Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523

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Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Risk analysis and assessment methodologies in the work sites: On a review,

classification and comparative study of the scientific literature of the period
2000e2009
P.K. Marhavilas a, b, *, D. Koulouriotis b, V. Gemeni b
a
Lab. of Electromagnetism, Dep. of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Democritus Univ. of Thrace, Vas. Sofias 12 St., 67100 Xanthi, Greece
b
Dep. of Production & Management Engineering, Democritus Univ. of Thrace, Vas. Sofias 12 St., 67100 Xanthi, Greece

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The objective of this work is to determine and study, analyze and elaborate, classify and categorize the
Received 1 November 2010 main risk analysis and risk-assessment methods and techniques by reviewing the scientific literature.
Received in revised form The paper consists of two parts: a) the investigation, presentation and elaboration of the main risk-
17 February 2011
assessment methodologies and b) the statistical analysis, classification, and comparative study of the
Accepted 8 March 2011
corresponding scientific papers published by six representative scientific journals of Elsevier B.V.
covering the decade 2000e2009. The scientific literature reviewing showed that the risk analysis and
Keywords:
assessment techniques are classified into three main categories: (a) the qualitative, (b) the quantitative,
Risk analysis
Risk assessment
and (c) the hybrid techniques (qualitativeequantitative, semi-quantitative). The qualitative techniques
Risk estimation are based both on analytical estimation processes, and on the safety managerseengineers ability.
Risk-assessment methodologies According to quantitative techniques, the risk can be considered as a quantity, which can be estimated
Risk-assessment reviewing and expressed by a mathematical relation, under the help of real accidents’ data recorded in a work site.
Qualitative The hybrid techniques, present a great complexity due to their ad hoc character that prevents a wide
Quantitative spreading. The statistical analysis shows that the quantitative methods present the highest relative
Hybrid techniques frequency (65.63%) while the qualitative a lower one (27.68%). Furthermore the hybrid methods remain
constantly at a very low level (6.70%) during the entire processing period.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction (Woodruff, 2005) while “hazard” is any unsafe condition or

potential source of an undesirable event with potential for harm or
Public interest in the field of risk analysis has expanded in leaps damage (Reniers, Dullaert, Ale, & Soudan, 2005). Moreover, risk has
and bounds during the last three decades, while risk analysis has been defined as a measure under uncertainty of the severity of
emerged as an effective and comprehensive procedure that a hazard (Høj & Kröger, 2002), or a measure of the probability and
supplements and complements the overall management of almost severity of adverse effects (Haimes, 2009). In general, “danger”
all aspects of our life. Managers of health care, the environment, should be defined as an attribute of substances or processes, which
and physical infrastructure systems all incorporate risk analysis in may potentially cause harm (Høj & Kröger, 2002).
their decision-making process. Moreover the omnipresent adap- A complex humanemachine system is seen as being composed
tations of risk analysis by many disciplines, along with its deploy- of humans, of machines, and of the interaction between them,
ment by industry and government agencies in decision-making, which could properly be described by a system model. The role of
have led to an unprecedented development of theory, method- a system model is essential in thinking about how systems can
ology, and practical tools (Haimes, 2009). malfunction, or in other words in thinking about accidents. A
Risk has been considered as the chance that someone or fundamental distinction is whether accidents are due to specific
something that is valuated will be adversely affected by the hazard malfunctions or “error mechanisms”, or whether they are due to
unfortunate coincidences. Over the years, the efforts to explain and
predict accidents have involved a number of stereotypical ways of
* Corresponding author. Lab. of Electromagnetism, Dep. of Electrical & Computer accounting for how events may take place (Hollnagel, 2004, 2006;
Engineering, Democritus Univ. of Thrace, Vas. Sofias 12 St., 67100 Xanthi, Greece.
Tel.: þ30 2541079973.
Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006; Qureshi, 2007).
E-mail addresses: marhavil@ee.duth.gr (P.K. Marhavilas), jimk@pme.duth.gr Furthermore, risk assessment is an essential and systematic
(D. Koulouriotis), vickygemeni@hotmail.com (V. Gemeni). process for assessing the impact, occurrence and the consequences

0950-4230/$ e see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2011.03.004
478 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523

of human activities on systems with hazardous characteristics (van main risk analysis and assessment methodologies. Below, we
Duijne, Aken, & Schouten, 2008) and constitutes a needful tool for present an overview of them having in mind this classification.
the safety policy of a company. The diversity in risk analysis
procedures is such that there are many appropriate techniques for 2.1. Qualitative techniques
any circumstance and the choice has become more a matter of taste
(Reniers et al., 2005; Rouvroye & van den Bliek, 2002). We can a) Checklists: Checklist analysis is a systematic evaluation against
consider the risk as a quantity, which can be measured and pre-established criteria in the form of one or more checklists,
expressed by a mathematical relation, under the help of real acci- which are enumeration of questions about operation, organi-
dents’ data (Marhavilas & Koulouriotis, 2007, 2008; Marhavilas, zation, maintenance and other areas of installation safety
Koulouriotis, & Voulgaridou, 2009). concern and represent the simplest method used for hazard
The objective of this work is to determine and study, classify and identification. A brief summary of its characteristics is as
categorize, analyze and overview, the main risk analysis and follows: (i) It is a systematic approach built on the historical
assessment (RAA) methods and techniques by reviewing the knowledge included in checklist questions, (ii) It is applicable
scientific literature. The paper consists of two parts: a) the to any activity or system, including equipment issues and
presentation of the main risk-assessment methodologies and human factors issues, (iii) It is generally performed by an
b) the statistical analysis, classification, and elaboration of the individual trained to understand the checklist questions, or
corresponding scientific papers published by Elsevier B.V. covering sometimes by a small group, (iv) It is based mostly on inter-
the last decade. views, documentation reviews, and field inspections, (v) It
generates qualitative lists of conformance and non-confor-
2. An overview of risk analysis and assessment techniques mance determinations with recommendations for correcting
non-conformances, (vi) The quality of evaluation is determined
The procedure of reviewing the scientific literature, revealed primarily by the experience of people creating the checklists
a plethora of published technical articles on safety, and risk analysis and the training of the checklist users, (vii) It is used for high-
referred to many different fields, like engineering, medicine, level or detailed analysis, including root cause analysis, (viii) It
chemistry, biology, agronomics, etc. These articles address concepts, is used most often to guide boarding teams through inspection
tools, technologies, and methodologies that have been developed of critical vessel systems, (ix) It is also used as a supplement to
and practiced in such areas as planning, design, development, or integral part of another method, especially what-if-analysis,
system integration, prototyping, and construction of physical infra- to address specific requirements. Although checklist analysis is
structure; in reliability, quality control, and maintenance. Further- highly effective in identifying various system hazards, this
more, our reviewing shows that the risk analysis and assessment technique has two key limitations: (a) The structure of check-
(RAA) techniques are classified into three main categories: (a) the list analysis relies exclusively on the knowledge built into the
qualitative, (b) the quantitative, and (c) the hybrid techniques checklists to identify potential problems. If the checklist does
(qualitativeequantitative, semi-quantitative). The qualitative tech- not address a key issue, the analysis is likely to overlook
niques are based both on analytical estimation processes, and on the potentially important weaknesses. (b) Traditionally provides
safety managerseengineers ability. According to quantitative tech- only qualitative information. Most checklist reviews produce
niques, the risk can be considered as a quantity, which can be esti- only qualitative results, with no quantitative estimates of risk-
mated and expressed by a mathematical relation, under the help of related characteristics. This simplistic approach offers great
real accidents’ data recorded in a work site. The hybrid techniques, value for minimal investment, but it can answer more
present a great complexity due to their ad hoc character that complicated risk-related questions only if some degree of
prevents a wide spreading. Fig. 1 illustrates the classification of the quantification is added, possibly with a relative ranking/risk

Main Risk Analysis and Assessment Methodologies

Qualitative Techniques Quantitative Techniques Hybrid Techniques

Check-Lists PRAT technique HEAT / HFEA

What-if Analysis DMRA technique FTA

Safety Audits Risk measures ETA

of societal risk

Task Analysis RBM

QRA technique

STEP technique
QADS

HAZOP
CREA method

PEA method

WRA

Fig. 1. It is presented the classification of the main risk analysis and assessment (RAA) methodologies.
 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523 479

indexing approach (Arvanitogeorgos, 1999; Ayyub, 2003; appropriate design criteria, operating conditions and proce-
Harms-Ringdahl, 2001; Marhavilas et al., 2009; Reniers et al., dures, safety measures and related risk-management programs.
2005; http://www.oshatrain.org). The result of an audit is a report that provides corporate
b) What-if-analysis: It is an approach that (1) uses broad, loosely management with an overview of the level of performance for
structured questioning to postulate potential upsets that may various safety aspects of operations. Reporting results should
result in accidents or system performance problems and make reasonable recommendations and suggestions about
(2) determines what things can go wrong and judges the safety procedure improvements and safety awareness of oper-
consequences of those situations occurring (Ayyub, 2003; ating personnel (Harms-Ringdahl, 2001; Reniers et al., 2005).
Doerr, 1991; Reniers et al., 2005). The main characteristics of d) Task Analysis (TA): This process analyzes the way that people
the technique are briefly summarized as follows: perform the tasks in their work environment and how these
 It is a systematic, but loosely structured, assessment, relying tasks are refined into subtasks and describes how the operators
on a team of experts to generate a comprehensive review interact both with the system itself and with other personnel in
and to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place. that system. It can be used to create a detailed picture of human
 Typically is performed by one or more teams with diverse involvement using all the information necessary for an analysis
backgrounds and experience that participate in group in an adequate degree of details (Brauchler & Landau, 1998;
review meetings of documentation and field inspections. Doytchev & Szwillus, 2008; Kirwan, 1994; Kontogiannis,
 It is applicable to any activity or system. 2003; Landau, Rohmert, & Brauchler, 1998). Task analysis
 It is used as a high-level or detailed risk-assessment involves the study of activities and communications under-
technique. taken by operators and their teams in order to achieve a system
 It generates qualitative descriptions of potential problems, goal. The result of a task analysis is a Task Model. The task
in the form of questions and responses, as well as lists of analysis process usually involves three phases: (i) collection of
recommendations for preventing problems. data about human interventions and system demands,
 The quality of the evaluation depends on the quality of the (ii) representation of those data in a comprehensible format or
documentation, the training of the review team leader, and graph, and (iii) comparison between system demands and
the experience of the review teams. operator capabilities. The primary objective of task analysis is
 It is generally applicable for almost every type of risk- to ensure compatibility between system demands and operator
assessment application, especially those dominated by capabilities, and if necessary, to alter those demands so that the
relatively simple failure scenarios. task is adapted to the person. A widely used form of task
 Occasionally it is used alone, but most often is used to analysis is the hierarchical task analysis (HTA). Through its
supplement other, more structured techniques (especially hierarchical approach it provides a well-structured overview of
checklist analysis). the work processes even in realistically sized examples. HTA is
an easy to use method of gathering and organizing information
The procedure for performing a what-if-analysis consists of the about human activities and human interaction, and enables the
following seven steps: analyst to find safety-critical tasks. It is time-consuming in case
of complex tasks and requires the cooperation of experts from
 We specify and clearly define the boundaries for which risk- the application domain, knowledgeable about the task opera-
related information is needed. tion conditions. Other analysis techniques are the Tabular Task
 We specify the problems of interest that the analysis will Analysis, Timeline Analysis, Operator Action Event Trees, the
address (safety problems, environmental issues, economic GOMS-methods (Goals, Operators, Methods, and Selection
impacts, etc.). Rules), Critical Action and Decision Evaluation Technique etc
 We subdivide the subject into its major elements (e.g. locations (Brauchler & Landau, 1998; Landau et al., 1998).
on the waterway, tasks, or subsystems), so that the analysis will e) The Sequentially Timed Event Plotting (STEP) technique: It
begin at this level. provides a valuable overview of the timing and sequence of
 We generate “what-if” questions for each element of the events/actions that contributed to the accident, or in other
activity or system. words, a reconstruction of the harm process by plotting the
 We respond to each of the “what-if” questions and develop sequence of events that contributed to the accident. The main
recommendations for improvements wherever the risk of concepts in STEP are the initiation of the accident through an
potential problems seems uncomfortable or unnecessary. event or change that disrupted the technical system, the agents
 We further subdivide the elements of the activity or system, if which intervene to control the system and the elementary
it is necessary or more detailed analysis is desired. The section “event building blocks”. The analysts construct an STEP work-
of some elements into successively finer levels of resolution sheet which charts the evolution of events and system inter-
until further subdivision will (1) provide no more valuable ventions (on the horizontal axis) performed by the agents (on
information or (2) exceed the organization’s control or influ- the vertical axis). Subsequently, they identify the main events/
ence to make improvements. Generally, the goal is to minimize actions that contributed to the accident and construct their
the level of resolution necessary for a risk assessment. “event building blocks” which contain the following informa-
 We use the results in decision-making. So we evaluate tion: a) the time at which the event started, b) the duration of
recommendations from the analysis and implement those that the event, c) the agent which caused the event, d) the
will bring more benefits than they will cost in the life cycle of description of the event, and e) the name of the source which
the activity or system. offered this information. In the second stage, the events are
c) Safety audits: They are procedures by which operational safety interconnected with arrows. All events should have incoming
programs of an installation, a process or a plant are inspected. and outgoing arrows which show “precede” and “follow”
They identify equipment conditions or operating procedures relationships between events. Converging arrows show
that could lead to a casualty or result in property damage or dependencies between events while divergent arrows show
environmental impacts (Ayyub, 2003). An auditor or an audit the impact on following events (Hendrick & Benner, 1987;
team reviews critical features to verify the implementation of Kontogiannis, Leopoulos, & Marmaras, 2000).
480 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523

f) The HAZOP method (Hazard and Operability study): It is  It is typically performed by a multidisciplinary team
a formalized methodology to identify and document hazards  It is applicable to any system or procedure
through imaginative thinking. It involves a very systematic  It is used most as a system-level risk-assessment technique
examination of design documents that describe the installation  It generates primarily qualitative results, although some
or the facility under investigation. The study is performed by basic quantification is possible
a multidisciplinary team, analytically examining design intent
deviations. The HAZOP analysis technique uses a systematic
process to (1) identify possible deviations from normal opera- 3. Quantitative techniques
tions and (2) ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place to
help prevent accidents. The basic principle of HAZOP study is g) The proportional risk-assessment (PRAT) technique: This technique
that hazards arise in a plant due to deviations from normal (Ayyub, 2003; Fine & Kinney, 1971; Marhavilas & Koulouriotis,
behavior. In HAZOP study, process piping and instrument 2007, 2008) uses a proportional formula for calculating the
diagrams (PIDs) are examined systematically by a group of quantified risk due to hazard. The risk is calculated considering
experts (HAZOP team), and the abnormal causes and adverse the potential consequences of an accident, the exposure factor
consequences for all possible deviations from normal operation and the probability factor. More specifically a quantitative
that could arise are found for every section of the plant. Thus, the calculation of the risk, can be given with the following propor-
potential problems in the process plant are identified. The tional relation (Marhavilas & Koulouriotis, 2008):
HAZOP team is a multidisciplinary team of experts who have
extensive knowledge on design, operation, and maintenance of R ¼ P$S$F
the process plants. Generally, a team of six members consisting
where: R: the Risk; P: the Probability Factor; S: the Severity of Harm
of team leader, process engineer, operation representative,
Factor; F: the Frequency (or the Exposure) Factor.
safety representative, control system engineer, and maintenance
The above relation provides a logical system for safety
engineer is recommended for the study. The HAZOP team
management to set priorities for attention to hazardous situa-
members try to imagine ways in which hazards and operating
tions. The validity of these priorities or these decisions is obvi-
problems might arise in a process plant. To cover all the possible
ously a function of the validity of the estimates of the
malfunctions in the plant, the HAZOP study team members use
parameters P, S and F, and these estimates, apparently very
a set of ‘guide words’ for generating the process variable devi-
simple, require the collection of information, the visit of the
ations to be considered in the HAZOP study. The sets of guide
workplaces and the discussion with the workers about their
words that are often used are NONE, MORE OF, LESS OF, PART OF,
activities (Reniers et al., 2005). The participation of the workers
and MORE THAN. When these guide words are applied to the
is thus essential as they are the only persons to know exactly
process variables in each line or unit of the plant, we get the
how the work is actually performed. Each factor in the previous
corresponding process variable deviation to be considered in
equation, takes values in the scale of 1e10 (Marhavilas &
the HAZOP study. A list of guide words with their meaning and
Koulouriotis, 2008; their tables 1, 2, 3), so that the quantity R
the parameters where they can be applied is presented in Table 1.
can be expressed in the scale of 1e1000. We can use Table 2 to
The guide words and process variables should be combined in
associate the gradation of the risk value R with the urgency level
such a way that they lead to meaningful process variable devi-
of required actions.
ations. Hence, all guide words cannot be applied to all process
variables. For example, when the process variable under
h) The decision matrix risk-assessment (DMRA) technique: It is
consideration is temperature, only the guide words MORE OF
a systematic approach for estimating risks, which is consisting
and LESS OF lead to meaningful process variable deviations. The
of measuring and categorizing risks on an informed judgment
sequence of typical HAZOP study is shown in Fig. 2. The proper
basis as to both probability and consequence and as to relative
planning and management of HAZOP study is one of the crucial
importance (Ayyub, 2003; Henselwood & Phillips, 2006;
factors for better effectiveness and good reliability of the results.
Marhavilas & Koulouriotis, 2008; Haimes, 2009; Marhavilas,
The HAZOP study can be planned and managed properly only
Koulouriotis, & Mitrakas, submitted for publication; Reniers
when duration of each activity and for complete study is known
et al., 2005; Woodruff, 2005). The combination of a conse-
(Ayyub, 2003; Baysari, McIntosh, & Wilson, 2008; Harms-
quence/severity and likelihood range, gives us an estimate of
Ringdahl, 2001; Hong, Lee, Shin, Nam, & Kong, 2009; Khan &
 risk (or a risk ranking). More specifically, the product of
Abbasi, 1997; Labovský, Svandová, Markos, & Jelemenský,
severity (S) and likelihood (P) provides a measure of risk (R)
2007; Reniers et al., 2005; Yang & Yang, 2005). The main char-
which is expressed by the relation:
acteristics of the technique are briefly summarized as follows:
 It is a systematic, highly structured assessment relying on
R ¼ S$P
HAZOP guide words to generate a comprehensive review
and ensure that appropriate safeguards against accidents are Once the hazards have been identified, the question of assigning
in place severity and probability ratings must be addressed. Eventually, the
technique is consummated by the construction of the risk matrix
(in Table 3-a) and the decision-making table (in Table 3-b). The new
Table 1
The list of guide words and their meaning (Khan & Abbasi, 1997). developed DMRA technique has two key advantages: a) It differ-
entiates relative risks to facilitate decision-making. b) It improves
Guide words Meaning
the consistency and basis of decision. Moreover, it is a quantitative
No/None Complete negation to design intention
(due to risk measuring) and also a graphical method which can
More Quantitative increase
Less Quantitative decrease create liability issues and help the risk managers to prioritize and
Part of Only part of intention is fulfilled manage key risks (Marhavilas & Koulouriotis, 2008).
As well as In addition to design intention, something else occurs
Reverse Logical opposition of design intention occurs i) Quantitative risk measures of societal risk: The societal risk
Other than Complete substitution
associated with operation of given complex technical system
 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523 481

Take one
process
unit

Choose deviation e.g.

temp, flow rate,
pressure

No
Is deviation Yes
possible?

Is it
hazardous?
Yes

No
What changes in plant Will operator
know that there
will tell the deviation is deviation?

Yes

What changes in plant will prevent

deviation or make it less likely or
protect against consequences?

No
Yes Is cost of Consider other
changes
modifications
justified?
No
Are all
Yes
parameters
studied? No

Has all
equipments of
unit been studied?

Yes
Stop

Fig. 2. Procedure of HAZOP study (Khan & Abbasi, 1997).

is evaluated (Kosmowski, 2002, 2006) on the basis of a set of where Sk is k-th accident scenario (usually representing an accident
the triples: category) defined in the determined modeling process, Fk is the
frequency of this scenario (evaluated as probability per time unit,
R ¼ fhSk ; Fk ; Nk ig usually one year), and Nk denotes the consequences of k-th
scenario, i.e. potential losses (the number of injuries and fatalities)
or financial losses. On the basis of the above relation the FeN curve
Table 2 (CCDF: complementary cumulative distribution function) is to be
Gradation of the risk value in association with the urgency level of required actions
(Marhavilas & Koulouriotis, 2008).
drawn. Fig. 3 illustrates an example of such curve in double loga-
rithmic co-ordinates to be compared with criteria lines: D (lower
Risk Value (R) Urgency level of required actions line) and G (upper line). The social risk for a given technical system
700e1000 Immediate action is accepted when FeN curve is below the criterion line D (a defined
500e700 Required Action earlier than 1 day
function with regard to societal preferences) for all N. If the FeN
300e500 Required Action earlier than 1 month
200e300 Required Action earlier than 1 year curve is situated between criteria lines D and G, then the ALARP (as
<200 Immediate action is not necessary but it is low as reasonably practicable) principle should be applied to
required the event surveillance indicate the ways to reduce risk. If for any N the FeN curve is above
482 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523

Table 3
The decision matrix risk-assessment technique: (a) The risk matrix. (b) The decision-
making table (Marhavilas & Koulouriotis, 2008).

Hazard probability ratings

(P)
Severity
of conse-
quences 6 5 4 3 2 1
ratings
(S)
6 36 30 24 18 12 6
5 30 25 20 15 10 5
4 24 20 16 12 8 4
3 18 15 12 9 6 3
2 12 10 8 6 4 2
1 6 5 4 3 2 1

Unacceptable 18-36 Fig. 3. Examples of the FeN curve and criteria functions for societal risk.

Undesirable 10-16
As a result the individual risk is independent of the contribu-
Acceptable with controls 5-9 tions from window failure due to blast effects. The flame jet is
only relevant if the height of its origin is situated less than 5 m
Acceptable 1-4
above the unprotected person. Debris throwing and bulk
outflow are always relevant for the individual risk. The results
are input for explosion effect calculations, followed by
a prediction of the consequences for people. The consequences
and the scenario frequency are then combined to the individual
the upper criteria line G, the risk is intolerable and the system must and societal risk, which can be compared to the relevant
re-designed (e.g. functionally and structurally modified) to reduce regulations (Van der Voort et al., 2007).
risk as required. A measure of societal risk can be the average rate of k) Quantitative assessment of domino scenarios (QADS). The
death evaluated according to the formula: domino effect is assumed as an accident in which a primary
X event propagates to nearby equipment, triggering one or more
R ¼ Fk Nk
secondary events resulting in overall consequences more
k
severe than those of the primary event. Furthermore, an acci-
where: Fk is the frequency of k-th accident scenario [a1]; and Nk is dent is usually considered as a “domino event” only if its overall
the number of fatalities resulting from k-th scenario. severity is higher or at least comparable to that of the primary
accidental scenario, while domino accidental scenarios result
j) The QRA (Quantitative Risk-Assessment) tool. The QRA tool has from the escalation of a primary accidental event. The escala-
been developed for the external safety of industrial plants with tion is usually caused by the damage of at least one equipment
a dust explosion hazard. This tool provides a consistent basis to item, due to the physical effects of the primary event. Four
analyze the individual and societal risk, it consists of a combi- elements may be considered to characterize a domino event:
nation of sub models, and an overview is presented in Fig. 4. (i) A primary accidental scenario, which triggers the domino
First the scenarios and their frequencies are defined. The effect. (ii) A propagation effect following the primary event,
individual risk is defined as the probability (frequency) of due to the effect of escalation vectors caused by the primary
lethality for an unprotected person in the vicinity of event on secondary targets. (iii) One or more secondary acci-
a hazardous location. The societal risk takes the actual envi- dental scenarios, involving the same or different plant units,
ronment into account. For example, an industrial plant is causing the propagation of the primary event. (iv) An escala-
divided into two groups of modules, defined by their size, tion of the consequences of the primary event, due to the effect
shape, and constructional properties. Then the relevant of the secondary scenarios. The quantitative assessment of
explosion scenarios are determined, together with their domino accidents requires the identification, the frequency
frequency of occurrence. These include scenarios in which one evaluation and the consequence assessment of all the credible
module participates, as well as domino scenarios. The domino scenarios, including all the different combinations of
frequency is partly based on casuistry. The QRA tool offers the secondary events that may be originated by each primary
possibility to define four types of objects: unprotected people, event. The identification of the credible domino scenarios
cars, domestic houses and office buildings, each with their own should be based on escalation criteria addressing the possible
protection level against the different explosion effects. The damage of equipment due to the physical effects generated in
development of the dust explosion and the process of venting the primary scenarios. In the approach to the frequency
and the launch of module parts are predicted for each scenario. assessment of domino scenarios, the damage probability of
 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523 483

Frequency Scenario Scenarios and

Frequencies

Dust Explosion Dust Explosion

Modeling

Debris and Flame Blast Bulk Explosion Effects

fragment throw effects outflow

Lethality Lethality Lethality Lethality Explosion

Consequences

Individual Risk Risk

Societal Risk

Fig. 4. An overview of the QRA tool is presented (van der Voort et al., 2007).

a unit due to a given primary event may be considered inde- where fp is the expected frequency of the primary event that trig-
pendent on the possible contemporary damage of other units. gers the escalation (Cozzani, Antonioni, & Spadoni, 2006).
Thus, if n possible target units are present, a single primary
event may cause a maximum of n different secondary events, l) The CREA (Clinical Risk and Error Analysis) method. CREA is
each having an overall probability to take place equal to Pd,i. a methodological approach for quantitative risk analysis, con-
However, each secondary event may take place contemporary sisting of five steps (see Fig. 5) according to the work of Trucco
to other secondary events. A single domino scenario may thus and Cavallin (2006) and based on techniques which are well-
be defined as an event involving the contemporary damage of k established in industry, and have been adapted for the medical
units resulting in k secondary events, with k comprised domain. CREA allows the analyst to join data which have been
between 1 and n. If each of the n secondary units is labeled by collected through direct observation of processes or interviews
a numerical indicator comprised between 1 and n, a domino to clinical operators to statistical data reported in literature.
scenario may thus be indicated as a vector Jm k ¼ ½g ; .; g 
1 k The risk assessment for CREA method is condensed to the
whose elements are the indexes of the secondary units following: For each activity k, the probability P(EMik) of
involved in the event. Since k  n, in general more than one occurrence of the EMi-th error mode (EM) and the severity
domino scenario may involve k units. Therefore, the subscript index D(EMik) of the associated harm have to be calculated on
m of vector J indicates that the single domino scenario is the the basis of available data and the experts’ judgment; their
mth combination of k secondary events. The number of domino product represents the Risk Index R(EMik) for each EM, as
scenarios involving k different secondary events may be shown in the classical equation:
calculated by the following expression:

n! RðEMik Þ ¼ PðEMik Þ  DðEMik Þ

sk ¼
ðn  kÞ!k! For each EM, only its occurrence probability related to the whole
process in known, but in fact the same EM could happen in several
The total number of different domino scenarios that may be
tasks in one or more process activities. Thus, the experts estimate
generated by the primary event, Sd, may be calculated as follows:
the likelihood to have a particular EM within the various activities
X
n of the process (yik), making it possible to calculate the probability of
Sd ¼ sk ¼ 2 n  1
k¼1
1 Activities Identification IDEF
The probability of a single domino scenario involving the Care process modeling
contemporary damage of k units resulting in k secondary events,
k , may be evaluated as follows:
identified by the vector Jm
Activities description COGNITIVE
n h
2
Y   i Tasks analysis
TASK
ðk;mÞ k
ANALYSIS
Pd ¼ 1  Pd;i þ d i; Jm 2$Pd;i  1
i¼1
k Þ equals 1 if the ith event belongs to the 3 Identification of error modes HUMAN
where the function dði; Jm Analysis of incorrect actions or decisions HAZOP
mth combination, 0 if not. The last equation is the algebraic
expression obtained from the union of the probabilities of the k
events belonging to the mth combination, calculated considering as 4 Risk evaluation RISK
independent the secondary events. The expected frequency of the Risk index of each activity or process DIAGRAM
ðk;mÞ
mth domino scenario involving k contemporary events, fd , may
thus be calculated as 5 Organizational causes Analysis VINCENT’S
FRAMEWORK
Analysis of factors influencing error modes
ðk;mÞ ðk;mÞ
fd ¼ fP $Pd
Fig. 5. Fundamental steps and tools of CREA (Trucco & Cavallin, 2006).
484 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523

the error mode i which occurred in the activity k by multiplying the Table 5
probability of occurrence of EM i for the estimated likelihood, as The severity class and related weights (Trucco & Cavallin, 2006).

follows: Class of severity Description Weight Mj

A-no consequences No harm or increase of patient MA ¼ 0.1
PðEMik Þ ¼ yik  ½PðEMi ÞAVERAGE monitoring
B-minor harm Temporary harm to patient, whit MB ¼ 0.3
As far as the severity index D(EMik) is concerned, it is calculated additional therapeutic intervention
as the linear combination of the conditional probabilities xijk of the or prolonged hospitalization inside
severity class j, weighted with a coefficient Mj, that grows with the one month
severity of the harm. C-medium harm Temporary harm to patient MC ¼ 0.5
(temporary disability) or
prolonged hospitalization over
E 
X 
one month
DðEMik Þ ¼ Mj $xijk D-serious harm Permanently harm to patent MD ¼ 0.7
j¼A (permanently disability),
life-threatening harm or near
The values of coefficient Mj could be adjusted on the basis of the death event
risk perception of the team which is conducting the analysis. The E-death Death of patient ME ¼ 0.9
estimates of probabilities of occurrence of EMs, the likelihood of
severity classes and the Risk Index of each activity can be presented
in Tables. The Risk Index of each activity k (ACTk) is given by the
representing them by fixed values (conservative percentiles of
sum of the risk indexes of each EM detected in the same activity, as
action characteristics called the characteristic and design values)
follows:
which are usually specified in structural design codes. Outside
X the regulatory area of the codes, attempts were undertaken to
RðACTk Þ ¼ RðEMik Þ
specify AAs in terms of probability distributions (p.d.’s) assigned
i
in the framework of a classical statistical approach (CSA) which
Each error mode of every activity is mapped in risk diagrams, in dominates the structural reliability analysis. The application of
that three iso-risk curves allow four risk control areas to be iden- the fixed values and p.d. specified in line with CSA to
tified: emergency (R > 0.05), urgency (0.01 < R < 0.05), planning a mechanical damage assessment is vulnerable to criticism. A
(0.0050 < R < 0.01) and monitoring (R < 0.005). Risk mapping can fundamentally different approach to forecasting AAs consists in
also be done on several aggregation levels. For example, in the drug a numerical simulation of physical phenomena involving AAs. So
therapy management process, the error modes are presented in the forecasting of abnormal actions in the framework of the
Table 4, while the coefficients Mj, in Table 5, according to the work predictive, epistemic approach is achieved by a stochastic
of Trucco and Cavallin (2006). simulation of accident courses (scenarios) involving AA(s) or, in
short, a stochastic accident simulation (SAS). This simulation
m) The PEA (Predictive, Epistemic Approach) method. This procedure will serve as a means of propagating epistemic uncertainty. The
is based on the so-called predictive, epistemic approach to risk AAs forecasting should be considered a part of a broader
assessment. It provides formal means for combining hard data problem of a quantitative risk analysis (QRA) and carried out
and subjective information and allows forecasting the abnormal using knowledge-based methods of QRA. They allow using
(accidental) actions (AA) in the form of mathematical models, a wider spectrum of diverse knowledge related to AAs than the
which quantify epistemic (state-of-knowledge) uncertainties in methods provided by CSA. The problem considered is how to
characteristics of the actions. The epistemic models allow answer the question “what is the frequency (annual probability,
a rough, knowledge-based estimation of probabilities of damage probability per year of operation, etc.) of exceeding a given
from abnormal actions. These models are considered to be the magnitude m of an abnormal action” or, in brief, “what is the
first step toward preventing (reducing) losses associated with value of the product Fr(AA)  P(mjAA)”, where Fr(AA) is the
damage from abnormal actions. The damage can be assessed by frequency of imposition of the AA (random event AA) and
either deterministic or probabilistic structural analysis. The P(mjAA) is the conditional probability of exceeding m given AA.
prevailing practice of modeling abnormal (accidental) actions is An answer to this question depends on an interpretation of
F(AA) and P(mjAA). Specifying the frequency Fr(AA) and p.d.
Table 4 P(mjAA) solely on the basis of the data gained from occurrences
Error modes in the drug therapy management process (Trucco & Cavallin, 2006). of AAs will more often than not be impossible. Data on AAs are
usually sparse or irrelevant to a particular situation of exposure
Error mode (EM) Code Description
of a structure to AAs (exposure situation) or, what is not
EM1 Wrong patient
EM2 Inadequate monitoring after administration
uncommon, unavailable at all. This situation may be alleviated
EM3 Wrong dose (overdose or underdose) by mixing hard data (relevant experience data) with engi-
EM4 Wrong dosage form neering judgment (subjective information expressed as expert
EM5 Wrong administration frequency opinions, judgments of analysts and analyst groups, etc.). A
EM6 Wrong drug preparation
methodological framework for such a mixing is provided by
EM7 Order misunderstanding
EM8 Unauthorized drug a predictive, epistemic approach to QRA (PEA). This approach
EM9 Different drug preparation or administration uses the concept of probability as the “engineer’s measure of
EM10 Omitted dose uncertainty” or “degree of belief”. In view of forecasting AAs,
EM11 Wrong time PEA may be defined as a way of interpreting and specifying the
EM12 Extra dose
EM13 Deteriorated drug error
frequency Fr(AA) and p.d. P(mjAA). PEA is focused on a future
EM14 Drug-drug interaction or drug allergies occurrence of observable events, like AA and “exceeding m given
EM15 Wrong route AA”, and not on true, although unobservable values of Fr(AA)
EM16 Wrong administration technique and P(mjAA). In PEA, there exists only one type of uncertainty,
EM17 Wrong rate
namely, an epistemic uncertainty in (the engineer’s degree of
 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523 485

belief concerning) a future occurrence of AA and “exceeding m on. If these non-safety-related aspects are quantified in the
given AA” (Vaidogas, 2006). In line with PEA, the final result of proposed weighted risk (analysis), and thus in one (monetary)
forecasting an AA (Abnormal Action) can be expressed by an dimension, safety measures can be balanced and optimized in
action model defined as respect of decision-making, shown as follows:

X Rwj
FrðxÞ ¼ FrðAAÞð1  FX ðxjpx ÞÞ Minimise : Ctot ¼ C0 ðyÞ þ
i ¼ 1 ð1 þ rÞj
where x is the vector of AA characteristics, X is the random vector
with a distribution function (d.f.) FX(xjpx) which models an in which Ctot is the total costs (money); C0(y) is the investment in
epistemic uncertainty in x, Fr(AA) is the frequency expressing the a safety measure (money); y is the decision parameter; j is the
epistemic uncertainty related to a future occurrence of AA. The d.f. number of the year and r is the real rate of interest. The above
FX(xjpx) expresses epistemic uncertainty in the event X <¼ x (“is equation provides an overall mathematical-economic decision
less component wise”). Thus, the value Fr(x) quantifies epistemic problem for balancing safety measures for all kinds of aspects by
uncertainty in the frequency of exceeding at least one component expressing both positive/negative risks and benefits of a project.
of x. Fr(x) by its form is a generalization of a hazard curve. If the The components of the weighted risk can only be computed
direct data on components of X is sparse or absent, both Fr(AA) quantitatively, if the monetary value per considered risk aj is
and FX(xjpx) can in some cases be assigned indirectly by a SAS determined. Some of these values can be found in literature. It
which can generate samples of AA characteristics and yield an should be noted that these values are depending on local circum-
estimate of Fr(AA). The d.f. FX(xjpx) can be fitted to the generated stances, which themselves depending on cultural and political
samples. Such a SAS can be used for a propagation of epis- aspects of the local policy.
temic uncertainties and relate stochastic models of the physical
phenomena preceding AA to epistemic uncertainties in charac-
teristics of AA (Vaidogas, 2006). 3.1. Hybrid techniques

n) The weighted risk analysis (WRA): In order to balance safety o) Human Error Analysis Techniques (HEAT) or Human Factor Event
measures with aspects, such as environmental, quality, and Analysis (HFEA): Human errors have become widely recognized
economical aspects, a weighted risk analysis methodology is as a major contributory cause of serious accidents/incidents
used. The weighted risk analysis is a tool comparing different in a wide range of industries. The systematic consideration
risks, such as investments, economical losses and the loss of of human error in the design, operation, and maintenance
human lives, in one-dimension (e.g. money), since both of highly complex systems can lead to improved safety and
investments and risks could be expressed solely in money more efficient operation (Attwood, Khan, & Veitch, 2006a,b;
(Suddle, 2009). When a risk analysis is performed, not only Baysari et al, 2008; Hollywell, 1996; Kontogiannis, 1999;
technical aspects but also economical, environmental, comfort Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009). Work place design, safety
related, political, psychological and societal acceptance are culture, in addition to training, competence, task complexity,
aspects that play an important role. In some cases or scenarios stress, etc. constitute a group of factors that influence opera-
with great consequences, weighing factors for all risk dimen- tors’ behavior. These factors are called Performance Shaping
sions are used in order to make them comparable to each other Factors (PSF) (Kim & Jung, 2003), concern all work-related areas
and to relate them to the measures that must be taken for that exert certain influence on the operators performance, they
possible risk reduction. It is therefore, recommendable to are used in HEAT techniques (Kirwan, 1994), and “can be cause
compare and to integrate different decision-making elements, of some failures in other complex industrial systems” (Bellamy,
such as political, social, psychological, environmental, and Geyer, & Wilkinson, 2008; Cilingir & Mackhieh, 1998).
quality risks or benefits, in a “one-dimensional” weighted risk Doytchev and Szwillus (2008), and Kirwan (1994) have listed
Rw, e.g. in terms of money, as following (Suddle, 2009; Suddle & different human error analysis techniques, including ATHEANA
Waarts, 2003): (A Technique for Human Error Analysis), CREAM (Cognitive
Reliability and Error Analysis Method), HEART (Human Error
X X
Rw ¼ aj Rij Analysis and Reduction Technique), HEIST (Human Error
j¼1 i¼1 Identification in System Tools), THERP (Technique for Human
Error Rate Prediction) and others. The goal of these techniques
in which Rw is the weighted risk (cost unit per year); aj is the is to determine the reasons for human error occurrence, the
(monetary) value per considered loss (cost unit). It has to be noted factors that influence human performance, and how likely the
that the weighted risk Rw may consist of cost unities, which can be errors are to occur (Zarboutis & Marmaras, 2007). Moreover,
financial, but not necessarily. The weighted risk Rw can easily be a commonly utilized tool for investigating human contribu-
extended into multiple decision-making elements, depending on tions to accidents under a widespread evaluation scheme is the
the origin of the decision-maker. The previous formula can be HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System)
specified into particular risk components: method which quantitatively characterizes the role of human
X X X errors (Celik & Cebi, 2009). Li, Shu-dong, and Xiang-rui (2003)
Rw ¼ a1 Rhuman;i þ a2 Reconomic;j þ a3 Renvironment;k have studied some mathematical tools for incorporating
i¼1 j¼1 k¼1
X human factors (HF) in system reliability analyses. The overall
þ a4 Rquality;l þ / method, called “HF event analysis” (HFEA) relied on two
l¼1 analytic methods (i) “technique for human error rate predic-
tion” (THERP), which provided a human event tree model, and
in which a1 is the (monetary) value per fatality or injury (cost unit); (ii) “human cognitive reliability” (HCR), which determined
a2 is the (monetary) value per environmental risk (cost unit); a3 is human errors during the diagnosis stage of an accident. Balkey
the (monetary) value per economical risk (cost unit) (mostly and Phillips (1993) have proposed a practical approach to
a3 ¼ 1), a4 is the (monetary) value per quality risk (cost unit), and so quantifying human error within the accident process. A
486 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523

mathematical relationship was proposed to model the likeli-  Transfer symbols: Transfer symbols are used to indicate that
hood (P) of occurrence of a human error event, as follows: the fault tree continues on a different page.

  Procedure for Fault-Tree Analysis: The procedure for performing

1
Pðhuman errorÞ ¼ 1  feedback a fault-tree analysis consists of the following eight steps:
#options

 adjuster  redundancy  Define the system of interest. Specify and clearly define the
boundaries and initial conditions of the system for which
failure information is needed.
The variables in the equation are expected to affect the likeli-  Define the TOP event for the analysis. Specify the problem of
hood (P) of human error according to the following comments: interest that the analysis will address. This may be a specific
quality problem, shutdown, safety issue, etc.
 #Options: as the choices faced by an individual increase, so  Define the treetop structure. Determine the events and condi-
does the opportunity for, and likelihood of, error. tions (i.e. intermediate events) that most directly lead to the
 Feedback: visual feedback (e.g. the ability to actually see an TOP event.
action performed) will reduce the likelihood of human error.  Explore each branch in successive levels of detail. Determine the
 Adjusters (external or internal): these cover the environment events and conditions that most directly lead to each inter-
experienced by the operator e including temperature, humidity, mediate event. Repeat the process at each successive level of
clothing, mental and physical capabilities, and training. the tree until the fault-tree model is complete.
 Redundancy: this is defined as a real-time repeat of the inves-  Solve the fault tree for the combinations of events contributing to
tigation of whether a human error is occurring. the TOP event. Examine the fault-tree model to identify all the
p) Fault-tree analysis (FTA): It is a deductive technique focusing on possible combinations of events and conditions that can cause
one particular accident event and providing a method for the TOP event of interest. A combination of events and condi-
determining causes of that event. In other words FTA is an tions sufficient and necessary to cause the TOP event is called
analysis technique that visually models how logical relation- a minimal cut set. For example, a minimal cut set for over-
ships between equipment failures, human errors, and external pressurizing a tank might have two events: (1) pressure
events can combine to cause specific accidents. Fault trees are controller fails and (2) relief valve fails.
constructed from events and gates. Basic events can be used to  Identify important dependent failure potentials and adjust the
represent technical failures that lead to accidents while inter- model appropriately. Study the fault-tree model and the list of
mediate events can represent operator errors that may inten- minimal cut sets to identify potentially important dependen-
sify technical failures. The gates of the fault trees can be used to cies among events. Dependencies are single occurrences that
represent several ways in which machine and human failures may cause multiple events or conditions to occur at the same
combine to give rise to the accident. For instance, an AND gate time. This step is qualitative common cause failure analysis.
implies that both initial events need to occur in order to give  Perform quantitative analysis. Use statistical characterizations
rise to the intermediate event. Conversely, an OR gate means regarding the failure and repair of specific events and condi-
that either of two initial events can give rise to the intermediate tions in the fault-tree model to predict future performance for
event (Ayyub, 2003; Haimes, 2009; Harms-Ringdahl, 2001; the system.
Hong et al., 2009; Kontogiannis et al., 2000; Reniers et al.,  Use the results in decision-making. Use results of the analysis to
2005; Vesely, Goldberg, Roberts, & Haasl, 1981; Yuhua & identify the most significant vulnerabilities in the system and
Datao, 2005). Below it is presented a summary of the to make effective recommendations for reducing the risks
graphics most commonly used to construct a fault tree. associated with those vulnerabilities.
 Top event and intermediate events: The rectangle is used to
represent the TOP event and any intermediate fault events in For example a vessel’s hydraulic steering system (Fig. 6a) will
a fault tree. The TOP event is the accident that is being fail if both hydraulic pumps fail to operate. The TOP event for the
analyzed. Intermediate events are system states or occur- analysis is “both pumps transfer off”, and the treetop structure is
rences that somehow contribute to the accident. illustrated in Fig. 6b.
 Basic events: The circle is used to represent basic events in
a fault tree. It is the lowest level of resolution in the fault q) The ETA method (Event Tree Analysis). Event tree analysis (ETA)
tree. is a technique that uses decision trees and logically develops
 Undeveloped events: The diamond is used to represent visual models of the possible outcomes of an initiating event.
human errors and events that are not further developed in Furthermore, it is a graphical representation of the logic model
the fault tree. that identifies and quantifies the possible outcomes following
 AND gates: The event in the rectangle is the output event of the initiating event. The models explore how safeguards and
the AND gate below the rectangle. The output event asso- external influences, called lines of assurance, affect the path of
ciated with this gate exists only if all of the input events exist accident chains (Ayyub, 2003; Beim & Hobbs, 1997; Hong et al.,
simultaneously. 2009). In this method, an initiating event such as the mal-
 OR gates: The event in the rectangle is the output event of the functioning of a system, process, or construction is considered
OR gate below the rectangle. The output event associated as the starting point and the predictable accidental results,
with this gate exists if at least one of the input events exists. which are sequentially propagated from the initiating event,
 Inhibit gates: The event in the rectangle is the output event of are presented in order graphically. ETA is a system model
the INHIBIT gate below the rectangle. This gate is a special representing system safety based on the safeties of subevents.
case of the AND gate. The output event associated with this It is called an event tree because the graphical presentation of
gate exists only if the input event exists and if the qualifying sequenced events grows like a tree as the number of events
condition (the inhibiting condition shown in the oval) is increase. An event tree consists of an initiating event, probable
satisfied. subsequent events and final results caused by the sequence of
 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523 487

a Fuse #1 Fuse #2
b Both pumps
transfer off
Hydraulic Hydraulic
V1 pump #1 pump #2
OR

Relay

V2 No current to
Both pumps the pumps
fail
Switch

Fig. 6. (a) A drawing of a vessel’s hydraulic steering system. (b) The treetop structure produced by the application of FTA.

events. Probable subsequent events are independent to each a combination of sequential events. Usually a system
other and the specific final result depends only on the initiating failure occurs as a result of interacting sequence of events.
event and the subsequent events following. Therefore, the The expectation of a scenario does not mean it will indeed
occurrence probability of a specific path can be obtained by occur, but that there is a reasonable probability that it
multiplying the probabilities of all subsequent events existing would occur. A failure scenario is the basis of the risk
in a path. In an event tree, all events in a system are described study; it tells us what may happen so that we can devise
graphically and it is very effective to describe the order of ways and means of preventing or minimizing the possi-
events with respect to time because the tree is related to the bility of its occurrence. Such scenarios are generated
sequence of occurrences. In the design stage, ETA is used to based on the operational characteristics of the system;
verify the criterion for improving system performance; to physical conditions under which operation occur;
obtain fundamental information of test operations and geometry of the system, and safety arrangements, etc.
management; and to identify useful methods to protect
a system from failure. The ETA technique is applicable not only
to design, construction, and operation stages, but also to the
change of operation and the analysis of accident causes. The Start
main characteristics of the technique are briefly summarized as
follows:
Consider one unit
 It models the range of possible accidents resulting from an
initiating event.
 It is a risk-assessment technique that effectively accounts for
timing, dependence, and domino effects among various Development of accident or
accident contributors that are cumbersome to model in fault failure scenario
trees
 It is an analysis technique that generates the following:
B Qualitative descriptions of potential problems as combinations
of events producing various types of problems from initiating Estimation of likely Fault tree
events damage area development
B Quantitative estimates of event frequencies or likelihoods and
relative importance of various failure sequences and contrib-
uting events
Consequences
B Lists of recommendations for reducing risks
assessment Fault tree analysis
B Quantitative evaluations of recommendation effectiveness

r) The RBM Method (Risk-based Maintenance). This is a compre-

hensive hybrid (quantitative/qualitative) technique for risk-
Risk estimation
based maintenance and can be applied to all types of assets
irrespective of their characteristics. The quantitative descrip-
tion of risk is affected by the quality of the consequence study
and the accuracy of the estimates of the probability of failure.
The methodology of RBM is broken down into three main Are all units
over?
modules: (i) risk determination, which consists of risk identi-
fication and estimation, (ii) risk evaluation, which consists of
risk aversion and risk acceptance analysis, and (iii) mainte-
nance planning considering risk factors (Khan & Haddara,
2003).
Module I: risk estimation. This module comprises four steps, Move to next
which are logically linked as shown in Fig. 7. module
Step I.1: Failure scenario development. A failure scenario is
a description of a series of events which may lead to Fig. 7. Description of the risk-estimation model according to RBM technique (Khan &
a system failure. It may contain a single event or Haddara, 2003).
488 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523

Table 6
Quantification scheme for system performance function (Khan & Haddara, 2003).

Class Description Function (operation)

I Very important for system operation 8e10
Failure would cause system to
stop functioning
II Important for good operation 6e8
Failure would cause impaired performance
and adverse consequences
III Required for good operation 4e6
Failure may affect the performance and may
lead to subsequent failure of the system
IV Optional for good performance 2e4
Failure may not affect the performance
immediately but prolonged failure may
cause system to fail
V Optional for operation 0e2
Failure may not affect the
system’s performance

Step I.2: Consequence assessment. The objective here is to

prioritize equipment and their components on the basis
of their contribution to a system failure. Consequence
analysis involves assessment of likely consequences if
a failure scenario does materialize. Initially, consequences
are quantified in terms of damage radii (the radius of the
area in which the damage would readily occur), damage
to property (shattering of window panes, caving of
buildings), and toxic effects (chronic/acute toxicity,
mortality). The calculated damage radii are used to assess
the effect on human health, and environmental and Fig. 8. It is presented the distribution of the relative occurrence-frequencies fi ¼ ni/N,
production losses. The total consequence assessment is concerning papers including RAA techniques, as a result of six scientific journals
reviewing, covering the period of 2000e2009.
a combination of four major categories:
2.a) System performance loss: Factor A accounts for the system’s
performance loss due to component/unit failure. This is esti- Bi ¼ ðARÞi $ðADÞi =UFL
mated semi-qualitatively based on the expert’s opinion. In the
work of Khan and Haddara (2003), it is suggested using the X
following relation for determining the value of this parameter: B ¼ Bi
i ¼ 1;n
Ai ¼ function (performance), where details of the function are
given in Table 6. where i denotes the number of events (i.e. fire, explosion, toxic
2.b) Financial loss: Factor B accounts for the damage to the property release, etc.). The UFL in the first equation signifies the level of an
or assets and may be estimated for each accident scenario unacceptable loss. This value is subjective and may change from
using the following relations: case to case as per an organization’s criterion (Khan & Haddara,

Table 7
It presents for the period 2000e2009, the statistical results of six scientific journals investigation, concerning papers with as main aim the risk analysis and assessment (RAA)
techniques.

Journal Number of investigated Relative frequency Number of papers with Relative frequency Normalized per journal
papers (Fi ¼ Ni/N) risk-assessment techniques of occurrence frequency of occurrence
(Absolute frequency Ni) [%] (Absolute frequency of occurrence ni) (fi ¼ ni/N) (fi* ¼ ni/Ni)
[%] [%]

(A) (B) (C) ¼ (B)/N (D) (E) ¼ (D)/N (F) ¼ (D)/(B)

Safety science (JSS) 768 12.46 100 1.62 13.02
Journal of Safety Research (JSR) 658 10.68 9 0.15 1.37
Accident Analysis and 1411 22.90 43 0.70 3.05
Prevention (JAAP)
Journal of Loss Prevention 892 14.47 83 1.35 9.31
in the Process Industries (JLPPI)
International Journal of 868 14.08 23 0.37 2.65
Industrial Ergonomics (IJIE)
Reliability Engineering 1566 25.41 146 2.37 9.32
& System Safety (JRESS)
Total 6163 100.00 404 6.56

Annotations: Total absolute frequency (i.e. the total number of investigated papers): N ¼ 6163; Total absolute frequency of occurrence (i.e. the total number of papers with
risk-assessment techniques): n ¼ 404; Total relative frequency of occurrence: f ¼ 0.0656 (6.56%).
 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523 489

2003) use for UFL the value of 1000). AR: The area under the Module III: maintenance planning. Units whose level of estimated
damage radius (m2); AD: The asset density in the vicinity of the risk exceeds the acceptance criteria are studied in detail with the
event (up till w500 m radius) ($/m2). objective of reducing the level of risk through a better maintenance
plan.
2.c) Human health loss: A fatality factor is estimated for each
accident scenario using the following equations: Step III.1. Estimation of optimal maintenance duration. The
individual failure causes are studied to determine which
PDI ¼ PDI$PDFI one affects the probability of failure adversely. A reverse fault
analysis is carried out to determine the required value of the
probability of failure of the root event. A maintenance plan is
Ci ¼ ðARÞi $ðPDIÞi =UFR then completed.
X
C ¼ Ci Step III.2. Re-estimation and re-evaluation of risk. The last step
i ¼ 1;n in this methodology aims at verifying that the maintenance
where UFR denotes an unacceptable fatality rate. The suggested plan developed produces acceptable total risk level for the
value for UFR is 103 (subjective value and may change from case to system.
case).
The PDF1 defines the population distribution factor, which 4. Statistical analysis and results of the scientific literature
reflects heterogeneity of the population distribution. If the pop- reviewing
ulation is uniformly distributed in the region of study (w500 m
radius), the factor is assigned a value of 1; if the population is The second objective of the work was the statistical analysis,
localized and away from the point of accident the lowest value 0.2 classification, and comparative study of the scientific papers with
is assigned. PDI: The population density in the vicinity of the event as main aim the risk analysis and assessment (RAA) techniques.
(up till w500 m radius) (persons/m2) This objective was achieved by the investigation of six represen-
tative scientific journals published by Elsevier B.V. during the last
2.d) Environment and/or ecological loss: The factor D signifies decade. So, we exhaustively searched the journals (a) Safety Science
damage to the ecosystem, which can be estimated as: (JSS), (b) Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (JLPPI),
(c) Accident Analysis and Prevention (JAAP), (d) Journal of Safety
Research (JSR), (e) International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics
Di ¼ ðARÞi xðIMÞi =UDA (IJIE), and (f) Reliability Engineering and System Safety (JRESS),
covering the period 2000e2009.
X
D ¼ Di More specifically, we studied and investigated all the published
i ¼ 1;n papers of the above referred journals, gathering a total number of
6163 papers. The reviewing of the scientific literature (i) revealed
where UDA indicates a level for the unacceptable damaging area, a plethora of 404 published technical articles including risk analysis
the suggested value for this parameter is 1000 m2 (subjective value and assessment (RAA) techniques concerning many different fields,
and may change from case to case); IM denotes importance factor. like engineering, medicine, chemistry, biology, agronomics, etc. and
IM is unity if the damage radius is higher than the distance between (ii) showed that the risk analysis and assessment techniques are
an accident and the location of the ecosystem. This parameter is classified into three main categories the qualitative, the quantita-
quantified by Khan & Haddara (2003) (see their figure 4). tive and the hybrid techniques (qualitativeequantitative, semi-
Finally, the factors A, B, C and D are combined together to yield quantitative). These articles address concepts, tools, technologies,
the factor Con (consequence assessment factor) and methodologies that have been developed and practiced in such
h i0:5 areas as planning, design, development, system integration, pro-
Con ¼ 0:25A2 þ 0:25B2 þ 0:25C 2 þ 0:25D2 totyping, and construction of physical infrastructure; in reliability,
quality control, and maintenance.
In the Appendix (Table A) we depict the above referred 404
Step I.3: Probabilistic failure analysis. Probabilistic failure analysis selected papers, taking into account the basic classification of Fig. 1,
is conducted using fault-tree analysis (FTA). The use of FTA, and using seven columns e.g. (A) the number (or numerical code) of
together with components’ failure data and human reliability the paper, (B) the paper’s citation information, (C) the name of the
data, enables the determination of the frequency of occurrence risk analysis or/and assessment technique, (D) the type of the main
of an accident. methodology, (E) the kind of the paper’s data or material, (F) the field
Step I.4: Risk estimation. The results of the consequence and the of application, and (G) the source (JSS, JSR, JAAP, JLPPI, IJIE, JRESS).
probabilistic failure analyses are then used to estimate the risk Table 7 illustrates the statistical results of the investigation
that may result from the failure of each unit. including the following: (a) the absolute frequency Ni i.e. the
number of investigated papers per journal (JSS:768, JSR:658,
Module II: risk evaluation. The evaluation algorithm comprises JAAP:1411, JLPPI:892, IJIE:868, JRESS:1566), (b) the relative
two steps as detailed below: frequency Fi ¼ Ni/N (JSS:12.46%, JSR:10.68%, JAAP:22.90%,
JLPPI:14.47%, IJIE:14.08%, JRESS:25.41%), (c) the absolute frequency
Step II.1. Setting up the acceptance criteria. In this step, we identify of occurrence ni i.e. the number of papers with risk-assessment
the specific risk acceptance criteria to be used. Different techniques (JSS:100, JSR:9, JAAP:43, JLPPI:83, IJIE:23, JRESS:146),
acceptance risk criteria are available in the literature. (d) the relative frequency of occurrence fi ¼ ni/N (JSS:1.62%,
Step II.2. Risk comparison against acceptance criteria. In this step, JSR:0.15%, JAAP:0.70%, JLPPI:1.35%, IJIE:0.37%, JRESS:2.37%), and (e)
we apply the acceptance criteria to the estimated risk for each the normalized (per journal) frequency of occurrence fi* ¼ ni/Ni
unit in the system. Units whose estimated risk exceeds the which has been used in order to weigh up the contribution of each
acceptance criteria are identified. These are the units that journal (JSS:13.02%, JSR:1.37%, JAAP:3.05%, JLPPI:9.31%, IJIE:2.65%,
should have an improved maintenance plan. JRESS:9.32%).
Table 8
The table (i) compares the various risk analysis and assessment methodologies focusing on the advantages (column a) and disadvantages (column b) and (ii) highlights areas of fut

Techniques Advantages Disadvantages Future Improvements

(a) (b) (c)

Qualitative Techniques
Checklists  It is a systematic approach built on the historical  The inability of identifying complex  Some degree of quantification should be in
knowledge included in checklist questions hazard sources ranking/risk indexing approach
 It is applicable to any activity or system, including  The quality of evaluation is determined  A special, graphical type of checklist could
equipment issues and human factors issues primarily by the experience of cause analysis
 It is generally performed by an individual trained people creating the  An integrated risk analysis scheme, which
to understand the checklist questions, or sometimes checklists and the training of the well-considered selection of techniques (in
by a small group checklist users safety-analysis, task analysis, STEP and HAZ
 It ensures that organizations are complying with  It is used as a supplement to or integral more efficient results on the risk analysis
standard practices part of another method
 Easy application of the technique  The structure of checklist analysis relies
 It could answer more complicated risk-related exclusively on the knowledge built
questions only if some degree of quantification into the checklists to identify
is added, possibly with a relative ranking/risk potential problems.
indexing approach  If the checklist does not address
a key issue, the analysis is likely to overlook
potentially important weaknesses
 Traditionally provides only qualitative
information, with no quantitative
estimates of risk-related characteristics
What-If  Identifies hazards, hazardous situations or  It produces only qualitative results  A special, graphical type of the technique c
-Analysis specific accident events that could result  It determines only hazard consequences effective analysis
in undesirable consequences  It is a loosely structured assessment  An integrated risk analysis scheme, which
 Relative easy the application of the technique  The quality of the evaluation depends a well-considered selection of techniques (
 It is not very expensive on the quality of the documentation, -analysis, safety analysis, task analysis, STE
 It is applicable to any activity or system. the training of the review team leader, achieving more efficient results on the risk
 Occasionally it is used alone, but most often and the experience of the review teams  A combination of Hazop analysis, What-If-a
is used to supplement other, more structured Matrix into one framework (Hazwim: acco
techniques could be developed, constituting a meta-te
the organization of discussing process haza
employees of neighboring companies in an
 It could be incorporated in the developmen
accident prevention (EDAP) framework
Safety  Identifies equipment conditions or operating  It cannot be used for identifying technical  A graphical type of the technique could be
Audits procedures that could lead to a casualty or result installation hazard sources analysis
in property damage or environmental impacts  The result is only a report that provides  An integrated risk analysis scheme, which
 Easy application of the technique corporate management with an overview a well-considered selection of techniques (
 It is cheap of the level of performance for various -analysis, safety analysis, task analysis, STE
safety aspects of operations developed, achieving more efficient results
Task  It can be used to create a detailed picture of  It is time-consuming in case of complex  An integrated risk analysis scheme, which
Analysis human involvement using all the information tasks a well-considered selection of techniques (
necessary for an analysis in an adequate degree  It requires the cooperation of experts from what-if-analysis, safety analysis, task analy
of details the application domain, knowledgeable be developed, achieving more efficient resu
 Through its hierarchical approach it provides a about the task operation conditions  The hierarchical approach of the technique
well-structured overview of the work processes  The phase of data collection about human i
 In its hierarchical approach it is an easy to use demands should be improved
method of gathering and organizing information  The representation of data which are collec
about human activities and human interaction should be improved in a comprehensible fo
 In its hierarchical approach, it enables the analyst
to find safety critical tasks
STEP  It provides a valuable overview of the timing and  It is time-consuming in case of  An integrated risk analysis scheme, which w
technique sequence of events/actions that contributed to the complex sequence of events combine a well-considered selection of tech
accident  It produces only qualitative results what-if-analysis, safety analysis, task analys
 It provides a reconstruction of the harm process by be developed, achieving more efficient resu
plotting the sequence of events that contributed to  A special, graphical type of the technique co
the accident more effective analysis
HAZOP  It is a formalized and systematic methodology to  It is expensive and difficult  An integrated risk analysis scheme, which w
identify and document hazards through imaginative  It requires a multidisciplinary team a well-considered selection of techniques (i
thinking of experts to be used what-if-analysis, safety analysis, task analys
 Identifies system deviations and their causes that  It produces only qualitative results could be developed, achieving more efficien
can lead to undesirable consequences and determine  It is a time-consuming technique  A combination of Hazop analysis, WhateIf-
recommended actions to reduce the frequency and/or into one framework (Hazwim: according to
consequences of the deviations developed, constituting a meta-technical to
 It determines hazard causes and organization of discussing process hazard a
hazard consequences employees of neighboring companies in an
 Very popular technical method  It could be incorporated in the developmen
 It is applicable to any system or procedure prevention (EDAP) framework
 It is a highly structured assessment relying on guide  The technique could be extended by the de
words to generate a comprehensive review effects-specific guidewords and parameters

Quantitative Techniques
PRAT  Easy application of the technique  It requires efficient safety managers  It could be incorporated in databases, wher
 It is a quantitative technique to record the undesirable events are being registered, in order to help other
 The mathematical risk evaluation  It is a time-consuming technique in  It could be incorporated in computer autom
 Safe results, based on the recorded order to record data of undesirable the weak spots in an industrial area
data of undesirable events or accidents events of a company  It could be incorporated to an integrated qu
 It combines risk analysis with risk evaluation  The results depend on the opinion of which will combine a well-considered selec
 It can be incorporated in databases expert safety managers or production techniques
 It can help with their numerical results other engineers  It could be combined with stochastic (like t
risk-assessment techniques risk-assessment (like PRAT, SRE) methodolo
 It can help the safety managers/engineers to forecasting and risk-assessment process in
predict hazards, unsafe conditions and PRAT-TSP-SRE scheme of Marhavilas & Kou
undesirable events/situations, and also to
prevent fatal accidents.
 It can be applied to any company/corporation or
productive procedure
DMRA  Easy application of the technique  The results depend on the opinion of  A combination of Hazop analysis, WhateIf-
 Safe results, based on the recorded data expert safety managers or production one framework (Hazwim: according to Ren
of undesirable events or accidents engineers constituting a meta-technical tool for optim
 It combines risk analysis with risk evaluation process hazard analysis performances by em
 It can help the safety managers/engineers in an industrial area
to predict hazards, unsafe conditions and  It could be incorporated in the developmen
undesirable events/situations, and also to prevent prevention (EDAP) framework
fatal accidents.  It could be incorporated in databases, wher
 It can be applied to any company/corporation are being registered, in order to help other
or productive procedure  It could be incorporated in computer autom
 It is a quantitative and also a graphical the weak spots in an industrial area
method which can create liability issues and help  It could be incorporated to an integrated qu
the risk managers to prioritize and which will combine a well-considered selec
manage key risks techniques
Table 8 (continued )

Techniques Advantages Disadvantages Future Improvements

(a) (b) (c)

Risk measures  Easy application of the technique  It requires efficient safety managers to  It could be combined with stochastic (like t
of societal  It usually encompasses both public record the undesirable events risk-assessment (like PRAT, QRA) methodo
risk (SRE) and worker risk  It is a time-consuming technique in forecasting and risk-assessment process in
 It depicts the historical record of incidents order to record data of undesirable PRAT-TSP-SRE scheme of Marhavilas & Kou
 It is both a quantitative and events of a company  Improved mathematical risk criteria should
graphical technique  The application of empirical risk criteria sh
 The information about societal risk is  It should be clearly defined the procedure
illustrated by simple FN-diagrams
 It depicts criteria for judging the tolerability
of risk
 Mathematical or/and empirical risk criteria
may be defined to help target risk-reduction
measures, and limit the risk of major accidents
 A common form of societal risk criteria is
implemented easily by the drawing of specific
lines on FN-plots
 The system is characterized (as tolerable or
intolerable) graphically and easily
QRA  It provides a consistent basis to analyze the  It is complicated because it consists of a  It could be incorporated in databases, wher
technique individual and societal risk combination of sub models are being registered, in order to help other
 It is a quantitative technique  It is difficult because the scenarios and  It could be incorporated in computer autom
their frequencies should be defined weak spots in an industrial area
 It could be incorporated to an integrated q
will combine a well-considered selection o
 It could be combined with stochastic and q
SRE) methodologies, achieving a more real
process in the worksites
 It could be incorporated in the developmen
prevention (EDAP) framework
QADS  It is a quantitative assessment of domino  It is complicated  It should be clearly defined the procedure
accidents  It requires a lot of time-consuming in  The identification of the credible domino sc
 Escalation criteria address the possible its application escalation criteria
damage of equipment due to the physical  It is expensive  Improved escalation criteria should be dev
effects generated in the primary scenarios
CREA  It is a quantitative method  It is complicated  It should be expanded the incorporation of
method  It is based on techniques which are well-  It requires a lot of time-consuming techniques in CREA scheme
established in industry in its application
 It allows the analyst to join data which  It requires a multidisciplinary team
have been collected through direct observation of experts to be used
of processes or interviews to statistical data
reported in literature
PEA  It is based on the so-called predictive,  It is complicated  The epistemic models which allow a rough
method epistemic approach to risk assessment  It requires a lot of time-consuming probabilities of damage from abnormal act
 It provides formal means for combining hard in its application  The deterministic or probabilistic structura
data and subjective information and allows  It requires a multidisciplinary team of assessment of damage could be expanded
forecasting the abnormal (accidental) actions experts to be used
in the form of mathematical models
 It quantifies epistemic (state-of-knowledge)
uncertainties in characteristics of the actions
WRA  It is used in order to balance safety measures  It is very complicated and difficult  Weighing factors for all risk dimensions co
with aspects, such as environmental, quality,  It requires a lot of time-consuming comparable to each other and to relate the
and economical aspects in its application for possible risk reduction
 It is a tool that compares different risks, such  It requires a multidisciplinary team of
as investments, economical losses and the experts to be used, because of the
loss of human lives, in one-dimension different risks
Hybrid Techniques
HEAT/HFEA  It is a commonly utilized tool for investigating  It is very complicated and difficult  Sufficient mathematical tools for incorpora
human contributions to accidents under a analyses should be developed
widespread evaluation scheme  Practical approaches of quantifying human
be developed
FTA  It identifies and models combinations  It is very complicated and difficult  It could be combined with other accident s
of equipment failures, human errors,  It requires a lot of time-consuming Petri-Nets) in order to achieve the accident
and external conditions that can result in its application is involved
in an accident  It is expensive  It should be used to the development of ac
 It is performed primarily by an individual  It is used most often as a system-level thoroughly investigates the accidents
working with system experts through risk-assessment technique
interviews and field inspections
 It is a deductive modeling approach
 It produces quantitative and qualitative
results
 It is a highly structured method
 It determines accidents causes in depth
 It is generally applicable for almost every
type of risk-assessment application
 It can be used as an effective root cause
analysis tool in several applications
ETA  Identifies various sequences of events,  It is very complicated and difficult  It could be combined with other accident s
both failures and successes that can lead  It requires a lot of time-consuming Petri-Nets) in order to achieve the accident
to an accident in its application factor is involved
 It is a graphical representation of the  It is expensive  It should be used to the development of ac
logic model that identifies and quantifies thoroughly investigates the accidents
the possible outcomes following the
initiating event
 It is an inductive modeling approach
 It produces quantitative and qualitative
results
 It is applicable not only to design,
construction, and operation stages,
but also to the change of operation
and the analysis of accident causes
RBM  It is a comprehensive quantitative  The quantitative description of risk  It could be incorporated to an integrated q
and qualitative technique is affected by the quality of the which will combine a well-considered sele
 It can be applied to all types of assets consequence study and the accuracy techniques
irrespective of their characteristic of the estimates of the probability of failure  It could be improved a the combination sch
quantitative techniques, as FTA, ETA, PRAT
494 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523

Table 9
An overview illustration of the characteristics of the various risk analysis and assessment techniques, comparatively with settled evaluation criteria.

Evaluation criteria Qualitative Techniques Quantitative Techniques Hybrid Techniques

Check What-if Safety Task STEP HAZOP PRAT DMRA Societal QRA QADS CREA PEA WRA HEAT/HFEA FTA ETA RBM
-Lists -Analysis Audits Analysis risk
Data collection O O O O O O O O O O O
Representation of the O O O O
events’ chain
Identification of O O O O O O O O O O O O O
hazardous situations
Multidisciplinary O O O O O O O
experts team for
the application
High level of structuring O O O O O O O O O O O O
Applicable to any O O O O O O O O O O
process or system
Possibility of incorporation O O O O O O O O O O O
in integrated
risk analysis schemes
Time-consuming O O O O O O O O O O
System design O O O O O O O O O
Safety audits O O O O O O O O O
Human orientation O O O O O O O
Equipment orientation O O O O O O O
Proactive use O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
Reactive use O O O O O O O O O O
Mathematical background O O O O O O O O O O O O
Graphical illustration O O O O O O
Possibility of incorporation O O O O O
in databases
Possibility of incorporation O O O O O O
in computer
automated toolkits
Prediction of potential risks O O O O O O O O O O O O O
Individual risk orientation O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
Societal risk orientation O O O O O O O

Moreover, Fig. 8 depicts the distribution of the relative occur- (Table 7/col. D, E and Fig. 8), while the total frequencies are
rence-frequencies fi. According to these illustrations, JRESS pres- N ¼ 6163, n ¼ 404 and f ¼ 0.0656 (or 6.56%). On the other side, JSS
ents the highest absolute and relative frequency [Ni ¼ 1566, presents the highest normalized frequency of occurrence
Fi ¼ 25.41%] (Table 7/columns B, C), and the highest absolute and fi* ¼ 13.02% (column F).
relative frequency of occurrence as well [ni ¼ 146, fi ¼ 2.37%]

Fig. 9. It is displayed the percentage distribution of the relative frequencies of the

three main RAA categories (qualitative, quantitative, hybrid) which have been deter- Fig. 10. It is illustrated for the reviewing period 2000e2009, the percentage distri-
mined by the journals reviewing, covering the period of 2000e2009. bution of papers with RAA techniques, relatively to the various fields of application.
 P.K. Marhavilas et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 477e523 495

The main results and conclusions of this work are summarized

to the following points:

 The reviewing of the scientific literature, revealed a plethora of

published technical articles on safety, and risk analysis referred
to many different fields, like engineering, mechanics, industry,
medicine, chemistry, biology, agronomics, etc.
 These articles address concepts, tools, technologies, and
methodologies that have been developed and practiced in such
areas as planning, design, development, system integration,
prototyping, and construction of physical infrastructure, in
reliability, quality control, and maintenance.
 The RAA techniques are classified into three main categories:
(a) the qualitative, (b) the quantitative, and (c) the hybrid
techniques (qualitativeequantitative, semi-quantitative).
 The papers with RAA techniques still constitute a very small
part of the scientific literature i.e. taking into account the above
Fig. 11. It is depicted for the reviewing period of 2000e2009 the yearly percentage referred investigation which covers the period 2000e2009, the
distribution of papers with RAA, relatively to the three main RAA classes (qualitative,
total relative frequency is only 6.56%.
quantitative, hybrid).
 The quantitative methods present the highest relative
frequency (65.63%) while the qualitative a lower one (27.68%).
Furthermore the hybrid methods remain constantly at a very
In Table 8 we compare the various risk analysis and assessment low level (6.70%) during the entire processing period of
methodologies focusing on the advantages (column a) and disad- 2000e2009.
vantages (column b) and we highlight as well, areas of future  The qualitative techniques are based both on analytical esti-
improvements (column c). To continue, in Table 9 we present an mation processes, and on the safety managerseengineers
overview of the characteristics of the various risk analysis and ability. According to quantitative techniques, the risk can be
assessment techniques, comparatively with a list of several settled considered as a quantity, which can be estimated and
evaluation criteria. expressed by a mathematical relation, under the help of real
In Fig. 9 we display the percentage distribution of the relative accidents’ data recorded in a work site. The hybrid techniques,
frequencies of the three main RAA classes (qualitative, quantitative, present a great complexity due to their ad hoc character that
hybrid) which have been determined by the journals reviewing, prevents a wide spreading.
covering the period of 2000e2009. The pie-chart shows that the  The field of “Industry” concentrates the greatest number of
“quantitative” methods present the highest relative frequency RAA methods (53.71%), while other fields with significant
(quantitative: 65.63%, qualitative: 27.68%, hybrid: 6.70%). percentages are “Mechanics” (12.38%) and “Transportations”
Furthermore, in Fig. 10 we show the percentage distribution of (12.87%).
the papers including RAA techniques, relatively to the various fields  The yearly percentage distribution of papers with RAA shows
of application (Agriculture: 0.50%, Chemistry: 0.50%, Environment: that there is a gradual increasing (with intensive inclination) of
0.50%, Industry: 53.71%, Mechanics: 12.38%, Medicine: 0.50%, papers including quantitative techniques from 2003 to 2009
Transportations: 12.87%, Computer Science: 0.74%, Engineering: with a maximum percentage amount (16.70%) in year 2009.
4.95%, All fields: 13.37%). The main discernible feature of this pie- The distribution of “hybrid” techniques remains constantly low
chart is that the field of “Industry” concentrates the greatest (1.6%) during all the reviewing period (2000e2009), while
number of the papers with RAA methods. the “qualitative” techniques present a low level distribution
The bar-chart of Fig. 11 depicts for the period 2000e2009 the (3.3%) during the interval 2000e2008 but an intensive
yearly percentage distribution of the papers with RAA, relatively to increase in year 2009 (8.9%).
the three main RAA classes (qualitative, quantitative, hybrid). The
graph shows that there is a gradual increasing (with intensive A general basic ascertainment is that all of this knowledge
inclination) of papers including quantitative techniques from 2003 has not been fully shared among the various scientific fields, so
to 2009 with a maximum percentage amount (16.70%) in year we think that the scientific community faces with the challenge
2009. On the other side the distribution of the papers with to duplicate and transfer the commonalities from one field to
“hybrid” techniques remains constantly low (1.6%) during the another.
entire period of reviewing (2000e2009), while the papers with
“qualitative” techniques present a low level distribution (3.3%)
during the interval 2000e2008 but an intensive increase in year Acknowledgments
2009 (8.9%).
We acknowledge C. Mitrakas, Production & Management Engi-
neer, for his help on the preparation of some drawings.
5. Conclusions

The objective of this work is to analyze and classify the main risk Appendix
analysis and assessment (RAA) methods by reviewing the scientific
literature. It consists of two parts: a) the overview of the main RAA The following table presents the classification results of the
methodologies and b) the classification and statistical analysis of 404 papers with as main aim the risk analysis and assessment
the corresponding scientific papers published by six representative (RAA) techniques, which were determined by the investigation
scientific journals of Elsevier B.V. covering the last decade of 6163 papers of six scientific journals covering the period
(2000e2009). 2000e2009.
Table A.

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

1 Determination of the optimal escape routes of Double-Sweep, Floyd Quantitative Case study M
underground mine networks in emergency cases Warshall and Dantzig
(Jalali & Noroozi, 2009) algorithms
2 The relationship between culture and safety on offshore Checklists/Safety Audits Quantitative Empirical data In
supply vessels (Antonsen, 2009) & Qualitative
3 Incorporating organizational factors into probabilistic Socio-technical risk Quantitative Theoretical foundations M
risk assessment of complex socio-technical systems: & Empirical data (s
Principles and theoretical foundations (Mohaghegh
& Mosleh, 2009a,b)
4 The development of a more risk-sensitive and flexible Quantitative Accidents data M
airport safety area strategy: Part I & Part II. (Wong, & aviation database
Pitfield, Caves, & Appleyard, 2009a,b)
5 Classification of errors contributing to rail incidents and HFACS kai TRACEr Quantitative Accidents data In
accidents: A comparison of two human error & Qualitative
identification techniques (Baysari, Caponecchia,
McIntosh, & Wilson, 2009)
6 Economic cost of occupational accidents: Evidence from Quantitative Empirical data In
a small island economy (Shalini, 2009) & Qualitative
7 Toward an evaluation of accident investigation methods FTA, MORT, MES, SCAT, Hybrid Theoretical foundations In
in terms of their alignment with accident causation CTM, OARU, TRIPOD, AEB, & Empirical data
models (Katsakiori, Sakellaropoulos, & Manatakis, 2009) ISIM, NSB, WAIT, HSG245
8 The implementation of a human factors engineering Checklists Quantitative Empirical data M
checklist for humanesystem interfaces upgrade in & Qualitative (Case study) (n
nuclear power plants (Jou et al., 2009)
9 Severity analysis of Indian coal mine accidents e A Event evaluation Quantitative Accidents data M
retrospective study for 100 years (Maiti, Khanzode, algorithm (EEA)
& Ray, 2009)
10 Working safely with foreign contractors and personnel Qualitative Empirical data In
(Schubert & Dijkstra, 2009)
11 Designing of integrated quality and safety management IQMS Quantitative Theoretical foundations M
system (IQSMS) for shipping operations (Celik, 2009)
12 Indicators to compare risk expressions, grouping, and Probabilistic Risk Quantitative Accidents data M
relative ranking of risk for energy systems: Application Analysis (PRA)
with some accidental events from fossil fuels (Colli,
Arellano, Kirchsteiger, & Ale, 2009; Colli, Serbanescu,
& Ale, 2009)
13 General assessment of the occupational accidents that Quantitative Accidents data M
occurred in Turkey between the years 2000 and 2005
(Unsar & Sut, 2009)
14 Portable ladder assessment tool development and Checklists Quantitative Empirical data M
validation e Quantifying best practices in the field (C
(Dennerlein, Ronk, & Perry, 2009)
15 The weighted risk analysis (Suddle, 2009) WRA Quantitative Empirical data E
(Case study)
16 A proactive approach to human error detection and Qualitative Theoretical foundations M
identification in aviation and air traffic control
(Kontogiannis & Malakis, 2009)
17 A fuzzy multi-attribute model for risk evaluation in Fuzzy multi-attribute Quantitative Theoretical foundations In
workplaces (Grassi, Gamberini, Mora, & Rimini, 2009)
18 Method to assess and optimize dependability of Functional failure mode, Quantitative Accidents data In
complex macro-systems: Application to a railway effects and criticality
signaling system (Vernez & Vuille, 2009) analysis (FMECA)
19 A real-time warning model for teamwork performance Real-time warning Quantitative Theoretical foundations M
and system safety in nuclear power plants (Hwang et al., model (RTWM) (n
2009)
20 A simultaneous equations model of crash frequency by The Negative Binomial Quantitative Accidents data In
collision type for rural intersections (Ye, Pendyala, Regression model
Washington, Konduri, & Oh, 2009)
21 Effectiveness of temporary traffic control measures in Binary logistic Quantitative Accidents data In
highway work zones (Li & Bai, 2009) regression method
22 Safety management systems: Performance differences Confirmatory factor Qualitative Empirical data In
between adopters and non-adopters (Bottani, Monica, analysis (CFA)
& Vignali, 2009)
23 Economic assessment of human errors in Cost estimation Quantitative Empirical data In
manufacturing environment (Liu, Hwang, & Liu, 2009; model
Liu, Guo, Rogers, & Mannan, 2009; Liu et al., 2009)
24 A Bayesian network analysis of workplace accidents Bayesian network Quantitative Empirical data In
caused by falls from a height (Martín, Rivas, Matías, analysis
Taboada, & Argüelles, 2009)
25 Quantitative analysis of ATM safety issues using PROCOS stochastic Quantitative Accidents data/Theoretical In
retrospective accident data: The dynamic risk modeling model foundations
project (Leva et al., 2009)
26 Toward system for the management of safety on board Checklists Qualitative Empirical data In
artisanal fishing vessels: Proposal for checklists and
their application (Piniella & Fernández-Engo)
27 Injury and loss concentration by sinkings in fishing Quantitative Empirical data In
fleets (Perez-Labajos, Blanco, Azofra, Achutegui, (Case study)
& Eguía, 2009)
28 Study on the methodology for evaluating urban and UR-DCC evaluation Quantitative Empirical data E
regional disaster carrying capacity and its application model
(Chen, Tao, & Zhang, 2009)
29 A method to identify strategies for the improvement of Bayesian network Quantitative Empirical data In
human safety behavior by considering safety climate analysis
and personal experience (Zhou, Fang, & Wang, 2008)
30 Knowledge transfer in organizational reliability Qualitative Empirical data In
analysis: From post-accident studies to normal
operations studies (Etienne, 2008)
31 The impact of prevention measures and organizational Negative binomial Quantitative Empirical data In
factors on occupational injuries (Arocena, Núñez, regression
& Villanueva, 2008)
32 Analysis of trample disaster and a case study e Mihong Soft Systematic Quantitative Accidents data M
bridge fatality in China in 2004 (Zhen, Mao, & Yuan, Methodology (SSM)
2008)
33 Toward risk assessment for crane activities (Aneziris, Workgroup Occupational Quantitative Accidents data M
Papazoglou, Baksteen, et al., 2008; Aneziris, Papazoglou, Risk Model (WORM)
Mud, et al., 2008)
34 Expert judgment study for placement ladder bowtie Bowtie diagram Quantitative Accidents data M
(Kurowicka, Cooke, Goossens, & Ale, 2008)
35 The exposureedamage approach in the quantification COMAH Quantitative Accidents data (case study) In
of occupational risk in workplaces involving dangerous
substances (Papadakis & Chalkidou, 2008)
36 Suicide prevention in railway systems: Application of FTA Hybrid Empirical data In
a barrier approach (Rådbo, Svedung, & Andersson,
2008)
37 Impact of enforcement on traffic accidents and Poisson multivariate Quantitative Accidents data In
fatalities: A multivariate multilevel analysis (Yannis, multilevel modell
Papadimitriou, & Antoniou, 2008)
38 A fuzzy analytic network process (ANP) model to FBR, ANP Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
identify faulty behavior risk (FBR) in work system
(Dagdeviren, Yüksel, & Kurt, 2008)
39 Injuries in U.S. mining operations e A preliminary risk Holistic risk-management Quantitative Accidents data M
analysis (Komljenovic, Groves, & Kecojevic, 2008) process
40 Assessment of safety management information systems SMIS assessment process Quantitative Empirical data In
for general contractors (Jung, Kang, Kim, & Park, 2008)
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

41 Explaining safe work practices in aviation line Qualitative Empirical data M
maintenance (Pettersen & Aase, 2008)
42 Quantifying occupational risk: The development of an Occupational Risk Quantitative Accidents data E
occupational risk model (Ale et al., 2008) Model (ORM)
43 Quantified risk assessment for fall from height (Aneziris, Workgroup Occupational Quantitative Accidents data M
Papazoglou, Baksteen, et al., 2008; Aneziris, Papazoglou, Risk Model (WORM)
Mud, et al., 2008)
44 Considerations in developing complete and quantified Quantitative Theoretical foundations E
methods for risk assessment (van Duijne et al., 2008)
45 DomPrevPlanning: User-friendly software for planning DPP Quantitative Accidents data In
domino effects prevention (Reniers & Dullaert, 2007) & Qualitative (c
46 Driving task analysis as a tool in traffic safety research TA Qualitative Theoretical foundations In
and practice (Fastenmeier & Gstalter, 2007)
47 Assessment of hazardous material risks for rail yard FTA Hybrid Empirical data In
safety (Glickman & Erkut, 2007)
48 A prospective hazard and improvement analytic PHIA Quantitative Facts M
approach to predicting the effectiveness of medication
error interventions (Karnon et al., 2007)
49 Exploring the organizational preconditions for Grounded Theory Qualitative Accidents data In
occupational accidents in food industry: A qualitative Approach
approach (Stave & Törner, 2007)
50 The contribution of qualitative analyses of occupational Longitudinal qualitative Qualitative Theoretical foundations E
health and safety interventions: An example through analysis method and Empirical data
a study of external advisory interventions (Baril-
Gingras, Bellemare, & Brun, 2006)
51 Perception and observation of residential safety during Quantitative Facts M
earthquake exposure: A case study (Akason, Olafsson, & Qualitative
& Sigbjörnsson, 2006)
52 Toward a causal model for air transport safetydan FTA and Bayesian nets Hybrid Empirical data M
ongoing research project (Ale et al., 2006)
53 Team crystallization (SIO2): Dynamic model of team Team crystallization Quantitative Accidents data M
effectiveness evaluation under the dynamic and tactical dynamic mode
environment at nuclear installation (Kim, Kim, & Moon,
2006)
54 A quantitative approach to clinical risk assessment: The CREA Quantitative Facts M
CREA method (Trucco & Cavallin, 2006)
55 HEPI: A new tool for human error probability HEPI Quantitative Accidents data M
calculation for offshore operation (Khan, Amyotte,
& DiMattia, 2006)
56 Transferability of accident prediction models (Sawalha Negative binomial Quantitative Accidents data In
& Sayed, 2006) regression (t
57 A framework for measuring safety level for production SIM, HTSD and GP Hybrid Facts M
environments (Ayomoh & Oke, 2006)
58 Understanding risks in socially vulnerable contexts: The Vulnerability analysis Qualitative Empirical data In
case of waste burning in cement kilns in Brazil (de Souza (c
Porto & de Oliveira Fernandes, 2006)
59 Designing for safety in passenger ships utilizing What-if Quantitative Accidents data In
advanced evacuation analysesdA risk-based approach
(Vanem & Skjong, 2006)
60 A new approach to quantitative assessment of reliability PSA Quantitative Facts E
of passive systems (Kirchsteiger, 2005)
61 Operationalizing normal accident theory for safety- NAT Quantitative Facts E
related computer systems (Sammarco, 2005)
62 Statistical analysis of dangerous goods accidents in Quantification Quantitative Empirical data In
Japan (Ohtani & Kobayashi, 2005) method of the (t
third type
63 Effectiveness of safety belts and Hierarchical Bayesian Hierarchical Quantitative Empirical data In
analysis of their relative use (Abdalla, 2005) Bayesian analysis (t
64 A statistical model to estimate the probability of slip and Probability model Quantitative Statistics M
fall incidents (Chang, 2004)
65 Qualification of Formal Safety Assessment: an Formal Safety Qualitative Facts In
exploratory study (Rosqvist & Tuominen, 2004) Assessment (n
66 A Petri Net-based approach for ergonomic task analysis Petri Net approach Qualitative Facts E
and modeling with emphasis on adaptation to system
changes (Kontogiannis, 2003)
67 Apprenticeship in a work setting: the contribution and Qualitative Empirical data In
limits of operational resources constructed by workers
(Chatigny & Montreuil, 2003)
68 Assessment of programmable systems using Bayesian Bayesian belief nets Quantitative Facts E
belief nets (Gran, 2002)
69 Qualitative analyses of accidents and incidents to Qualitative Empirical data E
identify competencies. The electrical systems
maintenance case (Vidal-Gomel & Samurçay, 2002)
70 Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for nuclear Probabilistic Safety Quantitative Facts M
installations (Niehaus, 2002) Assessment
71 Probabilistic risk-assessment practices in the USA for PRA Quantitative Facts M
nuclear power plants (Garrick & Christie, 2002)
72 An interactive multiobjective model for the strategic Quantitative Facts In
maritime transportation of petroleum products: risk (t
analysis and routing (Iakovou, 2001)
73 Engineering analysis of hazards to life safety in fires: the Quantitative Empirical data C
fire effluent toxicity component (Hartzell, 2001)
74 Quantification of behavior for engineering design Quantitative Empirical data E
standards and escape time calculations
(Purser & Bensilum, 2001)
75 A systemic approach to effective chemical emergency Systemic approach Quantitative Empirical data C
management (Kourniotis, Kiranoudis, & Markatos,
2001)
76 An algorithm for the implementation of safety Algorithmic approach Quantitative Empirical data In
improvement programs (Cagno, Di Giulio, & Trucco,
2001)
77 Early hazard identification of chemical plants with HAZOP Qualitative Empirical data M
statechart modeling techniques (Graf & Schmidt-Traub,
2000)
78 Application of finite mixture models for vehicle crash Negative binomial Quantitative Empirical data In
data analysis (Park & Lord, 2009) regression (Finite (t
mixtures of Poisson)
79 Safety evaluation of multilane arterials in Florida Bayesian method Quantitative Facts In
(Abdel-Aty, Devarasetty, & Pande, 2009) (t
80 Collision prediction models using multivariate Poisson- Poisson-lognormal Quantitative Empirical data In
lognormal regression (El-Basyouny & Sayed, 2009) regression (t
81 Markov switching multinomial logit model: An Markov switching Quantitative Empirical data In
application to accident-injury severities (Malyshkina & (t
Mannering, 2009)
82 Kernel density estimation and K-means clustering to Kernel density Quantitative Accidents data In
profile road accident hotspots (Anderson, 2009) estimation (t
83 Validation of a Full Bayes methodology for Full Bayes Quantitative Empirical data In
observational beforeeafter road safety studies and methodology (t
application to evaluation of rural signal conversions
(Lan, Persaud, Lyon, & Bhim, 2009)
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

84 Markov switching negative binomial models: An Markov switching Quantitative Empirical data In
application to vehicle accident frequencies (Malyshkina, negative binomial model (t
Mannering, & Tarko, 2009)
85 The influence of heavy goods vehicle traffic on accidents Poisson Quantitative Accidents data In
on different types of Spanish interurban roads (Ramírez,
Izquierdo, Fernández, & Méndez, 2009)
86 Analytical HFACS for investigating human errors in HFACS Quantitative Accidents data In
shipping accidents (Celik & Cebi, 2009) (n
87 Correcting erroneous crash locations in transportation Statistical Quantitative Accidents data In
safety analysis (Tegge & Ouyang, 2009) regression (t
88 The predictive validity of empirical Bayes estimates of Empirical Bayes Quantitative Accidents data In
road safety (Elvik, 2008) estimates (t
89 Development of crash-severity-index models for the Crash-severity-index Quantitative Accidents data In
measurement of work zone risk levels (Li & Bai, 2008) models (t
90 Combining road safety information in a performance Weighting method Quantitative Empirical data In
index (Hermans, Van den Bossche, & Wets, 2008) (t
91 Investigating the effects of the fixed and varying Empirical Bayes Quantitative Empirical data In
dispersion parameters of Poisson-gamma models on estimates, Poisson (t
empirical Bayes estimates (Lord & Park, 2008)
92 Chinese truck drivers’ attitudes toward feedback by Άlle2 mέqodoi Quantitative Empirical data In
technology: A quantitative approach (Huang, Rau, (t
Zhang, & Roetting, 2008)
93 A multivariate Poisson-lognormal regression model for Poisson-lognormal Quantitative Empirical data In
prediction of crash counts by severity, using Bayesian regression (t
methods (Ma, Kockelman, & Damien, 2008)
94 The cost and risk impacts of rerouting railroad Network model Quantitative Accidents data In
shipments of hazardous materials (Glickman, Erkut, (t
& Zschocke, 2007)
95 Light truck vehicles (LTVs) contribution to rear-end Quantitative Empirical data In
collisions (Harb, Radwan, Yan, & Abdel-Aty, 2007) (t
96 A joint econometric analysis of seat belt use and crash- Econometric Quantitative Empirical data In
related injury severity (Eluru & Bhat, 2007) analysis (t
97 Multilevel modeling for the regional effect of Multilevel Quantitative Accidents data In
enforcement on road accidents (Yannis, Papadimitriou, modeling (t
& Antoniou, 2007)
98 Sensitivity analysis of an accident prediction model by Sensitivity Quantitative Accidents data In
the fractional factorial method (Akgüngör & Yıldız, analysis
2007)
99 Bayesian estimation of hourly exposure functions by Bayesian Quantitative Accidents data In
crash type and time of day (Qin, Ivan, Ravishanker, Liu, estimation
& Tepas, 2006)
100 Validating crash locations for quantitative spatial GIS-based Quantitative Accidents data In
analysis: A GIS-based approach (Loo, 2006) approach
101 Synthesis of quantitative and qualitative evidence for Quantitative Empirical data In
accident analysis in risk-based highway planning & Qualitative
(Lambert, Peterson, & Joshi, 2006)
102 Estimation of reduced life expectancy from serious Quantitative Accidents data M
occupational injuries in Taiwan (Ho, Hwang, & Wang,
2006)
103 Association between setting quantified road safety Quantitative Statistics In
targets and road fatality reduction (Wong et al., 2006)
104 Analysis of traffic injury severity: An application of non- Tree technique Qualitative Accidents data In
parametric classification tree techniques
(Chang & Wang, 2006)
105 Estimation of incident clearance times using Bayesian Bayesian Quantitative Facts In
Networks approach (Ozbay & Noyan, 2006) Networks & Qualitative
106 Bayesian methodology incorporating expert judgment Bayesian Quantitative Empirical data In
for ranking countermeasure effectiveness under methodology &
uncertainty: Example applied to at grade railroad
crossings in Korea (Washington & Oh, 2006)
107 Accident prediction model for railway-highway Statistical regression Quantitative Empirical data In
interfaces (Oh, Washington, & Nam, 2006) models &
108 Application of a human error framework to conduct HFACS, HFACS-RR Qualitative Empirical data In
train accident/incident investigations (Reinach & Viale,
2006)
109 Different quantitative measures of the impact of injury Quantitative Accidents data M
deaths on the community in the Guangxi Province,
China (Lam, Yang, Liu, Geng, & Liu, 2005)
110 Sources of error in road safety scheme evaluation: Quantitative Empirical data In
a quantified comparison of current methods (Hirst,
Mountain, & Maher, 2004)
111 Quantifying the role of risk-taking behavior in causation Quantitative Empirical data In
of serious road crash-related injury (Turner & McClure,
2004)
112 A qualitative assessment methodology for road safety Qualitative Statistics In
policy strategies (Wong, Leung, Loo, Hung, & Lo, 2004)
113 Using logistic regression to estimate the influence of Logistic Quantitative Accidents data In
accident factors on accident severity (Al-Ghamdi, 2002) regression
114 Effects of work zone presence on injury and non-injury Poisson Quantitative Accidents data In
crashes (Khattak, Khattak, & Council, 2002)
115 Multiple state hazard models and workers’ Quantitative Accidents data In
compensation claims: an examination of workers
compensation data from Ontario (Campolieti, 2001)
116 Diagnosis and monetary quantification of occupational Quantitative Accidents data In
injuries by indices related to human capital loss:
analysis of a steel company as an illustration (Sheu,
Hwang, & Wang, 2000)
117 A comparative analysis of mathematical models for Mathematical Quantitative Facts In
relating indoor and outdoor toxic gas concentrations in models in
accidental releases (Montoya, Planas, & Casal, 2009)
118 Risk-based maintenance strategy and its applications in Risk-based Hybrid Facts In
a petrochemical reforming reaction system (Hu, Cheng, maintenance
Li, & Tang, 2009)
119 Performance evaluation of process safety management MAVT Quantitative Empirical data In
systems of paint manufacturing facilities
(Chang & Liang, 2009)
120 The costs of industrial accidents for the organization: Theory of Quantitative Empirical data In
Developing methods and tools for evaluation and cost Constraints
ebenefit analysis of investment in safety (Gavious,
Mizrahi, Shani, & Minchuk, 2009)
121 A mathematical model to predict the heating-up of Quantitative Empirical data In
large-scale wood piles (Ferrero, Lohrer, Schmidt, Noll,
& Malow, 2009)
122 Inherent safety of substances: Identification of Quantitative Empirical data In
accidental scenarios due to decomposition products in
(Cordella, Tugnoli, Barontini, Spadoni, & Cozzani, 2009)
123 Criticality evaluation of petrochemical equipment based Failure mode and effects Quantitative Theoretical In
on fuzzy comprehensive evaluation and a BP neural analysis (FMEA) foundations
network (Guo, Gao, Yang, & Kang, 2009)
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

124 An overview of accident forecasting methodologies Scenario analysis, regression Quantitative Empirical data In
(Zheng & Liu, 2009) method, time-series method, & Qualitative
Markov chain method, grey
model, neural networks,
Bayesian networks
125 Modeling the risk of failure in explosion protection Residual risk model Quantitative Empirical data In
installations (Date, Lade, Mitra, & Moore, 2009)
126 Applications of 3D QRA technique to the fire/explosion 3D QRA Quantitative Empirical data In
simulation and hazard mitigation within a naphtha-
cracking plant (Yet-Pole, Shu, & Chong, 2009)
127 Comprehensive risk assessment and management of QRA, Pipeline Quantitative Empirical data In
petrochemical feed and product transportation comprehensive
pipelines (Gharabagh et al., 2009) risk analysis (PCRA)
128 Calculations of explosion deflagrating flames using dynamic flame surface Quantitative Empirical data In
a dynamic flame surface density model (Ibrahim, density (DFSD)
Gubba, Masri, & Malalasekera, 2009)
129 Numerical simulation on the diffusion of hydrogen due Numerical simulation Quantitative Empirical data In
to high-pressured storage tanks failure (Liu, Hwang,
et al., 2009; Liu, Guo, et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2009)
130 Numerical analysis of release, dispersion and Quantitative Empirical data In
combustion of liquid hydrogen in a mock-up hydrogen
refueling station (Baraldi, Venetsanos, Papanikolaou,
Heitsch, & Dallas, 2009)
131 Application of computational fluid dynamics for LNG Parametric Quantitative Empirical data In
vapor dispersion modeling: A study of key parameters analysis
(Cormier, Qi, Yun, Zhang, & Mannan, 2009)
132 Fuzzy-based methodology for performance assessment Fuzzy-based Quantitative Theoretical In
of emergency planning and its application methodology foundations
(Chen & Zhang, 2009)
133 Risk estimation for industrial safety in raw materials Quantitative Empirical data In
manufacturing (Okabe & Ohtani, 2009)
134 Computational fluid dynamics analysis on the critical Quantitative Facts In
behavior of reactive chemicals (Liu, Hwang, et al., 2009;
Liu, Guo, et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2009)
135 Process route index (PRI) to assess level of Quantitative Facts In
explosiveness for inherent safety quantification (Leong
& Shariff, 2009)
136 A hazard and operability analysis method for the HAZOP Qualitative Empirical data In
prevention of misoperations in the production of light
magnesium carbonate (Wang, Gao & Guo, 2009)
137 Risk assessment of LNG importation terminals using the BayesianeLOPA Quantitative Empirical data In
BayesianeLOPA methodology (Yun, Rogers, & Mannan, methodology
2009)
138 A risk-estimation methodological framework using PRAT, DMRA Quantitative Empirical data In
quantitative assessment techniques and real accidents’ e
data: Application in an aluminum extrusion industry
(Marhavilas & Koulouriotis, 2008)
139 Quantification of impact of line markers on risk on Quantitative Facts In

transmission pipelines with natural gas (Bajcar, Sirok,
Cimerman, & Eberlinc, 2008)
140 Reliability analysis of metallic targets under metallic Probabilistic Quantitative Facts In
rods impact: Toward a simplified probabilistic approach approach
(Mebarki, Nguyen, Mercier, Saada, & Reimeringer, 2008)
141 Numerical simulation of hydrogeneair detonation for Quantitative Empirical data In
damage assessment in realistic accident scenarios
(Bédard-Tremblay, Fang, Bauwens, Cheng,
& Tchouvelev, 2008)
142 CFD modeling of hydrogen release, dispersion and CFD Quantitative Facts In
combustion for automotive scenarios (Venetsanos,
Baraldi, Adams, Heggem, & Wilkening, 2008)
143 Numerical study on the spontaneous ignition of CFD Quantitative Facts In
pressurized hydrogen release through a tube into air
(Xu et al., 2008)
144 A quantitative risk-assessment tool for the external QRA Quantitative Facts In
safety of industrial plants with a dust explosion hazard
(van der Voort et al., 2007)
145 Numerical analysis of hydrogen deflagration mitigation LES Quantitative Facts In
by venting through a duct (Makarov, Verbecke,
& Molkov, 2007)
146 An application of 3D gas dynamic modeling for the Quantitative Facts In
prediction of overpressures in vented enclosures
(Karnesky, Chatterjee, Tamanini, & Dorofeev, 2007)
147 Numerical analysis of gas explosion inside two rooms LES Quantitative Facts In
connected by ducts (Hashimoto & Matsuo, 2007)
148 Numerical simulation of wind-aided flame propagation LES Quantitative Empirical data In
over horizontal surface of liquid fuel in a model tunnel
(Wang & Joulain, 2007)
149 Model-based HAZOP study of a real MTBE plant HAZOP Qualitative Empirical data In
(Labovský et al., 2007)
150 Improved qualitative fault propagation analysis POOM Qualitative Facts In
(Gabbar, 2007)
151 Operational risk assessment of chemical industries by Operational risk Quantitative Facts In
exploiting accident databases (Meel et al., 2007) assessment
152 A probabilistic model for the vulnerability of metal Probabilistic Quantitative Facts In
plates under the impact of cylindrical projectiles
(Mebarki et al., 2007)
153 n-Compartment mathematical model for transient Quantitative Facts In
evaluation of fluid curtains in mitigating chlorine
releases (Palazzi, Currò, & Fabiano, 2007)
154 Prevention of thermo-hydraulic rupture of solvent Stochastic Quantitative Facts In
transfer pipes in the pharmaceutical industry (Cronin, (p
Byrne, & O’Leary, 2007)
155 Failure of a heat exchanger generated by an excess of Quantitative Facts In
SO2 and H2S in the Sulfur Recovery Unit of a petroleum re
refinery (Lins & Guimarães, 2007)
156 A posteriori hazard analysis and feedback information Posteriori hazard Quantitative Empirical data In
of an accidental event in the grains storage of an analysis
agrochemical product (Laurent, Baklouti, Corriou,
& Gustin, 2006)
157 Computer-aided modeling of the protective effect of Geometrical Quantitative Facts In
explosion relief vents in tunnel structures (Sklavounos model
& Rigas, 2006)
158 Development of a database for accidents and incidents Quantitative Facts In
in the Greek petrochemical industry (Nivolianitou,
Konstandinidou, Kiranoudis, & Markatos, 2006)
159 Integration of accident scenario generation and Accident scenario Quantitative Empirical data In
multiobjective optimization for safety-cost decision- generation (c
making in chemical processes (Kim, Chang, & Heo,
2006)
160 First step toward preventing losses due to mechanical PEA Quantitative Empirical data In
damage from abnormal actions: Knowledge-based
forecasting the actions (Vaidogas, 2006)
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

161 Offshore oil and gas occupational accidentsdWhat is Quantitative Empirical data In
important? (Attwood et al., 2006a,b) in
162 Aspects of risk analysis associated with major failures of Quantitative & Qualitative Facts In
 ski, Fra˛ tczak, & Markowski, 2006)
fuel pipelines (Dziubin
163 A matrix-based risk-assessment approach for DMRA Quantitative Empirical data In
addressing linear hazards such as pipelines
(Henselwood & Phillips, 2006)
164 Quantitative assessment of domino scenarios by a QADS Quantitative Empirical data In
GIS-based software tool (Cozzani et al., 2006)
165 A fuzzy set analysis to estimate loss intensity following Fuzzy set analysis Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
blast wave interaction with process equipment (Salzano
& Cozzani, 2006)
166 A simple model for calculating chlorine concentrations RED Quantitative Facts In
behind a water spray in case of small releases
(Dandrieux-Bony, Dimbour, & Dusserre, 2005)
167 Dangerous good transportation by road: from risk Quantitative Empirical data In
analysis to emergency planning (Fabiano, Currò,
Reverberi, & Pastorino, 2005)
168 A study on the influence of liquid water and water vapor Arithmetic Quantitative Empirical data In
on the self-ignition of lignite coal-experiments and & Qualitative
numerical simulations (Lohrer, Schmidt, & Krause,
2005)
169 Development of a risk-based maintenance (RBM) Risk-based Hybrid Facts In
strategy for a power-generating plant (Krishnasamy, maintenance (RBM) p
Khan, & Haddara, 2005)
170 Estimation of failure probability of oil and gas Fuzzy fault-tree Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
transmission pipelines by fuzzy fault-tree analysis analysis
(Yuhua & Datao, 2005)
171 GAPda fault-tree-based methodology for analyzing GAP, FTA Quantitative Facts In
occupational hazards (Hauptmanns, Marx, & Knetsch,
2005)
172 Calculating overpressure from BLEVE explosions Quantitative Facts In
(Planas-Cuchi, Salla, & Casal, 2004)
173 Comparison of techniques for accident scenario analysis ETA, FTA, Quantitative Facts In
in hazardous systems (Nivolianitou, Leopoulos, Petri-Nets
& Konstantinidou, 2004)
174 Semi-quantitative fault-tree analysis for process plant FTA Hybrid Empirical data In
safety using frequency and probability ranges
(Hauptmanns, 2004)
175 Loss prevention in heavy industry: risk assessment of QRA Quantitative Facts In
large gasholders (Bernatik & Libisova, 2004)
176 Risk analysis as a basis for safety management system SMS Quantitative Facts In
(Demichela, Piccinini, & Romano, 2004)
177 A predictive risk index for safety performance in process PRI Quantitative Facts In
industries (Chen & Yang, 2004)
178 Risk-based maintenance (RBM): a quantitative RBM Hybrid Facts In
approach for maintenance/inspection scheduling and
planning (Khan & Haddara, 2003)
179 Algorithmic fault-tree synthesis for control loops FTA Hybrid Facts In
(Wang, Rogers, West, & Mannan, 2003)
180 Dynamic management of human error to reduce total Quantitative Facts In
risk (Jo & Park, 2003)
181 Safety analysis and risk assessment in a new pesticide Quantitative Empirical data In
production line (Rigas, Konstandinidou, Centola, & Qualitative
& Reggio, 2003)
182 Quantification of inherent safety aspects of the Dow Quantitative Facts In
indices (Etowa, Amyotte, Pegg, & Khan, 2002)
183 Technical modeling in integrated risk assessment of Quantitative Facts In
chemical installations (Papazoglou, Aneziris, Post, in
& Ale, 2002)
184 A new algorithm for computer-aided fault-tree FTA Hybrid Empirical data In
synthesis (Wang, Teague, West, & Mannan, 2002; Wang,
Wu, & Chang, 2002)
185 Analysis of hazard areas associated with high-pressure Quantitative Facts In
natural-gas pipelines (Jo & Ahn, 2002)
186 An integrated framework to the predictive error Task Analysis Qualitative Facts In
analysis in emergency situation (Kim & Jung, 2002)
187 A methodology for assessing risk from released The Probit Quantitative Facts In
hydrocarbon in an enclosed area (Lee, 2002) Approach
188 Numerical study of dust lifting in a channel with vertical Quantitative Facts In
obstacles (Klemens et al., 2001)
189 Evaluation of limits for effective flame acceleration in Quantitative Facts In
hydrogen mixtures (Dorofeev, Kuznetsov, Alekseev,
Efimenko, & Breitung, 2001)
190 Use of computational modeling to identify the cause of Quantitative Facts In
vapor cloud explosion incidents (Clutter & Whitney,
2001)
191 A procedure for analyzing the flight of missiles from Monte Carlo Quantitative Facts In
explosions of cylindrical vessels (Hauptmanns, 2001) evaluation
192 Analytical expressions for the calculation of damage The Probit Quantitative Facts In
percentage using the probit methodology (Vílchez, Approach
Montiel, Casal, & Arnaldos, 2001)
193 Risk analysis of a typical chemical industry using ORA ORA Quantitative Facts In
procedure (Khan & Abbasi, 2001) & Qualitative in
194 A mathematical model for predicting thermal hazard Quantitative Facts In
data (Liaw, Yur, & Lin, 2000)
195 Risk analysis of LPG transport by road and rail (Bubbico, Quantitative Facts In
Ferrari, & Mazzarotta, 2000)
196 A systematic Hazop procedure for batch processes, and HAZOP Qualitative Empirical data In
its application to pipeless plants (Mushtaq & Chung,
2000)
197 Data mining of tree-based models to analyze freeway ETA Quantitative Empirical data E
accident frequency (Chang & Chen, 2005)
198 Net-cost model for workplace interventions (Lahiri, Net-Cost model Quantitative Facts M
Gold, & Levenstein, 2005)
199 A comprehensive framework for assessing and selecting Analytic hierarchy Quantitative Facts M
appropriate scaffolding based on analytic hierarchy process & Qualitative
process (Fang, Shen, Wu, & Liu, 2003)
200 Consequences and likelihood in risk estimation: Hybrid Facts In
A matter of balance in UK health and safety
risk-assessment practice (Woodruff, 2005)
201 Combining task analysis and fault-tree analysis for FTA, TA, HEIST Hybrid Facts In
accident and incident analysis: A case study from p
Bulgaria (Doytchev & Szwillus, 2009)
202 Safety in construction e a comprehensive description of Checklists, Qualitative Empirical data In
the characteristics of high safety standards in Safety audits
construction work, from the combined perspective of
supervisors and experienced workers
(Törner & Pousette, 2009)
203 A note on the effectiveness of the house-arrest DWI Quantitative Facts T
alternative for motivating DWI offenders to install
ignition interlocks (Roth, Marques, & Voas, 2009)
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

204 A framework for understanding the development of Checklists, Qualitative Empirical data E
organizational safety culture (Parker, Lawrie, & Hudson, Safety audits
2006)
205 Observational learning and workplace safety: The Qualitative Experimental data In
effects of viewing the collective behavior of multiple
social models on the use of personal protective
equipment (Olson, Grosshuesch, Schmidt, Gray,
& Wipfli, 2009)
206 Work environment risk factors for injuries in wood Qualitative Facts In
processing (Holcroft & Punnett, 2009)
207 The role of production and teamwork practices in HRC Qualitative Empirical data In
construction safety: A cognitive model and an empirical
case study (Mitropoulos & Cupido, 2009)
208 Global trend according to estimated number of Qualitative Accidents data A
occupational accidents and fatal work-related diseases
at region and country level (Hämäläinen, Saarela,
& Takala, 2009)
209 What is most important for safety climate: The ANOVA Hybrid Facts In
company belonging or the local working environment?
e A study from the Norwegian offshore industry
(Høivik, Tharaldsen, Baste, & Moen, 2009)
210 Risk-assessment tools incorporating human error HEP/HEA Hybrid Theoretical foundations In
probabilities in the Japanese small-sized establishment & Empirical data
(Moriyama & Ohtani, 2009)
211 Measurement techniques for organizational safety Probabilistic Risk Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
causal models: Characterization and suggestions for Assessment (PRA) & Empirical data
enhancements (Mohaghegh & Mosleh, 2009a,b)
212 Age and lost working days as a result of an occupational LWDI Quantitative Facts In
accident: A study in a shiftwork rotation system
(Blanch, Torrelles, Aluja, & Salinas, 2009)
213 Deterioration of the useful visual field with aging during Quantitative Facts T
simulated driving in traffic and its possible
consequences for road safety (Rogé & Pebaylé, 2009)
214 A method for assessing health and safety management MAHS Hybrid Experimental data In
systems from the resilience engineering perspective
(Costella, Saurin, & de Macedo Guimarães, 2009)
215 Development of a relative risk model for roof and side SME Quantitative Facts In
fall fatal accidents in underground coal mines in India
(Maiti & Khanzode, 2009)
216 Relation between occupational safety management and Qualitative Theoretical A
firm performance (Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, & foundations
Vázquez-Ordás, 2009)
217 Safety is the antonym of risk for some perspectives of Qualitative Theoretical A
risk (Aven, 2009) foundations
218 From hanger-on to trendsetter: Decision-making on Qualitative Statistics In
a major safety initiative in a steel company maintenance
department (van Ginneken & Hale, 2009)
219 Globalization and workplace hazards in developing Qualitative Theoretical A
nations (Baram, 2009) foundations
220 Role of beliefs in accident and risk analysis and Qualitative Theoretical A
prevention (Kouabenan, 2009) foundations
221 Complaints regarding occupational health and safety in Quantitative Statistics A
the area of Thessaloniki (Greece) (Mekos, 2009)
222 Designing continuous safety improvement within Qualitative Theoretical A
chemical industrial areas (Reniers, Ale, Dullaert, foundations
& Soudan, 2009)
223 Effectiveness of road safety workshop for young adults Qualitative Statistics A
(Rosenbloom, Levi, Peleg, & Nemrodov, 2009)
224 Safety climate factors and its relationship with Quantitative Facts In
accidents and personal attributes in the chemical
industry (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2009)
225 Workplace and organizational factors in accident Qualitative Facts In
analysis within the Food Industry (Jacinto, Canoa,
& Soares, 2009)
226 Deriving the factor structure of safety climate scales Qualitative Experimental data A
(Shannon & Norman, 2009)
227 Agricultural accidents in north eastern region of India Qualitative Facts A
(Kumar & Dewangan, 2009)
228 Pilot study on the influence of stress caused by the need Qualitative Facts A
to combine work and family on occupational accidents
in working women (Martín-Fernández, de los Ríos,
Cazorla, & Martínez-Falero, 2009)
229 Risk characterization indicators for risk comparison in Risk Characterization Qualitative Theoretical In
the energy sector (Colli, Arellano, et al., 2009; Colli, Indicators (RCIs) foundations p
Serbanescu, et al., 2009)
230 Stochastic modeling of accident risks associated with an Stochastic Risk Modeling Quantitative Statistics A
underground coal mine in Turkey (Sari, Selcuk, Karpuz,
& Duzgun, 2009)
231 Factors correlated with traffic accidents as a basis for Advanced Driver Qualitative Facts T
evaluating Advanced Driver Assistance Systems Assistance Systems
(Staubach, 2009) (ADAS)
232 Occupational safety: The role of workplace sleepiness Qualitative Facts A
(DeArmond & Chen, 2009)
233 A new method for assessing the risk of accident Quantitative Statistics A
associated with darkness (Johansson, Wanvik, & Elvik,
2009)
234 Fuzzy Application Procedure (FAP) for the risk FAP Qualitative Theoretical A
assessment of occupational accidents foundations
(Murè & Demichela, 2009)
235 An optimizing hazard/risk analysis review planning HARP Qualitative Theoretical In
(HARP) framework for complex chemical plants foundations (C
(Reniers, 2009)
236 Force measurement in field ergonomics research and TLV Quantitative Empirical data In
application (Bao, Spielholz, Howard, & Silverstein, 2009)
237 Effects of ergonomics-based wafer-handling training on Checklists Qualitative Empirical data In
reduction in musculoskeletal disorders among wafer
handlers (Wu, Chen, & Chen, 2009)
238 An occupational safety risk analysis method at Fuzzy event tree analysis Hybrid Fuzzy sets In
construction sites using fuzzy sets (Gürcanli & Müngen, (FETA) technique
2009)
239 Development of a Structural Equation Model for ride The Structural Equation Quantitative Empirical data In
comfort of the Korean-speed railway (Lee, Jin, & Ji, 2009) Model (SEM) technique
240 Coordination indices between lifting kinematics and The phase angle technique Quantitative Empirical data In
kinetics (Xu, Hsiang, & Mirka, 2008) & The moving correlation
technique
241 Simultaneous field measuring method of vibration and OWAS & RULA techniques Quantitative Empirical data In
body posture for assessment of seated occupational
driving tasks (Hermanns, Raffler, Ellegast, Fisher,
& Göres, 2008)
242 Optimal balancing of multiple affective satisfaction Multiple Response Surfaces Quantitative Case study In
dimensions: A case study on mobile phones (Hong, Han, (MRS) Methodology
& Kim, 2008)
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

243 Discriminating relative workload level by data Data Envelopment Analysis Quantitative Case study In
envelopment analysis (Chang & Chen, 2006) (DEA) Methodology
244 Usability in a medical technology context assessment of Usability Evaluation Methods: Qualitative Empirical data In
methods for usability evaluation of medical equipment HTA (Hierarchical Task Analysis,
(Liljegren, 2006) CW (Cognitive Walkthroughs),HE
(Heuristic Evaluation), UT
(Usability Test)
245 Semantic Differential applied to the evaluation of User-Centered Design (UCD) Quantitative Empirical data In
machine tool design (Mondragón, Company, Vergara, Techniques, Semantic Differential & Qualitative
2005) approach
246 An anthropometric measurement for developing an Anthropometric data collection Quantitative Empirical data In
electric scooter (Chou & Hsiao, 2005) approach
247 Contextual assessment of working practices in changing Contextual Assessment of Qualitative Case study In
work (Nuutinen, 2005) Working Practices (CAWP)
method & The core task
modeling (CTM) technique
248 Nuclear power plant shift supervisor’s decision-making Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA): Qualitative Empirical data In
during microincidents (Carvalho, dos Santos, & Vidal, Ergonomic Work Analysis (EWA)
2005)
249 Prevalence of upper extremity musculoskeletal RULA technique Qualitative Empirical data In
symptoms and ergonomic risk factors at a Hi-Tech
company in Israel (Shuval & Donchin, 2005)
250 Measurement of trust in complex and dynamic systems Uncertainty models Qualitative Fuzzy sets, In
using a quantitative approach (Uggirala, Gramopadhye, & Quantitative & Empirical data
Melloy, & Toler, 2004)
251 A fuzzy rule-based approach to modeling affective user Fuzzy rule-based model Qualitative Fuzzy sets In
satisfaction toward office chair design (Park & Han, & Quantitative
2004)
252 Quality, productivity, occupational health and safety ICET (In-Circuit Electrical Test), Qualitative Empirical data In
and cost effectiveness of ergonomic improvements in FCT (Functional Electrical Tests)
the test workstations of an electronic factory processes, SA (Subjective Assessment)
(Yeow & Sen, 2003)
253 Identifying and analyzing hazards in manufacturing HAZOP, OSHA, checklists, HRA, Qualitative Empirical data In
industryda review of selected methods and THERP SLIM, HEART, Justification
development of a framework for method applicability of Human Error Data Information
(Willquist & Törner, 2003) (JHEDI)
254 A new approach to estimate anthropometric Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Qualitative Fuzzy sets In
measurements by adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference Inference System (ANFIS) & Quantitative
system (Kaya, Hasiloglu, Bayramoglu, Yesilyurt, & Ozok, method
2003)
255 Empirical evaluation of training and a work analysis tool Participatory ergonomics Qualitative Empirical data In
for participatory ergonomics (Saleem, Kleiner, (PE) & Quantitative
& Nussbaum, 2003)
256 Factors associated with self-reported musculoskeletal Exploratory factor analysis, Qualitative Empirical data In
discomfort in video display terminal (VDT) users Logistic regression
(Fogleman & Lewis, 2002)
257 Ergonomic interventions for the furniture OSHA Qualitative Empirical data In
manufacturing industry. Part Idlift assist devices m
(Mirka, Smith, Shivers, Taylor, 2002a,b)
258 Ergonomic interventions for the furniture OSHA Qualitative Empirical data In
manufacturing industry. Part IIdHandtools m
(Mirka et al., 2002a,b)
259 Accident sequence analysis of humanecomputer FTA, ETA Hybrid Theoretical foundations C
interface design (Fan & Chen, 2000)
260 Safety of long railway tunnels (Diamantidis, Zuccarelli, ETA Hybrid Theoretical foundations M
& Westhäuser, 2000) & Empirical data
261 Proving properties of accidents (Johnson, 2000) HFEA, Conclusion- Hybrid Theoretical foundations A
Analysis-Evidence (CAE)
262 An approach for assessing human decision reliability Human reliability Hybrid Theoretical foundations In
(Pyy, 2000) analysis (HRA) p
263 Prioritizing and quantifying the risk of outstanding Probabilistic Risk Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
corrective actions (Burns & Turcotte, 2000) Analysis (PRA)
264 Dynamic reliability: toward an integrated platform for Probabilistic Risk Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
probabilistic risk assessment (Labeau, Smidts, Analysis (PRA)
& Swaminathan, 2000)
265 Safety analysis of autonomous excavator functionality FTA Hybrid Case study M
(Seward, Pace, Morrey, & Sommerville, 2000) (m
266 Qualitative models of equipment units and their use in HAZOP Qualitative Theoretical foundations A
automatic HAZOP analysis (Bartolozzi, Castiglione,
Picciotto, & Galluzzo, 2000)
267 A simple component-connection method for building FTA Hybrid Theoretical foundations A
binary decision diagrams encoding a fault tree
(Way & Hsia, 2000)
268 Quantifying human and organizational factors in Human and Organizational Hybrid Theoretical foundations A
accident management using decision trees: the Reliability Analysis in
HORAAM method (Baumont, Ménage, Schneiter, Accident Management
Spurgin, & Vogel, 2000) (HORAAM)
269 Risk assessment of regional systems (Gheorghe, Mock, Regional risk assessment Quantitative Theoretical foundations In
& Kröger, 2000)
270 Sampling of uncertain probabilities at event tree nodes Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Hybrid Theoretical foundations A
with multiple branches (Philipson & Wilde, 2000)
271 A non-probabilistic prospective and retrospective Analysis of Consequences Hybrid Theoretical foundations T
human reliability analysis method d application to of Human Unreliability (ACIH)
railway system (Vanderhaegen, 2001)
272 Structured information analysis for human reliability Human Reliability Hybrid Theoretical foundations In
analysis of emergency tasks in nuclear power plants Analysis (HRA)
(Jung, Yoon, & Kim, 2001)
273 Modeling and quantification of dependent repeatable Human Reliability Hybrid Theoretical foundations A
human errors in system analysis and risk assessment Analysis (HRA)
(Vaurio, 2001)
274 On the ALARP approach to risk management (Melchers, ALARP approach Qualitative Theoretical foundations A
2001)
275 Analysis and synthesis of the behavior of complex Hierarchically Performed Hybrid Theoretical foundations C
programmable electronic systems in conditions of Hazard Origin and Propagation
failure (Papadopoulos, McDermid, Sasse, & Heiner, Studies (HiP-HOPS)
2001)
276 Improving the analysis of dependable systems by Bayesian Networks Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
mapping fault trees into Bayesian networks (Bobbio,
Portinale, Minichino, & Ciancamerla, 2001)
277 A case study in the integration of accident reports and Accident reports Qualitative Theoretical foundations A
constructivedesign documents (Johnson, 2001)
278 The human error rate assessment and optimizing Human Error Rate Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
system HEROS d a new procedure for evaluating and Assessment and
optimizing the manemachine interface in PSA (Richei, Optimizing System
Hauptmanns, & Unger, 2001) (HEROS)
279 A new importance measure for risk-informed decision- Differential importance Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
making (Borgonovo & Apostolakis, 2001) measure (DIM)
280 Efficient algorithms to assess component and gate Binary decision Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
importance in fault-tree analysis (Dutuit & Rauzy, 2001) diagrams (BDD)
281 An overview of PSA importance measures (van der Borst Probabilistic safety Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
& Schoonakker, 2001) assessment (PSA), Risk
importance measures
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

282 Identification, ranking, and management of risks in Hierarchical holographic Qualitative Theoretical foundations A
a major system acquisition (Lambert, Haimes, Li, modeling (HHM)
Schooff, & Tulsiani, 2001)
283 A fuzzy-logic-based approach to qualitative safety Fuzzy-logic-based Qualitative Fuzzy sets A
modeling for marine systems (Sii, Ruxton, & Wang, approach
2001)
284 CDF sensitivity analysis technique for ranking CDF sensitivity analysis Quantitative Theoretical foundations E
influential parameters in the performance assessment technique
of the proposed high-level waste repository at Yucca
Mountain, Nevada, USA (Mohanty & Wu, 2001)
285 Quantitative analysis methodology in safety-critical Quantitative analysis in Quantitative Theoretical foundations C
microprocessor applications (Camargo, Canzian, safety-critical & Case study
Almeida, Paz, & Basseto, 2001) microprocessors
286 Integration of interlock system analysis with automated HAZOP Qualitative Theoretical foundations E
HAZOP analysis (Cocchiara, Bartolozzi, Picciotto,
& Galluzzo, 2001)
287 Risk indicators as a tool for risk control (Øien, 2001a,b) Risk influencing factors Quantitative Theoretical foundations In
288 A framework for the establishment of organizational Organizational risk Quantitative Theoretical foundations In
risk indicators (Øien, 2001a,b) indicators
289 Use of risk assessment in the nuclear industry with HIFAR PSA (Probabilistic Quantitative Theoretical foundations In
specific reference to the Australian situation (Cameron safety assessment),
& Willers, 2001)
290 Risk assessment of LPG automotive refueling facilities Quantified risk Quantitative Theoretical foundations T
(Melchers & Feutrill, 2001) analysis (QRA) & Empirical data
291 Risk assessment in maritime transportation (Guedes Quantified risk Quantitative Theoretical foundations T
Soares & Teixeira, 2001) assessment (m
292 A dynamic fault tree (Cepin & Mavko, 2002) FTA Hybrid Theoretical foundations A
293 Quantifying uncertainty under a predictive, epistemic Quantified risk Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
approach to risk analysis (Apeland, Aven, & Nilsen, analysis (QRA) & Empirical data
2002)
294 Comparing safety analysis techniques (Rouvroye & van Enhanced Markov Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
den Bliek, 2002) Analysis
295 Automated multiple failure FMEA (Price & Taylor, 2002) Failure mode and Qualitative Theoretical foundations E
effects analysis (FMEA)
296 Automatic hazard analysis of batch operations with Petri Net-based model Quantitative Theoretical foundations E
Petri-Nets (Wang, Teague, et al., 2002; Wang, & Case study
Wu, et al., 2002)
297 A tool based approach to checking logical consistency in Accident reports Qualitative Theoretical foundations E
accident reports (Krishnan, 2002)
298 Optimization of safety equipment outages improves Probabilistic safety Quantitative Theoretical foundations E
safety (Cepin, 2002) assessment
299 Risk analysis in plant commissioning: the Multilevel Multilevel HAZOP Qualitative Theoretical foundations E
Hazop (Cagno, Caron, & Mancini, 2002) & Case study
300 Mode automata and their compilation into fault trees Mode automata Qualitative Theoretical foundations E
(Rauzy, 2002)
301 Social and economic criteria of acceptable risk (Lind, Cost-utility analysis Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
2002)
302 Component choice for managing risk in engineered Riskecost functions Quantitative Theoretical foundations E
systems with generalized risk/cost functions (Guikema
& Paté-Cornell, 2002)
303 An analysis of safety-critical digital systems for Probabilistic safety Qualitative Theoretical foundations In
risk-informed design (Kang & Sung, 2002) assessment (PSA) & Case study
304 Modified failure mode and effects analysis using FMEA Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
approximate reasoning (Pillay & Wang, 2003)
305 Development of a safety-critical software requirements Colored Petri Net (CPN) & Qualitative Empirical data In
verification method with combined CPN and PVS: Prototype Verification & Quantitative p
a nuclear power plant protection system application System (PVS)
(Son & Seong, 2003)
306 A quantification algorithm for a repairable system in the The GO methodology Quantitative Epmpirical data M
GO methodology (Zupei, Yao, & Xiangrui, 2003)
307 Fault-tree structures of override control systems Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) Qualitative Theoretical foundations In
(Ju, Chen, & Chang, 2003)
308 Safety analysis of the height control system for the Fault-Tree Analysis (FTA) Qualitative Empirical data M
Elbtunnel (Ortmeier et al., 2003)
309 Sequential application of heterogeneous models for the FTA, Bayesian Network & Qualitative Empirical data In
safety analysis of a control system: a case study (Bobbio Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) g
et al., 2003)
310 A rule induction approach to improve Monte Carlo Decision Tree Approach Qualitative Dataset A
system reliability assessment (Rocco, 2003)
311 Posbist fault-tree analysis of coherent systems (Huang, Posbist Fault-Tree Analysis Qualitative Statistical data M
Tong, & Zuo, 2004) & Quantitative & Fuzzy sets
312 Monte Carlo estimation of the differential importance Monte Carlo simulation Quantitative Empirical data In
measure: application to the protection system of p
a nuclear reactor (Marseguerra & Zio, 2004)
313 Dynamic reliability and risk assessment of the accident Accident Localization System, Qualitative Theoretical foundations M
localization system of the Ignalina NPP RBMK-1500 FTA & ALS dynamic model & Quantitative
reactor (Kopustinskas, Augutis, & Rimkevi cius, 2005)
314 Fault-tree construction of hybrid system requirements FTA & Causal Requirements Qualitative Empirical data M
using qualitative formal method (Lee & Cha, 2005) Safety Analysis (CRSA)
315 Approximate estimation of system reliability via fault FTA & Binary Decision Qualitative Empirical data In
trees (Dutuit & Rauzy, 2005) Diagrams (BDD) & Quantitative
316 Risk-informed design of IRIS using a level-1 PRA Qualitative Database In
probabilistic risk assessment from its conceptual design & Quantitative p
phase (Mizuno, Ninokata, & Finnicum, 2005)
317 A quantitative assessment of LCOs for operations using PRA & System dynamics Quantitative Empirical data In
system dynamics (Kang & Jae, 2005) method p
318 A Monte Carlo simulation approach for approximating Monte Carlo simulation Quantitative Empirical data A
multi-state two-terminal reliability (Ramirez-Marquez
& Coit, 2005)
319 A discrete-time Bayesian network reliability modeling PRA: Fault-Tree Analysis Qualitative Empirical data In
and analysis framework (Boudali & Dugan, 2005) & Bayesian Networks & Quantitative
320 Biased Monte Carlo optimization: the basic approach Monte Carlo method (MC) Quantitative Empirical data A
(Campioni, Scardovelli, & Vestrucci, 2005) & Importance Sampling (IS)
technique
321 Analysis of truncation limit in probabilistic safety Probabilistic Safety Quantitative Theoretical foundations A

assessment (Cepin, 2005) Assessment & Case study
322 Software safety analysis of function block diagrams FTA Qualitative Empirical data In
using fault trees (Oh, Yoo, Cha, & Son, 2005) p
323 Monte Carlo-based assessment of system availability. A Monte Carlo method Quantitative Empirical data In
case study for cogeneration plants (Marquez, Heguedas, (MC) g
& Iung, 2005)
324 Enhancing software safety by fault trees: experiences FTA Qualitative Empirical data M
from an application to flight critical software (Weber,
Tondok, & Bachmayer, 2005)
325 A historical overview of probabilistic risk-assessment PSA Quantitative Theoretical foundations In
development and its use in the nuclear power industry: & Case study p
a tribute to the late Professor Norman Carl Rasmussen
(Keller & Modarres, 2005)
326 First-order differential sensitivity analysis of a nuclear Monte Carlo method Quantitative Empirical data In
safety system by Monte Carlo simulation (Marseguerra, (MC) p
Zio, & Podofillini, 2005)
327 Optimal maintenance decisions under imperfect Risk-Based Inspection Quantitative Empirical data In
inspection (Kallen & van Noortwijk, 2005) (RBI) techniques
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data Fi

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

328 A support tool for identifying evaluation issues of road HAZOP Qualitative Empirical data In
safety measures (Jagtman, Hale, & Heijer, 2005)
329 Evaluation of tunnel safety: toward an economic safety PSA Quantitative Empirical data In
optimum (Arends, Jonkman, Vrijling, & van Gelder,
2005)
330 Identification of reference accident scenarios in SEVESO FTA, ETA & Identification Qualitative Accident data In
establishments (Delvosalle et al., 2005) of Major Accident Hazards & Empirical data
(MIMAH) methodology
331 A synergetic approach for assessing and improving Principle Component Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
equipment performance in offshore industry based on Analysis, Importance
dependability (Ebrahimipour & Suzuki, 2006) Analysis & Data
Envelopment Analysis
332 Evaluation and comparison of estimation methods for Parametric Robust Empirical Quantitative Empirical data In
failure rates and probabilities (Vaurio & Jänkälä, 2006) Bayes (PREB) estimation
methodology
333 An analytic model for situation assessment of nuclear Human Reliability Analysis Quantitative Empirical data In
power plant operators based on Bayesian inference (HRA) methods p
(Kim & Seong, 2006)
334 The ‘PROCESO’ index: a new methodology for the Operational Safety Index: Quantitative Dataset In
evaluation of operational safety in the chemical the ‘Proceso’ Index p
industry (Maroño, Peña, & Santamaria, 2006) (PROCedure for the
Evaluation of Operational Safety)
335 Causeeconsequence analysis of non-repairable phased The Causeeconsequence Qualitative Accident data In
missions (Vyzaite, Dunnett, & Andrews, 2006) diagram methods & Quantitative p
336 Reliability evaluation of the power supply of an FMEA & Markov model Qualitative Empirical data M
electrical power net for safety-relevant applications & Quantitative
(Dominguez-Garcia, Kassakian, & Schindall, 2006)
337 Application of Bayesian network to the probabilistic risk Bayesian network Quantitative Empirical data In
assessment of nuclear waste disposal (Lee & Lee, 2006) w
338 Process monitoring based on classification tree and Classification tree & Quantitative Case study In
discriminant analysis (Zhou, Hahn, & Mannan, 2006) Fisher Discriminant m
Analysis (FDA)
339 Bayesian framework for managing preferences in Bayesian approach Quantitative Empirical data In
decision-making (Maes & Faber, 2006)
340 Gradient and parameter sensitivity estimation for Monte Carlo analysis Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
systems evaluated using Monte Carlo analysis
(Ahammed & Melchers, 2006)
341 Application of condition-based HRA method for condition-based HRA Quantitative Empirical data In
a manual actuation of the safety features in a nuclear method (CBHRA) p
power Plant (Kang & Jang, 2006)
342 Reliability-based failure cause assessment of collapsed ETA & Bayesian approach Qualitative Empirical data M
bridge during construction (Choi, Lee, Choi, Cho, & Quantitative (c
& Mahadevan, 2006)
343 A fuzzy modeling application of CREAM methodology CREAM methodology Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
for human reliability analysis (Konstandinidou,
Nivolianitou, Kiranoudis, & Markatos, 2006)
344 Reliability analysis of reinforced concrete grids with Reliability analysis Quantitative Empirical data M
nonlinear material behavior (Neves, Chateauneuf,
Venturini, & Lemaire, 2006)
345 Bayesian analysis of repairable systems showing The Bayesian procedure Quantitative Dataset M
a bounded failure intensity (Guida & Pulcini, 2006)
346 A combined goal programmingdAHP approach to The Analytic Hierarchy Quantitative Empirical data In
maintenance selection problem (Bertolini & Bevilacqua, Process (AHP) technique
2006)
347 Designing a Bayesian network for preventive Bayesian Network Quantitative Empirical data In
maintenance from expert opinions in a rapid and p
reliable way (Celeux, Corset, Lannoy, & Ricard, 2006)
348 Reprioritization of failures in a system failure mode and FMEA & Decision-Making Quantitative Empirical data A
effects analysis by decision-making trial and evaluation Trial and Evaluation Laboratory
laboratory technique (Seyed-Hosseini, Safaei, technique (DEMATEL)
& Asgharpour, 2006)
349 A supplemental algorithm for the repairable system in The GO methodology Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
the GO methodology (Shen, Dai, & Huang, 2006)
350 An evaluation system of the setting up of predictive The Analytic Hierarchy Qualitative Theoretical foundations M
maintenance programmes (Carnero, 2006) Process (AHP) technique & Quantitative
351 Cause and effect analysis by fuzzy relational equations Cause and effect Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
and a genetic algorithm (Rotshtein, Posner, analysis o
& Rakytyanska, 2006) q
352 The use of global uncertainty methods for the Monte Carlo & Morris Quantitative Empirical data Ii
evaluation of combustion mechanisms (Tomlin, 2006) Method
353 Local and global uncertainty analysis of complex Monte Carlo & Morris Quantitative Empirical data Ii
chemical kinetic systems (Zádor, Zsély, & Turányi, 2006) Method
354 Sensitivity estimations for Bayesian inference models Markov Chain Quantitative Empirical data In
solved by MCMC methods (Pérez, Martín, & Rufo, 2006) Monte Carlo p
(MCMC) methods
355 Multidisciplinary perspective on accident investigation Human Error Qualitative Accidents data In
(Basnyat, Chozos, & Palanque, 2006) Analysis (HEA) &
Barrier analysis
356 Bayesian networks in reliability (Langseth & Portinale, Bayesian Networks Quantitative Empirical data M
2006)
357 Deterministic and stochastic approach for safety and Levelized reserve Quantitative Empirical data In
reliability optimization of captive power plant method & Levelized
maintenance scheduling using GA/SA-based hybrid risk method
techniques: A comparison of results (Mohanta, Sadhu,
& Chakrabarti, 2007)
358 The simulator experimental study on the operator Human Reliability Quantitative Theoretical foundations In
reliability of Qinshan nuclear power plant (Zhang, He, Analysis (HRA) & Case study p
Dai, & Huang, 2007)
359 Formal safety assessment based on relative risks model Formal Safety Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
in ship navigation (Hu, Fang, Xia, & Xi, 2007) Assessment (FSA)
360 Practical extensions to NHPP application in repairable Non-homogeneous Quantitative Facts In
system reliability analysis (Krivtsov, 2007) Poisson Process
(NHPP)
361 A support vector machine integrated system for the Support Vector Quantitative Facts In
classification of operation anomalies in nuclear Machine (SVM) p
components and systems (Rocco & Zio, 2007) approach
362 Bayesian risk-based decision method for model Bayesian Risk-Based Quantitative Experimental data A
validation under uncertainty (Jiang & Mahadevan, Decision method
2007)
363 Proposal for a sustainable framework process for the Human Reliability Qualitative Facts M
generation, validation, and application of human Assessment (HRA) & Quantitative
reliability assessment within the engineering design techniques
lifecycle (Kennedy, Siemieniuch, Sinclair, Kirwan,
& Gibson, 2007)
364 An analytic solution for a fault tree with circular logics FTA Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
in which the systems are linearly interrelated (Lim
& Jang, 2007)
365 A Monte Carlo simulation approach to the availability Monte Carlo Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
assessment of multi-state systems with operational simulation & Case study
dependencies (Zio, Marella, & Podofillini, 2007a,b) approach
366 Seismic PSA method for multiple nuclear power plants PSA Quantitative Facts In
in a site (Hakata, 2007) p
Table A. (continued )

Nr Paper Citation Technique’s name Method’s type Type of paper data F

or material

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F

367 Test interval optimization of safety systems of nuclear PSA Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
power plant using fuzzy-genetic approach (Rao, Gopika, p
Kushwaha, Verma, & Srividya, 2007; Rao, Kushwaha,
Verma, & Srividya, 2007)
368 Quantification of epistemic and aleatory uncertainties PSA Quantitative Facts In
in level-1 probabilistic safety assessment studies (Rao, p
Kushwaha, Verma, & Srividya, 2007)
369 A practical method for accurate quantification of large The (Minimal Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
fault trees (Choi & Cho, 2007) Cut Set) MCS-based
fault-tree method
370 Incorporating organizational factors into probabilistic PSA & Bayesian Quantitative Dataset In
safety assessment of nuclear power plants through Networks p
canonical probabilistic models (Galán, Mosleh,
& Izquierdo, 2007)
371 EUROCONTROLdSystemic Occurrence Analysis The Safety Occurrence Qualitative Facts In
Methodology (SOAM)dA “Reason”-based Analysis Methodology
organizational methodology for analyzing incidents and (SOAM)
accidents (Licu, Cioran, Hayward, & Lowe, 2007)
372 Condition-based fault-tree analysis (CBFTA): A new Condition-Based Quantitative Statistical data M
method for improved fault-tree analysis (FTA), FTA (CBFTA)
reliability and safety calculations (Shalev & Tiran, 2007)
373 Thermalehydraulic passive system reliability-based Limit State Function Quantitative Empirical data M
design approach (Burgazzi, 2007) (LSF)-based approach
374 Importance measures-based prioritization for The Monte Carlo Quantitative Empirical data In
improving the performance of multi-state systems: (MC) method
application to the railway industry (Zio, Marella,
& Podofillini, 2007)
375 An improved decomposition scheme for assessing the Dynamic Fault-Trees Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
reliability of embedded systems by using dynamic fault Analysis (DyFA)
trees (Huang & Chang, 2007)
376 Bayesian networks for multilevel system reliability Bayesian Networks Quantitative Theoretical foundations A
(Wilson & Huzurbazar, 2007) (BNs)
377 Addressing dependability by applying an approach for Model-Based Qualitative Theoretical foundations A
model-based risk assessment (Gran, Fredriksen, Risk-Assessment
& Thunem, 2007) (MBRA) approach
378 Using fuzzy self-organizing maps for safety-critical FMEA Qualitative Fuzzy sets M
systems (Kurd & Kelly, 2007) & Quantitative
379 Analysis of surveillance test interval by Markov process Markov process Quantitative Empirical data In
for SDS1 in CANDU nuclear power plants (Cho & Jiang, p
2008)
380 A simplified CREAM prospective quantification process CREAM Quantitative Empirical data In
and its application (He, Wang, Shen, & Huang, 2008) p
381 The MDTA-based method for assessing diagnosis The MDTA-based Qualitative Empirical data In
failures and their risk impacts in nuclear power plants method & Quantitative p
(Kim, Jung, & Son, 2008)
382 An analytical approach to quantitative effect estimation The Bayesian Belief Qualitative Theoretical foundations In
of operation advisory system based on human cognitive Network model & Quantitative p
process using the Bayesian belief network (Lee, Kim,
& Seong, 2008)
383 A new method for estimating human error AHPeSLIM method Qualitative Empirical data A
probabilities: AHPeSLIM (Park & Lee, 2008) (Analytic Hierarchy & Quantitative
Process e Success
Likelihood Index
Method)
384 Security risks and probabilistic risk assessment of PRA Quantitative Facts M
glazing subject to explosive blast loading (Stewart
& Netherton, 2008)
385 Evaluation of the reliability of transport networks based The Stochastic Moving Quantitative Theoretical foundations M
on the stochastic flow of moving objects (Wu, Ning, Network (SMN) model (c
& Ning, 2008)
386 A Bayesian Belief Network modeling of organizational Bayesian Belief Qualitative Empirical data In
factors in risk analysis: A case study in maritime Networks & Quantitative
transportation (Trucco, Cagno, Ruggeri, & Grande, 2008)
387 Modeling the reliability of search and rescue operations Bayesian Belief Qualitative Accidents data In
with Bayesian Belief Networks (Norrington, Quigley, Networks & Quantitative
Russell, & der Meer, 2008)
388 Development and application of a Risk-Assessment Tool Risk-Assessment Qualitative Facts In
(Majdara & Nematollahi, 2008) Tool (RAT) & Quantitative p
389 Reliability evaluation of deregulated electric power Quantitative Empirical data In
systems for planning applications (Ehsani, Ranjbar,
Jafari, & Fotuhi-Firuzabad, 2008)
390 Matrix-based system reliability method and The Matrix-based Qualitative Empirical data M
applications to bridge networks (Kang, Song, & Gardoni, System Reliability & Quantitative (t
2008) (MSR) method
391 A neuro-fuzzy technique for fault diagnosis and its The Neuro-Fuzzy Quantitative Fuzzy sets In
application to rotating machinery (Zio & Gola, 2009) (NF) modeling approach
392 Probabilistic design of aluminum sheet drawing for The Response Surface Quantitative Empirical data In
reduced risk of wrinkling and fracture (Zhang Method (RSM) based
& Shivpuri, 2009) model
393 Mathematical formulation and numerical treatment Non-Homogeneous Quantitative Empirical data A
based on transition frequency densities and quadrature Semi-Markov Processes
methods for non-homogeneous semi-Markov processes (NHSMP)
(Moura & Droguett, 2009)
394 On the use of the hybrid causal logic method in offshore Bayesian Belief Qualitative Empirical data In
risk analysis (Røed, Mosleh, Vinnem, & Aven, 2009) Networks & Quantitative
395 A generic method for estimating system reliability using Bayesian Networks Quantitative Empirical data A
Bayesian networks (Doguc & Ramirez-Marquez, 2009)
396 Bayesian approaches for detecting significant Bayesian analysis Quantitative Empirical data In
deterioration (Røed & Aven, 2009)
397 Model-based Monte Carlo state estimation for Model-based Quantitative Empirical data In
condition-based component replacement (Cadini, Zio, Monte Carlo
& Avram, 2009) method
398 An integrated structural framework to cost-based The priority-cost FMEA Qualitative Empirical data In
FMECA: The priority-cost FMECA (Carmignani, 2009) and Criticality Analysis & Quantitative
(PC-FMECA) methodology
399 Dynamic fault-tree analysis using Monte Carlo Dynamic Fault-Tree Qualitative Empirical data In
simulation in probabilistic safety assessment (Rao et al., Analysis (DFTA) & Quantitative p
2009)
400 Reliability assessment of passive isolation condenser APSRA (Assessment Qualitative Empirical data In
system of AHWR using APSRA methodology (Nayak of Passive System
et al., 2009) ReliAbility) methodology
401 An automated system for batch hazard and operability Batch HAZOP Qualitative Empirical data In
studies (Palmer & Chung, 2009)
402 Application of the fault-tree analysis for assessment of FTA Qualitative Empirical data In

power system reliability (Volkanovski, Cepin, & Mavko, & Quantitative p
2009)
403 Sensitivity analysis for decision-making using the MORE The Management Option Qualitative Empirical data In
methoddA Pareto approach (Ravalico, Maier, & Dandy, Rank Equivalence (MORE) & Quantitative
2009) method
404 Development of a new quantification method for a fire The Jung’s Single Top And Qualitative Empirical data In
PSA (Jung, Lee, & Yang, 2009) Run (JSTAR) method & Quantitative p
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accident investigation. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 91(12),
the Process Industries; JAAP: Accident Analysis and Prevention; JSR:
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