Environment and Planning A 1998, volume 30, pages 1975 -1989

Deconstructing communicative rationality: a critique of

Habermasian collaborative planning

M Tewdwr-Jones
Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales Cardiff, PO Box 906, Cardiff
CF1 3YN, Wales; e-mail: tewdwr-jones@cf.ac.uk
P Allmendinger
The Faculty of Health and Environment, Brunswick Building, Leeds Metropolitan University,
Leeds LS2 8BU, England; e-mail: p.allmendinger@lmu.ac.uk
Received 23 May 1997; in revised form 10 July 1997

Abstract. What has becomes known in recent years as communicative or collaborative planning has
forged a new hegemony in planning theory. Described by some as the paradigm of the 1990s, it
proposes a fundamental challenge to the practice of planning that seeks both to explain where
planning has gone wrong and (more controversially) to identify ways forward. The broad approach
itself and advocates of it have lacked the advantage of any critique. This paper provides such an
opportunity. Following a brief outline of communicative action, we identify three broad areas of
concern that militate against the option of a collaborative planning approach. More specifically, we
identify problematic assumptions in Habermas's original theoretical distinction of communicative
action as a fourth separate concept of sociological action. Although we accept its useful dissection
of planning and the role of values and consensus-building in decision-settings, we consider that
collaborative planning theory fails to incorporate adequately the peculiar political and professional
nuances that exist in planning practice. We conclude our critique by raising programmatic points for
planning theory and practice in general.

Introduction
The basis of communicative rationality is the work of H a b e r m a s , the G e r m a n
sociologist-philosopher, who published the influential tome Theorie des Kommuni-
kativen Handelns, Band I: Handlungsrationalitat und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung
in 1981, translated as The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the
Rationalization of Society in 1984. Within the work H a b e r m a s examines the concept of
rationality and its relations to problems of social action, inter subjective communication
and social - historical change. Although the work can certainly be regarded as his
m a g n u m opus, his own interpretations draw heavily on the writings of Mead and
Durkheim. H a b e r m a s ' s entry onto the stage of the m o d e r n - p o s t m o d e r n debate in
the early 1980s represented the long overdue left-wing defence of m o d e r n i s m and the
attack on what H a b e r m a s sees as the destructive antimodernisms of Lyotard, Foucault,
and others. His basic argument is that the emancipatory project of modernity must n o t
be abandoned. The three 'cultural spheres' of the Enlightenment (science, morality, a n d
art) have become dominated by instrumental rationality which is itself a product of
capitalism. Further, these three spheres have increasingly distanced themselves from the
'lifeworld' under the growing dominance of 'experts'. Habermas's lifeworld is one of his
most misunderstood concepts. This is partly to do with a lack of clarity in its original
conception and partly because H a b e r m a s has gone on to 'clarify' what he m e a n t
following criticism. In crude terms, it could be taken to be the sphere of 'everyday
life' including stocks and interpretation of previous knowledge. R a t h e r than being based
on the formal instrumentally rational basis of 'the system' (such as economic or
administrative systems), the lifeworld is instead based on normative - communicative
understandings. In order to counter the invasion of the lifeworld by experts and the
1976 M Tewdwr-Jones, P Allmendinger

instrumentality of 'the system', Habermas develops his communicative rationality,

central to which, as in poststructuralism, is the role of language and the search for
undistorted communication as a basis for consensus and action. In his 'ideal speech
situation', "communication will no longer be distorted by the effects of power, self-
interest or ignorance" (Norris, 1985, page 149). The basis for any such approach, as
Bertens (1995) has pointed out, is a democratic context in which anyone may question
the claims of anyone else:
"... so long as each party aims at consensus and agrees to concur with positions that
he or she cannot refute" (Poster, 1989, cited in Bertens, 1995, page 117).
In his development of a theory of communicative action, Habermas identified three
other sociological concepts of action: teleological, normatively regulated, and drama-
turgical. Although an in-depth examination of these concepts is beyond the scope of this
paper, it will be useful at this point to outline briefly the definitions of the four actions as
a precursor to a detailed critique of collaborative planning (and its limitations) later in
the paper. Teleological action occurs when an actor attains an end or brings about the
occurrence of a desired state by choosing the appropriate means to deliver the success.
Developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern, the action essentially concerns the
realisation of an end. Normatively regulated action, developed by Durkheim and Parsons,
describes how members of a social group orient their actions according to a set of
predefined common values, and where each individual complies with the group's norms.
Dramaturgical action is the social concept developed to describe the presentation
of the self to an audience, by constituting a particular behaviour or image for an
audience. Developed by Goffman, the action incorporates the possibility of strategic
behaviour, in which the individual actor may present a front to hide particular views,
or else (may) employ deceptive means to achieve a desired outcome. Communicative
action, by way of contrast, is identified by Habermas as the interaction of at least two
subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations. The indi-
viduals seek to reach an understanding about a situation and their plans of action in
order to coordinate their plans by way of agreement or consensus.
'Communicative planning' (Forester, 1989), 'argumentative planning' (Forester, 1993),
'planning through debate' (Healey, 1992), 'inclusionary discourse' (Healey, 1994), and
'collaborative planning' (Healey, 1997) are terms that have been used extensively in
planning theory literature over the last eight years or so to describe and transform
the concepts of Habermas into planning philosophy. The main components of a com-
municative rational approach to planning have been summarised by Healey (1992,
pages 154-155) under the following conditions:
(1) Planning is an interactive and interpretative process.
(2) Planning is undertaken among diverse and fluid discourse communities.
(3) The methods require respectful interpersonal and intercultural discussion.
(4) Focuses rest on the "arenas of struggle" (Healey, 1993, page 84) where public
discussion occurs and where problems, strategies, tactics, and values are identi-
fied, discussed, evaluated, and where conflicts are mediated.
(5) There are multifarious claims for different forms and types of policy development.
(6) A reflective capacity is developed that enables participants to evaluate and reevaluate.
(7) Strategic discourses are opened up to include all interested parties which, in turn,
generates new planning discourses.
(8) Participants in the discourse gain knowledge of other participants in addition to
learning new relations, values, and understandings.
(9) Participants are able to collaborate to change the existing conditions.
(10) Participants are encouraged to find ways of practically achieving their planning
desires, not simply to agree and list their objectives.
Deconstructing communicative rationality 1977

There have been various interpretations of communicative rationality as a basis for

planning (for example, Forester, 1980; 1989; 1993; Healey, 1993; 1996a; 1997; Healey
and Hillier, 1996; Hillier, 1993; Innes, 1995; Sager, 1994). Three broad categories emerge
from these interpretations. First there are the micropolitical interpretations of planning
practice usually based on a combination of Habermasian ideal speech and poststructur-
alist concern with language (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Forester, 1989; 1993). Following
in this tradition are the second category of ethnographic studies which compare this
ideal to practice (Healey, 1992; Healey and Hillier, 1996; Hillier, 1993). Third, there are the
prescriptive (though the authors would deny this label) studies aimed at using commu-
nicative rationality as a basis for what has now been termed 'collaborative planning'
(Healey, 1992; 1996a; 1996b; 1997). In this third category we find the most developed
accounts of collaborative planning and the critique of instrumental rationality.
Running through these studies are graduations of interpretations which demonstrate
a change in emphasis, particularly regarding power. As Richardson (1996) has summa-
rised, communicative planning might be characterised as:
(1) set within an ideal pluralist political system;
(2) aimed at redefining rationality in a new communicative way;
(3) attempting to develop a new unified planning theory;
(4) pro-modernist; and
(5) centrally locating the policy analyst or planner.
It is clear to us that communicative rationality has reached a defining moment. The
reasons for this can be collected under three main headings. First, there is the increased
questioning of its theoretical foundations. In particular, the Foucauldian concern with
power queries the lack of importance attached to outcomes in communicative ration-
ality. Other poststructural and postmodern critiques question whether consensus is
possible or even desirable in a world of increasing difference. But a more insidious
theoretical concern underpins communicative rationality. Its seeming neutrality of pro-
cess where the emphasis is on uncoerced and undistorted interaction among competing
individuals masks some important assumptions regarding participatory democracy, the
role and values of professionals and market economies. It is ironic that a process
concerned with transparency in communication seems to impose assumptions upon
the process, such as participatory democracy 'good', representative democracy 'bad'.
Second, practical problems have dogged any attempt to translate communicative
rationality into realistic projects and have overtly focused on process as opposed to
outcome. One recent example is in South Africa, where concern with empowerment
has led to a sclerosis of action. Communicative rationality also places too much emphasis
on the plan as a vehicle for embodying 'ideal speech' while either failing to recognise or
choosing to ignore the practical workings of planning practice. Such workings involve
a large amount of incremental decisionmaking (even where a plan is in place) that is
constituted in a power-laden political arena of local and national concerns, some of
which (such as the pressure to make quick decisions) preclude anything but the most
superficial nod at undistorted communication.
Third, we perceive a growing dissatisfaction with the unfulfilled promises of com-
municative rationality as well as evidence (to back up our own perceptions) that those who
pursue it as a theoretical exercise seek to speak on behalf of others who do not hold similar
views. This point is related to the imposition of values, but is more focused on local level
perceptions than on theoretical concerns. In particular it reflects recent evidence which
demonstrates that these values are not widely held by planners and politicians, which
itself undermines the general social democratic view of planners and planning.
We have been concerned that there has been little critique of communicative
rationality in planning or of collaborative planning over the last ten years to question
1978 M Tewdwr-Jones, P Allmendinger

the assumptions associated with and inherent within the theory as the concept has
taken root, and this has been the main motivation behind our critique.
The three components of our critique (theory, practice, and value) seriously under-
mine 'high' Habermasian communicative rationality in our view, something that we feel
is not lost on some of its main proponents, who have in recent years switched, redefined,
and altered their interpretations to make what has now been termed 'collaborative
planning' a pale imitation that resembles little more than enhanced participation. We
are not saying that these three areas of critique are the only grounds upon which
communicative rationality fails but these are three that we feel are particularly pertinent
and cover a broad range of concerns. We will now look at these three areas of concern.

Theoretical concerns
Communicative planning is not so much a theory, rather it could be described as a 'life
view' based on a participatory perspective of democracy and a dislike—or at least a
grave suspicion—of free-market economies (the basis of the demonised instrumental
rationality). As Healey (1993, page 233) has stated, "its context [is] planning as a
democratic enterprise aimed at promoting social justice and environmental sustain-
ability". Underlying this sentiment is a particular view or set of values. Criticism of
communicative rationality through its view of planning as an emancipatory project
concerned with undistorted communication can be aimed at the way in which these
values are 'hidden' within communicative rationality as well as the values themselves.
As Outhwaite rightly points out:
"Adoption or rejection of Habermas's theory depends more on holistic judgements
at the level of social theory than a piecemeal acceptance of successive philosophical
arguments" (1994, page 109).
To accept Habermas's work there has to be a corresponding 'world view' of values. At
a crude level, communicative rationality is about undistorted communication, open-
ness, a lack of oppression. It is, therefore, ironic, if not contradictory, that it should
itself contain clear prejudices towards a certain view or set of values. The counterclaim
would be that at least this view or set of values are open and can be challenged. But
here we return to the circularity of the position; how can you challenge a set of values
within a system that has been created by those values without destroying the system or
process itself? Further, how can a system or process that claims to bring about
consensus (by making participants 'open up' and show their values in the knowledge
that 'everyone is equal') justify a biased process? This is not to say that these values are
not acceptable or held by everyone anyway. Two aspects are of particular concern.
Participatory democracy, upon which communicative planning depends, is by no
means problem free or a value held by everyone. Even proponents of participatory
democracy feel that it has its limits given the emphasis on or preference for local rather
than national concerns (Pateman, 1970). What happens when the two meet? The
assumption that involvement in democratic processes breeds more involvement is
also open to question. As Held (1987, page 281) has concluded "...it is at least ques-
tionable whether participation per se leads'to consistent and desirable political out-
comes; an array of possible tensions can exist between individual liberty, distributional
questions (social justice) and democratic decisions." Communicative rationality also
criticises markets as allocators of resources and as the basis for instrumental rationality.
But one of the acknowledged strengths of New Right theory and, in particular, public
choice theory is the anthropological analysis of individuals as rational self-interested
actors whose characteristics shape political behaviour in voter, politician, or bureaucrat.
Communicative rationality rejects the individual basis of society and plumps instead for
an approach which is either community based or consensus based. Even if a position
Deconstructing communicative rationality 1979

somewhere between the two exists (where the biological imperative of the selfish gene
meets the social animal) then this undermines the nonpolitical nature of communicative
rationality. Habermas's only answer to this charge is that he is not concerned with
building an anthropology of action as a whole (Outhwaite, 1994, page 10).
A (if not the) basic assumption of communicative rationality is that consensus can
be reached. Although Habermas accepts that this might not always be the case there are
two aspects of concern here. The first aspect is what to do and how to mediate when
such consensus is not reached. The use of 'courts' accepts a dominatory and represen-
tative approach to politics absent from communicative rationality and involves using
the same mechanisms rejected by Habermas and his followers. More fundamentally,
attempts to mediate disagreement involve not only an acceptance of ontological differ-
ence but also a desire to unify it. Reaching agreement through open discourse is then
dependent upon a threat of imposition—hardly 'uncoerced'. Equally of concern and
related to the above point is the question of whether we should aim to create consensus
at all. Communicative rationalists accept the idea of postmodernism as epoch (1) , as
demonstrated by the associated importance attached to difference and the poststruc-
turalist concern with the relativity of language. But at the point where you think that
the acceptance of postmodern difference a la Foucault et al will surely undermine (or
at least question) the modernisms of Habermas and his search for consensus, the
communicative rationalists 'pull back'. Their position could be summarised as 'we are
living in a world of increasing difference, with the death of overarching assumptions
and theories which makes it even more important to create a shared basis for living
together'. Even where such consensus does not naturally exist. Although we do not
wish to follow the postmodern universalisation of difference and the lack of action
relativity entails, we feel that the unifying assumptions and aims of communicative
rationality are at odds with a desire for self-expression and difference. As Foucault
might say, opposition is good and power can be positive as well as negative. There is a
danger (if not inevitability) that seeking consensus will silence rather than give voice.
Also, there is the question raised by Rorty regarding instrumental rationality—the
bogeyman of communicative rationality. Is it all bad? Of course not. Just as we must
take the undoubted benefits of modernism with some of its alleged drawbacks, so
Rorty (1985) argues should we take instrumental rationality as an inevitable by-product
of liberalism. Besides, rationality and modernity have not been as influential as all that.
The growth in universal education, unions, the mass media, standards of living, and
consumer durables have greatly affected peoples lives in the past century, freeing
people from the slavery of work and mass opinions, and at least giving them an avenue
for self-expression. Although we must not forget that not everyone has benefited from
this in equal measures and huge disparities exist, can we really say that instrumental
rationality has (1) been crucial to people's 'voice', and (2) made a significant detrimental
difference to their ability to express that voice when other avenues are open to them? We
think not.

Practical concerns
As we noted above, the assumption that all stakeholders within the communicative
discourse arena are striving for enhanced democracy for communities is a value
judgment and one that does not hold water; the stakeholders present within the arena
of discourse will possess different aims and values and professional agendas. There is
also a difficulty in questioning how far values are held in common, and what assump-
tions can be made about this. The ethic assumes that all those who present themselves
(1)
Though, ironically, Habermas like Harvey and Jameson argues that postmodern is actually
new modern or late modern.
1980 M Tewdwr-Jones, P Allmendinger

into the discourse arena would share the same desire to make sense together. This
assumption does not relate to the nature of the human psyche; why should consensus
among all those attending be regarded as a positive attribute when clearly different
agendas and different objectives form the very essence of the planning argumentation
process? "Making sense together while living differently" (Forester, 1989, page 118)
possibly explains not only that we are different, but that we possess different percep-
tions of processes, of outcomes, and that we are driven by argumentation. It does not
suggest that the purpose of communicative planning is to ensure that everyone agrees,
or that everyone will accept a shared understanding of multifarious positions on the
same contentious issue.
Communicative rationality also assumes that all sections of a community can be
included within the collaborative planning discourse, although little has been said on
how this could be achieved, or even how all these stakeholders can be identified, and
by whom. If the role of the expert—the planner—is to be denied within a communi-
cative action process, who will facilitate the process of mutual learning and sort
through the arguments expressed? Where does this place the planning professional's
personal opinions or judgment? If professional judgment is to be 'neutralised', what is
the purpose of planning as a professional institution? Both Forester (1989) and Healey
(1997) recognise the political, value-laden nature of planning practice and its ability to
express values and carry power. However, they argue that the power component of
planning practice can be transformed through a transfiguration of social processes
and relations within particular places. As Healey (1997, page 86) argues, "Spatial and
environmental planning practices are embedded in specific contexts, through the
institutional histories of particular places and the understandings that are brought
forward by the various participating groups, and the processes through which issues
are discussed. Through this double activity of embedded framing, spatial and environ-
mental planning practices thus both reflect the context of power relations and carry
power themselves" (emphasis in original). So the power dimension is viewed as a
matter that can be transformed through a restructuring of power relations and social
contexts, with individuals recognising and identifying the distribution of power
between those actors participating within the collaborative exercise. Power is therefore
compartmentalised by Healey into a process to be recognised by stakeholders, rather
than as a process to be removed, although she does call for "a vigorous pluralistic
politics" (1997, page 213) to counteract these tendencies. The key issue is for communi-
cative action to transform the machinery of formal government and politics, to enable
more checks and balances to develop against the bureaucratic and administrative elites
that, together form governance.
The distribution of power between individual stakeholders is recognised, but com-
municative rationalists suggest that, by building up trust and confidence across these
fissures in interpersonal relations, "new relations of collaboration and trust ... [will]
shift power bases" (Healey, 1997, page 263). To say that this is optimistic would be an
understatement. The theorists are advocating a redesigning of institutions to foster
collaborative social learning processes; they are arguing for the replacement of existing
power structures with inclusionary argumentative governance, and this is the weakness
of the theory. The planning theorists, even Habermas himself, argue for communicative
rationality to foster an alternative to existing power structures. By simply changing the
institutional framework of governance, it is argued that a more open discursive style of
governance can develop. This, however, displays little regard for individual perception
and motivation. It tackles only the institutional aspect of power structures, and denies
the existence of power inherent within the individual.
Deconstructing communicative rationality 1981

H a b e r m a s identified four different social concepts of action in advancing his

communicative theory of action. H e suggested that communicative action would be a
useful alternative to the other three. We wish to argue at this point that communicative
action is n o t an independent theory to sociological concepts of teleological action,
normatively regulated action, or dramaturgical action. Aspects of these other theories
of social action are actually inherent within communicative action, n o t independent
from communicative action. We shall illustrate this point with reference to planning
practice.
First, an actor within a communicative planning model could intentionally employ
strategies a n d tactics within the discourse arena to bring about his or her desired ends.
There is a possibility that, even if actors (as stakeholders) sign u p for an open, honest,
and trustworthy discursive style of argumentation, an individual may feel inclined to
act 'teleologically'.
Second, members of a group who participate within the collaborative planning
exercise are likely to possess shared agendas and c o m m o n values in an attempt to ensure
that their viewpoints succeed in the discourse arena, even if they agree to be open a n d
honest in the debate. Examples of these groups might include: members of an environ-
mental lobbying group who have organised themselves to fight a highway scheme or
opencast mining development; paid employees or shareholders of a property develop-
ment company which is attempting to secure a large-scale housebuilding p r o g r a m m e
in a locality; or professional planning representatives of a local planning authority who
are charged with the responsibility of implementing the representative democrats'
planning policy objectives. The development of an inclusionary open discourse on its
own will not guarantee an open and fairer collaborative process, as groups of stake-
holders will form natural pacts because either they assign themselves to particular
n o r m s or conventions or else will want to ensure that their viewpoints win over other
participants. Thus, there is potential for normatively regulated action to occur within
communicative planning.
Third, individual stakeholders within the discourse arena might attempt to con-
stitute a particular image of the self in* presenting viewpoints, either to evoke an
acceptable image to the audience, or to present a completely false position to minimise
argumentation and debate. Members of the professional planning bodies, in the United
K i n g d o m at least, are familiar*with this aspect, as they usually do not want to show all
their cards at once during consultations with members of the public and developers.
They are selective in the information they disclose in negotiations, they manipulate
agendas, they act to sway the argument, through selective debriefing and careful aware-
ness of circumstances. Forester (1989) recognises this point at length in his discussion of
the power c o m p o n e n t of planners' day-to-day tasks and their skills, to use Goffman's
(1959) terminology, of strategic behaviour and dramaturgical action. This component,
however, is curiously absent from Healey's work.
Communicative action is, therefore, inherently political and powerful, as it is unable
to control the individual thought-processes of stakeholders or guarantee that all partici-
pants will act in an open and honest m a n n e r all the time. A n d so long as there is a
possibility that individuals will n o t wish to build trust, understanding, and new relations
of power a m o n g participants, nor wish to generate "social, intellectual and political
capital which can endure beyond the particular collaborative effort" (Healey, 1997,
page 264), then a truly successful communicative action process is infeasible, as power
and political action will remain dominant determinants.
Communicative planning is founded on the rationale that individuals will decide
'morally', and that negotiative processes within collaborative discourse arenas are
founded on truth, openness, honesty, legitimacy, and integrity. It fails to include the
1982 M Tewdwr-Jones, P Allmendinger

possibility that individuals can deliberately obfuscate the facts and judgments for their
own benefit, and for the benefit of their own arguments. Forester (1989) systematically
addresses this issue, but little has been said by Habermas or the other planning
translators on how communicative planning should take account of this. They believe
that individuals will simply alter their persona once a more collaborative process has
been agreed to. We suggest that this expectation is simply too optimistic for practice to
incorporate. We call on the planning theorists at this point to debate the potential
impact of individual stakeholders employing strategic behaviour within collaborative
planning, and to discuss how 'the self question' could be mitigated at the micropolitical
level other than through the even more optimistic and generalised call for the redesign
of institutions. The style of language utilised and the type of knowledge shared can also
never be constant or universal. In such a heavily politicised arena as planning, con-
sensus is completely Utopian—there will always be winners and losers—and it will
never be possible for all individuals to abandon their political positions and act
neutrally. The assertion that individuals put across their own principles in an open
and honest manner, and are then subjected to 'mutual mind-changing' as other indi-
viduals' principles conflict, fails to show any regard for the benefits of argumentation.
If everyone is to agree, or achieve consensus, what would be the purpose of individuals
with differing opinions initially participating in the discourse arena, only if there is a
slight possibility that their views will find favour with the majority? Would not
communicative planning solely benefit the moral majority, however defined, and pos-
sibly exclude minority interests—in some cases, the very sections of society it is seeking
to support? Forester (1996) and Healey (1997) claim that the rituals associated with
communicative practices require a minimum degree of commitment and trust on the
part of the parties to enable them to proceed.
"'Successful' strategy-making efforts produce strategies and policies which convince
stakeholders of the value of a new direction and its implications, through the
creation of a new discourse or story about a set of issues" (Healey, 1997, page 267)
We concur with Healey's view of the importance of convincing stakeholders of the
benefits and values of new approaches and ideas, but we disagree with the notion that
this is 'successful'. Agreement between stakeholders on the benefit of a particular
strategy is only successful for that particular strategy; it does not mean that the same
stakeholders will readily agree to new forms of practices or working for strategy-making
in the future. 'Success' in spatial strategy-making is therefore dependent on the 'degree
of convincing' individual stakeholders can impose on the other members of the dis-
course arena. The debating arena might well produce new relations and forms of
practice that all stakeholders concur with; this would be successful for that particular
day, but there is no guarantee that successive meetings would witness the same degree
of mutual mind-changing. Similarly, a 'successful' practice might exist only for one
particular issue within a discourse arena—individuals come together as a temporary
aberration but drift apart again into retrenched positions for the remainder of the
exercise. Individual actors, in our view, will feel a desire to cooperate or agree only
on the basis of whether they trust the stakeholders advocating a particular position
(that is, on examining—consciously or subconsciously—the origins of the perspective)
and on the length of time they are prepared to give hearing to the subject and the view-
point; the power associated with acceptance or nonacceptance of interpersonal relations
is therefore carried within the individual stakeholder's psyche as a consensual-
determining force.
It is our contention that collaborative or communicative planning would not replace
the self-conscious autonomous individual either from expressing a divergent view or
from disagreeing with a consensual view. Nor is it realistic to expect that an individual
Deconstructing communicative rationality 1983

possessing a divergent opinion from the consensus would, after discourse, abandon all
claims to the separate view and not lobby by other means to achieve their preferred
outcome. The key issue is what could be regarded as legitimate means of lobbying?
Making sense together could well be a positive feature of participatory democracy, and
prove useful as a debating arena and method through which people express different
opinions on development issues and community desires. But it would be wrong to
think that the only purpose of such a system would be to enact the processes of
participatory democracy, without any discussion of the outcome from the process.
An evaluation of the outcome from collaborative planning action does not seem to
be an important question for the theorists to address, on the basis that the outcome
will only be appropriate (and of interest), for individual localities and their debating
arenas. As Healey (1997, page 264) makes clear, "Consensus on problems, policies and
how to follow them through is not something to be uncovered through collaborative
dialogue". But if individuals (as stakeholders) within the discourse arena are to be
persuaded to be involved in the exercise, and are to be persuaded to discuss their
preferred options and strategies openly, they will want to know how the process will
lead to policy outcomes or decisions. If the sole benefit of communicative planning is
to establish the arena for discourse among competing, multiple stakeholders, the whole
process will be castigated as nothing more than a talking shop.
Earlier translations of Habermas into communicative planning theory suggested
that all those involved in the discourse arena should challenge the hierarchical traditions
within which planning is set, for example through questioning the role and opinions of
central government and establishing an opposing 'bottom-up' view formulated through
collective decisionmaking that would have to be accepted (Healey, 1992). Later inter-
pretations recognise that to achieve any meaningful consensus, and for individuals to
begin to consider how those desires could be transposed into practical planning
solutions, necessitates wider institutional, legal, and political restructuring before
transposition can take place (Healey 1996a; 1997):
"The collaborative approach to strategic place-making... is... unlikely to flourish
without some changes in political culture and institutional design" (1996a, page, 19).
This reflects the disappointment that might be apparent, or even the failure of collab-
orative planning techniques, in translating agreed discourses into practical outcomes.
Recent work in South Africa has indicated that the establishment of a collaborative
technique involving all relevant stakeholders within a community and their quest for an
agreed discourse floundered because more emphasis was placed on the process of
collaborative planning rather than on considering how the discourses could be trans-
lated into practical realities (Oranje, 1996). Similar research in the United Kingdom on
a local planning authority's attempts at innovative participatory democracy found that
it had been successful in involving a high proportion of stakeholders in the community,
and in generating discourse among a range of different interest groups, but was less
successful in translating the agreed discourse into the nuances of the land-use planning
policy process (Tewdwr-Jones and Thomas, 1998). Although this brings into play
matters relating to communities' (and planners') frustrations with existing institutional
parameters within planning, it also serves to raise community and stakeholders' expec-
tations of delivering concrete results. Habermas and the communicative planning
theorists have argued that there may be times of disappointment, when collaborative
action techniques fail, but imply that the failure is one of implementation alone, and
relates to the institutional processes evident in localities immediately following the
collaborative planning exercise that can mitigate against shared discourses, thus neatly
avoiding the attachment of any fault to the theory itself. Within the UK local planning
authority's exercise highlighted above, stakeholders felt aggrieved by the authority's
1984 M Tewdwr-Jones, P Allmendinger

failure through political and legal constraints to transpose desires into the planning
system, and believed that the more innovative, progressive democratic pluralism
advanced had been a waste of time, because little attention had been focused on
outcome. It is somewhat ironic to note that, in the mind of the planners within this
local planning authority, the exercise had been truly successful, because a democratic
process had been created; the fact that the process had failed to deliver what the
community expected was not regarded by the proponents of innovative participation
as a problem.
At this point, we would also call on the theorists to describe how individuals should
explain to stakeholders the usefulness of such a strategy when there is no possibility of
delivering results or outcomes, and how community expectations should not be raised
by the development of more innovative processes. This begs the question of what
collaborative planning would be seeking to achieve. Is it the arena within which the
development plan is debated that is more important, or the usefulness of the strategy
or plan (as an outcome) once developed? If the focus is exclusively on the process
rather than the outcome, it raises the issue of scale; if each tier of the planning
hierarchy has to be subject to stakeholder consensus, how could collaborative planning
work?

Values
We can also identify a number of issues relating to the values within communicative
rationality that are worthy of attention. First, we wish to question the position of the
professional planner within a collaborative planning exercise. A strong theme of the
communicative rationalists' theory is to deny a central coordinating or expert role for
the planner in the discourse arena, as it is the planner who is tarnished with the power
and political trappings of the administrative elite. Healey (1997, page 309) calls for "a
more interactive relationship between experts and the stakeholder communities they
serve", for planners to act as "a knowledge mediator and broker" or as "a critical
friend" (Forester, 1996). There is an assumption here that planners (if indeed one
accepts a need to retain planners at all within a collaborative planning technique),
will act or be forced to act democratically, or at least be supportive of increasing
progressive democratic pluralism. Why should this be the case? The theorists seem to
be calling for planning professionals to adopt open and pluralistic stances and for
them to be treated the same as all other stakeholders but do not go so far as to
question the role of professionalism within collaborative planning. The assessment of
the role of professionalism within innovative planning participation techniques is an
interesting issue, but too broad a matter to be debated here [see Allmendinger (1996),
Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones (1997), and Tewdwr-Jones (1996) for further discus-
sion]. However, we are unable to discern from the planning theorists' work whether
they are arguing for planning professionalism to be part of a local community's
systematic institutional redesign (the transformation of existing institutional structures
to enable more pluralistic practices) or else hinting that it is time to consider whether
or not to deprofessionalise the planning system altogether. Fostering a more open,
discursive form of collaborative planning in the spirit of Habermas would, it seems to
us, necessitate the deprofessionalisation of planning, as the educational and training
skills baggage that accompanies the separation of planning as a professional activity is
a significant block to fostering complete pluralistic practices and only encourages the
predominance of existing power relations.
Second, a requirement for actors to adopt more open styles of practices is a point
acknowledged by Habermas, although he does not address what is stopping actors from
taking a communicative stance in the first place. There is nothing to stop individuals
Deconstructing communicative rationality 1985

refusing to act in such a way nor to pretend to act in that way by behaving strategically.
The consequence for Habermas is that he is not now "...saying that people ought to
act communicatively, but that they must.... When parents educate their children, when
living generations appropriate the knowledge handed down by the predecessors, when
individuals cooperate, i.e., get on with one another without a costly use of force, they
must act communicatively" (quoted in Outhwaite, 1994, page 112). The compulsive
element brings us back to the point made earlier concerning the moral or normative
aspect of communicative rationality and collaborative planning; you either accept it
as a whole or not at all. Planners, in the United Kingdom at least, have never been
encouraged to act democratically by the state, by their professional institute, or even
through their education. Acting democratically is an assumption that underlies the
possible implementation of collaborative planning. It also assumes that unspecified
individuals (other than planners) will act as facilitators within the discourse arena
between the competing stakeholders, without the recognition of what roles planners
would perform, or how the facilitator and/or planner mediates between a representative
democratic viewpoint and a participatory democratic viewpoint. The person facilitating
the discourse arena is also in a potentially powerful position. How can the neutrality
and independence of the facilitator be agreed and checked? Planners themselves can
equally be stakeholders eager to implement either their employers' political or planning
desires (normatively regulated action), or personal planning ideologies developed over
the years of planning education and training (teleological action). Assuming that
planners would act neutrally in this respect, in the face of competing (even opposing)
interests, is naive. This issue goes to the very heart of the position of the planner; can
stakeholders trust the planner to translate agreed discourses into practical realities?
Would 'interdependence' be achievable?
We believe that, within the United Kingdom, the planner is not under any obligation
to facilitate the process of learning, nor is the planner grounded in an ethic of inclusion.
And to convince planners that they should operate in this manner is, currently,
ambitious. Recent research in Britain has suggested that planners are suspicious of
questions of social justice (Campbell and Marshall, 1996), and do not believe that the
planning system could, or indeed should, address these matters. There is even some
evidence that planners have very little regard for public consultation and participation,
as it potentially undermines their professional autonomy and threatens their independent
professional judgment (Allmendinger, 1996; Kaufman and Escuin, 1996; Tewdwr-Jones,
1996). The professional element can also be diverse. Not every planner in the innova-
tive public participation scheme might accept an agreed public involvement approach.
Indeed, some planners are extremely reluctant to develop a greater, innovative partici-
patory role for communities for fear of losing (or at least dissolving) their professional
positions.
It is our belief that discourse concerning planning can never be divorced from ques-
tions of dominatory principles: who controls what, how is an agenda set, who benefits
from the consensual position, does everyone accept the 'agreed' position? Planners are
able to participate, even to promote, mutual understanding within multiple-discourse
arenas, but simultaneously may not be prepared either to abandon completely their
personal beliefs and values or to amend their values to reflect the values of other
stakeholders. They need to link lifeworlds. At the moment, links between different actors'
lifeworlds is, for the planner, a oneway process. Individuals within the communicative
discourse arena possess prior knowledge, and expectations of both process and outcome.
That knowledge, enshrined within individuals' beliefs, values, personal opinions, and
moral codes, will undergo change, scrutiny, reevaluations, reconsideration, and reas-
sessment as the collaborative exercise gets underway. But the collaborative discourse
1986 M Tewdwr-Jones, P Allmendinger

arena cannot guarantee that this prior knowledge will be completely revised, replaced,
or abandoned in favour of other more pertinent views expounded by individuals within
the meeting. It holds true that identifying and predefining a set of planning problems in
advance to address within plans can often be problematic, and proponents of commu-
nicative rationality are correct in raising the problems of formulating 'agendas' of
planning problems yet to be identified; however, they fail to acknowledge that facts
and knowledge can be developed by the individual in advance and be adapted to suit
different circumstances as the discourse unfolds, and as different language is used. Thus
individuals may hold a preconceived notion of how certain planning problems could be
tackled once they are identified.
Third, there is a further problem that communicative rationality presupposes;
individual stakeholders participating within the discourse arena should possess either
the same knowledge about issues to be discussed, or else perfect knowledge, to enable
debate to occur with honesty and integrity. It also supposes that individual stake-
holders possess the required skills to enable effective participation within the discourse
arena, when it is self-evident that debating and interpersonal skills vary from one
individual to the next. Collaborative planning assumes that individuals, by acting
openly and honestly, will be prepared to see their values subjected to scrutiny, criticised
by stakeholders, and would then admit 'defeat' in the face of competing arguments.
Individuals are far more 'behaviourist', and to treat the reevaluation process as a
scientific concept in this way is to do nothing more than to attempt to separate the
human senses from the body, to split behaviour from action, and to divorce emotion
from fact. Would not some stakeholders feel aggrieved by this process? Would not
some stakeholders feel a desire to act further, rather than rationally and scientifically
by saying, "OK, I agree with you. I may have really strong views and values about this
issue, but in the light of other views expressed at this meeting, I'm prepared to go along
with them"? Imagine representatives of a large powerful property company being
prepared to back down in the face of residents' concerns within this forum, without
first attempting to enact hardware political and planning lobbying (such as quasi-legal
argumentation) to secure their multimillion pound property deal. We concur with
Healey's view that it would be to everyone's advantage if the property company,
together with the planners, the environmentalists, the residents and the other interested
stakeholders, were to agree to act openly and honestly within a discursive argumenta-
tive arena. We do not believe, however, that this is realistic.
Fourth, the communicative or collaborative planners have also been at pains to
state that they are not advocating a prescription for planning practice. We feel, how-
ever, that their styles of theorising and debate have encouraged analysts to attempt to
advance a prescribed form of planning practice in the spirit of collaborative planning.
This is not to the detriment of the analysts themselves. At no point in the main works
would you find reference to a 'good practice guide'. However, here we have identified a
difference between Forester's interpretation of Habermasian communicative action
and Healey's work; the latter contains a great deal of normative commitments and
questions for individual communities to ask themselves if they are to develop a rethink
along the lines of 'what might happen if...'. Hence, in her book Collaborative Planning,
Healey systematically outlines "an institutional audit" comprising monitoring, review, and
evaluation of collaborative practices by communities (1997, pages 288 - 289), and in a
related conference paper she lists "good practice pointers in the design of planning systems
to facilitate collaborative, multi-party place-making practices" (1996a, pages 22-23).
In her 1996 Environment and Planning B paper, Healey also lists five questions, or
'dimensions', communities should consider if they are to implement a communicatively
rational approach to spatial strategymaking (1996b, pages 222-223). So, although the
Deconstructing communicative rationality 1987

prescription label is intentionally absent, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that

what we are seeing in Healey's work is the development of something akin to a
'collaborative action programme for planning practice'.
Fifth, little has been said until recently about 'rights of appeal' in a collaborative
exercise. As outlined earlier in the paper, the acceptance of an arbitration process (that
is, through courts or appeals mechanisms) to solve unresolved disputes promotes the
dominatory principle Habermas has been attempting to argue against in his theory of
communicative action, as the discourse arena will be continually threatened by the
imposition of a way or process of action if the open discourse arena fails to reach
agreement. We assume that individual stakeholders who feel aggrieved by decisions
taken against their own (even minority) desires would be afforded an opportunity to
challenge the consensus—or at least to be heard—at a later date. But to enact any
right of appeal is to suggest that the agreed view developed from the discourse arena
could be overturned in favour of other more pertinent considerations expressed by
stakeholders either later in the process or by stakeholders who decided not to partici-
pate in the original collaborative exercise. Would the consensus become an informal
blueprint, or would it be more flexible? We have been surprised, therefore, to read in
Healey's latest work (1997) of the recognition of the need for an appeals arbitration
process within a collaborative technique, as a form of "backstop formal arrangement"
(page 310) when breakdowns in agreement occur. This not only undermines the devel-
opment and continued commitment of stakeholders to participating in a collaborative
planning technique (that is, it would surely encourage the powerful development interests
to employ those quasi-legal hardware political and lobbying argumentation methods to
secure their teleological action rather than through discursive arenas), it also under-
mines high Habermasian communicative rationality.

Conclusions
Collaborative planning as a theory of practice has caused a sea change in the param-
eters of how theorists are considering planning, but the assertion that a shift is
occurring in planning practice seems to be an exaggeration. Some planners are imple-
menting more innovative forms of participation in local planning processes, but this
should not be regarded as a reassertion of the place; these have not occurred within
collaborative or communicative rationality frameworks. They have rather been devel-
oped by individual planners eager to promote a more democratic form of planning
process. The move has not emanated from any grand goal, or moral dilemma within
the planning system—after all, who are the champions of collaborative planning within
planning practice? It has not even been precipitated by either the state or the profes-
sional planning institute. Although these moves are welcome attempts to encourage
more people to become involved in the day-to-day decisionmaking processes of local
planning authorities and could therefore be described as 'bottom-up' to some degree,
they are nevertheless undertaken within an institutional, political, and legal framework
that remains 'top-down'. There is a degree of flexibility apparent, but when planners
attempt to transpose stakeholders' desires into practical policy outcomes, experience
has shown that it is the hierarchical regulatory and institutionalised planning context
that wins the day. The arguments have changed recently, and there does now seem to
be acknowledgement that bottom-up democratic processes will only be truly effective
when the political culture and institutional designs within which planning occurs are
also transformed. There is thus a recognition that the reassertion of the locale will
conflict with the consolidation of performance criteria.
It also militates against the possibility that planners, even within the top-down
institutional framework of politics, law, and government, might have already developed
1988 M Tewdwr-Jones, P Allmendinger

arenas of trust, discourse, and shared understanding for the benefit of participatory
democracy. Are these existing arenas to be abandoned, or should they be regarded as
not sufficiently democratic?
The great contribution of communicative and collaborative theorists, as in all
aspects of critical theory, has been to reveal and question. Forester's (1989) book
Planning in the Face of Power provides an inspirational and groundbreaking contribu-
tion to planning theory and practice that helped inspire us to enter planning research
and theory. Just as the strength of the communicative approach has been its critique,
its weakness is offering an alternative for planning practitioners. It has been possible to
recognise a difference in approach between Forester and Healey, particularly the latter's
normative commitment in prescribing key questions to implement collaborative plan-
ning approaches that certainly smack of prescription, even if the author herself did not
intend this to be so. In any case, any attempt to draw implications for planning practice
is bound to attract further prescriptive analyses from policy researchers to applied
frameworks and a reflective and indepth critique of the practical approach by planning
theorists. We recognise that we may have misinterpreted or misunderstood the theorists'
work; if we have done so, we can only apologise in advance, but we view this paper as a
prompt and an opportunity for them to put the record straight.
To be fair, communicative planning has raised a set of serious issues about how
common values can be forged and applied in a field of differences and power plays. It is
correct that planning should assert the 'public good', whatever that means. But we need
to find new ways of forging a public good that are flexible and inclusive. The problem
with communicative planning is its idealism and utopianism; what does it have to say
about resources and the ability to speak (the traditional problems of participation)?
How does it deal with the complex configuration of power relations in which planners
and participants are enmeshed? These questions seem to have been pushed into the
background, possibly because they are too difficult to consider under present circum-
stances. But the assertion of a public good will only be achieved if planners make
current arrangements work to their, and our, advantages, to harness the activities of
the 'powerful' with democracy, rather than merely to include 'voices'.
Acknowledgements. The authors acknowledge the comments made and suggestions put forward
on earlier drafts of this paper by Neil Harris, Patsy Healey, Jean Hiller, Jon Murdoch, Huw
Thomas, and the anonymous referees.
References
Allmendinger P, 1996, "Development control and the legitimacy of planning decisions. A comment"
Town Planning Review 61 229-233
Allmendinger P, Tewdwr-Jones M, 1997, "Mind the gap: planning theory-practice and the translation
of knowledge into action" Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 24 802 - 806
Bertens H, 1995 The Idea of the Postmodern. A History (Routledge, London)
Campbell H, Marshall R, 1996, "Ethical issues in planning practice", paper presented to the
University of Newcastle 50th Anniversary Conference, 25-27 October; copy available from
the authors, Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, Sheffield
Fischer F, Forester J (Eds), 1993 The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning (UCL Press,
London)
Forester J, 1980, "Listening: the social policy of everyday life. Critical theory and hermeneutics
in practice" Social Praxis 7(3/4), 219-232
Forester J, 1989 Planning in the Face of Power (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA)
Forester J, 1993 Critical Theory, Public Policy and Planning Practice (State University of New York
Press, Albany, NY)
Forester J, 1996, "Beyond dialogue to transformative learning: how deliberative rituals encourage
political judgment in community planning processes", in Democratic Dialogues: Theories and
Practices Ed. S Esquith (University of Poznan, Poznan) pp 141 -168
Goffman E, 1959 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Doubleday, New York)
Deconstructing communicative rationality 1989

Habermas J, 1981 Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns, Band 1: Handlungsrationalitat und

gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main)
Habermas J, 1984 The Theory of Communicative Action; Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of
Society translated by T McCarthy (Polity Press, Cambridge)
Healey P, 1992, "A planner's day: knowledge and action in communicative practice" Journal of the
American Planning Association 58 9 - 20
Healey P, 1993, "The communicative work of development plans" Environment and Planning B:
Planning and Design 20 83 -104
Healey P, 1994, "Strategic spatial planning as a process of argumentation", OP23, Centre for
Architecture and Planning Research, Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia
Healey P, 1996a, "Collaborative planning in a stakeholder society", paper presented to the
University of Newcastle 50th Anniversary Conference, 25 - 27 October; copy available from
the author, Department of Town and Country Planning, University of Newcastle upon Tyne,
Newcastle upon Tyne
Healey P, 1996b, "The communicative turn in spatial planning theory and its implications for
spatial strategy formulation" Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 23 217 - 234
Healey P, 1997 Collaborative Planning. Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies (Macmillan, London)
Healey P, Hillier J, 1996, "Communicative micropolitics: a story of claims and discourses"
International Planning Studies 1(2) 165 - 184
Held D, 1987, Models of Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge)
Hillier J, 1993, "Discursive democracy in action", paper presented to the Association of European
Schools of Planning Congress, Lodz, Poland, July; copy available from the author, Centre for
Architecture and Planning Research, Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia
Innes J, 1995, "Planning theory's emerging paradigm: communicative action and interactive
practice" Journal of Planning Education and Research 14(3) 183 - 190
Kaufman J, Escuin M, 1996, "A comparative study of Dutch, Spanish and American planner
attitudes", paper presented to ACSP/AESOP Joint Congress, Toronto, July 1996; copy
available from the authors, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Burcom Mall, Madison, WI
Norris C, 1985 The Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory After Deconstruction (Methuen,
London)
Oranje M, 1996, "Modernising South Africa and its forgotten people under postmodern
conditions", paper presented to the University of Newcastle 50th Anniversary Conference,
25 - 27 October; copy available from Yasmin Ibraham, Department of Town and Country
Planning, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne
Outhwaite W, 1994 Habermas. A Critical Introduction (Polity Press, Cambridge)
Pateman C, 1970 Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
Poster M, 1989 Critical Theory and Post-structuralism: In Search of a Context (Cornell University
Press, Ithaca, NJ)
Richardson T, 1996, "Foucauldian discourse: power and truth in urban - and regional policy making"
European Planning Studies 4 279-292
Rorty R, 1985, "Habermas and Lyotard on postmodernity", in Habermas and Modernity
Ed. R Bernstein (MIT Press, Cambridge MA) pp 161 - 175
Sager T, 1994 Communicative Planning Theory (Avebury, Aldershot, Hants)
Tewdwr-Jones M, 1996, "Reflective planning theorising and professional protectionism" Town
Planning Review 61235 - 243
Tewdwr-Jones M, Thomas H, 1998, "Collaborative action in local plan-making: planners'
perceptions of 'planning through debate'" Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design
25 127-144