D.E.

S SHRI NAVALMAL FIRODIA LAW COLLEGE

___________________________________________

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF DELHI

__________________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF

SHILPA MITTAL . . . Appellant

(Through-Ishan Paradkar)

VERSUS

STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR. … Respondent

(Through-Akanksha Redij)

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE Respondent

________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

Akanksha Redij, 3rd Year LLB (A), Roll no. 09

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................................................................2

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..............................................................................................3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ....................................................................................5

STATEMENT OF FACTS …...............................................................................................6

ISSUES RAISED ................…..............................................................................................8

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ..............................................................................................9

PRAYER CLAUSE ..............................................................................................................13

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

Art. Article

V Versus

CrPC Criminal Procedure Code

Ors Others

Anr Another

SC Supreme Court

Hon’ble Honorable

WP Writ Petition

AIR All India Report

SCC Supreme Court Case

IPC Indian Penal Code

JJ Act Juvenile Justice Act

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Statues:

 Constitution of India

 Indian Penal Code 1860

 Criminal Procedure Code 1973

 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Webliography:

 www.manupatra.com
 www.scconline.com
 www.google.com
 www.indiakanoon.com

Cases:

 Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant has approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the
case of Shilpa Mittal vs State of NCT of Delhi and Anr under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India, 1950.

The ground in support of acceptance of jurisdiction by the respondent.

Article 136 - Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court –

1. Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its

discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence, or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any
court or tribunal in the territory of India.
2. Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence, or
order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law
relating to the Armed Force

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1) Juvenile ‘X’ had violently hit Siddharth Sharma, a pedestrian, while

driving his Mercedez Car No. DL-2F-CM-3000 on 4 April 2016 at 08:50
p.m., near red light traffic signal, Sham Nath Marg, Civil Lines, Delhi.

2) The injured Siddharth Sharma was rushed to hospital with critical

injuries, but he succumbed to the injuries during treatment. Initially, the
FIR was registered for the offence under Section 279/337 of IPC.

3) Upon the death of victim Siddharth Sharma, the investigation was

conducted for the offence under Section 279/304A of IPC and Juvenile
‘X’ was produced before the Board on 8 April 2016.

4) A juvenile ‘X’, aged 16 to 18, is accused of committing an offense

punishable under section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC),
which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or up to ten years
in prison and a fine in the first part and up to ten years in prison and a fine
in the second part.

5) The appellant’s brother was one of the victims in the car accident. At the
time of the occurrence, the Juvenile was between the ages of 16 and 18.
The Children’s Court rejected the appeal in a similar fashion.

6) After then, juvenile “X” went to the High Court of Delhi through his
mother, who ruled that the offence in question did not fall under the
jurisdiction of section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, because no
minimum term had been established for it. The sister of the deceased has
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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 now appealed to the Supreme Court.

7) The Children Court did pass an order to try X as an adult vide order dated
04.06.2016. The appeal against the order was rejected vide order dated
11.02.2019. The Juvenile then preferred an appeal to Delhi High Court
which set aside the order vide order dated 01.05.2019 and directed the
Juvenile to be tried under Serious Offences of JJ act. The sister of the
deceased has now appealed to the Supreme Court.

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 ISSUES RAISED

Whether Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 extends to those offences
prescribing either no minimum punishment or a minimum punishment of less than
7 years but states clearly the maximum punishment of more than 7 years?

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

Whether Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 extends to those offences
prescribing either no minimum punishment or a minimum punishment of less than
7 years but states clearly the maximum punishment of more than 7 years?

1. Under Section 2(35) of Juvenile Justice Act of 2015 “juvenile” means a

child below the age of eighteen years.

2. The appellant has submitted that "petty offences" are those offences
where the punishment is up to 3 years." serious offences" are those where
the maximum punishment is of 7 years and as far as heinous offences are
concerned, if the definition is read literally, then these are only those
offences which provide a minimum sentence of 7 years and above and
that this leaves out a host of offences falling within the 4th category. The
4th category of offences are those where the minimum sentence is less
than 7 years, or there is no minimum sentence prescribed but the
maximum sentence is more than 7 years.

3. We do agree that there has been a gross mistake committed by the

framers of the legislation while enacting the act as they have not covered
the 4th category offences. However, when the wording of the statute is
clear but the intention of the Legislature is unclear, the Court cannot add

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 or subtract words from the statute to give it a meaning which the Court
feels would fit into the scheme of things. In criminal law, sections are
strictly interpreted.

4. In Case of Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, it was held, we must leave
up to the Legislature, the things that are Legislature's. "The highest
judicial duty is to recognize the limits on judicial power and to permit the
democratic processes to deal with matters falling outside of those limits”

5. Prima facie, offences under 304 of IPC are outside the ambit of section
2(33) of the JJ Act, 2015. The legislature intends to rehabilitate Juvenile
in conflict of law. It has been established that there was no intention from
Juvenile ‘X’ to commit a crime. It was an unfortunate incident and to
punish a child under heinous offense, who can have a bright future will
very well defeat the very purpose of the act. By awarding him a sentence
under IPC 304, we would be creating a 4 th category of offences where
there is no minimum sentence prescribed which is absent in JJ act of
2015.

6. As clear from aforesaid sections, Heinous Crimes are crimes where

punishment prescribed is minimum 7 years or more whereas 304 IPC
(which offence is punishable with a maximum punishment of
imprisonment for life or up to 10 years and fine in the first part and
imprisonment up to 10 years or fine, or both in the second part.) does not
envision any minimum punishment.

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
7. We must also keep in mind the fact that the scheme of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is that children
should be protected. Treating children as adults is an exception to this
rule. It is also a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that
normally an exception must be given a restricted meaning.

8. Also according to the scheme of the act before the juvenile is tried as an
adult a very detailed study must be done and the procedure laid down has
to be followed. Even if a child commits a heinous crime, he is not
automatically to be tried as an adult. This also clearly indicates that the
meaning of the words ‘heinous offence’ cannot be expanded by removing
the word ‘minimum’ from the definition.

9. The appellant contends that the doctrine of surplusage should be applied

and the word minimum should be ignored treating it as unlawful or
redundant. There is no manner of doubt that if the intention of the
Legislature is absolutely clear from the objects and reasons of the Act
then the Court can correct errors made by the person who drafted the
legislation and may write down or omit/delete/add words to serve the
purpose of the legislation and ensure that the legislation is given a
meaning which was intended to by the Legislature.

10.Since two viewpoints are feasible, we would request the court to choose
the one that is in favour of the Juvenile. As we know Juvenile Justice act
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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 is a welfare social legislation, its philosophy and principles state that
children should be treated as children.

11. We request the court try its best to ensure that these children could start
afresh which is different from their past. As we know this act mainly
focuses on the growth and development of children. This act prevents the
children from not becoming habitual criminals, and if this court convicts
the juvenile under section 304 of IPC this will impact his mental and
physical health and will also shatter his future.

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent
 PRAYER

Therefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is most humbly prayed that this hon’ble court may be pleased to
adjudge and declare that;

1) To take up literal interpretation of section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice

(Care and Protection) Act 2015.

2) The Court may Consider the accused as a Juvenile and provide various
protections and should be acquitted of all the allegations.

3) Pass any other order that any other order which Hon’ble court may deem
fit in the interest of justice, Equity and Good Conscience.

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Counsel on behalf of Respondent