Chapter 9

TRANSPORT LAYER AND

SECURITY PROTOCOLS FOR
AD HOC WIRELESS
NETWORKS

9.1 INTRODUCTION
The objectives of a transport layer protocol include the setting up of an end-to-end
connection, end-to-end delivery of data packets, flow control, and congestion control.
There exist simple, unreliable, and connection-less transport layer protocols such
as UDP, and reliable, byte-stream-based, and connection-oriented transport layer
protocols such as TCP for wired networks. These traditional wired transport layer
protocols are not suitable for ad hoc wireless networks due to the inherent problems
associated with the latter. The first half of this chapter discusses the issues and
challenges in designing a transport layer protocol for ad hoc wireless networks, the
reasons for performance degradation when TCP is employed in ad hoc wireless
networks, and it also discusses some of the existing TCP extensions and other
transport layer protocols for ad hoc wireless networks.
The previous chapters discussed various networking protocols for ad hoc wire-
less networks. However, almost all of them did not take into consideration one very
important aspect of communication: security. Due to the unique characteristics of
ad hoc wireless networks, which have been mentioned in the previous chapters, such
networks are highly vulnerable to security attacks compared to wired networks or
infrastructure-based wireless networks (such as cellular networks). Therefore, secu-
rity protocols being used in the other networks (wired networks and infrastructure-
based wireless networks) cannot be directly applied to ad hoc wireless networks.
The second half of this chapter focuses on the security aspect of communication in
ad hoc wireless networks. Some of the recently proposed protocols for achieving
secure communication are discussed.

451
452 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

9.2 ISSUES IN DESIGNING A TRANSPORT LAYER

PROTOCOL FOR AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS
In this section, some of the issues to be considered while designing a transport layer
protocol for ad hoc wireless networks are discussed.

• Induced traffic: Unlike wired networks, ad hoc wireless networks utilize

multi-hop radio relaying. A link-level transmission affects the neighbor nodes
of both the sender and receiver of the link. In a path having multiple links,
transmission at a particular link affects one upstream link and one down-
stream link. This traffic at any given link (or path) due to the traffic through
neighboring links (or paths) is referred to as induced traffic. This is due to
the broadcast nature of the channel and the location-dependent contention
on the channel. This induced traffic affects the throughput achieved by the
transport layer protocol.

• Induced throughput unfairness: This refers to the throughput unfairness

at the transport layer due to the throughput/delay unfairness existing at the
lower layers such as the network and MAC layers. For example, an ad hoc
wireless network that uses IEEE 802.11 DCF as the MAC protocol may expe-
rience throughput unfairness at the transport layer as well. A transport layer
protocol should consider these in order to provide a fair share of throughput
across contending flows.

• Separation of congestion control, reliability, and flow control: A

transport layer protocol can provide better performance if end-to-end relia-
bility, flow control, and congestion control are handled separately. Reliability
and flow control are end-to-end activities, whereas congestion can at times be
a local activity. The transport layer flow can experience congestion with just
one intermediate link under congestion. Hence, in networks such as ad hoc
wireless networks, the performance of the transport layer may be improved if
these are separately handled. While separating these, the most important ob-
jective to be considered is the minimization of the additional control overhead
generated by them.

• Power and bandwidth constraints: Nodes in ad hoc wireless networks

face resource constraints including the two most important resources: (i)
power source and (ii) bandwidth. The performance of a transport layer pro-
tocol is significantly affected by these constraints.

• Misinterpretation of congestion: Traditional mechanisms of detecting

congestion in networks, such as packet loss and retransmission timeout, are
not suitable for detecting the network congestion in ad hoc wireless networks.
This is because the high error rates of wireless channel, location-dependent
contention, hidden terminal problem, packet collisions in the network, path
breaks due to the mobility of nodes, and node failure due to a drained battery
can also lead to packet loss in ad hoc wireless networks. Hence, interpretation
Section 9.3. Design Goals of a Transport Layer Protocol for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 453

of network congestion as used in traditional networks is not appropriate in

ad hoc wireless networks.

• Completely decoupled transport layer: Another challenge faced by a

transport layer protocol is the interaction with the lower layers. Wired net-
work transport layer protocols are almost completely decoupled from the lower
layers. In ad hoc wireless networks, the cross-layer interaction between the
transport layer and lower layers such as the network layer and the MAC layer
is important for the transport layer to adapt to the changing network envi-
ronment.

• Dynamic topology: Some of the deployment scenarios of ad hoc wireless

networks experience rapidly changing network topology due to the mobility of
nodes. This can lead to frequent path breaks, partitioning and remerging of
networks, and high delay in reestablishment of paths. Hence, the performance
of a transport layer protocol is significantly affected by the rapid changes in
the network topology.

9.3 DESIGN GOALS OF A TRANSPORT LAYER PROTOCOL

FOR AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS
The following are the important goals to be met while designing a transport layer
protocol for ad hoc wireless networks:

• The protocol should maximize the throughput per connection.

• It should provide throughput fairness across contending flows.

• The protocol should incur minimum connection setup and connection main-
tenance overheads. It should minimize the resource requirements for setting
up and maintaining the connection in order to make the protocol scalable in
large networks.

• The transport layer protocol should have mechanisms for congestion control
and flow control in the network.

• It should be able to provide both reliable and unreliable connections as per

the requirements of the application layer.

• The protocol should be able to adapt to the dynamics of the network such as
the rapid change in topology and changes in the nature of wireless links from
uni-directional to bidirectional or vice versa.

• One of the important resources, the available bandwidth, must be used effi-
ciently.

• The protocol should be aware of resource constraints such as battery power

and buffer sizes and make efficient use of them.
454 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

• The transport layer protocol should make use of information from the lower
layers in the protocol stack for improving the network throughput.

• It should have a well-defined cross-layer interaction framework for effective,

scalable, and protocol-independent interaction with lower layers.

• The protocol should maintain end-to-end semantics.

9.4 CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSPORT LAYER SOLUTIONS

Figure 9.1 shows a classification tree for some of the transport layer protocols dis-
cussed in this chapter. The top-level classification divides the protocols as exten-
sions of TCP for ad hoc wireless networks and other transport layer protocols which
are not based on TCP. The solutions for TCP over ad hoc wireless networks can
further be classified into split approaches and end-to-end approaches.

Transport layer solutions for ad hoc wireless networks

TCP over ad hoc wireless networks Other transport layer protocols

ACTP [14]
ATP [15]
Split approach End−to−end approach

Split−TCP [13] TCP−ELFN [8]

TCP−F [9]
TCP−BuS [10]

ATCP [12]

Figure 9.1. Classification of transport layer solutions.

9.5 TCP OVER AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS

The transmission control protocol (TCP) is the most predominant transport layer
protocol in the Internet today. It transports more than 90% percent of the traffic
on the Internet. Its reliability, end-to-end congestion control mechanism, byte-
stream transport mechanism, and, above all, its elegant and simple design have
not only contributed to the success of the Internet, but also have made TCP an
influencing protocol in the design of many of the other protocols and applications.
Its adaptability to the congestion in the network has been an important feature
Section 9.5. TCP Over Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 455

leading to graceful degradation of the services offered by the network at times of

extreme congestion. TCP in its traditional form was designed and optimized only
for wired networks. Extensions of TCP that provide improved performance across
wired and single-hop wireless networks were discussed in Chapter 4. Since TCP is
widely used today and the efficient integration of an ad hoc wireless network with
the Internet is paramount wherever possible, it is essential to have mechanisms that
can improve TCP’s performance in ad hoc wireless networks. This would enable the
seamless operation of application-level protocols such as FTP, SMTP, and HTTP
across the integrated ad hoc wireless networks and the Internet.
This section discusses the issues and challenges that TCP experiences when used
in ad hoc wireless networks as well as some of the existing solutions for overcoming
them.

9.5.1 A Brief Revisit to Traditional TCP

TCP [1] is a reliable, end-to-end, connection-oriented transport layer protocol that
provides a byte-stream-based service [the stream of bytes from the application layer
is split into TCP segments,1 the length of each segment limited by a maximum seg-
ment size (MSS)]. The major responsibilities of TCP include congestion control, flow
control, in-order delivery of packets, and reliable transportation of packets. Conges-
tion control deals with excess traffic in the network which may lead to degradation
in the performance of the network, whereas flow control controls the per-flow traf-
fic such that the receiver capacity is not exceeded. TCP regulates the number of
packets sent to the network by expanding and shrinking the congestion window.
The TCP sender starts the session with a congestion window value of one MSS. It
sends out one MSS and waits for the ACK. Once the ACK is received within the
retransmission timeout (RTO) period, the congestion window is doubled and two
MSSs are originated. This doubling of the congestion window with every success-
ful acknowledgment of all the segments in the current congestion window, is called
slow-start (a more appropriate name would be exponential start, as it actually grows
exponentially) and it continues until the congestion window reaches the slow-start
threshold (the slow-start threshold has an initial value of 64 KB). Figure 9.2 shows
the variation of the congestion window in TCP; the slow start phase is between
points A-B. Once it reaches the slow-start threshold (in Figure 9.2, the slow-start
threshold is initially taken as 16 for illustration), it grows linearly, adding one MSS
to the congestion window on every ACK received. This linear growth, which con-
tinues until the congestion window reaches the receiver window (which is advertised
by the TCP receiver and carries the information about the receiver’s buffer size),
is called congestion avoidance, as it tries to avoid increasing the congestion window
exponentially, which will surely worsen the congestion in the network. TCP updates
the RTO period with the current round-trip delay calculated on the arrival of every
1 TCP does not maintain packet boundaries, and hence multiple application layer packets be-

longing to the same TCP connection, containing stream of bytes, may be combined into a single
packet, or a single packet may be split into multiple packets, but delivered as a stream of bytes.
Hence, a TCP packet is considered as a segment containing several bytes rather than a packet.
However, segment and packet are used interchangeably in this chapter.
456 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

Linear increase
(congestion avoidance)
18 C
17 1
0
0
1
B
16
15 0
1 TCP Reno M
Congestion window size (MSS)

14
13 L
12
11 O
10 11
00
J K
00Regular TCP
11
00(TCP Tahoe)
11 1F
0
9
8 0
1 N
E 11
00
7
6 00
11 I
5 Multiplicative
decrease
11
00
00
11
H
4
3
2 G
1 A D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
11
00
00
11 time
Congestion detected
00slow start threshold
11
Figure 9.2. Illustration of TCP congestion window.

ACK packet. If the ACK packet does not arrive within the RTO period, then it
assumes that the packet is lost. TCP assumes that the packet loss is due to the
congestion in the network and it invokes the congestion control mechanism. The
TCP sender does the following during congestion control: (i) reduces the slow-start
threshold to half the current congestion window or two MSSs whichever is larger,
(ii) resets the congestion window size to one MSS, (iii) activates the slow-start al-
gorithm, and (iv) resets the RTO with an exponential back-off value which doubles
with every subsequent retransmission. The slow-start process further doubles the
congestion window with every successfully acknowledged window and, upon reach-
ing the slow-start threshold, it enters into the congestion avoidance phase.
The TCP sender also assumes a packet loss if it receives three consecutive du-
plicate ACKs (DUPACKs) [repeated acknowledgments for the same TCP segment
that was successfully received in-order at the receiver]. Upon reception of three
DUPACKs, the TCP sender retransmits the oldest unacknowledged segment. This
is called the fast retransmit scheme. When the TCP receiver receives out-of-order
packets, it generates DUPACKs to indicate to the TCP sender about the sequence
number of the last in-order segment received successfully.
Among the several extensions of TCP, some of the important schemes are dis-
cussed below. The regular TCP which was discussed above is also called as TCP
Tahoe [2] (in most of the existing literature). TCP Reno [3] is similar to TCP
Tahoe with fast recovery. On timeout or arrival of three DUPACKs, the TCP Reno
sender enters the fast recovery during which (refer to points C-J-K in Figure 9.2)
Section 9.5. TCP Over Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 457

the TCP Reno sender retransmits the lost packet, reduces the slow-start threshold
and congestion window size to half the size of the current congestion window, and
increments the congestion window linearly (one MSS per DUPACK) with every
subsequent DUPACK. On reception of a new ACK (not a DUPACK, i.e., an ACK
with a sequence number higher than the highest seen sequence number so far), the
TCP Reno resets the congestion window with the slow-start threshold and enters
the congestion avoidance phase similar to TCP Tahoe (points K-L-M in Figure 9.2).
J. C. Hoe proposed TCP-New Reno [4] extending the TCP Reno in which the
TCP sender does not exit the fast-recovery state, when a new ACK is received. In-
stead it continues to remain in the fast-recovery state until all the packets originated
are acknowledged. For every intermediate ACK packet, TCP-New Reno assumes
the next packet after the last acknowledged one is lost and is retransmitted.
TCP with selective ACK (SACK) [5], [6] improves the performance of TCP by
using the selective ACKs provided by the receiver. The receiver sends a SACK
instead of an ACK, which contains a set of SACK blocks. These SACK blocks
contain information about the recently received packets which is used by the TCP
sender while retransmitting the lost packets.

9.5.2 Why Does TCP Not Perform Well in Ad Hoc Wireless

Networks?
The major reasons behind throughput degradation that TCP faces when used in
ad hoc wireless networks are the following:

• Misinterpretation of packet loss: Traditional TCP was designed for wired

networks where the packet loss is mainly attributed to network congestion.
Network congestion is detected by the sender’s packet RTO period. Once a
packet loss is detected, the sender node assumes congestion in the network and
invokes a congestion control algorithm. Ad hoc wireless networks experience
a much higher packet loss due to factors such as high bit error rate (BER) in
the wireless channel, increased collisions due to the presence of hidden termi-
nals, presence of interference, location-dependent contention, uni-directional
links, frequent path breaks due to mobility of nodes, and the inherent fading
properties of the wireless channel.

• Frequent path breaks: Ad hoc wireless networks experience dynamic changes

in network topology because of the unrestricted mobility of the nodes in the
network. The topology changes lead to frequent changes in the connectivity of
wireless links and hence the route to a particular destination may need to be
recomputed very often. The responsibility of finding a route and reestablish-
ing it once it gets broken is attached to the network layer (Chapter 7 discusses
network layer routing protocols in detail). Once a path is broken, the routing
protocol initiates a route reestablishment process. This route reestablishment
process takes a significant amount of time to obtain a new route to the desti-
nation. The route reestablishment time is a function of the number of nodes
in the network, transmission ranges of nodes, current topology of the network,
458 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

bandwidth of the channel, traffic load in the network, and the nature of the
routing protocol. If the route reestablishment time is greater than the RTO
period of the TCP sender, then the TCP sender assumes congestion in the
network, retransmits the lost packets, and initiates the congestion control al-
gorithm. These retransmissions can lead to wastage of bandwidth and battery
power. Eventually, when a new route is found, the TCP throughput continues
to be low for some time, as it has to build up the congestion window since the
traditional TCP undergoes a slow start.

• Effect of path length: It is found that the TCP throughput degrades rapidly
with an increase in path length in string (linear chain) topology ad hoc wireless
networks [7], [8]. This is shown in Figure 9.3. The possibility of a path break
increases with path length. Given that the probability of a link break is pl ,
the probability of a path break (pb ) for a path of length k can be obtained as
pb = 1 − (1 − pl )k . Figure 9.4 shows the variation of pb with path length for
pl = 0.1. Hence as the path length increases, the probability of a path break
increases, resulting in the degradation of the throughput in the network.

• Misinterpretation of congestion window: TCP considers the congestion

window as a measure of the rate of transmission that is acceptable to the
network and the receiver. In ad hoc wireless networks, the congestion control
mechanism is invoked when the network gets partitioned or when a path break
occurs. This reduces the congestion window and increases the RTO period.
When the route is reconfigured, the congestion window may not reflect the
transmission rate acceptable to the new route, as the new route may actually
accept a much higher transmission rate. Hence, when there are frequent path

1500
TCP throughput (Kbps)

1000

500

2 4 6 8 10 12
Path length (number of hops)

Figure 9.3. Variation of TCP throughput with path length.

Section 9.5. TCP Over Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 459

0.8
Probability of path break

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Path length (number of hops)

Figure 9.4. Variation of pb with path length (pl = 0.1).

breaks, the congestion window may not reflect the maximum transmission
rate acceptable to the network and the receiver.

• Asymmetric link behavior: The radio channel used in ad hoc wireless

networks has different properties such as location-dependent contention, envi-
ronmental effects on propagation, and directional properties leading to asym-
metric links. The directional links can result in delivery of a packet to a node,
but failure in the delivery of the acknowledgment back to the sender. It is
possible for a bidirectional link to become uni-directional for a while. This
can also lead to TCP invoking the congestion control algorithm and several
retransmissions.

• Uni-directional path: Traditional TCP relies on end-to-end ACK for en-

suring reliability. Since the ACK packet is very short compared to a data
segment, ACKs consume much less bandwidth in wired networks. In ad hoc
wireless networks, every TCP ACK packet requires RTS-CTS-Data-ACK ex-
change in case IEEE 802.11 is used as the underlying MAC protocol. This
can lead to an additional overhead of more than 70 bytes if there are no re-
transmissions. This can lead to significant bandwidth consumption on the
reverse path, which may or may not contend with the forward path. If the re-
verse path contends with the forward path, it can lead to the reduction in the
throughput of the forward path. Some routing protocols select the forward
path to be also used as the reverse path, whereas certain other routing pro-
tocols may use an entirely different or partially different path for the ACKs.
460 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

A path break on an entirely different reverse path can affect the performance
of the network as much as a path break in the forward path.

• Multipath routing: There exists a set of QoS routing and best-effort rout-
ing protocols that use multiple paths between a source-destination pair. There
are several advantages in using multipath routing. Some of these advantages
include the reduction in route computing time, the high resilience to path
breaks, high call acceptance ratio, and better security. For TCP, these ad-
vantages may add to throughput degradation. These can lead to a significant
amount of out-of-order packets, which in turn generates a set of duplicate ac-
knowledgments (DUPACKs) which cause additional power consumption and
invocation of congestion control.

• Network partitioning and remerging: The randomly moving nodes in

an ad hoc wireless network can lead to network partitions. As long as the TCP
sender, the TCP receiver, and all the intermediate nodes in the path between
the TCP sender and the TCP receiver remain in the same partition, the TCP
connection will remain intact. It is likely that the sender and receiver of the
TCP session will remain in different partitions and, in certain cases, that only
the intermediate nodes are affected by the network partitioning. Figure 9.5
illustrates the effect of network partitions in ad hoc wireless networks. A
network with two TCP sessions A and B is shown in Figure 9.5 (a) at time
instant t1. Due to dynamic topological changes, the network gets partitioned
into two as in Figure 9.5 (b) at time t2. Now the TCP session A’s sender and
receiver belong to two different partitions and the TCP session B experiences
a path break. These partitions could merge back into a single network at time
t3 (refer to Figure 9.5 (c)).

TCP receiver TCP receiver

for session A for session A TCP receiver
for session A

TCP receiver TCP receiver

for session B for session B
TCP sender
TCP receiver for session B
for session B

TCP sender TCP sender TCP sender

for session B TCP sender for session B TCP sender for session A
for session A for session A

(a) Network topology (b) Network topology (c) Network topology

at time t = t1 at time t = t2 at time t = t3

Figure 9.5. Effect of partitioning and merging of network.

Section 9.5. TCP Over Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 461

• The use of sliding-window-based transmission: TCP uses a sliding

window for flow control. The transmission of packets is decided by the size of
the window, and when the ACKs arrive from a destination, further packets
are transmitted. This avoids the use of individual fine-grained timers for
transmission of each TCP flow. Such a design is preferred in order to improve
scalability of the protocol in high-bandwidth networks such as the Internet
where millions of TCP connections may be established with some heavily
loaded servers. The use of a sliding window can also contribute to degraded
performance in bandwidth-constrained ad hoc wireless networks where the
MAC layer protocol may not exhibit short-term and long-term fairness. For
example, the popular MAC protocols such as CSMA/CA protocol show short-
term unfairness, where a node that has captured the channel has a higher
probability of capturing the channel again. This unfairness can lead to a
number of TCP ACK packets being delivered to the TCP sender in succession,
leading to a burstiness in traffic due to the subsequent transmission of TCP
segments.

The enhancements to TCP that improve the performance of TCP in ad hoc

wireless networks are discussed in the following sections.

9.5.3 Feedback-Based TCP

Feedback-based TCP [also referred to as TCP feedback (TCP-F)] [9] proposes mod-
ifications to the traditional TCP for improving performance in ad hoc wireless net-
works. It uses a feedback-based approach. TCP-F requires the support of a reliable
link layer and a routing protocol that can provide feedback to the TCP sender about
the path breaks. The routing protocol is expected to repair the broken path within
a reasonable time period. TCP-F aims to minimize the throughput degradation
resulting from the frequent path breaks that occur in ad hoc wireless networks.
During a TCP session, there could be several path breaks resulting in consider-
able packet loss and path reestablishment delay. Upon detection of packet loss, the
sender in a TCP session invokes the congestion control algorithm leading to the
exponential back-off of retransmission timers and a decrease in congestion window
size. This was discussed earlier in this chapter.
In TCP-F, an intermediate node, upon detection of a path break, originates
a route failure notification (RFN) packet. This RFN packet is routed toward the
sender of the TCP session. The TCP sender’s information is expected to be ob-
tained from the TCP packets being forwarded by the node. The intermediate node
that originates the RFN packet is called the failure point (FP). The FP maintains
information about all the RFNs it has originated so far. Every intermediate node
that forwards the RFN packet understands the route failure, updates its routing ta-
ble accordingly, and avoids forwarding any more packets on that route. If any of the
intermediate nodes that receive RFN has an alternate route to the same destination,
then it discards the RFN packet and uses the alternate path for forwarding further
data packets, thus reducing the control overhead involved in the route reconfigura-
tion process. Otherwise, it forwards the RFN toward the source node. When a TCP
462 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

sender receives an RFN packet, it goes into a state called snooze. In the snooze
state, a sender stops sending any more packets to the destination, cancels all the
timers, freezes its congestion window, freezes the retransmission timer, and sets up
a route failure timer. This route failure timer is dependent on the routing protocol,
network size, and the network dynamics and is to be taken as the worst-case route
reconfiguration time. When the route failure timer expires, the TCP sender changes
from the snooze state to the connected state. Figure 9.6 shows the operation of the
TCP-F protocol. In the figure, a TCP session is set up between node A and node
D over the path A-B-C-D [refer to Figure 9.6 (a)]. When the intermediate link
between node C and node D fails, node C originates an RFN packet and forwards
it on the reverse path to the source node [see Figure 9.6 (b)]. The sender’s TCP
state is changed to the snooze state upon receipt of an RFN packet. If the link CD
rejoins, or if any of the intermediate nodes obtains a path to destination node D,
a route reestablishment notification (RRN) packet is sent to node A and the TCP
state is updated back to the connected state [Figure 9.6 (c)].
As soon as a node receives an RRN packet, it transmits all the packets in its
buffer, assuming that the network is back to its original state. This can also take
care of all the packets that were not acknowledged or lost during transit due to the
path break. In fact, such a step avoids going through the slow-start process that
would otherwise have occurred immediately after a period of congestion. The route
failure timer set after receiving the RFN packet ensures that the sender does not
remain in the snooze state indefinitely. Once the route failure timer expires, the
sender goes back to the connected state in which it reactivates the frozen timers and
starts sending the buffered and unacknowledged packets. This can also take care
of the loss of the RRN packet due to any possible subsequent congestion. TCP-F
permits the TCP congestion control algorithm to be in effect when the sender is
not in the snooze state, thus making it sensitive to congestion in the network.

TCP state−connected
A B C D

(a) TCP−F connection from A to D

TCP state−snooze
A B C D
RFN RFN
(b) Link C−D breaks and C originates RFN
TCP state−connected
A B C D
RRN RRN
(c) Link C−D rejoins and C originates RRN

Figure 9.6. Operation of TCP-F.

Section 9.5. TCP Over Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 463

Advantages and Disadvantages

TCP-F provides a simple feedback-based solution to minimize the problems arising
out of frequent path breaks in ad hoc wireless networks. At the same time, it
also permits the TCP congestion control mechanism to respond to congestion in
the network. TCP-F depends on the intermediate nodes’ ability to detect route
failures and the routing protocols’ capability to reestablish a broken path within
a reasonably short duration. Also, the FP should be able to obtain the correct
path (the path which the packet traversed) to the TCP-F sender for sending the
RFN packet. This is simple with a routing protocol that uses source routing [i.e.,
dynamic source routing (DSR)]. If a route to the sender is not available at the
FP, then additional control packets may need to be generated for routing the RFN
packet. TCP-F has an additional state compared to the traditional TCP state
machine, and hence its implementation requires modifications to the existing TCP
libraries. Another disadvantage of TCP-F is that the congestion window used after
a new route is obtained may not reflect the achievable transmission rate acceptable
to the network and the TCP-F receiver.

9.5.4 TCP with Explicit Link Failure Notification

Holland and Vaidya proposed the use of TCP with explicit link failure notification
(TCP-ELFN) [8] for improving TCP performance in ad hoc wireless networks. This
is similar to TCP-F, except for the handling of explicit link failure notification
(ELFN) and the use of TCP probe packets for detecting the route reestablishment.
The ELFN is originated by the node detecting a path break upon detection of
a link failure to the TCP sender. This can be implemented in two ways: (i) by
sending an ICMP2 destination unreachable (DUR) message to the sender, or (ii)
by piggy-backing this information on the RouteError3 message that is sent to the
sender.
Once the TCP sender receives the ELFN packet, it disables its retransmission
timers and enters a standby state. In this state, it periodically originates probe
packets to see if a new route is reestablished. Upon reception of an ACK by the TCP
receiver for the probe packets, it leaves the standby state, restores the retransmission
timers, and continues to function as normal.

Advantages and Disadvantages

TCP-ELFN improves the TCP performance by decoupling the path break infor-
mation from the congestion information by the use of ELFN. It is less dependent
on the routing protocol and requires only link failure notification about the path
break. The disadvantages of TCP-ELFN include the following: (i) when the net-
work is temporarily partitioned, the path failure may last longer and this can lead
2 Internet control message protocol (IETF RFC 792) is used for defining control messages for

aiding routing in the Internet.

3 Certain routing protocols for ad hoc wireless networks have explicit RouteError messages

to inform the sender about path breaks so that the sender can recompute a fresh route to the
destination. This is especially used in on-demand routing protocols such as DSR.
464 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

to the origination of periodic probe packets consuming bandwidth and power and
(ii) the congestion window used after a new route is obtained may not reflect the
achievable transmission rate acceptable to the network and the TCP receiver.

9.5.5 TCP-BuS
TCP with buffering capability and sequence information (TCP-BuS) [10] is similar
to the TCP-F and TCP-ELFN in its use of feedback information from an interme-
diate node on detection of a path break. But TCP-BuS is more dependent on the
routing protocol compared to TCP-F and TCP-ELFN. TCP-BuS was proposed,
with associativity-based routing (ABR) [11] protocol as the routing scheme. Hence,
it makes use of some of the special messages such as localized query (LQ) and
REPLY, defined as part of ABR for finding a partial path. These messages are
modified to carry TCP connection and segment information. Upon detection of
a path break, an upstream intermediate node [called pivot node (PN)] originates
an explicit route disconnection notification (ERDN) message. This ERDN packet
is propagated to the TCP-BuS sender and, upon reception of it, the TCP-BuS
sender stops transmission and freezes all timers and windows as in TCP-F. The
packets in transit at the intermediate nodes from the TCP-BuS sender to the PN
are buffered until a new partial path from the PN to the TCP-BuS receiver is ob-
tained by the PN. In order to avoid unnecessary retransmissions, the timers for the
buffered packets at the TCP-BuS sender and at the intermediate nodes up to PN
use timeout values proportional to the round-trip time (RTT). The intermediate
nodes between the TCP-BuS sender and the PN can request the TCP-BuS sender
to selectively retransmit any of the lost packets. Upon detection of a path break,
the downstream node originates a route notification (RN) packet to the TCP-BuS
receiver, which is forwarded by all the downstream nodes in the path. An interme-
diate node that receives an RN packet discards all packets belonging to that flow.
The ERDN packet is propagated to the TCP-BuS sender in a reliable way by using
an implicit acknowledgment and retransmission mechanism. The PN includes the
sequence number of the TCP segment belonging to the flow that is currently at
the head of its queue in the ERDN packet. The PN also attempts to find a new
partial route to the TCP-BuS receiver, and the availability of such a partial path to
destination is intimated to the TCP-BuS sender through an explicit route successful
notification (ERSN) packet. TCP-BuS utilizes the route reconfiguration mechanism
of ABR to obtain the partial route to the destination. Due to this, other routing
protocols may require changes to support TCP-BuS. The LQ and REPLY messages
are modified to carry TCP segment information, including the last successfully re-
ceived segment at the destination. The LQ packet carries the sequence number of
the segment at the head of the queue buffered at the PN and the REPLY carries
the sequence number of the last successful segment the TCP-BuS receiver received.
This enables the TCP-BuS receiver to understand the packets lost in transition and
those buffered at the intermediate nodes. This is used to avoid fast retransmission
requests usually generated by the TCP-BuS receiver when it notices an out-of-order
packet delivery. Upon a successful LQ-REPLY process to obtain a new route to the
Section 9.5. TCP Over Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 465

TCP-BuS receiver, PN informs the TCP-BuS sender of the new partial path using
the ERSN packet. When the TCP-BuS sender receives an ERSN packet, it resumes
the data transmission.
Since there is a chance for ERSN packet loss due to congestion in the network,
it needs to be sent reliably. The TCP-BuS sender also periodically originates probe
packets to check the availability of a path to the destination. Figure 9.7 shows an
illustration of the propagation of ERDN and RN messages when a link between
nodes 4 and 12 fails.
When a TCP-BuS sender receives the ERSN message, it understands, from the
sequence number of the last successfully received packet at the destination and
the sequence number of the packet at the head of the queue at PN, the packets
lost in transition. The TCP-BuS receiver understands that the lost packets will
be delayed further and hence uses a selective acknowledgment strategy instead of
fast retransmission. These lost packets are retransmitted by the TCP-BuS sender.
During the retransmission of these lost packets, the network congestion between the
TCP-BuS sender and PN is handled in a way similar to that in traditional TCP.

Advantages and Disadvantages

The advantages of TCP-BuS include performance improvement and avoidance of
fast retransmission due to the use of buffering, sequence numbering, and selective

TCP−BuS receiver

15
Network link

14 13
Broken link

12
11 TCP data flow
9
8
10 ERDN

11
00
00
11
4
7 RN

LQ
6 5
REPLY
3
New partial path

11
00
2

00
11
1
Pivot node
TCP−BuS sender

Figure 9.7. Operation of TCP-BuS.

466 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

acknowledgment. TCP-BuS also takes advantage of the underlying routing proto-

cols, especially the on-demand routing protocols such as ABR. The disadvantages
of TCP-BuS include the increased dependency on the routing protocol and the
buffering at the intermediate nodes. The failure of intermediate nodes that buffer
the packets may lead to loss of packets and performance degradation. The depen-
dency of TCP-BuS on the routing protocol may degrade its performance with other
routing protocols that do not have similar control messages as in ABR.

9.5.6 Ad Hoc TCP

Similar to TCP-F and TCP-ELFN, ad hoc TCP (ATCP) [12] also uses a network
layer feedback mechanism to make the TCP sender aware of the status of the
network path over which the TCP packets are propagated. Based on the feedback
information received from the intermediate nodes, the TCP sender changes its state
to the persist state, congestion control state, or the retransmit state. When an
intermediate node finds that the network is partitioned, then the TCP sender state
is changed to the persist state where it avoids unnecessary retransmissions. When
ATCP puts TCP in the persist state, it sets TCP’s congestion window size to one
in order to ensure that TCP does not continue using the old congestion window
value. This forces TCP to probe the correct value of the congestion window to
be used for the new route. If an intermediate node loses a packet due to error,
then the ATCP at the TCP sender immediately retransmits it without invoking the
congestion control algorithm. In order to be compatible with widely deployed TCP-
based networks, ATCP provides this feature without modifying the traditional TCP.
ATCP is implemented as a thin layer residing between the IP and TCP protocols.
The ATCP layer essentially makes use of the explicit congestion notification (ECN)
for maintenance of the states.
Figure 9.8 (a) shows the thin layer implementation of ATCP between the tra-
ditional TCP layer and the IP layer. This does not require changes in the existing
TCP protocol. This layer is active only at the TCP sender. The major function
of the ATCP layer is to monitor the packets sent and received by the TCP sender,
the state of the TCP sender, and the state of the network. Figure 9.8 (b) shows
the state transition diagram for the ATCP at the TCP sender. The four states in
the ATCP are (i) NORMAL, (ii) CONGESTED, (iii) LOSS, and (iv) DISCONN.
When a TCP connection is established, the ATCP sender state is in NORMAL.
In this state, ATCP does not interfere with the operation of TCP and it remains
invisible.
When packets are lost or arrive out-of-order at the destination, it generates
duplicate ACKs. In traditional TCP, upon reception of duplicate ACKs, the TCP
sender retransmits the segment under consideration and shrinks the contention win-
dow. But the ATCP sender counts the number of duplicate ACKs received and if it
reaches three, instead of forwarding the duplicate ACKs to TCP, it puts TCP in the
persist state and ATCP in the LOSS state. Hence, the TCP sender avoids invok-
ing congestion control. In the LOSS state, ATCP retransmits the unacknowledged
segments from the TCP buffer. When a new ACK comes from the TCP receiver,
Section 9.5. TCP Over Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 467

1111
0000
0000
1111
DISCONN

Data

DUR
0000
1111
0000
1111
DUR

0000
1111
TCP layer TCP_Input() TCP_Output()
DupACK/ DUR

0000
1111
Packet

0000
1111
ATCP ATCP_Input() ATCP_Output() Before RTO/
3 Dup ACKs NORMAL

1111
0000 0000
1111
TXPacket
Network layer IP_Input() IP_Output()

0000
1111 1111
0000
Data
0000
1111
ACK ECN
0000
1111
0000
1111
0000
1111 0000
1111
ATCP
retransmits
segments ECN
in TCP buffer LOSS CONGESTED

1111
0000
(a) ATCP thin layer implementation

0000
1111
(b) State transition diagram for the ATCP sender

0000
1111
0000
1111
TCP sender in persist state DUR − Receive destination unreachable

TXPacket − TCP transmits a packet

Figure 9.8. An illustration of ATCP thin layer and ATCP state diagram.

it is forwarded to TCP and the TCP sender is removed from the persist state and
then the ATCP sender changes to the NORMAL state.
When the ATCP sender is in the LOSS state, the receipt of an ECN message or
an ICMP source quench message changes it to the CONGESTED state. Along with
this state transition, the ATCP sender removes the TCP sender from the persist
state. When the network gets congested, the ECN4 flag is set in the data and the
ACK packets. When the ATCP sender receives this ECN message in the normal
state, it changes to the CONGESTED state and just remains invisible, permitting
TCP to invoke normal congestion control mechanisms. When a route failure or
a transient network partition occurs in the network, ATCP expects the network
layer to detect these and inform the ATCP sender through an ICMP destination
unreachable (DUR) message. Upon reception of the DUR message, ATCP puts the
TCP sender into the persist state and enters into the DISCONN state. It remains in
the DISCONN state until it is connected and receives any data or duplicate ACKs.
On the occurrence of any of these events, ATCP changes to the NORMAL state.
The connected status of the path can be detected by the acknowledgments for the
periodic probe packets generated by the TCP sender. The receipt of an ICMP
DUR message in the LOSS state or the CONGESTED state causes a transition
to the DISCONN state. When ATCP puts TCP into the persist state, it sets
4 ECN is currently under consideration by IETF and is now a standard (IETF RFC 3168).
468 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

Table 9.1. The actions taken by ATCP

Event Action
Packet loss due to high Retransmits the lost packets without reducing con-
BER gestion window
Route recomputation de- Makes the TCP sender go to persist state and stop
lay transmission until new route has been found
Transient partitions Makes the TCP sender go to persist state and stop
transmission until new route has been found
Out-of-order packet de- Maintains TCP sender unaware of this and retrans-
livery due to multipath mits the packets from TCP buffer
routing
Change in route Recomputes the congestion window

the congestion window to one segment in order to make TCP probe for the new
congestion window when the new route is available. In summary, ATCP tries to
perform the activities listed in Table 9.1.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Two major advantages of ATCP are (i) it maintains the end-to-end semantics of
TCP and (ii) it is compatible with traditional TCP. These advantages permit ATCP
to work seamlessly with the Internet. In addition, ATCP provides a feasible and
efficient solution to improve throughput of TCP in ad hoc wireless networks. The
disadvantages of ATCP include (i) the dependency on the network layer protocol
to detect the route changes and partitions, which not all routing protocols may
implement and (ii) the addition of a thin ATCP layer to the TCP/IP protocol
stack that requires changes in the interface functions currently being used.

9.5.7 Split TCP

One of the major issues that affects the performance of TCP over ad hoc wireless
networks is the degradation of throughput with increasing path length, as discussed
early in this chapter. The short (i.e., in terms of path length) connections generally
obtain much higher throughput than long connections. This can also lead to unfair-
ness among TCP sessions, where one session may obtain much higher throughput
than other sessions. This unfairness problem is further worsened by the use of
MAC protocols such as IEEE 802.11, which are found to give a higher throughput
for certain link-level sessions, leading to an effect known as channel capture effect.
This effect leads to certain flows capturing the channel for longer time durations,
thereby reducing throughput for other flows. The channel capture effect can also
lead to low overall system throughput. The reader can refer to Chapter 6 for more
details on MAC protocols and throughput fairness.
Section 9.5. TCP Over Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 469

Split-TCP [13] provides a unique solution to this problem by splitting the trans-
port layer objectives into congestion control and end-to-end reliability. The conges-
tion control is mostly a local phenomenon due to the result of high contention and
high traffic load in a local region. In the ad hoc wireless network environment, this
demands local solutions. At the same time, reliability is an end-to-end requirement
and needs end-to-end acknowledgments.
In addition to splitting the congestion control and reliability objectives, split-
TCP splits a long TCP connection into a set of short concatenated TCP connections
(called segments or zones) with a number of selected intermediate nodes (known as
proxy nodes) as terminating points of these short connections. Figure 9.9 illustrates
the operation of split-TCP where a three segment split-TCP connection exists be-
tween source node 1 and destination node 15. A proxy node receives the TCP pack-
ets, reads its contents, stores it in its local buffer, and sends an acknowledgment to
the source (or the previous proxy). This acknowledgment called local acknowledg-
ment (LACK) does not guarantee end-to-end delivery. The responsibility of further
delivery of packets is assigned to the proxy node. A proxy node clears a buffered
packet once it receives LACK from the immediate successor proxy node for that
packet. Split-TCP maintains the end-to-end acknowledgment mechanism intact, ir-
respective of the addition of zone-wise LACKs. The source node clears the buffered
packets only after receiving the end-to-end acknowledgment for those packets.

Destination Node

15

14 11
00
00
11
13
Network Link

12 TCP Data Flow

11
9
8
10 LACK

11
00
00
11
7
11
00
00
11
4

6 5 Proxy Node

3
2 End−to−end TCP ACK
1

Source Node

Figure 9.9. An illustration of Split-TCP.

470 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

In Figure 9.9, node 1 initiates a TCP session to node 15. Node 4 and node 13
are chosen as proxy nodes. The number of proxy nodes in a TCP session is deter-
mined by the length of the path between source and destination nodes. Based on a
distributed algorithm, the intermediate nodes that receive TCP packets determine
whether to act as a proxy node or just as a simple forwarding node. The most sim-
ple algorithm makes the decision for acting as proxy node if the packet has already
traversed more than a predetermined number of hops from the last proxy node or
the sender of the TCP session. In Figure 9.9, the path between node 1 and node
4 is the first zone (segment), the path between nodes 4 and 13 is the second zone
(segment), and the last zone is between node 13 and 15.
The proxy node 4, upon receipt of each TCP packet from source node 1, ac-
knowledges it with a LACK packet, and buffers the received packets. This buffered
packet is forwarded to the next proxy node (in this case, node 13) at a transmission
rate proportional to the arrival of LACKs from the next proxy node or destination.
The transmission control window at the TCP sender is also split into two windows,
that is, the congestion window and the end-to-end window. The congestion window
changes according to the rate of arrival of LACKs from the next proxy node and
the end-to-end window is updated based on the arrival of end-to-end ACKs. Both
these windows are updated as per traditional TCP except that the congestion win-
dow should stay within the end-to-end window. In addition to these transmission
windows at the TCP sender, every proxy node maintains a congestion window that
governs the segment level transmission rate.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Split-TCP has the following advantages: (i) improved throughput, (ii) improved
throughput fairness, and (iii) lessened impact of mobility. Throughput improvement
is due to the reduction in the effective transmission path length (number of hops
in a zone or a path segment). TCP throughput degrades with increasing path
length. Split-TCP has shorter concatenated path segments, each operating at its
own transmission rate, and hence the throughput is increased. This also leads to
improved throughput fairness in the system. Since in split-TCP, the path segment
length can be shorter than the end-to-end path length, the effect of mobility on
throughput is lessened.
The disadvantages of split-TCP can be listed as follows: (i) It requires modifica-
tions to TCP protocol, (ii) the end-to-end connection handling of traditional TCP
is violated, and (iii) the failure of proxy nodes can lead to throughput degradation.
The traditional TCP has end-to-end semantics, where the intermediate nodes do
not process TCP packets, whereas in split-TCP, the intermediate nodes need to
process the TCP packets and hence, in addition to the loss of end-to-end semantics,
certain security schemes that require IP payload encryption cannot be used. During
frequent path breaks or during frequent node failures, the performance of split-TCP
may be affected.
Section 9.6. Other Transport Layer Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 471

9.5.8 A Comparison of TCP Solutions for Ad Hoc Wireless

Networks
Table 9.2 compares how various issues are handled in the TCP extensions discussed
so far in this chapter.

9.6 OTHER TRANSPORT LAYER PROTOCOLS FOR AD HOC

WIRELESS NETWORKS
The performance of a transport layer protocol can be enhanced if it takes into
account the nature of the network environment in which it is applied. Especially
in wireless environments, it is important to consider the properties of the physical
layer and the interaction of the transport layer with the lower layers. This section
discusses some of the transport layer protocols that were designed specifically for
ad hoc wireless networks. Even though interworking with TCP is very important,
there exist several application scenarios such as military communication where a
radically new transport layer protocol can be used.

9.6.1 Application Controlled Transport Protocol

Unlike the TCP solutions discussed earlier in this chapter, application controlled
transport protocol (ACTP5 ) [14] is a light-weight transport layer protocol. It is
not an extension to TCP. ACTP assigns the responsibility of ensuring reliability
to the application layer. It is more like UDP with feedback of delivery and state
maintenance. ACTP stands in between TCP and UDP where TCP experiences low
performance with high reliability and UDP provides better performance with high
packet loss in ad hoc wireless networks.
The key design philosophy of ACTP is to leave the provisioning of reliability to
the application layer and provide a simple feedback information about the delivery
status of packets to the application layer. ACTP supports the priority of packets
to be delivered, but it is the responsibility of the lower layers to actually provide a
differentiated service based on this priority.
Figure 9.10 shows the ACTP layer and the API functions used by the applica-
tion layer to interact with the ACTP layer. Each API function call to send a packet
[SendTo()] contains the additional information required for ACTP such as the max-
imum delay the packet can tolerate (delay), the message number of the packet, and
the priority of the packet. The message number is assigned by the application layer,
and it need not to be in sequence. The priority level is assigned for every packet
by the application. It can be varied across packets in the same flow with increasing
numbers referring to higher priority packets. The non-zero value in the message
number field implicitly conveys that the application layer expects a delivery status
information about the packet to be sent. This delivery status is maintained at the
ACTP layer, and is available to the application layer for verification through an-
other API function IsACKed<message number>. The delivery status returned by
5 Originally called ATP, for differentiating with ad hoc transport protocol it is referred to as

ACTP in this chapter.

472
Table 9.2. A comparison of TCP solutions for ad hoc wireless networks

Issue TCP-F TCP-ELFN TCP-BuS ATCP Split-TCP

Packet loss due to Same as TCP Same as TCP Same as TCP Retransmits the Same as TCP
BER or collision lost packets without
invoking congestion
control
Path breaks RFN is sent to ELFN is sent to ERDN is sent to the Same as TCP Same as TCP
the TCP sender the TCP sender TCP sender, state
and state changes and state changes changes to snooze,
to snooze to standby ICMP DUR is sent to
the TCP sender, and
ATCP puts TCP into
persist state
Out-of-order packets Same as TCP Same as TCP Out-of-order packets ATCP reorders pack- Same as TCP
reached after a path ets and hence TCP
recovery are handled avoids sending dupli-
cates
Congestion Same as TCP Same as TCP Explicit messages ECN is used to notify Since connection is
such as ICMP source TCP sender. Conges- split, the congestion
quench are used tion control is same control is handled
as TCP within a zone by proxy
nodes
Congestion window Same as before Same as before Same as before the Recomputed for new Proxy nodes maintain
after path reestab- the path break the path break path break route congestion window and
lishment handle congestion
Explicit path break Yes Yes Yes Yes No
notification
Explicit path reestab- Yes No Yes No No
lishment notification
Dependency on rout- Yes Yes Yes Yes No
ing protocol
End-to-end semantics Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Packets buffered at No No Yes No Yes
intermediate nodes
Section 9.6. Other Transport Layer Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 473

Application layer
ACTP_SendTo (delay, message number, priority)

ACTP layer
IsACKed (message number)
IP_Output( )
Network layer

Figure 9.10. An illustration of the interface functions used in ACTP.

IsACKed<message number> function call can reflect (i) a successful delivery of the
packet (ACK received), (b) a possible loss of the packet (no ACK received and the
deadline has expired), (iii) remaining time for the packet (no ACK received but the
deadline has not expired), and (iv) no state information exists at the ACTP layer
regarding the message under consideration. A zero in the delay field refers to the
highest priority packet, which requires immediate transmission with minimum pos-
sible delay. Any other value in the delay field refers to the delay that the message
can experience. On getting the information about the delivery status, the applica-
tion layer can decide on retransmission of a packet with the same old priority or
with an updated priority. Well after the packet’s lifetime expires, ACTP clears the
packet’s state information and delivery status. The packet’s lifetime is calculated
as 4×retransmit timeout (RTO) and is set as the lifetime when the packet is sent to
the network layer. A node estimates the RTO interval by using the round-trip time
between the transmission time of a message and the time of reception of the corre-
sponding ACK. Hence, the RTO value may not be available if there are no existing
reliable connections to a destination. A packet without any message number (i.e.,
no delivery status required) is handled exactly the same way as in UDP without
maintaining any state information.

Advantages and Disadvantages

One of the most important advantages of ACTP is that it provides the freedom
of choosing the required reliability level to the application layer. Since ACTP is a
light-weight transport layer protocol, it is scalable for large networks. Throughput is
not affected by path breaks as much as in TCP as there is no congestion window for
manipulation as part of the path break recovery. One disadvantage of ACTP is that
it is not compatible with TCP. Use of ACTP in a very large ad hoc wireless network
can lead to heavy congestion in the network as it does not have any congestion
control mechanism.

9.6.2 Ad Hoc Transport Protocol

Ad hoc transport protocol (ATP) [15] is specifically designed for ad hoc wireless
networks and is not a variant of TCP. The major aspects by which ATP defers from
474 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

TCP are (i) coordination among multiple layers, (ii) rate based transmissions, (iii)
decoupling congestion control and reliability, and (iv) assisted congestion control.
Similar to other TCP variants proposed for ad hoc wireless networks, ATP uses
services from network and MAC layers for improving its performance. ATP uses
information from lower layers for (i) estimation of the initial transmission rate, (ii)
detection, avoidance, and control of congestion, and (iii) detection of path breaks.
Unlike TCP, ATP utilizes a timer-based transmission, where the transmission
rate is decided by the granularity of the timer which is dependent on the congestion
in the network. The congestion control mechanism is decoupled from the reliability
and flow control mechanisms. The network congestion information is obtained from
the intermediate nodes, whereas the flow control and reliability information are
obtained from the ATP receiver. The intermediate nodes attach the congestion
information to every ATP packet and the ATP receiver collates it before including
it in the next ACK packet. The congestion information is expressed in terms of the
weighted averaged6 queuing delay (DQ ) and contention delay (DC ) experienced by
the packets at every intermediate node. The field in which this delay information
is included is referred to as the rate feedback field and the transmission rate is the
inverse of the delay information contained in the rate feedback field. Intermediate
nodes attach the current delay information to every ATP data packet if the already
existing value is smaller than the current delay. The ATP receiver collects this
delay information and the weighted average value is attached in the periodic ACK
(ATP uses SACK mechanism, hence ACK refers to SACK) packet sent back to the
ATP sender. During a connection startup process or when ATP recovers from a
path break, the transmission rate to be used is determined by a process called quick
start. During the quick start process, the ATP sender propagates a probe packet to
which the intermediate nodes attach the transmission rate (in the form of current
delay), which is received by the ATP receiver, and an ACK is sent back to the
ATP sender. The ATP sender starts using the newly obtained transmission rate by
setting the data transmission timers. During a connection startup, the connection
request and the ACK packets are used as probe packets in order to reduce control
overhead. When there is no traffic around an intermediate node, the transmission
delay is approximated as β × (DQ + DC ), where β is the factor that considers the
induced traffic load. This is to consider the induced load (load on a particular link
due to potential contention introduced by the upstream and downstream nodes in
the path) when the actual transmission begins. A default value of 3 is used for β.
ATP uses SACK packets periodically to ensure the selective retransmission of lost
packets, which ensures the reliability of packet delivery. The SACK period is chosen
such that it is more than the round-trip time and can track the network dynamics.
The receiver performs a weighted average of the delay/transmission rate information
for every incoming packet to obtain the transmission rate for an ATP flow and this
value is included in the subsequent SACK packet it sends. In addition to the rate
feedback, the ATP receiver includes flow control information in the SACK packets.
6 Originally called “exponentially averaged,” renamed here with a more appropriate term,

“weighted average.” An example for this is Q̄delay = α × Qdelaynew + (1 − α) × Qdelayold ,

where α is an appropriate weight factor and the other terms are self-explanatory.
Section 9.7. Security in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 475

Unlike TCP, which employs either a decrease of the congestion window or an

increase of the congestion window after a congestion, ATP has three phases, namely,
increase, decrease, and maintain. If the new transmission rate (R) fed back from
the network is beyond a threshold (γ) greater than the current transmission rate
(S) [i.e., R > S(1 +γ)], then the current transmission rate is increased by a fraction
(k) of the difference between the two transmission rates (i.e., S = S + R−S k ). The
fraction and threshold are taken to avoid rapid fluctuations in the transmission rate
and induced load. The current transmission rate is updated to the new transmission
rate if the new transmission rate is lower than the current transmission rate. In the
maintain phase, if the new transmission rate is higher than the current transmission
rate, but less than the above mentioned threshold, then the current transmission
rate is maintained without any change.
If an ATP sender has not received any ACK packets for two consecutive feedback
periods, it undergoes a multiplicative decrease of the transmission rate. After a
third such period without any ACK, the connection is assumed to be lost and the
ATP sender goes to the connection initiation phase during which it periodically
generates probe packets. When a path break occurs, the network layer detects it
and originates an ELFN packet toward the ATP sender. The ATP sender freezes
the sender state and goes to the connection initiation phase. In this phase also, the
ATP sender periodically originates probe packets to know the status of the path.
With a successful probe, the sender begins data transmission again.

Advantages and Disadvantages

The major advantages of ATP include improved performance, decoupling of the
congestion control and reliability mechanisms, and avoidance of congestion window
fluctuations. ATP does not maintain any per flow state at the intermediate nodes.
The congestion information is gathered directly from the nodes that experience it.
The major disadvantage of ATP is the lack of interoperability with TCP. As
TCP is a widely used transport layer protocol, interoperability with TCP servers
and clients in the Internet is important in many applications. For large ad hoc
wireless networks, the fine-grained per-flow timer used at the ATP sender may
become a scalability bottleneck in resource-constrained mobile nodes.

9.7 SECURITY IN AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS

As mentioned earlier, due to the unique characteristics of ad hoc wireless networks,
such networks are highly vulnerable to security attacks compared to wired networks
or infrastructure-based wireless networks. The following sections discuss the various
security requirements in ad hoc wireless networks, the different types of attacks
possible in such networks, and some of the solutions proposed for ensuring network
security.
476 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

9.8 NETWORK SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

A security protocol for ad hoc wireless networks should satisfy the following require-
ments. The requirements listed below should in fact be met by security protocols
for other types of networks also.
• Confidentiality: The data sent by the sender (source node) must be compre-
hensible only to the intended receiver (destination node). Though an intruder
might get hold of the data being sent, he/she must not be able to derive any
useful information out of the data. One of the popular techniques used for
ensuring confidentiality is data encryption.
• Integrity: The data sent by the source node should reach the destination
node as it was sent: unaltered. In other words, it should not be possible for any
malicious node in the network to tamper with the data during transmission.
• Availability: The network should remain operational all the time. It must
be robust enough to tolerate link failures and also be capable of surviving
various attacks mounted on it. It should be able to provide the guaranteed
services whenever an authorized user requires them.
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is a mechanism to guarantee that the
sender of a message cannot later deny having sent the message and that the
recipient cannot deny having received the message. Digital signatures, which
function as unique identifiers for each user, much like a written signature, are
used commonly for this purpose.

9.9 ISSUES AND CHALLENGES IN SECURITY

PROVISIONING
Designing a foolproof security protocol for ad hoc wireless is a very challenging
task. This is mainly because of certain unique characteristics of ad hoc wireless
networks, namely, shared broadcast radio channel, insecure operating environment,
lack of central authority, lack of association among nodes, limited availability of
resources, and physical vulnerability. A detailed discussion on how each of the
above mentioned characteristics causes difficulty in providing security in ad hoc
wireless networks is given below.
• Shared broadcast radio channel: Unlike in wired networks where a sepa-
rate dedicated transmission line can be provided between a pair of end users,
the radio channel used for communication in ad hoc wireless networks is broad-
cast in nature and is shared by all nodes in the network. Data transmitted by
a node is received by all nodes within its direct transmission range. So a ma-
licious node could easily obtain data being transmitted in the network. This
problem can be minimized to a certain extent by using directional antennas.
• Insecure operational environment: The operating environments where
ad hoc wireless networks are used may not always be secure. One important
Section 9.10. Network Security Attacks 477

application of such networks is in battlefields. In such applications, nodes may

move in and out of hostile and insecure enemy territory, where they would be
highly vulnerable to security attacks.

• Lack of central authority: In wired networks and infrastructure-based

wireless networks, it would be possible to monitor the traffic on the net-
work through certain important central points (such as routers, base stations,
and access points) and implement security mechanisms at such points. Since
ad hoc wireless networks do not have any such central points, these mecha-
nisms cannot be applied in ad hoc wireless networks.

• Lack of association: Since these networks are dynamic in nature, a node can
join or leave the network at any point of the time. If no proper authentication
mechanism is used for associating nodes with a network, an intruder would
be able to join into the network quite easily and carry out his/her attacks.

• Limited resource availability: Resources such as bandwidth, battery power,

and computational power (to a certain extent) are scarce in ad hoc wireless
networks. Hence, it is difficult to implement complex cryptography-based
security mechanisms in such networks.

• Physical vulnerability: Nodes in these networks are usually compact and

hand-held in nature. They could get damaged easily and are also vulnerable
to theft.

9.10 NETWORK SECURITY ATTACKS

Attacks on ad hoc wireless networks can be classified into two broad categories,
namely, passive and active attacks. A passive attack does not disrupt the operation
of the network; the adversary snoops the data exchanged in the network without
altering it. Here, the requirement of confidentiality can be violated if an adversary
is also able to interpret the data gathered through snooping. Detection of passive
attacks is very difficult since the operation of the network itself does not get affected.
One way of overcoming such problems is to use powerful encryption mechanisms to
encrypt the data being transmitted, thereby making it impossible for eavesdroppers
to obtain any useful information from the data overheard.
An active attack attempts to alter or destroy the data being exchanged in the
network, thereby disrupting the normal functioning of the network. Active attacks
can be classified further into two categories, namely, external and internal attacks.
External attacks are carried out by nodes that do not belong to the network. These
attacks can be prevented by using standard security mechanisms such as encryption
techniques and firewalls.7 Internal attacks are from compromised nodes that are
7 A firewall is used to separate a local network from the outside world. It is a software which

works closely with a router program and filters all packets entering the network to determine
whether or not to forward those packets toward their intended destinations. A firewall protects
the resources of a private network from malicious intruders on foreign networks such as the Internet.
In an ad hoc wireless network, the firewall software could be installed on each node on the network.
478 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

actually part of the network. Since the adversaries are already part of the network
as authorized nodes, internal attacks are more severe and difficult to detect when
compared to external attacks.
Figure 9.11 shows a classification of the different types of attacks possible in
ad hoc wireless networks. The following sections describe the various attacks listed
in the figure.

9.10.1 Network Layer Attacks

This section lists and gives brief descriptions of the attacks pertaining to the network
layer in the network protocol stack.
• Wormhole attack: In this attack, an attacker receives packets at one loca-
tion in the network and tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location
in the network, where the packets are resent into the network [16]. This tun-
nel between two colluding attackers is referred to as a wormhole. It could be
established through a single long-range wireless link or even through a wired
link between the two colluding attackers. Due to the broadcast nature of the
radio channel, the attacker can create a wormhole even for packets not ad-
dressed to itself. Though no harm is done if the wormhole is used properly for
efficient relaying of packets, it puts the attacker in a powerful position com-
pared to other nodes in the network, which the attacker could use in a manner
that could compromise the security of the network. If proper mechanisms are
not employed to defend the network against wormhole attacks, most of the
existing routing protocols for ad hoc wireless networks may fail to find valid
routes.
• Blackhole attack: In this attack, a malicious node falsely advertises good
paths (e.g., shortest path or most stable path) to the destination node during
the path-finding process (in on-demand routing protocols) or in the route
update messages (in table-driven routing protocols). The intention of the
malicious node could be to hinder the path-finding process or to intercept all
data packets being sent to the destination node concerned.
• Byzantine attack: Here, a compromised intermediate node or a set of com-
promised intermediate nodes works in collusion and carries out attacks such as
creating routing loops, routing packets on non-optimal paths, and selectively
dropping packets [17]. Byzantine failures are hard to detect. The network
would seem to be operating normally in the viewpoint of the nodes, though
it may actually be exhibiting Byzantine behavior.
• Information disclosure: A compromised node may leak confidential or im-
portant information to unauthorized nodes in the network. Such information
may include information regarding the network topology, geographic location
of nodes, or optimal routes to authorized nodes in the network.
• Resource consumption attack: In this attack, a malicious node tries to
consume/waste away resources of other nodes present in the network. The
 Security Attacks

Passive attacks Active attacks

Snooping
MAC layer Network layer Transport layer Application layer Other attacks
attacks attacks attacks attacks

Jamming Wormhole attack Session hijacking Repudiation Denial of service

Blackhole attack Impersonation
Byzantine attack Manipulation of
Information network traffic
disclosure Device tampering
Resource consumption
attack
Routing attacks

Figure 9.11. Classifications of attacks.

479
480 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

resources that are targeted are battery power, bandwidth, and computational
power, which are only limitedly available in ad hoc wireless networks. The
attacks could be in the form of unnecessary requests for routes, very frequent
generation of beacon packets, or forwarding of stale packets to nodes. Using
up the battery power of another node by keeping that node always busy by
continuously pumping packets to that node is known as a sleep deprivation
attack.
• Routing attacks: There are several types attacks mounted on the routing
protocol which are aimed at disrupting the operation of the network. In what
follows, the various attacks on the routing protocol are described briefly.
– Routing table overflow: In this type of attack, an adversary node
advertises routes to non-existent nodes, to the authorized nodes present
in the network. The main objective of such an attack is to cause an
overflow of the routing tables, which would in turn prevent the creation
of entries corresponding to new routes to authorized nodes. Proactive
routing protocols are more vulnerable to this attack compared to reactive
routing protocols.
– Routing table poisoning: Here, the compromised nodes in the net-
works send fictitious routing updates or modify genuine route update
packets sent to other uncompromised nodes. Routing table poisoning
may result in sub-optimal routing, congestion in portions of the network,
or even make some parts of the network inaccessible.
– Packet replication: In this attack, an adversary node replicates stale
packets. This consumes additional bandwidth and battery power re-
sources available to the nodes and also causes unnecessary confusion in
the routing process.
– Route cache poisoning: In the case of on-demand routing protocols
(such as the AODV protocol [18]), each node maintains a route cache
which holds information regarding routes that have become known to the
node in the recent past. Similar to routing table poisoning, an adversary
can also poison the route cache to achieve similar objectives.
– Rushing attack: On-demand routing protocols that use duplicate sup-
pression during the route discovery process are vulnerable to this attack
[19]. An adversary node which receives a RouteRequest packet from the
source node floods the packet quickly throughout the network before
other nodes which also receive the same RouteRequest packet can react.
Nodes that receive the legitimate RouteRequest packets assume those
packets to be duplicates of the packet already received through the ad-
versary node and hence discard those packets. Any route discovered by
the source node would contain the adversary node as one of the inter-
mediate nodes. Hence, the source node would not be able to find secure
routes, that is, routes that do not include the adversary node. It is
extremely difficult to detect such attacks in ad hoc wireless networks.
Section 9.10. Network Security Attacks 481

9.10.2 Transport Layer Attacks

This section discusses an attack which is specific to the transport layer in the
network protocol stack.

• Session hijacking: Here, an adversary takes control over a session between

two nodes. Since most authentication processes are carried out only at the
start of a session, once the session between two nodes gets established, the
adversary node masquerades as one of the end nodes of the session and hijacks
the session.

9.10.3 Application Layer Attacks

This section briefly describes a security flaw associated with the application layer
in the network protocol stack.

• Repudiation: In simple terms, repudiation refers to the denial or attempted

denial by a node involved in a communication of having participated in all or
part of the communication. As mentioned in Section 9.8, non-repudiation is
one of the important requirements for a security protocol in any communica-
tion network.

9.10.4 Other Attacks

This section discusses security attacks that cannot strictly be associated with any
specific layer in the network protocol stack.

Multi-layer Attacks
Multi-layer attacks are those that could occur in any layer of the network protocol
stack. Denial of service and impersonation are some of the common multi-layer
attacks. This section discusses some of the multi-layer attacks in ad hoc wireless
networks.

• Denial of Service: In this type of attack, an adversary attempts to prevent

legitimate and authorized users of services offered by the network from ac-
cessing those services. A denial of service (DoS) attack can be carried out in
many ways. The classic way is to flood packets to any centralized resource
(e.g., an access point) used in the network so that the resource is no longer
available to nodes in the network, resulting in the network no longer operating
in the manner it was designed to operate. This may lead to a failure in the
delivery of guaranteed services to the end users. Due to the unique charac-
teristics of ad hoc wireless networks, there exist many more ways to launch a
DoS attack in such a network, which would not be possible in wired networks.
DoS attacks can be launched against any layer in the network protocol stack
[20]. On the physical and MAC layers, an adversary could employ jamming
signals which disrupt the on-going transmissions on the wireless channel. On
the network layer, an adversary could take part in the routing process and
482 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

exploit the routing protocol to disrupt the normal functioning of the network.
For example, an adversary node could participate in a session but simply drop
a certain number of packets, which may lead to degradation in the QoS being
offered by the network. On the higher layers, an adversary could bring down
critical services such as the key management service (key management will be
described in detail in the next section). Some of the DoS attacks are described
below.

– Jamming: In this form of attack, the adversary initially keeps monitor-

ing the wireless medium in order to determine the frequency at which
the receiver node is receiving signals from the sender. It then transmits
signals on that frequency so that error-free reception at the receiver is
hindered. Frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) and direct se-
quence spread spectrum (DSSS) (described in detail in the first chapter
of this book) are two commonly used techniques that overcome jamming
attacks.
– SYN flooding: Here, an adversary sends a large number of SYN pack-
ets8 to a victim node, spoofing the return addresses of the SYN packets.
On receiving the SYN packets, the victim node sends back acknowledg-
ment (SYN-ACK) packets to nodes whose addresses have been specified
in the received SYN packets. However, the victim node would not receive
any ACK packet in return. In effect, a half-open connection gets created.
The victim node builds up a table/data structure for holding informa-
tion regarding all pending connections. Since the maximum possible size
of the table is limited, the increasing number of half-open connections
results in an overflow in the table. Hence, even if a connection request
comes from a legitimate node at a later point of time, because of the table
overflow, the victim node would be forced to reject the call request.
– Distributed DoS attack: A more severe form of the DoS attack is the
distributed DoS (DDoS) attack. In this attack, several adversaries that
are distributed throughout the network collude and prevent legitimate
users from accessing the services offered by the network.

• Impersonation: In impersonation attacks, an adversary assumes the identity

and privileges of an authorized node, either to make use of network resources
that may not be available to it under normal circumstances, or to disrupt the
normal functioning of the network by injecting false routing information into
the network. An adversary node could masquerade as an authorized node
using several methods. It could by chance guess the identity and authen-
tication details of the authorized node (target node), or it could snoop for
information regarding the identity and authentication of the target node from
a previous communication, or it could circumvent or disable the authentica-
tion mechanism at the target node. A man-in-the-middle attack is another
8 SYN packets are used to establish an end-to-end session between two nodes at the transport

layer.
Section 9.11. Key Management 483

type of impersonation attack. Here, the adversary reads and possibly mod-
ifies, messages between two end nodes without letting either of them know
that they have been attacked. Suppose two nodes X and Y are communicat-
ing with each other; the adversary impersonates node Y with respect to node
X and impersonates node X with respect to node Y , exploiting the lack of
third-party authentication of the communication between nodes X and Y.

Device Tampering
Unlike nodes in a wired network, nodes in ad hoc wireless networks are usually
compact, soft, and hand-held in nature. They could get damaged or stolen easily.

9.11 KEY MANAGEMENT

Having seen the various kinds of attacks possible on ad hoc wireless networks, we
now look at various techniques employed to overcome the attacks. Cryptography
is one of the most common and reliable means to ensure security. Cryptography is
not specific to ad hoc wireless networks. It can be applied to any communication
network. It is the study of the principles, techniques, and algorithms by which in-
formation is transformed into a disguised version which no unauthorized person can
read, but which can be recovered in its original form by an intended recipient. In
the parlance of cryptography, the original information to be sent from one person
to another is called plaintext. This plaintext is converted into ciphertext by the
process of encryption, that is, the application of certain algorithms or functions.
An authentic receiver can decrypt/decode the ciphertext back into plaintext by the
process of decryption. The processes of encryption and decryption are governed
by keys, which are small amounts of information used by the cryptographic algo-
rithms. When the key is to be kept secret to ensure the security of the system, it
is called a secret key. The secure administration of cryptographic keys is called key
management.
The four main goals of cryptography are confidentiality, integrity, authentication
(the receiver should be able to identify the sender and verify that the message actu-
ally came from that sender), and non-repudiation. A detailed study of cryptography
is presented in [21].
There are two major kinds of cryptographic algorithms: symmetric key algo-
rithms, which use the same key for encryption and decryption, and asymmetric key
algorithms, which use two different keys for encryption and decryption. Symmetric
key algorithms are usually faster to execute electronically, but require a secret key
to be shared between the sender and receiver. When communication needs to be
established among a group of nodes, each sender-receiver pair should share a key,
which makes the system non-scalable. If the same key is used among more than two
parties, a breach of security at any one point makes the whole system vulnerable.
The asymmetric key algorithms are based on some mathematical principles which
make it infeasible or impossible to obtain one key from another; therefore, one of
the keys can be made public while the other is kept secret (private). This is called
public key cryptography. Such systems are used extensively in practice, but are not
484 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

provably secure. They rely upon the difficulty of solving certain mathematical prob-
lems, and the network would be open to attacks once the underlying mathematical
problem is solved.

9.11.1 Symmetric Key Algorithms

Symmetric key algorithms rely on the presence of the shared key at both the sender
and receiver, which has been exchanged by some previous arrangement. There are
two kinds of symmetric key algorithms, one involving block ciphers and the other
stream ciphers. A block cipher is an encryption scheme in which the plaintext is
broken into fixed-length segments called blocks, and the blocks are encrypted one
at a time. The simplest examples include substitution and transposition. In substi-
tution, each alphabet of the plaintext is substituted by another in the ciphertext,
and this table mapping the original and the substituted alphabet is available at
both the sender and receiver. A transposition cipher permutes the alphabet in the
plaintext to produce the ciphertext. Figure 9.12 (a) illustrates the encryption using

Original Alphabet ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ

Substitution EFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZABCD

Plaintext EVERYDAY CREATES A HISTORY

EVERY DAYCR EATES AHIST ORY

Ciphertext IZIVC HECGV IEXIW ELMWX SVC

(a)

Transposition
1 2 3 4 5

3 5 1 4 2

Plaintext EVERYDAY CREATES A HISTORY

EVERY DAYCR EATES AHIST ORY

Ciphertext EYERV YRDCA TSEEA ITASH YOR

(b)

Figure 9.12. Substitution and transposition.

Section 9.11. Key Management 485

substitution, and Figure 9.12 (b) shows a transposition cipher. The block length
used is five.
A stream cipher is, in effect, a block cipher of block length one. One of the
simplest stream ciphers is the Vernam cipher, which uses a key of the same length
as the plaintext for encryption. For example, if the plaintext is the binary string
10010100, and the key is 01011001, then the encrypted string is given by the XOR
of the plaintext and key, to be 11001101. The plaintext is again recovered by XOR-
ing the ciphertext with the same key. If the key is randomly chosen, transported
securely to the receiver, and used for only one communication, this forms the one-
time pad which has proven to be the most secure of all cryptographic systems. The
only bottleneck here is to be able to securely send the key to the receiver.

9.11.2 Asymmetric Key Algorithms

Asymmetric key (or public key) algorithms use different keys at the sender and
receiver ends for encryption and decryption, respectively. Let the encryption process
be represented by a function E, and decryption by D. Then the plaintext m is
transformed into the ciphertext c as c = E(m). The receiver then decodes c by
applying D. Hence, D is such that m = D(c) = D(E(m)). When this asymmetric
key concept is used in public key algorithms, the key E is made public, while D is
private, known only to the intended receiver. Anyone who wishes to send a message
to this receiver encrypts it using E. Though c can be overheard by adversaries, the
function E is based on a computationally difficult mathematical problem, such as
the factorization of large prime numbers. Hence, it is not possible for adversaries
to derive D given E. Only the receiver can decrypt c using the private key D.
A very popular example of public key cryptography is the RSA system [21] de-
veloped by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, which is based on the integer factorization
problem.
Digital signatures schemes are also based on public key encryption. In these
schemes, the functions E and D are chosen such that D(E(m)) = E(D(m)) = m
for any message m. These are called reversible public key systems. In this case, the
person who wishes to sign a document encrypts it using his/her private key D, which
is known only to him/her. Anybody who has his/her public key E can decrypt it and
obtain the original document, if it has been signed by the corresponding sender. In
practice, a trusted third party (TTP) is agreed upon in advance, who is responsible
for issuing these digital signatures (D and E pairs) and for resolving any disputes
regarding the signatures. This is usually a governmental or business organization.

9.11.3 Key Management Approaches

The primary goal of key management is to share a secret (some information) among
a specified set of participants. There are several methods that can be employed to
perform this operation, all of them requiring varying amounts of initial configura-
tion, communication, and computation. The main approaches to key management
are key predistribution, key transport, key arbitration, and key agreement [22].
486 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

Key Predistribution
Key predistribution, as the name suggests, involves distributing keys to all inter-
ested parties before the start of communication. This method involves much less
communication and computation, but all participants must be known a priori, dur-
ing the initial configuration. Once deployed, there is no mechanism to include
new members in the group or to change the key. As an improvement over the basic
predistribution scheme, sub-groups may be formed within the group, and some com-
munication can be restricted to a subgroup. However, the formation of sub-groups
is also an a priori decision with no flexibility during the operation.

Key Transport
In key transport systems, one of the communicating entities generates keys and
transports them to the other members. The simplest scheme assumes that a shared
key already exists among the participating members. This prior shared key is
used to encrypt a new key and is transmitted to all corresponding nodes. Only
those nodes which have the prior shared key can decrypt it. This is called the
key encrypting key (KEK) method. However, the existence of a prior key cannot
always be assumed. If the public key infrastructure (PKI) is present, the key can be
encrypted with each participant’s public key and transported to it. This assumes
the existence of a TTP, which may not be available for ad hoc wireless networks.
An interesting method for key transport without prior shared keys is the Shamir’s
three-pass protocol [22]. The scheme is based on a special type of encryption called
commutative encryption schemes [which are reversible and composable (composi-
tion of two functions f and g is defined as f(g(x)))]. Consider two nodes X and
Y which wish to communicate. Node X selects a key K which it wants to use in
its communication with node Y . It then generates another random key kx, using
which it encrypts K with f, and sends to node Y . Node Y encrypts this with a
random key ky using g, and sends it back to node X. Now, node X decrypts this
message with its key kx, and after applying the inverse function f −1 , sends it to
node Y . Finally, node Y decrypts the message using ky and g−1 to obtain the key
K. The message exchanges of the protocol are illustrated in Figure 9.13.

Key Arbitration
Key arbitration schemes use a central arbitrator to create and distribute keys among
all participants. Hence, they are a class of key transport schemes. Networks which
have a fixed infrastructure use the AP as an arbitrator, since it does not have strin-
gent power or computation constraints. In ad hoc wireless networks, the problem
with implementation of arbitrated protocols is that the arbitrator has to be powered
on at all times to be accessible to all nodes. This leads to a power drain on that
particular node. An alternative would be to make the keying service distributed,
but simple replication of the arbitration at different nodes would be expensive for
resource-constrained devices and would offer many points of vulnerability to at-
tacks. If any one of the replicated arbitrators is attacked, the security of the whole
system breaks down.
Section 9.11. Key Management 487

X Y

Generate K, k x
Encrypt with f
f(k x , K)

Generate k y
g(k y f(k x, K)) Encrypt with g

Decrypt f

g(k y , K)
Decrypt g
Obtain K

Figure 9.13. Shamir’s three-pass protocol.

Key Agreement
Most key agreement schemes are based on asymmetric key algorithms. They are
used when two or more people want to agree upon a secret key, which will then be
used for further communication. Key agreement protocols are used to establish a
secure context over which a session can be run, starting with many parties who wish
to communicate and an insecure channel. In group key agreement schemes, each
participant contributes a part to the secret key. These need the least amount of
preconfiguration, but such schemes have high computational complexity. The most
popular key agreement schemes use the Diffie-Hellman exchange [21], an asymmetric
key algorithm based on discrete logarithms.

9.11.4 Key Management in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks

Ad hoc wireless networks pose certain specific challenges in key management due
to the lack of infrastructure in such networks. Three types of infrastructure have
been identified in [23], which are absent in ad hoc wireless networks. The first is
the network infrastructure, such as dedicated routers and stable links, which ensure
communication with all nodes. The second missing infrastructure is services such as
name resolution, directory, and TTPs. The third missing infrastructure in ad hoc
wireless networks is the administrative support of certifying authorities.

Password-Based Group Systems

Several solutions for group keying in ad hoc wireless networks have been suggested in
[23]. The example scenario for implementation is a meeting room, where different
488 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

mobile devices want to start a secure session. Here, the parties involved in the
session are to be identified based on their location, that is, all devices in the room
can be part of the session. Hence, relative location is used as the criterion for access
control. If a TTP which knows the location of the participants exists, then it can
implement location-based access control. A prior shared secret can be obtained
by a physically more secure medium such as a wired network. This secret can be
obtained by plugging onto a wired network first, before switching to the wireless
mode.
A password-based system has been explored where, in the simplest case, a long
string is given as the password for users for one session. However, human be-
ings tend to favor natural language phrases as passwords, over randomly generated
strings. Such passwords, if used as keys directly during a session, are very weak
and open to attack because of high redundancy, and the possibility of reuse over
different sessions. Hence, protocols have been proposed to derive a strong key (not
vulnerable to attacks) from the weak passwords given by the participants. This
password-based system could be two-party, with a separate exchange between any
two participants, or it could be for the whole group, with a leader being elected to
preside over the session. Leader election is a special case of establishing an order
among all participants. The protocol used is as follows. Each participant generates
a random number, and sends it to all others. When every node has received the
random number of every other node, a common predecided function is applied on
all the numbers to calculate a reference value. The nodes are ordered based on the
difference between their random number and the reference value.

Threshold Cryptography
Public key infrastructure (PKI) enables the easy distribution of keys and is a scal-
able method. Each node has a public/private key pair, and a certifying authority
(CA) can bind the keys to the particular node. But the CA has to be present at
all times, which may not be feasible in ad hoc wireless networks. It is also not
advisable to simply replicate the CA at different nodes. In [20], a scheme based on
threshold cryptography has been proposed by which n servers exist in the ad hoc
wireless network, out of which any (t+1) servers can jointly perform any arbitration
or authorization successfully, but t servers cannot perform the same. Hence, up to
t compromised servers can be tolerated. This is called an (n, t + 1) configuration,
where n ≥ 3t + 1.
To sign a certificate, each server generates a partial signature using its private
key and submits it to a combiner. The combiner can be any one of the servers. In
order to ensure that the key is combined correctly, t + 1 combiners can be used to
account for at most t malicious servers. Using t + 1 partial signatures (obtained
from itself and t other servers), the combiner computes a signature and verifies its
validity using a public key. If the verification fails, it means that at least one of the
t + 1 keys is not valid, so another subset of t + 1 partial signatures is tried. If the
combiner itself is malicious, it cannot get a valid key, because the partial signature
of itself is always invalid.
Section 9.11. Key Management 489

The scheme can be applied to asynchronous networks, with no bound on mes-

sage delivery or processing times. This is one of the strengths of the scheme, as
the requirement of synchronization makes the system vulnerable to DoS attacks.
An adversary can delay a node long enough to violate the synchrony assumption,
thereby disrupting the system.
Sharing a secret in a secure manner alone does not completely fortify a system.
Mobile adversaries can move from one server to another, attack them, and get hold
of their private keys. Over a period of time, an adversary can have more than t
private keys. To counter this, share refreshing has been proposed, by which servers
create a new independent set of shares (the partial signatures which are used by
the servers) periodically. Hence, to break the system, an adversary has to attack
and capture more than t servers within the period between two successive refreshes;
otherwise, the earlier share information will no longer be valid. This improves
protection against mobile adversaries.

Self-Organized Public Key Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

The authors of [24] have proposed a completely self-organized public key system
for ad hoc wireless networks. This makes use of absolutely no infrastructure –
TTP, CA, or server – even during initial configuration. The users in the ad hoc
wireless network issue certificates to each other based on personal acquaintance. A
certificate is a binding between a node and its public key. These certificates are
also stored and distributed by the users themselves. Certificates are issued only for
a specified period of time and contain their time of expiry along with them. Before
it expires, the certificate is updated by the user who had issued the certificate.
Initially, each user has a local repository consisting of the certificates issued
by him and the certificates issued by other users to him. Hence, each certificate
is initially stored twice, by the issuer and by the person for whom it is issued.
Periodically, certificates from neighbors are requested and the repository is updated
by adding any new certificates. If any of the certificates are conflicting (e.g., the
same public key to different users, or the same user having different public keys), it is
possible that a malicious node has issued a false certificate. A node then labels such
certificates as conflicting and tries to resolve the conflict. Various methods exist to
compare the confidence in one certificate over another. For instance, another set of
certificates obtained from another neighbor can be used to take a majority decision.
This can be used to evaluate the trust in other users and detect malicious nodes. If
the certificates issued by some node are found to be wrong, then that node may be
assumed to be malicious.
The authors of [24] define a certificate graph as a graph whose vertices are
public keys of some nodes and whose edges are public-key certificates issued by
users. When a user X wants to obtain the public key of another user Y , he/she
finds a chain of valid public key certificates leading to Y . The chain is such that the
first hop uses an edge from X, that is, a certificate issued by X, the last hop leads
into Y (this is a certificate issued to Y ), and all intermediate nodes are trusted
through the previous certificate in the path. The protocol assumes that trust is
transitive, which may not always be valid.
490 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

Having seen the various key management techniques employed in ad hoc wireless
networks, we now move on to discuss some of the security-aware routing schemes
for ad hoc wireless networks.

9.12 SECURE ROUTING IN AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS

Unlike the traditional wired Internet, where dedicated routers controlled by the
Internet service providers (ISPs) exist, in ad hoc wireless networks, nodes act both
as regular terminals (source or destination) and also as routers for other nodes.
In the absence of dedicated routers, providing security becomes a challenging task
in these networks. Various other factors which make the task of ensuring secure
communication in ad hoc wireless networks difficult include the mobility of nodes, a
promiscuous mode of operation, limited processing power, and limited availability
of resources such as battery power, bandwidth, and memory. Section 9.10.1 has
pointed out some of the possible security attacks at the network layer. In the
following sections, we show how some of the well-known traditional routing protocols
for ad hoc networks fail to provide security. Some of the mechanisms proposed for
secure routing are also discussed.

9.12.1 Requirements of a Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc

Wireless Networks
The fundamental requisites of a secure routing protocol for ad hoc wireless networks
are listed as follows:
• Detection of malicious nodes: A secure routing protocol should be able
to detect the presence of malicious nodes in the network and should avoid
the participation of such nodes in the routing process. Even if such malicious
nodes participate in the route discovery process, the routing protocol should
choose paths that do not include such nodes.

• Guarantee of correct route discovery: If a route between the source and

the destination nodes exists, the routing protocol should be able to find the
route, and should also ensure the correctness of the selected route.
• Confidentiality of network topology: As explained in Section 9.10.1, an
information disclosure attack may lead to the discovery of the network topol-
ogy by the malicious nodes. Once the network topology is known, the attacker
may try to study the traffic pattern in the network. If some of the nodes are
found to be more active compared to others, the attacker may try to mount
(e.g., DoS) attacks on such bottleneck nodes. This may ultimately affect the
on-going routing process. Hence, the confidentiality of the network topology
is an important requirement to be met by the secure routing protocols.
• Stability against attacks: The routing protocol must be self-stable in the
sense that it must be able to revert to its normal operating state within a
finite amount of time after a passive or an active attack. The routing protocol
Section 9.12. Secure Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 491

should take care that these attacks do not permanently disrupt the routing
process. The protocol must also ensure Byzantine robustness, that is, the
protocol should work properly even if some of the nodes, which were earlier
participating in the routing process, turn out to become malicious at a later
point of time or are intentionally damaged.

In the following sections, some of the security-aware routing protocols proposed

for ad hoc wireless networks are discussed.

9.12.2 Security-Aware Ad Hoc Routing Protocol

The security-aware ad hoc routing (SAR) protocol [25] uses security as one of the
key metrics in path finding. A framework for enforcing and measuring the attributes
of the security metric has been provided in [25]. This framework also enables the
use of different levels of security for different applications that use SAR for routing.
In ad hoc wireless networks, communication between end nodes through possibly
multiple intermediate nodes is based on the fact that the two end nodes trust the
intermediate nodes. SAR defines level of trust as a metric for routing and as one
of the attributes for security to be taken into consideration while routing. The
routing protocol based on the level of trust is explained using Figure 9.14. As
shown in Figure 9.14, two paths exist between the two officers O1 and O2 who
want to communicate with each other. One of these paths is a shorter path which
runs through private nodes whose trust levels are very low. Hence, the protocol
chooses a longer but secure path which passes through other secure (officer) nodes.

Chosen route S2

S3
S1

O2

O1

P3
P1

Oi Officer−node Shortest route

Si Secure−node Secure route
Pi Private−node

Figure 9.14. Illustration of the level of trust metric.

492 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

The SAR protocol can be explained using any one of the traditional routing pro-
tocols. This section explains SAR using the AODV protocol [18] discussed in detail
in Chapter 7. In the AODV protocol, the source node broadcasts a RouteRequest
packet to its neighbors. An intermediate node, on receiving a RouteRequest packet,
forwards it further if it does not have a route to the destination. Otherwise, it ini-
tiates a RouteReply packet back to the source node using the reverse path traversed
by the RouteRequest packet. In SAR, a certain level of security is incorporated into
the packet-forwarding mechanism. Here, each packet is associated with a security
level which is determined by a number calculation method (explained later in this
section). Each intermediate node is also associated with a certain level of security.
On receiving a packet, the intermediate node compares its level of security with that
defined for the packet. If the node’s security level is less than that of the packet,
the RouteRequest is simply discarded. If it is greater, the node is considered to be
a secure node and is permitted to forward the packet in addition to being able to
view the packet. If the security levels of the intermediate node and the received
packet are found to be equal, then the intermediate node will not be able to view
the packet (which can be ensured using a proper authentication mechanism); it just
forwards the packet further.
Nodes of equal levels of trust distribute a common key among themselves and
with those nodes having higher levels of trust. Hence, a hierarchical level of security
could be maintained. This ensures that an encrypted packet can be decrypted (using
the common key) only by nodes of the same or higher levels of security compared
to the level of security of the packet. Different levels of trust can be defined using
a number calculated based on the level of security required. It can be calculated
using many methods. Since timeliness, in-order delivery of packets, authenticity,
authorization, integrity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation are some of the desired
characteristics of a routing protocol, a suitable number can be defined for the trust
level for nodes and packets based on the number of such characteristics taken into
account.
The SAR mechanism can be easily incorporated into the traditional routing pro-
tocols for ad hoc wireless networks. It could be incorporated into both on-demand
and table-driven routing protocols. The SAR protocol allows the application to
choose the level of security it requires. But the protocol requires different keys for
different levels of security. This tends to increase the number of keys required when
the number of security levels used increases.

9.12.3 Secure Efficient Ad Hoc Distance Vector Routing Protocol

Secure efficient ad hoc distance vector (SEAD) routing protocol [26], is a secure
ad hoc routing protocol based on the destination-sequenced distance vector (DSDV)
routing protocol [27] discussed in Chapter 7. This protocol is mainly designed to
overcome security attacks such as DoS and resource consumption attacks. The op-
eration of the routing protocol does not get affected even in the presence of multiple
uncoordinated attackers corrupting the routing tables. The protocol uses a one-way
hash function and does not involve any asymmetric cryptographic operation.
Section 9.12. Secure Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 493

Distance Vector Routing

Distance vector routing protocols belong to the category of table-driven routing
protocols. Each node maintains a routing table containing the list of all known
routes to various destination nodes in the network. The metric used for routing
is the distance measured in terms of hop-count. The routing table is updated
periodically by exchanging routing information. An alternative to this approach is
triggered updates, in which each node broadcasts routing updates only if its routing
table gets altered. The DSDV protocol for ad hoc wireless networks uses sequence
number tags to prevent the formation of loops, to counter the count-to-infinity
problem, and for faster convergence. When a new route update packet is received
for a destination, the node updates the corresponding entry in its routing table only
if the sequence number on the received update is greater than that recorded with
the corresponding entry in the routing table. If the received sequence number and
the previously recorded sequence number are both equal, but if the routing update
has a new value for the routing metric (distance in number of hops), then in this
case also the update is effected. Otherwise, the received update packet is discarded.
DSDV uses triggered updates (for important routing changes) in addition to the
regular periodic updates. A slight variation of DSDV protocol known as DSDV-
SQ (DSDV for sequence numbers) initiates triggered updates on receiving a new
sequence number update.

One-Way Hash Function

SEAD uses authentication to differentiate between updates that are received from
non-malicious nodes and malicious nodes. This minimizes resource consumption
attacks caused by malicious nodes. SEAD uses a one-way hash function for au-
thenticating the updates. A one-way hash function (H) generates a one-way hash
chain (h1 , h2 , . . . ). The function H maps an input bit-string of any length to a
fixed length bit-string, that is, H : (0, 1)∗ → (0, 1)ρ , where ρ is the length in bits of
the output bit-string. To create a one-way hash chain, a node generates a random
ρ
number with initial value x ∈ (0, 1) . h0 , the first number in the hash chain is
initialized to x. The remaining values in the chain are computed using the gen-
eral formula, hi = H(hi−1 ) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, for some n. Now we shall see how the
one-way hash function incorporates security into the existing DSDV-SQ routing
protocol. The SEAD protocol assumes an upper bound on the metric used. For
example, if the metric used is distance, then the upper bound value m − 1 defines
the maximum diameter (maximum of lengths of all the routes between a pair of
nodes) of the ad hoc wireless network. Hence, the routing protocol ensures that no
route of length greater than m hops exists between any two nodes.
If the sequence of values calculated by a node using the hash function H is given
by (h1 , h2 , . . . , hn ), where n is divisible by m, then for a routing table entry with
sequence number i, let k = m k
− i. If the metric j (distance) used for that routing
table entry is 0 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, then the value hkm+j is used to authenticate the
routing update entry for that sequence number i and that metric j. Whenever a
route update message is sent, the node appends the value used for authentication
494 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

along with it. If the authentication value used is hkm+j , then the attacker who tries
to modify this value can do so only if he/she knows hkm+j−1 . Since it is a one-way
hash chain, calculating hkm+j−1 becomes impossible. An intermediate node, on
receiving this authenticated update, calculates the new hash value based on the
earlier updates (hkm+j−1 ), the value of the metric, and the sequence number. If the
calculated value matches with the one present in the route update message, then
the update is effected; otherwise, the received update is just discarded.
SEAD avoids routing loops unless the loop contains more than one attacker.
This protocol could be implemented easily with slight modifications to the existing
distance vector routing protocols. The protocol is robust against multiple unco-
ordinated attacks. The SEAD protocol, however, would not be able to overcome
attacks where the attacker uses the same metric and sequence number which were
used by the recent update message, and sends a new routing update.

9.12.4 Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks

Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN) routing protocol [28], based
on cryptographic certificates, is a secure routing protocol which successfully defeats
all identified attacks in the network layer. It takes care of authentication, message
integrity, and non-repudiation, but expects a small amount of prior security coor-
dination among nodes. In [28], vulnerabilities and attacks specific to AODV and
DSR protocols are discussed and the two protocols are compared with the ARAN
protocol.
During the route discovery process of ARAN, the source node broadcasts
RouteRequest packets. The destination node, on receiving the RouteRequest packets,
responds by unicasting back a reply packet on the selected path. The ARAN proto-
col uses a preliminary cryptographic certification process, followed by an end-to-end
route authentication process, which ensures secure route establishment.

Issue of Certificates
This section discusses the certification process in which the certificates are issued
to the nodes in the ad hoc wireless network. There exists an authenticated trusted
server whose public key is known to all legal nodes in the network. The ARAN
protocol assumes that keys are generated a priori by the server and distributed to
all nodes in the network. The protocol does not specify any specific key distribution
algorithm. On joining the network, each node receives a certificate from the trusted
server. The certificate received by a node A from the trusted server T looks like
the following:

T → A : certA = [IPA, KA+ , t, e]KT − (9.12.1)

Here, IPA , KA+ , t, e, and KT − represent the IP address of node A, the public key
of node A, the time of creation of the certificate, the time of expiry of the certificate,
and the private key of the server, respectively.
Section 9.12. Secure Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 495

End-to-End Route Authentication

The main goal of this end-to-end route authentication process is to ensure that
the correct intended destination is reached by the packets sent from the source
node. The source node S broadcasts a RouteRequest/RouteDiscovery packet des-
tined to the destination node D. The RouteRequest packet contains the packet
identifier [route discovery process (RDP)], the IP address of the destination (IPD ),
the certificate of the source node S (CertS ), the current time (t), and nonce NS .
The process can be denoted as below. Here, KS− is the private key of the source
node S.

S → broadcasts : = [RDP, IPD , CertS , NS , t]KS− (9.12.2)

Whenever the source sends a route discovery message, it increments the value of
nonce. Nonce is a counter used in conjunction with the time-stamp in order to
make the nonce recycling easier. When a node receives an RDP packet from the
source with a higher value of the source’s nonce than that in the previously received
RDP packets from the same source node, it makes a record of the neighbor from
which it received the packet, encrypts the packet further with its own certificate,
and broadcasts it further. The process can be denoted as follows:

A → broadcasts : = [[RDP, IPD , CertS , NS , t]KS−]KA− , CertA (9.12.3)

An intermediate node B, on receiving an RDP packet from a node A, removes its

neighbor’s certificate, inserts its own certificate, and broadcasts the packet further.
The destination node, on receiving an RDP packet, verifies node S’s certificate
and the tuple (NS , t) and then replies with the RouteReply packet (REP). The
destination unicasts the REP packet to the source node along the reverse path as
follows:

D → X : = [REP, IPS , CertD , NS , t]KD− (9.12.4)

where node X is the neighbor of the destination node D, which had originally
forwarded the RDP packet to node D. The REP packet follows the same procedure
on the reverse path as that followed by the route discovery packet. An error message
is generated if the time-stamp or nonce do not match the requirements or if the
certificate fails. The error message looks similar to the other packets except that
the packet identifier is replaced by the ERR message.
Table 9.3 shows a comparison between the AODV, DSR, and ARAN protocols
with respect to their security-related features. ARAN remains robust in the presence
of attacks such as unauthorized participation, spoofed route signaling, fabricated
routing messages, alteration of routing messages, securing shortest paths, and replay
attacks.

9.12.5 Security-Aware AODV Protocol

This section discusses security solutions that address a particular security flaw in
the AODV routing protocol [18]. AODV is an on-demand routing protocol where
496 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

Table 9.3. Comparison of vulnerabilities of ARAN with DSR and AODV protocols

Attacks Protocols
AODV DSR ARAN
Modifications required Sequence num- Source routes None
during remote redirection ber and hop-
counts
Tunneling during remote Yes Yes Yes
redirection
Spoofing Yes Yes No
Cache poisoning No Yes No

the route discovery process is initiated by sending RouteRequest packets only when
data packets arrive at a node for transmission. A malicious intermediate node could
advertise that it has the shortest path to the destination, thereby redirecting all
the packets through itself. This is known as a blackhole attack, as explained in
Section 9.10.1. The blackhole attack is illustrated in Figure 9.15. Let node M be
the malicious node that enters the network. It advertises that it has the shortest
path to the destination node D when it receives the RouteRequest packet sent by
node S. The attacker may not be able to succeed if node A, which also receives
the RouteRequest packet from node S, replies earlier than node M . But a major
advantage for the malicious node is that it does not have to search its routing table

B
C
A
PATH 1

S D

1
0 G
0
1
M
PATH 2

E
F

Figure 9.15. Illustration of blackhole problem.

Section 9.12. Secure Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks 497

for a route to the destination. Also, the RouteReply packets originate directly from
the malicious node and not from the destination node. Hence, the malicious node
would be able to reply faster than node A, which would have to search its routing
table for a route to the destination node. Thus, node S may tend to establish a
route to destination D through the malicious node M , allowing node M to listen
to all packets meant for the destination node.

Solutions for the Blackhole Problem

One of the solutions for the blackhole problem is to restrict the intermediate nodes
from originating RouteReply packets. Only the destination node would be permitted
to initiate RouteReply packets. Security is still not completely assured, since the
malicious node may lie in the path chosen by the destination node. Also, the delay
involved in the route discovery process increases as the size of the network increases.
In another solution to this problem, suggested in [29], as soon as the RouteReply
packet is received from one of the intermediate nodes, another RouteRequest packet
is sent from the source node to the neighbor node of the intermediate node in the
path. This is to ensure that such a path exists from the intermediate node to the
destination node. For example, let the source node send RouteRequest packets and
receive RouteReply through the intermediate malicious node M . The RouteReply
packet of node M contains information regarding its next-hop neighbor nodes. Let
it contain information about the neighbor node E. Then, as shown in Figure 9.16,
the source node S sends FurtherRouteRequest packets to this neighbor node E.
Node E responds by sending a FurtherRouteReply packet to source node S. Since

B
C
A

S D

1
0 F
0
1
M

E
FurtherRouteRequest
FurtherRouteReply

Figure 9.16. Propagation of FurtherRouteRequest and FurtherRouteReply.

498 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

node M is a malicious node which is not present in the routing list of node E, the
FurtherRouteReply packet sent by node E will not contain a route to the malicious
node M . But if it contains a route to the destination node D, then the new route to
the destination through node E is selected, and the earlier selected route through
node M is rejected. This protocol completely eliminates the blackhole attack caused
by a single attacker. The major disadvantage of this scheme is that the control
overhead of the routing protocol increases considerably. Also, if the malicious nodes
work in a group, this protocol fails miserably.

9.13 SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the major challenges that a transport layer protocol faces in
ad hoc wireless networks. The major design goals of a transport layer protocol were
listed and a classification of existing transport layer solutions was provided. TCP is
the most widely used transport layer protocol and is considered to be the backbone
of today’s Internet. It provides end-to-end, reliable, byte-streamed, in-order deliv-
ery of packets to nodes. Since TCP was designed to handle problems present in
traditional wired networks, many of the issues that are present in dynamic topology
networks such as ad hoc wireless networks are not addressed. This causes reduction
of throughput when TCP is used in ad hoc wireless networks. It is very important to
employ TCP in ad hoc wireless networks as it is important to seamlessly communi-
cate with the Internet whenever and wherever it is available. This chapter provided
a discussion on the major reasons for the degraded performance of traditional TCP
in ad hoc wireless networks and explained a number of recently proposed solutions
to improve TCP’s performance. Other non-TCP solutions were also discussed in
detail.
The second half of this chapter dealt with the security aspect of communication
in ad hoc wireless networks. The issues and challenges involved in provisioning se-
curity in ad hoc wireless networks were identified. This was followed by a layer-wise
classification of the various types of attacks. Detailed discussions on key manage-
ment techniques and secure routing techniques for ad hoc wireless networks were
provided. Table 9.4 lists out the various attacks possible in ad hoc wireless networks
along with the solutions proposed for countering those attacks.
Section 9.14. Problems 499

Table 9.4. Defense against attacks

Attack Targeted Layer in the Proposed Solutions

Protocol Stack
Jamming Physical and MAC layers FHSS, DSSS
Wormhole attack Network layer Packet Leashes [16]
Blackhole attack Network layer [25], [29]
Byzantine attack Network layer [17]
Resource consumption Network layer SEAD [26]
attack
Information disclosure Network layer SMT [30]
Location disclosure Network layer SRP [30], NDM [31]
Routing attacks Network layer [19], SEAD [26], ARAN [28],
ARIADNE [32]
Repudiation Application layer ARAN [28]
Denial of Service Multi-layer SEAD [26], ARIADNE [32]
Impersonation Multi-layer ARAN [28]

9.14 PROBLEMS
1. Assume that when the current size of the congestion window is 48 KB, the
TCP sender experiences a timeout. What will be the congestion window size
if the next three transmission bursts are successful? Assume that MSS is 1
KB. Consider (a) TCP Tahoe and (b) TCP Reno.

2. Find out the probability of a path break for an eight-hop path, given that the
probability of a link break is 0.2.

3. Discuss the effects of multiple breaks on a single path at the TCP-F sender.

4. What additional state information is to be maintained at the FP in TCP-F?

5. Mention one advantage and one disadvantage of using probe packets for de-
tection of a new path.

6. Mention one advantage and one disadvantage of using LQ and REPLY for
finding partial paths in TCP-BuS.

7. What is the impact of the failure of proxy nodes in split-TCP?

8. During a research discussion, one of your colleagues suggested an extension of

split-TCP where every intermediate node acts as a proxy node. What do you
think would be the implications of such a protocol?

9. What are the pros and cons of assigning the responsibility of end-to-end reli-
ability to the application layer?
500 Transport Layer and Security Protocols for Ad Hoc Wireless Networks Chapter 9

10. What is the default value of β used for handling induced traffic in ATP and
why is such a value chosen?
11. Explain how network security requirements vary in the following application
scenarios of ad hoc wireless networks:
(a) Home networks
(b) Classroom networks
(c) Emergency search-and-rescue networks
(d) Military networks
12. Explain how security provisioning in ad hoc wireless networks differs from
that in infrastructure-based networks?
13. Explain the key encrypting key (KEK) method.
14. Nodes A and B want to establish a secure communication, and node A gener-
ates a random key 11001001. Suppose the function used by both nodes A and
B for encryption is XOR, and let node A generate a random transport key
10010101, and let node B generate 00101011. Explain the three-pass Shamir
protocol exchanges.
15. Why is it not advisable to use natural-language passwords directly for cryp-
tographic algorithms?
16. Consider the certificate graph shown in Figure 9.17, with the local certificate
repositories of nodes A and B as indicated. Find the possible paths of trust
from node A to node B which can be obtained using a chain of keys.
17. List a few inherent security flaws present in the following types of routing
protocols: (a) table-driven and (b) on-demand routing.
18. List and explain how some of the inherent properties of the wireless ad hoc
networks introduce difficulties while implementing security in routing proto-
cols.
19. Mark the paths chosen by the following secure-routing protocols for the net-
work topology shown in Figure 9.18: (a) Shortest path routing and (b) SAR
protocol. Assume that node 2 is a secure node. (c) If node 2 (which lies in the
path chosen by SAR protocol) is suddenly attacked and becomes a malicious
node, then mark an alternative path chosen by SAODV protocol.
Section 9.14. Problems 501

Certificates in local repository of A

Certificates in local repository of B

Figure 9.17. Certificate graph.

1
0
1

01
3
6

1
0
2

1
0
Source 01 7

5
01 10
4

01
01
9
8 12

11 01 01 Destination

13

Private node
01 Malicious node
01 Secure node

Figure 9.18. Example network topology.

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