Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant

and its Safety Features

Reactor Engineering Course at BAEC (RECB-9) 2021
Date: 11.02.2021

Dr. A.F.M. Mizanur Rahman

Chief Scientific Officer, CRNPP and
Project Director, Probable Site Selection for Construction of Nuclear Power
Plant in the Southern Part of Bangladesh
Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission
 CONTENTS
 Introduction
 Safety Object
 Fundamental Safety Principals
 Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)
 Fundamental Safety Function of NPP
 Special Safety Feature of VVER
 Video Show Related Safety Feature of VVER

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Introduction

Nowadays Safety of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is

Global Concern due to Serious NPP Accident:

 Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident in 1979;

 Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster in 1986; and

 Fukushima Nuclear Disaster in 2011

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Safety Objective
The objective of nuclear power plants safety is the
protection of individuals, society and the
environment from undue radiological hazard so
that nuclear power production does not
significantly add to the health risks to which
individuals and society are already exposed.

1. ALARA during routine operation;

2. Minimize the risk to public from accidental
release of radioactivity.

Fundamental safety Objective applies for all

facilities and activities and for all stages over the
life time of the facility.

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Fundamental Safety Principles
To achieve safety objectives IAEA has been formulated 10
Fundamental Safety Principles:
 Principle 1: Responsibility for Safety
The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organization
responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.
 Principle 2: Role of Government
An effective legal and governmental framework for safety, including an
independent regulatory body, must be established and sustained.
 Principle 3: Leadership and management for safety
Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and
sustained in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that
give rise to, radiation risks.
 Principle 4: Justification of facilities and activities
Facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks must yield an overall
benefit.

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Fundamental Safety Principles (Cont.)
Principle 5: Optimization of protection
Protection must be optimized to provide the highest level of safety that can
reasonably be achieved.
Principle 6: Limitation of risks to individuals
Measures for controlling radiation risks must ensure that no individual bears an
unacceptable risk of harm.
Principle 7: Protection of present and future generations
People and the environment, present and future, must be protected against radiation
risks.
Principle 8: Prevention of accidents
All practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or radiation
accidents.
Principle 9: Emergency preparedness and response
Arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear
or radiation incidents.
Principle 10: Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation
risks
Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks must be justified
and optimized.
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 Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)
Nuclear power plant with pressurized water reactor
Fossil-fired power plant

Nuclear vs. fossil power plant

and

• Fossil and nuclear power plants differ in the way of generating the heat
for steam turbines

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Types of Nuclear Power Plants

PWR / VVER
(Pressurized Water Reactor)

BWR
(Boiling Water Reactor)
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Types of Nuclear Power Plants (Cont.)

Gas Cooled Reactor

PHWR
(Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors)

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 Fundamental Safety Functions of NPP

Provision of the three fundamental safety functions has been the

leading principle in the design of nuclear power plants:
1. Control of reactivity

2. Removal of decay heat to the ultimate heat sink

3. Containment of radioactive material

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Control of Reactivity
Reactivity, r = (Keff-1)/Keff
 Preventing uncontrolled reactor power increase

 Ensuring fast safe shutdown of the reactor when needed

If the control rods are inserted into the core the reactor will stay in
shutdown state even at low temperature over the long term. This
means that reactor can be cooled down to safe shutdown condition
without any concern that it might become critical again and without
a mandatory requirement to inject boron into the reactor coolant
system.

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Removal of Decay Heat
To prevent increased temperatures of reactor core, the decay heat
must continually be removed, even after shutdown.

If the decay heat is not continually removed from the reactor

following shutdown, this heat could cause a failure of the system
that is designed to contain the fission products.

 Cooling of the shutdown reactor

 Cooling of used nuclear fuel

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Containment of Radioactive Materials
 Preventing significant radioactive releases to the environment

The defense-in-depth approach ensures that any release of

hazardous amounts of radioactive materials will be extremely
unlikely.

This approach uses three barriers to prevent the release of

fission products from the reactor core to the environment.

These consist of:

1. Fuel rods (fuel pellet and fuel cladding)
2. Reactor vessel and primary coolant system
3. Containment

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Fuel Rods
Fuel rods consist of fuel pellet and fuel cladding

The first barrier designed to prevent an inadvertent release of

radioactive material from the reactor core is the nuclear fuel rod itself.

 During normal operations, about 99 percent of all fission products

remain trapped within the fuel's structure very near the point at which
they were generated by fission.

 The release of fission products from the fuel rods would require a
breakdown of the fuel cladding.

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Reactor Vessel and Primary Coolant System
The second barrier designed to prevent the inadvertent release of fission
products to the environment is the primary coolant system.

One part of the primary coolant system, the reactor core, is located
within a pressure vessel which has walls of steel up to 10 inches (25 cm)
thick. This pressure vessel is called the reactor vessel.

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Containment Building
The third barrier between the fission products and the environment
is the containment building.

The containment building is the familiar large dome-like structure

which may be seen when approaching or passing many nuclear
power plants.

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 Containment Building of PWR/VVER
HURRICANE, TORNADO Ingress Protection PLANE CRASH
Counting the maximum wind speed of 56 m/s
(roofs break down , large trees uprooted, BASIC VARIANT:
railway carriages overturned, cars demolished 20,0 tons at a speed 200 m/s
off the road) OPTION: 400,0 tons

SHOCK WAVE
with a pressure of 30 kPa in the front

SEISMIC EFFECT
BASIC VARIANT: FLOOD, STORM
Safe Shutdown Earthquake on MSK-64 scale - Appropriate for the conditions
7 points; of a concrete site
Design-Basis Earthquake – 6 points
OPTION:
Safe Shutdown Earthquake – 9 points on MSK-
64 scale LONG LOSS OF ELECTRICITY
Design-Basis Earthquake – 8 points AND WATER SUPPLY

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Multiple Layers Protection System

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Special Safety Feature of VVER
The Russian abbreviation VVER stands for Water-cooled, Water-moderated
Energy Reactor.
- Horizontal steam generators
- Hexahedral fuel assemblies
- No bottom penetrations in the pressure vessel
- High-capacity pressurizes providing a large reactor coolant inventory
- Long term cooling of reactor core without electrical power;
- Long term decay heat removal that does not rely on primary ultimate heat
sink (sea, river, cooling tower);

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Special Safety Feature of VVER (Cont.)
Reactor Design Specifications
Name Characteristics
Rated thermal power of the reactor, MW 3,200 +128
Coolant flow rate through the reactor, m3/h (at inlet temperature) 88,000
Coolant pressure at the reactor outlet, absolute, Mpa 16.2+0.3
Coolant temperature at the reactor inlet, С 298.2
Coolant temperature at the reactor outlet, С 328.6+5
Number of loops, pcs. 4
Rated power operation time throughout the year, (effective), h, minimum 8,400
Rated time of fuel assemblies’ stay in the reactor core (charge life), years 4
Equivalent diameter of the core, m 3.16
Time of the extension shaft drop from CPS AR from ULS to LLS upon EP
1.2 to 4.0
signal in case of de-energizing of electromagnets, s, within
Number of FA in the core, pcs. 163

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 Special Safety Feature of VVER (Cont.)
• Active and Passivity Safety System
• Multiple Train Redundancy: The plant utilises four trains for
safety systems and for their control systems.
• Diversity: The backup systems for the systems providing basic
safety functions use different equipment from the backed up safety
system and if possible also a different operating principle.
• Physical Separation: All four trains of safety systems and their
control systems are physically separated.

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Special Safety Feature of VVER (Cont.)
Active Safety Systems
A system or component whose functioning depends on an external input, such as
actuation, mechanical movement, or supply of power, and which, therefore,
influences the system process in an active manner are called active system

 High pressure emergency spray system;

 Low pressure emergency spray system;

 Emergency gas removal system;

 Emergency boron injection system;

 Emergency feedwater system;

 Residual heat removal system;

 Main steamline isolation system

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Special Safety Feature of VVER (Cont.)
Passive Safety System
Either a system which is composed entirely of passive components and structures or
a system which uses active components in a very limited way to initiate subsequent
passive operation

 First-stage hydroaccumulator system (passive part of the emergency core

cooling system).
 Second-stage hydroaccumulators of the passive core flooding system (second-
stage HA).
 Primary and secondary circuit overpressure protection system (PRZ PSD and
SG PSD).
 System of passive heat removal from containment;
 System of passive heat removal via steam generators;
 Double-envelope containment

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Special Safety Feature of VVER (Cont.)
The core catcher is a cone shaped metal structure weighing about
800 t. It is double walled, with the gap between the two walls filled with
FAOG (ferric and aluminium oxide granules). The core catcher is filled
with sacrificial material, which is a ceramic mixture also including ferric
oxide and aluminium oxide.

Corium Catcher 25/28

Special Safety Feature of VVER (Cont.)

Unit 1 Unit 2

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Special Safety Feature of VVER (Cont.)

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Video of VVER Safety Feature

Video Show related to safety feature of VVER

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 Thank Your All
for
Your Kind Attention