether Muslim holiday pay may be granted to non-Muslim EEs

HELD:
Yes. There should be no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims as
regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays. Wages and other
emoluments granted by law to the working man are determined on the basis
of the criteria laid down by laws and certainly not on the basis of the worker’s
faith or religion.

Considering that all private corporations, offices, agencies, and entities or

establishments operating within the designated Muslim provinces and cities
are required to observe Muslim holidays, both Muslim and Christians working
within the Muslim

6. DAVID vs. MACASIO

G.R. No. 195466, July 2, 2014

FACTS:
Macasio filed a complaint against David for non-payment of OT, holiday, 13th
month and SIL pay. David alleged that Macasio was hired on “pakyaw” or task
basis and who is not entitled to such claims pursuant to the provisions of the
IRR of the LC.

ISSUE:
Whether Macasio is entitled to holiday, SIL, and 13 th month pay.
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HELD:
Macasio is entitled to holiday and SIL pay.

Engagement on “pakyaw” or task basis does not determine the parties’

relationship as it is simply a method of pay computation.

The general rule is that holiday and SIL pay provisions cover all employees. To
be excluded, an employee must be one of those that the provisions expressly
exempt. The payment of an employee on “pakyaw” or task basis alone is
insufficient to exclude one from the coverage of SIL and holiday pay. They are
exempted from the coverage of Title I only if they qualify as “field personnel”.

“Field personnel” shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly

perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office
of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty.

Macasio does not fall under the classification of “field personnel”. As such, he
is not exempted from the grant of holiday and SIL pay even if he was engaged
on “pakyaw” or task basis.

Macasio is not entitled to 13th month pay.

The governing law on 13th month pay is PD No, 851. It exempts employees
“paid on task basis” without any reference to “field personnel”.

7. LIM vs HMR Phils., Inc.

G.R. No. 201483, Aug. 4, 2014

FACTS:
Lim filed a case for illegal dismissal and money claims against HMR. The NLRC
declared Lim to have been illegally dismissed and ordered HMR to pay Lim full
backwages, reckoned from his dismissal up to the promulgation of the
decision. The SC dismissed the petition for certiorari of HMR.

Lim moved for execution of the NLRC decision. The NLRC computed the
backwages from Feb. 3, 2001, the date of the illegal dismissal, up to Oct. 31,
2007, the date of actual reinstatement. HMR opposed the computation arguing
that the backwages should be computed until April 11, 2003 only, the date of
promulgation of the NLRC decision, as stated therein. Furthermore, HMR
points out that the base pay of Lim was already inclusive of holiday pay, and
that the conversion of sick leave to cash was subject to management discretion
in accordance with company policy.

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ISSUE:
a. Whether the computation of backwages should be reckoned until the
promulgation of the NLRC Decision on April 11, 2003 or until actual
reinstatement
b. Whether a recomputation of backwages up to the date of the actual
reinstatement of Lim would violate the principle of immutability of
judgments
c. Whether the petitioner is entitled to holiday pay
d. Whether the petitioner is entitled to sick leave pay

HELD:
A. Art. 279 of the LC is clear in providing that an illegally dismissed EE is
entitled to his full backwages computed from the time his compensation
was withheld up to the time of his actual reinstatement. The body of the
April 11, 2003 NLRC decision expressly recognizes that Lim is entitled to full
backwages until his actual reinstatement.

B. No. The rule is that it is the dispositive portion that categorically states the
rights and obligations of the parties to the dispute as against each other.
Thus, it is the dispositive portion that must be enforced to ensure the
validity of the execution.

That a judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its

dispositive portion is a long and well-established rule. A companion to this
rule is the principle of immutability of final judgments. Save for the
recognized exceptions, a final judgment may no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law and regardless of what court renders it. Any attempt to insert,
change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion
violates the rule on immutability of judgments.

C. The respondents insist that the base pay of Lim is already inclusive of
holiday pay. The records, however, are insufficient to determine whether
holiday pay is indeed included in the petitioner’s base pay.

Whether or not holiday pay is included in the monthly salary of an EE, may
be gleaned from the divisors used by the company in the computation of
overtime pay and employees’ absences. If all non-working days are paid,
the divisor of the monthly salary to obtain daily rate should be 365. If non-
working days are not paid, the divisor is 251, which is a result of
subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays, and the ten legal holidays. Hence, if the
petitioner’s base pay does not yet include holiday pay, it must be added to
his monetary award.

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 D. Respondent claims that petitioner is not entitled to have his sick leaves
converted to cash because such was subject to the discretion of
management in accordance with company policy.

The provisions of the Personnel Policy Handbook of HMR does not give
HMR the absolute discretion to decide whether or not to grant sick leave
conversion. The discretion only pertains to what form the sick leave
conversion may take, and not whether or not sick leave conversion will be
granted at all.

8. AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC. vs. BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 156367, May 16, 2005

FACTS:
Bautista was a driver-conductor of Autobus, who terminated his services latter
on. Bautista instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims for
non-payment of 13th month pay and SIL pay against Autobus.

The LA dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal but ordered the payment
of 13th month pay and SIL pay. Autobus appealed the order, contending that
respondent is not entitled to the grant of SIL because he was paid on purely
commission basis.

ISSUE:
A. Whether respondent is entitled to service incentive leave
B. Whether respondent’s claim of SIL pay is already barred by prescription

HELD:
A. Yes. Respondent is not a field personnel but a regular employee who
performs tasks usually necessary and desirable to the usual trade of
petitioner’s business. Accordingly, he is entitled to the grant of SIL.

The definition of “field personnel” is not merely concerned with the

location where the EE regularly performs his duties but also the fact that
the EE’s performance is unsupervised by the ER. Field personnel are those
regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business of
the ER and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty.

B. No. The 3-year prescriptive period commences, not at the end of the year
when the EE becomes entitled to the commutation of his SIL, but from the
time when the ER refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of
commutation or upon termination of the EE’s services, as the case may be.

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 It was only upon his filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, one month
from the time of his dismissal, that respondent demanded from his former
ER commutation of his accumulated leave credits. Therefore, the
prescriptive period for his claim of SIL pay only commenced from the time
the ER failed to compensate his accumulated SIL at the time of his
dismissal.

9. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT vs PHIL. PLAZA HOLDINGS

G.R. No. 177524, July 23, 2014

FACTS:
The union is the collective bargaining agent of rank and file EEs of PPHI. They
executed a 3rd CBA w/c provided, among others, collection by PPHI of 10%
service charge on sale of food, beverage, transportation laundry and rooms
except on negotiated contracts and special rates.

The union listed an uncollected service charges amounting to ₱2,952,467.61 by

which only ₱80,063.88 admitted by PPHI which according to PPHI are specified
entries or transactions in the nature of negotiated contracts and special rates.

ISSUE:
Whether PPHI violated Art. 96 of the Labor Code when they referred the
Union’s claim for service charges on the specified entries or transactions.

HELD:
No.

Art. 96 reads:
“In case the service charge is abolished, the share of the covered
employee shall be considered integrated in their wages.”

This last paragraph of Art. 96 presumes the practice of collecting service

charges and the termination of this practice. When this happens, Art. 96
requires the employer to incorporate the amount that the employees had
been receiving as share of the collected service charges into their wages. In
case where no service charges had previously been collected, Art. 96 will not
operate.

In the case, PPHI had not in fact been collecting service charges on the
specified entries/transactions that were pointed out as either falling under
“negotiated contracts” and/or “special rates” or did not involve a “sale of food,
beverage, etc.” Accordingly, Art. 96 of the LC finds no application in this case;
the PPHI did not abolish or terminate the implementation of any company
policy that could have otherwise rendered it liable to pay an amount

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 representing the covered employee’s share in the alleged abolished service
charges.

10. NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY vs NWSA CONSOLIDATED

UNIONS
G.R. No. L-18939, Aug. 31, 1964

FACTS:
The Court of Industrial Relations conducted a hearing in 1957 on the
controversy then existing between both parties on the issue of, among others,
the 25% additional compensation for Sunday work which should be included in
computing the daily wage.

ISSUE:
Whether NAWASA is a public utility and therefore exempt from paying
additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal holidays

HELD:
NAWASA is a public utility because its primary function is to conduct, maintain
and operate water reservoirs and waterworks for the purpose of supplying
waters to the inhabitants. The court likewise agreed that a public utility is
exempt from paying additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal
holidays.

However, prior to the enactment of RA 1880, the Metropolitan Water District

had been paying 25% additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal
holidays which practice was continued by NAWASA when the latter took over
the operations. Un the CBA, it was also agreed that all existing benefits enjoyed
by the employees prior to its effectivity shall remain in force and shall form
part of the agreement, among which certainly is the 25% additional
compensation.

A public utility is therefore not required to pay additional compensation to its

employees for work done on Sundays and legal holidays. There is, however, no
prohibition for it to pay such if it voluntarily agree to do so.

The NAWASA committed itself to pay its additional compensation. It must pay
not because of compulsion of law but because of contractual obligation.

11. ROBINA FARMS CEBU vs. VILLA

G.R. No. 175869, April 18, 2016

FACTS:
Villa filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal,
non-payment of OT and SIL pay. She averred that petitioner enticed her to
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 avail herself of the company’s special retirement program. For failure to issue
invoices, she was suspended for 10 days. Upon reporting back to work, she had
been advised to cease working because her application for retirement had
been approved, then subsequently disapproved, and later on was advised to
tender her resignation with a request for financial assistance. She had
manifested her intention to return to work but petitioner prevented her from
entering the work premises.

ISSUE: Whether Villa is entitled to OT and SIL pay

HELD:
Villa is not entitled to OT pay.

Entitlement to OT pay must first be established by proof that the OT work was
actually performed before the EE may properly claim the benefit. The DTRs
submitted did not substantially prove the actual performance of work. In
accordance with Sec. 4(c), Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the LC, any employee could render OT work only when there was prior
authorization therefor by the management. Without prior authorization, Villa
could not validly claim having performed work beyond the normal hours of
work.

Villa is entitled to SIL pay.

The ER is obliged to prove that it fully paid the accrued SIL pay to the EE.
Petitioner did not present proof that Villa had been justly paid.

12. HSY MARKETING vs. VILLASTIQUE

G.R. No. 219569, Aug. 17, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioner hired respondent as company driver for Fabulous Jeans. Respondent
figured in an accident, in which Fabulous Jeans had to pay for the
hospitalization of the aggrieved. Respondent was asked to reimburse the said
expenses but to no avail. He was allegedly required to sign a resignation letter,
but he refused to do so. He tried to collect his salary for that week but was
informed that the same was withheld for his refusal to resign. Convinced that
he was already terminated, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
monetary claims.

Petitioner contends that respondent should be considered as having

voluntarily severed his own employment, for refusing to report for work. Thus,
his money claims cannot prosper because he was not terminated.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to SIL pay

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HELD:
Yes. Respondent was a regular EE and is entitled to benefit of SIL pay.

Respondent was not a field personnel. Company drivers who are under the
control and supervision of management officers are regular EEs entitled to
benefits including SIL pay.

SIL is a right w/c accrues to every EE who has served w/in 12 months, whether
continuous or broke, including authorized absences and paid regular holidays
unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or policy,
or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in w/c
case said period shall be considered 1 yr. it is also commutable to its money
equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the yr. In other words, an EE
who has serve for 1 yr is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may
collect its monetary value.

13. DASCO vs. PHILTRANCO SERVICE

G.R. No. 211141, June 29, 2016

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for non-payment of OT and SIL pay, among others.
Petitioners were employed by respondents as bus drivers and/or conductors.
Respondents argue that petitioners are field personnel whose time outside the
company premises cannot be determined with reasonable certainty since they
ply provincial routes and are left alone in the field unsupervised. Therefore
they are not entitled to OT and SIL pay.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners as bus drivers and/or conductors are entitled to OT and
SIL pay

HELD:
Yes. Petitioners are not field personnel but regular EEs and are entitled to OT
and SIL pay.

Field personnel are those who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business of the ER and whose actual hours of work in the
field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.

Petitioners cannot be considered as field personnel because they are under

control and constant supervision of the bus companies while in the
performance of their work. They are regular employees because they perform
tasks which are directly and necessarily connected with the respondents’
business. Thus, they are consequently entitled to the benefits of accorded to
regular employees, including OT and SIL pay.
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