Phenomenology of the Self

Rocci Vizzusi— rvizzusi@csustan.edu

Introduction

In this project, I will be utilizing a phenomenological method to investigate the self or

ego as it functions in experience. Phenomenology is a philosophical movement inaugurated by

Husserl and expanded by others that emphasizes a return “to the things themselves,” by

analyzing the first-person structure of experience. Specifically, I will examine a debate in this

field about whether every conscious experience contains a subject (ego) or whether

consciousness is essentially bereft of an ego prior to self-reflection. My prediction is that both

egological and non-egological theories of self have merit and that aspects of both theories are

ultimately reconcilable. Because I am conducting research in phenomenology, a subfield of

modern philosophy, my concepts will not be measured so much as analyzed and argued. To

accomplish this, I will trace the ideas of self found in the work of early phenomenologists,

namely Husserl, while integrating the work of contemporary researchers in philosophy, cognitive

science, and psychology. This investigation may have value for the multidisciplinary study of

consciousness currently being vigorously carried out around the world.

Research Question

Key Concept 1: Egological Theory of Self/Consciousness

● An egological theory of consciousness is one that claims there is a subject for every

object of experience.
 ● Egological theories argue that every experience has an owner, a self. Therefore,

awareness of something else is also awareness of one’s ego.

● Egological theories were once unpopular under the dominance of functionalism and

scientific materialism but have experienced a resurgence in the wake of failures to find

definitive answers to the problem of subjectivity.

Key Concept 2: Non-Egological Theory of Self/Consciousness

● Non-egological theories deny that every experience has a subject.

● Mental events simply occur and there is no self that is intrinsic to having experience. Self

awareness is something that occurs only upon reflection, it is not implied by

consciousness.

● These theories are common in the sciences and have the support of some philosophers.

Like egological theories, non-egological theories of the self also present difficulties.

Research Question:

Does every conscious experience contain a subject (ego) or is consciousness bereft of a self prior

to self-awareness and/or self-reflection?

Background and Literature Review

Questions about the self have a long history in the philosophical and, especially, the

phenomenological tradition. Husserl conceived of phenomenology “as a science of the essential

structures of pure consciousness with its own distinctive method” (Moran 2002). He was

centrally concerned with subjectivity and how the attainment of knowledge is possible. By
closely describing experience, Husserl attempted to outline the notion of the self, of which

consciousness is a constitutive factor. His method was to “bracket out” the content of

experiences. By abstracting away the specific objects that commonly engulf our consciousness, it

becomes possible to penetrate to the transcendental “rules” that govern first-person experience.

Through this reduction, Husserl sought to discover the pure foundations that comprise

subjectivity. This approach and its conclusions, which attribute subjectivity to the self (ego),

have been widely debated.

Attempting to clarify some issues brought up by Husserl’s opponents, Zahavi (2005)

concentrates on the deceptively complex question: “What is a self?” Through his investigation,

Zahavi attempts to reconcile phenomenology with modern neuroscience and cognitive theory.

His hypothesis is that questions concerning selfhood are inseparable from those concerning

consciousness. Therefore, in order to understand the nature of consciousness, it is imperative to

understand the first-person perspective.

Zahavi’s investigation and others of the same sort inevitably encounter a quandary: does

experience inherently contain a self? Classical phenomenology considers the ego to be the

essential starting point through which experience is possible. However, other theorists in

philosophy and cognitive science have proposed non-egological theories; they consider the self

to be merely a social construction or, even, an illusion (Metzinger 2003). In light of these views,

an investigation into the phenomenology of the self seems necessary in order to resolve key

elements in this debate.

● For this project, I will be utilizing phenomenology. Phenomenology is a philosophical

movement inaugurated by Husserl and expanded by others that emphasizes a return “to

the things themselves” by analyzing the first-person structure of experience. As such, my

concepts will not be measured so much as analyzed and argued.

● Issues of consciousness and subjectivity are some of the few problems that modern

science has been unable to solve. Thus, phenomenology is a suitable approach; it is

imperative that subjective experience is understood in its first-person “givenness.”

Materials:

● Texts written by prominent philosophers will be my primary sources. Husserl and his

writings, especially those that focus on phenomenological reduction and its application to

understanding the nature of the self will be a central focus. I will analyze commentaries

on these texts as well as more contemporary writers that focus on the phenomenology of

subjectivity.

● This design allows me to use the great theoreticians of the past as a guide for interpreting

the contemporary debate in philosophy

Expected Conclusions and Significance

My prediction is that both ecological and non-ecological theories of self have merit and

that aspects of both theories are ultimately reconcilable. Examining these texts in-depth will

reveal a more nuanced conception of the self that incorporates parts of both theories.
 The significance of these findings extends beyond philosophy to tangential fields that

study consciousness and the self. Research in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience

may be illuminated by an analysis of the first-person nature of the self.

References

Metzinger, T. (2003). ​Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity​. MIT Press.

Moran, D. (2000). ​Introduction to phenomenology​. London; New York: Routledge.

Smith, David Woodruff, "Phenomenology", ​The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (​ Summer

Zahavi, D. (2005). ​Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective.

Acknowledgements

Dr. Hakhamanesh Zangeneh

Dr. Suditi Gupta

Tim Held