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(AJP-3.3.4.2)

RECONNAISSANCE AND
SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT TO
JOINT OPERATIONS

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ATP-61

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

SUPPORT
TO ALLIED JOINT OPERATIONS

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

November 1998

1. ATP-61 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT TO ALLIED JOINT

OPERATIONS, is a NATO UNCLASSIFIED Publication. The agreement of nations to use this
publication is recorded in STANAG 7107.

2. ATP-61 is effective on receipt.

A. GRθNHEIM
Major General, NOAF
Chairman, MAS

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CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION

BY NATIONS

ANNEX A

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Nation Reservation

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RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE DATE EFFECTIVE BY WHOM

DATE ENTERED DATE ENTERED

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PARAGRAPH PAGE

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

Purpose 101 1-1

Scope 102 1-1
Applicability 103 1-1
Authority 104 1-1
Abbreviations, Terms, and Definitions 105 1-2

CHAPTER 2 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE MISSION AREAS

Definitions 201 2-1

General 202 2-1
Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance 203 2-2
Operational Reconnaissance and Surveillance 204 2-2
Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance 205 2-2
Tasks 206 2-2

CHAPTER 3 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES,

CHARACTERISTICS, AND LIMITATIONS

Section A - Required Capabilities

General 301 3-1
Required Capabilities 302 3-1
Section B - Characteristics and Limitations
General 303 3-3
Aerial Systems 304 3-3
Surface Systems 305 3-4
Subsurface Systems 306 3-6
Space Systems 308 3-6
Other Collection Capabilities 309 3-7

CHAPTER 4 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT AND

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

General 401 4-1

Intelligence Disciplines 402 4-1
Intelligence Cycle 403 4-2
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Cycle 404 4-4
Intelligence and Reconnaissance/Surveillance Interrelationship 405 4-5
Collection Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management Concept 406 4-6

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CHAPTER 5 - RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE COLLECTORS,

PRODUCTS AND TARGETS

Sensors 501 5-1

Products 502 5-3
Targets 503 5-4

ANNEX A - GLOSSARY

Abbreviations/Acronyms A-1
Terms and Definitions A-3

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
101. Purpose. The purpose of this publication is to provide a reference document covering doctrine
for reconnaissance and surveillance support to Allied joint operations.

102. Scope. Reconnaissance and surveillance doctrine is intended to assist commanders in

accomplishing assigned missions by supporting their ability to obtain information necessary for
developing plans and conducting operations. This publication’s focus will be on operational level
doctrine but may be used as a reference at any level. This doctrine should serve as the foundation for
other subordinate reconnaissance and surveillance publications to include tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Tactics, techniques and procedures will not be described in this document except where
necessary for understanding or continuity. The publication will:

a. Provide guidance for NATO and national commanders, their staffs, and their components
in order to effectively employ assigned, attached, or supporting reconnaissance and
surveillance forces;

b. Lead to a better understanding of reconnaissance and surveillance operations within

NATO’s nations and armed forces.

103. Applicability. The principles, guidelines, and conceptual framework described in this
document are provided for NATO Nations, higher NATO commands, joint task forces, subordinate
units of these organisations, tactical commanders and their staffs. They are written for those who:

a. Provide strategic direction for reconnaissance and surveillance operations;

b. Employ and prepare Allied joint forces for reconnaissance and surveillance operations;

c. Support or are supported by reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

104. Authority. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of commanders.
Commanders will exercise judgement in applying the doctrine herein to accomplish their missions.

105. Abbreviations, Terms, and Definitions. Abbreviations, terms, and definitions are located in
Chapter 2 and Annex A.

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CHAPTER 2

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE MISSION AREAS

“What enables the wise sovereign and the general to...achieve things beyond the
reach of ordinary man is foreknowledge.”
Sun Tzu

201. Definitions.

Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection

methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure
data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
(AAP-6)

Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface and subsurface areas, places,
persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (AAP-6)

Air Reconnaissance. The collection of information of intelligence interest either by visual

observation from the air or through the use of airborne sensors. (AAP-6)

Air Surveillance. The systematic observation of air space by electronic, visual, or other
means, primarily for the purpose of identifying and determining the movements of aircraft and
missiles, friendly and enemy, in the air space under observation. (AAP-6)

Battlefield Surveillance. Systematic observation of the battle area for the purpose of
providing timely information and combat intelligence. (AAP-6)

Sea Surveillance. The systematic observation of surface and sub-surface areas by all
available and practical means primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying and determining the
movement of ships, submarines, and other vehicles, friendly and enemy, proceeding on or under the
surface of the world’s seas and oceans. (AAP-6)

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR). ISTAR is the

process that links surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems and sensors to cue
manoeuvre and offensive strike assets. It encompasses collection and management of information
and intelligence to provide situational awareness for commanders and staff to direct operations and
support the targeting process.

202. General. The primary objective of reconnaissance and surveillance operations is to provide
timely collection support and satisfy information/intelligence requirements, including Alliance,
national, and theatre requirements. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations:

Provide assessment support to all levels of command before, during and after the conduct of
operations;

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Assist in determining where and when to employ limited resources and concentrate the efforts
of these resources;
Provide important means for assessing efforts of deception and concealment;
Affect the formulation of policy and strategy as well as the development of a joint campaign;
Are performed by forces with a primary reconnaissance and surveillance mission and other
forces with either a collateral mission or the capability to perform such a mission; and
Can be categorised as either strategic, operational, or tactical though the missions
accomplished are essentially the same for each level of operations or interests. The variables are
depth of operations, operational tempo, level of detail, timelines, reporting, and level of acceptable
risk.

203. Strategic Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Operations conducted to collect information that
when processed, analysed, and integrated with other information, supports political leaders and
senior military commanders in the formulation of policy and military plans at the national or Alliance
level.

204. Operational Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Operations conducted to collect information

that supports commanders in the development and execution of campaigns and major operations.

205. Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance. Operations conducted to collect information that
supports commanders in the planning and execution of battles and engagements.

206. Tasks. In order to satisfy information/intelligence requirements, reconnaissance and

surveillance resources conduct operations in support of the following intelligence functional areas:

a. Provide Indications and Warning (I&W). Reconnaissance and surveillance operations

provide time-sensitive information necessary to assess forces and installations that threaten
NATO. This mission area may require continuous surveillance or as-required reconnaissance
to provide timely I&W of a threat or impending attack. I&W information is necessary to
assess an enemy’s offensive and defensive force capabilities and other factors that may affect
Allied plans and operations.

b. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlespace (IPB) is a command and staff function to allow the systematic, continuous
analysis of the enemy and the battlespace environment. Reconnaissance and surveillance
support the systematic IPB process that begins in peacetime and continues throughout an
operation. They provide information needed to identify and analyse enemy centres of
gravity, strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, intentions, and critical vulnerabilities.

c. Identify Enemy Orders of Battle/Force Disposition. Reconnaissance and surveillance

operations provide information to intelligence staffs, who will integrate it with other
information/intelligence to develop enemy orders of battle and other intelligence related data

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bases. These will be used to prepare an Intelligence Estimate, detailing the enemy’s
capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities and intentions, as well as assessments of terrain and
weather effects in the operational area. This allows commanders to plan and conduct
campaigns and major operations. At the unit level, such information allows commanders to
plan and execute their assigned missions.

d. Situation Development. Reconnaissance and surveillance support the dynamic process of

situation development by collecting critical information needed to assess the current situation
and confirm or deny enemy courses of action predicted by IPB. Situation development helps
the commander refine his understanding of the battlespace, identify enemy orders of battle,
force dispositions and monitor enemy activity, thereby reducing uncertainty and risk.

e. Monitor Enemy Activity. During peacetime, reconnaissance and surveillance assets

monitor potential enemies to identify emerging threats to Allied interests in order that an
appropriate response can be prepared. They can also assist in monitoring, or verifying
compliance with international agreements, e.g., arms control accords. During times of crisis,
reconnaissance and surveillance assets monitor potential conflict areas, providing information
to assist commanders in planning their deployments. During war, reconnaissance and
surveillance assets continuously monitor the enemy in order to determine his situation, force
posture and dispositions relative to friendly forces and to measure reactions to friendly
combat operations.

f. Support to Force Protection. Force protection is the set of comprehensive security

measures, collection activities, and defensive operations taken to guard the force against the
effects of enemy action. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations support the broader
intelligence force protection mission by aiding in identifying, locating, and countering enemy
intelligence, collection, sabotage, subversion, and terrorism capabilities; by enhancing
detailed and accurate assessment of threat force capabilities
and intentions; and by helping facilitate friendly command and control warfare (C2W) efforts
to deny the enemy the opportunity to take offensive action against friendly forces.

g. Support Targeting Objectives. Targeting plays a prominent role in the commander’s

decision to employ forces. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations contribute to the
targeting process by detecting, locating, identifying, and analysing targets and later providing
input for after-action assessments.

1. Detection involves the use of reconnaissance and surveillance assets to identify

new potential targets or significant changes to existing targets. Detection is an
ongoing process; it is conducted before, during, and after military operations. During
peacetime, requirements must be established for target reconnaissance and
surveillance, crisis monitoring, and combat support. During military operations other
than war and war, priorities may need to be adjusted as the situation or objective
changes.

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2. Once detected, a potential target’s location must be accurately defined within a

designated reference system. Mobile targets pose significant problems because their
positional data is so perishable; current data is essential for target analysis and later
for target acquisition.

3. Identification is the discrimination between objects within a particular type or

class. In order to identify a target, multiple reconnaissance and surveillance
operations using differing information collectors, such as human observation and
technical sensors may be necessary. Frequently, the information from one collector
can be used to cue other collectors to the target. The amount of information required
and the collector used will vary depending on the target characteristics, location, and
circumstances of its detection.

4. Once the target is identified, detailed information may be required to analyse the
target, evaluate its vulnerabilities, and indicate the appropriate method and/or weapon
system(s) to attack the target.

5. After-action assessments monitor the impact of operations on enemy targets and

provide information for follow-on actions.

h. Assessment. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations provide assessment support to all

levels of command before, during, and after the conduct of military operations. Assessments
such as Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) can provide information on the success of military
operations and the need for follow up or new operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance
operations can assist in determining where and when to employ limited resources and
concentrate their efforts. They also provide an important means for assessing deception
efforts. Such assessments will affect the formulation of policy and strategy, as well as the
development of campaigns, operations, battles, and engagements.

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CHAPTER 3

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

CAPABILITIES, CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS
Section A-- REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

301. General. This chapter will address those capabilities which reconnaissance and surveillance
systems should possess in order to provide users required information. No single system can cover
all the information requirements of the requesters, therefore, requesters must articulate their needs in
a manner that is clear to the collection managers. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are force
multipliers. Effective use of these forces enables commanders to increase preparedness, and
maximise the effects of combat forces by optimising strengths, exploiting enemy weaknesses, and
countering enemy strengths. Whether planning for aerial reconnaissance, sea surveillance, ground
reconnaissance or space surveillance, the availability of these forces and their capabilities are critical
to mission success. All reconnaissance and surveillance forces have unique characteristics for their
own special mission. Commanders must be aware of these capabilities and limitations and
thoroughly weigh each against the mission objectives. They must consider the survivability of the
forces and determine the risk at which they are willing to place them to obtain the intelligence
information. A comprehensive ISTAR capability enables commanders to ‘stay ahead’ of the enemy
to conduct operations successfully and protect forces.

302. Required Capabilities. Lessons learned from recent military conflicts demonstrate that the
speed of modern warfare dictates that commanders receive timely, accurate and relevant information
to support them in their decision making process. That same information is necessary at the unit
level in order to properly plan and execute their missions. In addition to being able to provide timely
and accurate information, reconnaissance and surveillance assets must be available in a timely
manner, survivable, reliable, suitable, standardized, capable of continuous coverage (if required),
and protected from enemy exploitation. To achieve these capabilities, they must be exercised during
peacetime to maintain their operational efficiency .

a. Timeliness. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets must be responsive to the needs of the
requester. These assets should be made available to collect information when and where it is
required. Timeliness should be looked at in the aggregate and is driven by the purpose of the
mission, level of need, and customer requirements. Commander Allied Joint Forces
(COMAJF) should ensure available collection assets are ready to meet anticipated requests.
As required, he will exploit information from collection assets not allocated to the joint force.
The period of time between the arrival of a request and the requested time over target may
limit the time available for planning, preparation, choice of asset or sensor, and execution of
the mission.

b. Accuracy. Accuracy is a crucial requirement for all aspects of the reconnaissance and
surveillance cycle (see Chapter 4). Reconnaissance and surveillance assets should provide
unambiguous, undistorted and complete information, and be resistant to deception.

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Accuracy requirements may be driven by the purpose of the mission, level of need and
customer requirements. These requirements may in turn, determine the selection of the
collection system(s).

c. Survivability. Survivability must be examined in the context of the entire reconnaissance

and surveillance system--collection platforms, sensors, communications and data links,
ground stations, processing facilities, and personnel. Not all systems, or components of the
system, require the same degree of survivability. For those systems that can not transmit
information during a mission, the safe return of these assets is especially important.
Survivability must be matched to the threat these systems will be exposed to during the
operation and their importance to the entire reconnaissance and surveillance system.
Reconnaissance and surveillance systems are vulnerable and also scarce resources; therefore,
commanders should consider how they would compensate for the loss of reconnaissance and
surveillance capability should it be destroyed or otherwise become unavailable. Careful
mission planning, effective employment tactics, and redundancy or overlap of reconnaissance
and surveillance capabilities are the best ways of ensuring that information is collected and
delivered.

d. Reliability. Reconnaissance and surveillance systems must be able to provide reliable

information despite enemy deception measures such as camouflage and decoys. This may
require the employment of other reconnaissance and surveillance systems to verify the
information acquired by previous systems. The development and evaluation of these systems
should be initiated as soon as potential enemy concealment and deception capabilities are
known.

e. Suitability. Suitability is an important consideration in planning for the employment of

collective reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Tasking must be based on an asset’s
capability and its suitability within the context of the overall collection plan.
Suitability also applies to the transmission, exploitation and dissemination of the collected
information or processed intelligence. Both the information and the format must be useful to
the user and easy to interpret.

f. Standardization. Standardization is a critical aspect of any reconnaissance and surveillance

system. Interoperability, commonality, and compatibility of sensors, data link, and
supporting Communication and Information Systems (CIS) are crucial to the responsiveness,
survivability, and overall effectiveness of a reconnaissance and surveillance system.
Commanders will be deprived of information if the components of the system are dissimilar,
or if connectivity among sensors, supporting systems, and supported systems is too fragile to
withstand the stress of combat. The collection and dissemination systems must be able to
transmit accurate information to those who need it in a timely manner. Interoperable systems
unify collection efforts resulting in enhanced application of armed force. Connectivity also
improves the overall reconnaissance and surveillance capability to accurately portray the
battlespace through cross-cueing, information enhancement, and analytical exchange. This
multi-source approach reduces the possibilities of being deceived by the enemy.

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g. Continuous Coverage. If required, reconnaissance and surveillance assets must be able to

provide comprehensive 24 hour a day coverage in poor visibility conditions, over varying
terrain and in all electromagnetic environments. The capability to loiter and observe targets
over a prolonged timescale ensures support is available when needed. Extensive knowledge
of enemy strategy, tactics, capabilities, and culture requires extensive data collection over a
prolonged period in order to provide the most complete and accurate picture of the enemy
possible. Having a complete and exact picture enables personnel to anticipate enemy actions
and to choose appropriate responses. However, keeping sensors, equipment, and systems in
place for extended periods adds an extra burden to support systems.

Section B--CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS

303. General. Commanders must be aware of the capabilities, limitations, and numbers of their
assigned and supporting reconnaissance and surveillance systems. This is required to ensure systems
are not placed at unnecessary risk or the wrong asset tasked to satisfy a collection need. COMAJF
should ensure assets, sensors and support systems are ready to meet anticipated requests. If the
required capability does not exist within the commander’s assigned force, other external collection
capabilities can be requested to support the commander’s collection requirements. External
collection capabilities of a classified nature may be made available to COMAJF . Reconnaissance
and surveillance systems posses a wide variety of characteristics, specifications, and limitations.
They can operate below the surface, on the surface, in the air and throughout space. They can be
manned as well as unmanned. They can image visible or non-visible objects, penetrate surfaces, and
detect and collect different wavelengths of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra. All systems
include one or more sensors to collect information. Some systems can change their sensors for
specific operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance systems have two common limitations; they
are scarce resources and are generally high-value assets. These two factors require commanders to
employ assets judiciously. Different reconnaissance and surveillance assets and systems can
complement each other and eliminate specific limitations when used in mixed or combined
applications.

304. Aerial Systems. Among the primary sources of reconnaissance and surveillance capability
available to support the joint force’s information requirements are aerial systems. These systems can
be equipped with imaging and signal collecting sensors.

a. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) offer significant advantages and limitations. The
greatest advantage of these systems is that they normally do not put friendly personnel at risk.
Moreover, they possess relatively low radar cross-sections and minimized visual and acoustic
signatures which reduce the chance of detection. UAVs can be configured with a broad range
of collection capabilities. In the past, UAVs were only considered tactical in nature,
characterized by specific mission capabilities and relatively small area coverage. New
systems, mainly under development will provide broad area coverage, greater sensor
payload, higher operating altitudes, longer endurance and better retasking capabilities. The

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range and endurance of UAVs vary considerably depending on the situations for which they
are designed to be employed. Weather can impede or preclude UAV operations in many
cases where large, manned aircraft would not be affected. Payload constraints often permit
less than the full complement of sensors desired for a given tasking. Increased payload and
loiter time are available for increased size, complexity, and cost. Also, UAV flight paths
must either be preprogrammed, or remotely controlled with line of sight limitations (a control
station may be airborne to increase UAV range). Employment of UAVs often requires the
implementation of special airspace control means and joint co-ordination between in-theatre
forces to enable safe passage.

b. Manned aerial platforms generally are among the most flexible, mobile and responsive
assets available and capable of carrying out critical missions. Some platforms are able to
collect vital information in near real time (NRT). Manned platforms can respond to changing
conditions and may be able to modify missions while they are in progress. They can cover a
relatively large area and carry a wide range and mix of sensors. Many of these assets have
common data links between aircraft or with ground stations allowing them to send large
volumes of information often in NRT. Manned air surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities can be divided into two groups, penetrating and standoff. During peace time,
virtually all air reconnaissance and surveillance is accomplished using standoff techniques.
The standoff mode may be used during military operations other than war and war when the
enemy threat is too great to allow high value assets to penetrate enemy territory. The primary
advantage of using a standoff mode is reduced vulnerability to enemy surface-to-air and air-
to-air attacks. The primary disadvantage is standoff requirements limit the amount of enemy
territory that can be observed. Reconnaissance and surveillance platforms will penetrate when
information is required beyond standoff range, where other systems may not be available to
provide the coverage required, or when weather conditions are such that standoff systems are
degraded. The main disadvantage of manned systems is the exposure or potential exposure of
personnel and scarce reconnaissance assets to enemy military operations. Manned assets are
considerably more expensive than unmanned systems. All assets are susceptible to adverse
environmental conditions (e.g., weather, smoke, chemicals, etc.); however, in some cases,
unmanned assets may fly in adverse environmental conditions when risk to humans is
considered too great.

305. Surface Systems. Surface platforms also vary greatly in size and complexity, with great
differences between land-based and sea-based assets.

a. Land-based reconnaissance assets provide a diverse mix of capabilities that can range
from a small force conducting a reconnaissance patrol, to dedicated SIGINT units, to highly
sophisticated surveillance radars. Such assets can be employed to support operations across the
full range of military activities and can obtain extremely diverse types of information. For
example, a reconnaissance patrol can determine the extent and location of obstacles and
defensive positions while also performing counterreconnaissance operations to deceive the
enemy and deny friendly force dispositions. They can also cue, and be cued by other high

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resolution assets. As with aerial platforms, there are advantages and disadvantages to land-based
reconnaissance systems. The primary advantage is that as they are generally organic to the land
component, they are usually forward deployed and responsive to its needs; they are not easily
prone to deception, can be interrogated, and they have the ability to interpret information .
Manned reconnaissance assets, e.g., patrols, have additional advantages: they can carry out
other actions whilst on a primarily reconnaissance mission; and can use their initiative to
investigate sightings further, e.g., suspected deception measures. They can also be debriefed on
other matters not included in their original mission. However, their range is usually limited by
physical constraints, personnel safety, the military situation and the ability of combat support
systems to sustain assets over extended ranges and timescales.

b. Sea-based surface platforms have varying degrees of reconnaissance and surveillance

capability, including organic manned and unmanned aerial systems. Part of this capability for
example, radar, sonar and underwater acoustic surveillance, is required for defence of maritime
forces. These facilities monitor enemy submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and surface targets.
Other capabilities, such as SIGINT-gathering assets, can support a broad range of military
activities ranging from monitoring arms control treaty compliance to establishing enemy orders
of battle and preparation of combat strike plans. Deployment aboard ships also provides
sea-based reconnaissance and surveillance assets with several advantages. Ships have greater
power and load-carrying capabilities than do some other reconnaissance and surveillance
platforms, enabling them to carry heavier and bulkier equipment that may have greater
information gathering and processing capabilities. Ships also possess the advantages of mobility
and sustainability, enabling them to position and reposition reconnaissance and surveillance
assets. Access is relatively unrestricted because maritime areas of interest to reconnaissance and
surveillance are often close to international waters. Many classes of ships have organic air assets
that can extend shipboard sensor horizons and provide valuable on-site reconnaissance. These
qualities at times provide advantages over other reconnaissance and surveillance assets.

c. Air, land, and maritime forces employ surface-based surveillance systems to control the
movement of aircraft through a given sector of airspace. The purpose of surface-based
surveillance systems used to control the movement of aircraft is to provide a degree of
warning and control over air resources within a designated airspace control area. Examples
of these systems are early warning (EW), ground controlled intercept (GCI), and air traffic
control radars. The advantage of these systems is that they provide an additional layer of
control and observation that may not be available with other surveillance systems. Their
primary disadvantage is that they are susceptible to enemy attack and jamming. Also, some
of the ground-based warning sensors have sensor limitations and are susceptible to adverse
weather conditions. In addition, air defence sensors are limited to line-of-sight surveillance,
and many systems are affected by ground clutter.

d. Special operations forces (SOF) are valuable assets and should be considered for employment
in joint reconnaissance and surveillance operations. Although most SOF activities

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are surface-based, SOF aircraft may also support reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
Special reconnaissance (SR) operations can be conducted when there is a need to obtain or
verify information about enemy capabilities, intentions, and activities, or to gather data about
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of an area inaccessible by technical
means. SOF patrols have the capability to sustain long-range 24 hour operations for extended
periods of time. They also have secure communications for near-instantaneous transmission of
their reports. SR operations complement national and theatre reconnaissance and surveillance
assets across the range of military operations to obtain specific, time-sensitive information of
strategic and operational significance. SOF offer the availability of technically knowledgeable
observers to verify critical information about targets or target complexes. These observers will
use their judgement to defeat enemy deception attempts and may transmit a more complete
picture of what is happening on the target. As with other manned reconnaissance, SOF can be
tasked or retasked with secondary missions, and can designate targets, e.g., with laser
designators, for attack missions. These highly specialised personnel are often able to achieve
results out of proportion to their numbers; but they need to be inserted, require time to prepare
positions or redeploy, and are vulnerable to compromise if used in an overt role.

306. Subsurface Systems. Subsurface systems vary greatly in size, complexity, and capability. These
include sensors generally best suited for long-term surveillance of a specific and limited geographic
region. Seismic detectors, for example, can indicate that enemy forces might be moving in an area,
making further reconnaissance of the area useful. Submarines, on the other hand, are invaluable
platforms for clandestine reconnaissance operations within waters peripheral to enemy territory.
Submarines are dispatched on independent patrols to collect a range of data from hydrographic features
to enemy activities. These patrols also assist in filling in gaps from other collection systems, such as
long-range aircraft.

307. Space Systems. While not all NATO nations possess space assets capable of reconnaissance
and surveillance, those nations that do can be expected to provide some degree of reconnaissance and
surveillance support using these systems. Space systems provide information allowing commanders
to assess the situation, develop concepts of operations, and distribute changes to their forces quickly.
Commanders should be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of space systems available for
use. The primary advantage of these systems is the ability to provide worldwide coverage of areas of
interest, especially those remote or hostile areas where little or no information can be obtained by
conventional resources. Other advantages include their longevity and relative immunity to enemy
actions and the ability to place satellites into orbits that maximise their effectiveness. Limitations
include atmospheric and weather disturbances that affect most imagery systems. Also, space systems
schedules can be predicted and are therefore vulnerable to deception practices and signature control
activities. While able to provide worldwide coverage, tasking demands on space systems and orbit
requirements may limit their responsiveness. The support provided by space systems are divided into
military and non-military systems, as outlined below.

a. Military space reconnaissance and surveillance systems employ a variety of specialised

sensors providing a broad and increased range of capabilities. During peacetime, space

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systems routinely support activities such as indications and warning, peacekeeping

operations, disaster and humanitarian relief and training exercises. Space reconnaissance
and surveillance information helps commanders to determine the enemy’s strength, location,
and intentions. Detection and warning sensors provide early detection of ballistic missile
attack and down-link this information to the appropriate ground stations, allowing
commanders to take the appropriate actions. Environmental monitoring systems are crucial
in understanding and reacting to weather that may affect friendly and enemy military
operations. Ignorance of environmental conditions can jeopardise the success of an operation
or mission. Space reconnaissance and surveillance systems provide military forces with
terrain information that enhances mission planning capabilities. Additionally, these systems
can often cue or be cued by other reconnaissance and surveillance systems to watch a specific
area of interest, enhancing accuracy and reaction times to the users of that information.

b. Non-military space systems include civil, commercial, and Allied capabilities, and
normally complement military space systems. These systems possess a variety of capabilities;
however, in some cases, their availability may be limited due to the priority of their civil or
commercial tasks. Examples of these systems are weather, navigation and multispectral
imagery satellites. COMAJFs may have some of their requirements satisfied by these
systems, depending on how share-use agreements are negotiated with the owners.

308. Other Collection Capabilities. Most NATO nations operate reconnaissance and surveillance
systems controlled at the national level and provide direct support to the national authorities. The
information provided by these systems is used by senior government leaders to make strategic
political and military decisions; it is also very useful to theatre commanders. Depending on the
specific collection capability, timeliness can be good--within seconds of collection. Other
capabilities are inherently slow--hours to days from the time of the request. Accuracy is system
dependent. Additionally, the security of these systems and their sources may require sanitation of the
information before it can be made available to the requester. National reconnaissance and
surveillance systems provide invaluable information, especially when local access by conventional
reconnaissance and surveillance systems is denied by range limitations, lack of air superiority, or
political reasons. COMAJF must develop specific requirements well in advance so that use of these
systems will be reliable and timely. These systems should be considered when the theatre
commander’s organic reconnaissance and surveillance assets cannot satisfy the intelligence
requirements or to verify information from another collection source. COMAJF can request specific
information from these systems and should exercise the process during peacetime exercises.
Nevertheless, the employment of national reconnaissance assets remains under the responsibility of
the designated national authority/commander.

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CHAPTER 4
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE SUPPORT
AND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

401. General. This chapter explains how reconnaissance and surveillance fits into the overall
intelligence process. To provide a basis for understanding how the two work together, the chapter
discusses the various intelligence collection disciplines, the intelligence cycle, the reconnaissance
and surveillance cycle, and how the two cycles are interrelated.

402. Intelligence Disciplines. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets collect information that
becomes intelligence when processed, analysed, evaluated, and interpreted. The following is a list of
intelligence collection disciplines relevant to reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

a. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is derived from imagery acquired by photographic, radar,

electro-optical and thermal sensors which can be ground based, sea-borne or carried by air
and space platforms. IMINT uses imagery to locate and identify enemy activity, facilities,
infrastructure, and equipment. It can also provide commanders environmental information
which may have an impact on their military operations.

b. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the generic term used to describe communications

intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) when there is no requirement to
differentiate between the types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two. SIGINT uses
intercepted electromagnetic emissions to provide information on the capabilities, intentions,
formations, and locations of enemy forces.

(1). COMINT consists of information derived from intercepting, monitoring, and

locating the enemy’s communications systems. COMINT exploits the enemy’s
communications transmissions.

(2). ELINT consists of information derived from intercepting, monitoring, and

locating the enemy’s non-communication emitters. ELINT exploits the enemy’s
radar, beacons, and other non-communication emitters.

c. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is a category intelligence derived from information

collected and provided by human sources. HUMINT sources can also provide technical
intelligence and imagery, and may be vital in the preparation for operations. Examples of
HUMINT activities are surface reconnaissance units and long range patrols, observation and
listening posts, or aircrew or submarine crew debriefings. Trained linguists are often an
essential requirement for these activities.

d. Acoustic Intelligence (ACOUSTINT) is derived from the collection and processing of

acoustic phenomena.

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e. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is scientific and technical intelligence

obtained from quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from sensing instruments
for the purpose of identifying any distinctive feature associated with the source, emitter or
sender; and to facilitate further identification and/or measurement of the same.

403. Intelligence Cycle. The intelligence cycle is the process by which information is collected,
converted into intelligence, and made available to the user. The four steps in the cycle include
direction and planning, collection, processing/exploitation, dissemination and evaluation. These steps
define a recurring, sequential, and interdependent process for the development of intelligence.
Intelligence operations are conducted within the framework of the intelligence cycle, the entire cycle,
or a specific step within the cycle. Moreover, all intelligence, regardless of the scope of the
requirement or level of command, is developed by following these steps. No one step of the cycle is
more important than the others; consequently, proper direction is required to ensure the process flows
smoothly and remains focused on the correct objectives.

a. Direction and Planning. In addition to supporting the policy/strategy development

processes at all levels, the intelligence cycle is geared to support COMAJF in the formulation
of the concept of operations, development of the campaign plan, and execution of the
campaign. Therefore, COMAJF must clearly articulate the mission and objectives, outline
the plan of action, and state the intelligence requirements necessary to support the mission,
objectives and plan. The process of planning reconnaissance and surveillance operations
should include identifying and validating the need for the operations, and if a need is
determined, prioritising the operations.

(1). Intelligence Requirements. COMAJF may be given intelligence requirements

(IRs) by higher headquarters. COMAJF, in his mission analysis, may also identify
IRs which can be general or highly specific, and with time constraints. Based on
these IRs, COMAJF’s intelligence staff will also develop IRs to be included in the J2
Collection Plan. This plan forms the basis of the reconnaissance and surveillance
efforts. The designation of IRs helps to ensure reconnaissance and surveillance
efforts are focused on the most critical information needs to support the operational
effort. Once hostilities begin and as they continue, new direction and guidance
evolves, creating new requirements or modifying existing requirements.

(2). Validation. The information requirement must then be validated. Does the
requirement meet the commander’s concept of operation? Has the information been
acquired but not distributed to the requester? Are there other ongoing operations that
might satisfy the requirement? If any of these conditions are met, the requested
reconnaissance and surveillance mission may not be necessary.

(3). Priorities. Once a requirement has been established and validated, it must be
prioritised among the other requests for information. As the intelligence requirements
are aligned with the collection capabilities available, factors such as the

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enemy threat to reconnaissance and surveillance assets, timeliness of the

reconnaissance and surveillance response, availability of reconnaissance and
surveillance assets, and the impacts of platform and sensor capabilities will affect how
reconnaissance and surveillance are tasked and employed.

(4). Collection Plan. Based upon the commander’s direction, a collection plan is
formulated which co-ordinates organic sensors, and if necessary, requests national
tasking to support collection efforts. The Collection Plan contains specific tasking of
the selected sources and agencies.

b. Collection. This step includes not only the actual physical collection of information but in
some cases, the transfer or transmission of that information to processing facilities. This
requires close co-ordination between the operations planners, collection managers, and
intelligence analysts. The collection managers establish collection requirements to satisfy
their intelligence requirements, while the operations planners determine how to employ
assigned reconnaissance and surveillance assets to satisfy the collection requirements. If the
assigned assets cannot meet the commander’s objectives, then external reconnaissance and
surveillance support, such as specific national capabilities, will be required. This external
collection support may be on going but may require specific tasking or parameters to satisfy
the intelligence requirement. Also, different types of collection capabilities may be required
to validate information acquired from another source. Furthermore, collection capabilities
need redundancy so the loss or failure of one system can be compensated by another one.
Ideally, they should be interoperable so that the information collected can be integrated and
correlated into an all-source analysis. The collection architecture must be aware of and
responsive to the intelligence requirements of the theatre forces. The system must be in place
and exercised during peacetime in order to implement a collection plan at the beginning of
hostilities.

c. Processing/Exploitation. Processing involves five stages: collation, where the incoming

information is recorded and grouped together; it is then evaluated to determine its reliability
and credibility. Evaluation is followed by analysis; the identification of significant items of
information and comparing them with existing knowledge or intelligence and drawing
relevant conclusions. Integration involves assembling analysed information and intelligence
to facilitate the recognition of significant patterns of knowledge; finally, interpretation
involves judging the significance of analysed information and other intelligence in relation to
the current body of knowledge. Processing allows commanders to take full advantage of or
exploit information that has come to hand. The need to task additional reconnaissance and
surveillance assets may become apparent at any stage of processing, for instance to confirm
information received from one particular source, or to investigate enemy developments
revealed by analysis or interpretation. Advances in technology have changed the way
information is processed into intelligence. Some reconnaissance and surveillance assets
possess an onboard data processing capability. This allows the data to be converted into
usable information, though further processing may be necessary to produce a finished

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intelligence product. For example, Joint STARS can process the data it obtains onboard and
send it to specific ground processing stations or by data link directly to the requester.

d. Dissemination and Evaluation. This final step in the intelligence cycle is also being
affected by advances in technology. Some reconnaissance and surveillance systems are
capable of disseminating collected data/information to requesters on a real or NRT basis,
vastly increasing their responsiveness. This is especially important for those reconnaissance
and surveillance operations supporting ongoing military operations in which the situation
may be evolving rapidly and perishable information may lose its usefulness within a matter of
minutes or even seconds. Both the collection and dissemination processes require
continuous management. Without effective management, communications paths can become
saturated by single source information retranslated by many intermediate collection agencies.
This well-intentioned information flow can quickly exceed the reconnaissance and
surveillance information processing capability. On the other hand, intelligence agencies
should evaluate the potential value of unconfirmed information. These agencies should be
aware of operational requirements and provide all pertinent intelligence information (i.e.,
threat information).

404. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Cycle. The reconnaissance and surveillance cycle is the
process by which reconnaissance and surveillance assets are requested, integrated into the overall
operations plan, and tasked to satisfy information or intelligence requirements. The steps in the
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Cycle are: tasking, planning, execution, processing/exploitation
and dissemination; these are described in more detail below and depicted at Figure 4-1. The request
to conduct a reconnaissance and surveillance operation is the principal link between the Intelligence
and the Reconnaissance and Surveillance cycles. The request defines the basic intelligence needs,
requirements and prevailing conditions for the support by reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
The request should provide sufficient information on the area or object of interest. Additionally,
requests should include: information detailing the reason for or intended use of the data, priority,
timelines, product types and means of transmission.

a. Tasking. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are tasked in essentially the same
manner during peacetime, crisis, and war, except for tailoring the approval and execution
process for the scope of operations. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets are tasked once
information or intelligence requirements have been established. This may be accomplished
through request messages. In cases where real or NRT information is required, it may be
necessary to establish ad hoc procedures in theatre to satisfy the immediate requirements.
Most important to the requesters of information is to clearly articulate their requirements and
allow the collection managers and operations planners to decide the best way to meet their
requirements. Within the commander’s staff, the intelligence collection managers will co-
ordinate with the operations planners to determine what available reconnaissance and
surveillance asset(s) should be tasked to satisfy the given intelligence requirements. If
organic assets are available, then the appropriate unit will be tasked. If organic assets are not
available to satisfy the request and the request is still considered valid, then the request is
forwarded to the next higher level for consideration. Assets may also be tasked or retasked

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while the mission is ongoing. Changing situations may dictate that reconnaissance and
surveillance assets be reassigned from their planned mission to support a new requirement.
Reassigning assets that are executing their planned mission must be considered carefully.

b. Planning. This step of the reconnaissance and surveillance cycle involves both the broad
planning done at the headquarters level, which is incorporated into the campaign plan, and
the detailed planning accomplished at the unit level.

(1). Reconnaissance and surveillance planning begins at the Major NATO Command
(MNC) level by providing direction and guidance and establishing strategic and
operational level intelligence requirements. This direction and guidance is passed to
lower echelons and refined. At this level, collection managers establish theatre level
collection requirements and co-ordinate their efforts with the operations planners. The
components of these commands are normally tasked to accomplish the reconnaissance
or surveillance operation. Therefore, they normally determine the best way to employ
their reconnaissance and surveillance assets in such a way so as to allow maximum
effectiveness while minimising risk. At this level, reconnaissance and surveillance
planners must consider the trade-offs of survivability and information acquisition.
Commanders should establish priorities for reconnaissance and surveillance
operations knowing that these priorities may change as the situation develops. These
priorities should be established to generally conform to command objectives, concept
of operation, and unanticipated requirements. Combining objectives, guidance,
threats, force capabilities, and system availability requires thorough analysis and
effective co-ordination among all elements which plan reconnaissance and
surveillance operations. The end results of the planners’ efforts are included in the
tasking order.

(2). The detailed mission planning at the unit level is accomplished based on
information contained in the tasking order and other sources such as the airspace
control order. Planning should take into account the existing and forecasted threat,
weather, geographical features, tactics necessary to accomplish the mission and defeat
the threat, and specific information the requester may require (i.e., scale, run-in
heading, oblique versus vertical photography).

c. Execution. This step involves the actual execution of the assigned mission. To complete
the mission successfully, commanders must consider the risks (e.g., threat, tactics, weather,
safety, and logistics) involved.

d. Processing/Exploitation. The collected or transmitted information may not always be in a

form suitable for direct use by the requester. Information may need to be processed and
exploited by specialist agencies before dissemination to the requester. Reconnaissance and
surveillance mission taskers should always ensure that the appropriate agency is tasked in
parallel with the collection mission. Processing is the transfer of collected/transmitted and
recorded raw data of the sensor (primary imagery or data) into useable/visible information

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(secondary imagery or data). This includes the chemical process of exposed wet film in the
negative or positive state, the processing of radar data into radar imagery, the decompression
of compressed data and also the enhancement of the data or imagery. Imagery is interpreted,
and generally, the results are included in a report.

e. Dissemination. This step involves the transmission of the collected processed and
exploited information to the requester. It may take on various forms: real time or NRT data
links directly from collection platform to requesters, broadcast transmissions from collection
platform to multiple agencies, or standard reporting procedures.

405. Intelligence and Reconnaissance/Surveillance Interrelationship. Traditionally, a

reconnaissance and surveillance mission entailed completion of the reconnaissance/ surveillance
cycle and dissemination of the collected information back into the intelligence cycle where the
information was further processed, analysed and became intelligence. However, technology has
changed that traditional process. Due to the highly perishable nature of some
information/intelligence or criticality of a situation, the requester may not be able to wait for the
normal intelligence process to satisfy intelligence requirements. In some cases, data that has been
minimally evaluated may be transferred directly from the collection platform to the requester;
however, it is important that this data is also transferred to the All Source Cell (ASC) where it will be
processed and used in the production of intelligence. Since this data has not been processed and
analysed or integrated with other data, the product is not finished intelligence; rather it is considered
as combat information or raw data. Figure 4-1 depicts the relationship between the
reconnaissance/surveillance cycle and the intelligence cycle.

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Intelligence Cycle

Direction/Planning

Request
Dissemination/ Collection
Evaluation

Processing/
Exploitation

Intelligence & Combat

Intelligence Information
Requirements Intelligence

Tasking

Requester
Combat Dissemination Planning
Information

Processing/
Exploitation
Execution

Reconnaissance/
Surveillance Cycle

Figure 4-1 Intelligence-Reconnaissance/Surveillance Relationship

406. Collection Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) Concept . The
need for unified and coherent collection of information and intelligence so as to ensure that the IRs
of the operational commanders are better met by the intelligence community has led to the
development of the CCIRM Concept. The concept develops logically from the constituent elements
of the Intelligence Cycle. CCIRM is a management function to enable the timely flow

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of intelligence. Its principal objective is the efficient exploitation of the full spectrum of collection
assets, sources and databases in order to satisfy IRs from all operational levels. CCIRM consists of
two major components: the co-ordination of the collection effort and the management of the IRs
arising from particular operations, missions or deployments.

a. Collection co-ordination is the development and control of a collection plan, which sets
out how information and intelligence needed to meet IRs is to be collected. This results in
either the direct tasking of assets over which a collection manager has authority, or the
generation of tasking requests to tasking authorities at higher, lower or lateral levels. The
collection plan is constantly revised and updated.

b. Intelligence requirements management is the overall management of processing,

exploiting, and disseminating intelligence to satisfy tactical, operational and strategic IRs in
support of military operations.

c. CCIRM Organisation. Allied Joint Force Headquarters (AJFHQ) J2 staffs will be

responsible for CCIRM policy and implementation. The J2 staff will receive COMAJF’s
priority intelligence requirements as well as requests for information from subordinate
formations. It will satisfy those it can from within the force’s joint resources or seek national
assistance for those it can not. At lower command levels, CCIRM organisations may form
the focal points for tactical intelligence requirements management. They will satisfy IRs
from within its formation resources where practicable, and co-ordinate access to other
resources as necessary.

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CHAPTER 5
RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE
COLLECTORS, PRODUCTS and TARGETS
501. Sensors. There are two general means of collecting information: human observation and
technical sensors. They are described in detail below.

a. Human Observation. Reconnaissance and surveillance by human observation is the oldest

method of gathering military information and remains a valued source of information. Human
observation is done by visual and acoustic detection, recognition and even identification. The
human eye has a far greater "field of view" than most sensors and can be adjusted to changing
points of interest instantly. Human sources can rapidly evaluate and assess observed
information, draw conclusions and direct actions. Gathered information can be transferred
expeditiously to the requester or other users. Technical devices can assist the human eye or
ear in extending their range, minimizing disturbances and increasing their sensitivity or
resolution. Human sources can complement the results of other sensors by providing
additional data not covered by the sensors and also replace them if they malfunction. The
value and the reliability of human sources are highly dependent upon the degree of training
and experience they have, as information gleaned from human sources may possess a certain
degree of subjectivity. The performance of human sources generally decreases with the
growing duration of the operation and can be adversely affected by stress factors. These
factors also increase the tendency of human beings to 'see what they expect or wish to see'
and the susceptibility to measures of camouflage, concealment, deception and masking.

b. Technical Sensors. Technical sensors can generally be divided into two categories:
imaging and non imaging. Both operate in the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrum and
cover frequencies not perceptible by the human eye or ear. Technical sensors not only
collect, but they also record data for repeatable recalling, transmission, copying and even
enhancement for specific purposes. Additionally they are able to provide auxiliary data
which may include information such as the parameters of the carrying platform (speed,
height, bank, time) or the specifications of the sensor itself. Different sensors can be used at
the same time in various configurations and suites. Sensors can be pre-programmed or
operator directed. Generally, technical sensors are highly reliable and may be less susceptible
to efforts of concealment or deception than human sources. Technical sensors may be
degraded by malfunction and operator error, and their products may be impacted by
atmospheric and other natural factors.

1. Imaging Sensors. Operating within a certain frequency spectrum, imaging sensors are
able to produce an image of targets or objects of interest. Optical and non-optical images
are permanently recorded on a medium such as film or tape and may be transmitted from
a platform to the requester, thus significantly improving the timeliness of the information.
Imaging sensors for reconnaissance and surveillance operate traditionally in the frequency

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of visible light, infrared or radar, providing pictures or photos and videos highly similar to
which is seen with the human eye.

(a). Optical sensors are passive and receive light from artificial and natural sources
reflected by the target or object of interest. They use electronic scanning devices or
conventional lenses with a broad range of focal length, in single or multiple
configurations. They can take imagery from the vertical or oblique view including
side, forward or even rear oblique perspectives. Some sensors have the capability to
collect imagery across the horizon or along a specific track.

(b). Infrared (IR) imaging sensors are also passive and scan IR radiation, emission or
reflection which basically accompanies heat or thermal radiation. IR sensors are able
to detect and recognize information which is hidden from visual sensors, e.g., energy
flows. If thermal traces still exist, IR sensors may be able to indicate activities
already past. Although they can penetrate darkness and even artificial smoke, their
performance may be degraded by moisture in the atmosphere and some natural
substances as chlorophyll. IR sensors are an ideal supplement to and therefore often
used with optical sensors. IR sensors can "look" vertical and side or forward oblique.

(c). Imaging radar sensors for reconnaissance and surveillance are mainly air- or
space-based, and are capable of covering considerably more targets or area than other
sensors. They illuminate the target, area or object with HF-wavelengths, receive
reflected returns and convert phase and amplitudes into a "visible" image. Some
microwave systems only look sideways, e.g., Sideways Looking Aperture Radar
(SLAR). State-of-the-art systems use a synthetic aperture radar vice the older ones
utilising a real aperture radar. SLAR or Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems
have long range all-weather capability. They are able to detect and differentiate
moving targets (Moving Target Indicator – MTI) to determine heading and speed.
Inverse SAR, interferometric SAR and forward looking systems are highly
specialized variants. The latter is also used as a terrain-following radar and has target
tracking capabilities.

(d). Passive microwave (radiometric)systems are mainly used for civil applications of
remote sensing. They also produce an image by scanning and recording the natural
microwave radiation of the earth’s surface.

2. Non Imaging Sensors. Non imaging sensors search for, intercept, record, identify and
often analyse natural and artificially radiated electromagnetic energy. They can be
sensitive to radio waves, microwaves, IR-radiation, X-rays and gamma rays. Sensors for
specific military use operate in the frequency range of radio waves and microwaves.
Passive sensors intercept communications or other transmitters such as radars or
navigation aids. Communications Intelligence (COMINT) systems can identify
adversaries by analysing voice patterns or the particular use of a communications code.
Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) systems provide electronic fingerprints such as signal

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strength or bandwidth of the intercepted type of radar, and may also identify a specific
piece of such equipment. Active sensors, such as radar facilitate the continuous,
systematic collection of information on position, movement, origin and to some extent,
the identity of objects (e.g. aircraft, ships) within a given area.

502. Products. The results of reconnaissance and surveillance operations can be provided in the
form of reports, imagery, data-linked or networked real or NRT data, tables, drawings, overlays,
diagrams, data bases, and maps. The choice of the final product and the source of origin (man or
machine) depends on the specific objective of the operation as well as the specific sensor or system
applied. All results can be transmitted on- or off-line.

a. Reports. Reports can be submitted verbally or as written text or electronic data (soft
copy).

1. Verbal reports are given by personnel such as aircrews or analysts explaining what
they have seen through visual observation or by screening imagery. The inflight report
(INFLIGHTREP) is a formatted report given by the crew of an airborne asset and can be
based on or supported by the data of a sensor. The narrative overlay is a verbal report
given by the observer or screener of running video imagery. It can be transmitted in
NRT to the user separately or together with the recorded video.

2. Written reports are normally structured or formatted in a standardized NATO form,

e.g., the Reconnaissance Exploitation Report or Radar Exploitation Report. The content
of these reports depends on the mission objective, the target category and the purpose
code. Such reports enable the user to extract only the information requested or required.

b. Imagery. Imagery is collectively the representation of objects of interest, areas or targets

reproduced electronically or by optical means and processed. Imagery is a product used to
extract particular information by image interpretation and reporting. Generally, imagery
provides considerably more detail than actually needed and may possess peculiarities,
ambiguities and distinctive features which would have to be considered during interpretation.
Radar imagery in particular requires experienced and well trained interpreters and analysts.
The collected (raw) image is called primary imagery and has to be processed and exploited to
gain the interpretable form of secondary imagery. Modern image interpretation is enhanced
with the support of computer-based systems possessing enlargement and enhancement
devices, and software tools for interpretation, reporting, annotation, change detection and
merging with auxiliary data, other imagery and (digital) maps.

c. Data Linked or Networked Real or NRT Data. Surveillance sensors can continuously
distribute data via data-links or networks that may be merged with information from other
sources. An example of such a product is the Recognized Air Picture.

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d. Tables/Drawings/Overlays/Diagrams/Data Bases/Maps. These results may be produced

by the sensor itself automatically (e.g. fingerprints data), by supporting computer systems or
by human analysts. They include extractions of specific details of imagery, vectors, headings,
and digital figures. They also can be transmitted together with textual reports,

503. Targets. The target or object of interest will influence the way in which a reconnaissance and
surveillance operation is planned and conducted.

a. Target Categories. In STANAG 3596, Air Reconnaissance Requesting and Target

Reporting Guide, NATO has defined 17 target categories ranging from airfields to power
supply facilities, and included the specific structure of textual reports for each category.
National categories or those for other specific purposes may differ,

b. Target Designations. With regard to the execution of a reconnaissance operation, NATO

distinguishes between the following target designations: Pin Point or single target, Lines
Searches, Strip Searches and Area Searches. These are described below.

1. Pin Point. A Pin Point is a target or object whose location is already known precisely
and can be expressed with an accurate geographical reference. Examples are permanent
targets such as airfields, barracks, bridges or railway stations.

2. Line Searches. Line searches are defined by a start and end point and are part of lines
of communication, roads, railroads or waterways. Such lines should not exceed 25 NM in
length. Start and endpoints must be confirmed by image. Detected targets can be
confirmed by visual observation and/or imagery. Imagery confirmation can be obtained
by pre-planned sensor coverage of the suspected location or by an aircrew.

3. Strip Searches. Strip searches are straight lines between a defined start and end point
and should not exceed 10 NM. Target confirmation is obtained in same manner for line
searches.

4. Area Searches. Area searches are conducted in areas defined by exact border point
locations or at a given radius from a centre point. Target confirmation procedures are the
same as those for line and strip searches.

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ANNEX A

GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

ACOUSTINT. Acoustic Intelligence

AJFHQ. Joint Force Headquarters

ASC. All Source Cell

BDA. Battle Damage Assessment

C2W. Command and Control warfare

CCIRM. Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management

CIS. Communication and Information Systems

COMAJF. Commander, Allied Joint Force

COMINT. Communications Intelligence

ELINT. Electronic Intelligence

EW. Electronic Warfare

GCI. Ground Controlled Intercept

HUMINT. Human Intelligence

I&W. Indications and Warnings

INFLIGHTREP. Inflight Report.

IMINT. Imagery Intelligence

IPB. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

IR. Infrared

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IRs. Intelligence Requirements

ISTAR. Intelligence, Surveillance. Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

LOS. Line Of Sight

MAS. Military Agency for Standardization

MASINT. Measurement and Signature Intelligence

MNC. Major NATO Command

MTI. Moving Target Indicator

NAEW. NATO Airborne Early Warning

NRT. Near Real Time

SAR. Synthetic Aperture Radar

SIGINT. Signals Intelligence

SLAR. Sideways Looking Aperture Radar

SOF. Special Operations Forces

SR. Special Reconnaissance

UAV. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Air Reconnaissance. The collection of information of intelligence interest either by visual

observation from the air or through the use of airborne sensors. (AAP-6)

Air Surveillance. The systematic observation of air space by electronic, visual, or other means,
primarily for the purpose of identifying and determining the movements of aircraft and missiles,
friendly and enemy, in the air space under observation. (AAP-6)

Battlefield Surveillance. Systematic observation of the battle area for the purpose of providing
timely information and combat intelligence. (AAP-6)

Collection Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management Concept. Encompasses those

activities that result in the effective and efficient employment of intelligence collection, processing,
exploitation and reporting to satisfy intelligence requirements in support of military operations.
Consists of two major components: the co-ordination of the collection effort and the management of
intelligence requirements arising from particular operations, missions or deployments.

Intelligence. The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations,
hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term
is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such
activity. (AAP-6)

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance. ISTAR is the process that links
surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems and sensors to cue manoeuvre and
offensive strike assets. It encompasses collection and management of information and intelligence to
provide situational awareness for commanders and staff to direct operations and support the targeting
process.

Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,

information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics or a particular area.
(AAP-6)

Sea Surveillance. The systematic observation of surface and sub-surface areas by all available and
practical means primarily for the purpose of locating, identifying and determining the movement of
ships, submarines, and other vehicles, friendly and enemy, proceeding on or under the surface of the
world’s seas and oceans. (AAP-6)

Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface and subsurface areas, places,
persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (AAP-6)

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ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
 NATO UNCLASSIFIED
ATP-61

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

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ORIGINAL
NATO UNCLASSIFIED