Utility Functions On Indivisible Goods
Utility Functions On Indivisible Goods
Some branches of economics and game theory deal with indivisible goods, discrete items that can be
traded only as a whole. For example, in combinatorial auctions there is a finite set of items, and every agent
can buy a subset of the items, but an item cannot be divided among two or more agents.
It is usually assumed that every agent assigns subjective utility to every subset of the items. This can be
represented in one of two ways:
An ordinal utility preference relation, usually marked by . The fact that an agent prefers a
set to a set is written . If the agent only weakly prefers (i.e. either prefers or is
indifferent between and ) then this is written .
A cardinal utility function, usually denoted by . The utility an agent gets from a set is
written . Cardinal utility functions are often normalized such that , where is
the empty set.
Monotonicity
Monotonicity means that an agent always (weakly) prefers to have extra items. Formally:
Monotonicity is equivalent to the free disposal assumption: if an agent may always discard unwanted items,
then extra items can never decrease the utility.
Additivity
Additivity (also called linearity or modularity) means that "the whole is equal to the Additive utility
sum of its parts." That is, the utility of a set of items is the sum of the utilities of each
item separately. This property is relevant only for cardinal utility functions. It says
that for every set of items, 0
apple 5
hat 7
bread 7
An equivalent property is diminishing marginal utility, which means that for any
sets and with , and every :[2] apple and bread 9
A submodular utility function is characteristic of substitute goods. For example, an apple and a bread loaf
can be considered substitutes: the utility a person receives from eating an apple is smaller if he has already
ate bread (and vice versa), since he is less hungry in that case. A typical utility function for this case is given
at the right.
0
In other words, is a supermodular set function. apple 5
An equivalent property is increasing marginal utility, which means that for all sets knife 7
and with , and every : apple and knife 15
A supermoduler utility function is characteristic of complementary goods. For example, an apple and a
knife can be considered complementary: the utility a person receives from an apple is larger if he already
has a knife (and vice versa), since it is easier to eat an apple after cutting it with a knife. A possible utility
function for this case is given at the right.
0
In other words, is a superadditive set function. X or Y or Z 1
A utility function with is said to be additive if and only if it is both superadditive and subadditive.
With the typical assumption that , every submodular function is subadditive and every
supermodular function is superadditive. Without any assumption on the utility from the empty set, these
relations do not hold.
In particular, if a submodular function is not subadditive, then must be negative. For example,
suppose there are two items, , with , and . This
utility function is submodular and supermodular and non-negative except on the empty set, but is not
subadditive, since
Also, if a supermodular function is not superadditive, then must be positive. Suppose instead that
. This utility function is non-negative, supermodular, and
submodular, but is not superadditive, since
Unit demand
Unit demand (UD) means that the agent only wants a single good. If the agent gets Unit demand utility
two or more goods, he uses the one of them that gives him the highest utility, and
discards the rest. Formally:
0
For a preference relation: for every set there is a subset with
cardinality , such that . apple 5
Gross substitutes
Gross substitutes (GS) means that the agents regards the items as
substitute goods or independent goods but not complementary
goods. There are many formal definitions to this property, all of
which are equivalent.
Example
Aggregate values of functions
Property on {a}, {b} and {a,b}
function
f g h aggregate(f,g,h)
See also
Utility functions on divisible goods
Single-minded agent
References
1. Gul, F.; Stacchetti, E. (1999). "Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes". Journal of
Economic Theory. 87: 95–124. doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2531 (https://doi.org/10.1006%2Fjeth.
1999.2531).
2. Moulin, Hervé (1991). Axioms of cooperative decision making. Cambridge England New
York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521424585.
3. Koopmans, T. C.; Beckmann, M. (1957). "Assignment Problems and the Location of
Economic Activities" (http://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d00/d0004.pdf)
(PDF). Econometrica. 25 (1): 53–76. doi:10.2307/1907742 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F1907
742). JSTOR 1907742 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/1907742).