NATO CONFIDENTIAL

ATP-01, Vol. I

NATO STANDARD

ATP-01, VOLUME I
ALLIED MARITIME TACTICAL
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROCEDURES
Edition (H) Version (1)

MAY 2021

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATION

Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN

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May 2021

PUBLICATION NOTICE

1. ATP-01(H)(1), Volume I, ALLIED MARITIME TACTICAL INSTRUCTIONS AND

PROCEDURES, is effective upon receipt and supersedes ATP-01(G)(1), Volume I.

2. Summary.

a. Chapter 1:

(1) Updates sector antisubmarine warfare commander definition in article 1205.

(2) Includes the adoption of the information warfare concept throughout.

(3) Adds new information warfare operations paragraph to article 1300.

b. Chapter 2:

(1) Updates Figures 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4.

(2) Deletes article 2140, Operation Awkward.

(3) Adds Force Marshaller to Table 2-3.

(4) Adds Table 2-4 to include strike warfare information.

(5) Adds officer’s in tactical command responsibilities and functions to Tables 2-4 and 2-7.

(6) Incorporates strike warfare commander in the composite warfare commander construct.

c. Chapters 4 through 15 additions, deletions, and updates throughout.

d. Changes definitions in Chapter 15 to align with ATP-08, Volume I, Doctrine for Amphibious
Operations.

e. Chapter 20: Adds new Chapter 20, Maritime Information Warfare.

f. Editorial changes throughout.

g. Updates to index and glossary.

This notice will assist in providing information to cognizant personnel. It is not accountable.

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS

18 GRC

General USA

NOTE

THE RESERVATIONS LISTED ON THIS PAGE INCLUDE ONLY THOSE

THAT WERE RECORDED AT TIME OF PROMULGATION AND MAY
NOT BE COMPLETE. REFER TO THE NATO STANDARDIZATION
DATABASE FOR THE COMPLETE LIST OF EXISTING RESERVATIONS.

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS
NATION SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

GRC Para 18011/Page 18-7: Hellenic Navy will implement IPROMs (Internal Protection
Measures) of Chapter 18 (Maritime Force Protection) provided that they comply
with national regulations.

USA The United States does not adhere to the concept of Integrated Operations
with respect to the employment of submarines in Coordinated Operations.
This submarine operation method is not employed when national or allied
submarines work with our Task Groups.

NOTE

THE RESERVATIONS LISTED ON THIS PAGE INCLUDE ONLY THOSE

THAT WERE RECORDED AT TIME OF PROMULGATION AND MAY
NOT BE COMPLETE. REFER TO THE NATO STANDARDIZATION
DATABASE FOR THE COMPLETE LIST OF EXISTING RESERVATIONS.

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NATO NATIONS
EACH NATION SHOULD SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN
NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION IF REQUIRED

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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PART I—GENERAL

CHAPTER 1—MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND ACTIVITIES

SECTION I—MISSIONS

1101 Collective Defence at Sea ................................................................................................1-1

1102 Maritime Security Operations ..........................................................................................1-1

SECTION II—ORGANIZATION

1201 Maritime Components ......................................................................................................1-2

1202 Task, Type, and Warfare Organizations............................................................................1-2
1203 Task Organization—Task Force Numbers .......................................................................1-2
1204 Task Organization—Task Designators .............................................................................1-3
1205 Changes in Task Organization Assignments ....................................................................1-4

SECTION III—ACTIVITIES

1300 General .............................................................................................................................1-5

1301 Military Activities From the Sea ......................................................................................1-5
1302 Maritime Assistance .........................................................................................................1-7

CHAPTER 2—COMMAND

SECTION I—GENERAL

2100 Scope ................................................................................................................................2-1

2101 Authority ..........................................................................................................................2-1
2102 Command .........................................................................................................................2-1
2103 Delegation of Authority....................................................................................................2-2
2104 Chain of Command ..........................................................................................................2-2
2105 Command System ............................................................................................................2-2
2106 Exercising Command .......................................................................................................2-2
2110 Structure for the Command of Maritime Forces ..............................................................2-3
2111 Full Command ..................................................................................................................2-3
2112 Operational Command .....................................................................................................2-3
2113 Operational Control ..........................................................................................................2-3
2114 Change of Operational Control ........................................................................................2-3
2115 Tactical Command............................................................................................................2-4
2116 Officer in Tactical Command ...........................................................................................2-4
2117 Tactical Control ................................................................................................................2-4
2118 Command by Veto ............................................................................................................2-5
2119 Command of Allied Forces ..............................................................................................2-5
2120 Command of Aircraft .......................................................................................................2-5
2130 Command During Replenishment at Sea .........................................................................2-5
2131 Method of Execution ........................................................................................................2-5

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2132 OPTASK RAS: The OTC Promulgating the Replenishment Programme .......................2-6
2133 OPSTAT UNIT: Supplying Ship Providing Details of Rigs to Customer Ships ..............2-6
2134 OPSTAT CARGO: Supplying Ship Reporting Cargo ......................................................2-6
2135 Command in Mine Countermeasures ...............................................................................2-6
2150 Command in Submarine Operations ................................................................................2-8
2151 Command and Control of Submarine Strike Operations .................................................2-8
2160 Command in Amphibious Warfare .................................................................................2-10
2161 Parallel Chains of Command .........................................................................................2-10
2162 Designation of Commanders ..........................................................................................2-10
2163 Relationships During Planning ......................................................................................2-10
2164 Command During Operations ........................................................................................ 2-11
2165 Consultation Between Commanders .............................................................................. 2-11
2166 Consultation Between Corresponding Commanders ..................................................... 2-11
2167 Naval Authority Over Landing Force Units ................................................................... 2-11
2170 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping ............................................................. 2-11
2175 Command of Maritime Interdiction Operations .............................................................2-12
2180 Command During Support Operations...........................................................................2-12
2181 Support Operations.........................................................................................................2-12
2182 Support Operations, Situation A.....................................................................................2-13
2183 Support Operations, Situation B ....................................................................................2-13
2184 Support Operations, Situation C ....................................................................................2-14
2190 Other Support Operations ..............................................................................................2-15
2191 Command and Control of Submarines During Strike Operations .................................2-15

SECTION II—TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA

2200 Introduction ....................................................................................................................2-16

2201 Command of Large Forces .............................................................................................2-16
2202 Delegation of Command Functions ...............................................................................2-16
2205 Command and Control Options .....................................................................................2-17
2206 Responsibilities ..............................................................................................................2-17
2210 Delegation of Authority..................................................................................................2-19
2211 Delegation Considerations .............................................................................................2-19
2212 Warfare Commander and Coordinator Responsibilities.................................................2-20
2213 Promulgation of Duties and Delegation of Functions ....................................................2-27
2220 Tasking Methods ............................................................................................................2-53
2221 NATO Message Text Formats—Purpose and Method of Use .......................................2-53
2222 Message Formats used in Maritime Operations .............................................................2-54
2223 Tactical Data Link Systems ............................................................................................2-54

CHAPTER 3—FORCE ORGANIZATION/READINESS

SECTION I—RAPID AMENDMENT OF TACTICS AND PROCEDURES

3100 General .............................................................................................................................3-1

3110 Procedure..........................................................................................................................3-1

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SECTION II—POSITION AND MOVEMENT

3200 Position/Reference Systems .............................................................................................3-2

3201 World Geographic Reference System ..............................................................................3-2
3202 Universal Transverse Mercator Grid ................................................................................3-4
3203 Cartesian Coordinate Grid................................................................................................3-5
3204 Antisubmarine Warfare Grid ............................................................................................3-5
3205 Bearing and Distance .......................................................................................................3-5
3206 Quick Reference System ..................................................................................................3-6
3207 Position/Bearing Accuracy Suffixes .................................................................................3-9
3208 Altitude or Depth............................................................................................................3-10
3209 Checksum Digits ............................................................................................................ 3-11
3210 Standard Positions/Reference Points/Position Reporting ..............................................3-12
3211 Data Link Reference Point (Only Link 11) ....................................................................3-12
3212 Helicopter Reference Point ............................................................................................3-13
3213 Harbour Reference Points ..............................................................................................3-13
3214 Ship as Anchoring Reference .........................................................................................3-14
3215 Routes and Reference Points ..........................................................................................3-14
3216 Convoy Route Position Designators ..............................................................................3-14
3217 Reporting and Exchanging Data on Positions ................................................................3-14
3220 Course and Speed ...........................................................................................................3-15
3221 Course and Speed Made Good .......................................................................................3-15
3222 Position and Intended Movement...................................................................................3-15
3223 Endurance .......................................................................................................................3-16
3230 Arrival and Departure ....................................................................................................3-16
3231 Reporting Time of Arrival ..............................................................................................3-16
3232 Entry Intervals ................................................................................................................3-16
3233 Anchoring in Formation .................................................................................................3-16
3234 Berth Numbers ...............................................................................................................3-16

SECTION III—EVASIVE STEERING

3300 Scope ..............................................................................................................................3-17

3301 General Instructions .......................................................................................................3-17
3321 Manoeuvre......................................................................................................................3-17
SECTION IV—FORMATIONS

3400 Scope ..............................................................................................................................3-19

SECTION V—DISPOSITIONS

3520 Disposition Planning Factors .........................................................................................3-20

SECTION VI—SCREENS

3600 Purpose ...........................................................................................................................3-21

3610 Types of Screen ..............................................................................................................3-21
3611 Screen Selection and Design ..........................................................................................3-21
3612 Stationing Screen Units ..................................................................................................3-22
3620 Description of Screens ...................................................................................................3-23

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3621 Sector Screen ..................................................................................................................3-23

3623 Helicopter Windline Screen ...........................................................................................3-25
3624 Departure and Entry Screens ..........................................................................................3-25
3625 Screen for Damaged Ships .............................................................................................3-27
3630 Manoeuvring with a Sector Screen ................................................................................3-28
3632 Instructions for Convoy Screens ....................................................................................3-28
3633 Helicopters in the Screen ...............................................................................................3-29
3634 Control of Screen Helicopters ........................................................................................3-29
3635 Pickets ............................................................................................................................3-30
3636 Towed Array Ships in the Screen ...................................................................................3-30
3640 Special Instructions ........................................................................................................3-30
3641 Instructions for Individual Screen Units ........................................................................3-30
3642 Screen Adjustment .........................................................................................................3-31

SECTION VII—READINESS

3700 Scope ..............................................................................................................................3-32

3720 Readiness for Action ......................................................................................................3-32
3721 Operational Capabilities .................................................................................................3-32
3722 Inoperable Equipment ....................................................................................................3-32
3723 Command Responsibilities.............................................................................................3-32
3724 Organization ...................................................................................................................3-33
3725 Joining ............................................................................................................................3-33
3730 General Degrees of Readiness .......................................................................................3-34
3740 Particular Degrees of Readiness.....................................................................................3-34
3741 Graduated Levels of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat
and Minimum Individual Protection ..............................................................................3-34
3742 Engineering Degrees of Readiness.................................................................................3-34
3750 Weapon Alert States .......................................................................................................3-35
3760 Aircraft Alert States........................................................................................................3-35
3770 Threat Warnings .............................................................................................................3-35

PART II—COMMUNICATIONS/C4ISR

CHAPTER 4—COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION I—TACTICAL COMPLANS

4100 Scope ................................................................................................................................4-1

4110 Communication Plan Design............................................................................................4-1
4120 Communication Guidelines ..............................................................................................4-2
4121 Network Control Station ..................................................................................................4-2
4123 Call Signs .........................................................................................................................4-3
4124 Use of Radio Teletype for Tactical Messages ..................................................................4-4
4125 Data Links ........................................................................................................................4-4
4126 Types of Data Link ...........................................................................................................4-4
4130 Communications Security ................................................................................................4-5
4131 COMSEC Procedures.......................................................................................................4-5
4132 Authentication ................................................................................................................. 4-5
4133 Authentication Policies ....................................................................................................4-7

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4135 Task Force/Group Communications.................................................................................4-7

4136 TF/TG Command Net ......................................................................................................4-7
4137 TF/TG and Screen Tactical Nets ......................................................................................4-8
4138 TF/TG Reporting ..............................................................................................................4-8
4139 Guidelines for Internet Protocol Chat Rooms ..................................................................4-8
4140 Anti-air Warfare and Airspace Coordination Communications .......................................4-9
4141 AAW Reporting Net .........................................................................................................4-9
4142 AAW Coordination Net (Force/Sector) ............................................................................4-9
4143 Local AAW Coordination Net ..........................................................................................4-9
4144 Combining AAW Nets....................................................................................................4-10
4145 Fleet Air Defence Identification Zone/Force Air Coordination Area Net ......................4-10
4146 Anti-air Warfare Interceptor Coordination and Reporting Net ......................................4-10
4147 Fighter/AEW Control Net ..............................................................................................4-10
4148 Joint AAW Support and Coordination Net .....................................................................4-10
4149 AAW Data Links ............................................................................................................4-10
4150 AAW Call Signs ............................................................................................................. 4-11
4155 Antisurface Warfare Communications ........................................................................... 4-11
4157 Surface Action Group Communications ........................................................................ 4-11
4158 Maritime Interdiction Operations Communications ......................................................4-12
4159 Sea Combat Commander Communications ...................................................................4-12
4160 Antisubmarine Warfare Communications ......................................................................4-12
4161 ASW Coordination and Reporting Net ..........................................................................4-12
4162 Communications with Distant ASW Units.....................................................................4-12
4163 Surface Ship Communications .......................................................................................4-13
4164 ASW Aircraft Communications .....................................................................................4-13
4165 Communications with Supporting Commands ..............................................................4-14
4166 Typical ASW Reporting Requirements ..........................................................................4-14
4170 Submarine Communications ..........................................................................................4-14
4171 Basic Considerations and Guidelines .............................................................................4-14
4172 Submarine Broadcast .....................................................................................................4-15
4173 Tactical Communications ...............................................................................................4-16
4174 Submarine Reporting .....................................................................................................4-17
4175 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Communications .................................4-17
4180 Aircraft Communications ...............................................................................................4-17
4181 Maritime Patrol Aircraft Communications.....................................................................4-17
4185 Helicopter Communications...........................................................................................4-18
4186 Helicopter Control Nets General ....................................................................................4-19
4190 Communications for Decentralized Command and Control ..........................................4-19

SECTION II—TACTICAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

4200 Introduction ....................................................................................................................4-20

4201 Systems ..........................................................................................................................4-20
4202 Employment ...................................................................................................................4-20
4203 Electronic Warfare Considerations .................................................................................4-20

CHAPTER 5—WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT

SECTION I—OVERVIEW

5100 Rules of Engagement .......................................................................................................5-1

5110 Planned Responses ...........................................................................................................5-1
5120 Force Defence Areas ........................................................................................................5-1

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SECTION II—WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

5220 Weapon Restrictions—General ........................................................................................5-3

5221 Weapon Control Status .....................................................................................................5-3
5222 Weapon Control Orders ....................................................................................................5-4
5223 Kill Line .......................................................................................................................... 5-5

CHAPTER 6—FORCE COORDINATION

SECTION I—AIR OPERATIONS

6100 Introduction ......................................................................................................................6-1

6101 Tasking Authorities ..........................................................................................................6-1
6102 Air Support Operations ....................................................................................................6-1
6103 Informing the OTC of Air Operations in His Vicinity .....................................................6-2
6105 Types of Operations .........................................................................................................6-2
6106 Operations Integral to a Force ..........................................................................................6-2
6107 Tasking of Support Aircraft ..............................................................................................6-2
6110 Definitions ........................................................................................................................6-5
6120 Air Coordination and Aircraft Control .............................................................................6-7
6121 The Force Marshaller .......................................................................................................6-8
6122 Responsibilities of the Aircraft Control Unit ...................................................................6-8
6123 Responsibilities of Units Carrying Aircraft......................................................................6-9
6124 Tactical Procedures ..........................................................................................................6-9
6125 Independent Operations ...................................................................................................6-9
6126 Controlled Operations ......................................................................................................6-9
6127 Factors Determining Type of Operations and Control ...................................................6-10
6128 Courses and True Bearings.............................................................................................6-12
6129 Link 11 MPA Joining Procedure ....................................................................................6-12
6130 Joining of Support Aircraft.............................................................................................6-12
6131 Procedures for Aircraft in Transit ...................................................................................6-12
6132 Joining Procedures .........................................................................................................6-14
6133 Identification/Recognition of Support Aircraft ..............................................................6-20
6134 Identification/Recognition Procedures ...........................................................................6-21
6135 Rapid Tasking Procedures for MPA Joining a Force......................................................6-22
6136 Procedure........................................................................................................................6-22
6137 Task ................................................................................................................................6-23
6138 Weapon Restrictions .......................................................................................................6-23
6139 Airplan Area ...................................................................................................................6-23
6140 Emission Control ............................................................................................................6-23
6141 Rapid Tasking Message Readback .................................................................................6-24
6142 Acknowledgement Message...........................................................................................6-24
6143 Example of Procedure ....................................................................................................6-24
6150 Employment of Aircraft While on Direct Support .........................................................6-25
6151 ASW Mission Designators .............................................................................................6-26
6152 Sonobuoy Operations .....................................................................................................6-26
6153 Identification and Recognition by Aircraft .....................................................................6-26
6160 MPA-to-MPA Turnover Procedures ...............................................................................6-27
6161 Terminology ...................................................................................................................6-27
6162 On-Task Extensions........................................................................................................6-28

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6163 Procedures for Specific Turnover ...................................................................................6-28

6164 Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures .....................................................................................6-30
6170 Safety Procedures for Maritime Air Operations.............................................................6-32
6171 Fixed-Wing Aircraft .......................................................................................................6-32
6172 Helicopters .....................................................................................................................6-33
6173 Low-Altitude Rules (Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters) .........................................6-34
6174 Lateral and Vertical Separation ......................................................................................6-35
6175 Use of Lights by Ships and Aircraft ...............................................................................6-37
6176 Helicopter Action Group Operations .............................................................................6-37
6177 Cooperation with Fixed-Wing Aircraft ..........................................................................6-38

SECTION II—SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

6200 Scope ..............................................................................................................................6-39

6201 Ship Movements During Flight Operations ...................................................................6-39
6202 Helicopter In-Flight Refuelling ......................................................................................6-39
6205 Carrier Operations ..........................................................................................................6-40
6206 Duties in a Task Group ...................................................................................................6-40
6209 Flying Sectors.................................................................................................................6-40
6210 Manoeuvring for Flight Operations ...............................................................................6-40
6211 Method A ........................................................................................................................6-41
6212 Method B ........................................................................................................................6-41
6213 Method C ........................................................................................................................6-42
6214 Manoeuvring for Emergency Landings..........................................................................6-42
6215 Antisubmarine Precautions During Delays While Operating Aircraft ...........................6-43
6216 Manoeuvring for Low-Visibility Recovery Operations .................................................6-43
6217 Course and Relative Wind ..............................................................................................6-43
6218 Operations at Night ........................................................................................................6-43
6219 Operations in Low Visibility ..........................................................................................6-43
6220 Air Operations in a Convoy ...........................................................................................6-45
6230 Carrier Air Operations ....................................................................................................6-46
6231 Offensive Air Operations................................................................................................6-46
6232 Command of Air Forces .................................................................................................6-46
6233 Offensive Operations ......................................................................................................6-48
6240 Request for CV Aircraft .................................................................................................6-48
6250 Air Traffic Control ..........................................................................................................6-49
6251 Ship Control Zones ........................................................................................................6-49
6252 Aircraft Launch/Departure .............................................................................................6-49
6253 Procedure for Returning Aircraft ...................................................................................6-50
6254 Marshal Procedures ........................................................................................................6-50
6255 Approach ........................................................................................................................6-50
6256 Carrier Approach Procedures .........................................................................................6-50
6257 Carrier Strike Group/Expeditionary Strike Group Airspace ..........................................6-52
6260 Silent and Darkened Helicopter Operations ...................................................................6-52
6261 Factors ............................................................................................................................6-52
6262 Method of Execution ......................................................................................................6-53

SECTION III—AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE

6300 Aircraft Emergency and Rescue .....................................................................................6-55

6301 General Provisions .........................................................................................................6-55
6302 Communications During Aircraft Emergencies .............................................................6-55

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6303 Rescue Operations ..........................................................................................................6-56

6304 Ditching, Bailout, and Ejection ......................................................................................6-61
6305 Diversion of Ship to Locate Survivors ...........................................................................6-62

SECTION IV—SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND MEASURES TO AVOID MUTUAL

INTERFERENCE

6400 Scope ..............................................................................................................................6-63

6401 Implementation of Procedures .......................................................................................6-63
6402 Implementation of Waterspace Management Procedures ..............................................6-63
6410 General Considerations ..................................................................................................6-63
6411 Authority ........................................................................................................................6-64
6412 Responsibility .................................................................................................................6-64
6413 Types of Measure ...........................................................................................................6-64
6414 Compromise ...................................................................................................................6-64
6415 Identification/Recognition ..............................................................................................6-64
6416 Initiation of Self-identification .......................................................................................6-64
6420 Routes and Reference Points ..........................................................................................6-65
6430 Restricted Areas .............................................................................................................6-65
6431 Controlled Airspace, Air Routes/Air Corridors, and Safety Sectors ..............................6-66
6432 Shore Bombardment and Bomb Lines ...........................................................................6-66
6433 Blind Bombing Zones ....................................................................................................6-66
6434 Controlled Waterspace, Waterspace Management Areas, and
ASW Weapon Restrictions .............................................................................................6-67
6435 Procedures for Request and Allocation of WSM Areas .................................................6-74
6436 Emergency Transit of Surface Forces Through SAAs or JAAs .....................................6-74
6437 Procedures for Surface Ships Entering Restricted Areas ...............................................6-76
6440 Safety Procedures ...........................................................................................................6-76
6445 Safety of Aircraft ............................................................................................................6-76
6446 Weapon Restrictions—General ......................................................................................6-76
6450 Special Surface Ship Precautions ...................................................................................6-76
6451 Surface Ship Notices and Advisories .............................................................................6-76
6452 Radiation Hazards to Personnel .....................................................................................6-77
6453 Radiation Hazards to Materiel .......................................................................................6-77
6454 Radiation Hazards to Fuel ..............................................................................................6-78
6460 Safety Procedures for Submarines .................................................................................6-79
6461 ASW Compensatory Allowances ...................................................................................6-79
6462 Submarine-Generated Search Area ................................................................................6-80
6463 NOTACK Area ...............................................................................................................6-84
6464 Safety Lanes ...................................................................................................................6-88
6465 Command Relationships of Transiting Submarines .......................................................6-88
6466 Responsibility to Assist Disabled Submarines ...............................................................6-88
6470 Special Precautions for Submarine Operations in Peacetime ........................................6-89
6471 Submarine Movements...................................................................................................6-89
6472 Action on Suspected Mutual Interference ......................................................................6-89
6473 Operations Inherently Dangerous to Subsurface Operations .........................................6-90
6474 Action at Time of Increased Tension..............................................................................6-91
6480 Prevention of Mutual Interference Between Submerged Submarines and Surface
Ships with Towed Acoustic Devices Streamed or Helicopter Dipping Sonar ...............6-91
6481 Prevention of Mutual Interference Between Mine Warfare Activities and
Submarines .....................................................................................................................6-93

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SECTION V—CONTACT PROSECUTION

6500 ASW Airplans, Attack and Support Methods, and Ship Plans .......................................6-95
6501 Surface Ship Search, Attack and Support Plans .............................................................6-95
6502 Airplans ..........................................................................................................................6-95

CHAPTER 7—PICTURE COMPILATION AND SCOUTING

SECTION I—PICTURE COMPILATION

7100 Introduction ......................................................................................................................7-1

7101 Picture Compilation .........................................................................................................7-1
7110 The Picture Compilation Plan ..........................................................................................7-1
7120 General Considerations ....................................................................................................7-1
7121 Environment .....................................................................................................................7-1
7122 Resources .........................................................................................................................7-2
7123 Operational Situation .......................................................................................................7-2
7130 Elements of Picture Compilation .....................................................................................7-2
7140 The Process of Picture Compilation .................................................................................7-3
7141 Detection ..........................................................................................................................7-3
7142 Localization ......................................................................................................................7-4
7143 Recognition ......................................................................................................................7-4
7144 Identification ....................................................................................................................7-5
7145 Dissemination ...................................................................................................................7-5
7150 Scouting............................................................................................................................7-5
7151 Introduction ......................................................................................................................7-5
7152 Aim ...................................................................................................................................7-5
7153 Scope ................................................................................................................................7-5
7154 Planning of Scouting Operations .....................................................................................7-7
7155 Scouting Methods.............................................................................................................7-8
7156 Surveillance Methods .......................................................................................................7-9
7157 Patrol ................................................................................................................................7-9
7158 Search .............................................................................................................................7-10
7160 Tasks ............................................................................................................................... 7-11
7161 Shadowing ...................................................................................................................... 7-11
7162 Information Exchange Between Shadowing and Relieving Units ................................. 7-11
7163 Countershadowing..........................................................................................................7-12
7164 Marking ..........................................................................................................................7-12
7165 Countermarking..............................................................................................................7-12
7166 Tattletale .........................................................................................................................7-12
7170 Picture Compilation and Weapon Employment .............................................................7-13
7180 Terms and Definitions ....................................................................................................7-13

SECTION II—DATA COMPILATION

7200 Data Compilation ...........................................................................................................7-15

7201 Reference Publications ...................................................................................................7-15
7202 OTC’s Requirements ......................................................................................................7-15
7203 Means of Data Compilation ...........................................................................................7-15
7204 Coordination ...................................................................................................................7-15

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7210 Surveillance ....................................................................................................................7-15

7211 Surveillance Area ...........................................................................................................7-15
7212 Coordination of Data Compilation in the Surveillance Coordination
Surveillance Area ...........................................................................................................7-16
7213 Force Track Coordinator (Air) .......................................................................................7-16
7214 Force Track Coordinator (Surface) and Force Track Coordinator (Subsurface)............7-16
7220 Contact Reports ..............................................................................................................7-17
7221 General Information .......................................................................................................7-17
7222 Responsibility for Passing Information About Contacts ................................................7-17
7223 Air Raid Reports ............................................................................................................7-18
7224 Surface and Subsurface Raid Reports ............................................................................7-19
7225 Other Reports .................................................................................................................7-19
7226 Warfare Commander Reports .........................................................................................7-20
7230 Communication ..............................................................................................................7-21
7240 Tactical Use of Data Links .............................................................................................7-21
7241 Purpose ...........................................................................................................................7-21
7242 Integration with Standard Tactical Doctrine ..................................................................7-21
7243 Tactical Use of Link 11 ..................................................................................................7-21
7244 Wide-Area Link Operations ...........................................................................................7-22
7245 Link 11 Waveform ..........................................................................................................7-22
7250 Link Management Units .................................................................................................7-22
7251 Data Net Control Station ................................................................................................7-22
7252 Gateway Unit .................................................................................................................7-24
7253 Link Broadcast Unit .......................................................................................................7-24
7254 Grid Reference Unit .......................................................................................................7-24
7260 Procedures ......................................................................................................................7-25
7261 Grid Lock Procedure ......................................................................................................7-25
7262 Procedures for Reporting Own Position ........................................................................7-26
7270 Security and EMCON Considerations ...........................................................................7-27
7280 Automatic Identification System ....................................................................................7-27

CHAPTER 8—ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE

SECTION I—OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION

8100 Introduction and Scope ....................................................................................................8-1

8101 Definitions ........................................................................................................................8-1
8110 Direction and Coordination ..............................................................................................8-2
8111 General .............................................................................................................................8-2
8112 Functions Which May Be Delegated to EWC/ASWC .....................................................8-2
8113 Individual Ship Responsibilities ......................................................................................8-4
8120 Voice Reporting ................................................................................................................8-4
8121 Procedures ........................................................................................................................8-4
8122 EW Reporting of Confidence Levels ...............................................................................8-4
8123 EW Intercept Bearing Accuracy .......................................................................................8-4

SECTION II—EMISSION POLICY

8200 Considerations ..................................................................................................................8-5

8201 Silent Emission Policy .....................................................................................................8-5

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8202 Enemy Contact .................................................................................................................8-6

8210 Breaking Silence ..............................................................................................................8-6
8220 Post-Attack EMCON and COMSEC ...............................................................................8-7

SECTION III—EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON)

8300 EMCON Considerations ..................................................................................................8-8

8301 EMCON Objectives .........................................................................................................8-8
8310 Construction of EMCON Plans ........................................................................................8-8
8320 Emission Diagrams ........................................................................................................8-12

SECTION IV—ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE TASKING

8400 Tasking Objectives .........................................................................................................8-13

8401 Electronic Warfare Tasking ............................................................................................8-13
8410 ESM Tasking ..................................................................................................................8-13
8411 ECM Tasking..................................................................................................................8-15
8420 Acoustic Warfare Tasking ..............................................................................................8-15

SECTION V—EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC

SUPPORT MEASURES

8500 Interception, Detection, and Direction Finding of Transmissions .................................8-16

8510 Electromagnetic Interference of Search Equipment by
Own Transmissions ........................................................................................................8-16
8511 Acoustic Interference of Search Equipment by Own Transmissions .............................8-16
8520 Recording Enemy Emissions .........................................................................................8-17
8530 Localization and Analysis of Enemy Emissions ............................................................8-17
8531 General ...........................................................................................................................8-17
8532 Recognition, Classification, and Identification ..............................................................8-17
8533 Disposition of Units .......................................................................................................8-17

SECTION VI—EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC

COUNTERMEASURES

8600 Employment of Electronic and Acoustic Countermeasures ...........................................8-18

8610 Jamming .........................................................................................................................8-18
8611 The Objective and Effects of Jamming ..........................................................................8-18
8612 Jamming Considerations ................................................................................................8-18
8613 Control of Electronic Jamming ......................................................................................8-19
8620 Communications Jamming .............................................................................................8-19
8630 Deception .......................................................................................................................8-20
8631 Active Deception ............................................................................................................8-20
8632 Passive Deception .........................................................................................................8-20
8650 Electronic Neutralization ...............................................................................................8-20

SECTION VII—EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC PROTECTIVE

MEASURES

8700 General ...........................................................................................................................8-21

8710 EPM/APM Considerations .............................................................................................8-21
8720 Reducing the Effectiveness of ECM/ACM ....................................................................8-21

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8721 Reducing the Effectiveness of Jamming ........................................................................8-21

8722 Measures Against Deception ..........................................................................................8-22
8723 Reducing the Effectiveness of Electronic Neutralization...............................................8-22
8724 Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion.........................................................8-22

SECTION VIII—AREAWIDE ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION

8800 Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell ............................................................................8-24

8801 EWCC Responsibilities ..................................................................................................8-24
8802 Additional EWCC Considerations .................................................................................8-25

PART III—ABOVE WATER WARFARE

CHAPTER 9—ANTISURFACE WARFARE

SECTION I—GENERAL

9100 General .............................................................................................................................9-1

9101 Definitions in ASUW Operations .....................................................................................9-1
9102 Command in Antisurface Warfare ....................................................................................9-1
9103 Definitions of ASUW Support Operations .......................................................................9-2
9104 Force Track Coordinator Surface and Subsurface ...........................................................9-2
9105 Concept of Antisurface Warfare .......................................................................................9-2
9106 Surface Policy ..................................................................................................................9-3
9107 Surface Action ..................................................................................................................9-3

SECTION II—ANTISURFACE WARFARE BY SURFACE UNITS

9200 Surface Action Checkoff List .........................................................................................9-10

9201 Surface Action Group .....................................................................................................9-10
9202 Surface Action Group Policy ......................................................................................... 9-11

SECTION III—ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH AIR COOPERATION

9300 General ...........................................................................................................................9-13

9301 Antisurface Operations Support by Fixed-Wing Aircraft ..............................................9-13
9302 Antisurface Operations by Helicopters ..........................................................................9-13
9303 Cooperation Between Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters .........................................9-13
9304 Employment of a Helicopter Action Group ...................................................................9-14

SECTION IV—ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH SUBSURFACE COOPERATION

9400 General ...........................................................................................................................9-15

9401 Weapons .........................................................................................................................9-15
9402 ASSM Targeting ............................................................................................................9-15
9403 Tactical Planning Considerations ...................................................................................9-15
9404 Communications ............................................................................................................9-17

SECTION V—THIRD-PARTY TARGETING

9500 General ...........................................................................................................................9-18

9501 Definitions ......................................................................................................................9-18
9502 Over-the-Horizon Targeting Considerations ..................................................................9-18

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SECTION VI—GUIDELINES FOR CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

9600 General ...........................................................................................................................9-20

9601 Scope of Operations .......................................................................................................9-21
9602 Operational Requirements ..............................................................................................9-22
9603 First-Stage Preparations ................................................................................................9-23
9604 Second-Stage Preparations ............................................................................................9-24
9605 Execution .......................................................................................................................9-28
9606 Miscellaneous ................................................................................................................9-33

CHAPTER 10—ANTI-AIR WARFARE

10000 Introduction ....................................................................................................................10-1

10001 Command and Control in Anti-air Warfare ....................................................................10-1
10002 Sector Anti-air Warfare Commander ..............................................................................10-1
10003 Local AAW Coordinator ................................................................................................10-2
10004 Force Track Coordinator—Air .......................................................................................10-3
10005 Individual Ship Responsibilities ....................................................................................10-3
10010 Stationing Anti-air Warfare Units...................................................................................10-3
10011 Dispersion ......................................................................................................................10-3
10012 Surface Pickets ...............................................................................................................10-4
10013 Aircraft Carriers .............................................................................................................10-4
10014 Surface-to-Air Missile Ships ..........................................................................................10-4
10015 Units With Self-Defence Weapons .................................................................................10-5
10016 Shotgun Position ............................................................................................................10-5
10020 Anti-air Warfare Aircraft ................................................................................................10-5
10021 Airborne Early-Warning Aircraft ...................................................................................10-5
10022 Electronic Warfare Aircraft ............................................................................................10-6
10023 Aircraft Authentication on AAW Nets ...........................................................................10-6
10030 Anti-air Warfare Communications .................................................................................10-6
10040 Anti-air Warfare Coordination .......................................................................................10-6
10041 Methods of Anti-air Warfare Coordination ....................................................................10-7
10042 Missile Engagement Zone ..............................................................................................10-9
10043 Crossover Zone ..............................................................................................................10-9
10044 Fighter Engagement Zone ..............................................................................................10-9
10045 Safety Sector ................................................................................................................10-10
10046 Watch Zones .................................................................................................................10-10
10047 Positive ECM Control ..................................................................................................10-10
10048 Missile Arc ...................................................................................................................10-10
10050 Antiship Missile Defence .............................................................................................10-10
10051 Introduction ..................................................................................................................10-10
10052 Threat ...........................................................................................................................10-10
10053 ASMD Reactions ......................................................................................................... 10-11
10054 Considerations for ASMD ........................................................................................... 10-11
10080 Carrier Battle Group Air Defence Tactics ....................................................................10-12
10081 Inner and Outer Defence Zones ...................................................................................10-12
10082 Inner Defence Zone ......................................................................................................10-12
10083 Outer Defence Zone .....................................................................................................10-12

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CHAPTER 11—INTERACTION WITH MERCHANT SHIPPING AND SAFETY OF

NAVIGATION MANAGEMENT—NAVAL COOPERATION AND
GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING AND ALLIED WORLDWIDE
NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM AND LEADTHROUGH
OPERATIONS

SECTION I—NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

11000 Reference........................................................................................................................ 11-1

11001 Description ..................................................................................................................... 11-1
11002 Effects ............................................................................................................................. 11-1
11003 Operational Application ................................................................................................. 11-1

SECTION II—ALLIED WORLDWIDE NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

11201 References ...................................................................................................................... 11-2

11202 Description .................................................................................................................... .11-2
11203 Effects ............................................................................................................................. 11-2
11204 Operational Application ................................................................................................. 11-2

SECTION III—LEADTHROUGH OPERATIONS

11301 Leadthrough Procedures for Surface Ships .................................................................... 11-3

11302 Procedures for Submarines ............................................................................................ 11-5

PART IV—UNDERWATER WARFARE

CHAPTER 12—ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

SECTION I—GENERAL

12100 Introduction and Scope ..................................................................................................12-1

12101 Aim of ASW ...................................................................................................................12-1
12102 ASW Tasks .....................................................................................................................12-1
12103 ASW Principles ..............................................................................................................12-1
12104 General Considerations ..................................................................................................12-2
12105 Definitions of ASW Operations......................................................................................12-3
12106 Command in ASW .........................................................................................................12-3
12107 ASWC Duties and Responsibilities ...............................................................................12-3
12108 Authority of the ASWC ..................................................................................................12-4
12109 Force Track Coordinator (Subsurface) ...........................................................................12-4
12110 Definitions of ASW Support Operations ........................................................................12-4
12120 Ranges of ASW Sensors and Weapons ..........................................................................12-4

SECTION II—EMPLOYMENT OF ASW UNITS

12200 ASW Ships .....................................................................................................................12-6

12201 Surface Screens .............................................................................................................12-6
12205 Surface Ship Towed Arrays ............................................................................................12-6
12206 General Considerations ..................................................................................................12-6

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12207 Stationing of Towed Array Units ...................................................................................12-7

12208 Towed Array Screen Station Options ............................................................................12-9
12209 Towed Array Zero-PIM Operations .............................................................................12-10
12210 ASW Helicopters..........................................................................................................12-10
12211 General Considerations ................................................................................................12-10
12212 ASW Helicopter Employment .....................................................................................12-10
12220 ASW Fixed-Wing Aircraft ........................................................................................... 12-11
12221 General Considerations ................................................................................................ 12-11
12222 Conduct of Airplans for Fixed-Wing ASW Aircraft and Helicopters .......................... 12-11
12223 Aircraft in Support of Towed Array Ships ...................................................................12-12
12230 ASW Submarines .........................................................................................................12-12
12231 General Considerations ...............................................................................................12-12
12232 Procedures for Coordinated Submarine/Task Group ASW ..........................................12-12
12233 Employment of Submarines in Area Operations ..........................................................12-13
12234 Employment of Submarines in Associated Support .....................................................12-13
12235 Employment of Submarines in Direct Support ............................................................12-14
12236 Employment of Submarines on Integrated Operations ................................................12-14
12237 Tactical Employment Options ......................................................................................12-14
12238 Command, Control and Communications in Submarine Direct Support
and Integrated Operations ............................................................................................12-15
12239 Stationing Considerations for Coordinated Operations with Submarines ...................12-16
12240 STOVEPIPE and SKYLIGHT Procedures ..................................................................12-16
12241 Aided Intercept by Submarines ....................................................................................12-18

SECTION III—CONTACT PROSECUTION

12300 General Considerations ................................................................................................12-19

12301 Contact Classification ..................................................................................................12-19
12302 Contact Classification Terms ........................................................................................12-19
12303 Contact Classification Process .....................................................................................12-21
12304 Contact Reporting ........................................................................................................12-21
12310 ASW Attack Policy ......................................................................................................12-24
12311 General .........................................................................................................................12-24
12312 Surface Ship ASW Attack Policy (ROE Permitting) ...................................................12-24
12313 Fixed-Wing Aircraft ASW Attack Policy (ROE Permitting) .......................................12-26
12314 Helicopter ASW Attack Policy (ROE Permitting) ......................................................12-26
12315 Attack Restrictions when Operating with Submarines ................................................12-26
12316 Assigned Submarine ASW Attack Policy (ROE Permitting) .......................................12-27
12317 Assessing Damage .......................................................................................................12-27
12320 Coordinated ASW ........................................................................................................12-28
12321 Datums .........................................................................................................................12-28
12322 ASW Search Plans .......................................................................................................12-28
12323 Collision Hazard During ASW Operations ..................................................................12-28
12330 Coordinated ASW Action .............................................................................................12-29
12331 Action on Gaining Contact...........................................................................................12-29
12332 Action by Units in the Vicinity of the Unit Gaining Contact .......................................12-29
12333 Detaching ASW Forces ................................................................................................12-30
12334 The SAU Commander ..................................................................................................12-30
12335 SAU Approach to a Contact or Datum .........................................................................12-32
12336 SAU Commander/SAC Intended Employment of Units .............................................12-35

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12337 Aircraft Reports to the SAU .........................................................................................12-36

12338 Changing Scene-of-Action Commander (SWAP) ........................................................12-37
12340 Action Following Contact when Direct Support Forces are Involved ........................12-37
12341 Submarine Gains Initial Contact ..................................................................................12-37
12342 ASW Aircraft Gains Initial Contact ............................................................................12-37
12343 Passive Sonar–Capable Surface Ship Gains Initial Contact ........................................12-38
12344 Coordinated Prosecution with Friendly Submarine .....................................................12-38
12345 ASW Aircraft Response to a Submarine-Generated Contact .......................................12-38
12346 Contact Handover.........................................................................................................12-39
12347 Submarine/Air Cooperation .........................................................................................12-39
12350 Ship-Towed Array Contact Prosecution .......................................................................12-39
12351 Localization ..................................................................................................................12-40
12352 TAS Ship/Aircraft Cooperation ....................................................................................12-40
12360 Torpedo Attack Coordination .......................................................................................12-41
12361 ASW Ship and Helicopter Attack and Support Methods .............................................12-42
12362 ASW Ship Actions .......................................................................................................12-42
12363 Vectored Attacks...........................................................................................................12-43
12364 MAD Verification Runs ................................................................................................12-44

CHAPTER 13—NAVAL MINE WARFARE

13000 Introduction ....................................................................................................................13-1

13001 Mining ............................................................................................................................13-2
13002 Types of Mines ...............................................................................................................13-2
13003 Mineable Waters .............................................................................................................13-3
13004 The Nature of a Minefield ..............................................................................................13-3
13005 Types of Mining .............................................................................................................13-4
13006 Jettisoning Mines ...........................................................................................................13-4
13007 Minelaying Operations ...................................................................................................13-4
13008 Information to Friendly Forces ......................................................................................13-5
13009 Procedures for and Methods of Surface Mining ............................................................13-5
13010 Protection of Surface Minelaying Forces .......................................................................13-5
13011 Naval Mine Countermeasures ........................................................................................13-5
13012 Passive Mine Countermeasures......................................................................................13-6
13013 Self-protective Measures ................................................................................................13-7
13014 Conduct of Surface Ships in Mine Threat Areas ............................................................13-8
13015 Active Mine Countermeasures .....................................................................................13-12
13016 Protection of MCM Forces...........................................................................................13-13
13017 Transit of Surface Ships Through a Channel ...............................................................13-13
13018 Conduct of Submarines in Mine Threat Areas ............................................................13-16

PART V—STRIKE/AMPHIBIOUS

CHAPTER 14—STRIKE WARFARE

SECTION I—GENERAL

14100 Introduction and Scope ..................................................................................................14-1

14101 Missions .........................................................................................................................14-1
14102 Air Operations in Overland Strike .................................................................................14-3
14103 Surface Warfare Considerations .....................................................................................14-4

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SECTION II—PLANNING

14200 General ...........................................................................................................................14-5

14201 Mission Planning Considerations ...................................................................................14-5
14202 Timely and Accurate Intelligence...................................................................................14-5
14203 Air Superiority ...............................................................................................................14-5
14204 Supression of Enemy Air Defenses ................................................................................14-6
14205 Effective Communications .............................................................................................14-6
14206 Weather...........................................................................................................................14-6
14207 Aircraft Capabilities .......................................................................................................14-6

CHAPTER 15—AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

SECTION I—INTRODUCTION

15100 General ...........................................................................................................................15-1

15102 Utility of Amphibious Operations ..................................................................................15-1
15103 Types of Amphibious Operations ...................................................................................15-2
15104 Characteristics of an Amphibious Operation .................................................................15-2

SECTION II—EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

15201 Sequence and Phasing of Amphibious Operations.........................................................15-4

SECTION III—COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

15301 Organization ...................................................................................................................15-6

15302 Command and Control Relationships ............................................................................15-8
15303 Operational Areas ......................................................................................................... 15-11
15304 Command Relationships During Planning ...................................................................15-12
15305 Advance Force and Pre-Landing Operations ...............................................................15-12

PART VI—OTHER

CHAPTER 16—MARITIME LOGISTICS AND REPLENISHMENT AT SEA

SECTION I—LOGISTICS

16000 General ...........................................................................................................................16-1

16001 Principals ........................................................................................................................16-1
16002 Logistic Planning ...........................................................................................................16-2
16003 Afloat Support ................................................................................................................16-3
16004 Maritime Logistic Nodes................................................................................................16-3
16005 Forward Maintenance and Repair ..................................................................................16-4
16006 Logistic Reporting .........................................................................................................16-4

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SECTION II—REPLENISHMENT AT SEA

16200 Objectives .......................................................................................................................16-5

16201 Command .......................................................................................................................16-5
16202 Operational Considerations ............................................................................................16-5
16203 Communications ............................................................................................................16-6
16204 Other Ships .....................................................................................................................16-6

CHAPTER 17—CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR

DEFENCE

17000 Hazards from Nuclear Bursts .........................................................................................17-1

17001 Types of Bursts ...............................................................................................................17-1
17002 Flash and Initial Radiation Effects .................................................................................17-1
17003 Electromagnetic Pulse ....................................................................................................17-2
17004 Blast and Underwater Shock ..........................................................................................17-2
17005 Base Surge ......................................................................................................................17-2
17006 Residual Radiation .........................................................................................................17-2
17007 Range of Effects .............................................................................................................17-2
17010 Basic Concept of Defence .............................................................................................17-4
17011 General Tactical Considerations.....................................................................................17-4
17012 Principles Affecting All Dispositions and Formations ..................................................17-5
17013 Principles Affecting Carrier Group Formations .............................................................17-6
17014 Principles Affecting Convoy Formations .......................................................................17-8
17015 Action Prior to Nuclear Attack ......................................................................................17-8
17016 Tactics Following a Nuclear Attack ...............................................................................17-8
17020 Selection of Formation Rendezvous ..............................................................................17-8
17021 Emergency Rendezvous ................................................................................................17-9
17025 Report On Operational Efficiency ..................................................................................17-9
17040 Biological Hazards .........................................................................................................17-9
17041 Survival of Agents ........................................................................................................ 17-11
17042 Wind ............................................................................................................................ 17-11
17043 General Tactical Considerations................................................................................... 17-11
17044 Detection Methods ....................................................................................................... 17-11
17045 Protection .....................................................................................................................17-12
17046 Hygiene ........................................................................................................................17-12
17047 Decontamination .........................................................................................................17-12
17050 Chemical Warfare .........................................................................................................17-12
17051 Delivery of Chemical Agents .......................................................................................17-13
17052 Nature of Chemical Agents ..........................................................................................17-13
17053 Environmental Effects ..................................................................................................17-13
17054 Threat to Naval Forces .................................................................................................17-13
17055 General Tactical Considerations...................................................................................17-14
17056 OTC’s Considerations ..................................................................................................17-14
17057 Chemical Attack ...........................................................................................................17-14
17058 Aircraft Operations.......................................................................................................17-16
17059 Contamination of Aircraft ............................................................................................17-16
17060 CBRN Threat Levels and Responsibilities...................................................................17-16

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CHAPTER 18—MARITIME FORCE PROTECTION

18000 Introduction ....................................................................................................................18-1

18001 The Threat ......................................................................................................................18-1
18002 Foreseeable Scenarios ....................................................................................................18-4
18003 Threat Assessments ........................................................................................................18-5
18010 Command and Control ...................................................................................................18-5
18011 Force Protection Functions ............................................................................................18-6
18012 Security Alert States .......................................................................................................18-9
18013 Force Protection Levels................................................................................................18-10
18014 Relationships Between Security Alert States and Force Protection Levels .................18-10
18015 Definitions of Force Protection Levels ........................................................................18-10
18016 Implementation of Force Protection Levels ................................................................. 18-11
18017 Force Protection Level Developing Process ................................................................ 18-11

CHAPTER 19—UNMANNED SYSTEMS

19000 Overview ........................................................................................................................19-1

19001 Background ....................................................................................................................19-1
19002 Types of Unmanned Systems .........................................................................................19-1
19003 Ship-based Missions.......................................................................................................19-1
19004 Mine Countermeasures...................................................................................................19-1
19005 Expeditionary and Amphibious Operations ...................................................................19-2
19006 Maritime Security Operations ........................................................................................19-2
19007 Counter-Piracy ...............................................................................................................19-3
19008 Antisubmarine Warfare ..................................................................................................19-3
19009 Transit and Passage Operations......................................................................................19-4
19010 Search and Rescue..........................................................................................................19-4
19011 Naval Surface Fire Support ............................................................................................19-4
19012 Counter-FAC/FIAC Mission ..........................................................................................19-4

CHAPTER 20—INFORMATION WARFARE

20000 Information Warfare .......................................................................................................20-1

20001 Command and Control in Information Warfare .............................................................20-1
20002 Information Technology .................................................................................................20-1
20003 Information Environment ...............................................................................................20-2
20004 Information Superiority ..................................................................................................20-2
20005 Assured Command and Control .....................................................................................20-2
20006 Battlespace Awareness ...................................................................................................20-2
20007 Maritime Information Warfare—Integrated and Joint Operations .................................20-2

LEXICON

Section I—Glossary...............................................................................................................Glossary-1
Section II—List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ....................................................................LOAA-1
Index .......................................................................................................................Index-1

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CHAPTER 1—MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND ACTIVITIES

SECTION II—ORGANIZATION

Figure 1-1. Example of Task Organization .......................................................................... 1-3

CHAPTER 2—COMMAND

SECTION I—GENERAL

Figure 2-1. Generic Submarine Strike Operation Task Organization .................................. 2-9

SECTION II—TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA

Figure 2-2. Levels of Command and Control Within the Officer in Tactical
Command’s Warfare Organization .................................................................. 2-27
Figure 2-3. Example of Warfare Command and Coordination Incorporated
in a Task Organization ..................................................................................... 2-28
Figure 2-4. Example of Assigned Command and Coordinated Functions
in a Force Using a Composite Warfare Commander ....................................... 2-29

CHAPTER 3—FORCE ORGANIZATION/READINESS

SECTION II—POSITION AND MOVEMENT

Figure 3-1. Sample Georef Chart ......................................................................................... 3-3

Figure 3-2. Sample Cartesian Coordinate Grid .................................................................... 3-5
Figure 3-3. Quick Reference System Overlay...................................................................... 3-7

SECTION VI—SCREENS

Figure 3-4. Construction of a Sector (Example) ................................................................ 3-24

Figure 3-5. Example of Sector Departure/Entry Screen..................................................... 3-26
Figure 3-6. Example of Grid Departure/Entry Screen ....................................................... 3-27

CHAPTER 4—COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION I—TACTICAL COMPLANS

Figure 4-1. Example of Electronic Protective Measures/Reduced Tactical COMPLAN .... 4-1

CHAPTER 6—FORCE COORDINATION

SECTION I—AIR OPERATIONS

Figure 6-1. Approach Corridors ........................................................................................... 6-6

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SECTION II—SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

Figure 6-2. Air Strike Command........................................................................................ 6-47

Figure 6-3. Air Sweep Command....................................................................................... 6-47
Figure 6-4. Multipicket Approach Corridor ....................................................................... 6-51
Figure 6-5. Single-Picket Approach Corridors ................................................................... 6-51

SECTION III—AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE

Figure 6-6. Rescue Destroyer Stations ............................................................................... 6-59

SECTION IV—SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND MEASURES TO

AVOID MUTUAL INTERFERENCE

Figure 6-7. Waterspace Management Areas ....................................................................... 6-68

Figure 6-8. ASW Compensatory Allowances .................................................................... 6-79
Figure 6-9. Submarine-Generated Search Area .................................................................. 6-80
Figure 6-10. Air-to-Air SGSA Handover During Area Operations...................................... 6-85
Figure 6-11. NOTACK Area ................................................................................................ 6-86

SECTION V—CONTACT PROSECUTION

Figure 6-12. Attack, Support, and Lost Contact Method 14AH/14SH Cordon ................... 6-97
Figure 6-13. Search Plan 1S Oak Tree ................................................................................. 6-98
Figure 6-14. Attack and Support Method 11AH Bear ......................................................... 6-99
Figure 6-15. Airplan 1 ........................................................................................................ 6-100
Figure 6-16. Airplan 2 ........................................................................................................ 6-101
Figure 6-17. Airplan 3 ........................................................................................................ 6-102
Figure 6-18. Airplan 4 ........................................................................................................ 6-104
Figure 6-19. Airplan 5 ........................................................................................................ 6-106

CHAPTER 7—PICTURE COMPLICATION AND SCOUTING

SECTION I—PICTURE COMPILATION

Figure 7-1. Scouting Description ......................................................................................... 7-7

Figure 7-2. The Picture Compilation and Weapon Employment Process .......................... 7-14

CHAPTER 8—ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE

SECTION III—EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON)

Figure 8-1. Emission Diagram Example ............................................................................ 8-12

SECTION IV—ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE TASKING

Figure 8-2. EW Tasking Format ......................................................................................... 8-14

CHAPTER 10—ANTI-AIR WARFARE

Figure 10-1. Example of Zone Coordination ....................................................................... 10-8

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CHAPTER 11—INTERACTION WITH MERCHANT SHIPPING AND SAFETY

OF NAVIGATION MANAGEMENT—NAVAL COOPERATION
AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING AND ALLIED WORLDWIDE
NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM AND LEADTHROUGH
OPERATIONS

SECTION III—LEADTHROUGH OPERATIONS

Figure 11-1. Example C2 Arrangements for Leadthrough Operations .................................11-3

Figure 11-2. Normal Channel With Offset Buoys .................................................................11-6
Figure 11-3. Measuring the Distance of the Lead Vessel ......................................................11-9

CHAPTER 12—ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

SECTION I—GENERAL

Figure 12-1. Relationship Between Regional, TF/TG ASWC and Supporting Units .......... 12-5

SECTION III—CONTACT PROSECUTION

Figure 12-2. Initial Contact Flow Chart ............................................................................. 12-22

Figure 12-3. Attack Criteria Flow Chart ............................................................................ 12-25
Figure 12-4. Datum Approach Triangle ............................................................................. 12-33

CHAPTER 13—NAVAL MINE WARFARE

Figure 13-1. The Naval Mine Warfare Family Tree ............................................................. 13-1
Figure 13-2. Information Flow for Transits of Mined Waters ............................................ 13-14

CHAPTER 15—AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

SECTION III—COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Figure 15-1. Example of Shifts in Support Relationship ................................................... 15-10

Figure 15-2. Factors that Determine the Size of the AOA/AOO with HIDACZ ............... 15-12

CHAPTER 17—CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR

DEFENCE

Figure 17-1. Above-Water Burst Effects .............................................................................. 17-4

Figure 17-2. Range of Effects of Base Surge (Underwater Burst) ....................................... 17-5
Figure 17-3. Underwater Burst Effect Graph ....................................................................... 17-6

CHAPTER 19—UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Figure 19-1. Key Concepts................................................................................................... 19-2

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CHAPTER 2—COMMAND

SECTION I—GENERAL

Table 2-1. Planning Responsibilities for Naval Mine Warfare ........................................... 2-7

SECTION II—TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA

Table 2-2. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions ............................................................ 2-30

Table 2-3. OTC’s Functions in AAW................................................................................ 2-33
Table 2-4 OTC’s Functions in Strike Warfare ................................................................. 2-35
Table 2-5. OTC’s Functions in ASUW ............................................................................. 2-36
Table 2-6. OTC’s Functions in ASW ................................................................................ 2-38
Table 2-7. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in IW .................................................. 2-40
Table 2-8. OTC’s Functions in Screening Operations ...................................................... 2-42
Table 2-9. OTC’s Functions in Air Coordination ............................................................. 2-43
Table 2-10. OTC’s Functions in Air Resource Coordination.............................................. 2-44
Table 2-11. OTC’s Functions in Electronic and Acoustic Warfare ..................................... 2-45
Table 2-12. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Convoy Operations ........................ 2-47
Table 2-13. OTC’s Functions in Departure and Entry Operations ..................................... 2-48
Table 2-14. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Mine Warfare ................................. 2-49
Table 2-15. OTC’s Functions in MIO ................................................................................. 2-50
Table 2-16. OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Force Protection in Harbour .......... 2-52
Table 2-17. Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations ............................................. 2-55

CHAPTER 3—FORCE ORGANIZATION/READINESS

SECTION V—DISPOSITIONS

Table 3-1. Disposition Planning Factors ........................................................................... 3-20

CHAPTER 4—COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION I—TACTICAL COMPLANS

Table 4-1. Authentication Policies ...................................................................................... 4-6

Table 4-2. Typical Advance Notification Requirements for Submarine Operations ........ 4-15

CHAPTER 6—FORCE COORDINATION

SECTION I—AIR OPERATIONS

Table 6-1. Table of Aircraft Mission Designators............................................................... 6-3

Table 6-2. ASW Mission Designator Table ........................................................................ 6-4
Table 6-3. Operational Combinations of Terms Which Must Be Used
to Tactically Control Aircraft ............................................................................6-11
Table 6-4. Link 11 MPA Joining Procedure ...................................................................... 6-13
Table 6-5. Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support ................... 6-17
Table 6-6A/1. Weapon Restrictions ........................................................................................ 6-23

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Table 6-6A/2. True Bearing Designators ................................................................................ 6-23

Table 6-6A/3. Range Designators ........................................................................................... 6-24
Table 6-6A/4. Emission Control ............................................................................................. 6-24
Table 6-6A/5. MPA Acknowledgement Message ................................................................... 6-25
Table 6-6. Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures....................................................................... 6-31
Table 6-7. IMC Vertical Separation Plan .......................................................................... 6-36
Table 6-8. Altitude Separation in HAG Operations.......................................................... 6-37

SECTION II—SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

Table 6-9. Night Lighting Measures ................................................................................. 6-44

SECTION III—AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE

Table 6-10. Signals From Aircraft in Distress .................................................................... 6-57

Table 6-11. Signals From Rendezvous Destroyer or Other Ships ...................................... 6-57
Table 6-12. Signals From Ship to Aircraft in Distress ........................................................ 6-58
Table 6-13. Rescue Destroyer Stations ............................................................................... 6-60
Table 6-14. Night Rescue Stations (Helicopter Ship Operations) ...................................... 6-61

SECTION V—CONTACT PROSECUTION

Table 6-15. ASW Airplans, Attack and Support Methods, and Search Plans..................... 6-96

CHAPTER 7—PICTURE COMPLICATION AND SCOUTING

SECTION I—PICTURE COMPILATION

Table 7-1. List of Track Identification Methods and Criteria ............................................. 7-6

SECTION II—DATA COMPILATION

Table 7-2. Link 11 Operational Employment Options...................................................... 7-23

CHAPTER 8—ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE

SECTION III—EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON)

Table 8-1. Basic EMCON Plan Format .............................................................................. 8-9

Table 8-2. Radiation Status Indicators ...............................................................................8-11

SECTION VII—EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Table 8-3. Standard Communication Antijam Measures/Procedures ............................... 8-23

CHAPTER 9—ANTISURFACE WARFARE

SECTION I—GENERAL

Table 9-1. Surface Action Checkoff List ............................................................................ 9-4

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SECTION VI—GUIDELINES FOR CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Table 9-2. Crisis Response Operations—Guidance Checkoff List ................................... 9-25

CHAPTER 12—ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

SECTION III—CONTACT PROSECUTION

Table 12-1. Passive Acoustic Designation ........................................................................ 12-23

Table 12-2. Selecting the Approach Method .................................................................... 12-33

CHAPTER 17—CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR

DEFENCE

Table 17-1. Blast Damage Ranges in Yards From Ground Zero ........................................ 17-3
Table 17-2. Nuclear Attack Aide-Memoire (Nuclear) ........................................................ 17-7
Table 17-3. Commander’s Guide on Radiation Exposure States, Dose Levels,
Probable Tactical Effects, and Risk of Exposure Criteria.............................. 17-10
Table 17-4. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
Aide-Memoire (Chemical) ............................................................................ 17-15
Table 17-5. CBRN Weapons or Devices—Threat Levels ................................................ 17-16
Table 17-6. Shipboard CBRN Defence Readiness Levels................................................ 17-17

CHAPTER 19—UNMANNED SYSTEMS

Table 19-1. US Support Missions for Amphibious Warfare .............................................. 19-3

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PREFACE
1. (NU) ATP-01, Volume I, Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures, contains tactical
principles, procedures, and instructions evolved as a result of experience and exercises to implement
operations based on the philosophy supporting the various forms of maritime warfare.
(NR) (NMP) The background to subsurface warfare and surface warfare is contained in ATP-28,
Volume I, Allied Antisubmarine Warfare Manual—Tactics and Procedures and ATP-31, NATO Above
Water Warfare Manual, respectively. Purely procedural information and brevity codes are in publications
such as ATP-01, Volume II, Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book; APP-01, Allied
Maritime Voice Reporting Procedures; APP-11, NATO Message Catalogue; and APP-07, Joint Brevity
Words Publication. (NU) Definitions necessary to the understanding of this book will be found in the
glossary.
(NR) (NMP) Procedures for air-maritime coordination are contained in AJP-3.3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine
for Air-Maritime Coordination and ATP-3.3.3.1, Air-Maritime Coordination Procedures. The fundamental
aspects of joint operations doctrine are contained in AJP-01, Allied Joint Operations Doctrine. The
primary objective of AJP-01 is to provide a doctrine that outlines the principal factors affecting the
planning, execution, and support of Allied joint operations.

2. (NU) The procedures for each type of warfare are explained in separate comprehensive chapters.
While the construction of the book necessitates that subjects are dealt with separately, it is of the utmost
importance to understand that there is interaction between tactical procedures which are intended to
counter different types of threat.

3. (NU) It is unrealistic to assume that a situation will ever exist in which a force may safely prepare to
face a single threat in isolation. It is vital that tactical thought is shaped accordingly, that due account is
taken of the need for the coordination of all sensors and weapons to meet the most urgent situation within
the shortest possible reaction time, and thus to face any threat with the most effective counter.

PURPOSE

1. (NU) The purpose of ATP-01 is to provide doctrine, tactics, instructions, and procedures governing
the command, control, and manoeuvring of all maritime units. This publication serves as the cornerstone
upon which the Allied Maritime Tactical Library is built. As such, this publication has precedence over
other maritime tactical publications should ambiguity or conflict arise.

2. (NU) ATP-01 is divided into two volumes. The specific purpose of each volume is as follows:

a. (NU) Volume I—Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures, provides doctrine, tactics,
instructions, and procedures for the tactical command, control, and manoeuvring of all maritime units.
This volume also provides instructions related to the employment of forces in selected aspects of
specialized warfare and, in particular, to the safe handling of units operating in close company.

b. (NU) Volume II—Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book, provides manoeuvring,
standard operational and administrative signals primarily for use between naval ships, and basic
manoeuvring instructions.

SCOPE

1. (NU) The doctrine and tactics contained in ATP-01 cover all aspects of the command and control of
maritime forces in peace and war. The publication provides the instructions and procedures required by a
commander to issue orders to fulfil his specified responsibilities and to enable subordinates to understand
and comply with these orders. It also gives details of specific duties associated with the execution of
tactical tasks.

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2. (NU) The scope of the individual volumes of ATP-01 is as follows:

a. (NU) Volume I—contains the doctrine, tactics, instructions, and procedures related to the tactical
employment of forces in specialized forms of warfare, and to the safe and effective manoeuvring of
maritime units at sea. Volume I is divided into six parts:
(1) NU) Part I—General—contains the principal mission, command, and force organization and
readiness information required for the effective conduct of maritime operations.

(2) (NU) Part II—Communications/Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)—contains doctrine, tactics, instructions,
and procedures related to the effective conduct of weapon employment and force coordination.

(3) (NU) Part III—Above Water Warfare—contains doctrine, tactics, instructions, and procedures
related to the effective conduct of anti-air warfare, antisurface warfare, and interaction with
merchant shipping and safety of navigation management.

(4) (NU) Part IV—Underwater Warfare—contains doctrine, tactics, instructions, and procedures
related to the effective conduct of antisubmarine warfare and naval mine warfare.

(5) (NU) Part V—Strike/Amphibious Warfare—contains doctrine, tactics, instructions, and

procedures related to the effective conduct of strike warfare and amphibious operations.

(6) (NU) Part VI—Other—contains doctrine, tactics, instructions, and procedures related to the
effective conduct of maritime logistics and replenishment at sea, chemical, biological, radiological
and nuclear (CBRN), force protection and unmanned systems.

b. (NU) Contains signals covering all instructions and procedures provided in Volume I.

NOTE

(NU) NONMETRIC VALUES ARE ACCURATE. METRIC VALUES

ARE ROUNDED OFF TO THE NEAREST METRE. IT IS THEREFORE
RECOMMENDED THAT NATIONS CHECK CONVERTED FIGURES
FOR CORRECTNESS AND REPORT ANY ERRORS TO THEIR
APPROPRIATE NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

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CONVENTIONS USED IN THIS PUBLICATION

CHANGE SYMBOLS

Revised text in changes is indicated by a black vertical line in either margin of the page, like the one
printed next to this paragraph. The change symbol indicates added or restated information. A change
symbol in the margin adjacent to the chapter number and title indicates a new or completely revised
chapter.
WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES

The following definitions apply to warnings, cautions, and notes used in this manual:

AN OPERATING PROCEDURE, PRACTICE, OR CONDITION THAT

MAYRESULT IN INJURYOR DEATH IFNOT CAREFULLYOBSERVED
OR FOLLOWED.

AN OPERATING PROCEDURE, PRACTICE, OR CONDITION THAT

MAY RESULT IN DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT IF NOT CAREFULLY
OBSERVED OR FOLLOWED.

NOTE

AN OPERATING PROCEDURE, PRACTICE, OR CONDITION THAT

REQUIRES EMPHASIS.

WORDING

Word usage and intended meaning throughout this publication is as follows:

“Shall” indicates the application of a procedure is mandatory.
“Should” indicates the application of a procedure is recommended.
“May” and “need not” indicates the application of a procedure is optional.
“Will” indicates future time. It never indicates any degree of requirement for application of a procedure.

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PART I General

Chapter 1—Missions, Organization, and

Activities

Chapter 2—Command

Chapter 3—Force Organization/Readiness

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CHAPTER 1 Missions, Organization, and Activities

SECTION I—MISSIONS

1101 Collective Defence at Sea

Collective defence, as embodied in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, remains of course North
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) primary goal, and the Alliance’s naval assets are an essential
part of the broader collective deterrence and defence architecture. Crisis response or limited contingency
operations can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation
of extended duration involving combat. The associated operational and tactical objectives are to protect
NATO interests and prevent surprise attack or further conflict. Many of these operations involve a
combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with other government agencies,
international governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, a crisis
may prompt the requirement for follow-on operations including foreign humanitarian assistance, civil
support, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), peace operations, strikes, raids, or recovery
operations. Information on international law of the sea related matters, which can be useful to maritime
commanders, can be found in AJP-3.1, Allied Joint Doctrine for Maritime Operations.
1102 Maritime Security Operations

NATO also contributes to maritime security through operations aimed at enhancing and enforcing
security at sea. NATO has thus taken an increasingly active role in securing maritime flows along vital
sea lines of communications (SLOC) and combating illicit activities at sea, thereby moving into the area
of maritime law enforcement.

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SECTION II—ORGANIZATION

1201 Maritime Components

Since its first major peace-support operation in the Balkans, the tempo and range of NATO operations
have increased significantly. NATO forces have been engaged in missions that cover the full spectrum
of operations including crisis management and peacekeeping to counter-piracy and humanitarian relief.
NATO’s robust maritime capability has made significant contributions to Alliance and partner nations
by providing maritime security, disaster relief, counter-piracy and other critical operations from the sea.
These highly flexible and scalable forces provide a broad spectrum of strategic, operational and tactical
options to the joint force commander (JFC) in support of joint and combined civil-military operations.
a. The Alliance’s maritime forces must have a clearly defined command and control (C2) structure
in order to be effective and NATO’s integrated military command structure. NATO has a single Allied
Maritime Command (MARCOM) located in Northwood, United Kingdom. MARCOM reports
directly to Allied Command Operations (ACO).

b. The Alliance also maintains multinational integrated maritime forces, which make up the core of
NATO’s maritime capability and are permanently available to provide maritime support to Alliance
operations. These forces include the two standing NATO maritime groups and the two standing NATO
mine countermeasures maritime groups. See Chapter 2 for more detailed information regarding
command and control.

1202 Task, Type, and Warfare Organizations

There are three systems, all in force at the same time, for organizing the operational units allocated to
various commands.
a. Task Organization. The organization of forces for operational purpose is to provide the
necessary flexibility for meeting changing operational requirements while retaining a clear indication
of the chain of command. Whenever a task organization is created, the commander shall be named in
the order creating it.

b. Type Organization. The organization of units normally of the same type into fleets/flotillas/
groups/squadrons, divisions, and subdivisions together with assigned flagships, tenders and aircraft.
Type organization is mainly for national administration and logistic purposes.

c. Warfare Organization. The functional organization of forces assigned to conduct tasks within
a specific area of maritime warfare: amphibious warfare, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine
warfare (ASW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), information warfare (IW), mine warfare (MW), and
strike warfare (STW). Maritime operations are often conducted in dangerous environments and forces
must be adequately trained, equipped and familiar with the legal framework and rules of engagement
(ROE) for weapons employment as defined by international law regarding armed forces engagement.
Chapter 5 provides additional information on ROE and weapons employment.

1203 Task Organization—Task Force Numbers

A fleet commander is allocated a block of whole numbers which he assigns as task force numbers in
accordance with (IAW) his needs. Fleet organization into task forces is illustrated in Figure 1-1.

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COMMON SUPERIOR

CTF 15 CTF 58 CTF 109

CTG 58.01 CTG 58.40 CTG 58.99

CTU 58.40.01 CTU 58.40.02 CTU 58.40.07 CTU 58.40.34 CTU 58.40.99

CTE 58.40.34.01 CTE 58.40.34.99

Figure 1-1. (NU) Example of Task Organization

1204 Task Organization—Task Designators

A fleet commander allocates units to specific task forces, but leaves to the task force commander and his
subordinate commanders the subdivision of the task force (TF) into task groups (TG), task units (TU),
and task elements (TE) which comprise his task organization. The system of task designation employed
is described below and is illustrated in Figure 1-1.
a. Commander Task Groups (CTG). A task force may be divided into as many as 99 task groups,
designated by adding .01 through .99 to the task force number. Commander Task Force (CTF) 58 (the
example in Figure 1-1) may comprise CTG 58.01, 58.40, 58.64, and so on, up to and including 58.99.
(For simplicity, Figure 1-1 shows only three task groups.) In the series, 58 designates the task force
and .01 through .99 designate the task groups.

b. Commander Task Units (CTU). A task group may be divided into as many as 99 task units,
designated by adding .01 through .99 to the task group number. In the example in Figure 1-1, task
units formed from CTG 58.40 are 58.40.01, 58.40.02, etc.

c. Commander Task Elements (CTE). Task elements subordinate to task units are only
organized when the complexity of the task assigned and the size of the force are such as to require
an additional echelon of command for the accomplishment of assigned tasks. Subdivision into task
elements should be limited to the minimum required for operations. There may be as many as 99 task
elements, designated by adding .01 through .99 to the task unit number. In the example in Figure 1-1,
task elements formed from CTU 58.40.34 are 58.40.34.01 and 58.40.34.99.

d. Restriction on Subdivision. Subdivision should be limited to the minimum required. A task

organization commander may subdivide his units into lower ordered components only.

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1205 Changes in Task Organization Assignments

It may sometimes be necessary to assign part or all of one task organization to another temporarily
or permanently. Such a change is accomplished by change of operational control (CHOP) when the
operational control (OPCON) authority changes. The communications aspect of a change of task
designator should be considered. An assignment to another task organization will be one of the following:
a. Short-term Duration. In short-term duration, it will normally be desirable for the force being
transferred to retain its existing task organization designation.

b. Longer-term Duration. Where the assignment is of a longer or of permanent duration, it

is preferable for the assigned force to adopt a designator derived from that component of the task
organization which it has joined.

c. Sector Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (SASUWC). Designated by the ASW

commander or officer in tactical command (OTC) to command a clearly defined sector within an ASW
area of operations which has been split up into smaller subareas. The SASUWC should be suitably
qualified and experienced with sufficient connectivity to enable them to exercise command within the
allocated sector. A separate ASW coordination and reporting secure net should be established for each
sector for supporting units to CHOP in and out. Significant responsibility may be delegated down
from the ASW commander and they may amend or amplify the ASW standard operating procedures
as necessary. The SASUWC is the lowest responsible command to whom ASW weapons employment
as well as establishment and coordination of submarine-generated search areas (SGSAs) within task
group areas may be delegated. Related term(s) antisubmarine warfare, waterspace management.

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SECTION III—ACTIVITIES

1300 General
In a context where threats are increasingly global in nature, the ability to deploy military forces in
distant theatres has gained greater prominence. As part of its maritime activities, NATO has put a strong
emphasis on developing capabilities that can respond quickly and be deployed wherever necessary. As
a result, the demand for maritime forces will continue to grow as NATO engages in more activities to
defend against global threats and provide critical support to allies and partners around the world. NATO
maritime activities generally fall into the following three areas:
a. Above Water Warfare. Above water warfare is conducted to establish dominance and sea
control in the above water environment. See Part III for more detail.
b. Undersea Warfare (USW). USW operations are conducted to establish dominance in the
underwater environment, which permits friendly forces to accomplish the full range of potential
missions and denies an opposing force the effective use of underwater systems and weapons. It includes
offensive and defensive submarine, antisubmarine, and mine warfare operations. Antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) operations are conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of
submarines. ASW is a subset of USW. See Part IV for more detail.
c. Information Warfare (IW). Information warfare operations are conducted to enable
commanders to fight in an increasingly complex information environment and considers the
application of IW across the full spectrum of operations: war fighting, maritime security and
defence engagement. Information superiority is the competitive advantage gained through the
continuous, directed and adaptive employment of relevant information principles, capabilities and
behaviours. It is critical to mission success and treats information as a centre of gravity which
can be defended and attacked. It enables the commander to better understand the situation and
make decisions quicker and better than their adversary, thus maintaining the tactical initiative. The
commander can then shape the information environment to their advantage and to the disadvantage
of their adversary. This can increase the commander’s freedom of action and manoeuvre whilst
limiting the adversaries.
1301 Military Activities From the Sea
a. Maritime Strike Warfare. Maritime strike operations are conducted to accomplish a number
of operational objectives including protecting sea lines of communication, denying the enemy
commercial and military use of the seas, protecting naval logistic support to deployed battle forces,
and establishing maritime power projection. Critical elements of maritime strike warfare include
surveillance coordination and surface warfare (SUW), maritime air support (MAS), air interdiction
of maritime targets (AIMT), maritime strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR), maritime
interdiction operations (MIO) support, combat search and rescue (CSAR), and overland strike.
See Chapter 14 for more detail.
b. Peacekeeping Operations. Multinational peacekeeping operations are required to maintain
peace and security, facilitate free and equitable political processes, protect civilians, assist in the
disarmament and demobilization of combatants, protect human rights and assist in restoring the rule
of law. NATO maritime forces offer flexible and scalable set of capabilities to conduct and support a
wide range of peacekeeping activities. Maritime support to peacekeeping operations will continue to
be one of the most significant and challenging activities facing the Alliance for years to come.
c. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations. NEOs are conducted to assist in evacuating
noncombatants, nonessential military personnel, selected host-nation citizens, and third country
nationals whose lives are in danger from violent activities or natural disaster. NEOs typically involve
insertion of a military force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon
completion of the mission. NEOs may be conducted in permissive, uncertain and hostile environments.
See Chapter 15 for more detail.

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d. Counter-piracy Operations. Growing piracy in the maritime domain has negatively affected
international commerce, undermined international humanitarian efforts and impacted the safety of
navigation in many of the worlds most travelled free-trade routes. NATO and partner maritime forces
have been helping to deter and disrupt pirate attacks in the region since 2008, protecting vessels and
helping to increase the general level of security. NATO’s counter-piracy activities are often carried
out in coordination with other countries and organizations, such as the European Union and are in
full compliance with relevant United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions. Not only do these
activities provide maritime security in the region, but they also offer regional countries training to
develop their own counter-piracy capacities.

e. Maritime Counterterrorism. Under Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, NATO ships are

patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect
against terrorist activity. As the Alliance has refined its counterterrorism role in the intervening years,
the tactical and operational experience that NATO has accrued has given the Alliance unparalleled
expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the maritime domain. This expertise is
relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism and, in particular, the proliferation and
smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, as well as enhanced cooperation with non-NATO countries
and civilian agencies.

f. Antisubmarine Warfare. The submarine still poses a significant threat in the maritime domain,
so ASW remains a key to obtaining and maintaining sea control. The ability to neutralize a submarine
threat is a critical capability and high priority warfare area for Allied maritime forces. Previously, the
emphasis had been largely on deep water operation but this has now switched to littoral operation
where ASW is generally more difficult. Like other forms of maritime warfare, successful antisubmarine
warfare depends on a mix of sensor and weapon technology, training, and experience. To destroy
submarines both the torpedo and mine are used, launched from air, surface and underwater platforms.
ASW also involves protecting friendly ships. See Chapter 12 for more detail.

g. Amphibious Operations. Amphibious operations are analogous with a number of other maritime
activities including power projection, deterrence, forcible entry from the sea and non-combatant
evacuation operations. Amphibious operations involve launching forces and equipment from the sea
by a naval and landing force (LF) embarked in ships or craft. Types of amphibious operations include
assault, raid, demonstration, withdrawal and amphibious support to other operations. Amphibious
forces are highly flexible, scalable and can be tailored to meet a wide range of requirements with the
ability to operate in both permissive to hostile environments. See Chapter 15 for more detail.

h. Naval Mine Warfare. Waterborne mines constitute a significant threat to the Alliance and
have been employed as offensive or defensive weapons in rivers, lakes, estuaries, seas, and strategic
choke-points. Offensive mines are placed in enemy waters, outside harbours and across important
shipping routes with the aim of sinking both merchant and military vessels. Defensive minefields
safeguard key stretches of coast from enemy ships and submarines, forcing them into more easily
defended areas, or keeping them away from sensitive ones. NATO’s mine countermeasure capabilities
are critical to the collective defence mission and keeping international sea lines of communications free
and open. See ATP-08, Vol. I, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations and Chapter 13 for more detail.

i. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE). Chemical,

biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive involve taking protective measures in situations
in which any of these five hazards are present. To account for high-yield explosive devices, the
term CBRNE (E for explosives) is used. CBRN defence consists of CBRN passive protection,
contamination avoidance, and CBRN mitigation. Current threats include the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery. Rapid advances in biological science and
technology also continue to increase the bioterrorism threat against NATO forces and its populations.
The combined joint CBRN defence task force is one of NATO’s key defences against CBRN
events, but also supporting the prevention of WMD proliferation. The maritime environment poses
unique challenges for CBRNE defence and requires special training and capabilities to be effective.
See Chapter 18 for more detail.

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j. Maritime Logistics. NATO’s maritime strategy identified the need for greater flexibility in
Alliance logistics and on the mobile and multinational character of NATO’s forces. Additionally, the
increased need for a closer cooperation with non-NATO nations and the requirement to logistically
support peacetime support operations have a substantial influence on the development of maritime
logistics and replenishment at sea capability. Naval units at sea must also consider theater infrastructure
and lines of communications including facilities for shore-based support, maritime prepositioning and
logistics over the shore operations. Forces afloat must also be concerned with sustainability and the
ability to replenish at sea for long transits and blue water operations. See Chapter 16 for more detail.

k. Constabulary Missions. The basic goals of constabulary missions are to defend national
sovereignty and when sanctioned to enforce international laws and treaties. When conducted by
maritime forces, they require similar military competencies and skills as those needed in other warfare
areas, but may also require additional support from international and host nation national authorities.

1302 Maritime Assistance

As populations grow and competition for resources increases, nations have become concerned with
preserving the natural environment, safety at sea, and the impact of natural or industrial disaster. Maritime
forces are uniquely equipped and structured to provide a rapid and capable first response when such
missions arise. Although these missions may be conducted in benign environment, they pose significant
challenges and maritime forces must be prepared to respond in these situations. The use of weapons is a
priori not scheduled, except in force or personal protection. Additionally, maritime assistance operations
include:
a. Search and Rescue. Preventing the loss of life and minimizing injury, by rendering assistance
to persons in distress in the maritime environment is a high priority for NATO’s maritime forces.
Naval forces may be tasked to employ search and rescue (SAR) capable aircraft, surface ships, or
submarines for search and rescue of personnel in distress on land or at sea. Tasking may include
peacetime SAR operations in neutral areas or CSAR to locate and extract personnel from enemy
controlled areas during wartime or contingency operations. Effective SAR missions require close
coordination between ships, aircraft and associated civil-military assets. Maritime SAR operations
include provisions for medical assistance to ships at sea, through the use of military and civilian
resources, including cooperating aircraft, vessels and other craft and installations. See ATP-10, Search
and Rescue.

b. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response. NATO’s maritime forces have robust

capabilities and are well-suited for these missions because the expeditionary naval forces can
quickly respond when crises arise. Military ships are ideal platforms for providing rapid response
with self-contained, multi-mission capabilities; able to operate without reliance on ports and airfields
ashore, while bringing the organic medical support, tactical lift, and robust communications needed
in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The expertise in maritime security provides the knowledge
and training to operate in some of the most vulnerable littoral regions while providing a stabilizing
presence.

Additionally, humanitarian assistance plays a significant role in NATO’s theater security cooperation
efforts and helps facilitate partner capacity-building, multinational training opportunities and
development of key partnerships with multinational partners. Moreover, these events allow maritime
forces to operate with non-government organizations and international relief organizations while also
providing immensely valuable training for NATO personnel.

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CHAPTER 2 Command
SECTION I—GENERAL

2100 Scope

(NU) This section includes definitions for command functions. It is written to specify responsibilities in
maritime warfare, to enable commanders to issue orders and instructions to fulfil their responsibilities,
and to enable subordinates to understand and comply with the orders and instructions they receive.
The duties to execute tactical tasks are not included in this chapter but are incorporated in the relevant
chapters.
(NU) Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of his mission.
Note. (NU) Certain AAP-06 definitions that appear in this chapter are expanded to clarify their meaning
within the context of maritime command. However, AAP-06 definitions are unchanged and are shown in
italics. Other definitions and terms used may not presently be found in AAP-06.
2101 Authority

a. (NU) Person. An authority is a person vested with the power to make decisions and issue orders.

b. (NU) Individual Power. Authority is also the individual power to make decisions and issue
related orders imposing those decisions—such power may be limited in scope, time, and location.

c. (NU) Responsibility. Authority automatically confers the responsibility to carry out tasks and
report results to the assigning authority.

2102 Command

(NU) The authority vested in a member of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control
of military forces.
(NU) The aim of command is to achieve the maximum operational and/or administrative efficiency.
a. (NU) Command Functions. Exercising command presupposes the existence of a chain of
command and a command and control system. Some functions arising from direction, coordination,
or control may be delegated to subordinates. This is normally done in large or widely dispersed forces
where decentralized decisionmaking is required. However, a centralized command is the most direct
way of allowing a commander to make use of his experience and ability.

b. (NU) Direction. The process of planning, decisionmaking, establishing priorities, formulating

policies, and imposing decisions.

c. (NU) Coordination. The establishment in operations, according to a changing situation, of an

orderly correlation in time and place of planned actions in order to achieve the best overall result. In
the maritime environment, the term coordination may include certain specified control functions.

d. (NU) Control. The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate
organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, which encompasses the
responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred
or delegated.

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2103 Delegation of Authority

(NU) An action by which a commander assigns a part of his authority commensurate with the assigned
task to a subordinate commander. While ultimate responsibility cannot be relinquished, delegation
of authority carries with it the imposition of a measure of responsibility. The extent of the authority
delegated must be clearly stated.
(NU) Delegation to a subordinate commander creates a new responsibility for a specific task. Subordinates
should be kept aware of the policies and intentions of their superiors, so that they can act accordingly
when faced with unexpected circumstances. A subordinate should never await instructions beyond the
time for action.
2104 Chain of Command

(NU) The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command
is exercised.
(NU) A chain of command establishes the interdependencies which exist at various levels between the
superior and his subordinates. Command functions may be exercised at any one of these levels. The
organization (task, type, or warfare) adopted for the forces employed automatically defines the chains of
command.
2105 Command System

(NU) A command system is formed by a chain of command and includes the means necessary to distribute
orders and collect, evaluate, and disseminate information.
2106 Exercising Command

a. (NU) General. Successful accomplishment of any mission entails seven phases:

(1) (NU) Appreciation of the situation.

(2) (NU) Selection of the aim.

(3) (NU) Decision on course of action.

(4) (NU) Development of a plan.

(5) (NU) The operation order.

(6) (NU) Execution.

(7) (NU) Evaluation.

b. (NU) Appreciation of the Situation and Decision. A mission should have only one aim from
which the commander can derive his tasks and purpose. It is essential that all units participating in the
mission understand the aim, so that they may act in accordance with the commander’s intentions, even
when the tactical situation has changed and it is no longer possible to follow the original operation
order.

c. (NU) Execution and Evaluation. Command and control of different operations vary widely
and depend on mission, composition, and disposition of the force. Documentation for the evaluation
of these operations may be drawn from many sources, most significant of which is probably the war
diary. The primary purpose of the war diary is to provide a cohesive picture of events which have

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occurred, so that higher authorities may study the operation in all its aspects and evaluate the results
achieved. Additional documents to clarify or link events, such as copies of relevant messages, should
be included as necessary.

2107–2109 Spare

2110 Structure for the Command of Maritime Forces

2111 Full Command

(NU) The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers
every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Note: The
term “command” as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a
purely national sense. It follows that no NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces
that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational
command (OPCOM) or operational control.
2112 Operational Command

(NU) The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to
deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control (TACON)
the commander deems necessary. It does not of itself include administrative command or logistical
responsibility. Operational command may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.
(NU) Operational command of maritime forces also includes retention or assignment of tactical command
(TACOM).
(NU) NATO commanders receiving operational command or operational control of NATO forces will
specify the mission(s) and tasking for these forces and delegate command and control authority as
required.
2113 Operational Control

(NU) The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may
accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy
units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include the authority
to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include
administrative or logistic control.
(NU) Operational control of maritime forces also includes retention or assignment of TACOM.

NOTE

(NU) OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS SUBORDINATE TO

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND HAS LIMITED AUTHORITY;
ITS MOST IMPORTANT LIMITATION IS ITS INABILITY TO
ALLOW REASSIGNMENT OF FORCES.

2114 Change of Operational Control

(NU) The date and time (Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)) at which the responsibility for operational
control of a force or unit passes from one operational control authority to another.
(NU) When it is intended that operational control of a force or unit pass from one operational control
authority to another, the operation order should state in explicit terms the manner of execution of CHOP.
This may be done in terms of time (GMT), position, or boundary crossing. Subject to the emission

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control (EMCON) plan, units executing CHOP should report to both operational control authorities
and the authority vested with operational command over the force or unit. When a CHOP occurs, task
organization commanders should inform the operational control authority of changes in the composition
of their forces and major deviations from their normal capabilities.
2115 Tactical Command

(NU) The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
(NU) It involves, therefore, the responsibility for the conduct of the tasks pertaining to the mission; that is,
issuing detailed orders and ensuring their correct execution. It also involves responsibility for the general
safety of assigned units, although ultimate responsibility remains with the commanding officers. Tactical
command of units temporarily attached does not include the authority to give them tasks inconsistent
with the mission previously allocated to them.

NOTE

(NU) TACTICAL COMMAND OF FORCES ALSO INCLUDES

RETENTION OR ASSIGNMENT OF TACTICAL CONTROL.

2116 Officer in Tactical Command

(NU) The OTC is the senior officer present eligible to assume command, or the officer to whom he has
delegated tactical command.
(NU) When a task organization is established, the OTC shall be named in the order creating it. If the OTC
is unable to exercise command, the next senior officer present in the task organization will assume and
retain command until or unless otherwise ordered. When a task organization has not been established
and the higher authority has not selected the OTC, the senior officer present eligible to command will
act as the OTC.
(NU) The OTC will normally be under the operational control of a higher authority (i.e., fleet commander
or area commander). That authority will provide direction which specifies the mission, tasking, and
forces assigned to the OTC and will also delegate tactical command and control of those forces to the
OTC. That authority may designate himself, the task force/group commander, or another command as
appropriate, to be OTC of the constituted force(s) or group(s). The OTC must design his command
and control organization to accomplish the assigned mission and effectively defend the force.
Article 1202 states that exercising command presupposes the existence of a chain of command. Some
functions arising from direction, coordination, or control may be delegated to subordinates.
2117 Tactical Control

(NU) The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to
accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
(NU) This authority is granted by the authority exercising operational command, operational control,
or tactical command to a subordinate commander to assume some function concerning direction,
coordination, or control of movements, manoeuvres, and actions relative to a specific task. The officer
exercising TACON is also responsible for the safety of the units under his control. Tactical control is
usually assigned to a subordinate for a limited period of time to conduct a specific mission or task.

NOTE

(NU) TACTICAL CONTROL IS SUBORDINATE TO TACTICAL

COMMAND.

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2118 Command by Veto

(NU) In many aspects of maritime warfare, it is necessary to preplan the actions of a force to an assessed
threat and to delegate some command functions to a subordinate. Once such functions are delegated,
the subordinate is to take the required action without delay, always keeping the OTC informed of the
situation. The OTC retains the power to veto any particular action.
2119 Command of Allied Forces

(NU) When Allied task forces of units of two or more nations are formed, the commander shall be named
in the order creating them. The commanders of national units joining an Allied task force at sea should
not displace the designated Allied commander by virtue of their national seniority or date of commission
unless specifically so directed by the senior in the chain of Allied command.
2120 Command of Aircraft

(NU) The degree of authority exercised by the OTC over aircraft employed in maritime operations is
determined by the type of mission and whether the aircraft are shipborne or land based (see Chapter 6).
a. (NU) Aircraft Commander. The aircraft commander is responsible for the efficient execution
of the assigned mission and for the command and safety of the aircraft throughout its mission. He
shall inform his controlling authority if weather conditions or material failure significantly affects his
ability to perform his mission. An aircraft commander retains ultimate responsibility for the safety of
his own aircraft.

b. (NU) Command of a Flight of Aircraft. The senior aircraft commander of a flight of aircraft
or the officer designated exercises tactical command of the flight and is responsible for the efficient
execution of the assigned mission.

2121–2129 Spare

2130 Command During Replenishment at Sea

(NU) The senior commander of the two forces—the commander of the force to be replenished and the
replenishment at sea (RAS) force commander—is the OTC. Although the OTC is responsible for the
proper execution of the entire replenishment operation, he should consider the recommendations of the
other force commander. If the RAS force commander is the OTC, he should generally respect the desires
of the commander of the force to be replenished as to position and time of rendezvous and the general
direction of movement during the replenishment. If the commander of the force to be replenished is the
OTC, he should carefully consider the RAS force commander’s recommendation as to replenishment
course and speed.
(NU) The message text format (MTF) messages provide the standard format for ordering replenishment.
2131 Method of Execution

(NU) MTF involves the use of five standard signals, as follows, all of which should be classified at least
Restricted.
a. (NU) OPSTAT RASREQ. For use by a combatant ship to signal its requirements, either direct
to the supplying ship or to the OTC. In either case, the requirements must be submitted in a timely
fashion.

b. (NU) Operation Task (OPTASK) RAS. For use by the OTC to promulgate the replenishment
programme.

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c. (NU) OPSTAT RAS. For use by supplying ships to provide customer ships with details of rigs
and types of stores that can be delivered from respective transfer stations.

d. (NU) OPSTAT UNIT. For use by all ships to promulgate details of transfer stations.

e. (NU) OPSTAT CARGO. For use by supplying ships to report cargo remaining to the OTC after
an RAS operation and on changing OPCON. Details and examples of these RAS signals are provided
in APP-11, NATO Message Catalogue. It should be noted that the use of MTF RAS signals requires
that transfer stations should be numbered.

2132 OPTASK RAS: The OTC Promulgating the Replenishment Programme

a. (NU) Replenishment Programme. When he has received the ships’ requirements, the OTC
will arrange and promulgate the replenishment sequence. This should arrive in the ships concerned
as soon as possible before the RAS operation to enable the supplying ships to prepare their stores and
predump as required. The complete replenishment programme will be passed by signal to all ships.
The order and stations to be used for replenishment are all contained in the RASDAT set.

b. (NU) Preliminary Movements. When the OTC of the combatant force orders his ships to
“Replenish,” the ships shown in the signal as being first to replenish are to proceed to the supplying
ship. Remaining escorts are to join the screen and heavy units are to proceed to their allocated stations
in the formation. Unless otherwise ordered by the OTC, replenishments should then proceed as
follows:

(1) (NU) Ships replenishing are to conform to the replenishment sequence laid down without
further orders.

(2) (NU) Heavy units are to take up the waiting position automatically when the ship ahead reports
that she expects to disengage in 15 minutes, and are to replenish when it is clear to do so.

(3) (NU) Escorts are to proceed as described in paragraph 2132a above, if they have been ordered
to relieve at the replenishment unit. If they have been ordered to relieve on station, escorts are to
proceed to replenish as soon as they have been relieved in their station, without further signal.

2133 OPSTAT UNIT: Supplying Ship Providing Details of Rigs to Customer Ships

(NU) On receipt of the OPTASK RAS or when ordered by the OTC, supplying ships are to provide
customer ships concerned with the details of rigs and types of stores to be delivered at each transfer
station. This shall be done by using the RASDAT set of the OPSTAT UNIT.
2134 OPSTAT CARGO: Supplying Ship Reporting Cargo

(NU) On completion of replenishment, each supplying ship is to report to the officer under whose
command the support ships have been placed (and to the replenishment force commander for information)
the quantities of cargo types remaining. If the OTC of an RAS operation is to be some other officer, the
supplying ship is also to report her cargo to the OTC 48 hours before the RAS operation.
2135 Command in Mine Countermeasures

(NU) Self-protection mine countermeasures (MCM) are the responsibility of the OTC or commanding
officer. Active MCM are the responsibility of the local commander in own waters and of the advance
force commander in amphibious operations. For detailed responsibilities, see Chapter 13.
(NU) Table 2-1 lists the C2 levels and associated planning responsibilities for naval mine warfare (NMW).

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Table 2-1. (NU) Planning Responsibilities for Naval Mine Warfare

LEVEL NATURE OF C2 PLANS, DIRECTIVES, ORDERS TO BE

ISSUED
Nation Full Command Deployment Plan
North Atlantic Council (NAC) (See Note 1)
a. Request National Military Authorities for
Strategic Military Assessment
b. Issue NAC Initiating Directive
c. Issue NAC Execution Directive
d. Approve Strategic Concept of Operations
(CONOPS)
e. Approve Strategic Operation Plan (OPLAN)
Maritime Component (MC) (See Note 1)
a. Task the Strategic Command for SACEUR
Strategic Assessment (SSA)
b. Assess SSA
c. Develop Military Response Options (MRO)
d. Endorse Strategic CONOPS
e. Endorse Strategic OPLAN
Supreme Allied Commander OPCOM (See Note 1)
Europe (SACEUR) a. Develop SSA
b. Develop MRO
c. Develop Strategic CONOPS
d. Develop Strategic OPLAN
e. Approve Operational CONOPS
f. Approve Operational OPLAN
Operational Commanders OPCON (See Note 1)
(JFCs/MARCOM) a. Execute the Operational Appreciation of the
Strategic Environment
b. Develop Operational CONOPS
c. Develop Operational OPLAN
Maritime Component TACOM OPTASK NMW/OPDIR OPTASK NMW/MLTASK
Commander (MCC) or CTG (See Notes 2 & 3)
Naval mine countermeasures
(NMCM) Forces and Naval
Minelaying Forces. OTC
NM/L Force
CTU NMCM Forces, e.g., TACOM/TACON OPTASK NMW/OPDIR OPTASK NMW/MLTASK
COMSNMCMG1/2; CTU (See Note 3)
NM/L Force
Notes:
1. (NU) Plans, directives and orders to be issued in accordance with (IAW) NATO Crisis Response
Planning Phases 1 to 4.
2. (NU) Active NMCM are the responsibility of the high readiness force (HRF) commander in the
area of operations (AOO) and of commander amphibious task force (CATF) or the advance force
commander in the joint operations area (JOA).
3. (NU) Self-protective Measures (passive NMCM) are the responsibility of the OTC and
commanding officer(s) of individual units or assets.
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2136–2149 Spare

2150 Command in Submarine Operations

(NU) Traditionally, submarine operations have been conducted independent of aircraft and surface
ships, and have required a centralized command system. Improvements in submarine communication
capabilities along with refocusing of maritime objectives have brought about much closer cooperation
and interoperability of submarines and other maritime forces. Shifting of tactical C2 to an OTC for
coordinated operations between submarines and surface and/or air forces is highly desirable in many
scenarios. Procedures and requirements of the shifting of tactical C2 are contained in ATP-18, Allied
Manual of Submarine Operations. The submarine operating authority (SUBOPAUTH) is the commander
who has, as a minimum, OPCON of submarines, and has the authority to delegate tactical command or
control. The SUBOPAUTH is normally the submarine force commander. When he is the area submarine
commander, the SUBOPAUTH is responsible to the area commander.
2151 (NU) (NMP) Command and Control of Submarine Strike Operations

(NC) (NMP) This section addresses the overarching command and control relationships and considerations
to ensure unity of command during submarine cruise missile strike operations. This section neither
addresses nor modifies national procedures for the actual handling, preparation or firing of a cruise
missile.
a. (NC) (NMP) Definitions.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Cruise Missile Strike Coordinator (CMSC). The designated agent who is
responsible for all sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) planning, coordination and reporting
(C&R) in a strike or series of strikes. In joint force operations, the CMSC conducts liaison with
the joint forces air component command (JFACC), subordinate warfare commanders, NATO force
commander and higher authority to ensure that SLCM employment is effectively integrated into daily
operations. The CMSC is responsible for coordination of the cruise missile strike. This will include
but is not limited to the responsibility to coordinate SLCM operations with other commanders and
coordinators (such as the launch area coordinator (LAC)), including the appropriate ground force
commanders, amphibious task force commanders, affected friendly surface forces, subordinate
warfare commanders and coordinators through the battle group commander or equivalent. He will
verify deconfliction of missile fly-out routes and divert areas. He will assign missile employment
tasking to firing units as directed by higher authority.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Launch Area Coordinator. The CMSC’s principal deputy, the LAC is responsible
to the CMSC for leading the execution of the SLCM strike operations. The LAC is designated to
coordinate on-scene requirements. When exercising TACON of submarines, the LAC shall know
SUBOPAUTH procedures and concerns and shall contact the SUBOPAUTH for guidance and
assistance in contacting and directing submarines to their launch areas. The LAC must deconflict
over water missile flight routes and coordinate closely with the anti-air warfare commander
(AAWC). The LAC should use all available means to ensure missile flight path airspace is
deconflicted. Additionally, the LAC will advise downrange forces of the approximate SLCM flight
path. The LAC will monitor and clear over-water divert areas. SLCM tracks are not reported in the
LINK 11 picture.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Firing Units (FRU). Firing units are responsible for conducting their launches
under the direction of the LAC. FRUs will also clear their local areas and booster drop zones.

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b. (NC) (NMP) Command Relationships and Procedures.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Generically, maritime forces will fall under the OPCON of the maritime
component commander (MCC). In the case of submarines, OPCON would rest with the NATO
SUBOPAUTH. TACON of strike-capable submarines would be assumed by the LAC during strike
operations using existing support submarine procedures. A diagram of the command relationship
is shown in Figure 2-1.

(2) (NC) (NMP) The submarine or submarines will be assigned in direct support of the launch
area coordinator to conduct strike operations in the envisaged command and control structure.
To request assignment of submarine firing units, the existing procedures in ATP-01, Vol. II and
ATP-18 should be followed, using the message formats in APP-11 and ATP-18. The strike mission
should be identified as the proposed employment, with the proposed level of support as directed.

(3) (NC) (NMP) The strike planners and the LAC should coordinate with the SUBOPAUTH
and/or the submarine operations coordinating authority (SOCA) to ensure water assignments
encompass proposed launch positions. An area proposal should be submitted at the same time
as the Support Submarine Assignment Request to allow the SUBOPAUTH to incorporate it into
the waterspace management (WSM) plan for the operation and deconflict any potential mutual
interference. The type of area, whether it is submarine action area (SAA) or joint action area
(JAA), will be dependent upon the existing submarine threat. However, the use of a JAA will offer
the commander afloat more flexibility to respond to an emergent threat.

(4) (NC) (NMP) The minimum communications requirements of units assuming TACON
of submarines are specified in MC 195/5; however, broadcast control authority (BCA) shall
always remain with the command exercising OPCON, the SUBOPAUTH. The mission-specific
communications requirement peculiar for the execution of a strike will remain a national
responsibility.

Joint Force Commander

Maritime Component Commander

SUBOPAUTH OTC/STWC
Cruise Missile Strike Coordinator

Launch Area Coordinator

OPCON
Submarine TACON

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Figure 2-1. (NU) (NMP) Generic Submarine Strike Operation Task Organization

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2152–2159 Spare

2160 Command in Amphibious Warfare

(NU) The commander amphibious task force (CATF), upon the commencement of operations, assumes
responsibility for the entire force and for the operation, and is vested with the commensurate authority to
ensure success of the operation. The specific means through which CATF exercises this authority during
an amphibious operation is set forth in ATP-08 and other relevant amphibious warfare publications.
For detailed responsibilities in amphibious warfare, which are complex and involve close cooperation
between many agencies, a summary has been included in Chapter 15.
2161 Parallel Chains of Command

(NU) The interrelation of naval and landing force tasks during the planning for an execution of amphibious
operations requires the establishment of parallel chains of command and corresponding commanders at
all levels of the amphibious task force organization. The following fundamental considerations govern
the application of such a system of parallel command:
a. (NU) Except during the planning phase, CATF, a naval officer, is responsible for the operation and
exercises that degree of authority over the entire force necessary to ensure success of the operation.

b. (NU) The amphibious task force and LF commands are on corresponding level of command with
regard to their respective components.

c. (NU) Corresponding commanders are established at each subordinate level of both the amphibious
task force and LF elements.

d. (NU) Matters of command which affect only the Navy forces are dealt with by CATF through the
naval chain of command.

e. (NU) Matters of command which affect only the LFs are dealt with by the commander landing
force (CLF) through the LF chain of command.

f. (NU) Matters of command which affect both the naval force and the LF are dealt with through the
corresponding naval and LF chains of command. Commanders at all levels are required to maintain
a close and continuous relationship to ensure that, except in emergencies, no commander makes
decisions affecting corresponding commanders without consultation. In such cases, the commander
making an emergency decision will notify corresponding commanders of his action at the earliest
practicable time.

2162 Designation of Commanders

(NU) Regardless of the composition of the amphibious task force, CATF is a naval officer designated
in the initiating directive. The commander of all troop components within the amphibious task force is
CLF and is also designated in the initiating directive. Commanders of subordinate task groups within
the amphibious task force, if they have not been named in the initiating directive, are designated by
CATF or CLF as appropriate. Should air forces be assigned, their commander, an air force officer, will be
designated in the initiating directive.
2163 Relationships During Planning

a. (NU) As directed by higher authority, component commanders of the amphibious task force, at
the beginning of the planning phase, report for planning purposes to CATF, who is responsible for
the preparation of the overall plan for the amphibious operation. CATF serves as the coordinating
authority for the conduct of planning. Matters on which CATF and CLF and commanders of the other
forces are unable to agree are referred to their common superior for decision.

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b. (NU) Since immediate responsibility for the conduct of LF operations ashore is vested in CLF,
the planning and execution of the landing and assault are primarily his concern. Participation of
other components in the assault consists generally in providing support for the LF. This involves
the analysis of LF proposals to determine their feasibility from the standpoint of the remainder of
the amphibious task force. The capability of providing the necessary support is a primary factor in
evaluating and concurring with proposed LF plans and concepts.

2164 Command During Operations

a. (NU) CATF, upon the commencement of operations, assumes responsibility for the entire force and
for the operation, and is vested with the commensurate authority to ensure success of the operation.

b. (NU) The specific means through which CATF exercises this authority is treated in relation to
those aspects of the amphibious operations set forth in this and subsequent paragraphs.

c. (NU) CATF exercises his command authority through the commanders of his task organization.
The latter, in turn, exercise their authority through their own chains of command.

d. (NU) Within the amphibious objective area (AOA), CATF is given specific command authority as
prescribed by the commander having overall authority for the operation. He will exercise control, as
prescribed in the initiating directive, over forces not a part of the amphibious task force, when such
forces are operating within the amphibious objective area after the arrival of the advance force or
the amphibious task force. When such forces are merely passing through the AOA, control will be
exercised only to the extent of preventing or minimizing mutual interference.

e. (NU) Subject to the overall authority of CATF, responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore,
and for the security of all personnel and installations located within the area of operations (AOO)
ashore, is vested in CLF.

2165 Consultation Between Commanders

(NU) In the exercise of his command authority, CATF, to the greatest possible extent, obtains and
considers the opinion of appropriate commanders, particularly in cases involving a decision requiring
the exercise of professional judgment in their operational fields. However, this requirement in no way
limits the command authority of CATF.
2166 Consultation Between Corresponding Commanders

(NU) No significant decision affecting the plans, disposition, or intentions of a corresponding commander
is made without consultation with the commander concerned.
2167 Naval Authority Over Landing Force Units

(NU) No Navy commander, other than CATF, exercises authority over, or assumes responsibility for, the
operating of landing force units, except where a Navy commander below the amphibious task force level
has been designated as commander of a subordinate force composed of Navy and LF units.
2168–2169 Spare

2170 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

(NU) Naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS) is the provision of cooperation, guidance,
advice, and assistance to merchant shipping in support of the commander’s mission and to enhance the
safety and security of merchant ships. NCAGS operates through the full spectrum of operations, from
peacetime to crisis, contributing to both the military and economic lines of development and, therefore,
must be considered at the early stages of planning. In particular, NCAGS expertise should be incorporated
into the staff composition where interaction with civil maritime actors is either anticipated or desired.

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(NU) Full details of NCAGS structure and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures can be found in
ATP-02, Vol. I, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) Manual. Chapter 11 of ATP-01,
Vol. I provides a general overview of NCAGS and Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System
(AWNIS).
2171–2174 Spare
2175 Command of Maritime Interdiction Operations

a. (NU) Maritime interdiction operations consist of operations conducted to enforce prohibition on

the maritime movement of specified persons or material within a defined geographic area. MIO are
normally restricted to the interception and, if necessary, boarding of vessels to verify, redirect, or
impound their cargoes in support of the enforcement of economic or military sanctions. Units engaged
in MIO normally exercise the right to perform the following:

(1) (NU) Interrogate vessels for reasons other than safe navigation.

(2) (NU) Send armed boarding parties to visit vessels bound to, through, or out of a defined area.

(3) (NU) Examine each ship’s papers and cargo.

(4) (NU) Search for evidence of prohibited items.

(5) (NU) Divert vessels failing to comply with the guidelines set forth by the sanctioning body.

(6) (NU) Seize vessels and their cargo that refuse to divert.

b. (NU) The maritime interdiction operations commander (MIOC) is the functional commander of all
forces assigned to conduct the MIO. The MIOC is responsible for:

(1) (NU) Conducting MIO within the assigned operations area or sector and exercising TACON
of all MIO forces within his assigned area.

(2) (NU) Assigning boarding and assisting ships as required.

(3) (NU) Tasking aircraft or other forces as required, to support a particular boarding.

(4) (NU) Assigning units very high frequency (VHF) working channels and night signal colours,
to be used for suspect vessel interrogation to prevent mutual interference.

(5) (NU) Maintaining an accurate database of boarded vessels.

c. (NU) A sector MIOC is assigned by the MIOC as required to provide C2 when geography prohibits
operations in a single geographic area. There may be a need for a number of sector MIO commanders.

d. (NU) Responsibilities and functions of the MIOC are found in Table 2-15. Detailed descriptions
and procedures for MIO are found in ATP-71, Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations.

2176–2179 Spare

2180 Command During Support Operations

2181 Support Operations

(NU) Occasions may arise when one force provides support to another force. The commander ordering

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the support will specify the degree, manner, and duration of support which forces provide each other.
The supporting force OTC should be provided with the necessary information concerning the situation,
and the mission of the force in need of support, at the time when the support is needed. The commander
ordering the support will indicate which of the following relationships apply.
a. (NU) Situation A. The supporting force is to join and integrate with the other force. The senior
officer present, or the officer to whom TACOM is delegated, is to become the OTC of the combined
force.

b. (NU) Situation B. The supporting force does not integrate. Unless otherwise ordered, the
supported commander is to exert the general direction of the supporting effort. In support Situation B,
it is critical that the commander ordering the support provides a clear framework of what is expected
from the supporting commander, particularly:

(1) (NU) Objective.

(2) (NU) Strength of forces.

(3) (NU) Time, place and duration of the supporting effort.

(4) (NU) Priority of the support mission relative to other missions given to the supporting
commander, including the authority, if any, to depart from its support mission in the event of an
exceptional opportunity or emergency.

c. (NU) Situation C. The supporting force commander has discretion of how best to provide
support. This situation may be ordered when, for example:

(1) (NU) There is a requirement for a force to provide simultaneous support to more than one
force or to provide support to any number of forces entering a designated area.

(2) (NU) When the majority of ships or aircraft are under the OPCON or TACOM of the supporting
commander.

2182 Support Operations, Situation A

(NU) The following considerations are applicable under Situation A:

a. (NU) Delegation of Tactical Command. The OTC of the overall force may delegate tactical
command or control of designated forces to subordinate commanders for the execution of assigned
tasks.

b. (NU) Tasking of Forces. The overall force OTC will issue tasking directives (e.g., operations
general (OPGENs)), specify reporting requirements, establish tactical communication circuits, order
overall force dispositions, and issue other direction as required by the situation.

2183 Support Operations, Situation B

(NU) Under the conditions of Situation B, the coordination between forces will take the following aspects
into account:
a. (NU) The supported commander must be able to participate and comment on the development of
the support plan (to be elaborated by the supporting commander and approved by higher authority).

b. (NU) The supported commander should provide as much latitude as possible to the supporting
commander in the planning and execution of his support operations.

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c. (NU) The supported commander should provide the priorities, timings and desired effects of the
operations conducted within his AOO.

d. (NU) Unless otherwise directed, the supporting commander will direct the operational tactics and
associated activities of the force allocated for the support mission.

2184 Support Operations, Situation C

(NU) The following considerations are applicable under Situation C:

a. (NU) General. Support Situation C differs from Situations A and B in that the missions of the
respective forces may be different. When the supporting force commander is ordered to support a
particular force under Situation C, the supporting force commander will decide what support can
be provided as dictated by the constraints of his assigned mission. Coordination between respective
OTCs is required to eliminate mutual interference and enhance conservation of resources.

b. (NU) Location of Operations. When the support force commander is ordered to support
a particular force under the conditions of Situation C, he should decide, in view of the discretion
allowed him, whether:

(1) (NU) To operate in a central location and thus be better placed to meet any expected
commitments.

(2) (NU) To move close to the particular force. Taking into consideration the circumstances above,
it may be decided to adopt Situation A or Situation B.

c. (NU) Duration of Support. The duration of the support is to be decided by the supporting force
commander in the absence of orders to the contrary. If the OTC of the force being supported wishes
to retain the supporting force beyond this time, approval of appropriate authorities must be obtained.

d. (NU) Support in a Designated Area. The supporting force commander may be ordered to
provide support in a designated area through which a number of forces may be passing. If the forces
to be supported are not simultaneously in the same area, the procedures in subparagraph b. may be
adopted by the supporting force commander with regard to each force.

e. (NU) Exchange of Information. In addition to the items in Article 2183, flow of information
concerning the measures for the prevention of mutual interference (PMI) can be ensured.

2185–2189 Spare

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2190 Other Support Operations

(NU) Individual units may be assigned to provide support to forces at sea. This support may be in one
of four forms:
a. (NU) Integrated Operations. Integrated operations are those operations in which a designated
unit provides support to a specific task force/group operating directly under its TACOM and TACON.
During integrated operations, the assigning authority retains OPCON.

b. (NU) Direct Support. The support provided by a unit or formation not attached or under
command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by
that unit or formation.

(NU) A unit assigned in direct support will operate under the tactical control of the OTC who is being
supported. Operational control and tactical command remain with the assigning authority. The direct
support unit will report to the designated controlling authority for employment. Control procedures
are amplified in subsequent chapters.

c. (NU) Associated Support. A unit assigned in associated support operates independently of

the supported force, but may be tasked to provide contact information to and receive intelligence
from the OTC who is being supported. The designated unit operates under the tactical control of the
assigning authority, who coordinates the tasking and movement of the supporting unit in response to
the supported OTC’s requirements.

d. (NU) Area Operations. Area operations are normally conducted in a geographic area, not
related to the protection of a specific force. Areas may be related to the protection of maritime forces
scheduled to enter the area, or to provide defence in depth to distant forces. Tactical command of units
conducting area operations remains with the assigning authority.

2191 Command and Control of Submarines During Strike Operations

(NU) When submarines are to be employed launching cruise missiles, TACON will be shifted to a
LAC that is responsible for directing the actions of cruise missile platforms in a designated launch
area (see Article 2212). The procedures established in Article 12232 and the format in ATP-18 are to
be followed to request tasking of submarine firing units. The strike mission is to be identified as the
proposed employment, along with proposed shift of TACON to the LAC. The strike planner onboard
the LAC should coordinate to ensure water assignments encompass the proposed launch positions. An
area proposal must be specified in the support submarine request message to allow the SUBOPAUTH to
incorporate this into the waterspace management ALLOCSTAT message for the operation and to address
any PMI issues. The mission-specific communications requirement peculiar for the execution of a strike
will remain a national responsibility.
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SECTION II—TACTICAL COMMAND AT SEA

2200 Introduction

a. (NU) General. The OTC will always be responsible for accomplishing the mission of the force.
He may delegate authority for the execution of various activities in some or all of the areas of maritime
warfare noted below to designated subordinate warfare commanders and/or coordinators. The three
principal areas of maritime warfare are ASUW, ASW, and anti-air warfare (AAW). Requirements for
air coordination, electronic warfare (EW) coordination, and surveillance coordination concern more
than one area of warfare and so assume particular importance in the devising of a command structure.

b. (NU) Development of Command Structure. In the development of a command structure

at sea, the OTC must identify the activities that will be required by the assigned task and determine
who will be accountable to him for their execution. For the purposes of this book, the following
conventions have been adopted for describing the activities in the OTC’s chain of command.

(1) (NU) Responsibility. The obligation placed upon an individual for correct and timely
execution of a task assigned by a superior that cannot be delegated. Responsibility also entails
accountability for the exercise of the authority delegated when tasking was assigned. Responsibility
cannot be delegated and thus accountability cannot be shifted. When a duty is assigned, the fact
that some tasking can be delegated further down the chain will not lessen the obligation of the
holder of the intermediate authority to his superior. The term responsibility is also used to describe
an activity that is specific to a duty and cannot be delegated further.

(2) (NU) Duty. An identified block of related functions within a larger command structure that can
be assigned to a single subordinate. Assignment automatically delegates the requisite authority for
C2 required to fulfil the tasking. With the delegation of authority comes the inherent responsibility
of the subordinate to the assigning superior for execution of the task in accordance with known
orders and procedures. The list of duties is contained in the Duty Table (ATP-01, Vol. II, Allied
Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book, Table D), for signalling purposes.

(3) (NU) Function. A defined activity which may be delegated to subordinates through specific
assignment or as part of a duty within the force command structure. Functions are listed in
Tables 2-2 through 2-16 and are grouped by warfare area. When any function is delegated, it is
assumed that the necessary authority for command, control, direction or coordination required for
the execution of that function has also been delegated.

2201 Command of Large Forces

(NU) A fundamental component of command effectiveness is the ability of the commander and
commanded units to communicate. This is particularly so in the case of large or dispersed forces; if
there are inadequacies in the communications capabilities of individual units, these must be identified
and assessed before a disposition is ordered. There will thus be occasions when the communications
capability of a force will impact upon the OTC’s concept of operations.
2202 Delegation of Command Functions

a. (NU) Considerations. A centralized command is the most direct way of allowing the OTC to
make use of his experience and ability. However, circumstances and command facilities can make
delegation necessary. Some factors are:

(1) (NU) Mission.

(2) (NU) The threat.

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(3) (NU) Need for quick action or reaction.

(4) (NU) Necessity to carry out many actions in different places at the same time.

(5) (NU) Practical inability of the OTC to exercise all functions because of excessive workload or
the requirements of some actions for specific knowledge of facilities.

(6) (NU) Lack of appropriate display and communications facilities.

(7) (NU) Force size and composition.

2203–2204 Spare

2205 Command and Control Options

(NU) The OTC is always responsible for formulating and promulgating policy. Other OTC functions,
including warfare functions, may, based on factors stated in Article 2202, be delegated to subordinates
within the constraints of the ROE in force and stated policy. For the five principal warfare areas, the OTC
has the following options:
a. (NU) The OTC retains command in the principal areas of warfare by retaining all the warfare
functions.

b. (NU) The OTC delegates to one subordinate commander one or more warfare functions.

c. (NU) The OTC delegates to more than one subordinate commander several warfare functions.

d. (NU) The OTC delegates to subordinates within geographic areas (or sectors) warfare functions
relevant to that area, but may retain any part of the overall function for himself. This form of delegation
can be used by a principal warfare commander as well, if so assigned.

e. (NU) A special form of delegation as described in item b. is that the OTC of a large force may
allocate all his warfare functions for the defence of a force to a composite warfare commander (CWC)
while retaining overall responsibility for the mission. The CWC may, in turn, delegate some or all
warfare functions as described above.

NOTE
(NU) ITEM A. DESCRIBES CENTRALIZED COMMAND WHILE
OPTIONS IN ITEMS B. THROUGH E. ALL DESCRIBE FORMS OF
DECENTRALIZED COMMAND.

2206 Responsibilities

a. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities. The OTC has overall responsibility for accomplishing the
mission of the force and for executing defence. The OTC’s policy and procedure for succession of
command authority as well as designation of the standby OTC should be specified in advance of the
operation in the OTC’s orders. The OTC shall specify the chain of command between himself and, when
designated, the CWC, principal warfare commanders, coordinators, supporting commanders, and the
forces under their tactical command and/or control. This may be done by task number designation or
by stipulating which task groups, units, or elements are designated for each commander. The detailed
OTC’s responsibilities for mission execution and defence of the force are listed in Table 2-2, those
for a convoy operation in Table 2-12, mine warfare in Table 2-14, force protection in harbour in Table
2-16, strike warfare in Table 2-4, and information warfare in Table 2-7. The OTC’s responsibilities
cannot be delegated.

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b. (NU) Principal Warfare Area Responsibilities. In exercising his responsibilities, the OTC
must consider both the threat to the force and the units which he has available to counter the threat.
However, no single threat may be considered in isolation; consequently, no tactic to counter a specific
threat may be employed without considering its effect on the security of the force from other threats
which may subsequently materialize. The OTC’s detailed functions are found in Tables 2-2 through
2-16. There are two categories reflected in the tables:

(1) (NU) Those functions of the OTC which may be delegated to a CWC.

(2) (NU) Those functions which may be delegated to warfare commanders, coordinators, or others
to control assets and take action necessary to execute the promulgated policy.

c. (NU) Coordination Responsibilities.

(1) (NU) Air Coordination. The OTC is responsible for coordinating all friendly air movement
within his area of interest (AOI). As he will not always know the position and intention of all
friendly units, he must exercise coordination partly by procedural means. The detailed functions
of the OTC for air coordination are to be found in Table 2-9 and are explained in Chapter 6,
Section I. They may be delegated to an air coordinator (AC).

(2) (NU) Electronic and Acoustic Warfare (EAW) Coordination. The OTC is responsible
for determining and promulgating force EAW policies with the advice from his information
warfare commander (IWC), if an IWC is established. Details of responsibilities and functions are
to be found in Tables 2-2 and 2-9 and are explained in Chapter 8. EW functions may be delegated
to the electronic warfare coordinator (EWC) through the IWC if established. Guidance on the
application of acoustic warfare (AW) is to be found in ATP-28, Volume I, Allied Antisubmarine
Warfare Manual—Tactics and Procedures.

(3) (NU) Surveillance. The OTC is responsible for establishing the surveillance areas for each
area of maritime warfare within the overall guidelines of the general picture compilation plan.
Details of responsibilities and functions are to be found in Tables 2-2 through 2-5 and are explained
in Chapter 6. Functions may be delegated to warfare commanders.

(4) (NU) Mine Warfare Coordination. The OTC is responsible for formulating and
promulgating MW policy. Detailed responsibilities and functions are found in Table 2-14. Mine
warfare functions may be delegated to a designated naval mine warfare coordinator (NMWC), as
indicated in the table.

(5) (NU) Tactical Data Link (TDL) Coordination. Tactical data links are now multi-link
networks. Being in a joint operation, with joint structure and component commanders or in a purely
maritime one, it is necessary to have a specific cell dedicated to link management. For maritime
forces, this cell data link manager/interface control officer (DLM/ICO) is called a maritime interface
control officer (MICO). In a joint operation, MICO is in charge of coordination with joint interface
control officer (JICO). In a maritime operation MICO is responsible for multi-link network in the
force. MICO is to be kept by the OTC or delegated to a principal warfare commander (PWC).

d. (NU) The Convoy Responsibilities of the OTC. The OTC is responsible for the safe and
timely arrival of the convoy. Detailed responsibilities and functions are found in Table 2-12 and are
explained in Chapter 10.

(1) (NU) Mercantile Convoy. The OTC of the escorting ships is not altered when a more senior
naval officer is present in a naval ship designated as part of the convoy and not part of the escort.

(2) (NU) Military Convoy. The senior naval officer of the ships in convoy and escorting ships
will designate the OTC of the combined force IAW Article 2116.

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(3) (NU) When a Support Force Is in Situation A. (See Article 2182.) When the OTC of the
support force is senior to the OTC of a mercantile convoy, he should consider allowing the OTC of
the convoy to remain in tactical command. This maintains continuity of command and the previous
close liaison between the OTC of the convoy and the convoy commodore.

(4) (NU) Unescorted Convoy. In the absence of a warship escort, the convoy commodore is
to command the convoy.

e. (NU) OTC’s Functions for Departure and Entry Operations.

(NU) The functions of the OTC are found in Table 2-13 and are explained in Chapter 3.

2207–2209 Spare

2210 Delegation of Authority

(NU) The OTC may retain tactical command and tactical control authority or he may delegate some
of that authority to subordinate commanders and coordinators. Such delegation does not mean that the
OTC relinquishes authority over subordinates. It does mean that the subordinate is given some or all
of that same authority over forces assigned to him by the OTC. If the OTC elects to designate a CWC
and/or warfare commander/coordinators, he may delegate tactical command authority required to carry
out assigned tasks to them by using the Duty Table (ATP-01, Vol. II, Table D) and Tables 2-2 through
2-16 of this chapter.
2211 Delegation Considerations

a. (NU) General. The following general considerations are provided for selection and location of
warfare commanders:

(1) (NU) Availability of interoperable data link and access to required displays.

(2) (NU) Sufficiency and interoperability of communications equipment.

(3) (NU) Availability of sufficient skilled personnel and state of training (staff augmentation if
necessary).

(4) (NU) Living/working space available in units.

(5) (NU) No undue limitations imposed by radiation hazards (RADHAZ) restrictions.

(6) (NU) Level of tension/state of hostilities.

(7) (NU) Threat assessment.

(8) (NU) Area of operations and disposition required.

(9) (NU) Emission policy (EP) including need for silence on unique emitters.

(10) (NU) Compatibility of unit force weapons and sensors employment with proposed warfare
command functions.

(11) (NU) The desirability of delegating all functions in a single warfare area to a single subordinate.

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b. (NU) Specific Anti-air Warfare Commander Considerations.

(1) (NU) Easy access to EW information.

(2) (NU) Possibility of using airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft as sector or standby AAWC1.

c. (NU) Specific Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC) Considerations.

(1) (NU) Availability of communication systems and space required for coordination with
submarines and the SUBOPAUTH. (Staff augmentation will normally be required.)

(2) (NU) Availability of air ASW expertise.

(3) (NU) Requirement for specialized oceanographic expertise.

d. (NU) Specific Antisurface Warfare Commander (ASUWC)1 Considerations.

(1) (NU) Access to aircrew postmission debriefs.

(2) (NU) Access to AEW and strike warfare expertise.

(3) (NU) Access to adequate targeting data.

e. (NU) Specific Information Warfare Commander Considerations.

(1) (NU) The ability to closely coordinate with CWC assets configured for EW operations, and
directs battlespace awareness, ship signals exploitation space, EW module, and other supporting
IW elements of the force;

(2) (NU) The ability to direct the IW planning process and to support IW combat operation
monitoring and assessment at the tactical, operational and strategic level of war;

(3) (NU) The alternate IWC should be assigned to a commander not already assigned warfare
or functional group command responsibilities that has access to SI circuitry and possesses a firm
understanding of IW.

f. (NU) Authority and Responsibility. In deciding what degree of control is to be delegated, and
when, the OTC must observe one cardinal principle: To operate effectively, each unit and command
must know in detail its obligation to the OTC, warfare commanders and coordinators, and other units.
To achieve this, it is essential that the OTC clearly specifies the chain of command. Although control
of different force weapons systems in a single ship may be delegated to different warfare commanders,
only one commander may exercise control over the movements of an individual unit at any one time.
Should it be necessary to change tactical control to meet specific circumstances, the OTC must clearly
specify under what circumstances and when such change is to take place. Should another commander
wish to move a unit to better carry out duties in a warfare field, he must do so through the commander
having tactical control of that ship or unit, as specified in the task organization, with the OTC or CWC
adjudicating any differences.

2212 Warfare Commander and Coordinator Responsibilities

a. (NU) General.

(1) (NU) Composite Warfare Commander. That officer to whom the OTC has assigned all
his authority and delegated functions for the overall direction and control of the defence of his
force.
1
Note: (NU) When referring to the composite warfare commander structure, the USA now refers to the anti-air
warfare commander (AAWC) as the air and missile defence commander (AMDC) and used AMD not AAW. USA
also refers to the ASUWC as the surface warfare commander (SUWC) effectively dropping the “anti.”

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(2) (NU) Principal Warfare Commanders. Subordinate to the OTC/CWC are four principal
warfare commanders: AAWC, ASUWC, ASWC, and IWC. The warfare commanders are
responsible for collecting and disseminating information and in certain situations are delegated
authority to respond to threats with assigned assets.

(a) (NU) The warfare commanders, when so authorized, may autonomously initiate action.
Attention is drawn to Article 2118, “Command by Veto.” The CWC also has power of veto
within his area of responsibility (AOR).

(b) (NU) In addition, commanders may be assigned authority for the deployment of force
(long-range) weapons systems and sensors, in accordance with the warfare organization, by
means of duty/function tables, regardless of the commander exercising tactical control of the
unit.

(3) (NU) Functional Groups. The OTC may form temporary or permanent functional groups
within the overall task organization. These groups would have specific stated functions, such as
operational deception (OPDEC), underway replenishment, screening duties, etc.

(4) (NU) Functional Call Signs. Warfare commanders and coordinators may be allocated a
two-letter call sign related to their respective command or coordination functions. This convention
allows a clear picture of the command and control organization and provides a quick and easy
reference to be used by warfare commanders for intercommunications. See Article 4123b.

b. (NU) Delegation to Principal Warfare Commanders. The AAWC, ASUWC, ASWC,

and IWC will be responsible for the collection of information in their particular areas and the
dissemination to the OTC and force of evaluated information in those areas. Warfare commanders
will maintain continuous liaison with each other to ensure timely flow of mutually supporting
information and avoid mutual interference. Subsequent sections and Tables 2-3 through 2-16 deal with
specific functions of the warfare commanders and specific amounts of authority delegated to them
in particular environments. Some warships have weapons systems which have effective ranges that
extend beyond the local area in which the ship is operating. Since warfare commanders are normally
assigned authority to employ these weapons, this may cause situations in which one commander has
tactical control of a ship and another has control of that ship’s force weapons systems. If firing the
weapon does not interfere with the tasking of the ship, there is generally no problem. However, if
significant manoeuvring is required, coordination between the appropriate warfare commanders is
vital in prosecuting the threat. A temporary shift of tactical control might be required but command
and control should remain clear. Disagreement between the warfare commanders should be resolved
by the OTC (or CWC if designated).

c. (NU) Delegation to the Screen Commander (SC). The SC is a functional commander

who will normally control movements for the ships in the inner screen in accordance with guidance
received from the warfare commanders. The functions of the SC are contained in Table 2-8.

d. (NU) Delegation to Coordinators. Coordinators are asset and resource managers. They
carry out the policies of the OTC and respond to the specific tasking of the warfare commanders.
Coordinators may also exercise control of specified assets.

(1) (NU) The Electronic Warfare Coordinator. The EWC is the principal advisor to the
OTC or IWC, if designated, in all matters pertaining to the employment and exploitation of
the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrum. Accordingly, he has broad responsibilities, which
impact upon task group planning as well as the management and control of all active and passive
weapons, sensors, and electronic communications equipment which operate in or target the
electromagnetic spectrum/environment, to include: electronic warfare support measures (ESM),
electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic protective measures (EPM), EMCON, OPDEC,
operations security (OPSEC), signals intelligence (SIGINT) (communications intelligence

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(COMINT)/electronic intelligence (ELINT)), and signal security (SIGSEC) (communications

security (COMSEC)/electronic security (ELSEC)). The extent to which the EWC exercises actual
control over assets is scenario dependent and should be clearly stated by the IWC as per the
OTC’s direction and understood by the other principal warfare commanders. The EWC’s planning
and management responsibilities encompass several areas. The EWC’s functions are found in
Table 2-11. In addition:

(a) (NU) The EWC must ensure that force assets are employed to support the requirements of
the OTC through the IWC who will coordinate with the other principal warfare commanders.
Coordination between the IWC and the other principal warfare commanders is vital to ensure
that all assets with ESM, ECM, and EPM capabilities are managed effectively.

(b) (NU) The EWC is the principal manager of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums.
The EWC will formulate, promulgate, control, and monitor the EMCON plan based upon the
IWC’s emission policy. The principal warfare commanders and the commanding officers must
operate force emitters within the effective EMCON plan. The principal warfare commanders
and commanding officers have the authority to break EMCON as per Article 8210. They must,
however, notify the EWC of his actions.

(c) (NU) The EWC through the IWC must ensure that the force deception plan and assets are
employed in a manner which facilitates the mission and policy of the OTC.

(d) (NU) The EWC through the IWC must ensure that cryptologic assets, both organic and
nonorganic, are employed in a mannethrough the IWCr which facilitates responsiveness to the
AAW, ASW, ASUW, and IW information needs of the OTC.

(2) (NU) The Air Coordinator. The AC exercises coordination within the force air coordination
area. The duty for air coordination should be assigned to the unit which has the greatest number
of electronic aids to aircraft navigation and control, the largest number of experienced air control
personnel, and the best air picture facilities. This duty may be collocated with the AAWC, air
resource element coordinator (AREC), helicopter element coordinator (HEC), or ASWC.

(3) (NU) Fleet Air Defence Identification Zone (FADIZ) Coordinator (FADIZ C). The
FADIZ C is a highly capable (surveillance, communications, and weapons systems) surface air
defence unit and is stationed along the threat axis to identify and deconflict aircraft entering into
and departing airspace designated as FADIZ by the AAWC. Functions of the FADIZ C are detailed
in Tables 2-9 and 2-10 and amplified in Chapter 6.

(4) (NU) The Air Resource Element Coordinator. The AREC is a resource manager.
He may, under certain circumstances, exercise tactical control for particular aircraft (i.e., for
aircraft projecting power ashore), but his primary role remains that of asset allocation and of
informing the warfare commander of the status of these assets, the results achieved by them,
and the information gained from their sensors. Particular functions of the AREC are detailed in
Table 2-10 and amplified in Chapter 6.

(5) (NU) The Helicopter Element Coordinator. When two or more ships other than a CV are
helicopter equipped, a central scheduling authority for flight operations from these ships is useful.
In a multithreat environment, the assets controlled by this coordinator may be in demand by any of
the principal warfare commanders. The HEC’s functions, therefore, will in many ways parallel those
of the AREC, with whom he should coordinate, concerning helicopters. Additional functions found
in Table 2-10 can be delegated to the HEC for non-CV-based helicopter operations. HEC functions
will be delegated by the OTC, generally to the senior commanding officer of helicopter-equipped
ships. These coordinating functions will normally not apply to amphibious force and logistic
helicopters. Requests for helicopters embarked in other than the CV and amphibious and logistic
ships will be direct to the HEC. The OTC must be made aware of helicopter scheduling, tasking,
and flight operations in order to be able to resolve potential requirement conflicts. The HEC should
promulgate a daily flight schedule.

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(6) (NU) The Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority.

(NC) (NMP) The SOCA functions as the primary point of contact in the task force/group with the
SUBOPAUTH and submarines assigned to him concerning coordinated operations matters. The
OTC/CWC may retain this function or delegate it to a subordinate commander (normally, but not
necessarily, the ASWC) depending on the role of the submarine (e.g., ASUW, special warfare,
support of amphibious warfare, etc.).

(a) (NC) (NMP) Division of SOCA Functions. In large operations, the OTC/CWC may
retain selected submarine coordination functions (e.g., WSM coordination) and delegate all other
functions (e.g., TACON) to one or more subordinate commanders. In doing so, unambiguous
lines of coordination shall be retained between the task group and the SUBOPAUTH, and
between individual submarines and the commanders to whom they are assigned. Division of
submarine coordination functions can provide a task group greater flexibility in submarine
employment, but it is not required if a single commander can effectively accomplish SOCA
functions for all submarines.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Submarine Element Coordinator (SEC)/Submarine Advisory

Team (SAT). The SEC is the principal advisor to the SOCA for submarine operations.
Assignment of a SEC to the SOCA staff should be considered anytime submarines operate
in associated support and is required in direct support (unless this requirement is waived
by the SUBOPAUTH). While not always necessary, a SAT—composed of additional watch
standers—may be required depending on the scenario. SEC/SAT becomes an integral part of
and is colocated with the SOCA staff.

(c) (NC) (NMP) SOCA and SEC/SAT functions and responsibilities are described in ATP-18.

(7) (NU) Local Warfare Coordinator. When two or more units are in company, a local warfare
coordinator may be designated. The local warfare coordinator has the following functions:

(a) (NU) Direction Functions:

i. (NU) Delegating, as appropriate, specified functions to other units in his local group.

ii. (NU) Establishing watch zones for units in his group.

iii. (NU) Broadcasting the local picture to units of the group on the local coordination net.

(b) (NU) Coordination Functions. Correlating and evaluating reports from units in
company and, where appropriate, relaying this information to the OTC/CWC or warfare
commander.

(c) (NU) Control Functions. The local warfare coordinator controls the local coordination
net.

(8) (NU) The Naval Mine Warfare Coordinator. (See note.) The NMWC is the principal
advisor to the OTC on matters pertaining to NMW. He is responsible for coordinating the laying
of minefields in support of the OTC and the efforts of supporting NMCM forces, which are usually
not under the direct command or control of the OTC/CWC. Specific functions of the NMWC may
include the MCM and mining functions listed in Table 2-14:

Note. (NU) The NMW coordinator could be the NMW commander and would fulfil both functions.

(a) (NU) Employment of tactical mining against targets of opportunity, using force assets.

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(b) (NU) Coordination with appropriate commanders for the laying of tactical minefields and
the execution of mining plans.

(c) (NU) Tasking of MCM forces assigned to the tactical command of the OTC/CWC.

(d) (NU) Coordination with appropriate local commanders for response to enemy mining of
choke points, safe havens, or operating areas, and for the execution of MCM plans.

(e) (NU) Maintaining and disseminating a plot of relevant MW information to the force.

(9) (NC) (NMP) Cruise Missile Strike Coordinator (CMSC). The designated agent who is
responsible for all sea-launched cruise missile planning and C&R in a strike or series of strikes
(see 2151.a(1)).

(10) (NC) (NMP) Launch Area Coordinator. The CMSC’s principal deputy, the LAC is
responsible to the CMSC for leading the execution of the SLCM strike operations (see 2151.a(2)).

(11) (NU) Force Protection Coordinator. The force protection coordinator (FPC), established
at the functional commander level, should be designated in particular circumstances in which
the lack of command and control capabilities to exercise some of the MFP functions at warfare
command level (e.g., units proceeding independently or in groups to harbour/anchorage, inshore
transits in the absence of the OTC…), thus allowing more effective command and control of MFP
aspects of operations.

e. (NU) Sea Combat Commander. Within an OTC’s area of operations, sea control is the
broad functional integration of ASW and ASUW disciplines necessary for sea control to the extent
and duration necessary for mission fulfilment. The sea combat commander (SCC) is an additional
organizational option available to the OTC in forming a CWC structure.

(1) (NU) An SCC executes the combined duties of ASWC and ASUWC. His duties may also
include any of the following:

(a) (NU) Screen commander.

(b) (NU) Helicopter element coordinator.

(c) (NU) Naval mine warfare coordinator.

(d) (NU) Submarine operations coordinating authority.

(e) (NU) Maritime interdiction operations commander (see ATP-71).

(2) (NU) The SCC concept is most appropriate for a medium-size force and smaller operating
in a low-to-moderate threat environment, where the full focus of a warfare commander’s efforts
does not need to be concentrated singularly on a critical warfare area. It offers advantages over the
traditional CWC arrangements by:

(a) (NU) Simplifying and streamlining C2 in a compressed littoral battlespace.

(b) (NU) Improving maritime situational awareness.

(c) (NU) Increased efficiency by placing the responsibility for integrating ASW and ASUW
search planning, asset allocation, and tactical direction under a single commander.

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(3) (NU) The CWC may delegate to the SCC the authority necessary to plan SC operations, to
establish SC policy, and to control assigned assets to implement the SC plan. The CWC retains
ultimate authority with the option of command by negation. The timing and extent to which the
control of forces is delegated depend upon the actual political, strategic, and tactical situation. The
principal duties and responsibilities of the SCC are listed in the duty tables associated with the
functions or subareas assigned (Tables 2-2 through 2-16). In addition to the subareas of ASUW
and ASW, other functions that may be assigned to the SCC include HEC, NMWC, SC, SOCA,
and MIOC. For further guidance on the SCC’s principal duties and responsibilities, see the articles
related to the subareas assigned to the SCC.

(4) (NU) The SCC and alternate SCC (if designated) report to the OTC/CWC using the applicable
call signs for one of the primary warfare duties assigned (i.e., ASWC or ASUWC) as specified in
the OPGEN.

f. (NU) Sector Warfare Commanders. If the tactical situation dictates that a principal warfare
area be divided into sectors, a sector warfare commander may be designated. Within his sector, a sector
warfare commander will be subject to the overriding authority (veto) of the OTC/CWC or parent
PWC, but is otherwise vested with most of the prerogatives and responsibilities of a PWC. Sector
warfare commanders have the following functions:

(1) (NU) Direction Functions.

(a) (NU) Designating local warfare coordinators.

(b) (NU) Delegating, as appropriate, specified functions to other units in his sector.

(c) (NU) Assigning aircraft to appropriate units for control.

(d) (NU) Initiating action against a threat, if no action has been initiated by other units in his
sector.

(e) (NU) Exercising overriding authority (veto) over all actions initiated by other units in his
sector.

(2) (NU) Coordination Functions.

(a) (NU) Resolving with other sector warfare commanders problems of coordination on or
near the borderlines between sectors, to ensure the efficient change of reporting responsibility
and to avoid mutual interference.

(b) (NU) Coordinating the effective employment of aircraft and missiles within his sector.

(3) (NU) Control Function. Controlling the communication nets within his sector and warfare
area.

(4) (NU) Additional Duties.

(a) (NU) Requesting the launch of land-based alert aircraft if no carrier is allocated to his
sector.

(b) (NU) Keeping the OTC/CWC or parent PWC informed of evaluated threats, and of the
location of friendly units that could be mistaken as hostile.

(c) (NU) Issuing situation reports (SITREPs) for the benefit of the units in his sector.

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g. (NU) Asset Control and Coordination.

(1) (NU) Picket Ships, Towed Array Ships, or Other Ships. Picket ships, towed array
ships, or other ships operating at a considerable distance from the main body will normally operate
under the tactical control of a warfare commander. As previously set forth, force AAW weapons
systems may be tasked by the AAWC and force ASUW weapons systems by the ASUWC, even
though the ship is under the tactical control of another commander. A ship’s stationing should be
coordinated to consider the requirements of all warfare commanders. Because tasking of a ship’s
weapons by one warfare commander may interfere with its primary tasking, such action must
be preceded by prior concurrence of the warfare commander having tactical control. If required,
tactical control may be temporarily passed to another commander (e.g., two Harpoon-equipped
towed array ships could be directed to form a surface action group (SAG) and temporarily operate
under the tactical control of the surface action group commander (SAGC)).

(2) (NU) Ships in the Inner Screen. Ships in the inner screen will normally operate under the
tactical control of the SC, with that authority delegated to him by the OTC/CWC. The ships’ inner
screen positions will be assigned by the SC in accordance with the OTC’s or warfare commanders’
requirements. These ships, like those in paragraph (1), may possess ASUW capabilities and the
ASUWC may, if assigned authority to do so, direct the SC to detach units as a SAG, but not before
getting prior concurrence of the ASWC, AAWC, or CWC, as appropriate. To simplify coordination,
the SC should also, whenever possible, be the ASWC. However, as noted previously, in large
dispositions there may be several SCs or none, depending upon force disposition.

(3) (NU) Rescue Destroyer. During flight operations, the unit designated as rescue destroyer
should be under the tactical control of the CV’s commanding officer and not be removed from the
rescue station without his consent. Rescue destroyers, like all other surface units, may be tasked
by the AAWC for emergency AAW support, and by the ASUWC and ASWC for “in-place” firings.

(4) (NU) Submarines. Submarines operating with a task group will conduct operations as directed
by the OTC/CWC (or subordinate commander delegated TACON) or, in the case of associated and
area operations, the SUBOPAUTH. When conducting support operations or integrated operations,
the submarine is to communicate directly with the SOCA regarding coordination of tactical
operations and the exchange of intelligence and targeting information.

h. (NU) Delegation to Commanders of Functional Groups.

(1) (NU) The OTC may designate commanders of functional groups, such as deception groups,
underway replenishment groups, etc. This commander will be implicitly responsible for all local
warfare functions within his group. He may delegate these functions to units under his control;
in this case, the unit executing those functions may be designated a local warfare coordinator.
The group commander reports action taken, contact information, etc., to the OTC and/or warfare
commander, as appropriate.

(2) (NU) The following is a list of the most commonly used titles (see the glossary for definitions
and indicated chapters for additional information):

(a) (NU) Screen commander.

(b) (NU) Search and attack unit (SAU) commander, see Chapter 12.

(c) (NU) Surface action group commander, see Chapter 9.

(d) (NU) Helicopter action group (HAG) commander, see Chapter 9.

(e) (NU) Main body group commander.

(f) (NU) Underway replenishment group (URG) commander.

(g) (NU) Deception group (DCG) commander (including missile traps and wolf traps).

(h) (NU) Maritime interdiction operations commander, see ATP-71.

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i. (NU) Delegation to Control Units. To carry out control functions, it is necessary to perform
specialized duties, which are generally delegated and distributed among the various units in the force.
A complete list of such duties is contained in the Duty Table (ATP-01, Vol. II, Table D).

2213 Promulgation of Duties and Delegation of Functions

a. (NU) The term “duty” is used to define warfare commander/coordinator and other functional
assignments. ATP-01, Vol. II, Table D, lists all duties. Certain duty assignments may be promulgated
by appropriate commanders.

b. (NU) The term “functions” refers to the actions and tasking listed in Tables 2-2 through 2-16.
These functions will be delegated by the OTC, CWC, and other commanders as appropriate to the
command structure/force needs.

c. (NU) Figure 2-2 depicts levels of C2 within the OTC’s warfare organization. Figures 2-3 and 2-4
provide examples of the command structure incorporating duty and warfare function assignments.

2214–2219 Spare

COMMAND
(SEE ARTICLE 2102a) OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND OTC

CWC
COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER (SEE PARA 2212a(1))

WARFARE PRINCIPAL WARFARE COMMANDERS

COMMAND
(SEE ARTICLE 2212) ANTISURFACE ANTISUBMARINE ANTI-AIR STRIKE INFORMATION
WARFARE WARFARE WARFARE PWC
WARFARE WARFARE
COMMANDER COMMANDER COMMANDER (SEE PARA 2212a(2))
COMMANDER COMMANDER
(ASUWC) (ASWC) (AAWC) (STWC) (IWC)
SCC, if assigned

FUNCTIONAL COMMANDERS
ASSIGNED FUNCTIONAL
TACTICAL MARITIME
UNDERWAY SCREEN MAIN COMMANDERS
DECEPTION INTERDICTION
CONTROL REPLENISHMENT COMMANDER BODY
(SEE PARA 2212h)
GROUP OPERATIONS (MIO)
(SEE ARTICLE 2117) GROUP (URG) (SC) GROUP
COMMANDER

ASSIGNED
COORDINATION COORDINATORS COORDINATORS
FUNCTION FADIZ Local (SEE PARA 2212d)
AC SOCA NMWC CMSC LAC EWC AREC HEC
(SEE PARA 2102c) C WC

ASSIGNED
CONTROL CONTROLLERS
FUNCTION
CONTROLLERS (SEE ARTICLE 2212g)
(SEE ARTICLE 2102d)
(SEE TABLE D OF ATP 1, VOL II FOR COMPLETE LIST)

Note: When the level of activity and complexity in the multiple mission areas involved are manageable, the tasks of ASWC and ASUWC can be
combined into one commander, titled the sea combat commander (SCC). In this situation there would be four warfare commanders instead of five.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 2-2. (NU) Levels of Command and Control Within the Officer in Tactical
Command’s Warfare Organization

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JFMCC
(OTC)

CTF CTF
CTF COMCARSTRKGRU COMSUBGRU
MARPAT/ISR (CWC) (SOCA)

CTG CTG CTG CTG CTG

COM DDG COMASGRU COM CG COMCARAIRWING
(ASUWC) (ASWC) (AAWC) (STWC) (IWC)

CTU
CV/CVN CTU CTU CTU
(AREC) EWC NMWC FPC

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 2-3. (NU) Example of Warfare Command and Coordination Incorporated in a Task Organization

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 2-4. (NU) Example of Assigned Command and Coordinated Functions in a Force Using a
Composite Warfare Commander

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Table 2-2. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions (Sheet 1 of 3)

NO. RESPONSIBILITIES
OTC’S RESPONSIBILITIES
(which cannot be delegated)
101 (NU) Promulgating policies and plans to accomplish the mission set forth by higher
authority, providing a description of his intentions to his subordinate commanders.
102 (NU) Directing and monitoring operations.
103 (NU) Establishing command, control and communications policy, promulgating warfare
command assignments, and establishing the force task organization if not already
established by higher authority.
104 (NU) Establishing the degree of authority delegated, specifying command functions
assigned to each PWC and SCC (if assigned).
105 (NU) Establishing and (with the assistance of appropriate warfare commanders and
coordinators) promulgating policies for force:
(a) (NU) Picture compilation plan.
(b) (NU) Electronic and acoustic emission, including EMCON and emission security
(EMSEC).
(c) (NU) Radar frequency plans.
(d) (NU) Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC).
(e) (NU) Force protection planning.
(f) (NU) Formulate and promulgate IRC plans.
(g) (NU) Formulate guidance for decoy/jamming operations.
(h) (NU) Formulate and promulgate the force EW guidance (to include ES, EP, and EA).
106 (NU) Promulgating a force communications plan (COMPLAN) (with the assistance of
appropriate warfare commanders and coordinators), including alternate plans, designating
circuits and frequencies and establishing guard requirements and circuit priorities.
107 (NU) During periods of tension, requesting the ROE appropriate to his mission from
higher authority.
108 (NC) (NMP) Formulating and promulgating plans for power projection and operations
against land targets in conjunction with appropriate commanders.
109 (NU) Planning and coordinating logistics requirements.
110 (NU) Responsibilities specific to convoy operations as given in Table 2-12.
111 (NC) (NMP) Designating a SOCA to coordinate with the SUBOPAUTH and assigned
submarines.
112 (NC) (NMP) Providing for submarine tactical communication requirements in the overall
communications plan (OPTASK COMMS). Ensuring all aircraft and surface ship circuit
operators are aware of GUERRILLA procedures.
113 (NC) (NMP) When appropriate, ensuring that a SEC (or SAT if additional personnel are
required) is available to commanders serving as SOCA.
114 (NC) (NMP) Specifying procedures for consolidation of SOCA responsibilities when
joining task groups with each having submarines assigned.
115 (NC) (NMP) When delegated by the SUBOPAUTH, assuming TACOM of designated
submarines.
116 (NU) Ordering security alert states.
117 (NU) Establishing the force protection level.
118 to 119 (NU) SPARE
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Table 2-2. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions (Sheet 2 of 3)

NO. FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to a warfare commander/coordinator.
120 (NU) Promulgating the policy for operational/tactical deception.
121 (NU) Formulating and promulgating the policy for planned responses.
122 (NC) (NMP) Promulgating the policy for and, when authorized, directing the employment of
nuclear weapons.

123 (NU) Formulating and promulgating general safety policy for assigned units, including policy
for aircraft/units joining the force.

124 (NU) Providing air, surface, and subsurface units as available to appropriate PWCs,
coordinating their respective efforts and, when necessary, resolving conflicting
requirements.
125 (NU) Requesting assignments of such external assets as may be required.
126 (NU) Designating position and intended movement (PIM), disposition and force surveillance
areas, and manoeuvring the force.
127 (NU) With other appropriate commanders, arranging for coordination of air, surface, and
subsurface surveillance with other friendly forces operating within or adjacent to the force
surveillance area.

128 (NU) Specifying desired search efforts outside the established force surveillance area,
requesting additional assets as necessary.
129 (NU) Specifying reference systems for air/surface/submarine contact reporting.

130 (NU) From all information available obtained from external sources and/or PWCs, resolving
any existing conflict, and constructing, displaying, and passing to the force a composite
picture of the tactical situation.
131 (NU) Evaluating information to establish probability areas/sectors for air, surface, and
subsurface threats.
132 (NU) Ordering degrees of readiness.
133 (NU) Informing SUBOPAUTH of task force/group intentions and movements.

134 (NC) (NMP) Requesting support submarines as required. (Not applicable if submarines are
permanently assigned to the task group.)
135 (NC) (NMP) Coordinating submarine and task force/group WSM requirements with
SUBOPAUTH.

136 (NC) (NMP) Providing SUBOPAUTH long-term submarine employment requirements and
coordinating information.
137 (NC) (NMP) Promulgating communications procedures and protocols required for
submarine operations applicable to the specific scenario. (See ATP-18.)
138 (NC) (NMP) Promulgating or otherwise ensuring all elements of the force, including
nonorganic support units, have the effective SUBOPAUTH and, as applicable, task group
submarine area (TGSA), WSM allocation and status message for the area in which they are
operating.
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Table 2-2. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions (Sheet 3 of 3)

NO. FUNCTIONS
139 (NC) (NMP) Providing assigned submarines with tailored intelligence support by force
summary message by tactical communications or via the SUBOPAUTH for relay on the
submarine broadcast.
140 (NC) (NMP) As required, exchanging on-scene tactical coordination and intelligence
information with assigned submarines. Maintaining an updated force SITREP for
immediate relay on tactical circuits.
141 (NC) (NMP) Acting as or designating the submarine-generated search area (SGSA)
coordinating authority. (See Article 6462.)

142 (NC) (NMP) Overseeing on-scene operations to ensure submarine safety from attack by
friendly forces. (See Article 6434.)

143 (NC) (NMP) When delegated by the SUBOPAUTH, assuming tactical control (TACON)
of designated submarines.
144 (NC) (NMP) When authorized by the SUBOPAUTH, assume local WSM and PMI
responsibilities for designated task group submarines. Promulgate a WSM allocation
and status message, applicable to the TGSA (see ATP-18).
145 (NC) (NMP) Maritime data link manager/interface control officer (MICO)

146 to 199 (NU) SPARE

NOTE
(NU) Standby OTC will be prepared to assume the duties of the OTC.

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Table 2-3. (NU) OTC’s Functions in AAW (Sheet 1 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.
220 (NU) Formulating and promulgating general AAW plans and, when necessary, specific
guidance to the force.
221 (NU) Promulgating EW policy as it affects AAW.
222 (NU) Formulating and promulgating policy on planned responses in AAW.
223 (NU) Ordering AAW degrees of readiness.
224 (NU) Stating requirements for nonorganic air support for AAW and forwarding related
requests. This may include requirements for wider AAW-related tasks (e.g., offensive
counter-air operations in support of AAW) as an input to the joint coordination board
through a maritime liaison element.
225 (NU) Designating the AAWC and standby AAWC. Where a joint air defence commander
(ADC) has been established, this function will be coordinated with the ADC.
226 (NU) Establishing and promulgating the air surveillance area. Where a joint airspace
control authority (ACA) has been established, this function will be coordinated with that
authority.
227 (NU) Assigning air and surface AAW units to AAWC for detection/localization/
identification (ID)/recognition and reporting air contacts.
228 (NU) Designating task groups/task unit (TU)/units that will be allocated to individual
coordinated air/sea procedures (CASP) categories.
229 (NU) Nominating regional air defence commanders (RADC) when directed by the ADC.
230 (NU) Liaising with the joint ACA regarding airspace management procedures and
forwarding related airspace management requests.
231 to 239 (NU) SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the AAWC but
may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
240 (NU) Developing and implementing the air surveillance and defence plan.
241 (NU) Dividing the AAW area into sectors, if required.
242 (NU) Designating sector AAWCs (SAAWCs) and/or local anti-air warfare coordinators
(LAAWCs) as required, inner defence zone coordinator (IDZC), and outer defence zone
coordinator (ODZC).
243 (NU) Designating force track coordinator air (FTC-A).
244 (NU) Designating link management units.
245 (NU) Establishing the requirements for shipborne/organic AAW air support and
forwarding requests to AREC/HEC.
246 (NU) Assigning stations sectors and/or patrolling areas and designating control units
(AEWCU or CAPCU) for AAW aircraft, keeping AC informed.
247 (NU) Establishing and promulgating the identification safety range (ISR) and safety
sectors for all friendly aircraft and any special areas or zones established for aircraft
safety and identification or to prevent mutual interference, in coordination with AC.
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Table 2-3. (NU) OTC’s Functions in AAW (Sheet 2 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS
248 (NU) Establishing joining control procedures for AAW aircraft, keeping the AC informed.
249 (NU) Promulgating ID criteria, required recognition levels, and required recognition
confidence levels.
250 (NU) Issuing criteria for weapon release and expenditure (a matrix if applicable).
251 (NC) (NMP) Establishing ZIPPO plan and defining ZIPPO area if other than a radius of 20 nm.
252 (NU) Exercising tactical control, including stationing and manoeuvring of assigned
surface AAW units in accordance with the OTC’s policies and plans.
253 (NU) Coordinating and controlling air surveillance.
254 (NU) Coordinating and controlling use of all force sensors in AAW.
255 (NU) Designating and disseminating (as appropriate) all reported contacts and using all
available information to maintain a complete air plot of the surveillance area.
256 (NU) Coordinating movements of friendly aircraft with the air surveillance area, in
cooperation with the AC.
257 (NU) Issuing periodic AAW SITREPs (when required by the tactical situation) and other
reports, including situation summaries (SITSUMs) and daily AAWC intentions message.
258 (NU) Controlling AAW nets, especially with respect to procedural integrity and security in
reporting communications security (COMSEC). The AAWC may in turn assign some of
this responsibility to sector AAWCs and/or FTC-A.
259 (NU) Coordinating with land-based air defence authorities.
260 (NU) Issuing threat warnings (air).
261 (NU) Issuing weapon restriction orders.
262 (NU) Coordinating and controlling employment of all force anti-air weapons and
resolving conflicts between tactical use of weapons and demands of aircraft safety.
263 (NU) Coordinating and ordering the launching and stationing of alert AAW aircraft.
264 (NU) Directing the employment of force CHAFF resources for AAW.
265 (NU) Exercising command by veto over all AAW actions, initiated by other units of the
force.
266 (NC) (NMP) Exercising control over antiship missile defence (ASMD) by:
(a) Ordering any ZIPPO restrictions.
(b) Controlling ZIPPOs, force manoeuvre if required.
(c) Relaying relevant ZIPPOs to other commands’ groups.
267 (NU) Providing assets as available to assist other commanders in prosecution of the
threat.
268 (NU) Designating FADIZ C and force marshaller.
269 to 299 (NU) SPARE
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Table 2-4. (NU) OTC’s Functions in Strike Warfare

NO. FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.
320 Formulate and promulgate general STW plans and, when necessary, specific guidance
to the force.
321 State requirements for nonorganic air support for STW and forwarding of related
requests.
322 Designate STW commander (STWC) and alternate.
323 Assign surface ships and aircraft to STW.
324 Establish tactical intelligence, environmental reconnaissance, and surveillance
requirements to support strike missions in conjunction with organic intelligence support.
325 to 339 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the STWC but
may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
340 Establish the requirement for organic STW air support and forward requests to AREC/
HEC.
341 Issue criteria for weapon release and expenditure (a matrix if possible).
342 Coordinate and control the employment of all STW weapons.
343 Establish joining and control procedures for STW aircraft; keep the AAWC and ACA
informed in accordance with the AAWC’s directives.
344 Submit timely and accurate mission reports.
345 Assist CWC formulation of general STW plans and, when necessary, specific guidance
to the force.
346 Identify requirements for nonorganic STW air support to CWC.
347 Recommend an alternate STWC to CWC.
348 Request assignment of ships, submarines, and aircraft from CWC.
349 Assist CWC establishment of tactical intelligence, environmental reconnaissance,
and surveillance requirements to support strike missions in conjunction with organic
intelligence support.
350 to 399 SPARE
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Table 2-5. (NU) OTC’s Functions in ASUW (Sheet 1 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.
420 Formulating and promulgating ASUW plans and, when necessary, specific guidance to
the force.
421 Promulgating EW policy as it affects ASUW.
422 Formulating and promulgating policy for planned responses in ASUW.
423 Ordering ASUW degrees of readiness.
424 Stating requirements for nonorganic air support for ASUW, forwarding related requests.
425 Designating the ASUWC and standby ASUWC.
426 Establishing and promulgating the surface surveillance area.
427 Assigning units to ASUWC for detection/localization/ID/recognition and reporting
surface contacts.
428 to 439 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the ASUWC but
may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
440 Developing and implementing the surface surveillance plan.
441 Dividing the ASUW area into sectors, if required.
442 Designating sector ASUWCs (SASUWCs).
443 Designating a force track coordinator surface (FTC-S).
444 Establishing the requirement for organic ASUW air support and forwarding requests to
AREC/HEC.
445 Assigning sectors and/or patrol areas and designating control units for ASUW aircraft,
keeping AC informed.
446 In accordance with the AAWC’s directives (see Function 247), establishing joining and
control procedures for ASUW aircraft, keeping the AAWC and AC informed.
447 Promulgating ID criteria, required recognition levels, and required recognition
confidence levels.
448 Issuing criteria for weapon release and expenditure (a matrix if applicable).
449 Exercising tactical control, including stationing and manoeuvring of assigned surface
ASUW units, in accordance with the OTC’s policy and plans.
450 Coordinating and controlling surface surveillance.
451 Coordinating and controlling use of all force sensors in ASUW.

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Table 2-5. (NU) OTC’s Functions in ASUW (Sheet 2 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS

452 Designating and disseminating (as appropriate) all reported contacts using all available
information to maintain a complete surface plot of the surveillance area.

453 Issuing periodic ASUW SITREPs (when required by the tactical situation) and other
reports, including SITSUMs.

454 Controlling ASUW nets, especially with respect to procedural integrity and security in
reporting (COMSEC). The ASUWC may in turn assign some of this responsibility to
sector ASUWCs and/or FTC-S.

455 Issuing threat warnings (SURFACE).

456 Coordinating and controlling employment of all force antisurface weapons.

457 Ordering aircraft launched and tasking aircraft attacks to counter hostile surface
contacts (ASUWC establishes aircraft alert requirements, OTC retains alert launch
authorization until specifically delegated).

458 Directing the employment of force CHAFF resources in ASUW.

459 Forming and detaching SAGs and HAGs or, in the event, directing screen commander
in dispatching SAGs/HAGs, liaising with other PWCs as required.

460 Providing assets as available to assist other commanders in prosecution of the threat.

461 Issuing weapon restrictions and orders.

462 to 499 SPARE

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Table 2-6. (NU) OTC’s Functions in ASW (Sheet 1 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS

Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.

520 (NU) Formulating and promulgating ASW plans and, when necessary, specific guidance
to the force.
521 (NU) Formulating and promulgating EW policy as it affects ASW.
522 (NU) Formulating and promulgating acoustic EP.
523 (NU) Formulating and promulgating acoustic deception policy, including the use of
acoustic decoys.
524 (NU) Formulating and promulgating policy on planned responses in ASW.
525 (NU) Ordering ASW degrees of readiness.
526 (NU) Stating requirements for nonorganic air support for ASW and forwarding related
requests.
527 (NU) Designating the ASWC and standby ASWC.
528 (NU) Establishing and promulgating the subsurface surveillance area.
529 (NU) Assigning air, surface, and subsurface ASW units to ASWC for detection/
localization/ID/recognition and reporting subsurface contacts.
530 (NC) (NMP) Designating the SEC and standby SEC (subject to concurrence of the
SUBOPAUTH).
531 to 539 (NU) SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the ASWC but
may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
540 (NU) Developing and implementing the subsurface surveillance plan.
541 (NU) Dividing the ASW area into sectors, if required.
542 (NU) Designating sector ASWCs (SASWCs) and local antisubmarine warfare
coordinators (LASWCs), as required.
543 (NU) Designating a force track coordinator subsurface (FTC-SS).
544 (NU) Implementing the acoustic part of the EMCON plan.
545 (NU) Establishing the requirements for organic ASW air support and forwarding
requests to AREC/HEC.
546 (NU) Assigning sectors and/or patrol areas and designating control units for ASW
aircraft, keeping the AAWC and the AC informed.
547 (NU) In accordance with AAWC direction (see Function 247), establishing joining and
control procedures for ASW aircraft, keeping the AAWC and AC informed.
548 (NU) Promulgating ID criteria, required recognition levels, and required recognition
confidence levels.
549 (NU) Issuing criteria for weapon release and expenditure (a matrix if applicable).
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Table 2-6. (NU) OTC’s Functions in ASW (Sheet 2 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS
550 (NU) In accordance with OTC/CWC directives (see Function 423), ordering
measures to evade submarines, including tactical torpedo countermeasures (TCMs)
(consequential manoeuvring will normally be ordered by the screen commander).
551 (NU) Issuing specific instructions to all friendly units to prevent mutual interference
between submarines in support, towed array surface ships, and all other friendly units.
552 (NU) Exercising tactical control, including stationing and manoeuvring of assigned
surface ASW units, subsurface ASW units (for submarines conducting direct support or
integrated operations), and aircraft whose primary mission is ASW.
553 (NU) Coordinating and controlling subsurface surveillance.
554 (NU) Coordinating and controlling employment of all force ASW weapons and sensors,
(NC) (NMP) taking into account the daily WSM message.
555 (NU) Evaluating information and promulgating classification in the force when more
than one ASW unit is reporting and classifying a contact.
556 (NU) Designating and disseminating (as appropriate) all reported contacts and using all
available information to maintain a complete subsurface plot of the surveillance area.
557 (NC) (NMP) When submarines are assigned in support, maintaining a plot of the
location and movement of friendly submarine havens, WSM areas, transit lanes,
and NOTACK areas, which may affect force operations in order to prevent mutual
interference.
558 (NU) Issuing periodic ASW SITREPs (when required by the tactical situation) and other
reports, including SITSUMs.
559 (NU) Controlling ASW nets especially with respect to procedural integrity and security
in reporting (COMSEC). The ASWC may in turn assign some of these functions to
SASWCs and/or FTC-SS.
560 (NU) Issuing threat warnings (SUBSURFACE).
561 (NC) (NMP) When designated as the SGSA coordinating authority by the OTC,
positively controlling ASW weapon release within the joint action area (JAA) in order to
prevent blue-on-blue engagements (see Function 141).
562 (NU) Ordering the launch and employment of alert aircraft to counter the submarine
threat.
563 (NU) Coordinating contact prosecution, including coordination with the SC
564 (NU) Forming and detaching SAUs, or, in the event, directing the screen commander to
dispatch SAUs, liaising with other PWCs, as required.
565 (NU) Providing assets as available to assist other commanders in prosecution of the
threat.
566 (NC) (NMP) Assigning acoustic warfare support measures (AWSM) duties and AWSM
guards as appropriate.
567 (NU) Directing employment of force decoys according to the policy formulated by the
OTC/CWC.
568 (NU) Promulgating plans to conduct acoustic deception in accordance with the policy
formulated by the OTC/CWC.
569 to 599 (NU) SPARE
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Table 2-7. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in IW (Sheet 1 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS
600 Formulate and promulgate, with the advice from the IWC, the force EW guidance (to
include ES, EP, and EA).
601 Formulate and promulgate, with the advice from the IWC, IRC plans (to include
OPSEC).
602 Formulate guidance, with the advice from the IWC, for decoy/jamming operations.
603 Formulate, with the advice from the IWC, the IW aspects of anti-intruder guidance, in
peacetime or tension periods.
604 Designate the IWC and, with the advice from the IWC, alternate IWC.
605 Order, with the advice from the IWC, EMCON plan in force and changes in response to
the tactical situation.
606 Establish, with the advice from the IWC, COMSEC monitoring plan and designate on
each net a warfare commander, coordinator, or unit COMSEC monitor.
607 to 610 SPARE
Functions normally delegated to the IWC but may be retained by the OTC/CWC:
611 Formulating and promulgation of the OPTASK COMMS
612 Assist OTC or CWC in force planning and integration.
613 Recommend force plans to OTC or CWC to meet JFC/JFMCC objectives.
614 Assist OTC or CWC in ensuring force reflects numbered fleet/JFMCC/JFC
communication synchronization and tasks and objectives.
615 Assist OTC or CWC in force DCO to include planning, integration, monitoring, and
protecting information systems against both internal and external threats.
616 Assisting OTC or CWC in force IW planning and integration.
617 Assisting OTC or CWC in force EW planning and integration.
618 Coordinating and controlling force ES assets and disseminating ES information within
the force.
619 Coordinating and controlling force EA assets. Stating requirements for nonorganic air
assets for Naval Strikes and forwarding request to the OTC.
620 Recommending force information operations condition and Rivercity profile to OTC or
CWC.
621 Assisting OTC or CWC in force OPSEC planning and integration.
622 Recommending force force deception plans to OTC or CWC
623 Promulgate plans to conduct electronic deception according to the policy formulated by
the OTC or CWC.
624 Recommending force PSYOP plans to OTC or CWC.
625 Assisting OTC or CWC in ensuring force reflects numbered fleet/JFMCC/JFC strategic
communications and maritime influence goals.
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Table 2-7. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in IW (Sheet 2 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS
626 Liaising with other warfare commanders to ensure IW is effectively integrated into daily
operations.
627 Recommending IW PPRs to the OTC or CWC.
628 Recommending alternate IWC to CWC.
629 Recommending the force EMCON policy to OTC, including in responding to changes
in the tactical situation. This includes coordinating with ASWC to manage acoustic
emissions.
630 Assisting OTC or CWC to establish a COMSEC monitoring plan.
631 Formulating and promulgating, as radio/radio footprint management, the force afloat
electromagnetic spectrum operations program.
632 Coordinating with ACA, AREC, and HEC for support aircraft.
633 With Cryptological Resource Coordinator (CRC), coordinating and directing
employment of ES and cryptologic sensor equipment in support of force tactical
intelligence requirements.
634 Directing the employment of force deception resources.
635 Developing, coordinating, and practicing preplanned responses for countersurveillance,
counterinfluence, and countertargeting.
636 Integrating real time ES contact reports with indications and warnings to recommend
force defensive measures and readiness conditions to OTC or CWC.
637 Monitoring force actions to ensure they remain aligned with previously directed
strategic communications policy and objectives.
638 Integrate indications and warning and special communications for BMD with the BMDC.
639 Assist OTC or CWC with nonlethal fires into the targeting cycle.
640 Assist the Strike Warfare Commander with the required intelligence to support ingress/
egress and within the target area.
641 Assisting OTC or CWC in force cyber operations to include planning, integration,
monitoring, and protecting information systems against both internal and external
threats.
642 Assisting OTC or CWC in Tactical Datalink (TDL) management.
643 OTC/IWC (if designated) develop and release OPTASK COMMS, OPTASK METOC,
and OPTASK INTEL.
644 to 659 SPARE
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Table 2-8. (NU) OTC’s Functions in Screening Operations

NO. FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to a CWC or functional commander.
720 Designating the screen commander(s) (SCs) (in a small force he may also be the
ASWC) and the standby SC.
721 Assigning to the SCs units to be employed in the inner screen(s).
722 Establishing the area in which the SC(s) accomplish(es) assigned duties.
723 to 739 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the screen
commander(s) but may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
740 In accordance with guidance provided by the OTC and/or PWCs, establishing the type
of inner screen best suited to the existing environmental conditions, forces assigned,
and other factors.
741 Arranging inner screen design with the PWCs if separate from SC, to ensure
compatibility with the overall employment.
742 Acting as LASWC for inner screen.
743 Assigning necessary subsidiary duties to units assigned (plane guard,
bathythermograph guard ships).
744 Stationing and employing ASW aircraft within the AOR and designating control units,
keeping the AAWC and the AC informed.
745 Ordering TCMs for use by units assigned in accordance with direction from ASWC.
746 Promulgating actions to be taken when submarine/surface contact is gained by a
screen unit within the AOR.
747 Promulgating the screen and screening stations to units assigned.
748 Exercising tactical control, including stationing and manoeuvring, of units assigned
within the AOR.
749 Coordinating contact prosecution in conjunction with the ASWC.
750 Dispatching SAUs when directed by OTC/ASWC and SAGs/HAGs when directed by
OTC/ASUWC and adjusting the screen accordingly.
751 to 799 SPARE
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Table 2-9. (NU) OTC’s Functions in Air Coordination

NO. FUNCTIONS
Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.
820 Promulgating air coordination policy.
821 Establishing (when this is not established by civil control authorities) and promulgating
aircraft separation and aircraft coordination procedures in the force air coordination area
(FACA).
822 Designating the AC and standby AC.
823 Establishing and promulgating within the force and to relevant outside authorities the
dimensions and location of FACA.
824 to 839 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the air coordinator but
may be retained by the OTC.
840 Designating aircraft control units (ACUs) for aircraft not assigned to warfare
commanders/coordinators in liaison with the AREC and HEC.
841 Supporting the AAWC in establishing airspace coordination measures, such as special
areas or zones for aircraft safety, ID, or prevention of mutual interference.
842 Supporting PWCs in establishing joining and control procedures for aircraft, if required.
843 Ensuring safe coordination of all aircraft when they are under task force (TF)/TG units’
tactical control.
844 Coordinating air traffic, controlling, and monitoring aircraft movements within the FACA
ensuring altitude separation and traffic control, keeping AAWC and ACUs involved
informed. (Conducted by FADIZ C when activated.)
845 Coordinating and monitoring tactical employment of all force aircraft.
846 Ensuring that available weather information, including the altimeter pressure setting in
millibars and inches, is promulgated within the FACA.
847 Support the AAWC in coordinating and reporting the movement of friendly aircraft.
(Conducted by FADIZ C when activated.)
848 Monitoring aircraft safety and coordination nets in conjunction with the ACU. (Conducted
by FADIZ C when activated.)
849 Maintaining up-to-date information on all national and international airspace information
and reservations that are likely to affect the force, ensuring adequate clearance and
non-violation by the force.
850 Promulgating restrictions on flying operations due to meteorological conditions, keeping
the OTC/PWCs informed.
851 Supporting the AAWC in resolving conflicts between tactical use of weapons and
demands of aircraft safety. (Conducted by FADIZ C when activated.)
852 Establishing the local air coordination areas (LACAS)
852 to 899 SPARE
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Table 2-10. (NU) OTC’s Functions in Air Resource Coordination

NO. FUNCTIONS

Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.

920 Formulating and promulgating general employment policy for air resources.
921 Designating the AREC and HEC.
922 to 939 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the AREC/HEC,
as appropriate, but may be retained by the OTC.
940 Supplying and apportioning air assets in response to warfare commander’s
requirements, informing them of assets assigned to their tasking.
941 Tasking organic aircraft assigned to warfare commanders/coordinators.
942 Designating ACUs for aircraft not assigned to warfare commanders/coordinators in
liaison with the AC.
943 Passing orders and information to aircraft under his control to enable assigned tasks
to be carried out. (Could be conducted by FADIZ C.)
944 Informing warfare commanders/coordinators of results obtained by air assets
assigned to their tasking. (Could be conducted by FADIZ C.)
945 Sending aircraft availability reports. (Could be conducted by FADIZ C.)
946 Promulgating and updating flight schedules and aircraft readiness.
947 Planning and executing war-at-sea air operations when so directed by the ASUWC or
OTC and power projection air operations.
948 Controlling aircraft operating against land targets (the controlling functions may be
delegated to an ACU or FAC).
949 to 999 SPARE
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Table 2-11. (NU) OTC’s Functions in Electronic and Acoustic Warfare (Sheet 1 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS

Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.

1020 Formulating and promulgating the force EAW policy.
1021 Formulating and promulgating the EW aspects of deception policy.
1022 Formulating policy for decoy/jamming operations.
1023 In peacetime or tension periods, formulating the EW aspects of anti-intruder policy.
1024 Designating the EWC and standby EWC.
1025 Ordering EMCON plan in force and changes in response to the tactical situation.
1026 Establishing COMSEC monitoring plan and designating on each net a PWC,
coordinator, or unit COMSEC monitor (e.g., AAWC is COMSEC monitor on AAWC net).
1027 to SPARE
1039
The following functions are normally delegated to the EWC but
may be retained by the OTC/CWC or IWC.
1040 Formulating and promulgating force EMC plan/radar frequency (RADFREQ) plan.
1041 Assigning electric warfare support measures (ESM) duties and ESM guards as
appropriate.
1042 In accordance with the OTC’s direction and guidance from the IWC, formulating and
promulgating force EMCON plans.
1043 Establishing tactical cryptologic information requirements and means of dissemination.
1044 Allocating, disposing, and tasking ESM, ECM, and EPM resources to ensure that threat
and target emissions are covered.
1045 Issuing the list of threat and target emitters and electronic order of battle (EOB).
1046 Tasking available units, including ESM- and ECM-capable aircraft, to detect and report
emitter contacts (EWC establishes alert requirements; OTC retains alert reaction
authorization until specifically delegated).
1047 SPARE
1048 Coordinating employment of ESM and cryptologic sensor equipment in support of the
OTC’s and warfare commanders’ tactical intelligence requirements.
1049 Collecting, evaluating, and classifying ESM and reporting evaluated information gained
to the OTC and appropriate warfare commanders (to include bearings from jammed
radars when appropriate).
1050 Issuing EW SITREPs and SITSUMs as directed by the IWC in conjunction with the
warfare commanders.
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Table 2-11. (NU) OTC’s Functions in Electronic and Acoustic Warfare (Sheet 2 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS

1051 Controlling and monitoring EW nets and force EMC plan/RADFREQ plan and ensuring
compliance with the EMCON plan and ELSEC policy. (ASWC monitors acoustic
portions of EMCON plan.)

1052 Directing employment of force decoy and CHAFF resources in conjunction with the
warfare commanders.

1053 Exercising control of EW reactions to a threat, including planned responses.

1054 Allocating force racket numbers.

1055 Coordinating employment of active jamming and electronic neutralization devices

according to the policy formulated by the OTC/CWC.

1056 Promulgating plans to conduct electronic deception according to the policy formulated
by the OTC/CWC.

1057 to SPARE
1099
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Table 2-12. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Convoy Operations

NO. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

OTC’s RESPONSIBILITIES
(which cannot be delegated)
1101 (NU) Formulate and promulgate policy for the defence of the convoy against all
threats.

1102 (NU) Establish close liaison with the convoy commodore for safe navigation of the
convoy and instruct him to order emergency turns.

1103 (NU) When required, designate appropriate warfare and functional commanders,
including screen commander(s).

1104 (NU) Detail the EP for both escorts and convoy.

1105 to 1139 (NU) SPARE

Functions which may be delegated to appropriate commanders.

1140 (NU) Advising the convoy commodore and the OIC shipping cooperation point (SCP)
of the optimum convoy disposition.

1141 (NU) Stationing of escorts and establishing intership spacing within the convoy.

1142 (NU) Establishing and controlling communications.

1143 (NU) Ordering evasive alterations of course.

1144 (NU) Keeping the NCAGS commander informed (EP permitting) of:
(a) (NU) Convoy’s position, course, and speed.
(b) (NU) Estimated time of arrival (ETA) at designated point.
(NC) (NMP) (normally point Xray.)
(c) (NU) Inability to adhere to route, comply with diversion, or reach a rendezvous
within 1 hour of the appointed time.
(d) (NU) Intended rendezvous and route when the convoy is scattered.
(e) (NU) Time of detaching sections from the convoy, and whether they are escorted.
(f) (NU) Names of escorts and merchant ships assigned to the convoy but not
present on sailing.
(g) (NU) Failure of escorts to meet the convoy within 8 hours of the appointed time.
(h) (NU) Names of escorts detached if they are not expected to rendezvous within
24 hours.
(i) (NU) Enemy reports.
(j) (NU) Intercepts of D/F bearings of enemy emissions that provide the first indication
of an enemy’s presence.
(k) (NU) Requests for replenishment within a rendezvous.
(l) (NU) Ships sunk or damaged and aircraft lost.
(m) (NU) Operational defects suffered by ships when advance knowledge will
materially assist shore authorities.
(n) (NU) Weather conditions.

1145 to 1199 (NU) SPARE

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Table 2-13. (NU) OTC’s Functions in Departure and Entry Operations

NO. FUNCTIONS

Functions which may be delegated to the CWC or a warfare commander.

1240 (NU) Promulgating departure or entry operation plan, ordering the time the plan
is to be executed, and specifying whether a departure or entry screen is to be
formed.

1241 (NU) For operations:

(a) (NU) Ordering the time that the initial search is to commence.
(b) (NU) Promulgating zero hour to the force and local authorities.
(c) (NC) (NMP) Promulgating points Alfa and Xray, if not already done by local
authority. For departure operations, ordering the time the first ship of the main body
is to pass through point Xray.
(d) (NC) (NMP) Promulgating the position of point Oscar.
(e) (NC) (NMP) Ordering the time the first ship of the main body or the Guide is to
pass through point Oscar.
(f) (NC) (NMP) Promulgating the position of point Yankee, when applicable.
(g) (NC) (NMP) Ordering the time that a specific unit or formation will pass point
Yankee.

1242 (NU) Informing the force of the support by shore-based forces.

1243 (NU) Allocating forces for the initial search on departure operations.

1244 (NU) Informing the screen commander of the cruising formation to be formed and
the type of screen required on passing a designated point.
(NC) (NMP) (normally point Oscar.)

1245 (NU) Defining the area to be searched during the initial search and establishing, if
required, the grid reference position.

1246 to 1299 (NU) SPARE

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Table 2-14. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Mine Warfare

NO. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

OTC’s RESPONSIBILITIES
(which cannot be delegated)
1320 Formulate and promulgate the force NMW policy.

1321 Where appropriate designate the force NMWC.

1322 to 1339 SPARE

Functions which may be delegated to NMW commanders/NMW coordinators.

MCM FUNCTIONS

1340 Acting as tasking authority IAW ATP-06 for NMCM forces assigned to the OTC.

1341 Coordinating the efforts of supporting NMCM forces.

1342 Coordinating with appropriate commanders for response to enemy mining.

1343 Coordinating with appropriate commanders for the execution of NMCM plans.

1344 Requesting appropriate subarea commander to issue subarea navigation warnings

resulting from NMCM operations.

1345 to 1369 SPARE

MINING FUNCTIONS

1370 Coordinating the laying of minefields in support of the force.

1371 Planning and conducting tactical mining operations by assigned forces against
targets of opportunity.

1372 Coordinating with appropriate commanders for the laying of tactical minefields.

1373 Coordinating with appropriate commanders for the execution of mining plans.

1374 Requesting appropriate area commander to issue subarea navigation warnings for
minefields.

1375 to 1399 SPARE

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-15. (NU) OTC’s Functions in MIO (Sheet 1 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS

Functions which may be delegated to a CWC.

1420 Formulating and promulgating general MIO plans and, when necessary, specific
guidance to the force.

1421 Formulating and promulgating EP as it affects MIO.

1422 Formulating and promulgating policy for planned responses in MIO.

1423 Ordering MIO degrees of readiness.

1424 Stating requirements for nonorganic air support for MIO and forwarding requests.

1425 Designating MIOC and alternate.

1426 Establishing and promulgating the MIO area of operations.

1427 Assigning units to MIO for detection/localization/ID/recognition and reporting surface

contacts.

1428 Establishing tactical intelligence, environmental reconnaissance, and surveillance

requirements to support MIO in conjunction with organic intelligence support.

1429 to 1439 SPARE

The following functions are normally delegated to the MIO commander but
may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
1440 Developing and implementing the MIO surveillance plan.

1441 Dividing the MIO area into sectors, if required.

1442 Designating sector MIOCs and on-scene commanders, as required.

1443 Maintaining an accurate database of vessels previously challenged and/or boarded

and disseminating that information to MIO forces.

1444 Establishing the requirement for organic air support and forwarding requests to
AREC/HEC.

1445 Assigning sectors and/or patrol areas and designating control units for aircraft,
keeping AAWC and AC informed.

1446 In accordance with the AAWC’s directives (see Function 247), establishing joining
and control procedures for MIO aircraft, keeping the AAWC and AC informed.

1447 Identifying suspect vessels and prioritising targets for query and possible visit, board,
search, and seizure (VBSS).

1448 Authorizing boardings and assigning the on-scene commander, and boarding and
assisting ships as required.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-15. (NU) OTC’s Functions in MIO (Sheet 2 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS
1449 Directing diversion of suspect vessels and assigning escort vessels.
1450 Issuing criteria for levels of force to be employed (a matrix if applicable).
1451 Determining when tracking and monitoring of a suspect vessel is no longer required.
1452 Exercising TACON, including stationing and manoeuvring of assigned surface MIO units, in
accordance with the OTC’s policy and plans.
1453 Coordinating and controlling MIO surveillance.
1454 Coordinating and controlling use of all force sensors in MIO.
1455 Designating and disseminating (as appropriate) all reported contacts using all available
information to maintain a complete surface plot of the surveillance area.
1456 Issuing periodic MIO SITREPs (when required by the tactical situation) and other reports,
including SITSUMs.
1457 Controlling MIO nets, especially with respect to procedural integrity and security in
reporting (COMSEC). The MIOC may in turn assign some of this responsibility to a sector
MIOC.
1458 Developing an MIO COMPLAN to include assigning units VHF working channels and night
signal colours to be used for suspect vessel interrogation, to prevent mutual interference.
1459 Ordering allocated aircraft launched and tasking aircraft employment against suspect
vessels.
1460 Providing assets as available to assist other commanders in the prosecution of threats to
the MIO force and other friendly forces.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-16. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Force

Protection in Harbour (Sheet 1 of 2)

NO. RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

OTC’S RESPONSIBILITIES
(Which cannot be delegated)
1520 Establish the degree of authority delegated, specifying command functions assigned
to the force protection coordinator (FPC).
1521 Disseminate relevant available intelligence and indications and warnings through
INTSUMs.
1522 Assigning air and surface units to the FPC for conducting force protection (FP)
operations.
1523 to 1539 SPARE
Functions which may be delegated to the CWC.
1540 Formulating and promulgating general FP plans, and, when necessary, specific
guidance to the force.
1541 Developing and implementing the force tasking regarding FP through a dedicated
structured/formatted message designated OPERATIONAL TASKING FORCE
PROTECTION IN HARBOUR (acronym OPTASK FP HARBOUR)
1542 Designating the FPC.
1543 Promulgating EW policy as it affects FP.
1544 Formulating and promulgating policies on pre-planned responses in FP.
1545 Issuing criteria for weapon release and expenditure.
1546 Ordering FP levels.
1547 Stating requirements for non-organic air support for FP operations forwarding related
requests.
1548 Establishing and promulgating the surveillance area, warning area and escorting area.
1549 to 1559 SPARE
The following functions are normally delegated to the FPC,
but may be retained by the OTC/CWC.
1560 Designating unit to host and establishing the Force Protection Operations Centre
(FPOC).
1561 Establishing the requirement for organic FP air support and forwarding requests to
AREC/HEC.
1562 Assigning sector and/or patrol areas and designating control units for FP aircraft,
keeping the AC informed.
1563 In accordance with the AAWC’s directives, establishing joining and control procedures
for FP aircraft, keeping the AAWC and AC informed.
1564 Establishing, implementing, and cancelling FP pre-planned reactions.
1565 Exercising TACON, including station and manoeuvring of assigned surface FP units in
accordance with OTC’s policies and plans.
1566 Coordinating and controlling FP activities within the escorting area, surveillance area
and warning area.
1567 Coordinating and controlling use of all sensors in FP.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-16. (NU) OTC’s Responsibilities and Functions in Force

Protection in Harbour (Sheet 2 of 2)

NO. FUNCTIONS
1568 Designating and disseminating, as appropriate, all reported contacts and using all
available information to maintain a complete all-environment plot of the surveillance
area.
1569 Issuing periodic FP SITREPs (when required by the tactical situation) and other
reports, including SITSUMs and daily FPC intentions message.
1570 Control dedicated FP nets, especially with respect to procedural integrity and security
in reporting COMSEC.
1571 At the tactical level, issue the threat warning for the force, or unit acting independently
in a designated theatre of operations (TOO).
1572 Ordering aircraft launched and tasking aircraft attacks to counter hostile contacts
(FPC establishes aircraft alert requirements, OTC retains alert launch authorization
until specifically designated).
1573 Direct SC to divert Marine expeditionary unit (MEU)/high-value unit (HVU), liaising
with other PWCs as required.
1574 Providing assets as available to assist other commanders in prosecution of the threat.
1575 to 1599 SPARE
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

2220 Tasking Methods

a. (NU) The OTC and other maritime commanders have at their disposal different means of tasking
the forces under their command. Primary methods of tasking assets are as follows:

(1) (NU) Signal message; see Article 2221.

(2) (NU) Tactical signals (ATP-01, Vol. II—Table D, Duty, with Governing Group BV).

b. (NU) The use of networked systems is becoming more prevalent and e-mail, chat rooms and web
pages are now commonly being used for passing tactical and operational information, reports, and
instructions. The OTC should establish the policy on passing legitimate orders over these networks.

c. (NU) The use of locally produced or free text message should be avoided for the following reasons:

(1) (NU) Understanding loose language in free text message can be open to misinterpretation and
lacks the rigor that has been applied to the layout of formatted messages and may therefore result
in vital information being accidentally omitted.

(2) (NU) Messages with no formatting or locally produced formats cannot be automated, requiring
intervention in all messages, distracting staff from the operational planning and execution of tasks.

2221 NATO Message Text Formats—Purpose and Method of Use

a. (NU) NATO message text consists of standardized messages that are both man- and
machine-readable. The formats of these messages are laid out in the NATO Message Catalogue
(APP-11) and are generally referred to as MTF messages.

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b. (NU) Purpose. MTF messages may be used:

(1) (NU) To convey operational instructions or intentions.

(2) (NU) To pass operational information to tactical commanders at sea.

(3) (NU) To pass operational information between component commanders and subordinate units.

(4) (NU) To report operational information between commanders and from subordinate to higher
formations.

(5) (NU) To notify organizations of impending and actual operations of units engaged in maritime
warfare.

c. (NU) Method of Use. MTF messages are to be used as shown in Table 2-17. Detailed instructions
of the structures and method of completion are contained in APP-11. Some of these messages have not
yet been incorporated into FORMETS and their structures are found in Chapter 6 of APP-11. Relevant
Allied publications should be consulted for direction on content to be included.

d. (NU) Ships and aircraft joining a force should be in receipt of all relevant messages pertaining to
the operation in sufficient time before joining a force, to allow the commander and operational staff to
make sufficient plans and provisions that they can join the force without further orders.

Note. Structured messages that have yet to be incorporated into FORMETS are indicated by italics in
Table 2-17.

2222 Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations

a. (NU) Purpose. Allied tactical air messages consist of standardized message forms and are used
to:

(1) (NU) Convey operational instructions or intentions from commanders to subordinates.

(2) (NU) Pass operational information to tactical commanders at sea.

(3) (NU) Report operational information and intelligence between commanders and from
subordinates to higher authorities.

(4) (NU) Notify air defence organizations of impending and actual movements of aircraft engaged
in maritime operations.

b. (NU) Message Formats. Message formats, with examples, are contained in APP-11.

2223 Tactical Data Link Systems

(NU) Tactical data links can be used by the OTC to make real-time amendments to tactical instructions,
C2 arrangements, and threat warning levels. These systems have an inherent capability for exercising
tactical coordination using contact reporting messages, weapons and platform status messages, and
command messages. Amplifying information can be found in ADatP 11, ADatP 16, ADatP 22, and
ADatP 33.
2224–2229 Spare

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 1 of 12)

GENERAL
MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION
OPGEN Promulgates general OTC Action: All TF/ As required, ensuring
matters of policy, TG units under the that sufficient
instructions and aspects command of the time is given to
common to all forms OTC, cooperating delegated principal
of warfare. Using the and supporting and functional
guidance contained in the forces. commanders to
OPGEN, principal warfare formulate their
Info: OTC of other
commanders, functional plans and issue
forces operating in
commanders and appropriate tasking
close proximity.
coordinators can prepare messages.
Superior authority.
detailed plans and
tasking for promulgating
by OPTASK and other
appropriate messages.

ORBATTOASEA Used to transfer OPCOM/OPCON Action: OPCOM/ As required prior to

operational command OPCON change of OPCOM/
and/or control from one relinquishing and OPCON.
authority to another. assuming command.
Units being
transferred.

STATUS REPORTING
OPSTAT UNIT Informs the OTC, Unit Action: OTC. 1. Before sailing.
other authorities and
Info: All TG units. 2. 48 hours before
cooperating units,
joining a force.
as appropriate, with
operational and detailed 3. On major change
information about the of unit data not
capabilities of a unit. reported in daily
reports.
NAVOPDEF Informs the chain of Unit Action: OTC 1. On initial
command of restrictions discovery of defect.
Info: Second line
on the operational
support units. 2. Major change in
capability of units, the
status of defect.
intentions for repair
and to initiate repair 3. Defect
assistance or advice as rectification.
appropriate.
OPSTAT DEFECT Provide information Unit Action: OTC As required by OTC/
regarding operational national authority.
defects and how they
affect the operational
capabilities of the unit, or
to report changes to this
information.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 2 of 12)

INFO DISSEMINATION
MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION
OPTASK LINK Promulgates detailed tasking OTC/delegated Action: All TF/TG As required.
and instructions regarding TDL manager units with an active
the operation of tactical data or passive tactical
links (TDL). data link capability.
Cooperating and
supporting forces.
Info: OTC of other
forces operating in
close proximity.
Superior authority.
OPTASK COMMS Promulgates the OTC/IWC Action: All TF/TG units As required.
communications plan in under the command of
force related instructions. the OTC, cooperating
and supporting forces.
Info: OTC of other
forces operating in close
proximity. Superior
authority.
OPTASK INTEL Promulgates detailed policy, OTC/IWC Units, supporting As required.
direction and guidance, commanders.
tasking and instructions for
all aspects of intelligence
support including the
implementation of the
CCIRM process.
OPTASK IM Provides dynamic CTG Action: Units As required.
Information Management
Info: Subordinate
(IM) issues pertinent to
Commands
Internet Protocol (IP)
networking in the maritime
environment.
FREQMAN Used to request/allocate CTG commander task force 1. At least 90
frequencies for exercises (CTF) days before
and operations. exercise.
Used to cancel a As original As original Message As required.
message(s) and/or to message
MSGCORRCANX correct the information in
a previously transmitted
message(s).
ROUTCHANG Promulgate changes to the Routing Authority All units As required.
Routing Indicators used by
task organizations, adding
and deleting signal message
addresses (SMAs) and
provide changes to routing
information for existing
SMAs.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 3 of 12)
MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION
ROUTSTAT States the activation and Routing Authority All affected units As required.
deactivation times of high
grade message routes.
TEMPSMA Used to promulgate the Routing Authority All units As required.
activation period of temporary
Signal Message Addresses
(SMA) and related information.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
LOCATOR Reports surface, subsurface, Unit Action: OTC, PWC. As required.
air, mines, or special interest
Info: All units.
units operating in the maritime
environment.
NAVPOSREP Report the location and/or Unit Action: OTC/sea As required.
intended movement of own area commander.
military and auxiliary vessels
and the location of other
military organizations.
NAVSITREP Report specific events, Unit Action: OTC, PWC. As ordered by
changes in location and OTC.
movement, changes in
readiness, or changes in major
equipment status of maritime
forces.
NAVSITSUM Periodic summary of friendly Sea area Action: Units Periodically.
forces giving details of their commander operating in area.
command, control, task
Info: Commanders of
organization, location and
adjacent sea areas.
planned movements.
OPTASK RMP Tasking of recognized maritime OTC Units, supporting As required.
picture (RMP) assets. commanders.

RMPSITSUM Periodic report the location Sea area Action: Units Periodically.
of surface and/or subsurface commander operating in area.
contacts and/or the overlay
Info: Commanders of
details of a specified
adjacent sea areas.
geographical area, comprising
the RMP.
MERSITREP Merchant shipping situation MCC All Units As required.
report.
MERSITSUM Merchant shipping situation MCC All Units Daily.
summary.
SAILNOTE Report of merchant vessel(s) NCAGSLO MCC As required.
movements.
COI LIST Consolidated list of vessels that MCC Action: All Weekly.
are of specific interest. supporting units
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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 4 of 12)

MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION

OPTASK Detailed tasking and instructions OTC, CWC Units, supporting As required.
METOC for all aspects of meteorological commanders.
and oceanographic support.
INFORMATION WARFARE
OPTASK EW Promulgates detailed tasking and OTC/IWC/EWC Action: All units in TG. As required
instructions for the conduct of by OTC.
Info: supporting forces.
electronic warfare.
JAMWARN Warning about intended jamming OTC/IWC/EWC Action: All units in TG. 12 hours
operations. before
Info: Supporting
planned
forces, adjacent forces/
jamming
authorities that may be
activity.
affected.
SATVULREP Promulgates periods of vulnerability Area All concerned. As required
to satellite reconnaissance and commander/ by OTC/
to prescribe countermeasures to OTC/IWC EWC.
satellite surveillance.
AIR WARFARE
OPTASK AAW Promulgates detailed tasking and OTC/AAWC/ Action: All TF/TG As required
instructions for all aspects of anti- ADC units, cooperating by the OTC.
air warfare and provide safety and and supporting forces
coordination information for shore including air stations,
based aircraft joining the force. combined air operations
centre (CAOCs) and
control and reporting
centre (CRCs).
Info: OTC of other
forces operating in
close proximity.
Superior authority.
OPSTAT CASP Provides coordinating information Any maritime Action: Cooperating 48 hours
for AD or AAW operations unit allocated to shore based AD assets. before
when an AD capable warship is CASP tasking commencing
Info: Air component
operating in, or adjacent to, a joint CASP
commander.
operations area. tasking.
STRIKE WARFARE
OPTASK STW

SURFACE WARFARE
OPTASK ASUW Promulgates detailed tasking and OTC/ASUW Action: All TF/TG As required
instructions for the conduct of anti- commander units, cooperating by the OTC.
surface warfare. and supporting forces
including air stations.
Info: OTC of other
forces operating in
close proximity.
Superior authority.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 5 of 12)
MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS
MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION
MOVEREP Provides information related to OTC/UNIT Action: Area As required.
the movement of naval units. commander. Ideally, at least
24 hours prior to
Info: Units likely movement or IAW
to be encountered local orders.
during passage.
OPTASK MIO Promulgate detailed tasking and MIO Action: All MIO As required.
instructions for all aspects of commander Units
Maritime Interdiction Operations.
Info: All supporting
Units
MIO REPORT Periodic and staged reports Unit Action: MIO As required.
during the approach, boarding Conducting commander
and post boarding phases of a Boarding Note: different
MIO operation. sections required
at each stage
of boarding.
Consolidated
message using all
sections required
after Action.
MIO Provides updates to the MIO Unit Action: MIO On significant
BOARDING Commander or other higher Conducting commander event, or not more
STATUS authority about the progress of Boarding than 2 hours.
the boarding operation.
MIO Orders the MIO commanders MIO Action: Boarding As required.
CLEARANCE intention in response to a MIO commander unit
Report.
HAILED A list of the vessels that they have Units Action: MIO Daily at 2300.
REPORT contacted during a period of MIO. commander
UNDERSEA WARFARE
OPTASK ASW Promulgates detailed tasking OTC/ASWC Action: All TF/TG As required by the
and instructions for all aspects of units, cooperating OTC.
ASW. and supporting
forces including air
stations.
Info: OTC of other
forces operating
in close proximity.
Superior authority.
UW OBJECT Provides information to SUBOPAUTH, Action: Submarine 48 hours prior
NOTE appropriate authorities on a OTC/SOCA, movement advisory to intended
unit’s intention for streaming Unit intending authority (SMAA). deployment or as
or deploying a sonic or other to deploy required by local
underwater device. underwater See AHP-06 to orders.
device. identify area
sponsors.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 6 of 12)

MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION

WSM Promulgates waterspace SUBOPAUTH Action: Submarines, 24 hours prior
ALLOCSTAT management information to ASW units, supporting to intended
minimise mutual interference maritime patrol aircraft activation or as
between submarines and ASW (MPA) bases. required by local
forces. orders.
WSM REQ Request for antisubmarine OTC, Action: 48 hours prior
warfare areas for water space ASWC,Unit SUBOPAUTH. to intended
management. activation or as
required by local
orders.
SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
OPSTAT Information exchange between SUBOPAUTH Action: SUBOPAUTH At least 48 hrs
READINESS SUBOPAUTH’s prior to TACON (relinquishing) (gaining/assuming) before transfer
being transferred. of TACON.
BARNSTORM Primary method for submarine SUBOPAUTH Action: Submarines, As required.
operations authority to pass all SOCA/OTC, ASWC,
major operational control, safety and other units as
and communication instructions appropriate.
to submarines on exercise of
patrol.
GRASSHOPPER Promulgate the execution of SUBOPAUTH Action: Submarines, See Chapter 6.
EXECUTE operation GRASSHOPPER. OTC/SOCA, ASWC
It can only be ordered by the and other units as
SUBOPAUTH. appropriate.
GRASSHOPPER Used to request execution of OTC or Action: As required
REQUEST operation GRASSHOPPER from ASWC SUBOPAUTH. but before the
the SUBOPAUTH MEADOW will
be active.
INTENDCHOP Signal when one or more SUBOPAUTH Action: SUBOPAUTH As soon as
submarines will change OPCON. (relinquishing (gaining/assuming possible.
OPCON) OPCON), submarine,
others as required.
RELINQTAC Report details outstanding before OTC/SOCA or Action: As appropriate.
relinquishment of TACOM/ ASWC SUBOPAUTH,
TACON by the OTC/SOCA. submarine, others as
appropriate.
SUBCHOP Provides SUBOPAUTH’s and SUBOPAUTH Action: Gaining/ As appropriate.
other affected commanders with (relinquishing) assuming
all information relevant to change and affected
of OPCON of submarines being SUBOPAUTHs, OTC,
chopped. SOCA, submarine.
SUBDANGER Promulgates intended operations SUBOPAUTH Action: SMAA, other At least 48
or actions hazardous to force commanders as hours before
submarines. appropriate. start day time.
See AHP-06 to
identify area
sponsors.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 7 of 12)

MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION

SUBFORCEREP Provides a means for the SOCA OTC/SOCA, Action: Submarine, Should be
to rapidly convey near term, ASWC SUBOPAUTH. kept ready for
perishable tactical coordination transmission at all
information and intelligence to times and updated
a support submarine on local just prior to
tactical nets. scheduled tactical
communications
This message is a supplement
with the support
and not a replacement for
submarine.
the support Submarine Force
Summary used to pass
more detailed information to
SUBOPAUTH for broadcast
relay to support submarines.
SUBFORSUM Updates the SUBOPAUTH and OTC/SOCA, Action: 1. At least every
submarines on TG operations, ASWC SUBOPAUTH, 24 hours.
intentions, assessments, and supporting
2. When new
coordination requirements. submarines, others
submarine joins.
This is a serialized message as appropriate.
and is the preferred method for
passing traffic containing tactical
coordination and intelligence
information.
SUBNOI Promulgates underwater SUBOPAUTH Action: SMAA, As appropriate.
(subsurface) interference area other authority as
information. appropriate.
See AHP-6.
SUBNOTE REQ Request to order and inform Submarine, Action: More than
about the movement of a OTC/SOCA SUBOPAUTH, 48 hours before
submarine. SMAA, OTC/SOCA, estimated time of
submarine. departure (ETD).
SUBNOTE Orders and informs about the SUBOPAUTH Action: SMAA, all At least 48 hours
movement of a submarine. affected submarines, before ETD.
other authorities as
appropriate.
See Table 2-1 of
AHP-06, Vol. I.
SUBNOTE Requests an order about a Submarine, Action: As soon as details
CHANGE REQ change in the movement of a OTC/SOCA SUBOPAUTH, are known.
submarine. SMAA, OTC/SOCA,
submarine.
SUBSUPREQ Requests submarine support OTC/SOCA or Action: As soon as
for specific employment option, ASWC SUBOPAUTH, possible.
warfare mission area and time others as
period. appropriate.
SUBNOTE Orders and informs changes in SUBOPAUTH Action: OTC, As required.
CHANGE the movement of a submarine. submarine
and others as
appropriate.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 8 of 12)

MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION

SUBSITREP The primary reporting means for the Unit Action: As required.
submarine to convey information back SUBOPAUTH.
to the submarine tasking authority.
SUBTASK Assign a submarine to the supported SUBOPAUTH Action: OTC, As required.
force/group. submarine
and others as
appropriate.
MINE WARFARE
OPTASK NMW Promulgate detailed tasks, OTC/NMWC Action: Units As required.
instructions and/or information for all
aspects of naval mine warfare. Info: Supporting
units
OPREP NMW Operational report on naval mine Units Action: NMWC As directed.
warfare operations and the areas
NMWC Action: OTC
impacted by present or future naval
mine warfare operations.
OPTASK Passes information to MCM NATO Action: MCM At least
LEADTHROUGH Tasking Authorities about ETA and Shipping Tasking Authority 36 hours before
Composition of a convoy/naval force Centre (NSC) ETA at transit
which has to pass a certain channel. RV.
LEADTHROUGH Pass information to MCM authorities OTC Action: MCM 12 hours before
ORDER about ETA and composition of a Transiting Commander transit.
convoy/naval force which has to pass Units
a certain channel.
TRANSIT Instructions issued by an OTC of MCM Action: Transiting 12 hours before
INSTRUCTIONS MCM forces with the aim to pass commander Units transit.
necessary information for execution
of a lead through operation to a naval
force, convoy or independent unit
AVIATION
OPTASK AIR Promulgates detailed tasking and OTC/AREC/ Action: All units Daily by 2000Z
instructions for all organic aircraft. HEC operating or or as directed
controlling aircraft. by the OTC.
Functional
commanders
employing tasked
aircraft. Units with
an AD capability.
Info: ACC/land
component
commander (LCC)
when operating
close to their AOA.
OPSTAT HELO Provides operational, technical HELO Action: OTC/ 1. 48 hours
information and restrictions about equipped AREC/HEC before
embarked or assigned helicopters. Units embarking.
Info: Units with
an Aircraft Control 2. One minute
capability. after OPSTAT
UNIT.
3. On major
change of
aircraft data/
status.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 9 of 12)
MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION
CROSSDECKREQ A request for NATO cross deck Unit Action: Cross 48 hours prior
operations to transfer capable deck receiving to intended
aircraft to or from a maritime platform, AREC/ activation or
platform. HEC. as required by
local orders.
Info: OTC.
CROSSDECKRESP The response for a request for Cross deck Action: 24 hours prior
NATO cross deck operations to receiving CROSSDECK- to intended
transfer capable aircraft to or platform REQ originator, activation or
from a maritime platform. AREC/HEC. as required by
local orders.
Info: OTC.
MPA JOIN Passes updated information on ACU Action: MPA base To be received
the tactical situation, pertinent at least 4 hours
information from the various before takeoff.
OPTASK messages and
amplifying information on the ACU Action: MPA in When in
mission to a supporting Maritime Transit ultrahigh
Patrol Aircraft prior to take off. frequency
(UHF) range if
update required.
PURPLE Used to provide a MPA Action: PWC Within 24 hours
comprehensive summary of the of landing.
activities of a mission or event. Info: OTC, TG
units.
GREEN Tasks maritime patrol or MPA tasking Action: ASUWC, 24 hours prior
surveillance and ASW units authority ASWC, AAWC, to mission.
when an air tasking order (ATO) Force Marshal,
has not been issued. aircraft control
authorities.
Info: Cooperating
forces.
REPLENISHMENT AT SEA
OPSTAT CARGO A report of the status and RAS supply Action: Logistics 1. 48 hours
quantity of major cargo types ship coordinator, OTC, prior to
and waste reception capacity URG commander. changing
remaining. OPCON or RAS
operations.
2. On
completion
of each
replenishment
operation.
3. After
replenishment
operations
or significant
change in
holdings.
OPSTAT RAS Provides customer ships with RAS supply Action: OTC, 1. 48 hours
details of rigs, waste reception ship logistics prior to joining
facilities and types of stores coordinator, TG force.
that can be delivered from units.
respective transfer stations. 2. As required.
3. To new units
joining force.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 10 of 12)

MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION

OPSTAT RASREQ Details the replenishment Unit (customer Action: Supplying 24 hours
requirements of a customer. It ship) unit prior to
is sent directly to the supplying replenishment/
ships concerned by independent Info: OTC/logistics as required by
ships and to the OTC by ships coordinator. the logistics
within a force. Supplying unit. coordinator.
OPTASK RAS Promulgates the replenishment OTC/logistics Action: Supplying 12 hours
programme. coordinator ships, receiving prior to
ships. ASWC, replenishment.
ASUWC.
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE
OPTASK AMPHIB Provide detailed tasking OTC/ Action: All TF/TG As required by
instructions to units regarding amphibious units, cooperating the OTC.
the execution of an amphibious commander and supporting
operation. forces.
Info: LCC, ACC,
OTC of other
forces operating in
close proximity.
PCS INTENTIONS Provides detailed instructions OTC/CATF Action: All TF/TG As required by
to amphibious units concerning units, cooperating the OTC.
the conduct of the surface and supporting
assault portion of an amphibious forces.
operation.
Info: LCC, ACC,
OTC of other
forces operating in
close proximity.
OTHER OPERATIONAL TASKING
OPTASK FP Promulgates guidance and OTC/ Action: All units in 1. 24 hours
HARBOUR instructions regarding Force local area harbour before ETA.
Protection for all naval forces commander
within a harbour or anchorage. 2. As required
by threat.
OPTASK NCAGS Promulgates detailed tasking NCAGS Action: All As required.
and instructions for all aspects commander concerned.
of shipping operations.
See ATP-02
OPTASK AWNIS Used to promulgate detailed Safety of Action: All TF/TG As required.
arrangements for the Navigation units within the
dissemination of classified Information area, cooperating
maritime safety information and Centre and supporting
the forwarding of information forces.
to the World-wide Navigational
Warning Service for release by Info: OTC of other
unclassified means. forces operating in
close proximity.
DIVING OPERATIONS
OPTASK DIVE Report planned and/or ongoing OTC/ Action: Tasked As required.
diving operations when diving local area unit.
operations are prepared in commander
Info: Units in
waters under command of the
vicinity of diving
local area commander.
operations.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 11 of 12)

MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION

DIVNOTE Gives notice to the local area Unit Action: Local Area 4 hours before
commander before commencing Commander diving.
diving operations in waters under
their control and for the local
diving authorities to reply with
chamber location/medical facility
details.
DIVEACC Informs other formations or to call Unit Action: OTC As required.
for immediate medical assistance
Supporting units
and/or evacuation of a casualty in
MCC
the event of a diving accident.
LOGISTICS
OPTASK LOG FLC Promulgates the force logistic FLC/group Action: All units in As required by
coordinator’s (FLC) logistic logistic TG, OTC. OTC.
directives, duty assignments and coordinator
other essential instructions to (GLC)
execute afloat logistic support for
forces assigned.
See ALP-4.1, Multinational
Maritime Force Logistics
LOGSITREPMAR Provides the logistical status of an Unit Action: OTC/FLC Daily.
individual unit.
OPTASK LOG Promulgates the multinational MNLC Action: OTC, host As required.
MNLC logistic commander’s (MNLC) nation authorities.
directives, duty assignments, and TG units.
other essential instructions and
information to execute logistic
support for the multinational
maritime force. This message
is the primary method for
coordinating logistic matters
ashore. See ALP-4.1
REPAIR DIR Specifies who will provide Repair Action: Unit(s) As required.
services, describes technical coordinator tasked to provide
assistance requirements and repair services
directs Action necessary to effect
Info: Unit to be
repairs.
repaired
EMREQ REQ Requests the transfer of the Requesting Action: Materiel As required.
necessary spare parts to correct Unit control officer
defects affecting the operational (MATCONOF)
readiness of a unit by exploiting
Info: Units
the combined resources of the
multinational maritime force
(MNMF).
EMREQ REP Used to respond positively to an Tasked Unit Action: As required.
EMREQ REQ indicating that the MATCONOF
required parts are being held and
can be redeployed as spare parts
to correct defects affecting the
operational readiness of a unit.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 2-17. (NU) Message Formats Used in Maritime Operations (Sheet 12 of 12)

MESSAGE PURPOSE ORIGINATOR ADDRESSEES OCCASION

EMREQ DEL Provides a means for the MATCONOF Action: Holding As required.
MATCONOF to direct a holding Unit
unit, which has previously sent
Info: Receiving
an EMREQ REP, to supply the
Unit
necessary spare parts to a unit,
which sent the initial EMREQ
REQ, to correct defects affecting
the operational readiness.
LALC REPORT Report on logistic airlift LALC Action: HEC 1. 1600Z.
requirements for the movement
Note: Must
of spare parts and technical
arrive with
assistance within the task force
HEC in time for
or task group. The message is
OPTASK AIR
intended to cover a time period
planning.
of 24hrs.
EVACREQ Request for personnel casualty Unit with Action: OTC As required.
evacuation. Casualty
Info: HEC

MEDCASREPTRACK Initial information about unit Units Action: FLC As required.

personnel casualties and
tracking personnel casualties
along the evacuation route.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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CHAPTER 3 Force Organization/Readiness

SECTION I—RAPID AMENDMENT OF TACTICS AND PROCEDURES

3100 General

(NU) It is recognized that in actual operations during wartime some tactics will prove more or less
effective than others and, in certain crucial cases, it is essential that a clearly defined method for rapidly
changing or perhaps cancelling a current tactic or procedure should exist.
3110 Procedure

a. (NU) Proposed Tactical (PROTAC) Amendment Message. Any operational unit observing
significant failure in the use of a NATO tactic is to report the fact to the OTC by message. The message
should take the form of a PROTAC amendment message IAW APP-11, designed to:

(1) (NU) Improve the effectiveness of a currently unsatisfactory tactic, or

(2) (NU) Replace an unsatisfactory tactic with a more effective one, or

(3) (NU) Cancel an ineffective tactic.

b. (NU) OTCs Receiving a PROTAC Message Should:

(1) (NU) Where it improves the safety or operational efficiency of their force and is of immediate
operational concern:

(a) (NU) Implement the PROTAC immediately for their own forces

(b) (NU) Forward it by message to the major subordinate commander (MSC) for action

(c) (NU) Send information copies to appropriate authorities, including, where applicable, the
commanders of adjacent areas/forces.

OR
(2) (NU) Where it is not of immediate operational concern, forward the PROTAC to the area MSC
by message.

OR
(3) (NU) Where the PROTAC is found to be invalid, cancel it by means of a message to the
originating unit.

c. (NU) Corrected Tactical (CORTAC) Procedure Message. MSCs or delegated headquarters

(HQs) receiving a PROTAC message are to act as coordinating agency for implementing the change
to, or cancellation of, a tactic throughout their area. As controlling agencies, MSCs or delegated HQs
shall, if they approve the content of a PROTAC, promulgate a CORTAC procedure message IAW
APP-11, to all appropriate forces in their area, with an action copy to their strategic commander.

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SECTION II—POSITION AND MOVEMENT

3200 Position/Reference Systems

a. (NU) Position can be expressed by any of the following means:

(1) (NU) Latitude and longitude. Latitude is expressed before longitude (e.g., 14° N 47° W).

(2) (NU) World Geographic Reference System (Georef).

(3) (NU) Grids—universal transverse Mercator (UTM), Cartesian coordinate grid (CCG), military
grid reference system (MGRS) or other grid promulgated by an appropriate commander.

(4) (NU) Bearing and distance in miles, or bearing and range in hundreds of yards.

(5) (NU) Station occupied (e.g., Station 3).

(6) (NU) Quick reference system (QRS).

b. (NU) The position may be further defined by an accuracy suffix and/or an altitude or depth
indication.

3201 World Geographic Reference System

a. (NU) Georef is not a true grid; it is merely a convenient means of expressing latitude and longitude
for the purposes of rapid plotting and reporting. Georef may be used whenever a UTM or CCG grid
is not suitable; it shall not be used for naval gunfire support, close fire support, direct air support, or
in any other application where positional information must be reported with accuracy. The system is
intended primarily for inter-Allied use in air operations and in air aspects of anti-air warfare operations.

b. (NU) Description. Georef is based on a division of the globe into 24 longitudinal zones of
15 degrees each, lettered from A through Z (omitting I and O) eastward from the 180th meridian; and
12 latitudinal zones of 15 degrees each, lettered from A through M (omitting I) northward from the
South Pole. See Figure 3-1.

(1) (NU) While relatively few charts have Georef overprints, the lettering system can easily be
added on existing charts by labeling the zones accordingly. Labeled in this manner, any basic
15-degree area can be located by first reading right to the desired alphabetical column, and then up
to the desired alphabetical row. The reference symbol for any 15-degree area in the world consists
of only two letters.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) MK indicates a 15-degree rectangular area with its SW corner at latitude

45° N, longitude 15° W.

(2) (NU) Each 15-degree area is further divided by 15-lettered degree units eastward, and
15-lettered degree units northward, using in each direction the letters from A through Q (omitting
I and O).

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{
90°
180° 165°150° 135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45° 30° 15° 0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 180°

75° 75°

60° 60°

K
MK
45° 45°
J
30° 30°
H
15° 15°
G
0° 0°
F
15° 15°
E
30° 30°
D
45° 45°

{
60° 60°
A B C D E F G H J K L M N P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
B
180° 165°150° 135° 120° 105° 90° 75° 60° 45° 30° 15° 0° 15° 30° 45° 60° 75° 90° 105° 120° 135° 150° 165° 180°

{
75°
A
90°

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3-1. (NU) Sample Georef Chart

(NU) A 1-degree area can be located by the right-up process, and the two-letter designator listed
immediately after the two-letter designator for the 15-degree area. The reference symbol for any
1-degree area consists of only four letters.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) GJPJ indicates a 1-degree area with its SW corner at latitude 38° N, longitude
77° W.

(3) (NU) Each 1-degree area is divided into sixty 1-minute units eastward and sixty 1-minute units
northward. These 1-minute units are designated by numbers, reading right-up from the SW corner
of each 1-degree area. A Georef report composed of four letters and four numerals is all that is
required to locate any 1-minute area in the world.

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-EXAMPLE-

(NU) WGAN 5630 indicates a 1-minute area with its SW corner at latitude
12°30’ N, longitude 120°56’ E.

(4) (NU) Further accuracy, if desired, can be obtained by reporting each 1-minute unit in tenths
(or hundredths) of a minute eastward and northward. This requires a six (or eight) numeral reference.
For example, WGAN 56503060 indicates a point at latitude 12°30’36” N, longitude 120°56’30” E.
(Note that numerical position references will always have an even number of digits, in which
the first half will indicate the right direction and the second half will indicate the up direction.)
The 15 degree designator may be omitted from reports, but care must be taken to ensure that the
omission will not cause ambiguity. For example, NG 1720 identifies a location on the western side
of Leipzig and NG 1720 (in UTM grid) identifies an aerodrome south of Skrydstrup in Denmark.

c. (NU) Size of Rectangle. To designate the size of any rectangular area, the standard Georef
coordinates are used to indicate the SW corner of the area followed by the letter S (denoting length of
sides) and by digits giving the eastward and northward dimensions of the area in nautical miles. The
digits are separated by the letter X.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) GJQJ 0207S6X6 indicates a rectangle with 6-mile sides and its SW corner
at latitude 38°07’ N, longitude 75°58’ W.

d. (NU) Size of Circle. To designate the size of a circular area, the standard Georef coordinates for
the centre of the circle are followed by the letter R (denoting radius) and by digits giving the nautical
mile radius of the circle.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) EDBL 2743R12 indicates a circle with a 12-mile radius with its centre at
latitude 34°17’ S, longitude 118°33’ W.

e. (NU) Altitude. To designate altitude, the standard Georef coordinates for the geographic location
of the aircraft are followed by the letter H (denoting height) and by two digits giving altitude in units
of thousands of feet.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) VFKC 1509H15 indicates aircraft at 15,000 feet at latitude 12°51’ S,

longitude 114°15’ E.

3202 Universal Transverse Mercator Grid

(NU) The UTM grid (the Army square grid) is used for naval bombardment purposes and for other
purposes where applicable. When using this grid, the MGRS will be used in communications between
ground forces and other forces jointly engaged; specifically when air forces including naval aviation
are acting in close air support of ground forces, and when landing force operations are supported by
all supporting forces. In such operations, latitude and longitude will be used when use of MGRS is
impractical.

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3203 Cartesian Coordinate Grid

(NU) The CCG is designed for limited security, rapid reporting of geographic positions in a system
compatible with tactical data systems. Grid positions are reported using X and Y coordinates
in relation to the grid origin (centre). This grid origin is based on a geographic reference point,
and contact positions are measured in units east/west (X axis) followed by units north/south
(Y axis). The unit of distance is known as the data mile (2,000 yards). The four quadrants of the grid,
reading clockwise from the northwest, are each identified by a colour—red, white, blue, and green
(see Figure 3-2).
a. (NU) Establishing the Grid. The grid origin is established by the OTC. Selection of the grid
origin at a position containing whole or half degrees of latitude or longitude will result in a less secure
grid and should be avoided when possible.

b. (NU) Method of Reporting. In reporting a position, the quadrant is first identified by colour.
Position relative to grid origin is then reported by transmitting the number of miles along the X axis
as a three-figure group, followed by the number of miles along the Y axis as a three-figure group. The
X and Y coordinates are separated by the word “TACK.”

3204 Antisubmarine Warfare Grid

(NU) An ASW grid is designed to provide area commanders and ASW forces a common grid to facilitate
ASW operations. This grid incorporates areas sized and oriented to provide reasonable probability
of detection by sensors, to allow target pursuit and attack, and to accommodate topographical and
environmental conditions.
3205 Bearing and Distance

a. (NU) When Reporting Bearing and Distance in Miles, the order of reporting will be:
bearing in degrees from reference point—the reference point—distance in miles. The nautical mile
(2,000 yards) is the unit of distance. All bearings are reporting as true unless otherwise specified.

Example:
RED WHITE
200

100

0 X AXIS
300 200 100 100 200 300
100

GREEN 200 BLUE

Y AXIS
Goblin ALFA’s position : WHITE 242 TACK 083
Goblin DELTA’s position : GREEN 200 TACK 150

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3-2. (NU) Sample Cartesian Coordinate Grid

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-EXAMPLES-

(1) (NU) From a point on the earth’s surface given in specific double letters or a
code name:

125KK45
140 Point Holly 50

(2) (NU) From a point of land or a navigational mark:

112 Hatteras 12
237 Finisterre 21

(3) (NU) From a standard position in the force:

310ZZ7

(4) (NU) From a ship of own force, using the call sign of the ship:

273 HOT-SHOT 12

b. (NU) When Reporting Bearing and Range in Hundreds of Yards, the order of reporting
is the same as that for bearing and distance, except that the word “RANGE” must be spoken (reports
in RANGE should normally be limited to less than 10,000 yards).

-EXAMPLES-

(1) (NU) From a standard position, range 9,500 yards:

165 TT RANGE 95

(2) (NU) From a sonobuoy, range 1,700 yards:

230 KINGPIN RANGE 17

3206 Quick Reference System

a. (NU) Purpose. The QRS is designed for rapid exchange of positions and tactical information
between units operating in coastal waters (e.g., a fjord environment). The QRS is suitable for exchange
of combat information, disposition of own forces, area allocation, aircraft control, enemy update,
reconnaissance operations, SITREPs, etc.

(1) (NU) The QRS sheet is a see-through plastic overlay in A-4 format (21.0 cm x 29.7 cm) with
176 numbered squares. An example of the overlay is provided in Figure 3-3.

b. (NU) Establishing the QRS. Any chart may be chosen, but all participants must use the
same scale. Upper left and upper right corners are given by geographic positions. If the overlay is
north-south oriented, only the upper left corner position should be given. When more than one QRS
is in use, each overlay is identified as QRS ALFA, QRS BRAVO, etc.

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NOTE: Reprint the overlay locally on transparent plastic at same size as template

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55

56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110

111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121

122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132

133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143

144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154

155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165

166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3-3. (NU) Quick Reference System (QRS) Overlay

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c. (NU) Ordering the QRS. The geographic positions of the QRS overlays should be signalled by
the OTC well in advance by an OPGEN, OPTASK, etc. Information should contain:

(1) (NU) Chart number and scale.

(2) (NU) QRS identifier (when more than one overlay).

(3) (NU) Upper left corner position (and upper right corner position if not north-south oriented).

(4) (NU) Period.

-EXAMPLE-

GENTEXT/REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS/QRS/NORWEGIAN CHART

322/1:200000/QRS ALFA/7025.0N-1800.0E/23100-UFN/QRSBRAVO/
7025.0N-1906.2E/231600-232000/QRS CHARLIE/7020.0N-2010.0E/
7031.4N-2106.1E/232000-240200//

d. (NU) Procedures. Normal raid-reporting procedures are used, but position is reported as a
numbered square. The square number may be passed in NUCO. If it is necessary to specify position
within a square, add direction from square centre (see example 2). When aircraft and helicopters are
participating, brevity words in APP-07, Joint Brevity Words apply:

-EXAMPLES-

(1) (NU) Contact report:

SMUGGLER 2634 - SQUARE 27 BRAVO - TRACKING SOUTH - SPEED

20 - TIME 1645Z

(2) (NU) Movement report:

NA22 DESIG SQUARE 35 WEST - M CORPEN 045 - TACK 30

(3) (NU) Command message:

TA88 - 11 DESIG SQUARE 31 ALFA

3207 Position/Bearing Accuracy Suffixes

(NU) To indicate the probable accuracy of a position or bearing, an accuracy suffix may be added.
These suffixes are particularly important when reporting an area of probability derived from two or more
passive bearings. The suffixes are:
a. (NU) Position:

(NU) Within a 2-mile radius—XRAY

(NU) Within a 10-mile radius—YANKEE

(NU) Outside a 10-mile radius—ZULU

(NU) From NAVSTAR global positioning system (GPS) unit—GOLF PAPA

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NOTE

(NU) THERE IS NO APPRECIABLE ERROR UNLESS OTHERWISE

STATED.

b. (NU) ESM bearings:

(NU) Within 2 degrees—ALFA

(NU) Within 5 degrees—BRAVO

(NU) Within 10 degrees—CHARLIE

(NU) Outside 10 degrees—DELTA

NOTES

1. (NU) BEARING ACCURACIES ARE CHARLIE, UNLESS

OTHERWISE STATED.

2. (NU) THE WORD “CLASS” IS INSERTED BEFORE A, B, C, AND

D.

3208 Altitude or Depth

(NU) When reporting positions, it may be appropriate to include an altitude or depth report.
a. (NU) Altitude. If an accurate altitude of any air track cannot be determined, estimated altitude is
to be reported using the appropriate APP-7 brevity code words (i.e., VERY LOW, LOW, MEDIUM,
HIGH).

(1) (NU) Friendly Air Tracks. The altitude of friendly aircraft can be reported using the words
ANGELS (in thousands of feet; e.g., ANGELS 1 DECIMAL 5 is 1,500 feet) or HEIGHT (in feet,
e.g., HEIGHT 400 is 400 feet) or using the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) term
FLIGHT LEVEL (e.g., FLIGHT LEVEL 250 is 25,000 feet).

(2) (NU) Other Air Tracks. The altitude of other air tracks can be reported using the word
ALTITUDE (in hundreds of feet; e.g., ALTITUDE 151 is 15,100 feet) or using the ICAO term
FLIGHT LEVEL.
NOTE

(NU) FLIGHT LEVEL IS ONLY TO BE USED WHEN ALTITUDE IS

REPORTED BY THE AIRCRAFT (SECONDARY SURVEILLANCE
RADAR, IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE (IFF), OR VOICE).

b. (NU) Depth. If an accurate depth of a submerged track cannot be determined, an estimated depth
may be reported using the appropriate APP-7 brevity code words (i.e., SHALLOW, DEEP), or if an
accurate depth can be determined, it may be reported as DEVILS (in tens of feet; e.g., DEVILS 30 is
300 feet).

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NOTE

(NU) NATO PUBLICATIONS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING

AMENDED TO THE FOLLOWING STANDARD UNITS OF
MEASUREMENT:

1. (NU) RANGE—YARDS.

2. (NU) DISTANCE—NAUTICAL MILES.

3. (NU) ALTITUDE—FEET.

4. (NU) DEPTH OF ALL OBJECTS IN WATER, INCLUDING

BOTTOM DEPTH AND THERMAL FEATURES, IN METRES
WITH FEET OR FATHOMS (AS APPROPRIATE) IN BRACKETS
USING CONVERSION OF 1 METRE = 3.28 FEET AND ROUNDED
OFF TO THE NEAREST METRE WHEN EXACT FIGURES ARE
REQUIRED. WHEN USING ONLY APPROXIMATE FIGURES
THE CONVERSION MAY BE ROUNDED OFF ACCORDINGLY
(E.G.,: 250 FM SHOULD BE ROUNDED OFF TO 450 M RATHER
THAN 457 M).

5. (NU) THICKNESS OF ICE—CENTIMETRES AND/OR METRES.

6. (NU) TEMPERATURES—DEGREES CELSIUS.

(NU) THE STANDARD UNITS ABOVE ARE NOT TO BE CONFUSED

WITH THE CODE WORDS RANGE AND ALTITUDE. FOR SAFETY
PURPOSES DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD, THE DEPTH
OF ALL OBJECTS WILL BE IN METRES FOLLOWED BY FEET
OR FATHOMS IN BRACKETS.
3209 Checksum Digits

a. (NU) To avoid confusion caused by error in transmission, checksum digits may be used in structured
and free text messages, and where available in formatted messages for positions, courses, speeds, and
times. Checksum digits may also be used for ranges, frequencies, etc.

b. (NU) To derive the checksum digit, the numbers in the position, course, speed, or time are to be
added together and the total put after the appropriate element. Only the last figure of the summation
is to be used; that is, if the total comes to “19,” only the “9” is used.

-EXAMPLES-

(1) (NU) Position—5004N9 15642W8. (The 9 and 8 are the checksum digits.)

(2) (NU) Course—225T9 degrees true or 225M9 degrees magnetic. (The 9 is the
checksum digit.)

(3) (NU) Speed—15KT6. (The 6 is the checksum digit.)

(4) (NU) Time—281030Z4. (The 4 is the checksum digit.)

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3210 Standard Positions/Reference Points/Position Reporting

(NU) The standard positions in the force are:

a. (NU) QQ—The centre of the front of the main body or convoy when not in circular formation.

b. (NU) TT—Originator’s present position.

c. (NU) XX—The standard position established by the OTC on which a search, enemy reporting and
so forth is to be based.

d. (NU) YY—Addressee’s present position.

e. (NU) ZZ—The centre of the force.

NOTE

(NU) WHENEVER POSSIBLE, XX SHOULD BE COINCIDENTAL

WITH THE DATA LINK REFERENCE POINT (DLRP).

3211 Data Link Reference Point (Only Link 11)

a. (NU) The DLRP is the common point from which all positional information on data link is derived.
The DLRP is established by the MICO, in a geographic position, before commencing link operations,
but may be changed for operational and/or security reasons. In principle, the DLRP should be the
same position as the CCG origin, thus ensuring that picture compilation is derived from using the
same origin by tactical data system (TDS) and non-TDS units when cooperating.

b. (NU) The force track coordinator(s) (FTCs) is (are) responsible for an accurate tactical (data link)
picture and for raid reporting within the force or in a sector, using voice compilation nets. The grid
reference unit (GRU) is responsible to the MICO for maintaining the accurate position of the DLRP
and the CCG origin. The GRU holds by definition the correct position of the DLRP and/or grid origin.

c. (NU) Establishing the DLRP. Although more than one DLRP can be established for consecutive
periods and/or for geographic areas, only one DLRP per data link should be effective during a certain
period. The geographic positions of DLRPs and the times of change are to be established well in
advance by the MICO through means of operational order (OPORD), OPGEN, etc.

d. (NU) Initiating the DLRP. When commencing link operations, all participating units (PUs)
insert the DLRP in their TDS. On completion, the GRU executes a grid lock.

e. (NU) Maintaining the DLRP. The accurate position of the DLRP is maintained by the GRU.
When necessary, the GRU executes a grid lock check to assist in updating PUs.

f. (NU) Changing the DLRP. Changing the DLRP causes disruption of the tactical picture for a
short period and should therefore only be executed when the tactical situation permits. On completion
of changing the DLRP and when all PUs have entered the DLRP in their TDS, the GRU executes a
grid lock. Non-TDS-fitted ships are to shift the CCG accordingly.

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3212 Helicopter Reference Point

(NU) In order to facilitate position reports from and to helicopters, a helicopter reference point (HRP)
may be established. Several types of helicopters are equipped with tactical navigation systems optimized
for passing positional information as a bearing and range from a reference point. The HRP can also be
used for updating the helicopter’s navigation system. With the use of an HRP, position reports can be
passed in the clear, enabling ships and helicopters to process information quickly.
a. (NU) Establishing the HRP. The HRP is a geographically fixed position issued by either the
AC in an OPTASK AIR or the helicopter control unit (HCU) prior to a mission. Due to navigation
system design, the HRP should be as close to possible to the area in which the helicopter will operate.
Preferably targets or contacts to be reported should not be outside 50 nm of the HRP. When an
operation requires more than one HRP, subsequent points can be established and designated with
a suffix (e.g., HRP ALFA, HRP BRAVO) or a code word. For transits, more than one HRP can be
established by the AC or HCU for a limited period of time.

b. (NU) Position Reports To and From Helicopters. The HRP can be used to pass geographic
position information, such as an air plan search origin (“DATUM 315 HRP 5 DECIMAL 5”), or as the
common reference when using method B2 in accordance with Table 9-2. When the helicopter initiates
a “Request update,” navigation updates may be passed using the “Standby, mark” procedure.

3213 (NU) (NMP) Harbour Reference Points

a. (NC) (NMP) In wartime, ships leave or enter harbour by a swept channel. The channel, which
varies in width, usually starts at the harbour entrance or boom gate and extends to seaward. Reference
Points A, X, O, and Y (if required) are used to facilitate leaving and entering a harbour; reference times
used are estimated time of arrival (ETA) or estimated time of departure (ETD) and zero time. Should
multiple swept channels be established, points A1, A2, X1, X2, etc., may be used. The Q-message
system and area warnings will provide the OTC with the necessary information on swept channels
and mined areas.

b. (NC) (NMP) Harbour reference points are defined as follows:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Point A. In an open approach, Point A may be right at the mouth of the harbour
or just to seaward of the gate; in a harbour with a long approach, it would be at the seaward end of
the approach. Point A should be promulgated by the local authority and is to be signalled to forces
at sea as soon as possible. In the absence of a local authority, the OTC will establish Point A.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Point X. Point X is the reference point at the seaward end of a swept channel.
The local authority will establish Point X and promulgate the position to the forces at sea. In the
absence of a local authority, the OTC will establish Point X.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Point O. On leaving, the various units of the formation that is to be formed
should be in or nearly in station when the Guide passes through Point O. This manoeuvre should be
accomplished so as to minimise the mining threat. The protective efforts of the screen should not
be lost and sufficient manoeuvring room should be provided. On entry, the reverse of the foregoing
process is started at Point O (i.e., the formation starts to break up in execution of the entrance
plan, which normally starts at this point). The OTC of the force entering or leaving harbour shall
designate Point O and inform the local authority of the position of Point O if EMCON permits.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Point Y. Large dispositions should form at Point Y when there is insufficient
area at Point O. The component formations form at Point O, and the disposition forms at
Point Y. On entry, the reverse of this process is started at Point Y. The position of Point Y will be
promulgated by the OTC.

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3214 Ship as Anchoring Reference

(NU) When a ship is ordered to anchor with reference to another ship, the reference ship is to identify
herself to the incoming ship.
a. (NU) Providing Identification.

(1) (NU) By day, her visual call sign is to be used.

(2) (NU) At night, she is to show a white light as high on the foremast as possible. This is in
addition to normal anchor lights.

(3) (NU) At darken ship, directional lights are to be used.

b. (NU) Providing Other Data.

(1) (NU) If at single anchor, she is to signal the bearing and distance of her anchor from her
foremast.

(2) (NU) If moored with two anchors, she is to signal the direction of the ship’s head and the line
of direction between her anchors.

3215 Routes and Reference Points

(NU) Routes and reference points are established for the purpose of facilitating control of surface, air,
and subsurface traffic so as to reduce interference between forces making passage in the same area.
Routes and reference points are established by commanders in chief and such other commanders as may
be specifically designated. Common routes and reference points should be promulgated when necessary
in order to ensure understanding between forces operating in adjacent areas. Information concerning
common routes and reference points should be disseminated to forces about to enter or leave an area
as well as to appropriate commands in adjacent areas. When no conflict with established routes and
reference points would result, commanders subordinate to those mentioned above may promulgate
additional routes and reference points for the temporary use of their own forces.
3216 (NU) (NMP) Convoy Route Position Designators

(NR) (NMP) Convoys or those independent merchant ships under naval supervision may be allocated
routes using two-letter designators for each prescribed position on those routes. These designators are
chosen by the sailing authority, at random for the first position on the route, and then sequentially after
that (avoiding I and O), and are changed for every sailing. Reference diversion points are similarly
ordered for each sailing to facilitate the ordering of subsequent diversions while retaining some simple
security between the routing authority and the merchant ships being diverted. For other methods of
prescribing merchant ships routing, see ATP-02, Vol. I.
3217 Reporting and Exchanging Data on Positions

a. (NU) Navigational Danger. Ships sighting or detecting land are to report immediately if the
formation may be running into navigational danger or if the position thus obtained differs materially
from that based on the OTC’s reference position.

b. (NU) Doubt of Position. Ships should exchange data on navigational positions if there is any
doubt of their positions, especially when approaching land or after a period in which a fix has not been
obtained. Large ships should also assist small ships and craft by passing their own positions to them.

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c. (NU) Position Reports. All large ships and the screen commander(s) will make position reports
to the OTC at 1200 (or 15 minutes after noon position) or when called for. The method by which the
position was determined will be indicated. Position reported will be the formation centre.

d. (NU) Movement Reporting System. When it is required on a need-to-know basis that

information be exchanged between commanders, individual ships (less submarines) or formations
are to report in peace, and may be directed to report in war, their positions, routing, changes thereto,
and intended CHOP by means of movement reports (MOVREPs). These MOVREPs may also
include other intentions (see Allied Communications Publication (ACP)-176, NATO Supplements).
Additional details are contained in APP-11.

3218–3219 Spare

3220 Course and Speed

a. (NU) Ships are ordered to proceed by course and speed. In formations, the Guide is ordered to
proceed at the signalled speed on the signalled course. Signalled speed is attained by using the normal
number of revolutions for the ordered speed and adjusting as necessary for foul bottom and damage;
signalled course requires correction of the compass course for gyro error or variation and deviation.

(NU) When evasive steering, such as zigzagging, is ordered, a base course and a base speed are to be
ordered. Subsequent course alterations do not change the base course unless the change is specifically
signalled.

b. (NU) Ships may also be ordered to proceed at a specific speed, such as maximum speed, operational
speed, stationing speed, normal speed, or steerageway. When no stationing speed has been ordered,
operational speed is to be substituted for stationing speed in the description of certain manoeuvres.
Normal speed should be previously established if its use is expected to be required by the type or
unit commander. Speeds may also be ordered with reference to specific equipment performance
requirements, such as optimum or maximum sonar speed, or with reference to the requirements of
specific operations, such as replenishment speed.

3221 Course and Speed Made Good

a. (NU) It is necessary to distinguish clearly between signalled (or base) course and signalled (or
base) speed and:

(1) (NU) Course and speed made good through the water (CSW).

(2) (NU) Course and speed made good over the ground.

b. (NU) CSW includes the effect of weather on course made good through the water and speed made
good through the water, but not the effect of current or tidal stream. Course and speed made good over
the ground includes the effect of current or tidal stream on course made good over the ground and
speed made good over the ground. It is course and speed made good over the ground that is normally
used when routing ships; in this case, the speed component is indicated as speed of advance (SOA).

3222 Position and Intended Movement

a. (NU) Purpose. The OTC establishes position and intended movement (PIM) to assist the return
of aircraft, to aid outlying surface units in maintaining station, to keep adjacent commands informed of
his intentions, and for rendezvous purposes. It is particularly important to keep all units in a dispersed
formation informed of PIM.

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b. (NU) Signal. The OTC shall signal PIM as follows: position—time of position—course—
speed—period in hours (if required) for which course and speed are in force. If, during the period,
several changes of course and speed will be in effect, course, speed, and period in force should be
repeated as necessary for each change. The OTC shall signal PIM to detached units, or those about to
be detached, which are scheduled to rejoin later, in sufficient time to permit these units to take suitable
action. PIM is normally signalled one hour prior to flight operations. EMCON permitting, the OTC
must advise his area commander and maritime headquarters (MHQ) of the force’s PIM.

c. (NU) PIM of Independent Unit. Commanders of units acting independently may establish their
own PIMs.

d. (NU) When Position of Force Differs From PIM. After PIM has been issued, unforeseen
circumstances may cause the position of the force to differ from PIM. For example, a new operational
requirement or a shift in the wind may affect the course and/or speed made good by a carrier force.
Under such circumstances, the OTC will issue a new PIM.

e. (NU) Task Group PIM. Signalling the PIM assists aircraft and ships to return to the force after
operating beyond visibility distance. Ordinarily PIM is signalled by the OTC at least one hour before
aircraft are launched. As soon as it is known, PIM is to be promulgated for flight planning purposes;
in any case, it must be furnished to pilots before takeoff.

3223 Endurance

(NU) Endurance is normally the hours fuel will last at indicated speed.
3224–3229 Spare

3230 Arrival and Departure

3231 Reporting Time of Arrival

(NU) The local authority is to be previously informed of the ETA of the unit wishing to enter harbour.
Ships should not enter harbour until permission is granted.
3232 Entry Intervals

(NU) The number and types of the ships entering harbour may be such that the situation is complex.
In this event, signals are provided to specify the sequence in which units are to enter and whether the
units are to be separated by time or distance intervals. To allow time for berthing, these intervals should
normally be greater than those for the same ships when leaving harbour.
3233 Anchoring in Formation

(NU) When ships are to anchor in formation they will be conducted to the anchorage by the formation
commander. Accurate station-keeping is particularly necessary.
3234 Berth Numbers

(NU) Ships proceeding independently to assigned berths, or shifting berths in a harbour or anchorage
where berths have been established, are to hoist the numbers of the berths to which they are proceeding.
When proceeding to berths in formation, berth numbers are not to be hoisted unless ordered by the unit
commander.
3235–3239 Spare

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SECTION III—EVASIVE STEERING

3300 Scope

(NU) This section describes antisubmarine evasion and torpedo countermeasures for main body, convoy,
and screen units as well as anti-fast patrol boat manoeuvres against a missile- or torpedo-firing boat
(FPB).
(NR) (NMP) Specific plans and instructions for antisubmarine evasive steering are contained in
ATP-03, Antisubmarine Evasive Steering.

3301 General Instructions

a. (NU) Main Body or Convoy. The main body or convoy will normally carry out evasive steering.

(NC) (NMP) If units of the main body are stationed by the sector method, only the Guide and the
slowest units will carry out evasive steering in accordance with ATP-03. Other main body units should
patrol their sectors at random and as vigorously as the SOA allows.

(NU) The screen should be fully informed about the type and/or plan of evasive steering in order to
be able to adjust patrolling.

3321 (NU) (NMP) Manoeuvre

a. (NC) (NMP) Against Missile-firing FPBs.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Keep FPBs at as great a range as possible from the main body.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Main body units should turn away from the threat.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Escorts should carry out countermeasures between the main body and the threat.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Once missiles are detected, ships should manoeuvre considering weapon arcs
while providing least radar target and optimizing chaff and decoy employment.

b. (NC) (NMP) Against Torpedo-firing FPBs.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Manoeuvre to keep FPBs on the quarter when a contact is evaluated as hostile or
possibly hostile to keep the weapon system arcs clear, reduce the closing range rate, and prevent
FPBs from closing within 4,000 to 5,000 yards forward of the beam.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Manoeuvre by TURN or CORPEN to keep the line of ships close to the normal
threat axis for as long as possible; keep ships closed up for mutual support and ease of manoeuvre.
When the threat could be different from straight-running torpedoes, the torpedo countermeasures
(manoeuvres and decoy employment) will be based on threat assessment and carried out in
accordance with respective national doctrines.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Manoeuvring should be aimed at:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Keeping FPBs within destructive range of aircraft.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Evading until all ship’s weapons are ready.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Upsetting the enemy’s fire control solution.

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c. (NC) (NMP) Assigned Mission. Manoeuvring is also subject to the assigned mission. A surface
unit should complete its assigned mission while simultaneously combating the FPB. A surface unit
screening large combatants should place itself between the main body and the threat. A surface unit
operating alone should manoeuvre to keep the FPB at maximum effective gun range and to minimise
the rate of closing.

d. (NC) (NMP) Other Factors. Whenever possible, a surface unit should attempt to get
up-sea of an FPB, as the latter cannot sustain a high speed into the wind and sea. If FPBs attempt a
pincer’s movement, a surface unit may manoeuvre to engage both pincers, or only one pincer at a
time, depending on the tactical situation and firepower available. Use of a smoke screen should be
considered. Use of illuminants at night between a surface unit and the threat may reduce the enemy’s
visual capability. See also Chapter 9.

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SECTION IV—FORMATIONS

3400 Scope

(NU) Formations consist of single or multiple-line formations. A disposition is a combination of two

or more formations. Both formations and dispositions may be formed by linear or circular methods.
Instructions for the use of formations and dispositions as well as details of Line Formations 1–12,
Disposition 2W and Disposition 4W can be found in ATP-01, Vol. II.

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SECTION V—DISPOSITIONS

3520 (NU) (NMP) Disposition Planning Factors

(NC) (NMP) Table 3-1 contains the main factors to be considered in the planning of force dispositions
as set forth in detail in this and other publications. It is not exhaustive, and is intended to be a guide only,
and should be reviewed as the tactical situation changes.

Table 3-1. (NU) (NMP) Disposition Planning Factors

a. MISSION

b. THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. Enemy’s likely course of action

2. Enemy’s weapon systems capabilities
3. Enemy’s command, control and communications
capabilities
4. Enemy’s ECM, ESM, and acoustic capabilities
5. Enemy’s intelligence state

c. STATIONING

1. PIM
2. Defence in depth
3. Own capabilities—offensive and defensive
4. Use of chaff
5. Deception
6. Use of pickets
7. Advanced offensive positions
8. Reconnaissance
9. Own deficiencies
10. Replenishment
11. Mutual interference and support
12. Intercepts

d. COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Emission policy
2. Communications requirements
3. Data links
4. Navigation

e. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

f. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

1. Weather
2. Propagation; above water and below water

g. FLIGHT OPERATIONS

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SECTION VI—SCREENS

3600 Purpose

(NU) The purpose of a screen is to protect a main body or convoy. It may be designed to provide protection
against aircraft, missiles, submarines, or surface forces. In a multithreat environment, due consideration
must therefore be given to the assessment of threat priorities and the advanced warning which can be
obtained by the force. Since the threat can change during an operation, continuous reassessment of
the situation is necessary to maintain the efficiency of the screen. Since present weapons and sensors
demand defence in depth, screens should be adequately dispersed, thus increasing the enemy’s problem
in recognizing and attacking the main target. Additional details and instructions for screening can be
found in respective warfare area publications.
3610 Types of Screen

a. (NU) Sector Screen. Sectors are chosen to exploit the individual equipment capabilities of
various screen units and to provide flexibility and defence in depth. Sectors are defined by true bearings
and distances from screen centre. Screen units patrol assigned sectors; the amount of patrolling and
the size of the sector depend on the speed advantage of the screen unit over the main body or convoy.
Random manoeuvring in sectors has the advantage of disguising the disposition of the force and thus
poses an additional recognition problem to an enemy.

b. (NU) Helicopter Windline Screen. A helicopter screen is provided for a carrier temporarily
during flight operations, relative to the carrier’s track into the wind.

c. (NU) Departure Screen. When the main body is large, forming up may require considerable
time, and it may be desirable to wait for the moment when the main body is in formation to order
screen units to their appointed station in the cruising screen. In this case, a departure screen is to be
ordered to protect the main body while it is forming up. When the main body is small, it may not be
necessary to form a departure screen.

d. (NU) Entry Screen. The purpose of the entry screen is the protection of the main body as it
passes through the area immediately to seaward of the swept channel, particularly during the period
it is changing formation prior to entering the swept channel. When the main body is large, an entry
screen using the same procedure as for a departure screen should be ordered by the OTC.

3611 Screen Selection and Design

(NU) Selection and design of the screen are based upon the OTC’s appreciation of the situation. The
OTC should consider the following:
(NR) (NMP) For details of various factors involved, see ATP-28, Vol. I, and ATP-31, NATO Above Water
Warfare Manual.
a. (NU) The mission.

b. (NU) The situation.

(1) (NU) The threat:

(a) (NU) Enemy forces (surface, subsurface, air, or combined).

(b) (NU) Enemy capabilities (sensors, weapons, standoff capability, nuclear warheads,
jammers).

(c) (NU) Enemy’s possible courses of action.

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(2) (NU) Characteristics of the area of operations:

(a) (NU) Distances (to own and enemy bases, to own and enemy supporting forces).

(b) (NU) Oceanographic factors (water depth, marine life, wrecks, sonar conditions, and
currents).

(c) (NU) Meteorological factors (visibility, sea state, radar conditions, wind direction and
speed).

(3) (NU) Own forces:

(a) (NU) Screen units (number and types, radar, EW, sonar, weapons, communications
replenishment requirements).

(b) (NU) Main body or convoy (composition, size and spacing, speed, manoeuvrability,
defensive capabilities).

(c) (NU) Support forces (pickets, aircraft, surface forces, submarines, auxiliaries).

c. (NU) Opposing courses of action.

(1) (NU) Enemy’s overall specific objectives.

(2) (NU) Own courses of action.

3612 (NU) (NMP) Stationing Screen Units

a. (NC) (NMP) Inner Screen. In addition to its ASW advantages, particularly against diesel
submarine torpedo attacks, an inner screen provides the best concentration of defensive fire and may
be the only possible formation with a small number of screen units. The risk of confusion is reduced
over that which is likely to be incurred when friendly forces are dispersed. Screen units stationed from
five to seven nm from the main body are unlikely to detect FPBs on radar before they reach optimum
firing range. The inherent disadvantages of the inner screen may be alleviated when aircraft are used
to provide radar early warning and distant ASW forces are used to provide early warning of submarine
contacts.

b. (NC) (NMP) Outer Screen. An outer screen may provide a more effective defence against the
anticipated threat than an inner screen would. The long-range, passive detection capability of support
submarines, sonobuoy-equipped ASW aircraft, and towed array surface ships provides a reasonable
ASW search coverage of a large area, and platform acoustic covertness inhibits the enemy’s ability
to manoeuvre to avoid detection. These units may be stationed in the order of 25 to 100 nm from
the main body as an outer screen to counter the threat of the medium-range, missile-equipped
submarine and to provide an initial line for defence in depth against submarine torpedo attacks.
Note that submarines are assigned stationary areas and are never used in moving screens. The
search capability of these units is reduced when they are employed in inner screens. Other factors
to consider with an outer screen are:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Coordination of the outer screen units may be complicated by a lack of
communications capability.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Effective screen coordination is required between the various warfare commanders
and the screen commander.

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(3) (NC) (NMP) The requirement for early detection of threats and the selection of the appropriate
response.

(4) (NC) (NMP) The stern sector must not be forgotten.

3613–3619 Spare

3620 Description of Screens

3621 Sector Screen

a. (NU) Description. The centre is ZZ or QQ, unless otherwise ordered. Sectors are allocated by
indicating sector boundaries and sector depth (separated by a tack) followed by the call sign of the
unit assigned to that sector.

(1) (NU) Sector Boundaries are ordered by a group of four numerals. First two numerals
indicate the true bearing of the left boundary in tens of degrees; the second two numerals indicate
the true bearing of the right boundary in tens of degrees.

(2) (NU) Sector Depth is also ordered by a group of four numerals. First two numerals indicate
the inner limit and the second two the outer limit of the sector in thousands of yards from the screen
centre.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) SCREEN K–ZZ–0307–0510 c/s DD 4

(NU) Meaning: DD 4 is allocated a sector 030° to 070° true, depth 5,000 to

10,000 yards from ZZ.

(3) (NU) Increments of 5° or 500 yards are ordered by using ANS.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) SCREEN K–ZZ–20 ANS 33 ANS–02 ANS 07 c/s DD 6

(NU) Meaning: DD 6 is allocated a sector 205° to 335° true, depth 2,500 to

7,000 yards from ZZ.

b. (NU) Stationing a Main Body or Military Convoy. Ships of a main body or military convoy
may be stationed by the sector method, but the fact that they are a part of the main body or military
convoy must be made clear to the force. Ships stationed by this method carry out random movements
within their sectors.

c. (NC) (NMP) Construction of ASW Screens. For ASW screen design use the screenplanner
software. For further details, see ATP-28, Vol. I Articles 0820–0822 and ATP-28, Vol. I screenplanning
supplement. (See Figure 3-4 for an example of an ASW sector screen.)

3622 Spare

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0°

330° 95% 91% 30°

50
95% 92%

91% 91%
73% 40
H1

75% 75%
65% H2 H3 65%
300° 30 60°

81% 68%
LUB 20 AUG

65% 65%
BRE BAY
MLA
10

50 40 30 20 10 10 20 30 40 50
270° 90°

10

20

30
240° 120°

40

50
210° 150°

180°

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 3-4. (NU) (NMP) Construction of a Sector (Example)

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3623 Helicopter Windline Screen

(NU) Available helicopters are ordered to sectors, stations, or patrol lines ahead of a carrier launching
or recovering aircraft. The break-dip position is to be at least 5,000 yards from the carrier at all times.
A helicopter windline screen may be ordered by using either the sector method or by stationing the
helicopter(s) relative to the carrier.
3624 Departure and Entry Screens

a. (NU) When the departure/entry screen is ordered, units proceed independently to the sectors or
areas assigned and then patrol at random within them. More than one unit may be allocated to a single
sector or area, in which case, the screen commander is to specify the unit that is to coordinate their
patrol. Sufficient time should be allowed so that screening ships do not proceed at a speed higher than
optimum sonar speed and are able to employ tactical countermeasures while taking up their cruising
stations.

(NU) In the case of departure operations, the screen commander should order the cruising
screen to be formed so that the screening units are in their cruising stations as the Guide passes
Point O. (See Article 3213.)

b. (NU) Departure/entry screens may be ordered by any method convenient to the particular
geographic location; for example, the sector method (see Figure 3-5).

c. (NU) Sector Departure/Entry Screens.

(1) (NU) Description. Units are allocated patrol sectors for which they are responsible, using
the sector method of ordering with the screen centre given as a geographic position. Screen centre
is usually best placed on Point X or along the line X-O.

(2) (NU) Method of Ordering.

(a) (NU) Form departure/entry screen sector.

(b) (NU) Screen centre.

(c) (NU) Sector allocations.

(3) (NU) Example. An example is given in Figure 3-5.

d. (NU) Grid Departure/Entry Screens.

(1) (NU) Description. Ships are allocated patrol areas for which they are responsible, the
boundaries of these areas being specified by the use of CCG preferably locked to a prominent
geographic feature.

(2) (NU) Method of Ordering.

(a) (NU) Form departure/entry screen.

(b) (NU) Grid reference position. (The grid position of point X must also be specified.)

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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 3-5. (NU) Example of Sector Departure/Entry Screen

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(c) (NU) Area allocations. Areas are designated by the grid reference indicating the southwest
corner of each patrol area. Patrol areas are to be three miles square unless otherwise ordered.
If a larger area is ordered, the grid reference is to be followed by a two-figure group, the first
figure indicating the east-west dimension and the second figure the north-south dimension in
miles. Patrol areas may be overlapped.

(3) (U) Example. An example is given in Figure 3-6.

3625 Screen for Damaged Ships

(NU) The sector method should be used for ordering screens for damaged ships. If the speed of a damaged
ship is low, screen units should be allocated large sectors in order to provide an all-around protection and
so that they can use adequate tactical countermeasures for their own defence.
3626–3629 Spare

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 3-6. (NU) Example of Grid Departure/Entry Screen

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3630 Manoeuvring with a Sector Screen

a. (NU) Conduct of Ship Screen Units. Units are to patrol widely throughout their sectors and,
when a subsurface threat exists, to choose that speed which makes for the best use of sonar in the
conditions prevailing. Units should take account of the movement of adjacent screen units in order
to avoid undue gaps. For safety reasons, a unit is not to close nearer than 500 yards to the boundary
separating its sector from one occupied by another unit.

b. (NU) Conduct of Helicopter Screen Units. Helicopters are to dip randomly throughout
their sectors. They may mark-dip in advance of their sectors but must break dip within it. Helicopters
operating under tactical direction should manoeuvre to cover adjacent helicopter sectors left
temporarily vacant. For safety reasons, a helicopter must break dip if it closes within 500 yards of a
sector boundary common to an adjacent occupied sector.

c. (NU) Alteration of Course. If the base course of the main body or convoy is altered, screen
units continue to patrol their sectors.

d. (NU) Screening a Carrier During Flight Operations. The conduct of screen units depends
on the method used for carrier flight operations (see Chapter 6):

(1) (NU) If Method A is used, the rules in subparagraph c above apply.

(2) (NU) If Method B is used, screen units are to patrol their sectors in the upwind direction.

(3) (NU) If Method C is used, screen units should anticipate a turn into the wind by moving
upwind in their sectors.

e. (NU) Adjusting the Screen. To adjust the screen, units may be ordered to shift their sector
boundaries or to change the depth of their sector. If the tactical requirements are not met by adjusting,
the screen must be reordered.

(1) (NU) Shifting Sector Boundaries. Units are ordered to shift their sector clockwise or
counterclockwise by a specified number of tens of degrees. Such shifts should be at least 10 degrees
and must not exceed 90 degrees. Caution must be exercised to ensure that large shifts do not result
in screen units hindering the main body and a reduction in screen protection for an excessive
period of time.

(2) (NU) Changing Depth of Sector. When the situation requires a rapid change of the screen,
units may be ordered to change the inner and outer limits of their sector in the direction of or away
from the screen centre by a specified number of thousands of yards. Such changes should not be
less than 1,000 yards.

(3) (NU) Main Body or Convoy. Ships of the main body or convoy that are stationed by the
sector method may be manoeuvred by the OTC the same way as screen units.

3631 Spare

3632 Instructions for Convoy Screens

(NU) General instructions for ordering and conduct of screens are contained in earlier articles in this
section. Specific responsibilities of convoy screen ships follow:
a. (NU) Maintaining Convoy Discipline. Screen ships are to assist the convoy commodore in
maintaining convoy discipline by reporting ships that make smoke, show lights, lose station, make
unauthorized use of radio, pump bilges, or dump refuse. They are to use initiative and warn merchant
ships directly when immediate action is necessary, informing the OTC and convoy commodore of the
action taken.

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b. (NU) Maintaining Convoy Formation. Screen ships are to make every effort to keep ships in
their proper stations. The OTC may order a screen ship to escort one or more scattered ships; he may
also remedy poor station-keeping by ordering screen ships to lead the flank columns of the convoy
until individual merchant ships have regained station. OTCs must report merchant ship casualties by
a merchant casualty report.

c. (NU) Action When Ship is Damaged. A screen ship on observing that a ship has been damaged
is immediately to report the occurrence and the cause, if known, to the OTC, and at night, if possible,
is to fire two white rockets. It must not be assumed that the OTC is aware of a ship being damaged
until the fact has been reported to him.

d. (NU) Rescue of Survivors. Action to counter a threat and continued protection of the convoy
are to take precedence over the rescue of survivors. When survivors are sighted in the vicinity during a
search for a submarine, life rafts should be dropped. If required, the OTC is to designate screen ships,
as soon as they can be spared, to pick up survivors and to screen other ships engaged in rescue work.

3633 Helicopters in the Screen

(NU) The rules for ordering helicopter screens or assigning helicopters a station or sector in a surface
screen are the same as those for ordering surface screens. However, stations or sectors assigned to
unspecified helicopters must be designated by addition of “DESIG H” after the station or sector assigned.
-EXAMPLE-

SCREEN K–N8C8 DESIG H

Meaning: In this sector screen, there is a helicopter patrol line 8,000 yards ahead of
the main body or convoy.

3634 Control of Screen Helicopters

a. (NU) Helicopter Control Unit. The OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) may assign
the control of helicopters to one or more HCUs. The duties of the HCU are the same as those of an
aircraft control unit (ACU). In the case of a windline screen, the OTC should order the number of
helicopters required and designate the carrier as an HCU. Helicopters may also be ordered to operate
independently.

b. (NU) Procedure When Helicopters Are Employed on Screening Duties.

(1) (NU) The OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) assigns helicopter screen stations.

(2) (NU) The OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) normally allocates one or more helicopters
to each HCU.

(3) (NU) HCU passes to helicopters their sector boundaries and sector limits, or the bearings and
distances of their stations from a suitable reference point (e.g., QQ or ZZ).

(4) (NU) HCU directs the movements of the helicopters under positive control to ensure safety.

c. (NU) Procedure When Carrying Out Evasive Steering. When evasive steering is being
carried out, HCUs must coordinate helicopter movements with ship movements so as to avoid
unacceptable gaps in the screen.

(1) (NU) Very-long-leg or Long-leg Zigzag Plan. When one of these plans is in force,
helicopters in the screen need only be informed of this fact and of the alterations of course at least
one dip cycle before they take place.

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(2) (NU) Short-Leg Zigzag Plan. When this plan is in effect, helicopters in the screen may be
taken under positive control. Helicopters should not be employed along the short legs except in the
direction of the force movement.

d. (NU) Information to Helicopters. Helicopters must be kept informed of the situation by their
HCUs to enable them to perform their functions properly. Information, such as course and speed
alterations, evasive steering in use, adjustment of the screen, and contacts obtained by other units, are
all required by helicopters in the screen.

3635 Pickets

a. (NU) Ordering. Picket stations are ordered either by true bearing and distance from screen centre
or by the sector method.

(NR) (NMP) When fixed-wing aircraft are employed as pickets, airplans from Chapter 12 may be
used.

b. (NU) Manoeuvring. The true bearings and ranges of picket stations do not change with
alterations of course by the main body or convoy. If new picket stations are desired, the OTC (or
screen commander, if delegated) should order them well in advance of the alteration of course.

c. (NR) (NMP) AAW Pickets. For further details of tasking and manoeuvring pickets in the AAW
role, see Chapter 10 and ATP-31.

3636 Towed Array Ships in the Screen

(NU) The procedures for stationing surface ships equipped with towed array systems are similar to those
for other surface ships.
(NC) (NMP) Additional considerations are:
a. (NC) (NMP) Towed Array Sonar (TAS) Ship. The TAS ship may require at least two hours
to localize and attack passive contacts. The dimensions of the patrol station assigned should therefore
include an allowance for at least two hours of force movement along the PIM. In addition, a requirement
to conduct sprint and search tactics may require elongation of a sector.

b. (NC) (NMP) TAS Ship Stations. TAS ship stations may be designated to include the ASW
function and, for suitably equipped units, those of EW, or ASUW, or AAW pickets.

(1) (NC) (NMP) TAS-equipped ships may also be employed in stationary patrol areas for
operations such as entry/departure screens and defended lanes.

(2) (NC) (NMP) More detailed explanations of TAS ship employment are found in ATP-28, Vol. I.

3637–3639 Spare

3640 Special Instructions

3641 Instructions for Individual Screen Units

a. (NU) Report on Joining a Screen. On joining, the commanding officer is to report to the OTC
and screen commander any defect that affects his operational capability and his fuel state.

b. (NU) Rejoining the Screen. Units rejoining a screen are to proceed to their previously assigned
station, unless otherwise ordered.

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c. (NU) Replenishment of Screen Units. When screen units are to conduct replenishment, the
procedure will be as follows:

(1) (NU) Screen ships are to proceed when relieved at screen station unless otherwise ordered.

(2) (NU) Remaining screen units act in accordance with subparagraph f below.

(3) (NU) Screen units rejoining after replenishment act in accordance with subparagraph b above.

(4) (NU) Screen helicopters may be refuelled by surface units.

d. (NU) Bad Weather Conditions. If, during bad weather, a screen unit is unable to maintain the
speed necessary to accomplish the task without damage or serious effects on its sensor performance,
the commanding officer is to report to the OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) the maximum
speed he can maintain.

e. (NU) Equipment Failure. Any sensor or weapon system failure in a screen unit is to be reported
immediately to the OTC (or screen commander, if delegated) and to adjacent units, including the
estimated time at which repairs will be completed. A gap caused by this failure is to be covered, as far
as possible, by adjacent units by adjusting their patrol without leaving their assigned sectors, stations,
or patrol lines, unless the screen commander decides to adjust or reorder the screen.

f. (NU) Filling a Gap. If a screen unit leaves the screen, units in sectors, stations, or patrol lines
adjacent to it are to manoeuvre in their sector, station, or patrol line so as to cover as much of the gap
as possible. They will leave their sector, station, or patrol line only if ordered to do so.

g. (NU) Right of Way. Ships of the main body or convoy have right of way over screen ships, unless
the latter are in contact with submarines. A helicopter in the dip or hover is not to be approached by
ships within 500 yards.

h. (NU) Navigational Hazards. Individual ships are responsible for avoiding navigational hazards.

i. (NU) Bulging the Screen. If, during manoeuvring a carrier by Method B (see Chapter 6), the
length of flight operations necessitates the carrier to proceed outside the screen, the screen is to bulge.
In this case, the two screen units ahead of the carrier leave their sectors, stations, or patrol lines to
screen the carrier.

j. (NU) Taking Up or Changing Sectors or Patrol Lines. Ships should proceed at maximum
sonar speed or operational speed as the tactical situation dictates.

k. (NU) Station-Keeping by Helicopter. A helicopter should be in its allocated station or sector

at the moment of breaking dip for next jump.

3642 Screen Adjustment

(NU) The OTC, or the screen commander when delegated this responsibility, will adjust the screen
whenever there is a change in the tactical situation or in the number of screen units available.

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SECTION VII—READINESS

3700 Scope

(NU) This section establishes common procedures for organizing, ordering, and reporting the readiness
of a force.
3701–3719 Spare

3720 Readiness for Action

3721 Operational Capabilities

a. (NU) The operational capabilities of any combatant unit can generally be considered to consist
of three components: warning, evaluation, and action. Normally any engagement will develop in the
following sequence:

(1) (NU) Warning. The indication by any tactical information source of the presence of a threat.

(2) (NU) Evaluation. The appraisal of threat information to determine the type and degree of
threat.

(3) (NU) Action. The employment of one or more weapon systems to counter the threat.

b. (NU) The rules governing degrees of readiness allow that, with a lowering of the warning, there
follows a more rapid lowering of the evaluation and a marked lowering of the action components. In
addition, the desired readiness for action is influenced by:

(1) (NU) Capabilities of tactical information sources, weapon systems, and communications.

(2) (NU) Effects of environmental factors (e.g., dawn or dusk, fog, sonar conditions, afternoon
effects, etc.).

(3) (NU) Training status of personnel.

(4) (NU) Command organization.

3722 Inoperable Equipment

(NU) When a unit is unable to assume or keep the ordered degree of readiness (or alert state), this
inability shall be reported to the OTC, including in the report the reason and the time at which the ordered
degree of readiness (alert state) will be assumed or resumed. Permission shall be obtained from the OTC
before equipment essential for warning, evaluation, or action is made inoperable for maintenance. Daily
performance checks are to be carried out on such equipment to ascertain its readiness for effective use.
3723 Command Responsibilities

a. (NU) Degree of Readiness. The OTC will order the degree of readiness to be assumed.
Commanding officers may order a higher degree of readiness for their own ship if they consider it
necessary.

b. (NU) Alert State. In a degree of readiness the OTC may order the alert state. Commanding
officers may order a higher state for their own systems. The OTC may assign this responsibility to one
of the commanders.

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c. (NU) Notice. The OTC will order the notice for the force.

d. (NU) Threat Warnings. The OTC will normally promulgate threat warnings. He may assign
this responsibility to commanders.

e. (NU) Emergency Signals. Emergency signals may be made by any commanding officer,
coordinator, commander, or the OTC, but their use requires caution because of the action/responses
that will be taken in the force.

f. (NU) Readiness in Harbour/Anchorage. The OTC or commanding officer will order the
degree of readiness in consultation with local authorities.

3724 Organization

a. (NU) Ships. One general degree of readiness is normally ordered to meet all types of threat;
however, a particular degree of readiness may be ordered when the situation so justifies. Particular
degrees may concern ASUW, ASW, AAW, MW, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) defence, or engineering. A modification of the degrees of readiness may be assumed by
amphibious forces as necessary to provide for the embarkation or disembarkation of troops and
equipment.

b. (NU) Guard Ships. The OTC may detail certain ships to assume a higher degree of readiness
than the remainder. Ships so detailed are known as guard ships.

c. (NU) Readiness in Harbour/Anchorage. Readiness in harbour will be organized in

accordance with local orders or on order of the OTC or commanding officer after consultation with
local authorities. For readiness of ships against underwater swimmer attack, see Chapter 18.

3725 Joining

a. (NU) When a ship joins a force, the joining unit will provide the following information to the OTC:

(1) (NU) Messages OPSTAT UNIT and OPSTAT HELO, stressing the restrictions to operational
readiness.

(2) (NU) National restrictions to the ROE.

(3) (NU) Messages and updated OPGEN, OPTASKs, and OPSTATs received to date.

b. (NU) The OTC will provide:

(1) (NU) Updated OPGEN, OPTASKs, and OPSTATs as necessary.

(2) (NU) Last status of EMCON, communication plan (COMPLAN), and link net.

(3) (NU) A frequency and a geographic position to rendezvous if joining fails.

(4) (NU) A list of relevant signals in force.

3726–3729 Spare

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3730 General Degrees of Readiness

(NU) This article states the aim of the several general degrees of readiness. When only a general degree
of readiness is ordered, each department shall comply in accordance with the appropriate particular
degree of readiness.
a. (NU) First. The aim is to employ the full operational capability of the unit involved. All stations
are fully manned and can therefore be put into operation in the shortest time. Commanding officers
may order temporary relaxation from the first degree of readiness to permit designated personnel to
draw and distribute meals at their action stations.

b. (NU) Second. The aim is to employ the best operational capability that can be maintained for a
prolonged period (e.g., two to three weeks) with up to one-half of the personnel on duty. Emphasis is
to be laid on the warning component.

c. (NU) Third. The aim is to have weapons available to counter an unexpected threat and to retain
sufficient warning time to assume a higher degree of readiness, while relaxing equipment, with up to
one-third of the personnel on duty. This degree can be maintained for an indefinite period.

d. (NU) Fourth. The aim is to have all systems operational. Sufficient systems are to be manned to
achieve adequate warnings required.

e. (NU) Fifth. The aim is to allow for rest and relaxation within the limitations imposed by the notice
ordered. It is the lowest degree of readiness and is used only when in port or at anchor.

3731–3739 Spare

3740 Particular Degrees of Readiness

(NU) When ordering a general degree of readiness, the OTC may order a higher degree of readiness for
a particular type of warfare, CBRN defence, or engineering, should the situation so demand.
3741 Graduated Levels of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat and
Minimum Individual Protection

(NU) For information about promulgating the CBRN threat level and guidance about minimum protective
measures, see Article 17060. These minimum measures may be exceeded as required by an individual
command.
3742 Engineering Degrees of Readiness

a. (NU) First. Propulsion machinery is fully manned and power is available for maximum speed.

b. (NU) Second. Propulsion machinery is manned and ready for operational speed, with full power
available at two hours’ notice.

c. (NU) Third. Propulsion machinery is manned and ready for operational speed, with full power
available at four hours’ notice.

d. (NU) Fourth. Propulsion machinery is manned and ready for operational speed, with full power
available at eight hours’ notice.

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3743–3749 Spare

3750 Weapon Alert States

a. (NU) The readiness of force systems can be ordered by the OTC or his delegate or be reported by
a unit carrying force weapons.

b. (NU) When ordered, the weapon alert state expresses the time (in minutes) in which the weapon
system has to be ready. The alert state READY orders the immediate readiness of the indicated force
weapon system.

c. (NU) When reported, the weapon alert state expresses the time (in minutes) in which the weapon
system can be available. When the system is available it is reported READY.

3751–3759 Spare

3760 Aircraft Alert States

a. (NU) The OTC orders an aircraft alert state to prescribe readiness requirements for aircraft within
the force. Alert states are:

(1) (NU) AIRBORNE ALERT—Combat-equipped aircraft are airborne and ready for immediate
action.

(2) (NU) DECK ALERT—The OTC specifies the number and type of aircraft and the time in
minutes that they are to be airborne after the order to launch is given.

b. (NU) A deck alert requires more warning than an airborne alert. The OTC should bear in mind that
the presence of aircraft on the flight deck may hamper freedom of manoeuvre and that deck alerts
onboard small ships may restrict the use of other weapon systems. The OTC may use OPTASK AIR
(see APP-11) to order alert states for helicopters on all ships in the formation.

-EXAMPLES-

(NU) 2 fighter aircraft Alert 5…Two fighter aircraft ready to become airborne
5 minutes after the order to launch has been given.

(NU) 1 ASW helicopter Alert 20…One ASW helicopter ready to become airborne
20 minutes after the order to launch has been given.

3761–3769 Spare

3770 Threat Warnings

(NU) A threat warning is informative only. Force or individual unit actions are not therefore linked to
it automatically. An OTC may sometimes order measures of a temporary nature (including those for
use with antiship missile defence (ASMD)) when a threat warning is promulgated (e.g., changing the
EMCON plan). In many cases, however, such actions are more appropriately linked to detections and
enemy reports (emergency signals).

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a. (NU) Colour Code. The colour code applied to a threat warning denotes the severity of the
evaluated threat:

Colour Code Evaluation

WARNING WHITE ATTACK IS UNLIKELY WITHOUT ADEQUATE WARNING
WARNING YELLOW ATTACK IS PROBABLE
WARNING RED ATTACK IS IMMINENT, OR HAS ALREADY COMMENCED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

b. (NU) Type of Threat. The following plain language words are to precede the colour code to
denote the type of threat:

(NU) AIR

(NU) MINES

(NU) CBRN

(NU) SURFACE

(NU) SUBMARINES.

NOTE

(NU) FOR PROMULGATION OF MINE THREAT, SEE ALSO

AHP-01, ALLIED WORLDWIDE NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION
SYSTEM (AWNIS). FOR PROMULGATION OF CBRN THREATS AND
HAZARDS INFORMATION, CONSULT ATP-45, WARNING AND
REPORTING AND HAZARD PREDICTION OF CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR INCIDENTS
(SERIES).

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PART II Communications/C4ISR

Chapter 4—Communications

Chapter 5—Weapons Employment

Chapter 6—Force Coordination

Chapter 7—Picture Compilation and Scouting

Chapter 8—Electronic and Acoustic Warfare

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CHAPTER 4 Communications
SECTION I—TACTICAL COMPLANS

4100 Scope

This chapter sets forth in broad terms the tactical aspects of communications and establishes measures
necessary for their protection. The use of certain nets, as they affect the principal areas of warfare, is also
described. Detailed communications doctrine and COMPLANs and descriptions of specific circuits are
contained in ACP-176, NATO Supplements, and ACP-200. See also Chapter 8, Electronic and Acoustic
Warfare, and APP-01, Maritime Voice Reporting Procedures.
4110 Communication Plan Design

COMPLANs should be designed using the following guidelines:

a. Minimise the number of circuits to be guarded by ships. This is the principle of the electronic
protective measures/reduced tactical communication plan (RTC), as shown in Figure 4-1. An RTC
can be devised by combining circuits with similar procedures in order to reduce the total number
of nets IAW ACP-176. For small forces with limited communication equipment, an RTC should be
considered.

LINE COLUMN IDENTIFIER

IDENTIFIER FROM_ TO _
FROM_ TO_ PLAN SIX FOUR AND SO ON - -

LINE NO. CIRCUIT TITLE EMISSION A B C D E

CHARLIE 205/206 TF/TG 4510 7344 2994 2678 19568

BROADCAST

WHISKEY 207/208 TF/TG CALLING 12132.5 2965 3767 2725 18325

WORKING

AND SO ON 209/210 TF/TG 266.3 320.6 4213.5 5645.5

TACTICAL (4212) (5644)

212/213 TF/TG 308.6 371.1 2673.5

REPORTING (2672)

222 ACTION NET 288.7

ALPHA

223 ACTION 293.0

NET BRAVO

224 ACTION
NET CHARLIE

404/405 AAW WEAPON

COORD

AND SO ON

Figure 4-1. Example of Electronic Protective Measures/Reduced Tactical COMPLAN

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b. Minimise the use of MF/high frequency (HF) transmissions to reduce detectability by the enemy.
This involves the maximum use of satellite communications (SATCOM) and/or AUTOCAT/
MIDDLEMAN and ship-to-ship ultrahigh frequency (UHF) relay.

c. Use limited range of intercept (LRI) and low probability of intercept (LPI) techniques when MF/
HF transmissions are unavoidable.

d. Provide frequency diversity for key circuits, preferably in more than one band. Since equipment
and frequencies are bound to be in short supply, priority should be given to those circuits most needed
to coordinate force defence, particularly ASMD.

e. Separate vital UHF circuit frequencies by at least 30 MHz (preferably 40 MHz) to reduce the
effectiveness of disruptive jamming. To prevent mutual interference, a frequency separation of 1 to
5 MHz is necessary. Minimum separation depends upon equipment fitted in units.

f. Maximise cryptographic protection on circuits to minimise the requirement for low-grade codes
and authentication.

g. Consider special requirements for specific circuits as follows:

(1) Antijam Coordination Net. A line-of-sight net that ideally should be secure voice or out of
band (e.g., VHF (IMM) or VHF (aeronautical)). It is used for passing vital information when under
ECM attack, alerting the force to imitative deception (by a GINGERBREAD call) and coordinating
the execution of countermeasures.

(2) Fighter Control Frequencies. These should be in the lower half of the UHF band because
of undesirable transmission characteristics which are more pronounced at the top of the band than
at the bottom. Additional communications planning should allow for frequency-agile radios such
as HAVEQUICK.

h. Allow for the allocation of column and line identifiers in EPM COMPLANs to preserve security
and to gain valuable time when changing frequencies in a jamming environment. Lines should be
identified by random letters of the phonetic alphabet and columns by random numerals. The OTC
should make clear for what period the identifiers are in force.

i. Indicate circuit priorities to assist in equipment allocation within individual units.

4120 Communication Guidelines

Detailed procedures for the conduct of communications vary for different types of nets and are found in
the appropriate ACPs and APs. Maritime voice reporting procedures are contained in APP-01.
4121 Network Control Station

Each net has a network control station (NCS) assigned to control traffic and enforce discipline on the
net. The NCS function may be assigned as a specific duty, or it may be incorporated in the functions of
a warfare commander, coordinator, or controller (i.e., EWC or force track coordinator air (FTC-A)) as
discussed in Chapter 10. Link nets, such as Link 11, have slightly different requirements, and the control
procedures for those nets are described in Chapter 7.
4122 Spare

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4123 Call Signs

a. General. Daily changing call signs should be used on all military uncovered communication
circuits. Ship names or international call signs may be used:

(1) When communicating in the VHF (IMM) band in the vicinity of merchant vessels or stations.

(2) During SAR operations.

(3) In circumstances where it is considered impractical or unsafe to use daily changing call signs;
for example, on harbour movement nets. Such nets should not be used outside 15 miles of harbour
limits.

NOTE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USE OF CALL SIGNS ARE CONTAINED

IN APP-01.

b. Standard Call Sign Convention for Warfare Commanders and Coordinators. Warfare
commanders and coordinators may be allocated a two-letter call sign related to their respective
command or coordination function as shown below. This does not preclude the use of daily changing
call signs. A force may have more than one CWC (such as a carrier battle force consisting of multiple
carrier battle groups, each with its own CWC organization). The first letter of each call sign signifies
which CWC the commander or coordinator is subordinate to and is unique to that CWC organization.
For example, the first group would be allocated the letter A, the second group B. Therefore, call sign
BW is the AAWC of the second group.

NOTE

THE CALL SIGN AA IS RESERVED FOR THE FLEET COMMANDER.

Primary Alternate
CWC “____”B “____”V
AAWC “____”W “____”C
ASWC “____”X “____”Y
ASUWC “____”S “____”T
SC “____”N “____”D
EWC “____”E “____”Z
AREC “____”R “____”U
HEC “____”L “____”H
NMWC “____”G “____”F
SOCA “____”J “____”K
IWC “____”Q “____”TK
STWC “____”P “____”TK

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4124 Use of Radio Teletype for Tactical Messages

a. When voice circuit encryption/decryption equipment is not available, secure radio teletype (RATT)
should be used whenever possible to pass intra-force tactical signals.

b. All tactical signals passed via RATT circuits are to:

(1) Bear the precedence IMMEDIATE.

(2) Bear a sequential serial number and day-time group (DTG).

(3) Be identified by tactical signal (TACSIG) as the first word of the text.

(4) Be given RUSH DISTRIBUTION only and subsequently filed.

c. Tactical RATT cannot be used to transmit EXECUTIVE METHOD messages.

4125 Data Links

Tactical data links are communication paths used to transfer information from TDS-equipped units to
both TDS- and non-TDS-equipped units. These links permit a rapid exchange of information as they
automatically exchange data between the units participating. The information transferred may be used
for picture compilation or to order specific action by units or weapon platforms. Voice communications
must be used to pass all the appropriate information to non-link-fitted units and may be required to assist
in the management of links.

NOTE

CHAPTER 5 PROVIDES DATA LINK EMCON GUIDELINES,

AND ADATP SERIES PUBLICATIONS PROVIDE DETAILED
PROCEDURAL STANDARDS FOR DATA LINKS.

4126 Types of Data Link

The following NATO data links are associated with maritime operations:
a. LINK 1 is the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment link between air defence sites in Europe.

b. LINK 11 is an automatic, medium-speed UHF/HF link used for the exchange of picture compilation
and command-and-control information between ships and among ships, aircraft, and shore stations.

c. LINK 11B is an automatic medium-speed landline link used for the exchange of the tactical
picture between military units ashore.

d. LINK 16 is a real-time, ECM-resistant, secure, bit-oriented data link using time-division

multiple access technology for information exchange in contact reporting, aircraft control, weapons
coordination, and C2.

e. LINK 22 is a secure, ECM-resistant, medium-speed digital data link, employed within NATO to
support maritime operations through the exchange of tactical data among ships, submarines, fixed-wing
(FW) aircraft, helicopters, and shore-based units. The Link 22 communications system allows many
users to contribute to and access a real-time database of tactical information in a controlled manner.

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f. Variable message format (VMF) is a bit oriented digital information standard consisting of variable
length messages. Digital data VMF messages are not man readable but are designed as a common
means of exchanging digital data between combat units at various organizational levels, with varying
needs for volume and detail of information, and applicable to a broad range of tactical communication
systems.

g. Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP). This protocol allows TDL pre-formatted
messages beyond line of sight.

4127–4129 Spare

4130 Communications Security

4131 COMSEC Procedures

COMSEC procedures form an integral part of EPM and protect communications transmissions from
exploitation by hostile forces. These measures include:
a. Control of radiated power.

b. Use of low-grade codes to protect voice transmissions.

c. Use of covered (electronically encrypted) circuits.

d. Use of authentication (see Articles 4132 and 4133).

e. Minimal transmissions on communication circuits designated for use by the EP and strict circuit
discipline.

f. Frequency selection to best exploit the medium in which the transmission is effected, including the
use of LRI techniques.

g. Maintenance of equipment to minimise internal noise and nullify the possibility of TEMPEST
radiation from the superstructure of the transmitting unit or other improper antenna.

4132 Authentication

a. Principles. Authentication measures protect against imitative deception on communication

circuits. Current authentication procedures are based upon the following principles:

(1) Authentication should not be used unless warranted by the degree of risk that imitative
deception may be attempted by the enemy.

(2) When used, the amount of circuit time devoted to the procedure should be the minimum
consistent with the achievement of an acceptable level of protection against the unit employing
imitative deception.

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b. Risk of Imitative Deception. This risk exists on all types of uncovered circuits, and tactical
voice circuits are an obvious potential target. (See GINGERBREAD procedures in APP-01.)

c. Authentication Procedures. Present authentication rules call for the Challenge and Reply
mode whenever possible because it is significantly more secure than the Transmission mode. However,
Transmission mode can provide an acceptable compromise between security and net loading if it is
backed up by Challenge and Reply when message credibility is in doubt. While this is addressed in
Table 4-1, operators should be aware that it is relatively easy for an experienced adversary to defeat
the Transmission mode of authentication by obtaining a valid authentication from one net and using it
to intrude on another. For that reason, a receiving station must always initiate a Challenge and Reply
whenever the transmitting station has not been identified as a friendly.

Table 4-1. Authentication Policies

Occasion for Use Type of Authentication

IMITATIVE DECEPTION
1. When challenged. (A station never responds to a challenge Respond to challenge in
unless it follows on immediately from a transmission they accordance with Challenge and
have made.) Reply procedure.
2. a. When spoofing is suspected. Challenge and Reply
b. To check identity of originator of an unexpected message. Challenge and Reply

3. On receipt of a message:
a. Authenticated wrongly Challenge and Reply
b. On which authentication is more than 2 minutes’ time late. Challenge and Reply
c. Which was not authenticated when it should have been. Challenge and Reply

4. a. Joining a circuit. Challenge and Reply

b. Rejoining a circuit after a long absence (in excess of Challenge and Reply
an hour).
5. a. Imposing radio silence. Transmission
b. Broadcasting to a unit under silence, or transmitting Transmission
“blind.”
c. Requiring a unit to break silence. Transmission
6. Making enemy contact or amplifying reports. Transmission

7. Changing authentication policy in force. Transmission

8. Ordering to change watch, circuit, or frequency. Transmission

9. Initiating EPM procedures. Transmission

10. Detaching a unit; changing screening stations; or Transmission

employment of escorts and helicopters.
11. Altering course of speed of the main body. Transmission

12. Transmitting groups from Action Table. Transmission

13. Calling ZIPPO. Transmission
14. As directed by the command (i.e., when important tactical Transmission
signals are made).

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4133 Authentication Policies

a. Definitions.

(1) Policy ALFA. Enemy forces are likely to use imitative deception or the use of imitative
deception has been confirmed.

(2) Policy BRAVO. Imitative deception is unlikely to be used by the enemy.

b. Use of Authentication Policies.

(1) If the tactical situation is in favour of the enemy trying to conduct imitative deception, the
full degree of authentication is to be implemented as in Policy ALFA (Occasions 1 to 14 in
Table 4-1). This also applies when imitative deception has already been confirmed. To guard against
the situation in which an intruder attempts imitative deception simply to test the force’s reaction
(and the OTC does not wish to reveal the practical effects of Policy ALFA), Policy BRAVO may
be ordered by the OTC.

(2) In Policy BRAVO, authentication is used infrequently (Occasions 1 to 8 in Table 4-1). The
initial stage of an intruder situation is typical of one in which Policy BRAVO would be appropriate;
that is, the intruder is intent on monitoring rather than interfering with communications.

c. Ordering Authentication Policies. The authentication policy is ordered by the brevity word
OYSTER.

d. Aircraft Authentication on Relevant Nets. Excessive use of authentication with single-seat

aircraft is to be avoided. Transmission authentication is recommended over Challenge and Reply
methods as it can be accomplished easily and quickly.

4134 Spare

4135 Task Force/Group Communications

Command nets link the CWC (OTC if CWC is not designated) with the warfare commanders, functional
commanders, and coordinators. In addition, command nets provide a circuit for warfare commanders
to coordinate actions. Tactical nets are used for the passing of signals that require individual units of
a formation, or a formation as a whole, to manoeuvre by order of the formation commander and for
the exchange of urgent tactical messages that call for rapid response. Control nets are used to rapidly
exchange orders and information used in the overall direction and control of activities, weapons, systems,
etc., by a commander or designated authority. Administrative/working nets are used for the exchange
of messages of a nonoperational nature or operational messages of a nonurgent nature. The principal
nets typically used by task forces/groups organized under the CWC concept outlined in Chapter 1 are
described in the following articles.
4136 TF/TG Command Net

The TF/TG command net is the primary net for the coordination and exchange of information between
the OTC/CWC and warfare commanders and coordinators. It is the primary means to report the tactical
situation, pass policy and important decisions, exercise control, evaluate performance, and report changes
in warfare cognizance. It is also used to communicate between CWCs of different forces or widely
separated sectors.

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4137 TF/TG and Screen Tactical Nets

The TF/TG tactical net is used for manoeuvring signals and urgent short tactical messages. For larger
formations, a separate screen tactical net may be established to direct screening units.
4138 TF/TG Reporting

Although these nets are used primarily for surface data compilation, they are also the primary nets for
initial raid reports and shall therefore be guarded by CTGs/CTUs, major units, and all detached units in
the disposition. In addition, all surface units should maintain receiver watch on these circuits. The nets
will be used as follows:
a. By the OTC to pass tactical signals of an urgent nature to the disposition when passing a message
by other means would be detrimental to the operation.

b. By the FTCs to:

(1) Pass all filtered raid and EW reports to the OTC.

(2) Pass all position reports of own ships and aircraft (or groups of ships for individual task groups).

4139 Guidelines for Internet Protocol Chat Rooms

The professional, appropriate use of chat rooms on Internet protocol information systems such as NSWAN
can greatly assist in the management of all aspects of task force operations. Electronic chat is an informal
tool that supplements voice communications, message traffic, tactical signals, and tactical/operational
data systems. Chat rooms may be used at the commander’s discretion for delivery of orders and other
official traffic. Should the commander decide to use chat in this capacity, local directives should be issued
(or included in applicable OPTASKs) that indicate which operational reports and orders may be made
using chat and specify release and/or authentication procedures. Acknowledgement of orders given via
chat is required to ensure that the order is received and understood. Commanders must weigh chat room
benefits against situational awareness to prevent chat sessions from distracting tactical display operators.
a. Chat Room Names. If chat is used, commanders determine the chat rooms to establish and
monitor. Chat room titles and names should identify the group/unit to monitor the chat room and
the function of the chat room. For example, “SFN_AS” would be the name of the chat room used to
coordinate ASW that is monitored by Striking Force NATO.

b. Chat Room Participation. Commanders shall establish naming conventions for chat room
participants and guidelines for documenting chat sessions and the use of acronyms and whisper modes.

c. Chat Room NCS. Commanders should be the NCS for chat rooms that they establish. They are
responsible for:

(1) Enforcing circuit discipline.

(2) Ensuring that chat room participants are properly identified.

(3) Ensuring that chat rooms are being used for their intended purpose.

d. Password Protection. Temporary password-protected chat rooms may be established if

required by the affected commander(s) but should only be used for a specific event or time period.

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e. Whisper Sessions. Whisper boxes allow two or more chat rooms to exchange information
privately and will normally be used only when the subject does not pertain to the purpose of the chat
room or when sensitive data needs to be passed among a limited group. Whisper box use should be
minimised to maintain situation awareness among all chat room participants.

4140 Anti-air Warfare and Airspace Coordination Communications

AAW communications nets are used for picture compilation and weapon system coordination.
Well-coordinated AAW measures require a rapid and reliable flow of data between units of the force.
When coordinating AAW activities, one or more of the following nets—AAW reporting net, AAW
coordination net (force/sector), or AAW C&R net—may be used. The joint AAW shore coordination net
may be used when coordinating activities with shore air defence authorities. If equipment limitations
preclude manning of all assigned AAW nets by certain units, the affected units will report this to the
AAWC for resolution. If the AAWC is unable to resolve the problem without affecting other warfare
missions, the matter will be referred to the OTC for resolution.
4141 AAW Reporting Net

The AAW reporting net, controlled by the FTC-A, is used for exchanging information about the positions,
identities, and supplementary information of air contacts. The duty of FTC-A is normally held by the
AAWC but may be delegated.
4142 AAW Coordination Net (Force/Sector)

This net is controlled by the AAWC or sector anti-air warfare commander (SAAWC). Main types of
traffic are:
a. Threat warnings and ZIPPO calls.

b. Orders relative to combat air patrol (CAP) or AEW assignments, stationing, and relieving.

c. Weapon coordination (target assignment, weapon designation).

d. Weapon restriction orders relative to safety sectors.

e. Target engagement messages.

f. Reports of AAW ammunition states.

g. Coordination of homing for lost aircraft.

h. Coordination and direction of the initial phase of SAR.

i. Shore coordination when appropriate.

4143 Local AAW Coordination Net

This is a UHF voice net controlled by the local AAWC. The main uses of this net are to:
a. Provide a clear picture of the local air situation to enable point defence weapon controllers to
identify targets.

b. Promulgate threat warnings and ZIPPO calls.

c. Establish watch zones.

d. Issue weapon restriction orders.

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4144 Combining AAW Nets

In order to reduce the number of lines in use, the AAW coordination and AAW reporting nets are often
combined into a single net, known as the AAW C&R net. This is the primary voice coordinating, control,
and reporting net for the AAWC. The success of the combined net depends on good circuit discipline; the
ability to pass information depends on the complexity of the real-time situation. However, it is essential
that the following information be included:
a. Initial detection and tracking reports of evaluated threats.

b. Engagement and results of engagement.

c. Tracking reports of friendly aircraft that could be mistaken as hostile.

d. CAP and missile ship position reports when not on station.

e. CAP, AEW, and ASW aircraft launch and mission reports (MISREPs).

4145 Fleet Air Defence Identification Zone/Force Air Coordination Area Net

The FADIZ (or force air coordination area (FACA)) net is used by the FADIZ coordinator/FACA
controller/force marshaller to check-in friendly aircraft into and out of the TG AAW surveillance area,
conduct IFF checks and provide air control vectors (steers) as required. It is usually a secure net.
4146 Anti-air Warfare Interceptor Coordination and Reporting Net

This is the primary net used between SAAWCs to coordinate AAW measures. The anti-air warfare
interceptor C&R net is controlled by the AAWC. SAAWCs will use other nets to affect tracking and
weapon control functions within their respective sectors of responsibility.
4147 Fighter/AEW Control Net

Net controlled by the AAWACU/AEWCU used to pass employment orders to fighters and AEW aircraft.
Fighter and AEW control nets will normally be separated.
4148 Joint AAW Support and Coordination Net

This net is used for selective reporting of the air picture among the air defence agency ashore, AEW
aircraft, and REDCROWN. Normally, when operating in or adjacent to a joint operations area (JOA),
REDCROWN will establish communications with the appropriate air operations centre (AOC) on the
joint anti-air warfare support and coordination (JAAWSC) net.
4149 AAW Data Links

See Article 4126.

a. Link 11 (UHF/HF). Used to exchange track data and weapons control information between
AAW TDS-equipped units and is a means by which inner defence zone coordinator (IDZC) and outer
defence zone coordinator (ODZC) exchange information.

(1) This circuit is essential to AAW units within a time-critical inner defence zone (IDZ).

(2) For purposes of the outer air battle (OAB), Link 11 net participants should be held to a
minimum with an AEW acting as NCS.

(3) Silent surface-to-air missile (SAM) units in the outer defence zone (ODZ) receive the tactical
AAW picture via Link 11 (receive only). This operation permits units detecting new contacts to get
the information rapidly on the data link.

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b. Link 16. Link 16 is the primary TDL for AAW. It allows contact reporting, aircraft control,
weapons management, and C2. As not all navy ships are L16 fitted, it is necessary to broadcast the air
situation from L16 to L11. L16 fitted ships are normally double link fitted and able to emit on both
TDL. In case of lack of L16 relay (usually with airborne L16 station).

4150 AAW Call Signs

Encrypted or one- or two-letter call signs may be used on AAW circuits. The OTC will promulgate which
system will be used in his force. When lettered call signs are used, they will be assigned in the OPTASK
AAW message. Letter designators are assigned to AAW units as follows:

a. W—Collective call sign for all primary and secondary AAW units.

b. _W—AAWC for a specific CWC organization. Remark: The first letter of this call sign is significant
and unique for the CWC organization to which the AAWC belongs. The first battle group will be
allocated the letter A, the second B, etc.

c. _C—Alternate AAWC for a specific CWC organization. For first letter see remark above.

d. D to P—Single letters for primary AAW units.

e. Q to R—Single letters for EW aircraft.

f. S—For all ASUW units.

g. T to Z (except W)—Single letters for AEW stations.

h. Dual letters for secondary reporting units. First letter of call sign is that of primary AAW unit
assigned as local anti-air warfare coordinator (LAAWC). Second letter is A to Z (except I and O).
Ensure call signs assigned to secondary reporting units do not conflict with those previously assigned
to warfare commanders and coordinators.

4151–4154 Spare

4155 Antisurface Warfare Communications

Antisurface warfare operations require reliable, and preferably secure, communications nets for C2,
targeting, and picture compilation. ASUW operations are generally conducted on the TF/TG nets
described by Articles 4135 through 4138 vice dedicated nets such as those established for AAW and
ASW. ASUW control nets such as the SAG nets described in Article 4157 are normally initially shared
with similar ASW fighting nets.

Careful thought must be given to the communication requirements for over-the-horizon targeting
(OTHT). Targeting units may well operate outside normal UHF range and may require the use of HF
(subject to EP). By virtue of their important function, OTHT communications are also likely to be the
object of ECM effort by an enemy, and antijam alternatives should be allocated.

4156 Spare

4157 Surface Action Group Communications

a. Control Net. When the formation of a SAG is planned and adequate warning is given, there will
be no difficulty in activating a prepared communication plan. However, this may not be the case when
a SAG is formed in an emergency to counter a sudden threat. In this case, the SAG shall continue
employing the present control net. The OTC/SC should shift the remainder of the force to an alternate
circuit.

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b. Single-Letter Visual Signals. To counter an enemy capability to intercept or jam tactical

communications, ships detached to carry out SAG duties must be able to communicate without a
radio. This may be achieved by the use of the single-letter manoeuvring signals and single-letter
action signals in ATP-01, Vol. II. Such signals may be used without further orders as soon as the SAG
is formed. SAG control and tactical nets are still to be manned but should be used for vital information
in an emergency only.

4158 Maritime Interdiction Operations Communications

During MIO, an MIO C&R net should be established to coordinate interdiction and boarding operations
if this cannot be achieved on the TF/TG nets. ATP-71 provides communications requirements and
procedures for boarding operations.
4159 Sea Combat Commander Communications

When ASW and ASUW functions have been combined into a single SCC, the separate and distinct ASW
nets described previously shall be included in COMPLANs and activated as required. A separate SCC
C&R circuit should also be included. All ASW and SW coordination and reporting is conducted on the
SCC C&R net unless net loading grows to the point that a separate ASW net is required.
4160 Antisubmarine Warfare Communications

ASW communications are used for picture compilation and weapon system coordination. ASW
communications planning considers the communications capabilities of each assigned and supporting unit
and should include allocation of all circuits that may be required during the course of ASW operations;
however, ASW circuits should only be activated as needed. The basic communications organization for
ASW is in ACP-176.
4161 ASW Coordination and Reporting Net

The ASWC is the NCS for the ASW C&R secure voice net and uses it to coordinate with and exercise
TACON of assigned forces. This net is also used by ASW forces to submit contact reports, SITREPs, and
position reports to the ASWC. The ASWC also may authorize its use by individual units to coordinate
among themselves. When a sector antisubmarine warfare coordinator has been designated, a separate
ASW C&R net should be established for that sector. Communications between the ASWC and his
SASWCs are best accomplished via an ASW over-the-horizon (OTH) C&R net or by establishment of a
specific intersect or ASW C&R net.
4162 Communications with Distant ASW Units

a. During operations in which units are spread over a large area, an ASW OTH C&R net may be
used by the ASWC to gather information from and control the actions of widely scattered ASW units
(e.g., submarines and towed array surface ships). Ostensibly, the circuit uses HF voice; however, UHF
SATCOM and low data rate (LDR) teletype (TTY) are preferred during Allied operations. Use of
SATCOM for this net significantly enhances its reliability, especially for submarine communications.
This net is often referred to as ASW reporting or ASW LDR, reflecting its primary function and the
medium used. The ASWC functions as NCS and should operate the circuit as a directed net if it uses
TTY communications.

b. Consideration must be given to the special requirements in the tactical employment and coordination
of submarines and units with long-range passive sensors. These requirements are further set forth
below.

(1) Submarines. The submarine must operate in coordination with other units in order that its
potential may be fully exploited. This in turn requires communications to the submerged submarine
on an unscheduled basis; it also may require communications relay depending upon the equipment
fits of the submarine and the force ASW commander’s ship. Submarine communications are
discussed in Articles 4170 through 4174 and ATP-18.

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(2) Towed Array. The employment of towed array units requires provision of fast, secure
communication channels. These include secure voice UHF for scene-of-action coordination and
UHF/super-high frequency (SHF) SATCOM to the OTC/ASWC; secure HF RATT may also
be required. A dedicated intelligence broadcast may also be required. Specific communication
requirements are:

(a) A secure long-range circuit to pass contact information to the OTC/ASWC and for the
OTC/ASWC to control the towed array ship(s). A voice circuit is preferable; however, in its
absence a secure RATT circuit is acceptable.

(b) A secure circuit is required for towed array ships to exchange contact data for crossfixing.
A voice circuit is again preferable. If SATCOM is not available and ships are beyond line of
sight, it may be necessary to employ a third party to relay this information.

(c) Each towed array ship should be capable of coordinating the localization process with
assigned aircraft using secure voice UHF communications.

(d) All towed array units must be capable of receiving the recognized surface and subsurface
picture transmitted by the FTC or other authority out to the limits of the ASW AOI.

(e) A single net may meet the requirements of items (1) and (2). In a small force, it may also
include the subsurface raid reporting function.

4163 Surface Ship Communications

a. On dispatch of an SAU, responsibility for its communication requirements is transferred from

the OTC to the SAU commander. In general, the existing ASW nets continue to be manned by the
SAU, with the remainder shifting to an alternative ASW control frequency (Procedure ALPHA,
see ACP-176) or screen tactical frequency (Procedure BRAVO).

b. The SAU commander reports to the ASWC via the task group ASW C&R net and exercises
TACON of SAU ships with the ASW control net. Similarly, when a screen commander or manoeuvring
coordinator is assigned, a separate circuit may be activated for the execution of those functions internal
to the screen or main body, with the screen commander/manoeuvring coordinator making reports to
the ASWC via ASW C&R or TG CMD net. Careful thought must be given to the EP adopted by the
SAU commander to avoid alerting hostile units to the existence, composition, or position of the SAU,
and to this end, use should be made of standard tabulated messages, such as the ASW Action Table in
ATP-01, Vol. II. Single-letter manoeuvring signals may be used for SAU action.

4164 ASW Aircraft Communications

To avoid congestion on the ASW C&R net, it may be desirable to shift ASW aircraft coordination
functions to an ASW control net or air control net as appropriate. The ASW control net is used by the
scene-of-action commander (SAC) to exercise TACON of assigned units at the scene of action. As with
surface ships, the SAC uses the ASW control net to control the scene of action and makes reports to and
receives direction from the ASWC via the task group ASW C&R net. Air control nets are used to control
ASW aircraft and exchange information between ASW aircraft and surface ships and submarines. The
air control circuits must always be guarded by the ACU and assigned aircraft. Aircraft normally guard
243.0 MHz for air safety. Naval tactical data system (NTDS)/Link-11 is normally the optimal means for
ASW tactical data exchange with FW aircraft. UHF voice circuits are used if Link-11 is not available.

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4165 Communications with Supporting Commands

Significant tactical and operational ASW information can be provided by shore-based commands such
as the SUBOPAUTH and the area mobile mail centre. The ASWC may need to communicate directly
with external commands that are supporting the task group when the volume of message traffic on
fleet broadcasts prevents timely liaison with these commands. If sufficient communications assets are
available, an ASW shore coordination circuit (often referred to as a maritime rear link (MRL)) may be
established to provide this point-to-point connectivity between the ASWC and shore-based ASW and
submarine force commanders.
a. Submarine Operating Authority. The ASWC requires reliable communication with the
SUBOPAUTH for the receipt of WSM Allocations and Status (WSM ALLOCSTAT) messages.

b. Area Maritime Component Commander. The degree of connectivity required with the area
ASWC depends upon the proximity of task group ASW forces to contacts being tracked and prosecuted
by area ASW forces. Another factor is the distance between those contacts and the ASWC’s area of
operations.

4166 Typical ASW Reporting Requirements

The ASWC provides voice SITREPs during the progress of ASW operations and follows up with
periodic hard copy situation summaries (SITSUMs). SITREPs are made via the TG CMD net to keep
other warfare commanders aware of ASW operations, and SITSUMs are sent via the task group teletype
circuit.
4167–4169 Spare

4170 Submarine Communications

Communications with submarines differ significantly from those with other force assets and present
the most significant challenge in effecting mission coordination and tasking. Keys to success are
reliable long-range communications between the task group and the SUBOPAUTH and dependable,
redundant on-scene tactical circuits for the exchange of intelligence; command, control, and coordinating
information; and targeting data with assigned submarines. Planners and commanders must be familiar
with the submarine communication procedures and capabilities that are addressed in detail in ATP-18.
4171 Basic Considerations and Guidelines

a. Tradeoffs between covertness and coordination are necessary when conducting coordinated
operations. Planning should recognize that communication delays are often a necessary adjunct to
submarine operations. Additionally, an inverse relationship exists between the time a submarine spends
in a communications posture (depth and speed limited) and mission effectiveness, when the submarine’s
tasking requires it to operate at high speed or below communications depth for extended periods of time.
Historically, the submarine operational broadcast controlled by the SUBOPAUTH is the most reliable
means of providing coordination, tasking, and intelligence information to submarines. This method is
often slower than tactical communications, however, and provision must be made for the rapid, on-scene
exchange of intelligence and coordinating information as required by the tactical situation.

b. Brevity. As a rule, communications with submarines should be brief.

Message formats in APP-11 are designed to contain all information required by the SUBOPAUTH
and individual submarines in a concise summarization. The SUBOPAUTH may edit (or screen off the
submarine broadcast altogether) lengthy messages that are not specifically oriented to the submarine’s
employment. The objective is to avoid overloading the submarine communication system with message

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traffic not directly relevant to submarine/task group operations. Extracts of operational messages with
information may be consolidated and included in Submarine Force Summary and Situation Report
messages contained in APP-11. OPTASK messages, because of their length, normally are not relayed via
the submarine broadcast. Nevertheless, they are important, and efforts should be made to provide them
by a means other than the submarine broadcast (e.g., mail, courier, shore/guard ship communications,
etc.).
4172 Submarine Broadcast

a. Submarines receive message traffic on an accountable broadcast transmitted by the SUBOPAUTH.

How the broadcast is to be used for C2 of units operating with a task group should be coordinated with
the SUBOPAUTH prior to coordinated submarine–task group operations. The information transmitted
on the broadcast must be prioritised and coordinated with the SUBOPAUTH and SOCA. Generally,
those messages containing operational-level tasking (e.g., SUBNOTEs) have first priority, and those
for tactical-level tasking and coordination have second priority. Messages generated by the task
group may be edited to fit on the broadcast. Use of communications ZPW (automatic cancellation)
procedures applicable to perishable information allows early removal of these messages from the
broadcast and significantly reduces overall traffic loading. Further guidance on submarine broadcasts
is contained in ATP-18.

b. Lead-time Requirements. Depending on its role and communication schedule, lead time
required to ensure submarine receipt of tasking, coordinating instructions, intelligence, etc., can be
significant. Unless the submarine is maintaining a near-continuous communications connectivity with
the SOCA, plans should be based on worst-case message delivery time and maximise the use of
scheduled submarine broadcast cycles.

Table 4-2 contains examples of lead-time requirements based on normal broadcast cycles of 8 to
12 hours.

c. Maritime Rear Link. Establishing an MRL between the OTC/SOCA and SUBOPAUTH is
essential for most operations and greatly simplifies coordination of submarine tasking and waterspace
management requirements.

d. BARNSTORM Procedures. BARNSTORM is a single, serialized message that may be used

by the SUBOPAUTH to transmit submarine tasking, area assignment, waterspace management
application, intelligence, and other operational information on the submarine broadcast. The objective
is to ensure that submarines conducting communications-intensive operations receive all required
information without placing excessive traffic load demands on the submarine broadcast.

Table 4-2. Typical Advance Notification

Requirements for Submarine Operations

ADVANCE
EVENT NOTICE
(Hours)
Submarine Assignment Request 24 to 48

Mission Change 10 to 14

Waterspace Change Notification 12 to 30

Final Over-the-Horizon Targeting 2 to 3

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4173 Tactical Communications

a. Specific tactical circuits as well as special communication procedures for submarine coordination
should be identified in the OPTASK COMMS. This information should also be included in the
initial submarine assignment request. The objective is to ensure that tactical communication paths
and coordinating instructions are clear to all participants and that necessary and timely intelligence
information can be rapidly exchanged between the task group and submarine.

b. GUERRILLA Procedures. The code word GUERRILLA is used by a submarine to indicate that
it has HIGH PRECEDENCE traffic for the SOCA or a designated commander/unit in the task group.
This code word identifies the transmitting ship as a submarine and is intended to alert other circuit
operators to clear the net as soon as possible. Procedures are contained in ATP-18.

c. Tactical Circuits. Communications planning should provide for primary and secondary voice
and data circuits for use with the SOCA as well as alternate circuits for urgent communication with
any element of the task group. The intent is to provide the submarine a reliable circuit when time is of
the essence while limiting the need for frequent changes in the submarine’s basic COMPLAN setup.
First priority should be SATCOM (if fitted), followed by line-of-sight UHF and HF. Changes that do
occur should be reflected in periodic Force Summary message updates.

d. Special Communication Windows. Depending on tasking, special communication windows

outside the submarine’s normal broadcast cycle are generally disruptive to submarine operations and,
where possible, should be avoided. There are occasions, however, when use is appropriate; e.g., to
conduct initial rendezvous with coordinating air or surface forces, to provide updated OTH cruise
missile targeting information to the submarine, or to order/confirm implementation of a contingency
plan. Requests for special communication windows may be included in the Submarine Assignment
Request and subsequent Force Summary/SITREP messages or discussed directly with the submarine
on tactical coordination circuits.

e. UPLINK/DOWNLINK Considerations. Frequently, tactical situations require immediate

communications outside established communication windows. Procedures for UPLINK and
DOWNLINK should be clearly specified in the Submarine Assignment Request or appropriate
OPTASK (if held by the submarine) and changes identified in the Force Summary message.

(1) UPLINK.

(a) SATCOM Buoys. For submarines so equipped, SATCOM buoys can be used to send
messages to the SUBOPAUTH for relay to the SOCA. See ATP-18 for details.

(b) Expendable Communications Buoys (ECB)/Submarine-launched One-way

Tactical (SLOT) Buoys. Submarine-launched ECB and SLOT buoys are a reliable
communications option if the submarine must remain at search depth. ECB/SLOT buoy use
requires that an ASW aircraft be available for monitoring. See ATP-18 for details.

(2) DOWNLINK.

(a) Keyed Sonar. Depending on environmental conditions, keyed sonar provides a

reasonably reliable DOWNLINK for BELLRINGER. ATP-18 contains further details on
keyed sonar employment.

(b) Sound Underwater Signal (SUS). Two general types of SUS are available. One
employs explosive charges to produce an omnidirectional, broadband signal. The other is
nonexplosive and uses a battery-powered device that alternately transmits discrete preset
frequencies. Pulse length and sequence may be varied on some systems. ATP-18 contains
further details on SUS codes and employment.

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4174 Submarine Reporting

Specific submarine reporting requirements must be tailored to the scenario and clearly understood by
all parties prior to operations. Keeping the SOCA informed of contacts, search and engagement results,
intentions, and status is essential. Prompt contact, post-engagement, and periodic situation reports from
each submarine are key to the SOCA maintaining a master fused plot of operations and to the OTC’s
ability to coordinate, allocate, or reassign assets as the operational situation evolves.
Recommended communication-traffic-handling and event-sequencing procedures are addressed in
ATP-18. Message formats for contact and periodic situation reports are contained in APP-11.
4175 Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping Communications

NCAGS communications guidelines are described in ATP-02, Vol. I.

4176–4179 Spare

4180 Aircraft Communications

4181 Maritime Patrol Aircraft Communications

a. Area Operations. Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) on area operations will establish two-way
communications with their shore-based controlling authority using the appropriate Maritime Air
Telecommunications Organization (MATELO) frequencies. In addition, ground/air broadcasts
are available. During area operations, the MPA’s first communications priority is to the maritime
headquarters. MPA operating on area operations will pass traffic to the MHQ on the air reporting
and control net (ARCN), which operates in two modes: RATT and voice (RATT is designed to be
the primary). Modes of operation and the primary and secondary frequencies for the circuit are to
be included in the GREEN/air tasking order (ATO) messages to OTCs and submarine operating
authorities to allow the circuit to be monitored.

b. Aircraft on Direct Support Operations. These aircraft maintain communications with their
shore-based controlling authority on MATELO until they join the force. Thereafter, they communicate
with the specified agency within the force (e.g., force marshaller or ASW ACU) until they depart
the force. Normally, the OTC exercises tactical control of aircraft through an ACU, which guards
operational and safety frequencies. Whenever practicable, aircraft monitor MHQ ARCNs. Contact
reports will not be sent to the MHQ unless ordered specifically by the OTC. During direct support
operations, the MPA’s first communications priority is to the OTC. Subject to the EP, contact reports
may be sent to the OTC on HF if contact is not possible on UHF. On departing the force, aircraft
reestablish communications with their shore-based controlling authority on MATELO. The following
general communication procedures apply during direct support operations:

(1) RATT Procedures. MPA on direct support can use RATT:

(a) To pass joining messages.

(b) To overcome communication problems encountered when the identification safety range
(ISR) is greater than the UHF communication range.

(c) To allow exchange of tactical information between MPA and surface/subsurface units.

(d) To allow submarines to operate POST BOX and blind broadcast procedures.

(e) To provide the OTC secure communications with submarines operating in associated or
direct support.

(f) When necessary to clear urgent signal traffic from surface forces to shore authorities.

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(2) UHF Procedures:

(a) Read-back procedures are not to be used.

(b) Secure RATT may be used on UHF circuits, if fitted, to achieve the communication
requirements listed in paragraph b(1).

(3) SITREPs to Operational Control Authority. If the EP permits, the aircraft is to transmit
an encrypted encoded SITREP to the operational control authority on completion of an incident
after informing the OTC of the shift of HF channel. Detailed communication procedures that are to
be used on direct support operations are contained in ACP-176 and ATP-28, Vol. I.

c. Air/Submarine Operations.

(1) Communications between MPA and submarines are primarily by UHF in the following
preferred order:

(a) Secure voice.

(b) Secure UHF RATT.

(c) Uncovered UHF voice, using low-level code.

(2) HF communications are normally restricted to the interception of blind or indirect read-back
broadcasts by the submarine.

d. Maritime Air Control Authority (MACA). All MACAs will monitor circuits during MPA area
and direct support operations. Messages received by a MACA from MPA are relayed to the aircraft’s
parent MACA.

e. MPA Control Nets General.

(1) A MACA, when required, communicates with and controls aircraft by the following types of
communication:

(a) Point-to-point communication.

(b) Air/ground/air communication.

(2) During area/surveillance operations, MPA are under the control of the operational control
authority/parent MACA; however, other MACAs within the area also should be information
addressees on message traffic. During direct support operations, MPA are under the tactical control
of the OTC.

4182–4184 Spare

4185 Helicopter Communications

Communications with helicopters place primary reliance upon radio, but visual signals may be used for
short-range communication (e.g., in launch and recovery operations) when a restrictive EP is in force.
The aircraft’s communication capability must be carefully considered when the EP and COMPLAN are
formulated.
a. Circuits. These will normally be specified in the OPTASK AIR (see APP-11) and detailed in the
COMPLAN. Circuits available for this function are described in ACP-176.

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b. Tactical Data Links. Some helicopters have the capability to communicate with a parent ship
through a tactical data link.

c. Communications Relay. Some helicopters have a capability to monitor SLOT buoys and may
be used, subject to other screening commitments, to relay intercepted messages to the OTC or SOCA
(ASWC).

4186 Helicopter Control Nets General

a. Communication Circuits. Communication nets for helicopter control are detailed in ACP-176.
Selection of a suitable circuit is necessarily a function of the helicopter’s employment, but the OTC
must bear in mind the limited communication facilities available in most aircraft and control units.
Where interoperation with other types of aircraft is required (e.g., in ASW), it is normally prudent
to use a common control circuit both to aid information flow and to economize on communication
equipment and frequencies.

b. Emission Security (EMSEC). Care must be taken that transmissions between ships and aircraft
are subject to the same EMSEC constraints as those between other force units. Details of EMSEC
procedures are in Chapter 8.

4187–4189 Spare

4190 Communications for Decentralized Command and Control

a. General. When the OTC delegates tactical control of units in a force or group as described in
Chapter 1, there are specific communication requirements between the OTC and appointed warfare
commanders and coordinators, and between warfare commanders and coordinators and their assigned
units. To meet these requirements, the OTC and warfare commanders and coordinators have certain
circuits, described in ACP-176, at their disposal.

b. Plans. When drafting a COMPLAN, the OTC and warfare commanders and coordinators must
consider the communications assets of units assigned. Requirements for manning the nets and
establishing the net priorities should take into account each ship’s role as well as its abilities and
limitations. To avoid overburdening smaller units by too many communication demands, it may
be necessary to combine some circuit requirements or assign guard ships for some nets. The OTC
identifies vital nets and prioritises them in the COMPLAN. This list of prioritised nets is used by units
to determine how to meet their communication requirements. Communications plans should include
instructions for smooth transitions through various EMCON conditions. UHF airborne relay planning
must also be included to permit an uninterrupted flow of essential communications without violating
RADHAZ restrictions or EMCON plans.

c. Circuit Operation. Standard operating procedures apply to each circuit. The OTC and coordinators
act as NCS on their respective warfare nets. Warfare commanders or their FTCs will be the NCS for
their respective C&R nets. NCS duties are transferred from a primary commander to an alternate
commander when the warfare commander role is transferred. NCS is responsible for maintaining
proper circuit discipline and ensuring that proper security procedures are followed. Authentication
and encryption are used as required on all uncovered circuits in accordance with the instructions of the
OTCs and/or EWCs. Where possible, voice circuits should be operated in a secure mode.

d. Merger of Communications Circuits in Combined TG Operations. The merger of two

independent TGs into a combined TF requires one set of warfare nets to be secured while additional
units join the remaining nets. Having a number of units switching circuits can be complicated and, if
not handled correctly, cause a considerable amount of confusion.

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SECTION II—TACTICAL ASPECTS OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

4200 Introduction

Satellites provide a method of line-of-sight communications over long distances. They have the advantage
of being little affected by ionospheric phenomena and thereby offer high availability and reliability.
SATCOM is limited in range only by the requirement for both shore and ship terminals to be within the
earth coverage of the satellite antenna, and communication links via satellite have therefore assumed a
most significant role in communication between the OTC afloat and commander ashore.
4201 Systems

Technical details and procedural instructions for the use of SATCOM are given in national publications,
which may be released to other nations as required. A number of military and commercial systems are
available.
4202 Employment

SATCOM systems may be provided for strategic or tactical use.

a. Strategic Use. The majority of SATCOM channels are used for strategic purposes between
maritime forces and shore-based authorities. Where traffic to and from a seaborne commander is
heavy, SATCOM channels may be configured as MRL or full period terminations.

b. Tactical Use. Certain SATCOM systems are configured for tactical exchange of voice or data.
Where a tactical requirement is identified for strategic systems, this exchange can be achieved, with
the concurrence of the operating authorities concerned, by relay of traffic via shore for automatic
retransmission over satellite broadcast or rear link. This procedure may also be used for the radiation
of a TF/TG broadcast using shore-based transmitters, but the technique is expensive in satellite
capacity and should be used sparingly.

4203 Electronic Warfare Considerations

a. Security. By virtue of the highly directional nature of satellite transmissions from the mobile
terminal and the narrow beamwidth employed by them, SATCOM systems are less susceptible to D/F
than are HF transmissions. Nonetheless, they employ high power, generate significant sidelobes and,
particularly at low angles of elevation, may be detected by enemy ESM at long ranges.

b. Effect on Friendly ESM. Because of the frequencies at which they operate, satellite transmissions
may affect the sensitivity of friendly ESM equipment. This factor, and the susceptibility of SATCOM
to intercept and D/F, must be considered when the EP is formulated.

c. ECM. Most SATCOM systems are vulnerable to ECM. Where SATCOM provides a primary
communications route, consideration should be given to the provision of alternative means of
transmission as a backup.

d. Limitations. When operating in high latitudes, continuous SATCOM may not be possible
because of coverage limitations from geosynchronous orbits.

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CHAPTER 5 Weapons Employment

SECTION I—OVERVIEW

5100 Rules of Engagement

(NU) In the conduct of peacetime operations, maritime units normally base their conduct on International
Law, the International Rules of the Road, and the Geneva Conventions. Those units under national
command are further guided by national instructions, while those units under the OPCOM of the
strategic commanders conform to NATO instructions. The national/NATO instructions providing this
supplementary guidance are designated as ROE.
(NU) ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances,
conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or action which might be construed as provocative, may,
or may not, be applied. ROE are not to assign tasks or give tactical instructions. With the exception of
self-defence, during peacetime and operations prior to a declaration of counter aggression, ROE provide
the sole authority to NATO forces to use force. Following a declaration of counter aggression, ROE
generally limit the otherwise lawful use of force.
5110 Planned Responses

a. (NU) Initial Responses. As very short advanced warning of an attack may occur, it is essential
that initial responses to specific detections be planned and promulgated by the OTC. To ensure quick
reactions, planned responses should be:

(1) (NU) Matched to the actual threats.

(2) (NU) Promulgated so as to permit rapid updating.

(3) (NU) As simple as possible.

b. (NU) Promulgation. Unless otherwise directed in planned responses, the implementation of

such a plan carries with it the automatic upgrading of the appropriate threat warning to RED.

5120 Force Defence Areas

a. (NU) Force defence areas are directly associated with “anti-warfare missions” and are subsets
of the commander’s area of operation. Because of the changing nature of the environment, threat,
and own force capabilities, the size and geometry of these areas and zones will normally vary from
warfare mission to warfare mission area (e.g., ASW, surface warfare, AAW). They are established on
scene by the OTC or, if so authorized, the CWC or individual warfare commander.

(1) (NU) Surveillance Area: Aerospace, airspace, surface, and subsurface areas under systemic
observation of own force sensors to detect any object, event, or occurrence of possible military
concern.

(2) (NU) Classification, Identification, and Engagement Area: That area within the
surveillance area and surrounding the vital area(s) in which all objects detected must be classified,
identified, monitored, and the ability maintained to escort, cover, or engage. The size of the
classification, identification, and engagement area is a function of the closing speed of a contact
and the revisit time of a friendly surveillance asset.

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(3) (NU) Vital Area: The designated area around each mission essential unit(s), force(s),
installation(s), or location(s) to be defended by the force. The outer limit of the vital area is normally
equal to or greater than the threat weapons release range of opposition forces. Multiple vital areas
may be established within a classification, identification, and engagement area.

b. (NU) The size of the classification, identification, and engagement area and vital area can be used to
assist search planning, resource allocation, risk assessment and, with regard to ROE, the formulation
and execution of preplanned responses.

c. (NU) Preplanned responses can be triggered by the location of the threat (e.g., an unknown in the
vital area would require the execution of a more immediate specific preplanned response than that of
an unknown in the classification, identification, and engagement area).

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SECTION II—WEAPONS MANAGEMENT

5220 Weapon Restrictions—General

(NU) Weapon restrictions such as weapon control status and weapon control orders may be used for
effective and controlled use of weapons (exempt submarineborne weapons) and to maximise the safety
of friendly assets. They are promulgated by the OTC or the relevant warfare commander, each at his own
level and in his own area, as the occasion demands.
(NU) Whenever a threat is deemed to exist, the OTC should promulgate a policy for action. The weapon
employment policy can be stated in broad terms only, or specified in detail as required.
(NU) To state the weapon employment policy, the OTC (or the relevant warfare commander) may
promulgate a weapon control status in general or specified in detail as required.
(NU) Weapon control orders are one of the means of the OTC (or the relevant warfare commander) to
exercise command by veto.
(NU) Target engagement messages are one of the means for the OTC (or the relevant warfare commander)
to assign engagement tasks.
5221 Weapon Control Status

a. (NU) Definition. A weapon control status is issued by the OTC (or the relevant warfare
commander) to state his general direction/policy with regard to weapon employment for all or in a
particular warfare area. The weapon control status is general in nature because it does not overrule
ROE, WSM, specific weapon control orders, specific engagement orders, or command by veto. The
following weapon control status may be given:

(1) (NU) Weapons Free. Fire may be opened on any target(s) that has (have) not been identified
as friend.

(2) (NU) Weapons Tight. Do not open fire unless the target(s) has (have) been identified as
hostile.

(3) (NU) Weapons Safe. Do not open fire/cease firing. Fire may be opened only in self-defence
or in response to a formal order.

b. (NU) Qualifying Weapon Control Status. Weapon control status may be qualified by one or
more of the following:

(1) (NU) A geographic area.

(2) (NU) A sector.

(3) (NU) A principal warfare area.

(4) (NU) A period of time.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) WEAPONS SAFE 5 SECTOR 2

(NU) Meaning: Do not open fire in sector 2 for 5 minutes.

c. (NU) Changing Weapon Control Status. A weapon control status is changed by directing
another weapon control status.

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5222 Weapon Control Orders

a. (NU) Issuing Weapon Control Orders. Independent of weapon control status, the following
weapon control orders may be directed by the relevant warfare commander:

(1) (NU) Hold Fire. Do not open fire/cease firing; weapons already launched must be destroyed
if technically possible. The direction to hold fire should be repeated at the end of the transmission.

(2) (NU) Cease Fire. Do not open/cease firing; weapons already launched continue to intercept.

b. (NU) Qualifying Weapon Control Orders. Weapon control orders may be qualified by one
or both of the following:

(1) (NU) A particular unit.

(2) (NU) A particular contact (track number or position).

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) HOLD FIRE TRACK 1247, HOLD FIRE

(NU) Meaning: Do not open fire/cease firing on track 1247. Destroy missiles
launched at track 1247 if possible.

NOTE

(NU) IF THE RELEVANT WARFARE COMMANDER DIRECTS A

WEAPON CONTROL ORDER IN GENERAL, IT ACCOUNTS FOR
ALL UNITS AND ALL CONTACTS/TRACKS.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) WHISKEY THIS IS AW, HOLD FIRE, I SAY AGAIN, HOLD FIRE

(NU) Meaning: All anti-aircraft units hold fire on all air contacts. Destroy all
anti-aircraft missiles if possible.

c. (NU) Cancelling Weapon Control Orders. A weapon control order can only be cancelled by
the relevant warfare commander using the prefix NEGAT to the weapon control order.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) WHISKEY THIS IS AW, NEGAT HOLD FIRE, I SAY AGAIN, NEGAT
HOLD FIRE

(NU) Meaning: All anti-aircraft units cancel the order to hold fire.

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NOTE

(NU) A SPECIFIC WEAPON CONTROL ORDER CAN EXIST WITHIN

A WEAPON CONTROL STATUS.

-EXAMPLE-

(NU) WEAPONS FREE, HOLD FIRE TRACK 1644

(NU) Meaning: Fire may be opened on any contact not identified as friend, but
do not open fire on track 1644 (and destroy any weapons fired at track 1644 if
possible).

5223 Kill Line

(NU) In order to adequately defend against the prevailing threat, the OTC/PWC may consider establishing
a kill line around protected units to promulgate the range by which it is desired that enemy has been
engaged. In determining the range at which a kill line is to be established, the OTC/PWC should take into
account the nature of the threat, the enemy’s ability to engage at maximum range, the ability of friendly
forces to provide the required level of unit/force, the ability of friendly forces to comply with ROE at the
kill line, the prevailing operational situation, and the physical environment.

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CHAPTER 6 Force Coordination

SECTION I—AIR OPERATIONS

6100 Introduction

(NU) The discussion in this section encompasses maritime operations by aircraft:

1. (NU) Organic to a force.

2. (NU) Carrier- or land-based providing support to a force at sea.

3. (NU) Conducting air operations in the maritime environment.

6101 Tasking Authorities

(NU) Aircraft may be tasked by ashore authority if land-based, or by the OTC if shipborne on a force at
sea. When tasking aircraft, the tasking authority or OTC should:
1. (NU) Employ the appropriate aircraft in a safe manner to accomplish the assigned task.

2. (NU) Inform all units of all friendly aircraft operating in the vicinity.

3. (NU) Disseminate pertinent information to all units in the area in a timely manner.

4. (NU) Liaise with air defence authorities and civil air control authorities including NOTAM
actions. See AJP-3.3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Coordination, for further details on
air-maritime coordination.

6102 Air Support Operations

(NU) Maritime and land-based air assets may be assigned to provide support to forces at sea in one of
three forms.
a. (NU) Direct Support. Aircraft assigned to direct support of a force at sea will operate under
the tactical control of the OTC who is being supported. Operational control will remain with the
tasking authority, and tactical command may be delegated to the aircraft commander. Direct support
operations are normally carried out within the OTC’s surveillance area. The radius of direct support
operations about the force will be determined by the OTC and will vary according to:

1. (NU) The threat.

2. (NU) The number and type of aircraft available.

3. (NU) Area coverage desired.

4. (NU) EMCON plan in force.

(NU) The OTC is to inform the tasking authority of the dimensions of his surveillance area and of
subsequent changes, emission policy permitting.
b. (NU) Associated Support. In specific cases of communications or other control difficulties,
associated support may be provided. Aircraft tasked on associated support will operate independently
of other forces at sea; however, their tasking is in support of a specific force. They may be tasked to
support that force by providing contact information and to receive intelligence from the OTC who
is being supported. The aircraft may be tasked to establish communications with the supported force

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to prevent mutual interference. The OTC of the supported force cannot take tactical control of the
aircraft unless authorized by the aircraft tasking authority. The aircraft commander should be briefed
on the degree of support it can give to the OTC.

c. (NU) Area Operations. Area operations are conducted in areas within which enemy forces are
known to be, through which enemy forces are likely to pass, or within which it is desirable to deny the
enemy freedom of action. In addition, operations may be related to the protection of maritime forces
scheduled to enter the area in the future or to provide defence in depth to distant forces. Land-based
aircraft on area operations are under the operational control of a shore-based authority. Tactical
command and control of the aircraft conducting the mission is normally delegated to the aircraft
commander by the tasking authority. Aircraft commanders should be briefed on the whereabouts of
friendly naval forces and as to whether or not they may react to a request from these forces to assist in
the prosecution of contacts within the aircraft’s operating area. Notwithstanding such authorization,
the original tasking authority has the right to resume control of the aircraft at his discretion.

6103 Informing the OTC of Air Operations in His Vicinity

(NU) OTCs are to be informed by the appropriate authority of any friendly aircraft employed in the
vicinity of their force. When operating in or adjacent to a JOA, the ATO and ACO messages will normally
be used for this purpose.
(NU) If a force at sea is to be supported by land-based aircraft in associated or direct support, the OTC
will be informed by the appropriate coordinating authority of the type and nature of support being
provided in response to the support request, using standard aircraft tasking formats from APP-11, such
as the ATO. In the case of shipborne aircraft support, the OTC of the force providing the support should
keep the OTC of the supported force and REDCROWN/XCROWN agencies, and, if possible, shore
authorities, informed of the flying schedule and intentions using the standard maritime tactical message
system (MTMS) formats.
6104 Spare

6105 Types of Operations

6106 Operations Integral to a Force

(NU) Helicopter and carrierborne aircraft, which are an integral part of the force, are under the tactical
command of an OTC. They are assigned tasks as directed by the OTC or warfare commander as required.
Although the employment of these aircraft is not a support operation, the procedures in this chapter
sometimes apply. Shore-based authorities are to be informed of the employment of these organic aircraft,
if applicable.
6107 Tasking of Support Aircraft

a. (NU) Mission Designators. Air operations in support of forces at sea are normally tasked
by standard MTMS or other messages such as the ATO. The tasking authority should stipulate in
the tasking message both the form of support of each mission and the specific mission type by
promulgating mission designators from Table 6-1. The mission designators can only be changed by
the aircraft commander if delegated tactical command. Therefore, if an OTC wishes an aircraft to do
more than one mission type, it must be requested in the support request message. The supported OTC
can modify the tasking during a mission. Details on various scouting missions are in Chapter 7.
(NR) (NMP) ASW mission designators are detailed in Table 6-2.

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Table 6-1. (NU) Table of Aircraft Mission Designators

(NU) FORM OF AIR SUPPORT OPERATION (Notes 1 and 4) Designator

(NU) Area Operations AQ
(NU) Associated Support AS
(NU) Direct Support DS

(NU) MISSION TYPES (Notes 1, 3, and 4)

(NU) Air Surveillance SV
(NU) Anti-air Warfare AD
(NU) Antisurface Operations SW
(NU) Area Search SA
(NU) ASW Operations (Note 2):
(NR) (NMP) Further amplified with more mission designators
in Table 6-2 KS
(NU) Attack (Surface Targets) AT
(NU) Barrier BR
(NU) Investigate IN
(NU) Mining Operations MI
(NU) Reconnaissance RE
(NU) Screen SC
(NU) Search and Rescue SR
(NU) Search and Shadow:
a. (NU) Overt search, identification, and shadow AR
b. (NU) Overt search, covert identification, and overt shadow CP
c. (NU) Overt search, covert identification, and low shadow HR
d. (NU) Overt search, covert identification, and high shadow NV
e. (NU) Covert search, identification, and low shadow SX
f. (NU) Covert search, identification, and high shadow WZ
(NU) Surveillance SU
(NU) Training TN
Notes:
1. (NU) Tasking authorities are to use mission designators to promulgate the form of air support
operation and the mission types in all Forms GREEN.
2. (NU) To be used by tasking authority for all types of ASW operations (i.e., ASW surveillance, air-sub
operations, area, associated, or direct support operations).
3. (NU) Amplification of mission, such as reporting/tracking instructions or attack criteria, may be
required; e.g., “BR + Report hourly.”
4. (NU) These designators may also be used in other message traffic to describe aircraft employment.

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Table 6-2. (NU) (NMP) ASW Mission Designator Table

Mission Mission Threat (3) Sensor Remarks

Designator Aim (2)
(1) (4)

EM Deter All Radar—may be Optimize radar operating mode for

augmented by deterrence.
sonobuoys
ZY Deter and All Radar—may 1. Optimize radar operating for
Detect be augmented deterrence.
by passive 2. Patrol at best compromise
sonobuoys altitude for radar and sonobuoy
detection.
NL Detect and All Radar—may 1. Optimize radar operating for
Deter (active be augmented detect.
and passive) by passive 2. Patrol at best altitude for radar
sonobuoys detection.
JK Detect Primary Passive 1. Patrol at altitude for best
(passive) nuclear sonobuoys sonobuoy monitoring.
2. May be used against noisy/
diesel-electric if known/assessed to
be snorting.
FE Detect Nuclear Passive Patrol at altitude for best sonobuoy
(passive/ (and/or sonobuoys—may monitoring.
active) diesel- be augmented by
electric) radar
SN Support All As required 1. May be combined with another
submarine compatible secondary mission.
ASW 2. Patrol at altitude for best
operations sonobuoy/communications
monitoring.
Notes:
(1) Tasking authorities are to use mission designators to promulgate the mission form and mission
type (Table 6-3). The OTC will order the specific ASW mission designator.
(2) Specific requirements to “Report,” “Track,” and/or “Destroy” are to be ordered additionally by the
tasking authority, e.g., “ZY + Destroy,” “FE + Track + Report.”
(3) The tasking authority/OTC is to specify the type of threat, if known.
(4) If BLIND BROADCAST, POSTBOX, or AIRMAIL procedures are required, the Form GREEN is to
be amplified accordingly.

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6108–6109 Spare

6110 Definitions

(NU) The terms used by maritime aircraft during support operations are listed below and are illustrated
in Figure 6-1.
a. (NU) Departure Location. The location from which the supporting aircraft departs, including
an airfield, a carrier, or another ship.

b. (NU) Force Air Coordination Area. The FACA is that area surrounding a force within which
air coordination measures are required to prevent mutual air interference between all friendly surface
and air units and their weapon systems. Normally, the FACA will coincide with the AAW area or the
area of ASW direct support, whichever is the greater. The size and shape of the area will usually be
prescribed by the OTC and will depend upon the limits to which tactical control of aircraft must be
exercised. If two or more FACAs overlap, the senior OTC is responsible for overall coordination.

(NU) When the force is dispersed into separate groups or units, it may be necessary to establish local
air coordination area (LACAS) around each group or units. The LACAS may be promulgated by the
CWC, but this function will normally be delegated.

c. (NU) Handover Gate. The handover gate is the point at which the control of the aircraft, if radar
handover is used, changes from one controller to another. The handover gate position is determined
by agreement between the shore air defence coordinator (ADC) and the OTC.

d. (NU) Entry/Exit Gate. The entry/exit gate is the point to which an aircraft will proceed to
commence the transit inbound or outbound from an airfield or force at sea. It should be suitably
located to make the transit of the supporting aircraft as short as possible and clear of enemy units.
Gates are promulgated as fixed geographic positions. Since many aircraft radars cannot detect and
identify a surface force at 150 nm, the gate should be promulgated as a range and bearing from PIM
and not from ZZ or QQ.

1. (NU) The entry/exit gate is 5 nm in radius (10 nm in diameter) from the surface to 25,000 feet
mean sea level (MSL) and reserved as an MPA climb/descent zone to and from assigned altitudes.

2. (NU) The gate will be the only point of entry and departure for aircraft. Altitudes, as specified
in GREEN or ATO, should be at or near the upper limit of the gate in order to enable rapid and
positive identification (ID) by the force and ensure UHF communications.

e. (NU) Marshalling Gate. This is the point to which aircraft fly for air traffic control purposes prior
to commencing an outbound transit or after completing an inbound transit before landing. Marshalling
gates will always be within radar coverage of the designated controller (e.g., airfield/control and
reporting centre (CRC)/combined air operations centre (CAOC)/joint air operations centre (JAOC)/
carrier/force marshaller) and will be defined geographically or relative to the force. The gate is a
position clear of enemy units, and suitably located for transit from supporting air departure positions.

f. (NU) Identification Safety Range. The ISR in maritime operations is the minimum range
to which an aircraft may close an assumed friendly force without having been positively identified,
to ensure that the force does not mistake the aircraft for hostile. It should not be confused with the
various self-defence safety ranges that aircraft are advised to use when approaching/investigating
unknown contacts. The ISR normally encompasses the force missile engagement zone (MEZ) if zone
AAW coordination is being used. In larger dispositions this may not always be possible. In any case,
the ISR must be easily located by aircraft supporting a force. As with entry/exit gates, ISR relative to
ZZ or QQ will be difficult to locate accurately when EMCON, large dispositions, and longer ranges
are considered. Normally, ISRs should be established relative to the promulgated PIM rather than the
position of the force (ZZ or QQ) whose disposition about the PIM is dynamic.

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FADIZ
FADIZ
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 6-1. (NU) Approach Corridors
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g. (NU) Approach Corridor. The approach corridor is usually established on a line between
the entry/exit gate and the force/disposition centre. If the force centre cannot be determined by the
aircraft’s radar, the corridor will be on a line between the entry/exit gate and the PIM position. The
inner boundary is determined by the ISR. The approach corridor width is normally 5 nm either side of
the line. Depending on the mode of promulgation the corridor may be fixed geographically or move in
the following manner (see Figure 6-1): If the entry/exit gate and ISR are established relative to force/
disposition centre, the corridor orientation and dimensions will not change but the entry/exit gate and
the corridor will move with the force.

(NU) There may be occasions when tactical considerations dictate deviation from the direct route from
entry/exit gate to the force/PIM position. In which case, the routing must be included in the OTC’s
OPGEN/OPTASK updates or agreed to between the shore ADC and the OTC. When establishing
approach corridors, the OTC must consider the communications that will be available for joining and
marshalling, the direction of the friendly bases from which aircraft might come, threat axis, areas in
which support aircraft will be employed once on patrol, location of TOMCAT and AEW pickets in a
large disposition, and AAW coordination such as MEZ and fighter engagement zone (FEZ).

h. (NU) Identification Safety Point (ISP). When the gate is not within the radar cover of the
ships or when two-way communications are not established between the ACUs, the ISP is the point at
which aircraft on joining the force will attempt to establish two-way communications with the ships
and commence identification procedures. Unless otherwise promulgated the ISP will be a position
at 150 nm from ZZ on a direct line between the in-use gate and ZZ. There may be occasions when
tactical considerations dictate deviation from the direct route from gate to ZZ, in which case, an
ISP may be included in the OTC’s AAW update or agreed between the shore ADC and the OTC.
Otherwise, the ISP need not be promulgated.

i. (NC) (NMP) Fleet Air Defence Identification Zone. Airspace of defined dimensions within
which the ready identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles is required. FADIZ range
must cover the ISR, cannot be bigger than the radar coverage, because of the control requirements of
the zone, and should always encompass the handover gate and the marshalling gate in its case.

j. (NU) Coordinated Air Defence Area. A maritime task force/task group within a JOA may
require the establishment of a coordinated air-defence area. Additional information about joint air
defence coordination measures are available in AJP-3.3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control.

6111–6119 Spare

6120 Air Coordination and Aircraft Control

(NU) Air coordination involves the safe employment of aircraft and the coordination of airspace with
other users.
a. (NU) The OTC has responsibility for:

(1) (NU) All aircraft embarked in the force at all times.

(2) (NU) All aircraft assigned to the force for tactical command or control, from the time when
two-way communications are established with any ACU in the force.

b. (NU) Safety precautions and measures to prevent mutual interference are in Section IV of this
chapter.

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6121 (NU) (NMP) The Force Marshaller

(NC) (NMP) To simplify the transit of aircraft from shore/ship/shore and the coordination of the airspace
around a naval force, it is desirable that the OTC (CWC/AAWC if delegated) designate one unit as the
force marshaller. XCROWN duty gives the OTC a more extended possibility in managing a FACA or
CVOA.

a. (NC) (NMP) Duties of the Force Marshaller. The principal duties of the force marshaller are:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Accept control of all aircraft from the shore in transit to join the force, and
provide homing assistance if required.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Pass up-to-date instructions to aircraft when they come under the OTC’s TACON.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Transfer control of aircraft, which have joined the force, to the appropriate
control unit.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Retain control of those aircraft which are not to be transferred to other control
units.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Marshal aircraft leaving the force and execute their transfer to shore control.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Originate and take action on messages concerned with transit of aircraft between
shore and ship if it is considered necessary that these messages be sent.

b. (NC) (NMP) Communications for and Location of Force Marshaller. The force marshaller
must have ready access to the AAWC net and should ideally be collocated with the AREC/HEC
Communications for and Location of Force Marshaller. The force marshaller is to guard the FADIZ/
FACA NET and requires access to the JAAWSC net. To assist him with the general coordination of air
traffic around the force, aircraft leaving the force which do not require marshalling or assistance for
their return to shore control are to notify their departure to the force marshaller whilst still within UHF
range. Additionally, all aircraft (including MPA) passing within UHF coverage of the force should
check in with the force marshaller. The force marshaller must have ready access to the AAWC net and
should ideally be colocated with the AREC/HEC and the FADIZ coordinator.

6122 Responsibilities of the Aircraft Control Unit

(NU) Aircraft on direct support are under the tactical control of the OTC, who in turn normally delegates
that function to an ACU. General responsibilities of an ACU are as follows:

a. (NU) Ordering the tactical employment of aircraft as required by the OTC/AAWC/ASWC/

ASUWC and specifying the type of control.

b. (NU) Keeping the OTC fully informed of aircraft status and of any other factors affecting air
operations.

c. (NU) Informing the OTC, air coordinator and FADIZ coordinator of movements of aircraft under
control and in the operations area.

d. (NU) Informing aircraft under his control of movements of other friendly and enemy aircraft;
keeping them informed of the tactical situation.

e. (NU) Assisting aircraft that are operating independently or are controlled by shore-based authorities.

f. (NU) Relaying tactical information to and from aircraft.

g. (NU) Safety of all aircraft under his control.

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6123 Responsibilities of Units Carrying Aircraft

(NU) Any units carrying aircraft are responsible for informing the air coordinator and the FADIZ
coordinator of any unscheduled flights.
6124 Tactical Procedures

(NU) Tactical procedures are required to prevent tactical deficiencies caused by mutual interference
between ships, aircraft, and their weapons systems, and, in particular, to:
(1) (NU) Ensure the timely engagement of enemy forces.

(2) (NU) Ensure that all weapons of the force can be employed effectively within force and local
air coordination areas.

(3) (NU) Prevent the force from being alerted and reacting unnecessarily to unidentified forces
which are in fact friendly.

(4) (NU) Safeguard friendly forces from being engaged by each other.

(5) (NU) Provide a safe margin of separation whenever necessary between individual friendly
forces and their weapons.

6125 Independent Operations

(NU) Independent operations may be planned and coordinated by the shore headquarters, OTC or
air coordinator. Independent operations will be necessary when aircraft are operating remote from a
surface force and under shore control, or are cooperating with ships and are beyond surveillance or
communications range. An aircraft selects its own speed, altitude, and heading; is responsible for its
own navigation and collision avoidance; and has tactical freedom to accomplish its task. To implement
independent operations, the code word SOLO may be used.
6126 Controlled Operations

a. (NU) Terms and Definitions. The following terms and definitions from STANAG 3993 are
used to describe mission and safety-related control when ACUs are tactically controlling aircraft.

(1) (NU) Close Control. A form of aircraft mission control in which the aircraft is continuously
controlled, for altitude, speed, and heading, to a position from which the mission can be
accomplished.

(2) (NU) Loose Control. A form of aircraft mission control in which the aircraft commander
selects his own speed, altitude, heading, and the appropriate tactics required to accomplish the
assigned task. The controlling unit will advise the aircraft of the current tactical picture and will
provide further advice if and when available.

(3) (NU) Broadcast Control. Broadcast control does not require a controller qualification. It is
a form of aircraft mission control, used in the absence of full capability or if the tactical situation
precludes close or loose control, in which tactical/target information is passed to enable the aircraft
to accomplish the assigned task. The controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings
of hazards, but the aircraft commander(s) is (are) responsible for aircraft navigation and collision
avoidance. Two-way communications are not a prerequisite for this type of control.

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(4) (NU) Positive. The controlling unit is responsible for taking actions for collision avoidance,
such as ordering necessary alterations to heading, speed, and altitude to maintain separation criteria.

(5) (NU) Advisory. The controlling unit will provide adequate warnings of hazards affecting
aircraft safety. The aircraft commander is responsible for the aircraft’s navigation and collision
avoidance.

b. (NU) Operational Use. These agreed terms and definitions and the operational use of the
combinations of the terms listed in Table 6-3 are based on:

(1) (NU) The two aspects of tactical control of aircraft, namely the aircraft’s mission and the
aircraft’s safety.

(2) (NU) The fact that, notwithstanding the safety aspects covered by the set of standard aircraft
tactical control terms, the aircraft commander is ultimately responsible for the aircraft’s safety.
However, this ultimate responsibility of the aircraft’s commander does not relieve the controlling
unit from taking any conceivable measure within the range of possibilities to ensure the aircraft’s
safety.

(3) (NU) The fact that other than broadcast control, “control” means any combination of
mission-related close/loose and safety-related positive/advisory control. A combination is normally
required to control an aircraft tactically, but in exceptional circumstances the terms close, loose,
positive, and advisory may be used in isolation.

(4) (NU) The premise that no further PROWORDs or codewords additional to the combinations
listed in Table 6-3 are required to tactically control aircraft.

c. (NU) Inability to Exercise Control. If at any time the ACU cannot meet the requirement for
controlling its aircraft, it is to transfer its responsibility to another unit. If this is not possible, the ACU
is to decide whether to recall the aircraft or to order it to operate independently.

d. (NU) Change of Type of Control. Subject to control capabilities, all aircraft operating in the
same area should, if the danger of mutual interference exists, operate under the same type of control.
A change from one type of control to another may be ordered by the OTC or the ACU, or may be
requested by an aircraft.

6127 Factors Determining Type of Operations and Control

(NU) The factors that determine the type of operations and control that can be undertaken are:
(1) (NU) Operational considerations, such as mission, range, and EP.

(2) (NU) In-flight conditions.

(3) (NU) Tactical situation.

(4) (NU) Mutual interference.

(5) (NU) Capabilities of ACUs and controllers.

(6) (NU) Equipment status of aircraft involved.

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Table 6-3. (NU) Operational Combinations of Terms Which Must Be Used

to Tactically Control Aircraft

SAFETY

MISSION POSITIVE ADVISORY

CLOSE A form of aircraft mission control in which A form of aircraft mission control in
the aircraft is continuously controlled, which the aircraft is continuously
for altitude, speed, and heading, to a controlled, for altitude, speed, and
position from which the mission can be heading, to a position from which the
accomplished. mission can be accomplished.
The controlling unit is responsible for The controlling unit will provide
taking actions for collision avoidance, such adequate warnings of hazards
as ordering the necessary alterations to affecting aircraft safety. The aircraft
heading, speed, and altitude, to maintain commander is responsible for the
separation criteria. aircraft’s navigation and collision
avoidance.

LOOSE A form of aircraft mission control in A form of aircraft mission control in

which the aircraft commander selects his which the aircraft commander selects
own speed, altitude, heading, and the his own speed, altitude, heading, and
appropriate tactics required to accomplish the appropriate tactics required to
the assigned task. The controlling unit will accomplish the assigned task. The
advise the aircraft of the current tactical controlling unit will advise the aircraft
picture and will provide further advice if of the current tactical picture and will
and when available. provide further advice if and when
available.
The controlling unit is responsible for
taking actions for collision avoidance, such The controlling unit will provide
as ordering the necessary alterations to adequate warnings of hazards
heading, speed, and altitude, to maintain affecting aircraft safety. The aircraft
separation criteria. commander is responsible for the
aircraft’s navigation and collision
avoidance.

BROADCAST Broadcast control does not require a controller qualification. It is a form of aircraft
mission control used in the absence of full capability or if the tactical situation
precludes close or loose control in which tactical/target information is passed to
enable the aircraft to accomplish the assigned task. The controlling unit, when
possible, provides adequate warnings of hazards, but the aircraft commander(s)
is (are) responsible for aircraft navigation and collision avoidance. Two-way
communications are not a prerequisite for this type of control.

NOTE: The following combinations of terms will normally be used; however, in exceptional
circumstances, either column or line labels may be used in isolation:
1. Close—Positive Control
2. Close—Advisory Control
3. Loose—Positive Control
4. Loose—Advisory Control
5. Broadcast Control

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6128 Courses and True Bearings

(NU) Both true and magnetic courses and bearings may be used in aircraft operations. In communications
with aircraft, courses and bearings are to be suffixed TRUE or MAGNETIC.
6129 Link 11 MPA Joining Procedure

a. (NC) (NMP) Purpose. This procedure can be used by any Link 11 fitted MPA joining and
Link 11 surface force at sea. It is designed to be used over the standard joining procedure laid out in
Article 6132, but it is not meant to supersede it.

(NC) (NMP) The aim of this procedure is as follows:

(1) (NC) (NMP) To facilitate a join with a naval task group that the MPA has advanced knowledge
of the tactical situation in the operations prior to arriving on task.

(2) (NC) (NMP) To allow the naval task group to identify the MPA prior to arriving at the ISR,
thereby avoiding unnecessary wait and back log of joining aircraft.

(3) (NC) (NMP) To remove the necessity for the MPA to hold at the gate and perform an identify
manoeuvre and consequently to reduce the duration of the joining procedure.

(NC) (NMP) As a precaution, a standard joining procedure shall be prepared in the event of a
Link 11 failure (see Article 6132).

b. (NC) (NMP) Procedure. The ACU and the MPA must adhere to the procedures in Table 6-4.

c. (NU) (NMP) Communications.

(1) (NC) (NMP) A link net must be established in order to use this procedure. Care must be taken
to use frequencies that are conductive to good Link 11 propagation.

(2) (NC) (NMP) If the MPA is unable to establish watch on the link co-ordination frequency, the
appropriate information may be passed on the control/fighting voice circuit.

6130 (NU) (NMP) Joining of Support Aircraft

(NC) (NMP) If the force is using 4W Disposition, Tables 6-6A/2 and 6-6A/3 will be used to task the
aircraft in an airplan area which approximates as closely as possible to the required grid areas, thus
obviating the need to pass a series of encoded grid squares. Full 4W Disposition details can be passed
to the MPA when the environment permits.

6131 Procedures for Aircraft in Transit

a. (NU) Enemy Contacts. Aircraft commanders are to be briefed before takeoff on action to be
taken on contacts gained while in transit. Briefing shall take the form of transit instructions as follows:

(1) (NU) Transit Instructions A (TRANSALFA). The aircraft is not to report or investigate
enemy contacts. Contacts gained are to be logged and reported after flight. The aircraft is to attempt
to adhere to scheduled task times.

(2) (NU) Transit Instructions B (TRANSBRAVO). The aircraft is to report enemy contacts to
its controlling authority and to the OTC of the supported force. It is not to investigate such contacts
and is to continue its briefed mission unless otherwise ordered.

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Table 6-4. (NU) (NMP) Link 11 MPA Joining Procedure

ACU Indicates, in the joining message to the MPA tasking authority (info
NAS if known), the link status in effect at the time of joining (see
Table 6-5, serial 9).
At least one hour prior to the MPA on task time, check with FTC-A that
the data net control station (DNCS) has effectively inserted the MPA
terminal address as active picket into the Link 11 playground.
MPA As soon as possible (i.e., during pre-flights), establish Link 11 net in
accordance with EMCON. Go net active to transmit PU as soon as
possible just after take off, while transiting, and prior to arriving at the
ISR. This should only be done for MPA fitted with integrated GPS.
Others MPA should remain as passive pickets until a grid lock is
performed to compensate for navigational error.
If able, MPA should initiate a track alert on its own PU. This should
draw attention to the MPA status; however, not all MPA may be able to
do this procedure.
ACU Upon receipt of the MPA PU, send a pre-defined Link 11 signal
(command or TN) as laid out in the OPTASK LINK and joining
message. A particular command and control order is preferred to
any other signals, but the capabilities of both ships and MPA Link 11
terminals must be taken into consideration. If the ACU can’t carry
out any command and control orders, the ship should transmit a
pre-designated track at the MPA’s position. For example, a friendly air
track at the MPA’s position with the same course and speed of MPA
and which track number (or Tatoo code) is XXYY, XX representing
MPA’s PU and YY representing serial number. This track must be
deleted following acceptance of valid MPA PU in order to avoid dual
designation.
MPA After receiving the particular command and control order from the
ACU, the MPA answers “WILCO” to the ACU and is considered as
“positively identified,” clear to close the force, and clear to proceed to
its op area (Bullring).
When receiving the pre-designated track, MPA considers itself
“positively identified” and clear to close the force. Once the aircraft has
effectively joined the naval task group, the control/fighting voice circuit
is then established.

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(3) (NU) Transit Instructions C (TRANSCHARLIE). The aircraft is to attempt identification

and report all enemy contacts. Concurrently with the report, the aircraft shall take the following
action:

(a) (NU) Submarine—Destroy it whenever possible, unless ASW attack is prohibited by

WSM attack restrictions. In prehostility phase, track it in accordance with ROE. The time
spent investigating an enemy contact shall be in accordance with preflight briefing or further
orders.
(NC) (NMP) (See Article 6434.)

(b) (NU) Surface Ships—Endeavour to shadow until further orders are received.

(c) (NU) Aircraft—Endeavour to identify and ascertain course and speed.

b. (NU) Search for Friendly Force.

(1) (NU) Not Found. If the force is not found within one hour of the expected time, an encrypted
“Not found” message is to be made to the authority ordering the mission. The aircraft may request
the OTC to use homing procedures; however, the OTC may not wish to break radio silence to
answer the request or to use homing procedures. The aircraft is to continue searching for the force.

(2) (NU) When Found. When the force is found, an encrypted “Found” report is to be made
only if a “Not found” report has been made previously or if the aircraft has been ordered to make
this report. The position of the force is only to be included in a “Found” report when the aircraft
commander considers that the estimated position is in error to such an extent that any delay in
transmitting this information would adversely affect subsequent operations. The “Found” report, if
made, is to be transmitted at least 50 miles from the force. However, once the aircraft is under the
tactical command of the OTC, it shall be the OTC’s responsibility, considering his EMCON plan,
to determine the range from the force at which the “Found” report shall be sent.

6132 Joining Procedures

a. (NU) Preparation. The OTC will promulgate handover gates, entry/exit gates, altitudes, ISP,
ISR, PIM, communication window times, etc., in appropriate MTMS messages. It is essential that
the aircraft receive all this information well before takeoff. The GREEN will also provide further
information.

b. (NU) Joining Instructions Message.

(1) (NU) The OTC/ACU should, whenever possible, send a joining instructions message to the
tasking authority and the airbase or parent ship to promulgate and update information regarding
the mission. The message should contain the information listed in Table 6-4, Serials 7 and 9. The
message can be transmitted by any means and should be received by the airbase at least 4 hours
before aircraft takeoff.

(2) (NU) The signal should be of IMMEDIATE precedence to both action and information
addressees. The first words of the text should be “FOR . . .” (e.g., “FOR MISSION 1234 FROM
(c/s ACU) TO (c/s MPA)”).

c. (NU) Approaching the Force. The OTC should establish approach corridors for friendly
aircraft to use when joining a force. In extreme conditions of weather and EMCON, he may dictate a
rigidly designed flight profile for aircraft joining, operating on station, and departing a task force/task
group. The design of such a flight profile must take into account the force composition/disposition
with respect to ASW, AAW, ESM, ASMD, and airspace coordination in instrument meteorological

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conditions (IMC). In a large disposition, the force AAW posture may permit engagement of MPA or
other friendly aircraft attempting to join long before communications have been established or ID has
been completed. This is especially true when pickets or deception groups are used. Therefore, it is
essential that aircraft remain in these corridors until identified as friendly by the OTC.

(1) (NU) Aircraft at ISP. The aircraft should be at the ISP (entry/exit gate if no ISP) at the
promulgated ON TASK time, and if early it is to hold there until ON TASK time. The aircraft
then flies down the approach corridor, attempting to establish communications with the force
marshaller/nominated controller/OTC on the promulgated frequency when closing the force within
the approach corridor. If the aircraft reaches the ISR and has not established communications with
the OTC and has not been identified as friendly, it is to hold at the ISR within the corridor and
continue to attempt communications. If after 15 minutes at the ISR, no communications have been
established, the aircraft is to transit towards the entry/exit gate inside the corridor until the aircraft
commander considers it safe and:

(a) (NU) Unless otherwise directed, carry out an appropriate airplan beyond the ISR and
outside a safe range from unidentified or hostile contacts.

(b) (NU) Make periodic attempts to establish communications on the promulgated joining
circuit or other force circuits.

(c) (NU) If the aircraft commander considers he cannot provide useful support or if his
activities may conflict with carrier-based operations, he is to clear the force to a suitable
distance and inform MHQ that he is unable to join and request instructions.

(2) (NU) Not Found/Found Procedure. See 6131.b.

d. (NU) Use of Checklist.

(1) (NU) The checklist in Table 6-5 is designed to be for both RATT and voice joining. Whenever
RATT is available, it should be used in preference to voice, as it is clearer, faster, and reduces
traffic on busy voice circuits. The OTC’s EMCON plan will indicate which information must be
encoded when voice is used.

(2) (NU) Whenever voice joining procedures are used, the OTC should consider using the
abbreviated format (paragraph e), thereby reducing the time for establishing the aircraft on patrol.

e. (NU) Abbreviated Joining Procedure. It is sometimes necessary to expedite joining

procedures; for example, when an action is in progress during arrival of aircraft. Such a procedure
should include only the following items:

(1) (NU) From Aircraft:

(a) (NU) Authentication.

(b) (NU) Number and type of aircraft/helicopters, identity of senior aircraft/helicopter, persons
on board.

(c) (NU) Joining from.

(d) (NU) Joining for/request employment.

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NOTE

(NU) THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SHOULD

BE PASSED IF DIFFERENT FROM THE TASKING SIGNALS:

(NU) ALTITUDE
(NU) WEAPON LOAD
(NU) OFF TASK TIME.

(NU) FOR HELICOPTERS, IF APPLICABLE:

(NU) OBSERVER CONTROL GRADE

(NU) ANY RESTRICTION TO AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY.

(2) (NU) From Ship:

(a) (NU) Authentication.

(b) (NU) Identity and ship’s position.

(c) (NU) Employment/airplan—including PIM, master/watcher, controller grade, control

rules in force.

(d) (NU) Clearance to close/descend.

(e) (NU) Weapon restrictions if appropriate.

(f) (NU) Grid lock.

(g) (NU) Data link information if appropriate.

(NU) Supplementary information can be passed later when the tactical situation permits.

f. (NU) Helicopters. When helicopters join from another task unit within the same task group, the
abbreviated joining procedure should normally be sufficient and should therefore generally be used. If
the helicopter requires further information, it should request it by reference to the appropriate section
in the joining checklist (for example, “HCU FROM HELICOPTER. REQUEST D, H, M, AND N”).
(The helicopter requires EW Task, Safety Info, SITREP, and Acoustic Info.)

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Table 6-5. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Sheet 1 of 3)

SERIAL ACTION UNIT ACTION

NO.

1 OTC/ACU (NU) On receipt of GREEN or ATO, transmit joining instructions

message IAW paragraph 6432.b

2 MHQ (NU) Relay the joining instructions message to the aircraft. If for
any reason the MHQ is unable to relay the message to the aircraft,
it is to inform the OTC/ACU.

3 Aircraft (NU) Complete aircraft joining message and transmit it to MHQ for
dispatch to ACU. (See Note 5 or Serial 8.)

4 Aircraft (NU) Transit under tactical control of air operations centre

(CAOC/JAOC) or MHQ.

5 Aircraft (NU) Select assigned IFF/selective identification feature (SIF)

codes as ordered in GREEN or ATO.
(NU) Communications should be attempted with the force before
the aircraft reaches the gate.

6A Aircraft (NU) If radar handover expected, monitor handover on promulgated

handover circuit and establish communications with the force
marshaller, nominated controller, or OTC. (See Notes 1 and 2.)

6B Aircraft (NU) If nonradar handover expected, establish communications

with force marshaller, nominated controller, or OTC on RATT or
voice on ASW or marshalling circuits as promulgated. Pass: type
of aircraft, time at gate/ISR, direction of approach, and altitude.
(See Notes 1 and 2.)

7 Force marshaller/ (NU) Respond to aircraft (see Note 1); challenge aircraft IFF or
nominated pass identity procedure to be done (if required). Pass:
controller/OTC
a. (NU) Call sign and position of ACU.
b. (NU) Direction and distance to patrol area.
c. (NU) Altimeter setting (QNH).
d. (NU) Communications security protection (CSP) aspects of
EMCON plan.
e. (NU) Inform aircraft if ACU has received GREEN or ATO.
f. (NU) Time check.
g. (NU) Clearance to descend and proceed to patrol area, as
required.
h. (NU) If required, new control RATT or voice frequency, and
control of aircraft to ACU.
i. (NU) Grid lock.

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Table 6-5. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Sheet 2 of 3)

8 Aircraft (NU) Call ACU and ascertain if ACU has received aircraft joining
message. If not received, pass all items below; if received, update
appropriate items below:
a. (NU) Sortie number.
b. (NU) Any restrictions to role (see Note 3).
c. (NU) DTG or serial numbers of OPGEN and OPTASKs received.
d. (NU) ON/OFF task times.
e. (NC) (NMP) Serial number of the latest WSM message received
and serial number of SGSA in effect (if any.)
f. (NU) Aircraft data link coordination information.
(NU) Be prepared to pass following additional information if ACU
informs aircraft that no GREEN or ATO was received:
g. (NU) Aircraft type.
h. (NU) Weapon load.
i. (NU) IFF mode setting.

9 ACU (NU) ACU pass following joining instructions message (see Note 4):
a. (NU) Identify manoeuvre if no previous voice communications
established. Pass ship’s position and clearance to close/descend.
b. (NU) Threat assessment, mission designator and employment/
airplan, grid lock (if not already completed by force marshaller),
controller grade, control rules in force.
c. (NU) EMCON.
d. (NU) EW task.
e. (NU) PIM, if different.
f. (NU) Update important data from OPGEN and OPTASK if different.
g. (NC) (NMP) Update important data from JAA (including any SGSA
in effect) or SAA, if different; or pass latest WSM serial number and
effective SGSA (if any).
h. (NU) Update air safety information not previously transmitted,
including other aircraft activity.

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Table 6-5. (NU) Checklist for Aircraft Joining Surface Forces for Direct Support (Sheet 3 of 3)

9 ACU i. (NU) Lost communication procedures.

(Cont.)
j. (NU) Weapons restrictions and ROE.
k. (NU) SITREP, including in TA operations current contact
acoustic data (i.e., target sources, frequencies, source levels,
aspect dependencies and advice or sensor depth).
l. 1. (NU) Bathy and active acoustic information if different from
predicted range.
2. (NU) In TAS operations: ambient noise.
m. (NU) Weather, QNH, water depth, and tidal stream.
n. (NU) Call sign and position of important and detached units.
o. (NU) Times of ship/air RATT schedules (if applicable).
p. (NU) Data link coordination information.

NOTE:

(NU) Only information required need be sent.

10 Aircraft (NU) Report to ACU when in patrol area.

Notes:
1. (NU) Whenever joining an unsecure voice circuit, proper authentication must be used.
2. (NU) Helicopters are too close at altitudes that will allow early radar detection by the force being
joined and at speeds below 140 knots.
3. (NU) Restrictions should include any significant change in standard weapon load or any
unservice abilities.
4. (NU) ACU should not duplicate any information already held by the aircraft.
5. (NU) Aircraft joining message is to be:
a. (NU) In accordance with MATELO Handbook
b. (NU) Of IMMEDIATE precedence
c. (NU) Addressed to the OTC/ACU
d. (NU) From the aircraft call sign.
6. (NU) The communications security protection (CSP) aspects of an EMCON plan are reflected by
radiation status indicators (RSIs) A, D, and X.

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g. (NC) (NMP) Covert Joining Procedures.

(1) (NC) (NMP) The OTC may direct that covert joining procedure is to be used to avoid revealing
the presence of joining aircraft. This procedure restricts the aircraft commander from using UHF
for voice transmission until he is involved in the active engagement of a contact. However, should
the procedure become too restrictive, it may be cancelled by the OTC, ACU, or aircraft commander.

(2) (NC) (NMP) When joining, the aircraft commander will carry out normal joining procedures,
but he will not transmit on UHF to establish communications, as outlined for the self-identification
procedure. The aircraft commander and ACU will carry out the following:

(a) (NC) (NMP) The aircraft shows the appropriate IFF/selective identification feature (SIF).

(b) (NC) (NMP) When the ACU identifies the aircraft he passes patrol instructions using
message authentication.

(c) (NC) (NMP) If the aircraft commander understands the instructions, he squawks IDENT
(identity ALFA) and proceeds on patrol.

(d) (NC) (NMP) If the aircraft commander does not understand or hear all of the instructions,
he switches his IFF to standby for 1 minute (identity BRAVO).

(e) (NC) (NMP) The procedure is repeated until the aircraft commander squawks IDENT
(identify ALFA) to signify that patrol instructions are understood. In no case should the aircraft
overfly any ship unless given permission to do so by the ACU.

(f) (NC) (NMP) The ACU checks his message to ensure that his instructions are complete
and then retransmits. Should the aircraft commander again go to standby (identity BRAVO),
it is probable that he is having difficulty reading the ACU, and the ACU should instruct him
to close.

6133 Identification/Recognition of Support Aircraft

(NU) It is important that all aircraft approaching a force at sea be positively identified as friendly as
they close the force. When the aircraft departs from its base/force at sea, its identity is known and the
transfer of control and identification/recognition to the supported force can be done by radar handover
or nonradar handover procedures.
a. (NU) Radar Handover. This procedure is used when there is overlapping radar coverage at the
transit altitude between the departure air control area and the air control area around the supported
force. The controllers effect a positive transfer of control of the aircraft after mutual self-identification.

b. (NU) Nonradar Handover. This procedure is used when there is a gap in radar coverage at the
transit altitude or when EMCON denies the use of radar and positive handover by controllers is not
possible. Aircraft who are tasked to support a force and are controlled by maritime authorities, are to
use appropriate self-identification and joining procedures listed in Article 6134 and Table 6-5.

c. (NU) Fleet Air Defence Identification Zone Coordinator (REDCROWN).

(1) (NU) The AAWC assigns an AAW unit to serve as the FADIZ C (Proword: REDCROWN).
The FADIZ C is a highly capable (surveillance, communications, and weapons systems) surface
air defence unit and is stationed along the threat axis to identify and deconflict aircraft entering into
and departing airspace designated as FADIZ by the AAWC. When sector AAWCs are designated,
a sector FADIZ C is assigned for each AAW sector. Each sector FADIZ C is identified by a unique
proword and call sign, e.g., BLUECROWN, MAPLECROWN, etc. GREENCROWN is normally
used to identify the sector FADIZ C for an amphibious objective area.

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(2) (NU) The AAWC also designates an alternate REDCROWN. The alternate REDCROWN shall
be capable of immediately assuming FADIZ C duties if REDCROWN suffers degraded data link or
communications, or is improperly positioned because of change in threat axis or force disposition.
The AAWC should provide specific supplemental FADIZ and REDCROWN instructions in AAW
directives.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Common FADIZ C duties include the following:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Provide early detection and identification of friendly aircraft returning from
missions.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Detect and identify hostile aircraft (intruders) masked by friendly returning
aircraft.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Conduct flight following of friendly aircraft from launch to handover.

(d) (NC) (NMP) Provide radar advisories and control as required.

(e) (NC) (NMP) Provide steer to returning strike aircraft to marshal point, tanker station, or
return to force (RTF) corridor.

(f) (NC) (NMP) Conduct IFF/tactical air navigation operability checks.

(g) (NC) (NMP) Verify RTF procedures.

(h) (NC) (NMP) Receive handovers of friendly aircraft from other controlling authorities.

(i) (NC) (NMP) Handover friendly aircraft to other controlling authorities.

(j) (NC) (NMP) Authorize deviations from RTFs/minimum risk route (MRRS) of positively
identified friendly aircraft.

(4) (NC) REDCROWN should ideally be collocated with the force marshaller and/or conveniently
with the HEC/AREC.

6134 Identification/Recognition Procedures

(NU) Tentative initial identification/recognition of friendly aircraft may be assumed when an aircraft,
showing the proper IFF/SIF code, enters and settles down on the heading of the designated approach
corridor or sector. Positive identification/recognition will be considered as established when an aircraft
has been visually sighted and recognized by CAP, other known friendly aircraft, or a surface ship. If not
sighted, positive identification/recognition may be assumed if at least one planned IFF/SIF change or
identity manoeuvre has been made. The following self-identification procedures are established:
a. (NC) (NMP) IFF/SIF Identity. This may be ordered by the use of the term “Perform Identity
(designation).”

(1) Identity — Squawk IDENT

ALFA
(2) Identity — Switch to standby for 1 minute.
BRAVO
(3) Identity — (Wartime Only) Shift for 2 minutes to the wartime
CHARLIE mode/code assignments designated for the next half-
hour period; then return to the current mode.

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b. (NC) (NMP) Identity. If positive identification/rectification cannot be established through

IFF/SIF identity, one of the following shall be ordered by the controlling unit.

(1) Identity — Carry out one 360° orbit

DELTA

(2) Identity — Carry out a left or right 90° turn holding

ECHO new heading for 1 minute, returning to
corridor at a 45° angle.
(3) Identity — Carry out encoded vector.
FOXTROT

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6135 (NU) (NMP) Rapid Tasking Procedures for MPA Joining a Force

(NC) (NMP) The procedure permits MPA joining a force to be rapidly tasked, after the authentication/
identification phase has been completed, during periods when the use of a full joining message is
inappropriate. The procedure can also be used to retask MPA already established on task.
6136 (NU) (NMP) Procedure

(NC) (NMP) The procedure is executed after authentication/identification has been achieved. If
subsequently required, additional information may be passed as soon as circumstances permit in order
to amplify the tasking.
(NC) (NMP) The procedure consists of a task force “Rapid Tasking Message,” a readback of the message
by the MPA, and an MPA “Acknowledgement Message.”
a. (NC) (NMP) Rapid Tasking Message. The ACU passes tasking information by transmitting a
combination of letters and numbers, using the following format:

RAPID TASKING MESSAGE

2 letters 1 number 2 letters 1 letter 1 number
Task Weapon Airplan Airplan EMCON
Restriction Area Area Range
Sector
Bearings
Tables 6-1 and 6-2 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5

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b. (NC) (NMP) Acknowledgement Message. The MPA acknowledges the Rapid Tasking
Message in accordance with Table 6-6A/5.

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6137 (NU) (NMP) Task

(NC) (NMP) The task is passed by using the two-lettered mission designators from Tables 6-1 and 6-2.
6138 (NU) (NMP) Weapon Restrictions

(NC) (NMP) The weapon restriction policy is passed by the use of a single number from Table 6-6A/1.
Clearance for weapon release will apply to tasked airplan area only. When ROEs apply, the use of
number “3” from Table 6-6A/1 permits the OTC to deny the MPA clearance to attack until he is satisfied
that the MPA is in receipt of the latest ROEs in force. The OTC must also ensure that weapon WSM
Attack Rules (Section IV of this chapter) are enforced.
6139 (NU) (NMP) Airplan Area

(NC) (NMP) If the force is using 4W Disposition, Tables 6-6A/2 and 6-6A/3 will be used to task the
aircraft in an airplan area which approximates as closely as possible to the required grid areas, thus
obviating the need to pass a series of encoded grid squares. Full 4W Disposition details can be passed to
the MPA when the environment permits.
6140 (NU) (NMP) Emission Control

(NC) (NMP) Restrictions on the use of radar and HF by the MPA are ordered to comply with the latest
force EMCON policy by passing the appropriate number from Table 6-6A/4. V/UHF communications
are assumed to be authorised and IFF is to be used in accordance with standard operating procedures
(SOPs).

Table 6-6A/1. (NU) (NMP) Weapon Restrictions

NUMBER MEANING
1 CONVENTIONAL WEAPON ATTACKS AUTHORIZED

2 CONVENTIONAL WEAPON ATTACKS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED

3 CONVENTIONAL WEAPON ATTACKS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED UNTIL THE OTC IS

SATISFIED THAT THE MPA IS IN RECEIPT OF THE LATEST ROE IN FORCE.
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Table 6-6A/2. (NU) (NMP) True Bearing Designators

A 000 G 120 M 240 S 030 Y 045

B 020 H 140 N 260 T 090 Z 315
C 040 I 160 O 280 U 150 AA Circular Area
D 060 J 180 P 300 V 210
E 080 K 200 Q 320 W 270
F 100 L 220 R 340 X 330
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Table 6-6A/3. (NU) (NMP) Range Designators

A 20–50 G 40–70 L 60–90 P 80–120 S 100–140

B 20–80 H 40–100 M 60–120 Q 80–160 T 100–170 W 120–200
C 20–110 I 40–130 N 60–160 R 80–200 U 100–200 X 140–200
D 20–140 J 40–160 O 60–200 V 120–160
E 20–170 K 40–200 Y 0–50
F 20–200 Z 0–100

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Table 6-6A/4. (NU) (NMP) Emission Control

NUMBER MEANING
1 UNRESTRICTED RADAR AND HF
2 NO RADAR OR HF
3 UNRESTRICTED RADAR—HF ONLY WHEN > 100 NM ZZ
4 UNRESTRICTED RADAR—NO HF
5 RADAR ONLY WHEN > 30 NM ZZ—NO HF
6 RADAR ONLY WHEN > 30 NM ZZ—HF ONLY > 100 NM ZZ
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6141 (NU) (NMP) Rapid Tasking Message Readback

(NC) (NMP) To ensure correct reception of the intended tasking, particularly the weapons restrictions, a
readback of the Rapid Tasking Message is to be made by the MPA.
6142 (NU) (NMP) Acknowledgement Message

(NC) (NMP) The MPA acknowledges receipt of the Rapid Tasking Message with the appropriate response
from Table 6-6A/5. As MPA may be able to obtain elements of the PIM from other sources, voice traffic
is greatly reduced if MESSAGE A, or even MESSAGE D or E, is used in preference to MESSAGE C.
6143 (NU) (NMP) Example of Procedure

a. (NC) (NMP) Situation. The force has recently been under enemy air and subsurface attack
and is currently experiencing communication jamming and deception by enemy airborne assets. The
MPA that is joining the force has already received a full Joining Message, but the OTC now wishes
to amend the MPA’s task. Except for very brief periods, reliable ship-to-air communications cannot
be established. The force is on a mean line of advance (MLA) of 360/10. The MPA has already
determined the position of the force but does not know the course and speed.

b. (NC) (NMP) Required MPA Tasking. The OTC wishes to task the MPA with a “deter”
mission, using radar augmented by passive sonobuoys against an SSG/SSGN threat. The MPA will
be permitted to carry out conventional weapon attacks in the tasked airplan area—40 to 70 nm ahead
of the force, 40° either side of MLA. HF is not to be used within 100 nm of ZZ, and radar is not to be
used within 30 nm of ZZ.

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Table 6-6A/5. (NU) (NMP) MPA Acknowledgement Message

MESSAGE MEANING –
MESSAGE A TASKING UNDERSTOOD WILL – CALL WHEN ESTABLISHED IN AREA IF
COMMS PERMIT
MESSAGE B TASKING NOT UNDERSTOOD – REPEAT

MESSAGE C TASKING UNDERSTOOD – REQUEST PM

MESSAGE D TASKING UNDERSTOOD – REQUEST ONLY POSITION ELEMENT OF PIM

MESSAGE E TASKING UNDERSTOOD – REQUEST ONLY COURSE AND SPEED

ELEMENT OF PIM

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

c. (NC) (NMP) Rapid Tasking Message. The ACU would transmit the following:

(NC) (NMP) “RAPID TASKING MESSAGE—ZULU YANKEE ONE QUEBEC CHARLIE GOLF
SIX”

d. (NC) (NMP) Rapid Tasking Message Readback. The MPA transmits:

(NC) (NMP) “I READ BACK—ZULU YANKEE ONE QUEBEC CHARLIE GOLF SIX”

e. (NC) (NMP) MPA Acknowledgement Message. The MPA, after decoding the Rapid
Tasking Message, understands the tasking but requests the course and speed elements of the PIM by
transmitting:

(NC) (NMP) “MESSAGE ECHO”

f. (NC) (NMP) ACU Response. The ACU responds by passing the course and speed elements of
the PIM, appropriately encoded.

g. (NC) (NMP) MPA Acknowledgement Message. The MPA, having received and successfully
decoded the course and speed elements of the PIM, acknowledges by transmitting:

(NC) (NMP) “MESSAGE ALFA”

h. (NC) (NMP) On Patrol Call. The MPA proceeds to the airplan area and, if communications
permit, calls when established on patrol. If necessary, the ACU should amplify the tasking to the MPA
when conditions permit.

6144–6149 Spare

6150 Employment of Aircraft While on Direct Support

(NU) Employment of aircraft on direct support is determined by the OTC or the ASWC/ASUWC as
appropriate. On joining the force, the aircraft will be tasked using an appropriate airplan based on the
mission as promulgated in the tasking signal. The OTC cannot normally task a support aircraft on
mission types other than that authorized by the original tasking authority. The only exception to this is
when “KS” ASW operations is given, then the OTC can amplify aircraft using the mission designators in
Table 6-1. The OTC may change the employment of ASW aircraft by issuing a new airplan and/or ASW
mission designator.

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6151 (NU) (NMP) ASW Mission Designators

a. (NC) (NMP) Maximum Effect From ASW Air Effort. To derive the maximum effect from
ASW air effort, it is essential that the purpose and tasks of each sortie be clearly defined. Only by doing
so can it be assured that sorties are complementary and that the intentions of the tasking authority are
conveyed fully and without ambiguity to the aircraft commander.

b. (NC) (NMP) Type of ASW Operation Ordered. Irrespective of the type of ASW operation
ordered, the ASW Mission Designator Table (6-2) specifies one or both of the following mission aims.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Deter—To harass submarines to the extent that they fail to achieve their aims.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Detect—To detect submarines.

c. (NC) (NMP) Tasking Authority Factors. Factors which must be taken into account by the
tasking authority when matching each sortie to the intention of the commander include the threat,
other friendly forces available, and the environment.

d. (NC) (NMP) Appropriate Designator Letters. Tasking authorities, whether shore-based

or the OTC, will order the missions in Table 6-2 by indicating the appropriate designator letters.
Tasking authorities will use “KS” in the mission line of FORM GREEN to order ASW direct support
operations. Selection and ordering of the specific ASW mission designator is the prerogative of the
supported OTC.

e. (NC) (NMP) Deviation From Specified Sensor. Aircraft commanders may not deviate from
the specified sensor(s) without prior approval from the tasking authority/OTC since the use of other
sensors may negate the tasking authority’s/OTC’s intention.

6152 (NU) (NMP) Sonobuoy Operations

(NC) (NMP) Aircraft tasked with conducting a passive sonobuoy search will normally determine their
own sonobuoy spacing and orientation in the light of briefed or measured acoustic information. If the
unit is an ASW helicopter, or if the OTC or designated warfare specialist wishes, detailed employment
may be specified.
6153 Identification and Recognition by Aircraft
(NU) Visual identification/recognition is likely to be extremely hazardous to an aircraft. Covert tactics
should therefore be used to force the target to radiate and give the aircraft an opportunity for identification/
recognition. High-speed probe aircraft, when available, should be used if visual identification/recognition
is essential.
a. (NU) Actions on Gaining Contact. On gaining contact, the aircraft should immediately turn
away from the target, attempt to fix its position, and recognize the target using ESM. The aircraft
should remain outside the potential MEZ and, if covert, operate at minimum operating level or below
the ship’s theoretical radar horizon.

b. (NU) Identification. If unable to recognize using ESM, a positive identification run may be
necessary. The aircraft will normally take the following precautions:

(1) (NU) Approach from a direction other than that on which the initial detection was made.

(2) (NU) Approach at minimum altitude and high speed.

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(3) (NU) Monitor ESM for fire control radar lock-on and, if detected, alter course approximately
135° and open the target at minimum altitude and high speed.

(4) (NU) If no fire control radar is detected, continue the approach until visual identification is
obtained or AA range is reached.

6154–6159 Spare

6160 (NU) (NMP) MPA-to-MPA Turnover Procedures

(NC) (NMP) MPA-to-MPA turnover procedures must ensure safety of flight, maintain the tactical
problem, and preserve the EMCON policy. MPA controllers shall ensure oncoming aircraft arrive in
the assigned area at an altitude above the on-task aircraft, and that the relieving aircraft not expend
sonobuoys prior to the on-task aircraft’s departure from the operating area. Fifteen minutes prior to the
scheduled relief time, the on-task aircraft is to deploy predesignated turnover sonobuoys (A, B, C) or
briefed gapped turnover channels, which describe the tactical situation, at the briefed off-task time, to the
relieving aircraft. It is imperative that the oncoming aircraft mark-on-top these buoys for flight safety, to
ascertain the tactical situation, and to plot-lock buoy patterns for subsequent analysis/reconstruct. The
standard altimeter setting during turnover procedures (defined as 30 minutes prior to briefed on-task/
off-task time until turnover is completed) is 1013.2/29.92.
6161 (NU) (NMP) Terminology

(NC) (NMP) The following terms are used to describe geographic positions that are pertinent to tactical
situations.
a. (NC) (NMP) Jig Point. The jig point is a fixed geographic position established by the MPA
controlling agency for each sortie at which a crew will be briefed to drop the first buoy (Kingpin buoy)
of the briefed cold pattern. Any change of Kingpin position when ordering new cold tactics in flight
will be passed relative to the jig point as a range and bearing or as a new latitude and longitude for
Kingpin positions.

b. (NC) (NMP) Kingpin. The Kingpin is the master buoy position of a cold tactic on which the
barrier or field pattern is oriented. The Kingpin will normally be an end or corner buoy of the barrier
or field.

c. (NC) (NMP) Pattern Time. Pattern time is the time by which a barrier, wedge, or field must be
laid and monitoring commenced. If a crew is unable to meet the criteria, the pattern is to be moved
in accordance with the briefed time-late instructions. Air messages revising Kingpin position are to
include a time for the completion of the new pattern.

d. (NC) (NMP) Barrier. The term “barrier” is to be used to specify a straight line of buoys. Barrier
orientation will be ordered by one true bearing from the Kingpin buoy.

e. (NC) (NMP) Wedge. The term “wedge” is to be used to specify a bent line barrier of buoys.
Barrier orientation will be ordered by two true bearings. The first bearing provides barrier orientation
from the Kingpin to the centre of the wedge. The second bearing provides orientation from the centre
point to the last buoy.

f. (NC) (NMP) Field. The term “field” is to be used for all patterns that involve more than one row
of buoys. The pattern will be ordered by two true bearings. The first bearing will be row orientation
from the Kingpin and the second bearing will be the field direction (normally right angles to row
orientation). For all fields, the second and subsequent rows are normally offset left or right (as
specified) by one-half buoy spacing.

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g. (NC) (NMP) On-Task Point. The position of the reference buoy in the previous aircraft’s
turnover pattern is designated the on-task point for oncoming aircraft. An aircraft not relieving another
is to use the master buoy (kingpin) from his cold/cold tactic as the on-task point.

h. (NC) (NMP) Reference Buoy. Turnover buoys deployed by the offgoing aircraft will be used
as the reference point for the turnover. Though more than one buoy may be used to indicate contact
status, the turnover point will be established by a single reference buoy as specified below:

Contact Deployed Reference

Status Buoy Buoy
HOT/HOT A, AB, ABC, A
AC
HOT/COLD B, BC B
COLD/COLD C C
NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

i. (NC) (NMP) Off-Task Point. A point 30 nm along a vector specified by the controlling authority
from the reference buoy dropped by the offgoing aircraft. The aircraft is cleared to commence a climb
from flight level (FL) 140 or below at the off-task point to the return transit level while maintaining
the off-task vector. Where possible the off-task vector should be along the target track but optimized
to give maximum lateral separation from the track of the oncoming aircraft.

6162 (NU) (NMP) On-Task Extensions

(NC) (NMP) Occasionally the on-task aircraft will be instructed to extend his off-task time. Unless
in direct secure communications with the offgoing aircraft, individual initiative on the part of the
oncoming aircraft is not to be used in determining early descents, buoy drops, or any other departure
from established procedures. Extensions to briefed on-task times may be only authorized by the aircraft’s
OPCON authority.
6163 (NU) (NMP) Procedures for Specific Turnover

(NC) (NMP) To provide safe separation between the oncoming and offgoing aircraft during turnover, it is
necessary to establish a direction in which the aircraft must descend or climb when arriving and departing
the operating area. To establish this direction, the controlling authority will designate a departure vector
for each turnover. The designated vector will be used by the offgoing aircraft to determine the direction of
his departure track from the reference buoy, and the reciprocal of the vector will be used by the oncoming
aircraft to determine the direction in which to descend to the desired on-task altitude. Turnover/takeover
procedures are to be flown at FL 140 and FL 150 respectively, unless specified differently in Forms
GREEN and briefing signals. Aircraft may not descend from transit to turnover altitude sooner than
30 minutes prior to briefed on-task time, unless the previous aircraft has departed station. For safety of
flight, it is essential that aircraft tasked for operations in restricted EMCON adhere to the procedures
outlined below.
a. (NC) (NMP) Procedures for Aircraft at Off-Task Time.

(1) (NC) (NMP) At off-task time minus 30 minutes, the aircraft is to remain at or below FL 140.

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NOTE

(NC) (NMP) THE OFF-TASK TIME FOR THE OFFGOING

AIRCRAFT IS THE SAME AS THE ON-TASK TIME FOR THE
ONCOMING AIRCRAFT IN A CONTINUOUS PROSECUTION
SCENARIO.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Not later than off-task time minus 15 minutes, deploy the appropriate turnover
sonobuoys.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Replace turnover buoys if required.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Depart the reference buoy along the departure vector so as to arrive at the off-task
point (30 nm range along the departure vector from the reference buoy) not later than the scheduled
off-task time.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Under no circumstances are sonobuoys or stores to be released after the off-task
time.

(6) (NC) (NMP) When level at the assigned flight level, proceed to the designated inbound route.

b. (NC) (NMP) Nonarrival of Relief. If the relief is late, the on-task aircraft is not to remain
beyond its briefed off-task time unless specifically ordered by its OPCON.

(NC) (NMP) If aircraft-to-aircraft communications have not been established, the departing aircraft
should pass appropriate information to the antisubmarine warfare aircraft control unit (ASWACU) for
transmission to any subsequent relief.

c. (NC) (NMP) Procedures for Aircraft at On-Task Time.

(1) (NC) (NMP) At the assigned transit flight level, proceed to the on-task point (reference buoy if
deployed, or Kingpin position if not relieving a previous event) via the assigned route.

(2) (NC) (NMP) At the on-task point, descend if required, but do not fly lower than the authorized
turnover altitude (normally FL 150) until the on-task time.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Monitor turnover buoys and establish the position of the reference buoy by
mark-on-top.

(4) (NC) (NMP) At the on-task time, descend to search altitude from the on-task point along the
briefed on-task vector.

(5) (NC) (NMP) If the previous event was cold, proceed at the on-task time to the briefed position
and commence deployment of the briefed cold search pattern.

d. (NC) (NMP) Restrictions. If, for any reason, the position of the reference buoy cannot be
established, the aircraft is to remain overhead the on-task point at or above FL 150 until on-task time
plus 15 minutes. After this time the aircraft is cleared to descend and proceed with the appropriate
tactics.

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6164 (NU) (NMP) Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures

a. (NC) (NMP) Nongapped turnovers should use the sonobuoy turnover patterns specified in
Table 6-6.

b. (NC) (NMP) Planned gapped turnovers, when hot, should use the following turnover patterns:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Alpha buoy on the best estimate of the target’s position at the off-task time.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Bravo buoy on the best estimate of the target’s position at the on-task time of the
relieving aircraft.

(3) (NC) (NMP) A five-buoy wedge centred on the Bravo buoy at 2 mean detection range spacing.
The radio frequency (RF) channels of the wing buoys of the wedge, Delta-1 and Delta-2, will be
designated by the controlling authority. The RF channels of the inner buoys will be at the discretion
of the MPA captain.

NOTE
(NC) (NMP) SONOBUOY LIFE SETTINGS ARE TO BE THE
MINIMUM THAT WILL GUARANTEE RF LIFE FOR THE GAPPED
PERIOD, AND, IF POSSIBLE, THE BRAVO BUOY SHOULD BE
A DIFAR BUOY. CREWS ARE TO BE BRIEFED FOR GAPPED
TURNOVERS FOR ALL EVENTS AND ARE TO EMPLOY GAPPED
TURNOVER PROCEDURES IF ADVISED THAT THE ONCOMING
AIRCRAFT IS DELAYED BY MORE THAN ONE HOUR. A CREW
TAKING OVER A GAPPED TURNOVER HAS ONE HOUR IN
WHICH TO GENERATE CONTACT. IF CONTACT IS NOT
GAINED WITHIN ONE HOUR, COLD/COLD TACTICS ARE TO BE
EMPLOYED.

6165–6169 Spare

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Table 6-6. (NU) (NMP) Sonobuoy Turnover Procedures

Turnover Pattern Meaning Position
in Water
Alpha (only) Hot localized DP contact at On best estimate of target’s position at briefed
briefed off-station time. Target off-station time. (See Notes 1 and 2.)
course and speed uncertain.
Bravo (only) Nonlocalized contact at briefed On top of buoy having strongest target contact.
off-station time. (See Note 1.)
Charlie (only) No significant contact held On the end of the pattern closest to the destination
during the on-station period. air base (or as briefed). (See Note 1.)
Charlie buoy deployed for
search pattern continuity.
Alpha and Bravo Hot CZ or BB contact at briefed Collocated on last buoy in contact. (See Note 1.)
Collocated off-station time. Note: If the air
crew is not certain of the type of
contact (CZ/BB or DP), assume
nonlocalized contact and drop
Bravo buoy as above.
Alpha and Bravo Not Hot localized DP contact at Alpha on best estimate of target’s position at briefed
Collocated off-station time. Target course off-station time. Bravo down target’s course at 1 nm
and speed known. for each knot of target’s speed. (See Notes 1 and 2.)
Alpha and Charlie (Spare)
Collocated
Alpha and Charlie Not (1) Localized contact, offgoing Alpha on best estimate of target’s position at time the
Collocated aircraft had to leave station prior aircraft left station or lost contact. Charlie separated
or from Alpha 2 nm per 15 minutes difference between
the time the aircraft left station or lost contact time
(2) Lost CTC prior to briefed and briefed off-station time. (See Notes 1, 2, and 3.)
off-target course and speed
uncertain.
Alpha, Bravo, Same as above, except that Same as above, Bravo down target’s course at 1 nm
and Charlie Not target course and speed are per knot of target’s speed. (See Notes 1, 2, and 3.)
Collocated known.
Bravo and Charlie (Spare)
Collocated
Bravo and Charlie Not Nonlocalized contact when Bravo collocated on strongest buoy in contact at the
Collocated leaving (or station lost contact) time the aircraft left station or lost contact. Charlie
prior to briefed off-station time. displaced from Bravo 2 nm per 15 minutes difference
from the time the aircraft left station or lost contact
and the briefed off-station time. (See Notes 1 and 3.)
Zulu Buoy placed 15 minutes of Buoy positioned to maintain contact on quiet targets.
target SOA down track from
Alpha buoy.
Notes:
1. Crews are cleared to use any combination of buoy types for turnovers between similarly equipped aircraft as
briefed by the operational commander. When turnovers are between different aircraft types, or if any doubt exists
on types of buoys to use, lofar or difar will be used, with preference given to the use of difar for the Alpha and
Bravo buoys.
2. For localized DP contact, the aircraft must have achieved Doppler shift or difar closest point of approach
(CPA) and employed fixing techniques to confirm contact position to within 5 nm.
3. If at all possible, the Charlie buoy should be positioned along the target track to provide an additional
opportunity for contact.

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6170 Safety Procedures for Maritime Air Operations

6171 Fixed-Wing Aircraft
(NU) Safety of aircraft operating in support of a naval force is achieved by planned air coordination
consisting of the organization, procedures, and measures required to prevent mutual interference between
surface and air units and their weapons systems. The following procedures are to be used by tasking
authorities and OTCs for maritime aircraft to ensure the safety of aircraft from takeoff to landing.
(NU) The ultimate responsibility for the safety of the aircraft rests at all times with the aircraft commander.
a. (NU) Transit Separation. Tasking authorities and air coordination authorities are to arrange
separation for aircraft joining and departing a patrol area or a force at sea. This may be done by
ordering routes, handover gates, entry/exit gates, ISP, transit and patrol altitude, including upper and
lower limits, in the appropriate messages. This must be coordinated with the appropriate air defence
organizations.
b. (NU) Joining Procedures for Shore-Based Aircraft.
(1) (NU) Direct Support. Aircraft joining a force for direct support operations are to transit
through the entry/exit gate (ISP if promulgated), in the approach corridor to the ISR, at the allocated
transit altitude or FL until identified as friendly and cleared to ascend/descend to the patrol area
by the force marshaller/nominated controller/OTC. Aircraft must not leave the approach corridor
while closing unless identification has been confirmed by the force. If communication cannot
be established with the OTC, the aircraft will transit back towards the entry/exit gate within the
corridor and continue operations as detailed in Article 6132.
(2) (NU) Associated Support and Area Operations. Aircraft proceeding to an operating
area may commence the descent before reaching the patrol area, providing they do not infringe on
other aircraft areas. When relieving other aircraft, they are to enter the area through the promulgated
entry point at the assigned altitude. The offgoing aircraft is to depart through the promulgated
departure point, at an assigned altitude normally lower than that of the relieving aircraft. After
establishing two-way communication between the aircraft and arranging mutual separation, they
may depart the assigned altitudes. If communication has not been established between the aircraft,
the relieving aircraft may leave its assigned altitude 15 minutes after the briefed ON TASK time.
(3) (NU) Adjacent Patrol Areas. Aircraft patrol areas may be ordered with common boundaries,
but to prevent mutual interference between adjacent aircraft, a safety zone must be established
15 nm either side of the common boundary. Aircraft intending to prosecute a contact within this
safety zone, and prior to entering an area in which another aircraft is operating, must, when the
situation and EMCON policy permit, broadcast on the briefed frequency their position, altitude,
and intentions, including the position of the contact under investigation, and maintain a continuous
radar watch for other aircraft.
(NU) Subject to the EMCON plan in effect, ASW aircraft employed on operations in adjacent areas
should be allocated tactical air navigation (TACAN) channels for use in the air-to-air mode to assist in
the safe separation of such units. MHQs should allocate TACAN channels to aircraft under their tactical
control. Coordination between MHQs and OTCs will normally be necessary to avoid conflict.

NOTE

(NU) TO USE THE AIR-TO-AIR TACAN CAPABILITY BETWEEN

SUITABLY EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT, AIRCRAFT IN ADJACENT
AREAS SHOULD BE ALLOCATED CHANNELS WITH A
DIFFERENCE OF 63 BETWEEN CHANNEL NUMBERS (E.G., 21
AND 84, OR 33 AND 96).
(4) (NU) Aircraft Emergencies. The emergency communication procedures used by the MPA
will be in accordance with the procedures contained in ICAO documentation.

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6172 Helicopters

a. (NU) General. Helicopters may ditch without warning and should, whenever possible, be kept
under constant surveillance by a surface unit. Helicopters in the dip are to be considered ships not
under command. When working at close quarters, it is the responsibility of ships to avoid helicopters.
Ships should not pass within 500 yards of hovering helicopters, and should pass preferably on the
downwind side. To assist in passing, use should be made of the order FREEZE or JUMP, both of
which when given to helicopters are mandatory. The order FREEZE should be followed by the order
MELT as soon as the situation allows. Fixed-wing aircraft are not to position themselves so that
the slipstream strikes a helicopter or causes a helicopter to manoeuvre to avoid the slipstream. If,
for some reason, it becomes imperative for the helicopter to leave the hover before recovering the
sonar transducer, an emergency breakdip may be executed by cutting the cable. The aircraft may also
attempt a free-stream recovery by leaving the hover with the transducer still streamed, attempting
to recover the transducer in flight. In this situation, the aircraft will transmit “Emergency streamer.”
Fixed-wing aircraft within two nautical miles are to vacate the airspace below 3,000 feet.

b. (NU) Joining Procedures for Helicopters.

(1) (NR) (NMP) Communication Procedures. Communication procedures for helicopters

joining or departing a maritime force are detailed in APP-01.

(2) (NU) Airmove Messages. Airmove messages may be used to determine and confirm which
agency has tactical control when aircraft are being transferred between ships and shore, and to
enable overdue action to be initiated at the earliest opportunity.

(3) (NU) Transit. In situations where radar coverage of the forces does not overlap, the transit is
to be conducted on the transit control frequency. Other aircraft on this frequency may be used to
provide communication relay facilities to simplify the transfer of control of the aircraft to the force
marshaller. Attention is drawn to the significance of the establishment of two-way communication
in the transfer of OPCON.

(4) (NU) Join/Rejoin. Due to the low altitude of the majority of helicopter operations and
the small radar-echoing area of most helicopters, it is unlikely that positive ID/recognition as
described in Article 6134 will be achieved at ISRs in excess of 50 nm. However, the slow approach
and distinctive emissions associated with many helicopters should greatly assist in identification/
recognition after the helicopter has entered the ISR.

(NU) Helicopters joining or rejoining a force should obtain clearance from the AAWC via its
appropriate agency or controlling unit to close within ISR. The controlling unit should then order
standard identification/recognition procedures IAW Article 6134.

(NU) When a restrictive EP is in force or when two-way radio communication has not been
established, thus precluding a procedural clearance, the OTC/AAWC should consider the adoption
of some or all of the following procedures:

(a) (NU) Nominating “slot times” at the ISR for returning helicopters.

(b) (NU) Ordering specific approach altitudes and speeds for returning helicopters.

(c) (NU) Ordering briefed manoeuvres and/or IFF identifications to be performed every
10 minutes while closing, until identified.

(NU) The procedures adopted should be stated in the AAW and tasking messages.

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6173 Low-Altitude Rules (Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters)

a. (NU) Flying of Helicopters. Aircraft approaching a force are to assume that helicopters are
flying unless otherwise informed. The appropriate ACU is to inform aircraft on joining, of the state of
helicopter flying, and subsequently of any changes.

b. (NU) Standard Rules. Unless otherwise ordered, or overriding tactical considerations dictate,
the following rules apply when fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are operating in proximity (in the
order of 10 miles):

(1) (NU) Maximum altitude for ASW helicopters—400 feet.

(2) (NU) Minimum altitude for fixed-wing aircraft at night or when visibility is 3 nm or
less—700 feet (except for aircraft in the carrier approach and landing patterns). When a fixed-wing
aircraft is required to operate below 700 feet, all helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in the area
are to be placed under positive control whenever practical. However, in many situations, placing
helicopters under positive control and fixed-wing aircraft under advisory control will satisfy flight
safety requirements without restricting visibility.

(3) (NU) Minimum altitude for fixed-wing aircraft by day when flight visibility is greater than
3 nm—100 feet.

(4) (NU) Unless aircraft are cooperating and are on the same frequency, or can see each other, the
following minimum lateral or vertical separation is to be arranged:

(a) (NU) In the case of a fixed-wing aircraft and a helicopter: 1,500 yards lateral or 300 feet
vertical.

(b) (NU) In the case of two fixed-wing aircraft: 3 miles lateral or 500 feet vertical.

(c) (NU) In the case of two helicopters: 1,500 yards lateral or 300 feet vertical.

(5) (NU) Fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters conducting vectored attack (VECTAC) or magnetic
anomaly detector verification (MADVEC) procedures may overfly a helicopter in the dip or hover
position, but are to maintain a minimum vertical separation of 200 feet.
NOTES

• (NU) WHEN OPERATING WITH AN AIRCRAFT TOWING

MAGNETIC ANOMALY DETECTOR (MAD), THE ABOVE
LIMITATIONS SHALL BE STRICTLY OBEYED. THE TOWED
MAD SENSOR BODY AND CABLE CAN TRAIL AS MUCH AS
120 FEET BELOW THE AIRCRAFT.

• (NU) WHEN AIRCRAFT OR HELICOPTERS ARE DROPPING

SONOBUOYS, A LATERAL SEPARATION OF 1,500 YARDS
MUST ALWAYS BE ENFORCED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF
AIRCRAFT OPERATING AT LOWER ALTITUDES.

• (NU) IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT A FORCE QNH BE ESTABLISHED

BY THE AIR COORDINATOR (AC) AND UPDATED REGULARLY
TO ENSURE AIRCRAFT SEPARATION WITHIN THE FORCE.

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6174 Lateral and Vertical Separation

a. (NU) General. Unless otherwise ordered, such as during tactical manoeuvres, the following rules
apply when fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are operating within force-controlled airspace at levels
above 2,000 feet in IMC. Either lateral or vertical separation shall be provided. These restrictions do
not apply to tactical manoeuvres, such as intercepts or rendezvous. Aircraft not in close formation
should be separated as follows:

(1) (NU) Lateral separation:

(a) (NU) At least 3 nm when aircraft are within 40 nm of the control radar.

(b) (NU) At least 5 nm when aircraft are beyond 40 nm of the control radar.

(2) (NU) Vertical separation:

(a) (NU) Helicopters shall be separated by 500 feet.

(b) (NU) Fixed-wing aircraft shall be separated by 1,000 feet.

(c) (NU) Helicopters shall be separated from fixed-wing aircraft by 1,000 feet.

NOTE

(NU) BELOW 2,000 FEET HELICOPTERS SHALL BE SEPARATED

FROM FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT BY 300 FEET.

(d) (NU) When aircraft operate within assigned altitude bands, the above safety separation
shall be applied between the bands.

(NU) The vertical allocation of airspace should be promulgated by the air coordinator (AC) for all
aircraft operating within the FACA. The transition altitude is 5,000 feet unless otherwise ordered.
(See ICAO procedures.) Airspace is primarily allocated by task (ASW/AEW/ASUW/CAP, etc.) and
type (fixed-wing (FW) or rotary wing (RW)). Within the individual altitude/FL allocation, further
separation may be required to deconflict aircraft of the same task/type. Units operating within the
same altitude/FL band must be on a common frequency to permit coordination of standard vertical or
lateral separation between units.

b. (NU) Infringements in War. On occasions in war, units may urgently require to operate in
other than their own allocated airspace, e.g., in order to prosecute a target. On such occasions it may
be necessary to infringe another unit’s airspace before separation can be arranged. The infringing
unit should consider broadcasting its intention on “Guard” and the tactical frequency in use for the
area being infringed. Additionally the unit should call when reestablished at its originally allocated
altitude/FL.

c. (NU) Overlapping FACAs. Where FACAs overlap, the senior OTC is responsible for the overall
coordination of the mix of aircraft and tasking within the combined area.

d. (NU) IMC Vertical Separation Plan. An example of a multiforce IMC vertical separation plan
based on semicircular instrument flight rules (IFR) cruising levels is at Table 6-7.

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Table 6-7. (NU) IMC Vertical Separation Plan

Altitude/Flight Level Aircraft

FL 290+ FW AEW

FL 270–290 FW ASUW

FL 250–260 Air-to-air refuelling (AAR) Tanker

FL 220–240 CAP

FL 200–210 FW AEW

FL 170–190 CAP

FL 140–160 VS/MPA (high)

FL 120–130 FW ASUW

FL 100–110 CAP (low)

FL 80–90 RW/AEW

FL 55–70 VS/MPA (medium) (See Note 1)

5000 Transition Altitude

2000–4000 RW AEW/ASW (passive)

700–1500 VS/MPA (low)

400 RW ASW: Match Lamps

0–300 Dippers
NOTES:
1. Barometric pressures below 983 mb will reduce the separation between VS/MPA and RW ASW
(Passive).
2. ASW helicopters in the 0 to 400 feet allocation should be co-operating on the same ASW
frequency.
3. Administrative sorties will fly in an appropriate altitude/FL band monitoring the frequency in use,
but will use an alternate frequency for routine, nonoperational messages.
4. If quadrantal FLs are required, the separation plan must be amended by commencing the FL
allotments at 500 feet below the semicircular plan above, e.g., CAP (low) becomes FL 95–FL 205.
5. Communications Relay—Provision has not been made in the plan for communications relay
aircraft (FW or RW) employed on MIDDLEMAN/AUTOCAT/SATCATS tasks. Often this tasking
will be combined with other roles in which altitude allocation the aircraft will operate. If dedicated
sorties are required, the air coordinator may have to reallocate airspace accordingly.

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6175 Use of Lights by Ships and Aircraft

a. (NU) Ship Lights. During a night ASW action and/or when operating close to aircraft, the tactical
situation as well as safety-of-flight considerations may dictate the use of the 360° red masthead
light(s). If this use is directed by the OTC, the following meanings apply:

(1) (NU) Steady red light(s)—Obstruction warning.

(2) (NU) Flashing red light(s)—Ship is in sonar contact and is attacking. (A light that shows
a single flash at regular intervals, the duration of light always being less than the duration of
darkness, but which shows more than 30 flashes per minute).

(3) (NU) Occulting red light(s)—Identification light when required for control of aircraft. (A light
that is totally eclipsed at regular intervals, the duration of light always being greater than the
duration of darkness and the minimum exposure at light being 3 seconds). A rotating green, amber,
or blue beacon may sometimes be used for this purpose.

NOTE

(NU) IT IS OFTEN DIFFICULT FOR AN AIRCRAFT TO

DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OCCULTING AND FLASHING LIGHTS.
THE APPROPRIATE SAFETY WARNING MUST THEREFORE
ALWAYS BE GIVEN PRIOR TO CARRYING OUT AN ATTACK
EVEN WHEN THE USE OF THE FLASHING MASTHEAD LIGHT(S)
IS AUTHORIZED.

b. (NU) Aircraft Lights. When numbers of aircraft are operating in proximity at night or in poor
visibility, the senior officer present may order aircraft to use navigation lights.

6176 Helicopter Action Group Operations

a. (NU) Altitude Separation. See Table 6-8.

1. (NU) If more than one helicopter is operating in the same area, an altitude separation of 200 feet
must be observed between helicopters.

2. (NU) If more than one HAG is employed against the same target, each HAG should be assigned
an attack sector. As an additional safety measure, altitude bands should be allocated to the HAG.

Table 6-8. (NU) Altitude Separation in HAG Operations

EXAMPLE HAG 1 HAG 2

Altitude (feet) Sector Altitude (feet) Sector

CONTROLLER 800 1,000

MISSILE CARRIER 400 045 to 085 600 000 to 040

HELICOPTER

ILLUMINATING HELICOPTER 1,500 2,000

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3. (NU) Any departure from ordered altitude bands requires prior clearance by the ACU or HCU,
which then is responsible for horizontal separation.

b. (NU) Communications. Each HAG should, if possible, operate on a separate frequency. HAG
commanders will man an additional common frequency for coordination.

6177 Cooperation with Fixed-Wing Aircraft

(NU) If helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft cooperate in engaging a surface target, the following rules
will apply. As the supporting aircraft approaches the target area and communications are established, the
helicopter will provide all available target information to the supporting aircraft. The helicopter may be
requested to illuminate the target, if it is equipped to do so. Special precautions should be observed by
attack aircraft, particularly during periods of reduced visibility and at night, to ensure that the helicopter
is safely clear of dropped illumination devices, the attack flight path, and weapon effects.

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SECTION II—SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS

6200 Scope

(NU) This section covers aircraft operations from carriers and other ships with aircraft embarked. The
types and roles of aircraft are varied. Ordinarily the employment and responsibility for such aircraft
remains with the task group commander who must exercise care when positioning these ships in the task
group to facilitate coordinated flight operations.
6201 Ship Movements During Flight Operations

a. (NU) Right-of-Way. Ships engaged in the launching or recovery of aircraft have the right-of-way
except over the ships and formations noted in Volume II. If a ship must pass a ship which is conducting
flight operations, she should pass to starboard when the ship is on the flight operations course or to
leeward when the ship is not on the flight operations course.

b. (NU) Adjustment of Movements. When carriers are operating aircraft, ships in the formation
other than rescue destroyers are to adjust their course and speed to maintain true bearing following
minor adjustments made by the carrier. Rescue destroyers shall maintain relative bearing and distance
from the carrier. Minor adjustments are defined as alterations of course of not more than ten degrees
and alterations of speed of not more than two knots from the promulgated flight operations course and
speed. During periods of darkness or low visibility, the carrier shall signal impending major course
or speed changes to her escorts and receive an acknowledgement before altering her course or speed,
using the delayed executive method when EMCON conditions permit, or by flashing light if radio
silence is in force. Minor changes should be promulgated as information signals as time permits.

c. (NU) Ships Operating Vertical (VTOL) and Short Takeoff and Landing (VSTOL)
Aircraft. Ships operating VTOL/VSTOL aircraft are not normally subject to the same constraints as
those imposed on a CV operating non-VSTOL aircraft; however, they have to turn towards the wind
for takeoff and landing but are unlikely to require high speed. Operating Method B (Article 6210) is
preferred because of the flexibility of VSTOL.

d. (NU) Positioning of Ships Operating Helicopters. Large ships, such as LPH or LHA, will
often need considerable sea room and freedom to manoeuvre when operating helicopters. They should
be positioned in sectors or areas of a suitable size and shape to allow them to remain protected while
operating helicopters. They can, if necessary, operate in the same way as a carrier. Commanding
officers of such ships should advise the OTC of the size of the sector or area required and the preferred
operating method whenever helicopter operations are likely to be prolonged. Escorts will also need
sea room, but can manoeuvre, launch, and recover helicopters more quickly than larger ships. Their
requirements for helicopter operations are unlikely to be a major factor in the tactical positioning of
the ships.

e. (NU) Landing Circuit. Ships should keep clear of the path normally followed by aircraft in the
landing circuit.

6202 Helicopter In-Flight Refuelling

(NU) Helicopter in-flight refuelling (HIFR) employed by Task Force units extend helicopter flight
endurance. HIFR ships shall be prepared to conduct HIFR operations on 30 minutes’ notice.
6203–6204 Spare

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6205 Carrier Operations

6206 Duties in a Task Group

a. (NU) Ready Deck System. The OTC may order one carrier to keep its landing area ready as a
spare landing field for immediate use by aircraft from other carriers.

b. (NU) Duty Carrier System. The OTC may divide the operating day among the carriers present
with each responsible for providing CAP, tanker, ASW, MIDDLEMAN/AUTOCAT or surveillance
services for the entire force during the period assigned.

6207–6208 Spare

6209 Flying Sectors

(NU) When two or more ships operating aircraft are in company, each ship is allotted a flying sector for
her aircraft. Flying sectors are calculated as follows:
a. (NU) Sector Median. The median of each sector will be on the extension of the line joining the
centre of the formation to the ship concerned.

b. (NU) Arc of Each Sector. The arc of each of these sectors will be calculated by dividing the
360 degrees of arc by the number of ships involved. Thus, with two ships, each sector will cover an
arc of 180 degrees: with three ships, 120 degrees; with four ships, 90 degrees.

c. (NU) Limits. Flying sectors extend upward and outward as far as necessary.

6210 Manoeuvring for Flight Operations

(NU) A flight operations course and speed is used for manoeuvring ships operating aircraft. Three
methods of manoeuvring ships for flight operations are available. Unless otherwise ordered by the OTC,
Method A is to be used.
a. (NU) Method A—Manoeuvring the Whole Formation Together. This method usually
is employed for all extensive flight operations at night or in low visibility because of the danger of
operating ships independently within a formation under such conditions.

b. (NU) Method B—The Independent Method. In this method, the ship preparing to operate
aircraft drops to leeward within the screen or to the leeward corner of its sector and then turns into
the wind and manoeuvres independently. This method is particularly suitable when it is desired not
to exceed effective sonar speed but where it may be necessary to alter base course during flight
operations to keep the ship operating aircraft within her screen. Method B will normally be ordered
when one ship only is operating aircraft. It may be used at night at the OTC’s discretion. The sector
method of ordering a screen is recommended to be used with this method. The instructions in
Article 6212 apply.

c. (NU) Method C—Methods A and B Combined. The ship preparing to operate aircraft
proceeds initially as in Method B. The OTC then manoeuvres the whole formation, including the
ship concerned. It is used only by day when the OTC is not prepared to accept the risk that the
ship operating aircraft may move beyond the screen. This method is not used in low visibility. It
normally will be ordered only when one ship is operating aircraft. This method may be ordered if
flight operations will be of such length that the use of Method B will necessitate the ship operating
aircraft to proceed outside the screen, and it is important to spend as little time as possible off the base
course. When executing this method with sector screening, escorts should proceed to the upwind parts
of their sector prior to the ship concerned increasing her speed to operate aircraft.

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6211 Method A

a. (NU) The Guide. The following considerations normally govern the selection of the Guide:

(1) (NU) If only one ship operating aircraft is present, she is to be designated the Guide.

(2) (NU) When two or more ships operating aircraft are present, the ship in station zero is made
the Guide.

(3) (NU) If there is no ship operating aircraft in station zero or if a circular formation is not being
used, a designated ship is to be made Guide.

b. (NU) Signals and Turns. The formation will be to and from the flight operations course by
either:

(1) (NU) Signalling a turn-together to a definite course and speed at the beginning and at the
completion of flight operations, or

(2) (NU) Signalling an estimate of the flight operations course and speed beforehand; later turning
and adjusting speed by special signals. After turning away from the flight operations course, a new
estimate of the flight operations course must be signalled before each successive turn for flight
operations.

NOTE

(NU) WHEN EITHER OF THE ABOVE IS USED, IT IS PROBABLE

THAT ADJUSTMENTS OF COURSE AND SPEED WILL BE
NECESSARY AFTER THE INITIAL TURN AND BEFORE OR
DURING FLIGHT OPERATIONS. ALL SUCH ADJUSTMENTS
ARE TO BE TAKEN AS AMENDING THE SIGNALLED FLIGHT
OPERATIONS COURSE.

c. (NU) Minor Adjustments. When they are on flight operations course, individual ships operating
aircraft have discretion to make minor adjustments of course and speed, but they must remain within
500 yards of correct station. See also Article 6201.

6212 Method B

a. (NU) Choice of Initial Position. The ship preparing to operate aircraft is to choose an initial
position best calculated to complete launching or recovering aircraft within the cover of the screen
and cause the minimum interference with other ships of the main body.

b. (NU) Bulging the Screen. See Article 3461.

c. (NU) Resuming Station. The ship operating aircraft is on the assumption that the course and
speed of the force will not be altered. On completion of flight operations, she is to resume station with
as little delay as possible.

d. (NU) Adjusting Course. Should it appear probable during flying operations that the ship
operating aircraft will get outside the screen, the OTC may adjust the MLA of the Guide by signal.
When a screened unit other than the ship operating aircraft is designated Guide, this alteration to the
MLA is to be ordered by a TURN and/or SPEED signal addressed to the main body.

(NU) The screen commander is not required to reform the screen unless ordered to do so by the OTC.

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e. (NU) Screen Unit as Guide. When there is no other screened unit to become the Guide, the
following procedure is to be used:

(1) (NU) Forming or reforming the screen. The OTC is to order the formation of the screen in the
normal way and include the sectors which the screen should cover.

(2) (NU) The screen coordinator is to nominate an escort in advance, normally in a central position
on the screen, to be Guide when position required by the OTC.

(3) (NU) When the ship operating aircraft must manoeuvre independently, the OTC is to make
the appropriate escort the Guide. When using a sector type screen, the screen ship designated is to
proceed to the centre of her sector and then remain within one mile of this position. The Guide is
then to be regarded, for station-keeping purposes, as being at the centre of her sector at all times.

(4) (NU) The screen commander must be ready to nominate a new Guide should the existing one
be diverted from her station.

(5) (NU) The OTC may order the ship operating aircraft to assume/resume Guide in certain
circumstances (for example, to sidestep a known submarine threat).

f. (NU) Resuming Course and Station. When flight operations have been completed, the OTC
will order the force to turn to the course required, adjusting speed as necessary. The ship completing
aircraft operations is then to regain her normal station.

6213 Method C

a. (NU) Choice of Initial Position. Refer to Article 6212.

b. (NU) Operating Within the Screen. A ship preparing to operate aircraft is to gain an initial
position well to leeward within the screen, changing speed as necessary. On moving to her initial
position, this ship is to make the signal Disregard my movements. The procedures laid down in
Article 6201 are to be used in the normal I manner.

c. (NU) Manoeuvring to Operate Aircraft. The OTC will turn the whole formation, including
the ship operating aircraft, as soon as this ship is ready. The ship is then to manoeuvre as necessary
to operate aircraft, and the OTC will adjust the speed of the remainder of the force to keep the ship
within the screen.

d. (NU) Resuming Course and Station. When flight operations have been completed, the OTC
will order the force, including the ship completing aircraft operations, to turn together to the course
required, adjusting speed as necessary. The ship is then to regain her normal station.

6214 Manoeuvring for Emergency Landings

(NU) Any ship which must manoeuvre to land aircraft in distress is to notify the OTC. The OTC may then
turn the formation to the flight operations course, or he may order the ship concerned to act independently.
In addition, the following special provisions apply:
a. (NU) When Formation Is on Flight Operations Course. The ship concerned may proceed
to recover the aircraft in distress, provided there is sufficient relative wind or when she can produce
sufficient relative wind without moving more than 500 yards out of her assigned station.

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b. (NU) Independent Action in Peacetime. During daylight hours in peacetime, the commanding
officer of the ship concerned has discretion to act independently and at once, if this is necessary in the
interest of safety.

c. (NU) Rescue Operations. In the event of a forced landing in the vicinity, the destroyer or
helicopter (or both) assigned for the purpose should proceed to rescue the crew without further orders
(see Section VI).

6215 (NU) (NMP) Antisubmarine Precautions During Delays While Operating Aircraft

(NC) (NMP) Prolonged periods on a steady flight operations course may be dangerous and unacceptable
from the ASW point of view; therefore, if there are delays in flight operations, it will be wise to order
temporary alterations from the flight operations course. The OTC is to be informed at once of the
estimated duration of any appreciable delays.
6216 Manoeuvring for Low-Visibility Recovery Operations

(NU) If, while aircraft are airborne, it appears likely that the task force will encounter fog, snow, or other
conditions of low visibility, the OTC may order the task groups to separate and proceed independently
in the direction of the best predicted or known clear weather. Airborne aircraft are to be advised of this
action, and they are to advise the OTC of any clear areas known to them.
6217 Course and Relative Wind

(NU) Normally, the course for launching and recovering fixed-wing aircraft will be such that the ship
concerned has the relative wind down the angled deck.
6218 Operations at Night

a. (NU) Lighting Measures. The OTC will order the degree of lighting to be used for night flying
operations. When lighting measures are ordered, ships shall automatically be darkened (except for
the lights prescribed by the lighting measure) without further signal unless otherwise ordered by the
OTC. Lighting measures are given in detail in Table 6-9. Lighting measure green is the minimum for
all normal night operations, even for specially trained pilots, and compelling reasons should exist for
selecting a lesser amount of lighting.

b. (NU) Flashing Light Communications. Except for signals concerning immediate flight
operations or emergency signals, unshielded or omnidirectional flashing light communications shall
cease 15 minutes prior to scheduled night air operations and shall not be resumed until ships have
signalled completion of flight operations. Infrared light may be used for intership communications.

6219 Operations in Low Visibility

(NU) The tactical situation may require shipborne aircraft to be launched and landed under low-visibility
conditions. Governing considerations are the extent and severity of the weather conditions, the ability
and qualifications of the pilots, and the equipment to be used. Adequate preparations can be made when
it has been determined in advance that aircraft are to be launched and landed under known low visibility
conditions. It is also necessary that standard procedures be established for use when aircraft must
operate unexpectedly in unfavourable weather. When low visibility conditions are encountered or appear
imminent, an early decision must be reached as to how airborne aircraft are to be handled. One or more
of the following procedures may be used depending on existing conditions.
a. (NU) Aircraft orbit as directed until own ship has steamed into an area where visually controlled
landings can be made.

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Table 6-9. (NU) Night Lighting Measures

UNITS DESCRIPTION OF LIGHTING MEASURES NOTES
LIGHTS (1)
WHITE GREEN BLUE (2)

SHIPS OPERATING Red Truck ON ON ON A (1) Words in brackets are

AIRCRAFT (Obstruction) the nearest Royal Navy
Equivalent lights.
Special Operation ON ON ON B
Task Lights (2) The OTC may order lights
added to (or subtracted
Deck Edge (Outline) ON ON ON C from) any lighting measure
Deck Surface ON ON ON D in force by signalling PLUS
(Outline) (MINUS) followed by letter
designators.
Stern/Ramp ON ON ON E
Designation (Round Example:
Down After End of USE
Flight Deck) MEASURE
Signal Light Bars ON ON (3) F BLUE MINUS
BRAVO MIKE
(Port and Starboard
QUEBEC
Group)
Searchlight (Horizon ON (4) G (3) As required.
and Sector) (4) ON as required for homing
Centre Line ON ON ON H lost planes.
Extension Drop (5) Used as ordered by OTC.
Lights
DESTROYERS RENDEZ- Red Truck ON ON I
VOUS (Obstruction)
Dimmed Side Lights ON ON ON J
K
RESCUE Red Truck ON ON L
(Obstruction)
Dimmed Side Lights ON ON ON M
N
OTHER SHIPS Red Truck ON ON O
(Obstruction)
Dimmed Side Lights ON ON ON P
AIRCRAFT Recognition ON ON ON Q
Wing Lights ON ON ON R
Tail Lights ON ON ON S
T
Rescue Helicopter (5) (5) (5) U

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b. (NU) Aircraft land ashore in friendly territory if conditions permit.

c. (NU) Aircraft land on other appropriate ships which are operating in an area where visually
controlled landing can be made.

d. (NU) Aircraft land on designated appropriate ships, using a ship-controlled type of low-visibility
approach.

e. (NU) Aircraft land on designated appropriate ships using an aircraft-type low-visibility approach.

f. (NU) Aircraft abandoned by ditching or bailing out in an area designated by the OTC.

6220 (NU) (NMP) Air Operations in a Convoy

a. (NC) (NMP) Carrier in Situation A. The normal station for a carrier in Situation A,
Article 2181 is within the “box.” During flight operations, the carrier should operate in the area astern
of the convoy, remaining within the “box” whenever possible. Except during flight operations, the
carrier, when in the “box,” is to manoeuvre with the convoy. The carrier is not to pass between ships
or between lines in a convoy formation unless ships are spaced 2,000 yards or more apart.

b. (NC) (NMP) Duties of Carrier With a Convoy. The carrier will normally assume the following
duties:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Aircraft Control Unit and in addition:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Provide and control carrier aircraft within the requirement laid down by the
OTC.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Coordinate the homing of land-based aircraft conducting joining procedures.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Control aircraft in search and rescue duties.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Anti-air Warfare Commander. Except for those duties relating to the control
of emissions, and the control of EW equipment, these particular duties remain the responsibility of
the OTC unless specifically delegated.

c. (NC) (NMP) Carrier in Situation B or C. The relationship between the responsibilities of the
OTC of a carrier group and the OTC of a convoy are described in Article 2181.

d. (NC) (NMP) Procedures for Aircraft Operating With Convoy. Detailed procedures for
aircraft joining and departing convoys are given in Section I of this chapter.

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6230 Carrier Air Operations

6231 Offensive Air Operations

a. (NU) Strike Formations. The purpose of strike formations is the destruction of enemy surface
targets. They comprise:

(1) (NU) Attack aircraft equipped with weapons which have a high capability of destruction.

(2) (NU) Escort aircraft, including fighter aircraft, which protect strike aircraft against enemy
opposition.

b. (NU) Sweep Formations. The purpose of sweep formations is the destruction of enemy aircraft.
They comprise fighter aircraft and support aircraft (AEW and EW).

6232 (NU) (NMP) Command of Air Forces

(NC) (NMP) Figures 6-2 and 6-3 illustrate the command organization of aircraft for offensive, strike, and
sweep operations. See also Article 3220 for command of aircraft.
a. (NC) (NMP) Airborne Coordinator. When a succession of strikes is initiated, or when several
targets exist in one area, the task force commander is to designate an airborne coordinator and a
standby airborne coordinator. The duty of the airborne coordinator is to direct all aircraft formations
in the target area to the best advantage, thereby ensuring that no important target is missed and that
no part of the strike is wasted on targets already destroyed. He is to fly with an escort, in the most
suitable position for observing the strike, without seeking combat himself, and is to report all special
circumstances in the target area that may affect the arming, briefing, or conduct of future strikes. The
task force commander may also designate an airborne coordinator when a large-scale fighter sweep is
contemplated. The airborne coordinator’s aircraft may require additional communications equipment.

b. (NC) (NMP) Strike Commander. A strike commander for the aircraft from each task group
taking part in a particular strike is designated by each task group commander. The strike commander
leads the strike aircraft to and from the target and is responsible for the conduct of the strike, subject
to the orders of the airborne coordinator, if present. Each task group commander also designates a
standby strike commander. The strike commander or standby strike commander is normally either the
attack leader or the escort leader.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Attack Leader. The attack leader is designated by the task group commander
and is in command of all attack aircraft from the task group. He may also be the strike commander,
if so designated by the task group commander. Attack aircraft from each ship will be led by their
leader to report to the attack leader for the strike.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Escort Leader. The escort leader is designated by the task group commander
and is in command of all fighter aircraft assigned to escort the attack aircraft from the task group.
The escort leader may also be the strike commander if he is so designated by the task group
commander. Fighter aircraft from each ship assigned to the escort will be led by that ship’s fighter
leader to report to the escort leader for the strike.

c. (NC) (NMP) Sweep Commander. A sweep commander for the aircraft from each task group
taking part in a particular sweep is designated by each task group commander. The sweep commander
is responsible for the conduct of the sweep subject to the orders of the airborne coordinator, if present.
Each task group commander also designates a standby sweep commander.

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AIRBORNE
COORDINATOR
FOR TASK FORCE

STRIKE COMMANDER MAY BE ATTACK LEADER STRIKE COMMANDER

FOR TASK GROUP OR ESCORT LEADER FOR TASK GROUP

ATTACK LEADER ESCORT LEADER

FOR TASK GROUP FOR TASK GROUP

ATTACK ATTACK FIGHTER FIGHTER

LEADER LEADER LEADER LEADER

(1) STANDBY AIRBORNE COORDINATOR (2) EITHER THE ATTACK LEADER OR

AND STANDBY STRIKE COMMANDER ESCORT LEADER IS DESIGNATED THE
WILL BE DESIGNATED BY THE AP- STRIKE COMMANDER BY THE TASK
PROPRIATE FORCE OR GROUP GROUP COMMANDER.
COMMANDER.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-2. (NU) (NMP) Air Strike Command

AIRBORNE
COORDINATOR
FOR TASK FORCE

SWEEP COMMANDER SWEEP COMMANDER

FOR TASK GROUP FOR TASK GROUP

FIGHTER FIGHTER
LEADER LEADER

STANDBY AIRBORNE COORDINATOR AND

STANDBY SWEEP COMMANDER WILL BE
DESIGNATED BY THE APPROPRIATE FORCE
OR GROUP COMMANDER.

NATO RESTRICTED (NMP)

Figure 6-3. (NU) (NMP) Air Sweep Command

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6233 (NU) (NMP) Offensive Operations

(NC) (NMP) The organization for offensive carrier air operations depends on many factors: the nature
of the targets, whether surface or air, the time within which the required results will have to be achieved;
the constraints of the defensive organization of the force; and the availability of other aircraft. Offensive
air operations generally fall into two categories, strike or sweep.
a. (NC) (NMP) Strike Operations.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Major Strike. An action in which there is a coordinated attack by a large number
of aircraft, often from multiple air wings. In addition to attack aircraft, other aircraft included are
fighter escort, target CAP, barrier CAP, and support aircraft, all deployed in a single formation or
multiple formations. A major strike is normally recovered on a ready deck prior to launching of
the next formation.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Limited Strike. An action which consists of a coordinated attack, similar to
a major strike but with a smaller number of aircraft. This type of strike is preferred for sustained
operations, or when the requirement is to get a moderate number of aircraft to the objective in the
shortest possible time (e.g., for the neutralization of an enemy airfield over a sustained period).
Aircraft engaged in a limited strike are normally recovered after another formation is launched.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Continuous Operations. An arrangement that permits offensive air
operations to be conducted over an extended period. This method is used when the destruction of
the objective(s) can be achieved by the concentrated firepower of major or limited strikes. Each
recovery is preceded by the launching of a similar number and type of aircraft.

b. (NC) (NMP) Sweep Operations. Sweep operations are designated to eliminate the enemy’s
air capability and are organized in a similar fashion to strikes. The principal difference is in the
composition of the formations that are launched. The deck load consists primarily of fighters and
escort aircraft selected for the specific mission. Escorts usually include AEW and EW aircraft.

6234–6239 Spare

6240 (NU) (NMP) Request for CV Aircraft

a. (NC) (NMP) Requests for CV Aircraft. Carrier-based air assets will be requisitioned
through the AREC. That coordinator will endeavour, insofar as possible, to meet the several warfare
commands’ requests, and will issue and promulgate to the OTC and warfare commanders the daily
airplan. In order to aid the AREC in his planning and ensure that their own requirements are entered
into this planning, each warfare commander should provide the AREC a message request of projected
aircraft requirements for inclusion in the next day’s airplan. Requests should reach the AREC about
1800 local time. The OTC should receive an information copy. Needs will change, and these changes
should be communicated to the AREC.

b. (NC) (NMP) Requests for Tactical Aircraft. Requests for tactical aircraft embarked aboard
ships other than the CV (e.g., AV8-B onboard ITA Navy CV) will be directed to the AREC. Marine
aircraft (fixed-wing and helicopters) remain under the command of the landing force commander.
Requests for marine aircraft by warfare commanders/coordinators should be coordinated by the
AREC and submitted to the tactical air coordinator embarked with the landing force commander.

c. (NC) (NMP) Alert Requirements. Alert requirements should be included in the hard copy
message provided by the warfare commanders to the AREC for determining the next day’s airplan.
Changes in alert requirements will be of most immediacy and must be rapidly communicated to
the AREC. The OTC will resolve any conflicts in alert requirements and will retain alert launch

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authorization until specifically delegated to the particular warfare commanders (see Tables 2-3
to 2-5). Even when this authorization is granted it must be used with caution. Warfare commanders
should consider, and the AREC should make them aware of, major disruptions to scheduled launches
which may be caused by too great a frequency of alert launches.

6241–6249 Spare

6250 Air Traffic Control

6251 (NU) (NMP) Ship Control Zones

a. (NC) (NMP) General. Ship control zone (SCZ) is an area activated around a ship operating
aircraft, which is not to be entered by other aircraft without permission.

b. (NC) (NMP) Fixed-Wing Operations. For ships operating fixed-wing aircraft, a zone of
10 nm radius from sea level to 5,000 ft MSL is established. These are nominal values and may be
changed as the situation dictates. Outside the SCZ, there are special additional rules such as those
for returning friendly aircraft. These rules will apply out to a considerable distance, depending on
weather conditions, and will be promulgated separately. A SCZ may be permanently activated when
continuous flying is taking place or aircraft are at alert states.

c. (NC) (NMP) Helicopter Operations. For ships operating helicopters, a zone of 2 nm radius
from sea level to 500 feet above MSL will be activated.

6252 Aircraft Launch/Departure

a. (NU) Fixed-Wing Aircraft. When launched from CVs, all jet and turboprop aircraft normally
proceed directly to a point at least 7 miles ahead of the ship at an altitude of 300 to 500 feet, then jets
fly a 10-mile arc, turboprops a 7-mile arc to intercept the departure radial. Propeller aircraft proceed
to a point 5 miles ahead; fly a 5-mile arc to the departure radial, maintaining an altitude of 300 to
500 feet. High-performance VTOL/VSTOL aircraft operating from ships other than CVs shall comply
with launch/departure procedures delineated for CVs. Jet and turboprop aircraft rendezvous between
20 and 50 miles, and propeller aircraft rendezvous between 10 and 50 miles from the ship along the
departure radial.

b. (NU) Helicopters. Helicopters may be operated either from the CV or other ships within the CV
control zone. ASW helicopters may also be operated tactically within the zone. Precise procedures to
suit every circumstance cannot be defined, but the following rules apply:

(1) (NU) All helicopters within the zone are to be under either positive or advisory control.

(2) (NU) Helicopters should normally be operated or transited through the control zone below
300 feet.

(3) (NU) Helicopters are not to approach within 5 nm of the CV unless cleared and/or operating
under the control of the CV.

c. (NU) Unscheduled Launch and Recovery Operations. Ships are to activate control zones
by INTENT message. Control zones around CV/LPH/LHA ships will be permanently in force unless
otherwise ordered.
(NR) (NMP) Detailed procedures for activation of control zones are provided in APP-01.

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6253 Procedure for Returning Aircraft

(NU) Aircraft returning from strikes and sweeps are to rendezvous on the way back from the target area
and return in formations appropriate for mutual defence, proper recognition, and fuel economy via the
Tomcat if one is stationed, and if they are so directed. To assist in the establishment of their friendly
character, aircraft make their final approach to each task group on a bearing and at an altitude previously
specified, and squawking IFF.
6254 Marshal Procedures

a. (NU) Marshalling is the procedure whereby aircraft are controlled on a predetermined flightpath
by an ACU prior to commencing an outbound transit or after completing an inbound transit prior to
recovery.

b. (NU) The location for this process is known as the marshalling gate and will be within the radar
coverage of the ACU.

c. (NU) On entering the ship’s control area, organic aircraft shall normally be turned over to marshal
control for further clearance to the marshal pattern. The marshalling gate may be overhead or on an
assigned radial at an appropriate distance/altitude to facilitate an orderly approach.

6255 Approach

(NU) Usually, under daylight/visual conditions, the aircraft approach the ship, enter a circling pattern, and
land in sequence. During night/instrument conditions, approaches will normally be under the guidance of
the approach control centre on board the respective ship.
6256 (NU) (NMP) Carrier Approach Procedures

(NC) (NMP) Aircraft approaching a carrier force, after completing a transfer joining procedure, may
be ordered to close by an approach corridor or an approach sector. These are specific safety sectors for
carrier approach. Land-based aircraft would normally be required to adopt these procedures.
a. (NC) (NMP) Approach Corridors. These corridors are assigned in conjunction with specified
check-in points based on Tomcats. The latter should be TACAN-equipped pickets and ideally should
be SAM ships. (If non-TACAN-equipped ships are used, procedures must be modified.) Figures 6-4
and 6-5 show multipicket and single-picket approach corridors, respectively.

(NC) (NMP) Corridors 1 through 4 are established as radials of Tomcat TACAN; corridors 5 and
6 are radials of the TACAN of the CV(s). Bearings of corridors are fixed relative to the AAW axis,
except corridors 3 and 4, which may be rotated by up to 20 degrees toward the axis to provide the
least deviation for returning friendlies. Additional corridors may be established, if required, in the rear
hemisphere; such corridors are defined as TACAN radials from the CV. All corridors are 10 nm in
width. Corridors from Tomcats to the 30-nm arc of the CV’s TACAN may vary in direction, depending
on the CV’s movements. If the CV’s TACAN is not in operation, pickets will steer returning aircraft
to marshal.

(NC) (NMP) Checkpoints may be established at 150, 100, and 50 nm from the Tomcat or CV TACAN as
appropriate. These points are designated by corridor number followed by ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE,
respectively. At each checkpoint self-identification procedures are carried out either by changing
IFF/SIF settings or by aircraft manoeuvre.

(NC) (NMP) TACAN will normally be operated by Tomcats during periods when aircraft are returning
from the attack area. It will not be used by CVs when under air or submarine threat, except when the
safety of aircraft so dictates.

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(005ºR) (355ºR)
2A 1A

2B Anti- 1B
(300ºR) (060ºR)
COR-2 Air COR-1
CO 3
4A R- Warfare R- 3A
4B
4 2C Axis 1C CO 3B
4C I K 3C

TOMCATS
6A 6B 6C 5C 5B 5A
(270ºR) ZZ (090ºR)
COR-6 COR-5

30-MILE ARC
TO MARSHALL
0 50 100 150
scale

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-4. (NU) (NMP) Multipicket Approach Corridor

(335ºR) (025ºR)
2A 1A
AXIS
CO

R-1

(300ºR) 2B 1B (060ºR)
R-2

CO
CO

4A R-4 -3 3A
2C C OR
1C
4B 3B
4C 3C
TOMCAT
6A 6B 6C ZZ 5C 5B 5A
(270ºR) (090ºR)
COR-6 COR-5
30-MILE
ARC TO MARSHALL
0 50 100 150
scale

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-5. (NU) (NMP) Single-Picket Approach Corridors

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(NC) (NMP) The OTC or AAWC may select any of the corridors for each day of a particular exercise
or operation. Corridors activated are normally promulgated indicating the corridor by number, the call
sign of the Tomcat, and its TACAN channel.

b. (NC) (NMP) Approach Sectors. These sectors are more flexible than fixed-approach corridors
and may be assigned in conjunction with TACAN approach control pickets for each sector. Initial
reporting distances from each approach control unit will be promulgated by the OTC. The essential
difference between this system and fixed-friendly approach corridors is that the aircraft may return
from any bearing within the specified sector, the position of each aircraft being reported on AAW nets.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Identification/recognition and self-identification procedures are identical to those
described in Article 6134 and 6256a except that:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Aircraft must report initially at a specified TACAN distance from the sector
TACAN picket.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Friendly aircraft will be designated track numbers and shall be reported and
plotted by all units.

(2) (NC) (NMP) The use of approach sectors is particularly applicable to formations where
dispersion is minimised and aircraft normally return directly to the force. Friendly aircraft may
transit missile engagement zones on direct return routes when directed by the AAWC or SAAWC.

6257 (NU) Carrier Strike Group/Expeditionary Strike Group Airspace

(NU) Caution must be exercised when approaching carrier strike group (CSG) or expeditionary strike
group (ESG) airspace due to the large volume of air traffic within close proximity to the carrier vessel or
air-capable amphibious ship.
(NU) Identification, marshalling and approach standard procedures apply, including the correspondent
FADIZ, sector FADIZ, ISR or SCZ.
(NU) Use of specific PROWORDs to name sector FADIZ coordinator/tactical air control centre (TACC),
approach control or CV/LHD Tower may be appropriate, such as STRIKE, MARSHAL or TOWER
respectively for a CSG, or ICEPACK, CENTER or TOWER for an ESG.
6258–6259 Spare

6260 (NU) (NMP) Silent and Darkened Helicopter Operations

(NC) (NMP) This section provides a standard operating procedure for ships launching and recovering
helicopters by day or night in a tactical environment. Its use limits emissions by both ship and aircraft
and thus reduces the chance of detection by an enemy.
6261 (NU) (NMP) Factors

a. (NC) (NMP) Before deciding whether a silent and/or darkened procedure is to be used, or
alternatively whether limited lighting and radio assistance to the helicopters is necessary, careful
consideration must be given to such factors as:

(1) (NC) (NMP) experience of aircrew, flight deck personnel and command team;

(2) (NC) (NMP) recent operational flying practice;

(3) (NC) (NMP) weather conditions, particularly visibility and sea state;

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(4) (NC) (NMP) number of aircraft airborne in the vicinity;

(5) (NC) (NMP) ship/aircraft equipment fit.

b. (NC) (NMP) EMCON. Although EMCON restrictions may be superimposed on the ship’s
equipment, aircraft not fitted with autonomous recovery aids cannot operate in IMC in complete
EMCON silence.

c. (NC) (NMP) National regulations may prevent aircraft from complying fully with these
procedures. In this instance, aircraft are to comply as far as possible in order to achieve as high a
degree of standardization as possible.

d. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft visiting or operating from other nations’ ships may be unable to comply
with these procedures due to dissimilar equipment fit.

e. (NC) (NMP) IFR Separation. If considering fully silent and darkened operations, full IFR
separation in accordance with Article 6174 should be applied.

6262 (NU) (NMP) Method of Execution

(NC) (NMP) Implementation of these procedures is to be ordered by the force/ship commander to ensure
commonality of operations throughout the force.
a. (NC) (NMP) Deck Moves. The position of the aircraft either on deck or in the hangar will
be determined by the meteorological conditions and the required alert state. Aircraft moves and
spreading/folding of rotors should be carried out with minimum use of light.

b. (NC) (NMP) Manning Aircraft.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Hangar and flight deck lighting off.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Aircraft navigation lights off; internal lighting at a minimum.

c. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft Start.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Aircraft navigation lights remain off.

(2) (NC) (NMP) flight deck officer to use dimmed wands.

(3) (NC) (NMP) A check call on UHF may be made before launch; otherwise no radio transmissions
are to be made either from or to the helicopter. Routine voice communications should be made
only via telebrief systems (see Article 6261.c).

d. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft Launch.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Deck status lights at dim.

(2) (NC) (NMP) When ready to launch, pilot should flash downward-directed light. This is also to
be used to check disengagement of the harpoon where fitted.

(3) (NC) (NMP) As downward-directed light goes on, the Horizon Bar should be switched on.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Once the aircraft has launched and is clear of the deck, the Horizon Bar should
be switched off.

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(5) (NC) (NMP) Radio transmissions should not be made when the helicopter is in the immediate
vicinity of the ship. If HF is required for the mission and EMCON is restricted, the aircraft should
call on HF and the ship reply on UHF.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Helicopter radars should not be switched to transmit until the helicopter has
cleared the force/ship by the range dictated by the EMCON plan.

(7) (NC) (NMP) IFF/transponder equipment should be set to transmit on completion of the launch
manoeuvre and in accordance with the EMCON plan.

(8) (NC) (NMP) Navaids (e.g., TACAN) in ships and aircraft should only be used in accordance
with the EMCON plan.

(9) (NC) (NMP) Aircraft navigation lights should be in accordance with the OTC’s EMCON
policy.

e. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft Recovery.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Helicopter radars should be set to Standby when the helicopter closes the force/
ship to the range dictated by the EMCON plan. This also applies to aircraft lights, as ships may be
identified by visually tracking aircraft back to their parent units.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Navaids (e.g., TACAN) in ships and aircraft should only be used in accordance
with the EMCON plan.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Radio transmissions should be avoided when the helicopter is returning to the
ship and maximum use made of visual recovery aids. Meteorological conditions may make the use
of radio communications essential; if so, transmissions should be kept to an absolute minimum.

(4) (NC) (NMP) When the helicopter is estimated to beat 4 nm range or ETA minus 2 minutes,
the controller orders Masthead Obstruction Lights to occulting until the aircraft is established in
the circuit.

(5) (NC) (NMP) When the ship is steady on the flying course and ready to recover, the glide scope
indicator should be switched on.

(6) (NC) (NMP) At approximately ½ nm the helicopter switches the navigation lights on and the
ship responds by switching on the Horizon Bar.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Once on deck, if harpoon fitted, the helicopter should flash a downward-directed
light to check the engagement of the harpoon.

(8) (NC) (NMP) Deck lighting should not normally be used; all lighting should be turned off on
completion of the landing.

(9) (NC) (NMP) No radio transmissions should be made on deck; all voice communications
should be via telebrief systems.

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SECTION III—AIRCRAFT EMERGENCY AND RESCUE

6300 Aircraft Emergency and Rescue

(NU) The measures set forth in this section cover the more common problems encountered and the
procedures used in handling aircraft in distress.
6301 General Provisions

a. (NU) Emergency Landing Ship. Whenever possible, the OTO should make specific provision
for emergency landings by designating another appropriate ship as the emergency landing ship.
This assignment should be on a rotation basis and integrated into the flight schedule (for helicopter
operations, use OPTASK AIR set SPARDECK). This allows maximum aircraft usage from all ships
in company with minimum inconvenience to each.

b. (NU) Lost Aircraft Control. The OTC may detail one ship as lost aircraft control to coordinate
the homing of all lost aircraft. However, any ship which has lost an aircraft should begin to identify
it and home it, and the ship should immediately notify lost aircraft control of the steps that are being
taken.

c. (NU) Continuous Watch on Airborne Aircraft. Ships are to maintain a current estimate of the
time of return of their aircraft and keep, insofar as possible, a continuous watch on their movements.
They are to be alert for emergency IFF or other indications of aircraft in distress and are to plot and
report such signals, taking further action as conditions indicate.

d. (NU) Escort Aircraft. Whenever possible, an escort aircraft will accompany the aircraft in
distress back to the force; assist in the emergency landing procedure as directed, or as conditions
indicate; remain with the distressed aircraft until it enters the landing circuit; and maintain watch until
the emergency landing is completed.

e. (NU) Aircraft Not Involved to Keep Clear. Whenever other aircraft become aware of an
emergency landing in progress, they must keep clear of the entire operating area concerned.

f. (NU) Rescue Destroyer and Helicopter. The duties of rescue destroyers and rescue helicopters
are described in Article 6303.

6302 Communications During Aircraft Emergencies

(NU) The following provisions apply to aircraft in distress requiring an emergency landing and to the
ships involved:
a. (NU) Responsibility.

(1) (NU) Escort. The escort of an aircraft in distress assists by sending or relaying radio, radar,
or visual messages, using the same procedures as described for the aircraft in distress.

(2) (NU) Ship. Ships must be alert for radio, radar, or visual indications of aircraft in distress
and assist in relaying messages between the distressed aircraft, the OTC, and the parent ship as
conditions indicate.

b. (NU) Emergency IFF. An aircraft in distress is to turn on its EMERGENCY IFF and set in
Code 77 on Mode 3. In daylight operations, if the aircraft is within visual range of the ship, the use of
EMERGENCY IFF is optional.

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c. (NU) Pilot Voice Report. If possible, the pilot of an aircraft requiring an emergency landing is
to inform the ship with which he is in communication as to the nature of the trouble. He must state
whether he requires an IMMEDIATE or DEFERRED emergency landing and whether or not he can
take a wave-off. The pilot is then to furnish such amplifying information as conditions permit or
require.

d. (NU) Minimum Voice Transmission During Aircraft Emergencies. Voice transmission

should be clear, concise, and kept to a minimum consistent with safety. Aircraft and ships not concerned
in the emergency must keep silent on the frequencies in use for the emergency.

e. (NU) Maximum Use of Visual Signals. During a landing with radio failure or lost
communications, the use of appropriate visual signals is mandatory. To expedite landings the visual
signals in Tables 6-10, 6-11, and 6-12 are to be used by no radio (NORDO) aircraft and ships involved.
The same signals will be used by NORDO aircraft which are additionally in distress.

f. (NU) Establishing Visual Contact. The aircraft in distress and the ship should establish visual
contact with each other as far in advance of the emergency landing as is practicable. When initial
visual contact is to be made with the rendezvous destroyer or other ship, the aircraft in distress should
start signalling as soon as it approaches within reasonable visual range of the ship.

g. (NU) MAYDAY. The international distress call MAYDAY should only be used when an aircraft is
threatened by serious and imminent danger and is in need of immediate assistance.

6303 Rescue Operations

(NU) A destroyer or helicopter (or both) should be assigned for rescue duties to a ship operating aircraft.
Any ship or aircraft is to report immediately if it sees an aircraft land in the sea. The parent ship is to
inform the rescuing ship or helicopter as to the number of men in the aircraft. Rescue operations are
carried out as described in the following paragraphs.
a. (NU) Rescue Destroyers.

(1) (NU) During daylight operations when rescue helicopters are not available or need to be
augmented, rescue destroyers may be assigned to ships operating aircraft. These rescue destroyers
shall be stationed at distances from the ship operating aircraft and on bearings relative to the flight
operations course, with the exception of rescue destroyer stations 2SNX and 3SNX, which are
based on bearings relative to the course of the ship operating aircraft. Rescue destroyer stations are
as shown in Figure 6-6 and are also listed in Table 6-13.

(2) (NU) Slide-back techniques in station 1SN may be used whenever speeds in excess of 22 knots
are required. The use of the slide-back technique must be specifically authorized by the OTC.

(3) (NU) At night, rescue destroyers may be assigned the additional function of acting as reference
ships to indicate the horizon for takeoff and the landing pattern for recovery operations. Rescue
destroyers shall conform to the lighting measures in force at all time.

(4) (NU) If it is desired that the rescue destroyers have more boiler power than that required for
screening operations, the OTC shall so advise. Rescue destroyers are to have boats manned and
ready for lowering while flight operations are in progress.

(5) (NU) After flight operations, rescue destroyers are to remain with the designated ship until
released by her.

(6) (NU) Sufficient stations are provided in Figure 6-6 and Table 6-13 to permit the OTC flexibility
in assigning available rescue destroyers as appropriate.

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Table 6-10. (NU) Signals From Aircraft in Distress

SIGNAL MEANING OR PURPOSE

1. Rocking wings ........................................................ Initially, to attract attention and help establish visual
contact. Subsequently, to acknowledge receipt
of signals. On crosswind leg of landing circuit,
indicates inability to take a wave-off.
2. Firing RED flare ...................................................... Require emergency landing. Considered
IMMEDIATE unless other information is received.
3. Firing GREEN flare................................................. An early landing is necessary in the interest of
safety, but can orbit for a short time.
4. Series of SHORT flashes ....................................... Require IMMEDIATE emergency landing.

5. Series of LONG flashes.......................................... Require emergency landing but can accept short
delay.
6. Fly up the port side of the ship, low and close ....... I desire IMMEDIATE landing.
aboard, rocking wings, in a landing configuration with
hook DOWN. Navigation lights BRIGHT and STEADY
with anticollision lights ON. If turning final in the visual
flight rules (VFR) pattern or approaching final on a
CCA, momentarily turn on the taxi light, if available.
7. Fly up the port side of the ship with landing gear UP, I desire to land but can wait for the next recovery.
hook DOWN, navigation lights BRIGHT and STEADY,
and anticollision light OFF while abeam the ship.
8. Fly up the port side of the ship, rocking wings ....... I am proceeding to the BINGO field.
with landing gear and hook UP, navigation lights
BRIGHT and STEADY, and anticollision light ON. If
fuel state and the nature of the emergency permit,
continue making passes until joined by a wingman.
Upon reaching BINGO fuel state, proceed alone,
setting IFF/SIF to emergency when departing.
9. Flashing R .............................................................. To acknowledge receipt of message.
10. (Helicopter) Fly close aboard starboard ................. I require IMMEDIATE landing.
quarter, remaining clear of other traffic, with gear
DOWN and floodlights/landing light ON. With
complete electrical failure, fire a RED flare to
seaward.
11. (Helicopter) Fly by or hover on the starboard ......... I desire to land but can wait for the next recovery.
side of the ship, low and close aboard, with
navigation lights BRIGHT and FLASHING and
anti-collision lights ON.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Table 6-11. (NU) Signals From Rendezvous Destroyer or Other Ships

SIGNAL MEANING OR PURPOSE

Flashing WHITE R .................................................. Initially, to confirm visual contact. Subsequently,
to acknowledge receipt of signals from aircraft in
distress.
Flashing RED G....................................................... The OTC has given permission for aircraft in
distress to approach recovering ship.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 6-12. (NU) Signals From Ship to Aircraft in Distress

SIGNAL MEANING OR PURPOSE

OPTICAL LANDING SYSTEM **ALDIS LAMP BLINKER
1. Flashing cut and wave-off Flashing RED light M,M .......... *BINGO — Proceed to alternate landing field.
lights.
2. Flash, cut lights. N/A N/A .......... Add power — (jets and turbo props only).
3. N/A Steady GREEN light C .......... CHARLIE — Cleared to board.
-.-.
4. Flashing landing area Steady RED light D .......... DELTA — Delay in landing. Enter DELTA pattern
lights. -.. and maintain visual contact with the ship.

5. Landing area lights off. N/A N/A .......... Closed deck. Do not land.
(Night only)
6. N/A Z Z .......... Do not land. Ditch or bail out/eject in the vicinity of
--.. --.. the ship.

7. Steady (3 sec.) cut lights. N/A N/A .......... LSO has control of the aircraft on final approach at
approximately 1-1/2 miles.
8. N/A H H .......... Lower hook.
.... ....
9. N/A W W .......... Lower wheels.
.-- .--

10. N/A F F .......... Lower flaps.

..-. ..-.

11. N/A G G .......... Jettison disposable fuel tank.

--. --.
12. N/A Q Q .......... Jettison ordnance.
--.- --.-
OTHER MEANING OR PURPOSE
13. Series of GREEN flares (day only in wartime) Ship ready to receive aircraft for IMMEDIATE emergency
landing.
14. Series of RED flares Do not land even if previous authorization has been given.

15. Flag: EMERG FOXTROT (aircraft) Have emergency landing in progress. (Aircraft not involved
keep clear.)
EMERG HOTEL (helicopter)
*Signal is given only when ordered by the air officer.
**Aldis lamp may be located on the LSO platform, in the tower, or on the signal bridge.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

(7) (NU) The ship operating aircraft shall indicate estimated course and speed to be used during
impending flight operations in sufficient time to permit rescue destroyers to take and maintain
proper station. The ship shall also indicate readiness to operate aircraft at least 10 minutes prior to
commencement of flight operations.

(8) (NU) Rescue destroyers shall be in assigned stations at the time flight operations are scheduled
to commence. When assuming slide-back station 1SN, the destroyer takes a station that will result
in a relative bearing 35 degrees on the bow of the ship operating aircraft when the formation turns
into the wind.

(9) (NU) A rescue destroyer, having taken station, is to maintain that station relative to the flight
operations course and is to manoeuvre to maintain station without further orders on each occasion
that the flight operations course is altered by signal whether flying operations are actually in
progress or not. The exceptions to this rule are stations 2SNX and 3SNX, in which the rescue
destroyer maintains station relative to the course of the ship operating aircraft and is to manoeuvre
to maintain station without further orders by wheeling manoeuvres. See Article 6201 regarding
minor adjustments in course and speed.

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0
15

0
32
0
14
000º

WIN
D
330º 3000 YD
325º
STATION 3
2500 YD

2000 YD STA 3A

STATION 1500 YD
1SN 1200 YD
(INITIAL
POSITION) 1000 YD

270º
STA. 2 STA. 2A 2 3 4

STATION 2SNX
1N
YD

(LIMITS)
1200 - 2000

NOTE: 2SNX and

3SNX are at all
3SNX times relative to the
200º course of the carrier

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 6-6. (NU) Rescue Destroyer Stations

(10) (NU) During night operations, the ship operating aircraft shall, except in emergencies, wait
until rescue destroyers are on proper station before manoeuvring to conduct flight operations.

(11) (NU) The commanding officer of a ship operating aircraft shall be responsible for keeping the
rescue destroyer(s) informed of his ship’s course and speed changes and for issuing timely orders
to prevent the development of a dangerous situation which might arise from misunderstanding his
intentions.

(12) (NU) During night operations, rescue destroyers shall remain on station while aircraft are
airborne unless otherwise directed.

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Table 6-13. (NU) Rescue Destroyer Stations

Station Bearing Relative to Distance from Operating Aircraft (yards) Station Limits (yards) When
Number* Flight Operations Stationed
Course
NORMAL RESCUE DESTROYER STATIONS
1 200° 1,000 to 1,500 Day/Night
2 270° 2,500 Night
2A 270° 1,500
3 330° 3,000 Night
3A 000° 2,000
SUPPLEMENTAL RESCUE DESTROYER STATIONS
1N 200° Distance (yards) = (ship speed x 100) - 300. Not less than 1,200 Day/Night
nor more than 2,500**

1SN Initial station bears Initial distance is 1,500 yards; the rescue Not less than 1,200 Day
325°; rescue destroyer steams at a speed less than nor more than 2,500**
destroyer slides back signalled speed and the ship operating
to station bearing aircraft overtakes her. During the slide-
200° back, the rescue destroyer manoeuvres
to maintain the 1,500 yard distance. Time
required to complete slide-back may be
controlled by using a speed of relative motion
commensurate with the estimated time
required to complete the launch or recovery.
When the slide-back is completed, distance
is determined using the distance formula for
station 1N.
2SNX 190° (relative to 1,500 (normally) 1,200 to 2,500 Day/Night
course of carrier)
3SNX 190° (relative to 3,000 (normally) 1,200 to 2,000 (from Day/Night
course of carrier) station 2SNX)
4SNX The rescue destroyer operates on a station which has an inner limit of 2,000 yards and an outer limit of not
more than 6 minutes from the ship. The destroyer gains the outer limit of its station upwind and drops back
at such a relative speed that the outer downwind limit will not be exceeded, passing the ship not closer than
2,000 yards.
If the destroyer has not dropped back to the outer limit of station by the time the launch/recovery has been
completed, the destroyer turns earlier or faster to facilitate gaining the outer limit of station.
On downwind courses, the destroyer repeats the procedure in reverse (that is, sliding back from the outer
limit downwind of the ship to the outer limit upwind, passing the ship not closer than 2,000 yards).
When winds are light and variable and the ship turns toward the destroyer to hunt for the wind, the destroyer
manoeuvres clear promptly.
When the ship’s sled is in use on courses out of the wind, the destroyer manoeuvres to clear the sled by at
least 3,000 yards.
* Number and number-letter stations are not occupied simultaneously. ** OTC may specify maximum distance.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

b. (NU) Helicopter Rescue Station. The rescue helicopter is under positive control of the ship
operating aircraft at all times. During launching and recovery operations, the helicopter is airborne on
rescue station. The rescue station is a circular flight pattern on the starboard beam of the ship, 1 mile
in diameter. This pattern will normally be flown in a clockwise direction at an altitude of 200 feet.

c. (NU) Rescue Stations (Helicopter Ship Operations).

(1) (NU) Rescue ships normally are not required during daylight helicopter operations of helicopter
ships.

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(2) (NU) At night, it may be necessary in certain circumstances to detail a rescue ship. Rescue
ships may be assigned the additional functions of action as reference ships to indicate the landing
pattern for recovery operations. These ships shall be stationed at distances from the helicopter
ship on a bearing relative to the helicopter ship’s air operating course as shown in Table 6-14. The
number of stations used depends on different conditions of visibility, horizon, and the desires of
helicopter squadron commanders.

d. (NU) Rescue in the Vicinity of Ships Operating Aircraft.

(1) (NU) If forced landing occurs in the vicinity of a ship operating aircraft, the rescue destroyer
or helicopter (or both) proceed(s) to rescue the crew without further orders. First to arrive becomes
on-scene commander and directs all supporting forces. The commanding officer of the destroyer
is to assume on-scene command when ready to avoid any manoeuvre that might endanger the
helicopter. The helicopter shall approach from downwind of the scene. The destroyer shall remain
at least 500 yards upwind of the scene.

(2) (NU) The helicopter shall be the primary means of rescue during day or night operations
except when weather conditions preclude safe flight. During peacetime, the rotating anticollision
lights will be turned OFF, indicating yielding of primary means of rescue to destroyer and/or motor
whaleboat.

e. (NU) Rescue Outside Screen. In the event of a forced landing outside the screen, the nearest
screen ship is to proceed to rescue the crew without further orders. If more than one ship starts the
rescue, the senior of such ships will determine who is most suitably placed to continue the rescue,
thus expediting the recovery of personnel and at the same time ensuring that only one ship leaves the
screen.

f. (NU) Ship Operating Aircraft to Make Signals. In the event of an aircraft landing in the sea
from the flight deck, the ship is to make the necessary signals to indicate the occurrence. In addition,
the ship should mark the location in the most appropriate manner, whenever circumstances permit.

g. (NU) Condition of Rescued Personnel. The parent ship is to be informed as soon as

practicable as to the number and condition of rescued personnel.

6304 Ditching, Bailout, and Ejection

a. (NU) Ditching. The following procedures are designed to facilitate the safe landing and
subsequent rescue of the crew of an aircraft which must ditch at sea.

(1) (NU) Location. The pilot should attempt to ditch in a location most favourable for rescue
operations.

Table 6-14. (NU) Night Rescue Stations (Helicopter Ship Operations)

Station Bearing Relative To Flight Operations Course Distance From Helicopter Ship
Number (degrees) (yards)
1H 180 1,000
2H 270 1,000
3H 000 1,500
4H 090 1,000
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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(2) (NU) In a Rough Sea. If the sea is rough, a ship may be detailed to make a slick when time
is available. The pilot of the ditching aircraft should time his approach to land in the slick when it
is in optimum condition for a water landing. A destroyer (or helicopter) is to be detailed to take up a
rescue station about 1,500 yards downwind of the ship making the slick. When the landing is made,
the destroyer or helicopter should proceed to rescue the crew without further orders.

(3) (NU) In an Emergency. In an emergency or when the tactical situation does not permit the
foregoing preparations to be made, aircraft forced to ditch near the fleet should try to land about
2,000 yards on the lee bow of one of the leading destroyers of the screen.

(4) (NU) At Night. The pilot should first attempt to establish visual contact. He should turn on
all available lights and try to land about 2,000 yards ahead of a destroyer in the rear semicircle.
After landing, he should signal his position in the water if it is at all possible to do so. The nearest
destroyer in the screen is to proceed to rescue the crew without further orders.

b. (NU) Bailing Out or Ejecting. The following procedures are designed to facilitate the rescue
of personnel who must abandon aircraft by bailing out or ejecting:

(1) (NU) Location. Pilots who must bail out or eject should try to do so in such a location
that the aircraft will crash well clear of any ship, and that they themselves will land in a location
most favourable for rescue operations, preferably near one of the leading destroyers of the screen.
Modern aircrew emergency equipment contains an emergency transmitter beacon, sending a signal
on 243.0 MHz. A direction finding (DF) position should be established to help locate the aircrew.

(2) (NU) Escort Aircraft. One or more other aircraft or part of the CAP should standby the
aircraft in distress while the crew bails out or ejects and visually locate the parachute’s water entry.

(3) (NU) Establishing Watch Over Personnel in the Water. The escort aircraft should
establish a watch over survivors in the water; the watch should be relieved on station and a
continuous watch should be maintained, insofar as practicable, until the survivors are rescued.

(4) (NU) Marking Location of Survivors. Dye markers, smoke floats, and smoke lights
should be used to mark the position of survivors in the water, as conditions indicate.

6305 Diversion of Ship to Locate Survivors

a. (NU) When radio communications cannot be established with a surface ship which an aircraft
wishes to divert, the aircraft should first establish self-identification and then indicate the location of
survivors by:

(1) (NU) Circling the ship at least once at low altitude.

(2) (NU) Flying across the bow of the ship at low altitude and, at the same time, rocking the
aircraft.

(3) (NU) Sending a message by visual signalling or dropping a message if possible.

(4) (NU) Heading in the direction of the incident.

(5) (NU) Dropping smoke floats in the direction of the incident if possible.

b. (NU) This procedure should be repeated until the ship acknowledges by following the aircraft or
by hoisting the international flag NOVEMBER to indicate that it is unable to comply. In either case,
the ship is to report her actions to the OTC. Crossing the wake of the ship close astern at low altitudes,
opening and closing the throttles, or changing the propeller pitch and rocking the aircraft means that
the assistance of the surface ship is no longer required.

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SECTION IV—SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND MEASURES TO AVOID MUTUAL

INTERFERENCE

6400 Scope

(NU) This section details responsibilities and procedures for the establishment and use of safety zones
and areas, and measures necessary to ensure safety of friendly air, surface, and subsurface forces from
mutual interference.
6401 Implementation of Procedures

a. (NU) This section contains rules and procedures for both peace and wartime.
(NC) (NMP) Wartime procedures will be implemented at NATO Reinforced Alert or earlier, if ordered,
by a strategic commander or his designated subordinate.

b. (NU) The transition from peace to wartime procedures will have an effect on:

(1) (NU) SUBNOTE procedures.

(2) (NU) Restricted areas.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Waterspace management areas:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Submarine action areas.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Joint action areas (JAAs).

(c) (NC) (NMP) Antisubmarine warfare free areas (ASWFAs).

(d) (NC) (NMP) Task group submarine area (TGSA).

(4) (NU) Permanently and temporarily established exercise areas.

(5) (NU) Variable depth sonar (VDS)/depressed towed-array system (DTAS) NOTE, critical angle
towed-array system (CATAS) ADVISORY, or UWO NOTE, and Surface Ship Notes.

(6) (NU) Submarine movement advisory authority (SMAA) functions.

6402 Implementation of Waterspace Management Procedures

(NU) Normally water space is managed by notice of intentions (NOIs), VDS notes, SUBNOTEs, etc.
(NC) (NMP) In a period of increasing tension, WSM procedures may be implemented at any time but
should be in force shortly after Simple Alert is declared.
6403–6409 Spare

6410 General Considerations

(NU) The complexities of modern warfare necessitate promulgation of certain basic doctrines applicable
to all services and commands to prevent or minimise mutual interference during operations. Measures
to prevent or minimise mutual interference are those coordinated actions required of appropriate
commanders to ensure that the operations of forces under their direction are conducted in such a manner
as to prevent or minimise the adverse effects of actions of any one unit upon the operations of others.

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6411 Authority

(NU) Basic rules for measures to avoid mutual interference are prescribed on the basis of joint and
combined agreements. Detailed rules and procedures in consonance with the basic rules are promulgated
inappropriate service publications and by subordinate commanders as specified in Article 6412. During
an emergency, and when, in the judgement of the commander involved, time does not permit reference
to higher authority, the specified rules and procedures may be temporarily set aside. When such action
is taken, the commander involved must notify other appropriate commanders, setting forth the reasons
for the change.
6412 Responsibility

(NU) Each commander shall ensure that such detailed rules, procedures, plans, and methods of operation
as he considers necessary for dissemination at his level of command are in consonance with those of
higher echelons an are coordinated with parallel echelons. Moreover, dissemination shall leave no
doubt as to the responsibilities which result. Commanders down to the lowest echelons of a force are
responsible for making certain that adequate measures are taken to prevent or minimise interference with
the operations of other friendly forces.
6413 Types of Measure

(NU) Measures to prevent or minimise mutual interference include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) (NU) Assignment of nonconflicting missions insofar as practicable.

(2) (NU) Designation of relative importance of missions where conflict of missions must occur.

(3) (NU) Scheduling of tactical tasks so as to limit conflict in space, time, or area.

(4) (NU) Provision of adequate recognition and identification procedures.

(5) (NU) Timely provision of essential operational data by controlling authorities and a similar
exchange between forces where interference may occur.

6414 Compromise

(NU) In the event of compromise of any of the provisions or measures to prevent or minimise mutual
interference, commanders are responsible for seeing that immediate action is taken to notify the authority
establishing the particular measures and other commanders who may need to know.
6415 Identification/Recognition

(NU) The proper use of the procedures prescribed for identification/recognition is an essential feature
in avoiding mutual interference. Friendly submarines are to steer the promulgated safety course while
identification/recognition procedures are being carried out.
(NR) (NMP) Identification/recognition procedures for friendly aircraft are in Article 6134.
6416 Initiation of Self-identification

(NU) The responsibility for initiation of identification procedures is assigned below and has universal
application:
(1) (NU) Aircraft identify themselves to friendly surface units.

(2) (NU) Aircraft determine identity of surface units and of other aircraft before attacking.

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(3) (NU) Aircraft and ground forces are mutually responsible for establishing their own friendly
identity.

(4) (NU) Ground forces and surface forces are mutually responsible for establishing their own
friendly identity, except where special instructions for harbour entrance control are effective, or
when special orders are issued for specific operations.

(5) (NU) Submarines identify themselves to friendly surface ships and aircraft, except in submarine
safety lanes.
(NR) (NMP) Additionally, they do not identify themselves in submarine action areas.

(6) (NU) When ships of different size encounter each other, it is normally the responsibility of the
smaller ship to establish its friendly identity to the larger ship.

(7) (NU) Within similar types, there is a mutual responsibility for establishing friendly identity;
that is, air-air, ship-ship, submarine-submarine, and ground-ground.

6417–6419 Spare

6420 Routes and Reference Points

(NU) Routes and reference points are established for the purpose of facilitating control of surface, air, and
subsurface traffic so as to reduce interference between forces making passage in the same area. Routes
and reference points are established by appropriate commanders. Common routes and reference points
should be promulgated when necessary to ensure understanding between forces operating in adjacent
areas. Information concerning common routes and reference points should be disseminated to forces
about to enter or leave an area, as well as to appropriate commands in adjacent areas. When no conflict
with established routes and reference points would result, appropriate commanders may promulgate
additional routes and reference points for the temporary use of their own forces.
(NU) See also Chapter 3, Section II.
6430 Restricted Areas

a. (NU) Commanders establishing restricted areas shall:

(1) (NU) Advise other commanders sufficiently in advance to permit dissemination of restrictions
to all personnel concerned.

(2) (NU) Specify the geographic limits and, if appropriate, the altitude limits of the restricted
areas, and

(3) (NU) Provide for the timely disestablishment of a restricted area as soon as conditions no
longer require its existence.

b. (NU) Safety zones are normally used for noncombat operations.

c. (NU) Air and surface restricted areas include:

(1) (NU) Controlled airspace, air corridors, and safety sectors.

(2) (NU) Shore bombardment and bomb lines.

(3) (NU) Blind bombing zones.

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6431 Controlled Airspace, Air Routes/Air Corridors, and Safety Sectors

(NU) Controlled airspace, air routes, air corridors, and safety sectors are used to provide the safe transit
of aircraft. Inputs for coordination and deconfliction of airspace requirements, of all services involved in
an operation, are required by the designated airspace control authority (ACA) for the establishment and
dissemination of the airspace control plan. Further details are found in ATP-40.
a. (NU) Controlled Airspace. Prior coordination with the appropriate authority is required when
a controlled airspace is used by tactical or formation flights. Aircraft using a controlled airspace
shall not be subject to attack by friendly surface, submarine, or air forces unless positively identified
as enemy or unless they commit a hostile act. Controlled airspace will be in accordance with those
published in appropriate flight information or ICAO publications or as promulgated by appropriate
commanders.

b. (NU) Air Routes and Air Corridors. Ships and ground batteries are forbidden to fire at
any aircraft in air corridors. The defence of air corridors against incursion by enemy aircraft is the
responsibility of a CAP established for that purpose. Ordinarily, air corridors are established only
when a major air operation is involved, and then only when it is essential that the participating aircraft
pass near own ground and sea forces. Included within the concept of air corridors is a low-level transit
route (LLTR), defined as follows: A temporary corridor of defined dimensions through the areas of
organic low-level air defences of surface forces. For more details, see ATP-40.

c. (NU) Safety Sectors. Safety sectors are employed in AAW areas and are not the same as airways.

d. (NU) Identification Coordination. When maritime units are operating within, or in the vicinity
of, airspace controlled by other agencies, it must be ensured that ID criteria are coordinated between
all agencies concerned, and known by all users of that particular airspace.

6432 Shore Bombardment and Bomb Lines

(NU) Shore bombardment and bomb lines are used in coordinated operations with ground forces.
The policy regarding establishing and using these lines shall be at the discretion of the appropriate
commanders. Tactical and forward (safe) bomb lines are normally prescribed by a troop commander
according to his assessment of the requirement for coordinating air strikes with his ground forces.
(NC) (NMP) (See ATP-08 and AARTYP-1.)
6433 Blind Bombing Zones

(NU) Blind bombing zones are used to permit aircraft to conduct operations unimpeded by the danger of
attack by friendly forces. Rules governing actions within blind bombing zones follow:
a. (NU) Aircraft may attack any target encountered in a blind bombing zone without inquiry as to its
identity, except for a submarine in a moving haven (MHN) established by a SUBNOTE, or a surface
ship in an AOO about which the aircraft have been notified (see Article 6434).

b. (NU) Surface Ships shall normally keep clear of blind bombing zones. When surface ships
must enter such a zone, the correct notice procedures must be followed. Surface ships may attack
any submarine encountered, except for a submarine in a MHN established by a SUBNOTE (see
Article 6434).

c. (NU) Submarines shall normally keep clear of blind bombing zones; when submarines must
enter such a zone, they shall be protected by a SUBNOTE. During an emergency, a submarine entering
a blind bombing zone without prior timely notification (normally 24 hours is required) must accept the
risk of attack by friendly aircraft.
(NR) (NMP) Targets that a submarine may engage should be those permitted in Article 6434.

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6434 Controlled Waterspace, Waterspace Management Areas, and ASW Weapon

Restrictions

a. (NU) Waterspace Management/Prevention of Mutual Interference. Effective WSM and

PMI are essential to ensure safety of friendly submarine and surface forces. A clear understanding of
each function is required by all commands involved with submarine and/or ASW operations. WSM
and PMI are the responsibilities of the area SUBOPAUTH. When authorized by the SUBOPAUTH,
an OTC may assume local WSM and PMI responsibilities for designated task group submarines.
(NC) (NMP) See Table 2-2, Function 144.

NOTE

(NU) FOR THE PURPOSE OF WSM AND ASW WEAPONS

RESTRICTIONS, AN ASW WEAPON IS ANY WEAPON USED BY A
FRIENDLY PLATFORM AGAINST A SUBMERGED OR SURFACED
SUBMARINE.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Waterspace Management. WSM is an essential element of the overall
battle-space control plan required for any maritime operation. Its principal purpose is to allocate
waterspace in terms of ASW attack restrictions to permit the rapid and effective engagement of
enemy submarines while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly submarine and surface forces.
Essentially, WSM is a set of specifically defined submarine and ASW force operating areas and
attack rules. WSM procedures are implemented by the SUBOPAUTH on the behalf of the area
commander. They should be in place whenever ASW attack by any type of platform becomes
probable. WSM may be applied on any scale—local, regional, or theater-wide—depending on the
crisis situation, the existing or projected submarine threat, and requirements of the area commander.
Areas are published by geographic reference or grid specified by the theater commander. Elements
of WSM may be implemented individually or in combinations to provide measures appropriate to
operations ranging from peace support to hostilities. Figure 6-7 illustrates WSM areas and rules.

(2) (NU) Prevention of Mutual Interference. For submarine operations, PMI procedures are
specifically intended to prevent submerged collisions between:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Friendly submarines.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Submarines and friendly surface ships’ towed bodies.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Submarines and any other submarine hazards (e.g., detonations, submersibles,
oil drilling operations, etc.).

(d) (NC) (NMP) Submarines and friendly towed and autonomous bodies (e.g., naval mines,
unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), naval minesweeping
gear, VDS, helicopter dipping sonar etc.) (see Article 6481).

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) PMI USING STOVEPIPE PROCEDURES CAN BE FOUND

IN ARTICLE 12240.

b. (NC) (NMP) Definitions of Principal WSM Areas. ASW attack rules apply to attacks against
all contacts classified as submarine regardless of whether they are surfaced or submerged.

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SAA
SURF/AIR: ASW Attacks SSL: ASW Weapons Prohibited (1)
Prohibited

SUB: ASW Attacks Authorized

JAA
ASWFA
SURF/AIR: ASW Attacks
SURF/AIR/SUB(2): ASW Attacks Requires Coordination with
Authorized Friendly SUB

SUB: ASW Attacks Authorized

NOTES: (1) SUBS may attack submarines positively identified as hostile inside SSLs.
(2) SUBs must remain inside assigned areas but may shoot ASW weapons
into ASWFAs.
(3) The areas depicted above are also applicable to TGSAs.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-7. (NU) (NMP) Waterspace Management Areas

(1) (NC) (NMP) ASW Free Area. An ASW free area is one in which no friendly submarines are
operating. There are no ASW attack restrictions except when operating in the vicinity of a boundary
with a SAA, JAA, submarine safety lane (SSL), or other activated submarine operating area when
the necessary ASW weapon compensatory allowances must be applied (see Article 6461).

(2) (NC) (NMP) Submarine Action Area. An SAA is an area that contains one or more friendly
submarines. Only submarine-launched ASW weapons are authorized within the SAA.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Submarines are allocated submarine patrol areas (SPAs) and MHNs within
an SAA to avoid mutual interference between submarines. While the locations of SAAs are
promulgated by the SUBOPAUTH to all friendly forces in the region, the specific locations
of SPAs and MHNs within SAAs are normally only passed to the submarines concerned and
appropriate submarine movement authorities.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Surface or air ASW attacks are prohibited in an SAA.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Surface forces should not normally enter an SAA.

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(3) (NC) (NMP) Joint Action Area. JAA is an area in which a single friendly submarine is
operating in coordination with air and/or surface forces. Air and surface ASW attacks are prohibited
throughout the JAA unless NOTACK area or a SGSA has been established.

(a) (NC) (NMP) A separate JAA is to be established for each submarine with which coordinated
operations are planned or envisaged. Note that JAAs may be used for submarines tasked in
primary roles other than ASW; e.g., ASUW, strike warfare, special operations, etc.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Surface forces should normally not enter a JAA unless the submarine
operating in the JAA is conducting associated support, direct support, or integrated operations
with this force and provisions for implementation of SGSA procedures have been made.

(4) (NC) (NMP) ASW Area of Responsibility. The ASW area of responsibility (ASW AOR)
of a surface force is a geographically fixed region or specified area around PIM in which the
OTC, as opposed to an area commander, exercises ASW responsibility. Size and configuration
are determined by the OTC based upon the nature of the threat and assets available to counter.
Ideally, the ASW AOR should be an ASWFA that permits unrestricted use of air and surface ASW
weapons. If an SAA or JAA waterspace is included in or overlaps the ASW AOR, strict compliance
with ASW attack rules is required (see Figure 6-7 for ASW attack rules).

(5) (NC) (NMP) Submarine Safety Lanes. SSLs are available as a set of lanes superimposed
on the grid, or geographically described, and may be activated completely or partly by message. If
activated, SSLs are special cases of SSAs. A submarine in an activated SSL shall not attack another
submarine unless it is positively classified as hostile. ASW attacks by aircraft and surface ships are
prohibited in an activated SSL.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Task Group Submarine Area. A TGSA is an area designated by the
SUBOPAUTH in which one or more submarines are operating under TACOM of the task group
OTC. WSM and PMI requirements within this area are the responsibility of the OTC or specified
subordinate commander. TGSAs are established based on the mutual consent of both the OTC and
SUBOPAUTH to allow the on-scene commander to control WSM and submarine movements. A
TGSA may be established at any time before or after the implementation of full WSM procedures.
Further discussion of TGSA procedures is contained in ATP-18.

c. (NU) Havens. Static havens and MHNs, which may be stationary, are established to provide
a measure of security to submarines and surface ships in transit through areas in which existing
attack restrictions would be inadequate to prevent attack by friendly forces. Additionally, moving
havens in peacetime prevent or minimise mutual interference among friendly submarines or among
friendly submarines and ships’ operating systems (e.g., VDS/DTAS). Submarines can be made
available for exercises with other forces during transit only when prior arrangements have been made.
Ships operating towed acoustic devices under circumstances where a VDS/DTAS or UWO NOTE is
required should be routed in moving havens. (See Article 6480.)
(NR) (NMP) See also paragraph (4) below.

(1) (NU) Static Havens (used only during wartime or during periods of potential
hostilities). Static havens may be established by a SUBOPAUTH or task group commander.
Offensive operations within a static haven are limited as follows:

(a) (NU) Under no circumstances shall ships or aircraft attack a submarine within a static
haven. Nor shall they attack a surface ship unless the target is positively identified as enemy.
Additionally, surface ships shall not enter a static haven without the permission of the
commander who established the static haven.

(b) (NU) Submarines shall not attack other submarines or surface ships unless they are
positively identified as enemy.

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NOTE

(NC) (NMP) STATIC HAVENS ARE USED TO PROVIDE

PROTECTION TO FRIENDLY SUBMARINES DURING
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS WHICH INCLUDE NON-NATO
PARTNERS. DURING THIS TYPE OF OPERATION, STANDARD
WSM AREAS (SAA, JAA AND ASWFA) WILL CONTINUE TO BE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUBOPAUTH OR (WHEN TACOM
HAS BEEN DELEGATED) THE OTC OR SOCA. ADDITIONALLY,
THE COMMANDER PROMULGATING WSM ALLOCATION
AND STATUS MESSAGE TO NATO UNITS WILL ESTABLISH
STATIC HAVENS WHICH ENCOMPASS SUBMARINE WSM
AREAS (SAAS AND JAAS) AND DISSEMINATE THE LOCATIONS
OF THESE STATIC HAVENS TO ALL UNITS OPERATING
IN THE AREA OF CONCERN. THIS COMMANDER SHALL
ALSO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT UNITS
WHICH ARE NOT INFORMED OF WSM STATUS REMAIN
CLEAR OF STATIC HAVENS AND DO NOT CONDUCT
UNAUTHORIZED ATTACKS ON SUBMARINES AND
SURFACE SHIPS OPERATING WITHIN THESE STATIC HAVENS.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Submarine Moving Havens (Wartime or Peacetime Use). MHNs may
be assigned by the SUBOPAUTH to submarines to prevent mutual interference or minimise the
risk of attack between friendly submarines.
(NC) (NMP) Submarine MHNs are established by BARNSTORM procedures in ATP-18 or by
a SUBNOTE promulgated in accordance with the procedure in Article 6471. The sides of the
submarine MHN are always described in the following sequence—miles ahead, miles behind, and
miles on either side of the submarine’s ordered position.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Wartime. The dimensions of MHNs will be dictated by operational
requirements. Unless otherwise specified, the standard wartime submarine MHN has the
following dimensions from the submarine’s ordered position:

i. (NC) (NMP) Outside the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas: 50 miles ahead, 100 miles
behind, and 15 miles on each side.

ii. (NC) (NMP) In the Mediterranean Sea east of longitude 05°55’W (except for the
Aegean Sea) and in the Baltic Sea entered in latitude 57°45’N: 20 miles ahead, 40 miles
behind, and 15 miles on each side.

iii. (NC) (NMP) In the Aegean Sea: 5 miles ahead, 10 miles behind, and 3 miles on each
side.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Peacetime. In peacetime, SUBOPAUTHs are requested to restrict the size
of the MHN to the minimum to meet the submarine’s operational requirements—preferably
an area 20 miles ahead, 30 miles behind, and 5 miles on either side of the submarine’s ordered
position. In peacetime, the shape of the MHN may be varied to suit operational requirements,
in which case the dimensions are to be stated in the SUBNOTE.

(c) (NC) (NMP) In Restricted Waters. MHNs should be reduced in size in restricted waters,
in which case the dimensions must be stated in the SUBNOTE. They shall be established for
submarines in transit even though they are under escort.

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(d) (NC) (NMP) Request for Change to SUBNOTE. A submarine is responsible for
remaining within the submarine MHN established by the SUBNOTE. When unable to do so,
the submarine shall request a change to the SUBNOTE from the SUBOPAUTH under whose
operational control he is operating and, in peacetime, with information to the SMAA. Such
requests for changes to a SUBNOTE will include the reason therefore, and will be assigned a
precedence consistent with the urgency of the situation, up to and including IMMEDIATE if
necessary.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Operations Within a Submarine Moving Haven in Wartime. In wartime,
operations within a submarine MHN are limited as follows:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Aircraft and Surface Ships. ASW attacks are prohibited.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) FOR PROCEDURES WHEN SURFACE FORCES REQUIRE

ACCESS TO AN SAA OR JAA, SEE PARAGRAPH E. BELOW.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Submarines. A submarine in a MHN shall not attack another submarine
unless it is positively identified as enemy.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Surface Ship Moving Havens. In wartime, surface ship moving havens are
established by surface ship notices, which will be promulgated in accordance with Article 6437.
In peacetime, they will be established by a UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE in accordance with
Article 6480 or a MWNOTE in accordance with Article 6481. A surface ship moving haven will
normally be a circle centred on the ordered position of the ship (or Guide of a group of ships).
The operational command authority (OCA) or ship originating a surface ship moving haven notice
will determine the radius of a circular haven, taking into consideration such factors as the size of
a group of ships and the probable tactical manoeuvres. The size of surface ship moving havens
should be kept to the minimum consistent with the foregoing requirements in order to minimise the
area of prohibited attack. A surface ship is responsible for remaining within its established haven.
When unable to do so in wartime, the ship shall inform the OCA concerned as soon as practicable
and designate new planned positions. In peacetime, Articles 6480 and 6481 are to be followed.
Within surface ship moving havens, offensive operations are limited so that surface ships will
not be attacked unless in self-defence or IAW ROE. Attacks on aircraft and submarines will be
governed by the designation of the surrounding zone or area. When the movements of cartel ships,
enemy hospital ships, neutrals, etc., are known, they can best be safeguarded by the dissemination
of a notice of surface ship moving haven.

d. (NC) (NMP) Considerations in Area Allocations.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Communication schedules and maximum speeds of advance will affect the
planning and promulgation of changes in submarine area allocations.

(2) (NC) (NMP) The inherent difficulties in providing adequate information exchange with a
covert submarine demand that communications be limited and strictly scheduled. Additionally,
although a submarine may receive a message after a short while after release, it would not normally
transmit an acknowledgement for OPSEC reasons. These constraints dictate that a SUBOPAUTH
cannot normally assume receipt of a message, transmitted by broadcast to a submarine, for at least
12 hours after initial transmission.

(3) (NC) (NMP) For both operational effectiveness and survivability, a submarine is restricted in
speed. Limitations may be imposed for sonar search purposes, to ensure continuous communications,
to conserve battery capacity, or to minimise snorkel periods. A low speed of advance by submarines
is a sensible planning assumption.

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(4) (NC) (NMP) OTCs and MHQs should therefore give the SUBOPAUTH the earliest possible
notification of desired routes and water assignments. The SUBOPAUTH will acknowledge requests
as soon as possible (normally within 4 hours of receipt). The acknowledgement will be either a
WSM Allocation and Status message or a denial.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Own naval minelaying operations are to be conducted only after preliminary
coordination with the appropriate SUBOPAUTH. This is also valid for the conduct of naval mine
countermeasures to a limited extent, as discussed in Chapter 13.

e. (NC) (NMP) Procedures for WSM Allocation.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Procedures for Use When Surface Forces Require Access to a
Submarine Action Area or Joint Action Area (other than one established for their
use). The procedure to be followed depends upon the notice that can be given, measured from the
time of receipt and time of new requirement.

(a) (NC) (NMP) More Than 24 Hours From Receipt of Requirement. When more
than 24 hours’ notice can be given, the OTC must decide whether the aim of the mission is
best served by seeking separation or mutual support from submarines within SAAs. He must
request an ASWFA or JAA.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Less Than 24 Hours But More Than 18 Hours From Receipt of
Requirement. It is emphasized that the following is an emergency procedure and might be
impossible to implement. In this case the OTC may request Operation GRASSHOPPER from
the SUBOPAUTH. This orders all affected submarines to move to a small preplanned part of
their allocated area. The duration of GRASSHOPPER and the area required must be defined.
See Article 6436 for detailed instructions for Operation GRASSHOPPER.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Less Than 18 Hours Notice From Receipt of Requirement. An
alteration of the plans at this notice is not sufficient for any course of action other than for the
force to prohibit ASW attacks. It must be emphasized that the short notice might be insufficient
even to warn friendly submarines of the transit of friendly surface forces. Ships must be aware
that they may be open to attack by a friendly submarine and therefore must make every attempt
to make their identity known.

NOTE
(NC) (NMP) DTAS/VDS-FITTED SHIPS THAT ARE PASSING
THROUGH AN SAA OR JAA MUST RETRIEVE THE DTAS/VDS
SYSTEM UNLESS GRASSHOPPER IS IN FORCE. IF A CATAS
SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED A HAZARD TO CERTAIN CLASSES
OF SUBMARINE, THE SUBOPAUTH WILL ADVISE OF ANY
REQUIREMENT TO RETRIEVE THE CATAS. CATAS-FITTED SHIPS
MUST RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE OR LOSS
UNLESS THE SYSTEM IS RETRIEVED.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Procedures Within a Joint Action Area. By definition, a JAA will always
contain a single friendly submarine. Accordingly, air and surface ASW attacks are prohibited
throughout a JAA until such time as an SGSA or NOTACK area is established by the submarine.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Procedures Within an ASW Area of Interest.

(a) (NC) (NMP) The SUBOPAUTH operating submarines within the ASW AOI may be
requested by the area or surface force commander to provide associated support to the force. If
assigned, the SUBOPAUTH must designate the submarine operating area as an SAA or JAA.

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(b) (NC) (NMP) To provide maximum ASWFAs for forces in transit, JAA sizes for submarines
are to be kept as small as feasible considering the requirements of submarine operations.

(c) (NC) (NMP) If the transiting force stops to carry out local operations, JAAs or SAAs in the
vicinity may be modified to provide support more appropriate to stationary PIM operations.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Procedures for ASW Aircraft.

(a) (NC) (NMP) In an ASWFA. No ASW restrictions apply for ASW aircraft in an ASWFA.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Over an SAA. ASW aircraft should not normally be tasked over an SAA.
If such occurs, however, aircraft ASW attacks are prohibited.

(c) (NC) (NMP) In a JAA. Attacks by ASW aircraft are prohibited until such time as a
NOTACK area is established by the submarine. SUB/AIR cooperation procedures, in
accordance with ATP-28, Vol. I, apply when so ordered.

NOTE
(NC) (NMP) A MINIMUM OF 12 HOURS’ NOTICE MUST BE GIVEN TO
A SUBMARINE ORDERED TO EXECUTE SUB/AIR COOPERATION
PROCEDURES.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Procedures for Submarines Within an SAA/JAA. Submarines shall
consider as enemy and may attack any target encountered, subject to specific orders to the contrary
from higher authority and the current interpretation of international law. Submarines shall not
attack ships believed to be neutral or ships encountered along a route or in an area of friendly ship
operations about which they have been notified. No ship encountered under the circumstances
set forth in the preceding sentence shall be attacked unless the ship has been identified as enemy
beyond possibility of doubt.

f. (NC) (NMP) Coordination Responsibilities.

(1) (NC) (NMP) The SUBOPAUTH will:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Implement and promulgate SAAs, JAAs, SSLs, and widely and on a regular
basis ASWFAs on behalf of the area commander.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Order Operation GRASSHOPPER.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Promulgate to appropriate authorities SPAs and MHNs within SAAs.

(d) (NC) (NMP) Liaise with other authorities over cooperation within JAAs.

(2) (NC) (NMP) OTCs and MHQs can:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Request ASWFAs or JAAs.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Request Operation GRASSHOPPER.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Establish and promulgate ASW AOI.

(d) (NC) (NMP) Seek arbitration as appropriate.

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g. (NC) (NMP) Operations After Loss of Submarine Command and Control. The
SUBOPAUTH will ensure ASWFAs are promulgated by regular message. In the event of loss of
submarine C2, unrestricted ASW operations can continue in ASWFAs using the information contained
in the last promulgation message. These operations must remain outside SSLs.

6435 (NU) (NMP) Procedures for Request and Allocation of WSM Areas

a. (NC) (NMP) Procedures.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Purpose. The purpose of this paragraph is to formalize the procedure to be
followed when requesting or allocating ASWFAs, JAAs, and SAAs.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Aim. The aim is to provide a standard method to divide water effectively between
the commands involved.

b. (NC) (NMP) Considerations.

(1) (NC) (NMP) In order to reduce message traffic, WSM messages will initially not be addressed
lower than commander task force (CTF)/CTG level of any ASW-capable force. CTGs and sub-area
commanders are responsible for further dissemination as required.

(2) (NC) (NMP) To ensure uniformity of WSM plots, the SUBOPAUTH will issue a serialized
WSM message for his area of responsibility at an interval not exceeding 24 hours. If a new WSM
message is not issued within 24 hours, the last WSM message remains effective.

(3) (NC) (NMP) If required the SUBOPAUTH will issue numbered amendments to serialized
WSM messages when time does not allow waiting for the next serialized WSM message.

(4) (NC) (NMP) After a new serialized WSM message has become effective, the former serialized
WSM messages and amendments are automatically cancelled.

(5) (NC) (NMP) WSM requests received by the SUBOPAUTH will be acknowledged as soon as
practicable (normally within 4 hours of receipt) by IMMEDIATE message. The acknowledgement
will be in the form of:

(a) (NC) (NMP) An amendment to a serialized WSM message, or

(b) (NC) (NMP) A denial of a request.

c. (NC) (NMP) Format for WSM Messages. Formats for WSM messages are in accordance with
APP-11 and ATP-18.

6436 (NU) (NMP) Emergency Transit of Surface Forces Through SAAs or JAAs

a. (NC) (NMP) Operation GRASSHOPPER.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Purpose and Aim. To allow a transiting surface force, at short notice, the
maximum freedom for the use of ASW weapons by minimizing the size of SAAs or JAAs in the
quickest possible way.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Considerations.

(a) (NC) (NMP) This operation is to be regarded as an emergency procedure.

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(b) (NC) (NMP) If a STOVEPIPE plan or SKYLIGHTs are in force, GRASSHOPPER may
be requested, but can not be authorized unless the STOVEPIPE plan or SKYLIGHTs can be
cancelled.

(c) (NC) (NMP) The submarine’s ability to operate effectively will be significantly reduced
during the execution of these procedures.

b. (NC) (NMP) Execution of Operation GRASSHOPPER.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Description. When surface forces are required to enter an SAA or JAA at short
notice, the SUBOPAUTH can order a submarine to withdraw into a preplanned part of its SPA,
defined as a MEADOW.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Definition of a MEADOW. A MEADOW is a static submarine haven that is
effective only during the period and in the area in which Operation GRASSHOPPER is in effect.
MEADOWs will be defined by the area commander when he promulgates the ASW grid.
NOTE
(NC) (NMP) IF A SUBMARINE HAS BEEN ALLOCATED ONLY A PART
OF A GRID AREA (IN WHICH CASE THE SAA OR JAA BOUNDARY
IS CUTTING THROUGH THE MEADOW), THIS MEADOW IS
CANCELLED.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Submarines.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Within the area in which GRASSHOPPER is effective, submarines
withdraw into the MEADOW or into any part of their SAA or JAA which lies outside the
GRASSHOPPER area and remain there throughout the time specified in the execution message.

(b) (NC) (NMP) When the effective GRASSHOPPER time expires, submarines again occupy
their SAA or JAA as previously allocated.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Surface/Air Assets.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Within the time and area specified in the GRASSHOPPER execution message,
attacks with surface and air ASW weapons are prohibited within the MEADOW.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Surface assets should normally remain clear of MEADOWs.

(c) (NC) (NMP) During the time GRASSHOPPER is effective, no restrictions are imposed in
the GRASSHOPPER area on VDS/DTAS, etc., outside the MEADOW.

(d) (NC) (NMP) When the effective GRASSHOPPER time expires, the ASW weapon
restrictions of Article 6435 apply. (Surface/air ASW attacks are prohibited within the SAA.
NOTACK or SGSA is required for attacks within a JAA.)

c. (NC) (NMP) Method of Requesting and Ordering Operation GRASSHOPPER.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Request for GRASSHOPPER. The OTC or ASWC of a surface force that
has to proceed through an SAA or JAA at a notice between 18 and 24 hours may request the
SUBOPAUTH to execute GRASSHOPPER using the message format in APP-11.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Method of Ordering. The SUBOPAUTH orders GRASSHOPPER using the
message form at in APP-11. When so ordering, the SUBOPAUTH must provide the coordinates of
the centre and the size of each active MEADOW and the time they will be active.

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6437 Procedures for Surface Ships Entering Restricted Areas

(NU) Surface Ship Notices. When surface ships must enter a blind bombing zone, the commander
ordering the movement shall notify, as far in advance as possible, the theater, fleet, or equivalent
commander concerned and the commander controlling aircraft movements in the area. The commander
ordering the surface ship movement shall state either the route to be followed, given SOA and times of
passing reference positions, or the area in which the surface ship operations are to be conducted. During
an emergency, surface ships entering a blind bombing zone without prior timely notification (normally
24 hours is required) must accept the risk of attack by friendly aircraft.
6438–6439 Spare

6440 Safety Procedures

a. (NU) Safety procedures are established to:

(1) (NU) Safeguard friendly forces from attack by each other; prevent needless alarms; prevent
expenditure of unnecessary effort on the part of friendly forces by the approach of other forces not
yet recognized or identified as friendly.

(2) (NU) Provide confidence in identification, thereby ensuring the immediate effective
engagement of enemy forces.

(3) (NU) Ensure the safety of friendly forces in routing operations and exercises.

b. (NU) Safety procedures applicable to specific operations are established in appropriate publications.
Safety procedures for maritime air operations are detailed in Article 6170.
(NR) (NMP) Safety procedures for submarine operations in Article 6460.

6445 Safety of Aircraft

6446 Weapon Restrictions—General

(NU) Weapon restrictions apply to aircraft, SAMs, and guns and may be ordered to allow the operation
of friendly aircraft, especially within MEZs. They are promulgated by AAWCs, each at his own level and
in his own area, as the occasion demands. They may be ordered in a general sense, or specifically for a
given area, or for a given type of weapon.
6447—6449 Spare

6450 Special Surface Ship Precautions

6451 Surface Ship Notices and Advisories

(NU) Surface ship notices or advisories will only be required for those specific instances in which surface
ships are towing acoustic devices in peacetime under the provisions of Article 6480 or are required to
enter blind bombing zones or submarine patrol areas in wartime, or in peacetime are towing acoustic
devices (see Article 6480) or are conducting MW operations (see Article 6481).
(NR) (NMP) (See Article 6434.)

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6452 Radiation Hazards to Personnel

a. (NU) Ships Fitted With High-Power Transmitters and Personnel. Ships are typically fitted
with high-power transmitters such as radio communications, radar, and electronic warfare equipment.
The same ships also carry personnel. The RF fields produced by these transmitters can cause general
or localized heating in personnel from the induced currents. Personnel shall not be exposed to RF
levels that exceed the NATO standards of STANAG 2345. The commanding officer of each unit
is responsible for the safety of his own personnel, and those of surrounding units, from RADHAZ
produced within his unit. AECP-2, NATO Naval Radio and Radar Radiation Hazards Manual,
provides engineering derivations for RADHAZ protection for personnel, and AECP-2 Supplement
provides Practical Operational Guidance and procedures for fleet use. It is the responsibility of
each commanding officer to warn other units when his unit is within the range in which powerful
transmitters could create a RADHAZ to personnel on other units.

b. (NU) Instructions.

(1) (NU) Identify and attenuate potentially hazardous RF fields by physical controls wherever
possible, protective equipment, administrative actions, or a combination thereof.

(2) (NU) Limit RF field exposure of personnel per AECP-2.

(3) (NU) Define and control areas in which RF exposure of personnel could exceed the PEL. Ensure
that personnel are aware of potential RF exposures in their workplaces and duty assignments.

(4) (NU) Investigate, document, and prevent recurrences of RF overexposure.

(5) (NU) Use RF Hazard Warning Signs as shown in STANAG 1379 RAD, or the national standard
to warn personnel of hazardous areas.

(6) (NU) For RF Induced and Contact Current restrictions, use the following table:

Frequency Range Maximum Current Through Maximum Current Through Contact Current (mA)
(f) (in MHz) Both Feet (mA) Each Foot (mA)
0.003–0.1 2000*f 1000*f 1000*f
0.1–100 200 100 100

6453 Radiation Hazards to Materiel

a. (NU) Ships Fitted With High-Power Transmitters and Carrying Materiel. Ships are
typically fitted with high-power transmitters such as radio communications, radar, and electronic
warfare equipment. The same ships also typically carry naval stores including weapon systems
and ordnance that may contain electro-explosive devices (EED), or other materiel containing
critical systems, defined here as materiel. The RF fields produced by these transmitters can cause
inadvertent initiation or dudding of EEDs or upset sensitive electronic systems. The commanding
officer of each unit is responsible for the safety of his own materiel, and those of surrounding units,
from RADHAZ produced within his unit. AECP-2 provides engineering derivations of RADHAZ
protection for materiel and AECP-2 Supplement provides practical operational guidance and
procedures for fleet use. It is the responsibility of each commanding officer to warn other units when
his unit is within the safety distance of RF transmitters that could create a RADHAZ to materiel
on other units. It is also the responsibility of each commanding officer to warn other units of
RF-sensitive materiel held in such a location that they could be hazarded by RF transmissions from
other units.

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b. (NU) Instructions. Referring to the operational guidance in AECP-2 Supplement, each unit
should construct a set of tables such as described in Chapter 7 of that publication (Guidance to
Simplify the Implementation of Operational Procedures).

(1) (NU) Susceptibility Radiation Hazards Designator (SRAD) codes for RF-sensitive materiel
are provided to fleet units by each nation’s appropriate engineering authority for materiel safety.
Chapter 7, Table 1, provides a place to collect each unit’s SRAD codes from their ammunition
allowance list. This table is used to inform other units of the SRAD of materiel when approaching
another unit.

(2) (NU) Transmitter RADHAZ Designator (TRAD) codes for each unit’s transmitters are provided
by each nation’s appropriate engineering authority for electronic systems. Chapter 7, Table 2,
provides a place to collect each unit’s TRAD codes unique to emitters and antenna suites of that
unit. This table is used to compare to the SRAD provided from an approaching unit (platform). If a
unit’s TRAD is higher than any corresponding frequency SRAD of an approaching unit (platform),
then the appropriate safety distances in Chapter 3, Table 1, must be observed. If this is not possible,
one of the options of paragraph 302.b must be achieved.

(3) (NU) A table unique to each platform, such as that in Chapter 7, Table 3, can be prepared in
advance once the unit’s TRAD codes are known by filling in the matrix with values extracted from
Chapter 3, Table 1: Safety Distances. Since a safety distance of 3 metres is a minimum separation
between a transmitting antenna and materiel or aircraft structure, only values >3 metres need be
considered.

6454 Radiation Hazards to Fuel

a. (NU) Ships Fitted with High-Power Transmitters and Fuel. General instructions regarding
the control of RF transmissions to avoid RADHAZ to fuel and flammable materials pertain only to
flammables with flashpoints less than (<) 60° C. These fuels have to be in shielded, closed containers
when there is a possibility of being exposed to electromagnetic radiation.

b. (NU) Instructions. To avoid causing a hazard during fuelling operations on vessels in close
company, the following more detailed procedures should be observed for flammable materials with
a flashpoint below or equal to 60° C when they are exposed to RF transmissions during fuelling,
defuelling, and handling operations and ship-to-ship replenishments. These procedures apply, too,
when there is any leakage of flammable materials (flashpoint >60° C) from a damaged container.

(1) (NU) Radar and Satellite Communications. Radar main beams and radiations from
other directional aerials of own or other ship must not illuminate fuelling points, fuelling rigs,
aircraft, vehicles or craft being fuelled, defuelled or replenished within 300 m for radars of average
power greater than 500 W and within 100 m at lower powers.

(2) (NU) Radio Communication (omnidirectional).

(a) (NU) Within 10 metres of fuelling point, fuelling rig or nearest point of aircraft vehicle or
craft being fuelled, or replenished, no transmissions at all from own or other ship are authorized.

(b) (NU) Between 10 and 30 metres, transmissions are allowed from own and other ship up to
250 W per transmitter (no limit to the number of transmitter).

(c) (NU) Above 30 metres, no restriction. Transmitters connected to a dummy load do not
cause RADHAZ risks and are not restricted by the above precautions.

6455–6459 Spare

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6460 (NU) (NMP) Safety Procedures for Submarines

(NC) (NMP) Procedures for preventing engagement of friendly forces are of critical importance and must
be conscientiously followed, especially within JAAs. Air and surface units shall not conduct ASW attacks
inside the JAA unless prior coordination has been conducted with the submarine per the procedures of
this chapter. Likewise, submarines shall employ ASW and ASUW weapons with due regard for friendly
surface units that may be operating within or in the vicinity of the JAA. Within a JAA, two types of
area—SGSA and NOTACK—are used to prevent inadvertent engagement of friendly submarines. SGSA
procedures allow rapid engagement of hostile submarines by other ASW platforms (with SGSA CA
permission) without having to BELLRING the friendly submarine, while NOTACK procedures allow
direct coordination between the friendly submarine and an attacking ASW platform. The two procedures
complement each other and maximise the operational flexibility of both submarines and other ASW
units.

6461 ASW Compensatory Allowances

a. (NU) For any ASW engagement, air and surface units shall apply a compensatory allowance which
minimises the risk of that weapon inadvertently entering an area containing a friendly submarine.

(NC) (NMP) Conceptually, a compensatory allowance is a weapons danger zone with a navigation
safety buffer which applies to SAA, JAA, activated SSL, MEADOW, NOTACK, and SGSA boundaries.

b. (NU) The weapon danger zone is based on the type of weapon, method of employment, run pattern,
and estimated acquisition range. This danger zone is not intended to be the maximum possible weapon
run, but an area which will protect the submarine from a properly operating weapon. Weapon danger
parameters are derived from ASW weapon employment publications, and may also be specified by
the ASWC.

c. (NU) Submarines shall remain clear of their area boundaries by at least their assessed navigation
error and take appropriate precautions to prevent its own ASW weapons from endangering friendly
submarines and surface units.

d. (NU) Figure 6-8 illustrates compensatory allowances.

ASW weapons may be employed when the weapon

danger zone (B) lies completely outside the applicable
submarine area boundary and SURF/AIR self-assessed
navigation error (C).
Submarines operate
at a distance > their
self-assessed navigation
B
error (A) from the applicable A C
submarine area boundary.

A - SUB Self-Assessed Navigation Error

B - SURF/AIR Weapon Danger Zone
Applicable submarine area boundary C - SURF/AIR Self-Assessed Navigation Error

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 6-8. (NU) ASW Compensatory Allowances

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6462 (NU) (NMP) Submarine-Generated Search Area

(NC) (NMP) An SGSA (code name: BULLPEN) is a stationary, geographically defined area established
by the submarine commanding officer within a JAA in which the submarine will operate for a specified
period of time. While the SGSA is in effect, an SGSA coordinating authority/unit (SGSA CA) authorizes
and controls all nonsubmarine ASW attacks within the JAA (see Figure 6-9). The manner in which
SGSA procedures are implemented depends on whether the submarine is operating with a task group or
independently in cooperation with MPA or other land-based tactical aircraft in area operations. All voice
message formats associated with SGSA establishment, cancellation request, and JAA attack authorization
are found in APP-01.

a. (NC) (NMP) Definitions.

(1) (NC) (NMP) SGSA Coordinating Authority/Unit is the designated command or platform
that controls employment of air and surface ASW weapons within a JAA when SGSA procedures
are in effect. It is normally a command or platform with whom the submarine is conducting
coordinated operations.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Task Group Operations. When a submarine is operating with a task
group, a specified commander is to be designated as the SGSA coordinating authority. This
authority coordinates with the submarine regarding establishment of SGSAs and, when
ASW weapon employment is required by air/surface units, coordinates and authorizes ASW
engagements in the portion of the JAA that lies outside the SGSA. SGSA coordinating
authority responsibilities will normally be assigned to the SOCA. When ASW weapons are to
be employed and the submarine is inside the task group’s ASWC AOR, this should be the task
group’s ASWC. If delegated, these functions shall be performed by a responsible command in
the ASWC’s chain of command, normally no lower than a sector ASWC.

TGSA
Task Group Submarine Area

ASWFA
ASW Free Area ASW attacks – All ASW weapons authorised
(within RoE)

JTAA
Joint Action Area SGSA
Only ONE friendly Submarine Generated Search Area
submarine within JTAA ASW attacks:
by Surf/Air Require authorisation
by Submarine authorised
- all ASW weapons authorised outside NOTACK
Area
ASW

SM must remain inside

SGSA but may launch ASW NOTACK
weapons into the remainder
ASW attacks of the JTAA
- Prohibited unless SGSA or NOTACK established
- Require authorisation outside an SGSA (by SGSA CA) 20
- all ASW weapons authorised outside NOTACK Area
kyds

SAA
Submarine Action Area SPA SPA
Submarine Patrol Area Submarine Patrol Area
SSL
ASW attacks Submarine Safety Lane
- by Surf/Air prohibited

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-9. (NU) (NMP) Submarine-Generated Search Area

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(b) (NC) (NMP) Area Operations. When a submarine not operating with a task group is
conducting coordinated operations with MPA or other land-based aircraft, a single on-station
aircraft shall act as the SGSA Coordinating Unit. Responsibilities are the same as for a task
group SGSA coordinating authority.

(2) (NC) (NMP) FREEWHEEL. FREEWHEEL is the code word used by an SGSA coordinating
authority to confirm cancellation of an SGSA. It is sent to the submarine only after verification that
no air or surface ASW attacks or engagements are in progress or authorized in the JAA and outside
an SGSA. Upon receipt, the submarine is free to manoeuvre throughout the JAA.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) SUB MUST REMAIN WITHIN SGSA, BUT MAY SHOOT
ASW WEAPONS INTO THE REMAINDER OF THE JAA.

b. (NC) (NMP) SGSA Utilization. Submarines are authorized to use SGSA procedures any time
when operating in a JAA. The submarine commanding officer is the final authority in the establishment
of an SGSA. During task group operations, he will do so, in liaison with the SGSA coordinating
authority, to meet task group requirements consistent with submarine safety and his ability to complete
assigned tasking. In this regard, any request or directive to a submarine to establish an SGSA should
provide sufficient rationale such that the commanding officer understands its intentions and can assess
and advise the SOCA on issues that may affect submarine safety. The SGSA may also be used for area
deconfliction purposes other than those strictly associated with ASW. Examples include:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Establishing a specified segment of a JAA required by a submarine for ASUW,
strike warfare, intelligence surveillance, special operations, etc.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Clearing a portion of a JAA for surface ship transit or emergent submerged
interference advisory event, aircraft emergency ordnance jettison, or live fire training exercises.

c. (NC) (NMP) SGSA Configuration.

(1) (NC) (NMP) SGSA Size and Location. The requirements of the task group and the
submarine’s search capability are the primary factors in determining SGSA size and location.
Creating an SGSA that is larger than the submarine can reasonably use for the performance of
its mission during the given time period may unnecessarily restrict employment of other assets.
Conversely, an SGSA that is too small or poorly situated may inhibit the ability of the submarine to
carry out assigned tasks and defeat the purpose of coordinated or cooperative operations altogether.

(2) (NC) (NMP) SGSA Boundary Definition. The SGSA is always defined by specific
geographic reference: latitude and longitude, grid, circle, or line. In addition to prescribing
derivatives of the standard methods, the OTC or SUBOPAUTH may establish other appropriate
means of identifying a specific SGSA; e.g., preplanned areas identified by number or code name.
When used, preplanned areas should overlap to allow creation of sequential SGSAs.

(3) (NC) (NMP) SGSA Duration. The effective period for an SGSA is defined using specific
start and stop times. Duration should normally be equal to or less than the submarine broadcast
cycle (usually 8 to 12 hours) but greater than 2 hours. If duration is longer than the communication
interval, the submarine is not required to communicate each cycle solely to confirm SGSA duration.

(a) (NC) (NMP) When operating with a task group and two-way communication with the
SGSA coordinating authority has been established, the submarine should obtain concurrence
to the SGSA before leaving communication depth to ensure that parameters conform to the
force’s operational requirements.

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(b) (NC) (NMP) To facilitate SGSA continuity, the submarine may set more than one SGSA
in a single establishment message so long as only one SGSA is effective at a time. Similarly, a
SGSA stop time may be set to overlap the next tactical communications window.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Submarines shall specify a stop time for SGSA duration. The term
“Until further notice” shall not be used in order to prevent confusion which could result if
communications with the SGSA coordinating authority are lost prior to JAA expiration.

(d) (NC) (NMP) In area operations, the SGSA expiration time should be no later than the MPA
off-station time (includes the period of continuous on-station relief aircraft). This is to preclude
periods when the JAA outside the SGSA would not be covered by either submarine or MPA.

(e) (NC) (NMP) The SGSA coordinating authority may cancel an SGSA at any time. The
submarine may initiate the cancellation procedure by sending an SGSA cancellation request
message (see APP-01). Once the SGSA expires or is cancelled, the entire original JAA reverts
to an area in which non-submarine launched ASW attacks are prohibited unless a NOTACK
area is established by the friendly submarine (see Figure 6-5).

(4) (NC) (NMP) Prescheduled SGSAs. Use of prescheduled (suggested) SGSAs can be
used by the OTC for the coordination of ASW and WSM schemes; however, these prescheduled
(suggested) SGSAs have no status, nor do they become effective until the SGSA is established by
the submarine via the SGSA establishment message (see APP-01 for message format).

d. (NC) (NMP) Coordinating Authority/Unit Requirements. A submarine shall coordinate

with only one on-scene task group SGSA coordinating authority or area operations SGSA coordinating
unit at a time. The SGSA coordinating authority/unit shall maintain a plot showing the location and
start and stop times of each SGSA and an engagement authorization log listing the attacking unit,
location, and expiration time for use in coordinating and responding to attack requests.

e. (NC) (NMP) SGSA Establishment. SGSAs are to be established with the SGSA coordinating
authority using the message format in APP-01. Messages are normally sent via designated tactical
circuits and may be included in routine submarine SITREPs. Use of submarine satellite information
exchange subsystem (SSIXS) by submarines so equipped is also allowable during task group
operations. SUBOPAUTH should immediately relay such messages sent via SSIXS to the SGSA
coordinating authority by the fastest means possible. Once the submarine transmits an SGSA
establishment message, it shall not leave the SGSA until the area either expires or is cancelled. This
includes situations in which no acknowledgement of the SGSA establishment message is received.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Task Group Operations. A submarine operating with a task group shall
establish the SGSA with the SGSA coordinating authority, who may then authorize ASW attacks.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Area Operations. AIR/SUB cooperation procedures, per ATP-28, Vol. I, are
used in coordinated area operations. An on-station aircraft in the JAA acts as the SGSA coordinating
unit. Note that for area operations, SGSA procedures are executed by the submarine with a single
on-station aircraft, which is to coordinate and authorize all attacks outside the SGSA—its own as
well as those of other ASW aircraft. This duty may be turned over to a relieving aircraft.

f. (NC) (NMP) SGSA Cancellation Procedure. To terminate an SGSA, the submarine must
send an SGSA cancellation request message to the SGSA coordinating authority. The message should
be sent via tactical communications. Use of SSIXS is also allowable during task group operations. If
SSIXS is used the SUBOPAUTH should immediately relay such messages to the SGSA coordinating

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authority by the fastest means possible. Upon receipt of an SGSA cancellation request message, the
SGSA coordinating authority shall verify from the SGSA plot and attack authorization log that no
ASW attacks have been authorized outside the SGSA and inside the submarine’s JAA.

(1) (NC) (NMP) If no ASW attacks have been authorized, the SGSA coordinating authority shall
concur with SGSA cancellation request for concurrence message (brevity word freewheel). Once
the submarine has received “freewheel” it may operate anywhere in the JAA.

(2) (NC) (NMP) If ASW attacks have been authorized, the SGSA coordinating authority shall
acknowledge receipt of the submarine’s message and advise that engagements are or may be
in progress outside the SGSA (specify location). Only after all ASW attack authorizations have
been cancelled or completed can the SGSA coordinating authority/unit concur with an SGSA
cancellation request.
NOTES
• (NC) (NMP) THE SUBMARINE SHALL NOT LEAVE ITS SGSA UNTIL
IN RECEIPT OF CANCELLATION REQUEST CONCURRENCE
MESSAGE (BREVITY WORD FREEWHEEL) FROM THE SGSA
COORDINATING AUTHORITY PER MESSAGE FORMAT IN
APP-01, OR UNTIL THE STOP TIME OF THE SGSA.
• (NC) (NMP) AFTER THE SGSA IS CANCELLED, THE SGSA
COORDINATING AUTHORITY SHALL NOT AUTHORIZE ASW
ATTACKS INSIDE THE JAA UNTIL A NEW NOTACK AREA OR
SGSA HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE FRIENDLY SUBMARINE..

g. (NC) (NMP) Use of SLOT Buoys. At the submarine commanding officer’s discretion, an SGSA
establishment message may be sent by SLOT buoy provided communications have previously been
established with the SGSA coordinating authority/unit. The message must include an encoded position
element that must be check decoded on the submarine before the buoy is released. SGSA messages
passed by SLOT buoy need not be acknowledged until the two-way communications opportunity if
the SGSA is still in force. SLOT buoys shall not be used to cancel an existing SGSA.

h. (NC) (NMP) SGSA Modification. SGSAs shall not be modified. Changing an existing or
pre-established SGSA requires cancelling the existing or pre-established SGSA and establishing a
new one.

i. (NC) (NMP) SGSA Cancellation by the SGSA Coordinating Authority. When the SGSA
coordinating authority desires to cancel an SGSA, he must first ensure that no attacks have been
authorized outside the SGSA and inside the submarine’s JAA. Once verified, the SGSA coordinating
authority shall inform the submarine of SGSA cancellation via local communications or advise the
SUBOPAUTH to relay the cancellation on the submarine broadcast.

j. (NC) (NMP) SGSA Attack Rules. Attack rules associated with SGSA procedures apply only
within JAAs and are not applicable to SAAs and ASWFAs. NOTACK area procedures always apply
inside an SGSA and throughout the JAA whenever an SGSA has not been established by the submarine.
Unless a NOTACK area is in effect, the SGSA coordinating authority/unit alone must grant permission
before any air or surface ASW engagements are conducted within a JAA. Units desiring to conduct an
attack will request attack authorization subject to the following:

(1) (NC) (NMP) If an SGSA has not been established or the target is inside the SGSA, the SGSA
coordinating authority/unit shall positively deny the request, provide the last-known position and
intentions of the submarine, and direct that a NOTACK area be coordinated with the submarine
prior to ASW weapon release.

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(2) (NC) (NMP) If an SGSA has been established and the contact is within the JAA but outside
the SGSA, the SGSA coordinating authority/unit shall transmit SGSA coordinates and stop time to
the requesting unit and may authorize engagement. If the coordinates along with the serial number
or code name of the SGSA currently in effect have already been passed to the attacking platform,
only the serial number/code name and stop time need be transmitted. The attacking platform, in
addition to the SGSA coordinating authority, must verify that the target is in the portion of the JAA
that is outside the SGSA. Compensatory allowances must be considered in determining whether an
attack can safely be made if the target is in the vicinity of the SGSA boundary.

(3) (NC) (NMP) In that SGSA parameters are set or cancelled by the submarine with an SGSA
coordinating authority/unit, the details of the SGSA geographic position may or may not be an
aircrew preflight briefing item. In any event, SGSA location and attack authorization must be
obtained from the SGSA coordinating authority/Unit before any air or surface ASW weapons are
released inside a JAA.

k. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft-to-Aircraft SGSA Handover During Area Operations.

Figure 6-10 defines the rules for handing over SGSA from one SGSA coordinating unit to another
during area operations. It applies specifically to situations in which an on-station MPA is being
relieved by another aircraft during independent AIR/SUB cooperation. These rules do not apply
during associated support, direct support, or integrated submarine operations.

6463 (NU) (NMP) NOTACK Area

a. (NC) (NMP) NOTACK Area Specified. In certain circumstances, it is desirable to use other
force assets to prosecute contacts within the JAA or SGSA. Protection of the friendly submarine is
maintained by establishing a smaller, stationary area within the JAA or SGSA around the submarine,
known as the NOTACK area. The protected submarine is the only unit authorized to release ASW
weapons within this area. Establishment of a NOTACK area requires a relative plot lock between
the submarine and another unit, so that navigation inaccuracies are reduced over a short period of
time, and so that positive identification of a submerged contact as a nonfriendly submarine can be
established. Unless otherwise specified by the submarine, a NOTACK area has a 10-nm radius and
exists for a period of 2 hours (unless cancelled by the submarine). Attack rules for NOTACK areas
within JAAs and SGSAs are illustrated in Figure 6-11.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) ONLY THE SUBMARINE MAY ESTABLISH A NOTACK

AREA IN ITS JAA OR SGSA.

b. (NC) (NMP) Requesting a NOTACK Area. A request to establish a NOTACK area will be
signalled to the submarine by any means available that has been authorized by the OTC. Careful
consideration should be given to the method used in order to maximise the ability of the submarine to
remain as covert as possible. In addition to two-way communications, other methods of transmitting
the request are PROBE ALERT/ATAC/long-range call up (LRCU), SUS/ESUS, and keyed sonar.

c. (NC) (NMP) Submarine Responsibility in Establishing a NOTACK Area. The submarine

will acknowledge a NOTACK area request by either:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Establishing a NOTACK area, or

(2) (NC) (NMP) Informing the ASW unit of own intentions to prosecute the contact.

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Valid SGSA YES

> 60 minutes
remaining?

NO

ACFT to
NO ACFT Comms YES
Established?

SUB SGSA MSG

NO passed from YES
OFFSTA ACFT to
ONSTA ACFT?

NO SGSA
Readback
Correct?

YES

ASW WEAPONS PROHIBITED SGSA VALID

ASW aircraft await RDVU/ ASW aircraft may attack

Comms with SUB or execute outside SGSA (plus
NOTACK BELLRINGER procedures. Compensatory Allowance)
but inside the JAA per
SGSA procedures.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-10. (NU) (NMP) Air-to-Air SGSA Handover During Area Operations

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JAA OR SGSA
SURF/AIR/SUB: All ASW Weapons Authorized Outside NOTACK Area.
Inside NOTACK Area, Only SUB ASW Weapons Are Authorized.

NOTACK

NOTE: SUB must remain within NOTACK area but may shoot ASW
weapons into the remainder of the JAA/SGSA.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-11. (NU) (NMP) NOTACK Area

d. (NC) (NMP) NOTACK Area Procedures.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Establishing a NOTACK Area. The submarine may use two-way UHF voice
or a SLOT buoy to establish a NOTACK area. The former requires the submarine to come to
communication (periscope) depth and establish two-way communications with the requesting unit
on assigned ASW coordination frequencies. This may degrade the submarine’s ability to continue
its search/prosecution of a contact it may hold.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Announcing. The submarine must announce the initiation time and its position
using the NOTACK message format in APP-01.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Remaining in the Area. The submarine must remain within the NOTACK
area.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Scene-of-Action Commander. The submarine will be the SAC for the water
space within the NOTACK area.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Size of the NOTACK Area. Since NOTACK area rules preclude attacks
within the NOTACK area by other than the submarine, the submarine may elect to adjust the size
of the area to other than the standard 10 nm radius.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) A NOTACK AREA DOES NOT MOVE. IF THE SUBMARINE

MUST COMPENSATE FOR INTENDED MOVEMENT DURING
NOTACK AREA DURATION, A LARGER NOTACK AREA SHOULD
BE SPECIFIED.

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(6) (NC) (NMP) Changing a NOTACK Area. The submarine may elect to change the time,
location, or dimension of a NOTACK area. This is accomplished by cancelling the old NOTACK
area and establishing a new NOTACK area.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Cancelling the NOTACK Area. The submarine may cancel a NOTACK
area at any time. Acknowledgement of the cancellation by the ASW unit is required before the
submarine may depart the NOTACK area.

e. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft Responsibility in Establishing a NOTACK Area. ASW aircraft

which request a NOTACK area must:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Mark-on-top the submarine or the SLOT buoy and establish a plot lock.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) PLOT LOCK MAY BE CONSIDERED ESTABLISHED

IF THE AIRCRAFT’S POSITION IS POSITIVELY CONFIRMED TO
THE AIRCRAFT BY THE SUBMARINE, WHETHER OR NOT THE
AIRCRAFT IS ABLE TO MARK-ON-TOP.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Ensure that the time and position passed by the submarine equate to the checksum
digit provided for each.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) AN INCORRECT CHECKSUM INVALIDATES THE

NOTACK MESSAGE AND A NEW REQUEST TO ESTABLISH A
NOTACK AREA MUST BE INITIATED.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Plot and maintain the NOTACK area for its specified duration.
(4) (NC) (NMP) Add weapon stand-off distance to the radius of the NOTACK area.
(5) (NC) (NMP) Add navigational drift error for the aircraft.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) ANY ELEMENT ABOVE THAT IS MISSING OR

CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED RESULTS IN AUTOMATIC
CANCELLATION OF THE AUTHORIZATION TO ATTACK WITHIN
THE JAA, AND A REQUEST FOR A NEW NOTACK AREA MUST BE
INITIATED.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Once these conditions are met, ASW attacks may be conducted against targets in
the remainder of the JAA or SGSA outside the NOTACK area.

f. (NC) (NMP) Coordinated Aircraft/Surface Unit Attacks. A situation may exist in which
other ASW units are in position to launch an attack against an enemy submarine within a submarine
JAA or SGSA. Thus, the attacking platform may be other than the one marking-on-top the submarine.
In this case, the SAC is the unit conducting the plot lock with the submarine and the SAC must ensure
that the requirements above are met.

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g. (NC) (NMP) NOTACK Area Message. The specific message format is for voice, but the same
procedure is applicable for recorded communications with the appropriate modifications.

(1) (NC) (NMP) If a NOTACK area message is received via two-way voice, the aircraft should
read back for verification. If a SLOT buoy is used, the establishment message should be recorded
twice using a 30-second interval to enable the aircraft to copy without a delay. Additionally,
the SLOT buoy message must be independently copied by two separate crew members with an
identical match of message content.

(2) (NC) (NMP) NOTACK message format and procedures are given in APP-01.

h. (NC) (NMP) Use of Satellite Positioning System. In lieu of establishing a relative plot
lock, a geographic plot lock (i.e., the passing of a submarine’s position to the cooperating unit) is
permissible provided both the aircraft and submarine are equipped with fully functional satellite
positioning systems (e.g., GPS). During NOTACK establishment, the submarine shall use the brevity
word “GLOBAL” to indicate that its position has been established with GPS.

6464 Safety Lanes

(NU) Safety lanes are used to facilitate submarine and surface ship operations. Rules governing actions
within activated submarine and surface ship safety lanes follow.
a. (NU) Submarine Safety Lanes. SSLs are available as a set of lanes superimposed on a grid,
or geographically described, and may be activated wholly or in part by message. SSLs may be used
to prevent or minimise mutual interference among friendly submarines, ships and aircraft. Offensive
operations within activated SSLs are limited as follows:

(1) (NU) Aircraft. ASW attacks are prohibited.

(2) (NU) Surface Ships. ASW attacks are prohibited.

(NC) (NMP) Procedures for use when surface forces require access to an SAA are described in
Article 6434. OPERATION GRASSHOPPER or designation as a JAA is not applicable to SSLs.

(3) (NU) Submarines. A submarine in an SSL shall not attack another submarine unless it is
positively identified as enemy.

b. (NU) Surface Ship Safety Lanes. Offensive operations within a surface ship safety lane are
limited so that surface ships will not be attacked while in the lanes unless they are positively identified
as enemy or unless they commit a hostile act. Attacks on aircraft and submarines will be governed by the
designation of the surrounding zone or area. Cartel ships, enemy hospital ships, and neutral shipping may
be routed along surface ship safety lanes.
(NC) (NMP) However, surface ship moving havens are more appropriate for the previously mentioned
vessels.

6465 Command Relationships of Transiting Submarines

(NU) The OTC of all escorted submarine moves is normally the escort commander. In the case of
unescorted moves or when the submarines part company with the escort for any reason, the senior
submarine commander present shall assume the duties of OTC. The commander of an area through
which submarines are transiting will provide routing instructions for the SUBOPAUTH.
6466 Responsibility to Assist Disabled Submarines

(NU) Any friendly ship or aircraft meeting a disabled friendly submarine is to make every effort, so far
as circumstances permit, to ensure the subsequent safe passage of the submarine.

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6468–6469 Spare

6470 Special Precautions for Submarine Operations in Peacetime

(NU) This section contains additional procedures for promulgating NATO submarine movement
information. It also provides a system that meets the requirements for an orderly transition from peace
to war. The primary reason for accurate and timely promulgation of submarine movement information is
to prevent submerged mutual interference. Secondary reasons are to provide information for intelligence
plots so that submarine contact reports may be properly evaluated and to establish a search area in case
of SUBLOOK/SUBMISS/SUBSINK based on the routing information given in the SUBNOTE.
6471 Submarine Movements

a. (NU) Authorities. Authorities who have responsibilities with regard to submarine movements
are the SUBOPAUTHs, SMAAs, and submarine exercise area coordinator (SEACs).

(NU) Allied nations are responsible for informing relevant SMAAs about those national submarine
exercise areas which have been established permanently as agreed by the nations concerned and
are under the control of SEACs. SMAAs are responsible for monitoring submarine and VDS ship
movements and for informing SEACs, SUBOPAUTHs, and units concerned of possible mutual
interference. NATO SMAAs have no authority to control submarine movements. The procedures
required below will neither infringe on national prerogatives, infringe on the freedom of the sea, nor
release submarine commanders from their responsibilities regarding the International Law of the Seas.
They do place a moral obligation on all Allied SUBOPAUTHs to declare accurately their submarine
operations and in sufficient time to permit the widest promulgation to “need to know” addressees.

b. (NU) SUBNOTE Procedures. Submarines are routed in peace and in war by means of
SUBNOTEs that must clearly and accurately define the route to be followed.

(NR) (NMP) Details are in this section and APP-11.

c. (NU) Notice of Intention. When exercises are being planned it may be considered advisable
to establish a temporary submarine exercise area and/or to promulgate the intended track of the
submarine well in advance. This should be done by issuing an intention message to appropriate
addressees in advance of promulgating a SUBNOTE. This message should state the limits of the area
and the duration of its use and/or intended track.
(NR) (NMP) Details are in APP-11.

d. (NU) Diving Restrictions. It is assumed that the submarine will proceed along its promulgated
track dived. Those portions of the route that must be transited surfaced are to be specified in the
SUBNOTE. Should it be necessary to route the submarine dived through permanently established
exercise areas, the provisions of Article 6472 apply.

6472 Action on Suspected Mutual Interference

a. (NU) Outside Established Submarine Exercise Areas. The SMAA will advise
SUBOPAUTHs as soon as interference is suspected. However, an interference situation may become
evident to SUBOPAUTHs concerned as soon as SUBNOTEs or changes thereto are promulgated, in
which case they should initiate action to eliminate the suspected interference situation without waiting
for a message from the SMAA. There are no set parameters for determining when an interference
situation is deemed to exist, and the good judgement of the authorities involved will determine the
necessary action.
(NR) (NMP) As a minimum, however, interference should be considered to exist when the edge of
a MHN, SPA, or temporary exercise area is within five miles of another MHN, SPA, or temporary
exercise area.

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b. (NU) Inside Permanently Established Submarine Exercise Areas. The SEAC will be
best informed concerning the movements of his own submarines within an established exercise area.
On receipt of information of a submarine transiting through the permanent exercise area, the SEAC
is, if interference is possible, to recommend avoiding action to the SUBOPAUTH involved, keeping
the SMAA informed.

c. (NU) Inside Temporarily Established Submarine Exercise Areas. The commander

establishing a temporary submarine exercise area by a notice of intention will be best informed
concerning the movements of exercise submarines within the area. On receipt of information of a
nonexercise submarine transiting through the temporary exercise area, the SMAA is responsible for
advising the commander who established the area and the appropriate SUBOPAUTH. The commander
who established the area is to decide if interference is likely and to recommend to the appropriate
SUBOPAUTH, keeping the SMAA informed, whether or not avoiding action is required.

6473 Operations Inherently Dangerous to Subsurface Operations

a. (NU) Various peacetime operations scheduled by surface and air commanders are inherently
dangerous to submerged submarine passage when the whereabouts of the submarines are unknown to
these commanders. Such operations include:

(1) (NU) Streaming/deployment of VDS, minesweeping or minehunting gear, or other underwater

devices/bodies including helicopter dipping sonars.

(2) (NU) Scheduling of live air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, or antisubmarine weapon firings.

(3) (NU) Hydrographic survey explosive ranging.

(4) (NU) Naval mine warfare operations.

b. (NU) Recipients of SUBNOTEs should further disseminate submarine movement information to

those authorities normally involved in scheduling these operations in order to avoid mutual interference.

c. (NU) It is incumbent on surface and air commanders to send a message to the appropriate authorities
informing them of their intent to schedule operations which may be inherently dangerous to submerged
operations. In the case of surface ships streaming VDS or other towed underwater devices/bodies,
the requirements of Article 6480 shall be followed. Naval mine warfare operations are described in
Article 6481. In all other cases the SUBDANGER format from APP-11 should be used. In the case of
live weapon firings, the time and geographic area involved should be included. Commands scheduling
hydrographic survey explosive ranging operations should include track information, SOA, times for
explosive ranging, and size and detonation depth of charges to be used.

d. (NU) Operations inherently dangerous to submerged submarines are frequently undertaken by

civil authorities. These operations require separate consideration by authorities with responsibility for
submarine safety.

e. (NU) Maritime unmanned systems (MUS) carry out military operations or civilian activities
controlled by civil/military authorities. For prevention of mutual interference all underwater MUS
activities should be reflected in the corresponding underwater plots in order to ensure the safety of
subsurface operations.

(1) (NU) For any underwater MUS military operations, an UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE
message format is available to declare those operations. An appropriate UNDERWATER OBJECT
NOTE message is to be sent to the responsible SMAA at least 48 hours before commencing the
operation.

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(2) (NU) For underwater MUS civilian activities such as surveys, research or observations etc.; a
SUBDANGER message should be distributed to the appropriate SMAA by military authorities that
gained information by respective civilian messages like NOTMAR, HYDROLANT or NAVTEX
warning.

(3) (NU) The responsible SMAA should consider any deployment of an underwater MUS as a
hazard to subsurface operations.

6474 (NU) (NMP) Action at Time of Increased Tension

a. (NC) (NMP) Wartime procedures will be implemented when ordered by a strategic commander
or his designated subordinate. They will also be implemented at NATO Reinforced Alert. Timely
implementation of WSM procedures, which should be in force shortly after NATO Simple Alert is
declared or earlier, will facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime procedures.

b. (NC) (NMP) The order will be promulgated in time of tension when a greater than normal number
of submarines of NATO nations have begun deployment and when some of these submarines have
been transferred to NATO command and control. In a situation in which a submarine is operating in
a stationary MHN (i.e., at speed zero), or in a differently shaped MHN that is not moving, the MHN
will be confined to the specified area in which the submarine is operating at the time of execution of
the order. When the SUBNOTE in effect has the submarine scheduled to remain in a stationary MHN
for an extended period of time, it is incumbent upon the SUBOPAUTH to issue an amendment to the
SUBNOTE which changes the MHN to the standard wartime size and delineates clearly how it is
to be oriented. When the submarine is operating within a published local submarine exercise area at
the time the order is to be executed, the local exercise area in which the submarine is operating will
become an MHN until such time as the submarine departs the exercise area and a normal MHN is in
effect. MHNs are described in detail in Article 6434.

c. (NC) (NMP) The order will contain a time of execution and will be promulgated well in advance
so that authorities and submarines can take appropriate action at the same time. Normally a new
SUBNOTE should be issued to reflect the change in area and to reflect the different addressees.

d. (NC) (NMP) BARNSTORM procedures in ATP-18 are the preferred means of promulgating
specific submarine area assignments, once WSM procedures are in force.

6475–6479 Spare

6480 Prevention of Mutual Interference Between Submerged Submarines and Surface

Ships with Towed Acoustic Devices Streamed or Helicopter Dipping Sonar

a. (NU) Safety measures prescribed below shall be enforced to prevent mutual interference between
submerged submarines and surface ships with VDS, DTAS, and critical angle towed-array system
(CATAS) devices streamed or helicopter dipping sonar (HDS) when operating in nonexercise
situations in peacetime. This coordination is required to enhance safety and surveillance coverage,
and avoid conflicts of interest, but is not intended to prejudice national prerogatives or inhibit freedom
of the seas.

b. (NU) Even if HDS are considered as “soft” sonar systems for the purposes of PMI (e.g., they may
be employed in the same depth zone as submarine as described in AXP-01), they remain dangerous
devices and must be declared by UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE to the appropriate SMAA at least
48 hours before to be lowered to optimum depth.

NOTE
(NU) TOWED TORPEDO DECOYS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THESE
REQUIREMENTS.

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(1) (NU) Submarine commanding officers must assume that all ships which are operating sonar
have streamed a towed acoustic device unless positively known otherwise and that ships do
not know the submarine’s position. A submarine hearing sonar transmissions or other signals is
to remain clear, keeping in mind that the subject unit may be trailing an acoustic device up to
4,000 yards astern. A surface ship with contact on a friendly submarine must keep his ship and
towed array clear of the submarine.

(2) (NU) VDS may be employed in the active or passive mode. No active sonar transmissions or
other signals are required, provided the response to the VDS/DTAS NOTE has been received from
the SMAA.
(NC) (NMP) If the towing ship departs the MHN and the transducer cannot be recovered, the
towing ship is to provide a warning signal on some other acoustic device, such as hull-mounted
sonar or underwater telephone (UWT).

(3) (NU) VDS/DTAS Safety Precautions

(a) (NU) The VDS/DTAS NOTE described below is required for safety whenever a VDS/
DTAS device is to be streamed to a depth greater than 30 metres (98 feet). An UNDERWATER
OBJECT NOTE is also required for operations at 30 metres (98 feet) or less when:

i. (NU) The water depth is less than 375 metres (1,200 feet).

ii. (NU) Operation within 40 nautical miles of the Norwegian coast.

iii. (NU) Operation in the Aegean Sea north of Crete.

iv. (NU) Operation in the French national exercise areas.

(b) (NU) The required UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE is to be sent to the appropriate SMAA
at least 48 hours before commencing the operation. Upon receipt of the UNDERWATER
OBJECT NOTE, the SMAA is to send a message to the originator of the UNDERWATER
OBJECT NOTE confirming that there is no safety hazard. If a risk of collision between
the VDAS/DTAS and a submarine is apparent, the SMAA will advise those concerned and
request that appropriate action be taken to eliminate the hazard. VDS and DTAS are not to be
streamed until the ship is in receipt of the SMAA confirmation message, except as noted in
paragraph (5).
(NR) (NMP) UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE is sent using the message format in APP-11.

(c) (NU) Once the confirmation message is received, the ship may employ VDS/ DTAS in the
active or passive mode and no active sonar transmission or other warning signals are required.
(NC) (NMP) If the towing ship departs MHN and the system cannot be recovered, the towing
ship is to provide a warning signal on sonar or UWT, as described in AXP-01, Allied Submarine
and Antisubmarine Exercise Manual, unless otherwise specified by the SMAA.

(4) (NU) A ship planning to stream a CATAS at depths greater than 30 metres (98 feet) is to send a
UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE, using the message format in APP-11, to the appropriate SMAA
at least 48 hours before commencement of the operation. Upon the receipt of the UNDERWATER
OBJECT NOTE, the SMAA is to send a reply to the originator of the UNDERWATER OBJECT
NOTE acknowledging receipt. In the acknowledgement, the SMAA may include advice on other
units conducting surveillance in the area or advice on best placement of the sensor for minimizing
mutual interference and avoiding duplication of effort. Upon receipt of the acknowledgement,
and after considering the SMAA’s advice, the ship may stream its CATAS as stated in the
UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE. If the towing ship departs the UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE
area and the system cannot be recovered, the towing ship is to provide warning on sonar or UWT,
as described in the Sonar Signal Code Table of AXP-01, at least once every five minutes unless
otherwise specified by the SMAA.

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(5) (NC) (NMP) Urgent Contact Investigation. When a ship is required to conduct an urgent
investigation and time does not permit completion of the procedures in paragraphs (3) and (4)
above, VDS/DTAS or CATAS may be used but a UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE should be
dispatched by IMMEDIATE precedence message. The initial submarine contact report to national
or NATO authorities must contain a statement that VDS/DTAS or CATAS is being employed.
During investigation of unclassified contacts, ships streaming towed acoustic devices should not
deliberately close the contact within 4,000 yards. When a contact has been classified as “not a
NATO or known friendly” submarine by the appropriate SUBOPAUTHs, investigation forces
should employ all acoustic devices in a manner to exploit their maximum capability for contact
investigation. When a contact has been classified as “a NATO or known friendly” submarine,
unless otherwise instructed, the ship is to break contact.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Wartime Procedures.

(a) (NC) (NMP) UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTES are not required provided wartime
procedures have been implemented and waterspace management procedures are in force.
(See Articles 6434 through 6436 and 6474.)

(b) (NC) (NMP) The use of VDS/DTAS or CATAS systems is unrestricted in ASWFAs.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Surface ships passing through an SAA or JAA (other than one established
for their use) must retrieve their VDS/DTAS systems unless GRASSHOPPER is in force. In a
CATAS system that is considered a hazard to certain classes of submarine, the SUBOPAUTH
will advise of any requirement to retrieve CATAS. CATAS-fitted ships must recognize the
possibility of damage or loss unless the system is retrieved.

(d) (NC) (NMP) The restrictions in subparagraph (c) above also apply to surface ships in a
JAA established for their use, unless clearance has been received from the SUBOPAUTH. The
use of VDS/DTAS or CATAS systems and any restrictions that may apply should be negotiated
between the surface force commander and the SUBOPAUTH when a JAA is established.

6481 Prevention of Mutual Interference Between Mine Warfare Activities and

Submarines

a. (NU) The procedures for PMI/WSM between NMW activities and submarines are for use whenever
NMW equipment (for example, mines, remotely operated vehicles, autonomous underwater vehicles
(AUVs), minesweeping gear, VDS, etc.) is physically deployed at depths below 30 metres, as follows:

(1) (NU) In international waters and in areas outside of the nationally declared permanent exercise
areas detailed in AHP-06 (see Note).

(2) (NU) In areas where WSM has been implemented.

NOTE

(NU) PROCEDURES FOR PMI WITHIN PERMANENT EXERCISE

AREAS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NATIONAL
SUBMARINE EXERCISE AREA COORDINATOR. NATIONAL
SEACS ARE ENCOURAGED TO PROMULGATE PROCEDURES
FOR PMI BETWEEN MINE WARFARE ACTIVITIES AND
SUBMARINES WITHIN THEIR PERMANENT EXERCISE AREAS
TO NATIONS EXERCISING IN THESE AREAS.

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b. (NU) Peacetime Procedures.

(1) (NU) The exercise coordinator should submit a WSM request to the SUBOPAUTH as far
in advance of the planned operation/exercise as possible. The format for the WSM request is
contained in APP-11.

(2) (NU) The SUBOPAUTH SMAA will check for potential interference with other assets,
resolving interference through liaison with the affected parties. He will issue a WSM Status and
Allocation Message when interference is not present or has been resolved.

(3) (NU) The Submarine Movement Advisory Authority will then inform submarines under his
OPCON, or inform other SUBOPAUTHs using the SMAA system, of NMW activities in areas
adjacent to submarine operating areas or moving havens.

(4) (NU) NMW assets are responsible not to engage in NMW activities that may interfere with
submarines outside of the area or range of operations described in the UNDERWATER (UW)
OBJECT NOTE.

c. (NC) (NMP) Wartime Procedures or When WSM Has Been Implemented. When WSM
has been implemented, assigning requested areas for MW activities will be in the WSM Status and
Allocation Message. Promulgation of this message constitutes the acknowledgement detailed at
Article 6481.b.(2).

d. (NU) Coordination. In general UW OBJECT NOTES should be promulgated by the tasking

authority as far in advance of the planned operation as possible. If potential interference is discovered,
it will be resolved through liaison between the SMAA/SUBOPAUTH and the NMW tasking authority.
Sufficient lead time is required to allow potential interference to be resolved in a manner acceptable
to all parties. Interference that cannot be resolved through this liaison will be forwarded to a superior
commander for resolution. Notwithstanding this, UW OBJECT NOTES must be promulgated no less
than 48 hours prior to the planned operation to allow the SMAA and/or affected SUBOPAUTH time
to inform and, if necessary, reroute the submarine to avoid interference. This period is due to delays
inherent in the submarine communications broadcast system.

e. (NU) Messages. The format for the UNDERWATER OBJECT NOTE is detailed in APP-11.

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SECTION V—CONTACT PROSECUTION

6500 ASW Airplans, Attack and Support Methods, and Ship Plans

(NU) Table 6-15 lists the plan number, purpose, and publication location for detailed information on
ASW airplans, attack and support methods, and search plans.
6501 Surface Ship Search, Attack and Support Plans

(NU) Figures 6-12 through 6-14 describe general search, attack, and support plans available for use by
ships or by ships and helicopters. While these plans are designed specifically for ASW actions, many of
them have other applications as well. When helicopters are used, the letter H is added as a suffix to the
plan number.
(NU) Details on coordinated operations at the scene of an ASW action are provided in Chapter 12 and
ATP-28, Vol. I.
6502 Airplans

(NU) Figures 6-15 through 6-19 describe search plans designed specifically for use by aircraft conducting
ASW and surface search missions. ASW airplans are described in ATP-28, Vol. I.

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Table 6-15. (NU) ASW Airplans, Attack and Support Methods, and Search Plans

Plan Purpose Publication

(NU) (NMP) Airplans—Fixed-Wing Aircraft/HELOs
1 A close search designed for use by one aircraft to ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
investigate a bearing.
2 A close search designed for use by one aircraft to ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
investigate a datum or contact.
3 An airplan designed for use by one aircraft to provide a ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
barrier along a given line either fixed geographically or
relative to a force.
4 An airplan used to search relative to a force. ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
5 An airplan for use by one aircraft to search an area of ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
any size or shape.
(NU) (NMP) Airplans—Dipping HELOs
41, 42, 43 Airplans designed to investigate a bearing or a small ATP-28, Vol. I, Annex 9B
area with two or more helicopters.

44 A lost contact or datum search for use by two, three, or ATP-28, Vol. I, Annex 9B
four helicopters.

45 An airplan intended for use when one or more ATP-28, Vol. I, Annex 9B
helicopters are available to establish a barrier.

46 A helicopter search plan for use when one or more ATP-28, Vol. I, Annex 9B
helicopters are to be used on random search of a
geographical area.

47 A lost contact search for two helicopters. ATP-28, Vol. I, Annex 9B

48 A datum sector search designed for two helicopters ATP-28, Vol. I, Annex 9B
against submarine speeds up to 20 knots and time late
up to 15 minutes.

Attack and Support Methods

(NU) (NMP) 1. Line of bearing support for a close ASW action. ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
11AH Bear 2. Stand-off attack from a definite direction.

14AH Cordon 1. Sector support for a close ASW action. ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
2. Stand-off attack in sectors.
3. Circular attack in zone.
Search Plans
14SH Cordon A sector search around a datum, involving one or more ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
ships and/or helicopters.

1S Oak Tree Area search, intercept search, lost contact search, or ATP-01, Vol. I, Chap 6
bottom search by two or more ships.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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ATTACK, SUPPORT, AND LOST CONTACT METHOD

14AH/14SH CORDON

a. (NU) Plan CORDON is composed of sec- established, units are to remain in their existing
tors 0–8, centered on a contact or datum, as per the sectors unless otherwise ordered by the SAC.
diagram below. In PLAN RED CORDON, Sector
e. (NU) The SAC is to order:
Zero will default to the METFR as promulgated by
the ASWC. METFR will also apply to Sector Zero (1) (NU) Sector assignments. Units
when executing PLAN BLACK CORDON. However, may be designated multiple sectors providing
when using PLAN BLACK CORDON, the SAC must they are adjacent to one another. Not all sectors
also consider the age of the datum when assigning must be assigned.
the radius of Sector Zero. Over time, this will result in
(2) (NU) Radius of sector zero, if other
a Sector Zero larger than METFR.
than the default due to mission priority (i.e., detec-
b. (NU) Units have freedom of movement tion, engaged in operations other than war, etc.).
within assigned sectors but they must not approach
(3) (NU) Reassignment of sectors as
within 500 yards of adjacent occupied sectors. The
the tactical situation requires.
inner limit of sectors 1–8 is the boundary of sector
zero, and there are no outer limits.
Notes:
c. (NU) When employed as an ATTACK
AND/OR SUPPORT PLAN, CORDON allows ships 1. (NU) SACs may order a range or
and helicopters the freedom of manoeuvre within distance with sector assignments. If
assigned sectors in order to conduct attacks, pro- this is done, units are to remain within
vide support, and carry out assisting unit duties. 1 mile of that range/distance from the
d. (NU) When contact is lost, the establish- center of PLAN CORDON.
ment of the DATUM is the authority that initiates the
CORDON search plan. When the DATUM is 2. (NU) SACs may direct surface
ships to conduct stand-off ASW or to
remain outside of TDA. If this is done,
ships are not to approach within 500
yards of TDA. The SAC may also
SECTOR ASSIGNMENT consider setting the radius of sector
zero to that of TDA.

000 3. (NR) (NMP) PLAN BLACK COR-

DON can be considered no longer
315 045 valid when the furthest-on-circle of
8 1 the DATUM is larger than sector
zero. In this situation, the SAC should
7 2 SECTOR ZERO consider executing an alternate
search plan.
270 090
6 3 4. (NC) (NMP) In the case of an
CONTACT OR DATUM SSN threat, the SAC should consider
5 4 making sector zero of PLAN BLACK
CORDON between 6,000–9,000
225 135 yards in radius in order to allow for
6–9 minutes of searching to regain
180
contact prior to a new search plan be-
ing required (assuming an evasion
speed of 30 knots).

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 6-12. (NU) Attack, Support, and Lost Contact Method 14AH/14SH Cordon

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SEARCH PLAN 1S
OAK TREE

Oak Tree is a search by ships in a loose formation (3) LOST CONTACT SEARCH. This
into which helicopters may be integrated. It may be used method is used in the following cases:
as an area, intercept, lost contact or bottom search.
(a) When the submarine would be
a. DIRECTING SHIP. The SAU commander or outside the area covered by a close lost contact
SAC is the directing ship. search by the time it can be effectively started.
b. FORMATION. Units should be formed on a (b) When the execution of a close
loose line abreast. Distances between units and speed lost contact search would involve excessive ma-
are to be ordered by the SAU commander. Accurate noeuvring of the ships as a result of their positions
station keeping in this search is not necessary. The with reference to the datum.
SAU commander is to order and coordinate the decep-
(c) When the submarine’s most dan-
tive or evasive steering of the formation and/or individ-
gerous course can be predicted, or when it is es-
ual ships.
sential that the units should remain between the
c. METHODS submarine and his target.
(1) AREA SEARCH. An area can be (4) BOTTOM SEARCH. When searching
searched by: for bottom contacts, an area search should be con-
ducted with the direction of the search at right an-
(a) A SINGLE SWEEP through the area,
gles to the current.
using a broad zigzag if necessary to widen the front.
This method could be used if the area is small, or if it is d. SEARCH TURN. If a zigzag is in use
desired to carry out a rapid but comparatively low proba- when a search turn is executed, the zigzag is to
bility search. cease automatically and units are to return to base
course. The zigzag is only to be resumed on signal.
(b) A SERIES OF SWEEPS in the form of
While the formation is completing the manoeuvre,
an expanding square search based on a datum or
ships are particularly vulnerable. Individual ships
search center. In this case units are required to be in a
are therefore to carry out their own torpedo coun-
loose line abreast. This provides a slow sweep rate.
termeasures during this time.
(c) A SERIES OF PARALLEL SWEEPS
e. HELICOPTER MANOEUVRE DURING
through successive portions of the area. This provides
SEARCH TURN. When a ship alters course using a
thorough geographic coverage but a slow sweep rate.
search turn, helicopters stationed on it are to be re-
(d) A SERIES OF RANDOM SWEEPS positioned on the other side of that ship on the new
within the area. This provides maximum deception course.
when it is believed that the submarine will remain within
EXAMPLE
the area.
C2D THIS IS A1B
(2) INTERCEPT SEARCH. Units search a EXECUTE PLAN BLACK OAKTREE
moving area. The position and size of the area at any SIGNALS EXECUTE TO FOLLOW
moment depend upon the estimate of the submarine’s FORMATION YANKEE 090 TACK 40
probable courses of action. This moving area can be SPEED 16
searched by a series of sweeps if the area is large and if
time permits. When intercepting a submarine assumed
A1B
to be closing a convoy or force, time is normally limited.
The requirement to keep the units between the subma-
rine and the force will in most cases permit only a single 4,000 YD DATUM
sweep of the area.
C2D

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 6-13. (NU) Search Plan 1S Oak Tree

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ATTACK AND SUPPORT METHOD 11AH BEAR

a. When ASW action is being conducted, EXAMPLE

this method may be used to provide support from a
specific direction, to order the direction from which C2D THIS IS A1B
ships are to conduct stand-off attacks, or to order a
barrier across the assumed course of a submarine. EXECUTE PLAN RED BEAR
b. Plan BEAR may be based on a subma-
rine, datum, or unit. Selection of the origin for the BEARING 180 RANGE 80
plan will depend on the mission and also the cir-
cumstances of the action. Plan BEAR can be used SIGNALS EXECUTE TO FOLLOW
as a support plan to a Plan RED and/or Plan
BLACK.
FORMATION OSCAR 270 TACK 50
c. Use of Plan BEAR to form a barrier is a
quick alternative for changing the orientation of SPEED 18
the screen or creating defence in depth.
d. Use of a submarine or datum position is
more appropriate when it is within or close to the SUB
TDZ: BEARING 180°
8,000 YD
(1) ACTION BY SAC. The SAC must
specify the origin of the plan, the bearing, and the
distance at which ships and helicopters will estab- C2D 5,000 YD A1B
lish their patrol. The bearing will generally be the
submarine’s most dangerous course, its probable
escape course, or up sea. The range will be de-
pendent on the tactical situation.
(2) ACTION BY SHIPS. Manoeuvre on a
patrol line at right angles to the bearing ordered.
Movements should be coordinated by the SAC or
senior officer.
(3) ACTION BY HELICOPTERS. Heli-
copters are to dip on a line at right angles to the
bearing ordered and at the range ordered or exe-
cute Airplan 45 as directed by the SAC or HCU.

(NAT

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-14. (NU) (NMP) Attack and Support Method 11AH Bear

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AIRPLAN 1

a. DESCRIPTION. A close search designed for use by one aircraft to investigate a bearing.
b. EXECUTION. The aircraft flightpath depends on the search method employed. When an
aircraft is required to start the search from the origin of the bearing it is to be so ordered.
c. ORDERING. The following information is to be included in the orders to the aircraft:

Airplan Designation
A Bearing and type of bearing
B Time bearing obtained
C Origin of the bearing
D Distance in miles along bearing to be searched
E Starting position (optional).

NM
15
EXAMPLE BEARING
ORIGIN
EXECUTE AIRPLAN ONE

ALFA—060 CLASS CHARLIE RACKET I-BAND

BRAVO—1900Z

CHARLIE—UNIT CALLSIGN

DELTA—15

ECHO—(Aircraft Commander’s discretion)

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-15. (NU) (NMP) Airplan 1

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AIRPLAN 2

a. DESCRIPTION. A close search designed for use by one aircraft to investigate a datum or
contact.
b. EXECUTION. The aircraft proceeds to the required position to localize and classify the con-
tact. The aircraft commander reports results to the OTC, who will determine the duration of the search.
c. ORDERING. The following information is to be included in the orders of the aircraft:

Airplan Designation
A Datum and datum error or contact position
B How datum or contact position was established
C Datum time or time contact obtained
D Contact classification.

EXAMPLE
5 NM
EXECUTIVE AIRPLAN TWO XX 15 NM
ALFA—DATUM 3123—090XXX15 DATUM
ERROR 5 MILES

BRAVO—CRISS-CROSS INDIA BAND

CHARLIE—1426Z

DELTA—POSSUB HIGH 3

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-16. (NU) (NMP) Airplan 2

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AIRPLAN 3

a. DESCRIPTION. An airplan designed for use by one aircraft to provide a barrier along a given
line either fixed geographically or relative to a force. Unless otherwise ordered, the aircraft commander
will choose the sensor(s) to be employed. If the sensor to be employed is specified by the ordering au-
thority, the following should be considered.
(1) JULIE/ACTIVE SONOBUOY. A barrier of short duration and relatively short length (12
miles approximately). This barrier is fixed and cannot be relative to a moving force; it can, however, be
extended to cover a moving force for a short time.
(2) MAD. A medium-duration barrier which must be short in total length to be effective (5 miles
approximately).
(3) JEZEBEL. A passive barrier which may be maintained by either lofar or codar. It should be
located beyond the interference range of ships.
(4) OTHER SENSORS may be used, depending on aircraft equipment and the tactical
situation.
b. EXECUTION. The aircraft flight path depends on the search method employed.
c. ORDERING. The following information is to be included in the orders to the aircraft:

Airplan Designation
A Relative or geographic
B Origin (true bearing and distance in miles from a reference point) and time (when origin
is ordered with reference to a moving position)
C Bearing and distance of each leg
D Duration
E Sensor to be employed (normally aircraft commander’s discretion)
F Encoded course and speed elements of PIM (for relative airplans only).

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Figure 6-17. (NU) (NMP) Airplan 3 (Sheet 1 of 2)

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AIRPLAN 3 (Cont.)

EXAMPLE CHARLIE—000-15 THEN 045-15

EXECUTE AIRPLAN THREE DELTA—UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

ALFA—RELATIVE ECHO—VISUAL

BRAVO—285 QQ 18 AT 1015Z FOXTROT—025-12 (encoded)

NM
5
)1
(T
5

(T) T OF
04

12
025 MEN
E
BO OV
IN D M
DY
000 (T) 15 NM

MA NDE

PROJECTED POSITION OF
E
INT

ORIGIN SECOND LEG

285 (
T) Q
Q 18

PROJECTED POSITION OF
ORIGIN MAIN BODY SECOND LEG
285 (
T) Q
Q 18

MAIN BODY ON LEG OF

ZIGZAG PLAN

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-17. (NU) (NMP) Airplan 3 (Sheet 2 of 2)

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AIRPLAN 4

a. DESCRIPTION. An airplan used to search rela-

SECTOR SYSTEM
tive to a force. The area around the force is divided into
quarters designated Sector One through Sector Four. Ad- SECTOR INTENDED
ditionally, for all round search the four quarters are com- TWO MOVEMENT
bined in Sector Five. Other divisions may also be ordered
by the methods shown in the diagram. All such sectors and
divisions are based on the DR position of ZZ or QQ (origin) SECTOR SECTOR
as it advances along the PIM. FOUR ONE

b. EXECUTION. When more than one aircraft is as-

signed, each aircraft task is to be ordered individually and a FORCE
distinct area assigned to each aircraft. SECTOR
THREE
c. ORDERING. The following information is to be in-
cluded in the orders to the aircraft:
Airplan Designation SECTOR INTENDED
TWO MOVEMENT
A Sector number(s), and either depth of search in
miles (Sectors 1–4) or in miles ahead, abeam and astern
(Sector 5). SECTOR SECTOR
FOUR ONE
B Origin, time and encode position, course and
speed elements of PIM.
CONVOY
SECTOR
EXAMPLE THREE

EXECUTE AIRPLAN FOUR

ALFA—SECTOR 1 SQUARE 30

BRAVO-ZZ-0800Z-encoded 180 XX 40-090-10

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Figure 6-18. (NU) (NMP) Airplan 4 (Sheet 1 of 2)

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EXAMPLE 5:
AIRPLAN 4 (Cont.) SECTOR 090-140 CIRCULAR 40
ORIGIN 40
090º(T)
EXAMPLE 1:
SECTOR 1 CIRCULAR 20 INTENDED
INTENDED MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT
140º(T)
20

ORIGIN EXAMPLE 6:
SECTOR 090-14 CIRCULAR 30 to 50 MILES
50
ORIGIN 090º(T)
EXAMPLE 2: 30
SECTORS 1 and 2 CIRCULAR 20 INTENDED
INTENDED MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT 140º(T)

EXAMPLE 7:
ORIGIN 20
SECTOR 5 35 AHEAD 25 ABEAM 12 ASTERN
INTENDED
25 MOVEMENT
EXAMPLE 3:
SECTOR 1 SQUARE 20 25
INTENDED
MOVEMENT
20
ORIGIN 35
20

ORIGIN
12

EXAMPLE 8:
SECTORS 1 and 2 SQUARE 35
EXAMPLE 4: SECTORS 3 and 4 SQUARE 20
SECTORS 1 and 2 SQUARE 10 to 30
INTENDED
INTENDED MOVEMENT 35 MOVEMENT
35
35

ORIGIN
10

ORIGIN
20
30 20
20

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Figure 6-18. (NU) (NMP) Airplan 4 (Sheet 2 of 2)

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AIRPLAN 5

a. DESCRIPTION. An airplan for use by one aircraft to search an area of any size or shape. The
area may be either geographic or relative to a force.
b. EXECUTION. The aircraft commander will normally determine the aircraft flightpath
independently.
c. ORDERING. The following information is to be included in the orders to the aircraft:

Airplan Designation

A Relative or geographic
B Corners (for areas with straight sides)
C Center (for circular area) and radius in miles
D Encoded course and speed elements of PIM (for relative areas only)

EXAMPLE 1 EXAMPLE 2

EXECUTE AIRPLAN FIVE EXECUTE AIRPLAN FIVE

ALFA — GEOGRAPHIC ALFA — RELATIVE

CHARLIE — 240 WW 120 RADIUS 35 BRAVO — 090 QQ 10—
240 QQ 40—
300 QQ 40
DELTA — 270 — 15 (encoded)
300-40
WW

NM
120

PIM QQ
35 NM 270-15 090-10

240-40

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 6-19. (NU) (NMP) Airplan 5

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CHAPTER 7 Picture Compilation and Scouting

SECTION I—PICTURE COMPILATION

7100 Introduction

(NU) This section describes the process of picture compilation, which is fundamental to maritime
operations, and scouting, which is the observation of the surrounding environment.
(NR) (NMP) More details of the methods for gathering information and exploitation of the recognized
picture are contained in the relevant warfare publications: ATP-18; ATP-28, Vol. I; ATP-31; AJP-3.3.3; and
ATP-3.3.3.1, Air-Maritime Coordination Procedure.
7101 Picture Compilation

(NU) In all maritime operations, ranging from peacetime through increasing tension to hostilities, it is
necessary to compile a plot of surface, air, and subsurface contacts.
(NU) The process of all actions and activities aimed at compiling a plot is called picture compilation.
(NU) In maritime operations, picture compilation will normally be executed to support decisionmaking
in relation to the mission. The nature of the mission will dictate the importance of the plot and what
information is to be derived from it.
(NU) In support of the overall plan, the OTC and/or delegated authorities are to develop, formulate, and
implement the picture compilation plan.
7102–7109 Spare

7110 The Picture Compilation Plan

(NU) The picture compilation plan should take into account the following three items:
a. (NU) General considerations.

b. (NU) Elements of picture compilation.

c. (NU) The process of picture compilation.

7120 General Considerations

(NU) General considerations in developing the picture compilation plan are:

a. (NU) Environment.

b. (NU) Resources.

c. (NU) Operational situation.

7121 Environment

(NU) There are three basic elements of the environment which should be considered:
a. (NU) Geographic location of the AOO (e.g., open ocean, inshore).

b. (NU) Environmental factors (e.g., oceanographic, meteorological, atmospheric, etc.).

c. (NU) Familiarity with the geographic location and environmental factors.

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7122 Resources

(NU) The OTC or delegated authorities should assess all resources available to support the picture
compilation plan:
a. (NU) Intelligence information.

b. (NU) The capabilities and limitations of the available assets and their sensors and the probability
of gaining contact with them.

c. (NU) Dissemination capabilities (e.g., data link systems, voice communications, messages).

7123 Operational Situation

(NU) In maritime operations, the operational situation will significantly affect the production and
implementation of the picture compilation plan. Important elements are:
a. (NU) Mission.

b. (NU) Threat.

c. (NU) Peacetime, time of tension, time of war.

d. (NU) ROE.

e. (NU) Directives from superior authority.

f. (NU) Traffic density.

g. (NU) Familiarity with traffic-pattern.

7124–7129 Spare

7130 Elements of Picture Compilation

(NU) In general terms, picture compilation should result in the determination of the following four
elements:
a. (NU) WHAT:

(1) (NU) Environmental descriptors (surface, subsurface, land, air and space).

(2) (NU) Identity (hostile, suspect, unknown, neutral, assumed friend, friend).

b. (NU) WHERE:

(1) (NU) Position.

(2) (NU) Bearing.

(3) (NU) Area of probability.

(4) (NU) Height.

(5) (NU) Depth.

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c. (NU) WHITHER:

(1) (NU) Course.

(2) (NU) Speed.

d. (NU) WHEN: Time of contact report of information in the report.

(NU) All elements should be amplified if possible or required (e.g., type, class, nationality, Doppler,
behaviour, time late, etc.).
7140 The Process of Picture Compilation

(NU) Picture compilation can be subdivided into five processes:

a. (NU) Detection.

b. (NU) Localization.

c. (NU) Recognition.

d. (NU) Identification.

e. (NU) Dissemination.

7141 Detection

a. (NU) The detection process includes the employment of sensors in a certain area or volume, to
determine the presence or absence of contacts or contact-related data. The presence of contacts or
contact-related data should stimulate the other four processes.

b. (NU) The detection process can be aimed at the detection of specific contact(s) in a clear-cut area.

c. (NU) Probability of gaining contact depends on the following:

(1) (NU) Sensor probability of detection (sensor’s sweep width).

(2) (NU) Coverage factor.

(3) (NU) Frequency of cover.

(4) (NU) Duration of mission.

(5) (NU) Type and behaviour of target.

(6) (NU) Time late and last known position.

(7) (NU) Operator performance.

(8) (NU) Environmental and geographic factors.

d. (NU) These factors should be applied to the conduct of scouting missions against surface and
subsurface targets. As it is often impossible to assign values to these factors because of the problems
in predicting sensor performance and target behaviour, the probability of gaining contact is difficult to
determine. However, broad values for both coverage factor and frequency of cover may be required
in planning.

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e. (NC) (NMP) In such cases, the following values of sweep width may be used:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Sonar—surface ships—twice tactical sonar range.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Radar—70 percent of twice maximum range of detection.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Visual by aircraft in accordance with Table 6-1 of ATP-31.

(4) (NC) (NMP) ESM—70 percent of twice maximum range (provided target is making
electromagnetic emissions).

(5) (NU) (NMP) Automatic identification system (AIS)—70 percent of twice maximum range of
detection (provided target AIS is transmitting).

7142 Localization

(NU) The localization process includes the employment of sensors to determine the positional information
and movements of a contact (WHERE/WHITHER). The positional information, which might be an area
of probability or a bearing, can be relative to a platform, absolute, or in a grid system.
7143 Recognition

(NU) The recognition process includes the employment of sensors in order to determine characteristics
of a contact. The collected characteristics should be compared with reference data which can lead to
correlation, with a level of confidence. The degree to which recognition will have to be executed should
be ordered by the appropriate authority and can range from very rough (e.g., combatant/merchant) to
fine (e.g., name of contact). In general, recognition is the interpretation of data collected by sensors. The
recognition confidence levels which can be used are:
a. (NU) Certain Target. Positively recognized by type, visually or electro-optically, and by a
competent person and continuously tracked after initial recognition.

b. (NU) Probable Target.

(1) (NU) A certain target that has been tracked intermittently and is confidently considered to be
the same target, or

(2) (NU) A contact viewed by imaging radar whose image quality provides strong cumulative
evidence with positive indicators that are consistent with a type of enemy unit, or

(3) (NU) Strong, cumulative information based on any two of the following:

(a) (NU) A contact with an electronic emission unique to a type of enemy unit.

(b) (NU) A contact with acoustic emissions unique to a type of enemy unit.

(c) (NU) A contact in a position predicted by enemy or intelligence reports.

(d) (NU) A contact sighted visually or using electro-optics but not positively recognized.

(e) (NU) Radar target with tracking and/or formation consistent with that expected of the
enemy.

(f) (NU) Active sonar contact with tracking and/or formation consistent with that expected of
the enemy.

(g) (NU) Missile release by target.

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(h) (NU) A contact viewed by imaging radar whose image quality provides indicators that are
consistent with a type of enemy unit.

(i) (NU) A contact with electronic ID systems (e.g., AIS, IFF) transmission consistent with
that expected of the enemy.

c. (NU) Possible Target. A contact that has a lower degree of recognition than that required for
probable. The confidence of the recognition must be amplified as follows:

(1) (NU) High Confidence—A contact which satisfies only one of the criteria required for probable.

(2) (NU) Low Confidence—A contact which has indications that it may satisfy the criteria and
further investigation is required.

7144 Identification

(NU) The identification process includes the assignment of one of the six standard identities to a detected
contact (hostile, suspect, unknown, neutral, assumed friend, friend). The assignment of a standard
identity will be executed by the appropriate or designated authority, based upon the available data
(mostly localization and/or recognition data) and a set of rules (identification criteria) laid down by the
appropriate authority. Table 7-1 provides examples of identification methods and criteria.
7145 Dissemination

(NU) The dissemination process overlaps the previous four phases and includes the use of data links,
voice communications, and messages in order to transfer data of contacts between two or more units/
platforms.
7146–7149 Spare

7150 Scouting

7151 Introduction

(NU) The considerations and processes described in the previous paragraphs are applicable to all areas
of warfare. However, each type of warfare has its own special features which will impact on the methods
and processes for compiling the plot. It is the responsibility of the OTC and/or delegated authorities to
promulgate specific instructions for different warfare areas in advance as stated in Chapter 2.
7152 Aim

(NU) The aim of scouting is the observation, either systematic or not, of the surrounding environment
executed by all available means in a particular area.
7153 Scope

a. (NU) In maritime warfare, the generic term “scouting” is used to describe all surveillance and
reconnaissance activities as indicated in Figure 7-1.

b. (NU) Only tactical scouting will be considered, since strategic scouting is beyond the purpose of
this publication.

c. (NU) Scouting operations may be tasked against any vehicle or area. However, since deployed
maritime forces have a continuous need for information about the enemy or potential enemy, they
are constantly engaged in tactical surveillance and reconnaissance, and thus units may contribute to
scouting whether or not specifically tasked. Scouting operations are designed to investigate, detect,
identify, localize, report, and monitor if required. Occasionally, specific tasks may be ordered to
accomplish more limited needs, such as the hampering of the opposition’s movement.

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Table 7-1. (NU) List of Track Identification Methods and Criteria

The following list, which is not exhaustive, is intended to give examples of identification methods and
criteria that can be used by the OTC or delegated authority.

VISUAL (including electro-optics)

- Contact positively identified

- Contact identified but not positively
- Opening of fire (guns, missiles ...)
- Wrong reply to a visual identification signal
- No reply to a visual identification signal
- Ship or aircraft showing no lights

ELECTRONIC

- Contact(s) less than 10 (or n) degrees from a communications intercept bearing (or at an
intersection of two bearings)
- Contact(s) less than 10 (or n) degrees from a bearing (or at an intersection of two bearings) of a
radar or other electronic transmission
- Contact(s) less than 10 degrees from a jamming bearing
- Contacts not responding to an IFF/SIF interrogation
- Contacts giving wrong reply to an IFF/SIF interrogation
- Contact transmitting incorrect ID information on Auto ID System
- Electronic emission identified as that of a missile guidance system
- Electronic emission corresponding to a fire control radar
- Electronic emission with changing characteristics (frequency, scan, pulse repetition frequency
(PRF))
- Airborne radar transmissions associated with data link transmission

ACOUSTIC

- Contact with acoustic emissions

- Passive sonar intercept of a unit
- Passive buoy intercept of a unit

BEHAVIOUR

- Contact in a position predicted by enemy or intelligence reports

- Contact closes within a specific range
- Contact closes from an expected direction
- Contact proceeds at excessive speed
- Contact operating airborne vehicles
- Contact correlates with known PIM, patrol area, or flight plan of own units
- Contact shows hostile intent
- Contact shows hostile act
- Change of speed greater than 5 knots

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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FUNCTION SCOUTING

OPERATIONS
SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE
MISSION PATROL SEARCH

FIXED STATION RECTANGULAR

METHOD LINEAR SECTOR
CROSSOVER EXPANDING SQUARE
AREA INTERCEPTIVE
RANDOM

DETECTION
PHASES LOCALIZATION
IDENTIFICATION
RECOGNITION

PREHOSTILITIES
HOSTILITIES
TASKS
SHADOWING TATTLETALE MARKING SHADOWING ATTACK

HARASSMENT

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 7-1. (NU) Scouting Description

d. (NU) The relationship between the various types of operations, missions, methods, and tasks are
illustrated in Figure 7-1.

7154 Planning of Scouting Operations

a. (NU) Selection Criteria. The type of operation, mission, method, or task to be used will
depend on the situation and vehicles available and may also depend on the ROE in effect. Although
Figure 7-1 illustrates a progression of all the above, the sequence may be initiated or terminated with
any operation, as appropriate.

b. (NU) Selecting Units and Sensors.

(1) (NU) Units. Surface units, submarines, and aircraft may be assigned to conduct a scouting
operation. Coordinated operations are encouraged, where possible, to maximise the advantages of
each kind of unit.

(2) (NU) Sensors. Sensor selection is partially limited by the type of unit tasked. The controlling
authority may specify the sensor(s) to be used by giving adequate emission policy. It is usually
better to allow the unit a choice of sensor(s), as selection often depends on local operational
and environmental factors. Selection also depends on the ROE in force, as they are a primary
consideration in selecting covert or overt action and are therefore a factor in selecting the type of
sensors to be used.

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c. (NU) Overt and Covert Tactics. Scouting can be carried out overtly or covertly and the tactical
implications must be considered before missions are ordered.

(1) (NU) Overt Tactics. In general, overt tactics are adopted when concealment of the unit’s
task is undesirable, unnecessary, or impracticable, and/or the need for speed in gaining contact
overrides the need for concealment.

(2) (NU) Covert Tactics. The term “covert,” applied to air operations, should be interpreted as
“disguised” rather than as “passive,” because an aircraft may need to use radar occasionally to skirt
unidentified contacts at a safe stand-off distance based upon expected weapon envelopes of threat
units. In general, covert tactics are adopted to:

(a) (NU) Avoid detection of the unit or at least minimise the warning to enemy defences.

(b) (NU) Deny the enemy continuous intelligence of the unit.

(c) (NU) Force the enemy to use active sensors.

(d) (NU) Deceive the enemy.

7155 Scouting Methods

(NU) As indicated in Figure 7-1, scouting consists of surveillance and reconnaissance activities.
a. (NU) Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places,
persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means; specifically, in maritime
surveillance, to detect and determine the number, identity, or movement of aircraft, missiles, surface,
or subsurface vehicles. Surveillance operations in peacetime are normally a national responsibility.
NATO Surveillance Coordination Centres coordinate maritime surveillance operations in order to
optimize the effort and the information obtained. Moreover, contingency plans are available to expand
the NATO surveillance effort when the situation so dictates. Since forces under different operational
and tactical control may participate in surveillance operations, the command and control relationships
detailed in Chapter 2 are not always applicable. However, when local coordination is required, the
area headquarters may designate an on-scene surveillance coordinator (OSSC) as tactical coordinator.
The OSSC should:

(1) (NU) Establish communications with other forces involved in the same operation.

(2) (NU) Inform all units about his intentions.

(3) (NU) Dispose units in order to optimize efforts and resources.

(4) (NU) Send all the appropriate reports.

(5) (NU) Inform the concerned headquarters when assuming/passing his duty.

NOTE

(NR) (NMP) AIR AND SURFACE SURVEILLANCE ARE DESCRIBED

IN ATP-31; SUBSURFACE SURVEILLANCE IN ATP-18.

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b. (NU) Reconnaissance. An operation undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy;
or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a
particular area. Reconnaissance operations are often classified according to the purpose for which they
are undertaken (e.g., intelligence, ice, or beach reconnaissance) or according to the means employed
in obtaining the information (e.g., radar, AIS, or ESM reconnaissance). Reconnaissance missions may
be conducted by satellite, aircraft, submarines, or surface units. It is a more limited operation than
surveillance.

7156 Surveillance Methods

(NU) There are two methods to conduct a surveillance mission:

a. (NU) Patrol.

b. (NU) Search.

7157 Patrol

a. (NU) General. A patrol is a detachment of units sent out for the purpose of gathering information
or systematic and continuing investigation along a line to detect or hamper enemy movements.

b. (NU) Basic Types of Patrol. The four basic types of patrol are fixed station, linear, cross-over,
and area.

c. (NU) Ordering a Patrol. The OTC or controlling authority should promulgate some or all of
the following:

(1) (NU) Aim of the patrol.

(2) (NU) Type of patrol.

(3) (NU) Limits of the barrier line or location and dimensions of the patrol area.

(4) (NU) Sequence of ships and their initial position.

(5) (NU) Patrol guide.

(6) (NU) Start and duration of the patrol.

(7) (NU) Patrol speed.

(8) (NU) Assumed enemy course and speed.

(9) (NU) Sweep width.

(10) (NU) Direction and length of legs.

(11) (NU) EMCON plan.

(12) (NU) Tasking of passive sensors.

(13) (NU) Reporting procedures.

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(14) (NU) Action on gaining contact.

(15) (NU) Action on completing the patrol.

NOTE

(NR) (NMP) AN AIRCRAFT PATROL MAY BE ORDERED USING AN

APPROPRIATE AIRPLAN IN CHAPTER 6.

7158 Search

a. (NU) General. A search is a systematic investigation of a particular area to establish the presence
or the absence of (a) specific contact(s).

b. (NU) Basic Types of Search. The five basic types of search are rectangular, sector, expanding
square, intercepting, and random.

c. (NU) Ordering a Search. The OTC or controlling authority should promulgate some or all of
the following:

(1) (NU) Aim of the search.

(2) (NU) Type of search.

(3) (NU) Assumed position of enemy at a stated time, or the geographic area to be searched.

(4) (NU) Limiting enemy courses for intercepting search.

(5) (NU) Limiting enemy speeds for intercepting search.

(6) (NU) Direction of search line.

(7) (NU) Order of ships on search line if other than standard.

(8) (NU) Track spacing.

(9) (NU) Position of the Guide at time of starting search.

(10) (NU) Start and duration of search.

(11) (NU) Search course.

(12) (NU) Search speed.

(13) (NU) EMCON plan.

(14) (NU) Tasking of passive sensors.

(15) (NU) Reporting procedures.

(16) (NU) Action on gaining contact.

(17) (NU) Action on completion of search.

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7159 Spare

7160 Tasks

(NU) Based on the recognized picture, tactical decisions can be made. This can lead to the assignment of
tasks to ships, aircraft, or submarines. The following tasks are described in the subsequent paragraphs:
a. (NU) Shadowing.

b. (NU) Countershadowing.

c. (NU) Marking.

d. (NU) Countermarking.

e. (NU) Tattletale.

f. (NU) Weapon employment.

7161 Shadowing

a. (NU) Shadowing operations are normally a follow-up to surveillance and/or reconnaissance

missions. The effectiveness of shadowing is measured by the ability to obtain and report the required
information. Shadowing can be carried out using overt or covert tactics. In times of tension, the
shadowing unit must be well aware of the ROE in force. Shadowing may be conducted by aircraft,
submarines, or ships, or combinations of them.

b. (NU) It is important that shadowing is not mistaken for marking, as this may cause an unwanted
escalator effect. To avoid any misunderstanding on own intentions, the following should apply:

(1) (NU) Select shadowing units with little offensive capability.

(2) (NU) Shadowing with relatively strong units should be done within own sensors but outside
own maximum effective weapon range.

(3) (NU) Shadow covertly.

7162 Information Exchange Between Shadowing and Relieving Units

a. (NU) The exchange of information between the shadowing unit(s) and the relieving unit(s) must
be as complete as possible. Some major points to consider are:

(1) (NU) Additional information about the type of target.

(2) (NU) Position, course, and speed of the target.

(3) (NU) Observed EP and level of communications security of the target.

(4) (NU) Frequencies used by the target.

(5) (NU) Aircraft embarked.

(6) (NU) Behaviour of the target in general and against the shadowing unit(s).

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b. (NU) During aircraft handover, the aircraft going off task is to ensure that the relief aircraft gets a
positive handover. In covert operations, the following should be considered:

(1) (NU) The handover should take place below the target’s radar horizon.

(2) (NU) If possible, secure communications should be employed, preferably at a range and
altitude from the target that will preclude intercept.

(3) (NU) Passive handover techniques, such as the use of predesignated sonobuoy channels,
should be considered.

7163 Countershadowing

a. (NU) In both peacetime and times of tension, commanders should be aware of the fact that they
could be shadowed even though there may be no indication of a shadower. The known presence of
one shadower does not exclude the presence of other, undetected, shadowing units. A shadower is not
necessarily dangerous in itself.

b. (NU) Its task may be to gather intelligence or to observe units and relay information on movements.
On the other hand, its task may be to provide target information for the opponent’s offensive forces,
intended to adopt countershadowing tactics to hamper the shadower’s task.

c. (NU) The purpose of countershadowing tactics is to confuse and deceive the shadowing opponent
in order to withhold information on own movements and intentions and, if possible, to shake it off.
In general, these tactics will be most effective when used at night, in reduced visibility, or by taking
advantage of environmental conditions.

(NC) (NMP) A full description of tactical deception is contained in ATP-55.

7164 Marking

(NU) The aim of marking is to be able to deliver an immediate and effective attack on the enemy when
hostilities are ordered. However, units overtly engaged in marking operations will be particularly
vulnerable to surprise attack by the enemy; units marking covertly (e.g., SSNs) will be less vulnerable
to attack. In selecting the marking unit, it will be necessary to weigh the need to demonstrate a presence
against the vulnerability of the marker.
7165 Countermarking

(NU) The potential threat posed by a marking unit may be reduced by the employment of a countermarker.
Units engaged in countermarking will pose a direct threat to the marker and thus limit the options
available to him. If conducting continuous countermarking duties, they may be better able to accomplish
the aim than surface units as they are less vulnerable to pre-emptive action. Surface units conducting
countermarking may be at close quarters harassment stations; missile, gun, or radiation positions; or
defensive positions close to own threatened unit(s).
7166 Tattletale

(NU) A unit maintaining contact may be used to pass targeting information to other units. Such a unit
maintaining contact is designated a tattletale. A tattletale may or may not be capable of taking offensive
action. Tattletale operations may be preferable to direct marking as they permit the whereabouts of the
primary attacking unit to be concealed.
7167–7169 Spare

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7170 Picture Compilation and Weapon Employment

a. (NU) The required product of the picture compilation process is a recognized picture that forms the
basis for tactical decisionmaking, including weapon employment.

b. (NU) In general, weapon employment will only be considered on contacts which constitute a threat
to friendly forces and therefore should be identified as hostile.

(1) (NU) However, the identity hostile does not necessarily mean that the OTC has evaluated the
contact to form so great a threat that weapon employment is justified. On the other hand, in some
situations weapon employment may be authorized on contacts with an identity other than hostile.

(2) (NR) (NMP) The following factors are to be taken into account (see Figure 7-2) before weapon
employment on a contact is allowed:

(a) (NR) (NMP) More information might be required; e.g., specific characteristics with a
certain level of confidence.

(b) (NR) (NMP) Political situation.

(c) (NR) (NMP) ROE.

(d) (NR) (NMP) Mission.

(e) (NR) (NMP) Relative strengths.

(f) (NR) (NMP) Target priorities.

(g) (NR) (NMP) Weapon expenditure.

(h) (NR) (NMP) Promulgated weapon restrictions (see Articles 6446 to 6448).

(i) (NR) (NMP) Distance.

(j) (NR) (NMP) Threat (see Figure 6-3).

(3) (NR) (NMP) Exception. The tactical situation can be (become) so unfavourable
(e.g., number/type of threat, reaction time available) that the OTC/warfare commander considers
weapon employment on contacts with an identity less positive than hostile justified. (This may also
apply for individual units in a self-defence situation.)

c. (NU) The OTC and warfare commanders are to specify all these requirements and considerations
in the respective general and warfare instructions in order to make clear to all subordinates what
the weapon employment policy is. Usually this will result in differences among warfare areas
(e.g., different identification criteria, recognition (confidence levels), and weapon release criteria).

7180 Terms and Definitions

a. (NU) Picture Compilation. All actions and activities aimed at compiling a plot.

b. (NU) Detection. The discovery of the presence of a contact or contact-related data.

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DETECTION

LOCALIZATION

IDENTIFICATION
RECOGNIZED
PICTURE
ID CRITERIA
WEAPON RELEASE
RECOGNITION CONSIDERATIONS
RECOGNITION LEVEL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
(PLATFORM, TYPE, CLASS, NAME) RELEASE CRITERIA
TARGET PRIORITY
RECOGNITION CONFIDENCE LEVEL DISTANCE
(CERT, PROB, ...) WEAPON EXPENDITURE
REC CONF LEVEL
WEAPON CONTROL STATUSES
PREPLAN

SALVO SIZE

WEAPON EMPLOYMENT

NATO RESTRICTED (NMP)

Figure 7-2. (NU) (NMP) The Picture Compilation and Weapon Employment Process

c. (NU) Localization. The determination of positional information and the movements of a contact.

d. (NU) Recognition. The determination of certain characteristics of a contact.

e. (NU) Identification. The assignment of one of the six standard identities, based upon available
data and the determined identification criteria.

f. (NU) Recognized Picture. The result of the picture compilation process laid down in a common
plot, which is compiled using available information from all units/levels concerned, and which covers
a predetermined area in which all detected contacts have been evaluated and assigned an indisputed
identity.

g. (NU) Identification Criteria. Criteria laid down by the OTC or delegated authority to determine
which standard identity can be assigned to a detected contact based on the available localization and
recognition data.

h. (NU) Release Criteria. Criteria laid down by OTC or delegated authority to be satisfied before
weapon employment is authorized.

i. (NU) Recognition Level. The level to which a contact must be recognized as to platform type,
class, or individuality.

j. (NU) Recognition Confidence Level. The degree of probability with which the recognition
level is established.

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SECTION II—DATA COMPILATION

7200 Data Compilation

7201 Reference Publications

a. (NU) Procedures and Instructions. Instructions concerning communication procedures are

contained in relevant ACPs.
(NR) (NMP) Voice procedures for raid reporting are contained in APP-01.

b. (NU) Brevity Code. Operational brevity code words are from APP-07. Personnel concerned
with raid reporting should familiarize themselves with code words in general use.

c. (NR) (NMP) Data Links. Guidance for the technical use of data links can be found in the relevant
ADatPs (11, 16, 22, and 33).

7202 OTC’S Requirements

(NU) As described in Section I, the OTC/CWC and/or delegated authorities will formulate and implement
the picture compilation plan. Parts of the plan are the required and available means of data compilation.
7203 Means of Data Compilation

(NU) Various means are used to compile the recognized picture. Data links, voice nets, and RATT are
used to disseminate the information gathered through surveillance (which is done by air, surface, and
subsurface units). Data links, voice nets, and RATT are used to promulgate the information gathered
through surveillance (by these units). The function of the voice nets in data compilation is raid reporting.
On the same nets the management of data links will be coordinated.
7204 Coordination

(NU) As part of the picture compilation plan, surveillance is coordinated by the OTC or delegated warfare
commanders. Data compilation is coordinated by warfare commanders or by the force track coordinators
(air, surface, and subsurface) if the task is delegated by the OTC/warfare commanders.
7205–7209 Spare

7210 Surveillance

(NU) Surveillance missions are normally designated by delineating the area and type of surveillance.
Surveillance may be of a tactical or strategic nature and may be followed by reconnaissance. Considerations
for the selection of vehicles for surveillance are similar to those applying reconnaissance.
7211 Surveillance Area

a. (NU) The establishment of the size and shape of the surveillance area is fundamental to the
success of the surveillance concept. The size and shape of the surveillance area will be determined
by comparing the warning time required to deploy forces with the resources available to provide
surveillance.

b. (NU) The surveillance area may move with the PIM or be fixed.

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7212 Coordination of Data Compilation in the Surveillance Coordination Surveillance

Area

(NU) The aim of surveillance coordination is to optimize the use of resources and avoid duplication of
effort. Coordination of unit activities in surveillance is vested in the appropriate warfare commanders.
Coordination of data compilation may be delegated to the appropriate force track coordinator.
7213 Force Track Coordinator (Air)

(NU) The AAWC is responsible for maintaining and disseminating the air picture as it is formed by the total
of sensor inputs. This duty may be delegated to the FTC-A, who is normally colocated with the AAWC,
if designated. Acting under AAWC, AC or FADIZ C is ultimately responsible for the identification of all
friendly aircraft flying within its area. The AAWC/FTC-A has the following responsibilities for picture
compilation and dissemination:
a. (NU) Control the AAW reporting net (see Article 4141).

b. (NU) Compile the air picture, including the correlation and evaluation of reports from other units
of the force (including data links).

c. (NU) Issue SITREPs.

d. (NU) Designate the link management units (data net control station (DNCS), GRU, link broadcast
units, and Gateway Unit).

e. (NU) Manage the link picture.

f. (NU) Promulgate the link management codes to be used in network management.

g. (NU) Control over link operational procedures.

h. (NU) Order general grid locks to be done by the GRU.

i. (NU) Coordinate entries from non-link-fitted units into the link picture.

j. (NU) Order frequency shifts or other parameter shifts for link if necessary (initiated by the DNCS).

k. (NU) Crosstell of information with shore air defence authorities when appropriate.

l. (NU) Issue track release policy to be used.

7214 Force Track Coordinator (Surface) and Force Track Coordinator (Subsurface)

(NU) The ASUWC and ASWC are charged with maintaining and disseminating the surface and
subsurface picture as it is formed by the total of sensor inputs. These duties may be delegated to the force
track coordinator surface (FTC-S) and force track coordinator subsurface (FTC-SS), who are normally
colocated with their respective warfare commands when designated. Their duties can be combined in the
FTC-S/SS. In TDS systems, the FTC-A has the primary responsibility, while the FTC-S and FTC-SS are
using that part of the system made available for their data compilation efforts. The FTC-S and FTC-SS
have the following responsibilities:
a. (NU) Control the appropriate reporting nets.

b. (NU) Compile the surface and subsurface picture, including the correlation and evaluation of
reports from other units of the force (including data links).

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c. (NU) Issue SITREPs.

d. (NU) Coordinate entries from non-link-fitted units into the link surface and subsurface picture.

7215–7219 Spare

7220 Contact Reports

7221 General Information

a. (NU) Purpose. Contact reports are designed to pass the fullest information about contacts in the
shortest time and simplest manner. They serve to:

(1) (NU) Alert authorities and forces or units about contacts in the area.

(2) (NU) Develop comprehensive plots to assist in the rapid evaluation of the situation in the
air, surface, and subsurface environment. Contact reports can be made as raid reports and enemy
contact reports.

b. (NU) Raid Reports. Raid reports are designed to alert the OTC/warfare commander and the
units in a formation or disposition to new contacts and, by means of a series of related reports, to
develop an accurate plot. They may concern hostile, friendly, neutral, or unidentified contacts. Rapid
reporting may be used with land-based stations when a continuous flow of information is required.
(NR) (NMP) Details are in APP-01.

c. (NU) Enemy Contact Reports (ECRs). Enemy contact reports are designed to alert appropriate
shore authorities, as well as other forces or units operating in the area, to the presence of hostile units
or unidentified contacts in the area. Enemy contact reports are made by:

(1) (NU) The OTC.

(2) (NU) Surface units operating independently.

(3) (NU) Land-based aircraft not on direct support.

(4) (NU) Submarines operating independently.

(5) (NU) Merchant ships.

(NU) Details are in APP-11.

7222 Responsibility for Passing Information About Contacts

a. (NU) The OTC. The OTC is responsible for the dissemination of the recognized picture to all
units under his tactical command and to appropriate shore authorities or units in the area using enemy
contact reporting.

b. (NU) Surface Units.

(1) (NU) Any unit operating under the tactical command or tactical control of an OTC is responsible
for passing early and accurate contact information to him, using raid reporting.

(2) (NU) Any unit in the vicinity of the force, but not under the tactical command or control of an
OTC, is responsible for passing early and accurate information to the force about contacts that may
be a threat to the force, using enemy contact reporting.

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c. (NU) Aircraft.

(1) (NU) Aircraft on direct support are responsible for making raid reports to the OTC.

(2) (NU) Aircraft on area operations or in transit are responsible for making enemy contact and
in-flight reports to their shore controlling authority. When operating in the vicinity of friendly
surface forces, aircraft are also to pass the information to the OTC(s) concerned. Aircraft may be
briefed to give precedence to reports to the OTC(s) over reports to their shore controlling authority.
If two-way communication with an OTC cannot be established, or is not permitted by EMCON, an
aircraft is to broadcast its reports and, EMCON permitting, pass its reports ashore for retransmittal
on the appropriate ship broadcast.

d. (NU) Submarines.

(1) (NU) Submarines operating independently that make contact with possible enemy units are to
make the appropriate enemy contact reports as soon as practicable.

(NC) (NMP) The submarine may have to delay making its reports for the following considerations:

(a) (NC) (NMP) The requirement to safeguard the reporting of own position.

(b) (NC) (NMP) The requirement to maintain contact with the enemy, since coming to
a suitable depth for communication purposes may result in loss of contact with the enemy,
particularly when it is another submarine.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Any submarine operating under the tactical command or tactical control of an
OTC is responsible for passing early and accurate contact information to him in a format directed
by the OTC. The OTC should advise support submarines if contact engagement or force alertment
is to take precedence. While destruction of the enemy is highly desirable, the ultimate objective
is to ensure the survival of protected units. This normally will require submarines to alert the task
force before all but urgent approaches and attacks.

(3) (NC) (NMP) On each occasion, the relative importance to shore authorities and other forces in
the area of the information to be reported has to be weighed against these considerations.

7223 Air Raid Reports

a. (NU) General. Long-range detection of air contacts is the first principle of anti-air warfare;
however, detection alone does not ensure success, because individual commands must first make a
cursory evaluation of all information prior to reporting an air contact. Position and accurate amplifying
information about all air contacts must be reported to the FTC-A. Air picture reporting will cover
all contacts in the anti-air warfare area, with emphasis on early detection and an information flow
that is as continuous as possible on friendlies. However, contacts already being reported by another
unit should not be reported, unless the unit desiring to report is in a more advantageous position to
track and wishes to assume reporting responsibility for that contact. Ships are to track or watch all
air contacts on their radar displays, with emphasis on promulgated watch zones, and are to report
in accordance with reporting rules promulgated by the OTC. In any case, units are to report all air
contacts not positively identified as friendly, provided they are considered an immediate threat. All
means of detecting air contacts, including lookout reports, are to be exploited to the maximum extent.

(NU) Visual sighting can be of special value in engaging both high and low contacts, and lookouts
should be indoctrinated as to the importance of reporting all sightings, smoke, and contrails.

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b. (NU) Local Air Situation. In addition to reporting the general air station, there is an equal
requirement for all ships fitted with guns and self-defence missiles to have a clear picture of the local
air situation, including relevant information on missile zones, safety sectors, weapon restrictions, and
positions of friendly aircraft and helicopters. A knowledge of the positions of all friendly aircraft may
be the only clue to the identity of a contact that is in fact an enemy aircraft or missile. The AAWC will
normally be the LAAWC for his group and will promulgate the local air picture. Commanding officers
are responsible for the employment of their own weapons, and the primary function of the local AAW
coordination net is to promulgate information to assist them in making their decisions.

c. (NU) Local Air Picture. The aim is to provide the group with a clear picture of the air situation
around the group. Contacts within 50 nm are given priority, with less frequent reports on those beyond.
Contacts are reported using the current agreed basic identities. Position is reported as range and
bearing from ZZ of the local force. Although reporting procedures are vital for good raid reporting,
under certain conditions a colloquial running commentary has been proven to be more successful than
a rigid reporting procedure. However, when a unit detects or sights a target that is a direct threat to the
force and has not been reported, it immediately broadcasts a flash report.

d. (NU) Amplifying Instructions. Friendly aircraft should be referred to by their task. Other
aircraft should ideally be referred to by their force track number. A unit reporting a contact must be
careful to report fades, including when it is “too close,” so that another unit may continue reporting
that contact.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Particular attention must be paid to HOSTILEs with fighters in pursuit. If the
fighter is hauled off, the direction of breaking must be reported (North/South, East/West), so that
ships may identify the enemy.

7224 Surface and Subsurface Raid Reports

(NU) Surface raid reports are normally made on TF/TG Reporting net. This net may be HF or UHF.
Details concerning the information to be exchanged are in Chapter 9. Subsurface reports are made either
on ASW Air Coordination net, on an action net, or on TF/TG Reporting net, depending on whether
immediate action is required. Searches should, where possible, be coordinated on a communication
circuit common to all operating units. Where MPA are operating in this role, ASW Air Coordination
(UHF) net will normally be used. Helicopters operating independently of FW aircraft should be TF/TG
Reporting (HF/UHF) net, unless the level of traffic is such as to overload the limited facilities of the
helicopter. Certain helicopters have the facility for transmission of the tactical picture by data link, and
under these circumstances, control of the aircraft may be conducted on an alternate circuit at the OTC’s
discretion. (NR) (NMP) Voice procedures are in APP-01.
7225 Other Reports

a. (NU) Air Combat Report. Air combat reports are reports made by aircraft and are primarily
used to warn other aircraft and the ACUs of the presence of enemy aircraft. The report consists of
code words from APP-07 and/or plain language.

b. (NU) Supporting Aircraft Mission Reports. These reports (such as the MISREP) are used by
land-based aircraft when in support of maritime operations. They are described in APP-11.

c. (NU) Mine Detection Report. Every ship detonating a mine or detecting a moored mine or a
drifting mine case shall make a report to the OPCON authority with an information copy to the OTC
of the NMCM force if in contact with such a force. For dedicated mine countermeasures vessels
(MCMVs), the OPREP NMW/MINEREP found in APP-11 should be used. Other ships should use
the MW128 tactical signal from ATP-01, Volume II.

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d. (NU) Situation Reports.

(NR) (NMP) The use and components of SITREPs are detailed in APP-01.

e. (NU) Engagement After-Action Reports. All units will submit hard-copy after-action
summary reports to the OTC and warfare commander concerned, informing other warfare commanders
and others as directed. Units will, in addition, make voice reports to the warfare commander concerned
over the appropriate tactical net. For detached units, the task element commander should submit
consolidated reports. The AREC will transmit MISREPs or PURPLE messages for CV-based aircraft.
These reports will repromulgate mission results based upon mission debriefing or post-flight analysis.

7226 Warfare Commander Reports

a. (NU) Warfare Commander SITREP. Warfare commanders will make voice SITREPs to the
OTC on the TF/TG Command net. Additionally, warfare commanders must keep units apprised of the
tactical situation over the respective C&R nets. (The same SITREP may satisfy both requirements,
but if units are not guarding the TF/TG Command net, then the report should be made over both nets.)
SITREPs will briefly describe the tactical situation and state the warfare commander’s intentions.
They will be transmitted whenever dictated by the tactical situation and will be particularly critical
during fast-moving situations, in order to keep the OTC sufficiently informed.

b. (NU) Warfare Commander SITSUM. When directed, warfare commanders and coordinators
will submit message SITSUMs to the OTC. Reporting will be over the TF/TG command (RATT)
net in order to keep the OTC, other warfare commanders, and the task force generally informed.
SITSUMs will include (as appropriate) warning and weapon status, equipment casualties, and other
problems serious enough to be brought to the attention of the OTC and other warfare commanders.

(1) (NU) The ASUWC will, in addition, report best current estimate of hostile ship positions and
time of last actual detection. Results of recent ASUW actions and surveillance flights, and status of
ongoing actions and flights will also be reported. Friendly ship positions will be given on request.

(2) (NU) The ASWC will report best current locating information for hostile and friendly
submarines and towed array ships. Status of current prosecutions and ASW air picture and deck
alert will also be reported.

(3) (NU) The AAWC will summarize bogey and CAP status, including CAP station occupancy,
ACUs, and ready alert posture. Missile inventory and status and the results of recent engagements
will also be reported.

(4) (NU) The EWC will report force EMCON condition and intra–task force variations or
violations thereof, current RACKET status, and status of EW aircraft.

(5) (NU) The AREC will report aircraft readiness and availability, flight deck status, and launch
schedules. Real-time information will be most critical in AAW.

c. (NU) The OTC, along with the rest of the force, can best follow a rapidly developing situation
by monitoring the AAW(C) net. In order to avoid duplication in reporting and distraction of the
AAWC from his vital primary role, the OTC should cancel any requirement for AAW SITREPs/
SITSUMs over the TF/TG Command net during periods of intense AAW action and require instead
an after-action report from the AAWC summarizing the results of each series of engagements.

7227–7229 Spare

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7230 Communication

(NU) For details of communications and circuits associated with data compilation, see Chapter 4,
Section I.
7231–7239 Spare

7240 Tactical Use of Data Links

7241 Purpose

(NU) Data links are the backbone of operations. More than a link to share and establish tactical picture,
modern TDL allow large information exchange, including text messages, voice, logistic elements,
engagement orders. Multi-link networks, as it is in present operations, are great enablers and can give
strategical advantage, but their inherent complexity and various levels of implementation could be an
obstacle.
7242 Integration with Standard Tactical Doctrine

(NU) Link information is compatible with the information passed over voice circuits between
non-link-fitted units and should reflect the same tactical picture. Positional information passed by data
link is based on the DLRP, which is established by the OTC and should be in the same position as the
origin for the CCG. This is considered further in Articles 3211 and 7261.
7243 Tactical Use of Link 11

a. (NU) Link 11 Operation. The OTC’s tactical instructions for operating Link 11 are detailed
in the OPTASK LINK. The force picture depends largely on the interoperability and availability of
Link 11 facilities within the force or cooperating units. For Link 11, as for other communications
means, radiation status indicators (RSIs) apply respectively. The following considerations will
influence the OTC’s decision:

(1) (NU) Link equipment of participating units.

(2) (NU) Expected threat, preplanned reactions, and standard occasions for breaking radio silence.

(3) (NU) Mission.

(4) (NU) Planned tactical positioning of own units, keeping in mind the expected HF and UHF
communication ranges.

(5) (NU) Rules of discretion (required (maximum) net cycle time, rate of sequential transmission,
data exchange periodicity).

b. (NU) Operating Modes. The operating (or transmission) modes of the link are:
(NR) (NMP) They are described in ADatP-11.

(1) (NU) Roll Call.

(a) (NU) Full Roll Call.

(b) (NU) Partial Roll Call.

(c) (NU) Roll Call Broadcast.

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(2) (NU) Broadcast.

(3) (NU) Silence.

c. (NU) Tactical Use of Silence Mode. The Silence Mode can be used in two ways:

(1) (NU) All units silent with single transmissions made only are standard occasions for breaking
silence.

(2) (NU) All units silent with periodic, preplanned, single transmissions by designated units. This
tactical mode is referred to as Short Broadcast.

d. (NU) Operational Employment.

(NR) (NMP) See Table 7-2 for the description of operational employment options. The table gives
recommendations for tactical use of Link 11, depending on the RSIs resulting from the above-mentioned
deliberations.

7244 Wide-Area Link Operations

(NU) When a Link 11 net is established on a wide area and involves several TF/TG operating independently
or in support situation Bravo or Charlie, a link point of contact, the FTC-A, will be designated in each
TF/TG. On behalf of the OTC, the FTC-A of each TF/TG will be authorized to provide information
and requirements about the link net management with the DNCS, using RATT messages or the voice
Link Coordination Circuit. Depending on the nature of the operation, the senior OTC will promulgate
information or requirements about the net management, updating the current OPTASK LINK as
necessary. During wide-area Link 11 operations, the DNCS should be the AEW aircraft (E-3 or E-2 type)
when on station.
7245 (NU) (NMP) Link 11 Waveform

(NR) (NMP) Either Kineplex or Single-tone Link 11 Waveform (SLEW) can be used for Link 11 operations
on the HF band, as ordered by the OTC in the OPTASK LINK. However, Kineplex must normally be
the standard emission unless OTCs/net controllers have confirmation that all units participating in the
Link 11 are capable of HF SLEW operations or a suitably equipped ship is available to act as a gateway
between SLEW and Kineplex. Note that Kineplex terminals cannot use SLEW but SLEW terminals can
use either SLEW or Kineplex. SLEW is more reliable and uses a narrower bandwidth.
7246–7249 Spare

7250 Link Management Units

(NU) Apart from track management on voice nets and data links, the links themselves need to be
managed. Several duties describe the management task. These duties may be combined and are ideally
vested in the FTC-A.
7251 Data Net Control Station

(NU) The DNCS is the participating unit in a link organization for air, surface, and subsurface data
compilation that performs the technical management of the net.
a. (NU) The responsibilities are:

(1) (NU) Advise the FTC-A on the use of frequencies and link parameters.

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 RSI MODE ADVANTAGE DISADVANTAGE MODE DESCRIPTOR
U FULL ROLL 1. Optimum update rate. 1. Net cycle time (NCT) may be Permanent
(Unrestricted CALL 2. Complete exchange of data infor- long.
Transmission) mation between PUs. 2. Risk of participating units being

Table 7-2. (NU) (NMP) Link 11 Operational Employment Options

intercepted and detected.

U PARTIAL ROLL 1. Call-up is directed. 1. Repetitive call-up of participants Full report by designated PU during
(Unrestricted CALL 2. Exposed units may stay prolongs NCT. PARTIAL ROLL CALL or ROLL
Selective or silent. CALL BROADCAST — Sequential
Sequential 3. Any PU has access to the net. Transmission
Transmission)
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NATO CONFIDENTIAL
U ROLL CALL 1. Convert posture for PU other 1. Repetitive call-up. Silence (See Note)
(Unrestricted BROADCAST than DNCS. 2. Force picture depends on DNCS.
Continuous (extreme version 2. Any PU has access to the net.
Transmission of PARTIAL
of DNCS) ROLL CALL)

U or E BROADCAST 1. Higher update rate from assigned 1. No information from other PU. Permanent
7-23

(Unrestricted unit. 2. Broadcast unit detectable due to

Continuous 2. Force covert other than desig- emissions.
Transmission nated PU. 3. No directive control possible.
of Designated
Unit — PU)

E SHORT 1. Force covert. 1. Lowers update rate. Preplanned action — OTC option.
(Essential BROADCAST 2. Vital information can be broad- 2. Poor force picture compilation. The most covert mode. Transmis-
Transmission) cast immediately. 3. No directive control possible. sion allowed in accordance with
OTC’s schedule (See Note).

S SILENCE 1. No ESM decision possible. 1. No information exchange. Preplanned action (See Note)
EDITION (H) VERSION (1)

2. Immediate access to the net by 2. No force picture.

SHORT BROADCAST.

NOTE: Some units may choose the quantity of tracks or command and control orders selected for each transmission (selective SHORT BROADCAST). If
the OTC plans to use these capabilities, he should ensure that they are available and promulgate them in the OPTASK LINK format (sets
UNITFLTR, AREA or GENTEXT).

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(2) (NU) Initiate and terminate the data net, under the overall directives of the OTC.

(3) (NU) Control the order in which units are called in Roll Call mode of operation (Link 11).

(4) (NU) Monitor and analyse the data nets from link establishment to link termination (technical
performance).

b. (NU) The DNCS is chosen on the basis of:

(1) (NU) Central location relative to other link-fitted units, which it must interrogate.

(2) (NU) Radiation hazard and EMCON considerations.

(3) (NU) State of equipment.

7252 Gateway Unit

(NU) In group working with more than one TDS system (i.e., Link 11, 16, 22, VMF) a gateway unit is
assigned. A gateway unit is a participating unit operating in more than one data link system responsible
for forwarding tracks data between these data link systems (data forwarding unit). The transfer can be
manual or automatic.
7253 Link Broadcast Unit

(NU) For Link 11, a broadcast unit may be assigned. This unit will transmit data from this TDS system to
other units, which will only receive this data but not answer or retransmit. The receiving units will either
plot this data manually or automatically.
7254 Grid Reference Unit

(NU) The GRU is the unit designated by the OTC to maintain the OTC’s geographical reference point.
a. (NU) The GRU is responsible for:

(1) (NU) Carrying out general grid locks as ordered by the AAWC/FTC-A.

(2) (NU) Acting as reference for individual grid locks where possible.

(3) (NU) Monitoring the positional accuracy of transmitted data by link participating units.

(4) (NU) Ensuring his data systems’ navigational input is both up-to-date and accurate.

b. (NU) The GRU should be chosen by the OTC on the basis of:

(1) (NU) Position in the force, ensuring:

(a) (NU) Good link communications.

(b) (NU) Greatest track density coverage.

(2) (NU) Large and accurate track reporting capability.

(3) (NU) Accurate navigational facilities.

(4) (NU) Reliability of link participating unit.

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7255–7259 Spare

7260 Procedures

7261 Grid Lock Procedure

a. (NU) Grid Locks. The GRU executes grid locks on completion of the insertion of the DLRP
into the various TDS, or after changing the DLRP. Grid locks are also executed periodically to reduce
errors in grid reporting.

(1) (NU) Individual Grid Lock (Codeword RONSON). Individual grid locks are undertaken:

(a) (NU) When a unit joins the force and enters the net.

(b) (NU) On request of a misaligned unit.

(c) (NU) Whenever the GRU or FTCs detect misalignment of one unit only.

(2) (NU) General Grid Lock (Codeword GRID LOCK). General grid locks are undertaken:

(a) (NU) When misalignment occurs in several units.

(b) (NU) Upon activation of the net and after inserting the DLRP into the various TDSs.

(c) (NU) After changing the DLRP.

(d) (NU) When requested by FTC-A.

b. (NU) Execution of Grid Locks. The procedure of executing grid locks differs between TDS
and non-TDS units.

(1) (NU) TDS Units. This is the simple matching of the position of a single track reported over
the data link by the GRU or another unit with the same locally held radar contact in the unit(s)
carrying out the grid lock. Correction to align the link-reported track over the local contact will
be in X and Y coordinates and will be applied according to the individual system design, either
by moving the DLRP in terms of own-ship position or by applying the appropriate correction to
transmitted and received tracks. Units are to report whether or not satisfactory grid lock has been
achieved.

(2) (NU) Non-TDS Units. The correct X and Y coordinates of a locally held track are reported
by the GRU or another grid locking unit, and units adjust their grid accordingly.

NOTE

(NU) THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THE PICTURE

ALIGNED LIES WITH THE INDIVIDUAL UNIT(S).

c. (NU) Locking Non-TDS Aircraft Into Grid. The appropriate ACU can lock aircraft into grid
by five methods:

(1) (NU) Radar Grid Lock. On joining and after full identification procedures, the aircraft will
be instructed to stand by for grid lock and X and Y coordinates are issued.

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(2) (NU) Reverse Radar Grid Lock. If for some reason the ACU is unable to use radar, a
reverse radar grid lock is executed. This requires the aircraft to use its radar and take bearing and
distance from QQ or ZZ as applicable. It is essential that the aircraft knows the position of the
reference within the force so that the fix is correctly taken.

(3) (NU) On Top. If the aircraft has permission to enter the ISR and overfly the force and can
identify the ACU, the aircraft may obtain an ON TOP grid position of the ACU.

(4) (NU) TACAN Method. EMCON permitting and when a TACAN-fitted ship is in the group,
an aircraft can obtain a TACAN lock of this unit and then be passed its grid position.

(5) (NU) Alternative. Individual unit position reports can also be given using bearing and distance
from a geographically fixed reference position (e.g., HRP). When this is done, the code word(s)
(REVERSE) UPDATE is (are) to be used. An UPDATE can be given by the GRU or another grid
locking unit as a bearing and distance from the reference position to the subject unit. If for some
reason the GRU or grid locking unit is unable to use radar, a REVERSE UPDATE can be executed.
The subject unit uses its radar to determine the position of the GRU or grid locking unit; the GRU
or grid locking unit passes its own position relative to the reference position. This bearing and
distance is then used by the subject unit to align its grid.

d. (NU) Security of the Grid. Correlation between the DLRP and observed units enables the
enemy to break the grid and obtain a missile firing solution on any subsequent unit reporting its grid
position. While grid reports which have not been encoded are acceptable for detached units, bogeys,
etc., the position of major units must be encoded in a suitable numerical code.

7262 Procedures for Reporting Own Position

(NU) Units not correctly reported on the net are to report their positions as follows:
a. (NU) All ships are to guard or copy the TF/TG reporting HF net.

b. (NU) PIMs are to be reported to the OTC when units join. The OTC will:

(1) (NU) Relay PIM information to the FTC-S.

(2) (NU) Inform transmitting units of the FTC-S frequency and call sign.

c. (NU) Periodic position reports are to be transmitted to the FTC on the TF/TG reporting net.
Frequency of reporting is as follows unless otherwise directed:

(1) (NU) Hourly, from CTGs, CTUs; major units; and all detached units.

(2) (NU) Every two hours, or when more than five miles from reported PIM, from transiting and
supporting units.

d. (NU) A composite position report is to be made for ships operating in company by the commander
of the group.

(NU) Units on the link will monitor Link 11 to check for own-ship position accuracy. Units believing link
position to be significantly in error will report correct position to FTC broadcast ship. This procedure will
be of particular importance for detached units (e.g., towed array ships) to ensure that they are correctly
included in the force surface picture.
7263–7269 Spare

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7270 Security and EMCON Considerations

a. (NU) Speed of Transmission Versus Security. The conflict between the need to transmit
an enemy report quickly and the need for security has to be considered on each occasion of making
an enemy report. The solution will depend on the particular circumstances at the time, unless on-line
encryption facilities are available. If the enemy is aware that he has been detected, and especially if
he is able to inflict early damage, speed of transmission will be the more important factor. However,
it must be realized that enemy reports which are not encrypted may, if intercepted, be valuable to the
enemy.

b. (NU) Effect of Over-Emphasizing Security. It is important that security classifications are

not imposed unnecessarily. Due consideration should be given to the availability of on-line encryption
facilities and to type of units concerned with the reports.

c. (NU) Reporting Procedures During Restricted EMCON. Modifications to reporting

procedures should be anticipated when the force is operating under restrictive EMCON conditions.
In particular, the OTC must specify which reports are to be made when the OTC and/or warfare
commander’s flagships are in EMCON and when the entire force is EMCON (e.g., when only the
OTC’s flagship is in EMCON for purposes of operational/communications deception); the OTC may
require continued reporting by warfare commanders and units, but will not acknowledge receipt or
will acknowledge receipt via another circuit. If required by EMCON, RAID reporting responsibility
may be passed to the E2C, AWACS, or MPA. Reports, other than initial raid reports, would normally
be terminated in this situation.

d. (NU) Breaking Radio Silence. Enemy reporting is one of the occasions when radio silence
may be broken. This subject is described in more detail in Article 8210.

7280 Automatic Identification System

(a) (NU) Introduction. AIS is a shipboard International Maritime VHF transponder system
conceived and mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to enhance the safety
of life at sea, the safety and efficiency of navigation and the protection of the maritime environment.
In essence it is a form of Maritime IFF, but the fact that individual ships are responsible for some of
the transmitted information means that the information received through the transponder should be
analysed for its accuracy. Regulation 19 of the IMO Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Chapter V (Safety
of Navigation) covers the carriage requirements for shipborne navigational systems and equipment.

(b) (NU) Carriage of AIS by Warships. SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 1 provides the detail
on application of SOLAS. This clearly states that, unless expressly provided otherwise, this chapter
shall apply to all ships on all voyages, except; warships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned or
operated by a contracting government and used only on government non-commercial service.

(1) (NU) Thus technically warships, or other vessels owned, leased, or operated by a government,
are not mandated to conform to IMO regulations however many nations do choose to comply with
aspects of the regulations; or certainly to comply when not involved in a tactical activity. This
may require a CTG to consider what instructions are given to civilian-flagged vessels operating in
support of military operations particularly when a Silent EMCON policy is applied. This has led to
generic capability described as Warship AIS, often shortened to W-AIS.

(2) (NU) Following on from W-AIS there is growing availability of militarized AIS transponders
which provide an additional secure AIS channel that can be considered as a significant operational
force multiplier for the future. In these equipments the channel on which the secure data is passed
is selectable and the baseline is encrypted. Equipment configured in this manner can be used for
Blue Force Tracking and secure communication, but also allows Geospatial data to be transmitted
and exchanged between warships and any appropriately equipped smaller craft in a group.

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(c) (NU) Receipt and Exploitation of AIS Data.

(NU) Data Validity. Although mandated by the IMO, AIS is not policed on a global scale; received
AIS data should therefore be treated with caution. Whenever using AIS data the following issues
should be considered:

(1) (NU) Many vessels might not be fitted with AIS, particularly warships and small craft (less
than 300 GRT) including fishing boats and leisure craft.

(2) (NU) It is not considered technically difficult to manipulate Static data fields including
maritime mobile service identity (MMSI), IMO numbers, call sign and ship name. Alternatively,
the generation of Pseudo AIS data could potentially be employed to add confusion to a situation.

(3) (NU) An AIS fitted vessel might have an unserviceable system or it may be switched off if the
Master/CO considers its continued use may compromise the security of the ship (e.g., piracy or
high terrorist threat areas).

(4) (NU) Poorly configured or calibrated ship sensors (position, speed and heading) might lead to
incorrect information being transmitted.

(5) (NU) Manually input data (e.g., Navigational status and voyage related data has frequently
been observed to be inaccurate).

(6) (NU) Spurious data has occasionally been detected on AIS receivers. This has tended to occur
at very close ranges and has therefore been resolved easily by alternative sensors.

(7) (NU) Poor positioning or wooding of own receiver may deny AIS data along some lines of
bearing.

(8) (NU) Existing ships of less than 500 GRT are not required to fit a gyro compass and are thus
unlikely to transmit heading information on AIS, even if fitted with AIS equipment.

(NU) AIS Data Validation. Confidence in AIS received information can be increased by
comparison with other information sources including:

(1) (NU) Visual, electro-optical (EO)/infrared (IR) sight.

(2) (NU) Helo/MPA probe.

(3) (NU) EW data

(4) (NU) Known traffic routes and schedules.

(5) (NU) Lloyds Register Fairplay Shipping Database (available on the worldwide web).

(6) (NU) International Telecommunication Union (ITU) “List of Call signs and Numerical
Identities.” The ITU issues MMSI numbers that are listed with a ship’s name on CD-ROM.

(7) (NU) The use of S-AIS and correlation of optical and radar imagery may provide a significant
way ahead to improve AIS Data Validation.

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(d) (NU) EMCON/OPSEC Considerations. The IMO/SOLAS regulations state that AIS should
be in operation (implying transmitting) when underway or at anchor, however, they do permit the
system to be switched off1 if the CO/Master believes transmitting AIS data may affect the safety or
security of his ship. EMCON/OPSEC issues are considered to be covered by this mandate.

(1) (NU) Although AIS is currently limited in its operation by VHF ranges, AIS sourced data is
routinely collected and distributed via the world-wide web. An AIS transmission can therefore be
easily tracked through a range of strategically important waters.

(2) (NU) In broad terms, AIS transmissions should be limited to the minimum required either by
use of radiation status indicator (RSI S (Silence)), using standard occasions for breaking silence
(including navigational safety) or RSI X where its use can be specified if required to support overt
operations or to comply with local regulations. As a rule of thumb, if VHF radio transmissions
in a given area would have included the use of ships’ names, then overt AIS transmissions will
generally be acceptable.

(3) (NU) EMCON Plans. AIS transmit capability should always be considered when developing
a unit or force EMCON plan.

(4) (NU) AIS Transmit Checks. For ships with AIS transmit capability, the following AIS
settings should be checked before sailing and at each watch handover.

(i) (NU) Compliance with EMCON Policy, CO’s and CTG’s orders/local port requirements.

(ii) (NU) Static data fields correct.

(iii) (NU) Dynamic data correct, particularly navigational status.

(iv) (NU) Voyage related data correct, however, destination, waypoints and ETA should
generally not be entered.

(e) (NU) AIS Operational Planning. Units conducting surveillance and Maritime Interdiction
Operations during recent operations have found AIS to be a particularly valuable tool, primarily as
a sensor, however it has a proven utility in the transmit mode also. The following paragraphs reflect
recent operational experience and are provided to assist exploitation of AIS within an operational
environment.

(1) (NU) AIS & Hailing. If AIS data is available within the force all ships can reduce dramatically
the requirement for VHF hailing. If hailing is required, named and/or call sign from AIS should be
used to enable a short and precise call. Experience has shown that “short calling” is appreciated
by merchant shipping. Care should also be taken to ensure that merchant ships are not subject to
repeated VHF hails from different warships; pre-assigned Link Special Track numbers can be used
within a force to indicate ships that have been hailed.

(2) (NU) ROE. Consideration should be given to incorporating AIS received data within the ROE
process. For example, if AIS received data from a specific contact conflicts with data received via
other sources (including visual) it may be considered that the requirements for a boarding have
been fulfiled.

1
(NU) SOLAS Chapter V reg 19-Annex A Para 1.

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(3) (NU) AIS Operating Modes. Three AIS operating modes have been identified:

(i) (NU) Covert. Used to deny own ship data and position to opposing force. This mode
should be adopted as much as possible but it should be noted that a non-AIS-transmitting
vessel may draw attention to itself if held by OPFOR ship or shore based sensor systems.

(ii) (NU) Generic. With some AIS equipment it is possible to adjust Static data in order
to deny specific unit data. In this case, a “generic” MMSI number (issued by the ITU) can
be inserted and ship’s name replaced with text appropriate to the scenario (e.g., MILITARY
VESSEL CONDUCTING INTERDICTION OPERATIONS. This mode may be appropriate in
TACSIT 2 (Force position known).

(iii) (NU) Overt. All own ship Unit ID transmitted. To be used when passing through
mandatory VHF reporting areas/traffic schemes or to support overt operations.

(4) (NU) Spoofing. In addition to the three modes described, there is potential for AIS to be
use to spoof, either through the transmission of false targets, false position of own ship, of false
static data. This capability may be available within some AIS equipment however, it should be
noted that AIS has been introduced to improve traffic monitoring, augment existing procedures for
collision avoidance and simplify ship/ship, ship/shore information exchange. The system should
therefore be operated in a fashion that is consistent with regulation for the Safety of Life at Sea.
The transmission of false information should be avoided unless considered operationally necessary
and approved by the Command.

(f) (NU) Dissemination of AIS Policy. Instructions for tactical employment of AIS within a
force, both in transmit and receive, should be incorporated within appropriate operational tasking
messages. Relevant messages may include the OPGEN and/or OPTASKs ASUW, MIO, EW. In order
to ensure that AIS is fully considered when planning operations and developing EMCON plans, AIS
capabilities should be reported to the OTC in the OPSTAT UNIT message.

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CHAPTER 8 Electronic and Acoustic Warfare

SECTION I—OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION

8100 Introduction and Scope

(NU) This chapter covers the basic procedures and instructions for electronic and acoustic warfare
together with emission policy and control. The ability of a military force, as part of the overall information
operations plan (see AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine), to make effective use of the electromagnetic and
acoustic spectrum while, at the same time, preventing or reducing the enemy use thereof, will play an
important part in deciding the outcome of any future conflict. A comprehensive and viable emission
plan together with capable electronic and acoustic warfare systems is as important as any other plan or
weapon system in a commander’s arsenal, and must be fully integrated into all military operations. For
the purpose of this chapter, EAW means electronic and/or acoustic warfare.
(NC) (NMP) Detailed electronic and acoustic warfare information is contained in ATP-31 and ATP-28,
Vol. I, respectively.
8101 Definitions

a. (NU) Electronic Warfare Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, which
encompasses the search for, the interception and the identification of the electromagnetic emissions,
the employment of the electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile
use of electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.

(NU) EW comprises three divisions:

(1) (NU) Electronic Warfare Support Measures. That division of EW involving action
taken to search for, intercept, and identify electromagnetic emissions and locate their sources
for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information required for
immediate decisions involving ECM, EPM, and other tactical actions.

(2) (NU) Electronic Countermeasure. That division of EW involving actions taken to

prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, through the use of
electromagnetic energy. There are three subdivisions of ECM—electronic jamming, electronic
deception, and electronic neutralization.

(3) (NU) Electronic Protective Measures. That division of EW involving actions taken
to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s use of the
electromagnetic energy. There are two subdivisions of EPM—active EPM and passive EPM.

(a) (NU) Active EPM. Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter parameters as
necessary, to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

(b) (NU) Passive EPM. Undetectable measures, such as operating procedures and technical
features of equipment, which are meant to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic
spectrum.

b. (NU) Electronic Order of Battle. A list of emitters used by a force or in a scenario with
specific information on the electromagnetic characteristics, parameters, location, and platforms of
these emitters.

c. (NU) Acoustic Warfare. Military action to use the underwater acoustic spectrum to the advantage
of friendly forces by exploiting enemy emissions and controlling friendly emissions.

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(NU) There are three divisions within AW:

(1) (NU) Acoustic Warfare Support Measures (AWSM). That division of AW involving
actions to search for, intercept, and identify radiated underwater acoustic energy for the purpose of
exploiting such radiation. The use of AWSM involves no intentional underwater acoustic emissions
and is generally not detectable by the enemy.

(2) (NU) Acoustic Countermeasures (ACM). That division of AW involving actions taken
to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. ACM involve
intentional underwater acoustic emissions for deception or jamming.

(3) (NU) Acoustic Protective Measures (APM). That division of AW involving actions
taken to ensure friendly effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum, despite the enemy’s
use of acoustic energy. APM involve anti-AWSM and anti-ACM, and may not involve underwater
acoustic emissions.

d. (NU) Acoustic Spectrum (Freq KHZ).

FROM TO
ULFA _ 0.001
ELFA 0.001 0.01
VLFA 0.01 0.75
LFA 0.75 3
MFA 3 15
HFA 15 100
VHFA 100 300
UHFA 300 500
SHFA 500 +

e. (NU) The three divisions of electronic and acoustic warfare are parallel and complementary.

f. (NU) Frequency Management. Ensure frequency deconfliction and coordination, with

particular concern that safety frequencies are adequately assigned, throughout the force.

8110 Direction and Coordination

8111 General

(NU) The OTC/CWC is responsible for EAW; he may delegate functions in Table 2-9 to an electronic
warfare coordinator and Table 2-5/2-9 to an ASWC. To best exploit its potential, EAW policies and
activities must be harmonized with other warfare policies and activities. The OTC/CWC promulgates
the EP for the force, which will be reflected in the EMCON plan. To accomplish the mission, the
electromagnetic and acoustic environment in which the force will operate is a major factor of the situation
assessment.
8112 Functions Which May Be Delegated to EWC/ASWC

a. (NU) Formulation of EMCON Plans. The EWC and the ASWC are the OTC’s/CWC’s principal
advisers on the formulation of his EP. Once the OTC/CWC promulgates the EP, the ASWC will develop
the acoustic portions of the EMCON plans and the EWC will develop the electronic portions. Both
portions will then be incorporated into the force EMCON plans, which will be coherent in intent and
support the EP.

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b. (NU) ESM/AWSM Activities. The EWC/ASWC assign the ESM/AWSM duties and guards as
appropriate. They perform the following functions, if delegated by the OTC/CWC:

(1) (NU) Issue the list of threat and target emitters (electronic order of battle (EOB)).

(2) (NU) Assign the ESM/AWSM duties and ESM/AWSM guards as appropriate.

(3) (NU) Coordinate with the AC/AREC/HEC for aircraft support, the OTC/CWC/SOCA for
submarine support, and/or the OTC/CWC for surface support.

(4) (NU) Coordinate and control ESM/AWSM activities on the appropriate net.

(5) (NU) Collect, evaluate, recognize/classify intercepts, and disseminate data.

(6) (NU) Correlate information obtained from own sensors with information available from other
sources.

(7) (NU) The EWC allocates racket numbers.

c. (NU) ECM/ACM Activities. The IWC with support from the EWC/ASWC will coordinate and
control ECM/ACM activities respectively within the force. Coordination with all warfare commanders
is required. They perform the following functions, if delegated by the OTC/CWC:

(1) (NU) ASWC will direct the employment of force decoys according to the policy formulated
by the OTC/CWC/IWC.

(2) (NU) The IWC will coordinate and direct the employment of active jamming and of electronic
neutralization devices according to the policy formulated by the OTC/CWC.

(3) (NU) IWC or ASWC will advise and direct the OTC/CWC on planned responses.

(4) (NU) IWC will coordinate with the AC/AREC/HEC for aircraft support, the OTC/CWC/
SOCA for submarine support, and/or the OTC/CWC for surface support.

(5) (NU) IWC will advise the OTC/CWC, the SC, and warfare commanders on unit disposition to
achieve the optimum balance between ECM/ACM effectiveness and countersurveillance posture.

(6) (NU) IWC will promulgate plans to conduct electronic/acoustic deception according to the
policy formulated by the OTC/CWC.

(7) (NU) The IWC will provide tasking of ECM aircraft.

d. (NU) EPM/APM Activities. The EWC manages, monitors, coordinates, and may control
EPM within the force. In particular, he monitors compliance with the EMCON plan and assesses
force electromagnetic interference (EMI) and force electromagnetic compatibility (EMC). The
ASWC carries out similar functions in APM. The EWC also manages the security aspect of force
communications.

e. (NU) Anti-Intruder Activity. The EWC and warfare commanders may advise the OTC/CWC of
anti-intruder policy in peacetime or periods of tension.

f. (NU) Cryptological Activity. The EWC advises the IWC (or OTC/CWC if no IWC assigned)
on the use of cryptological assets, both organic and nonorganic.

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8113 Individual Ship Responsibilities

a. (NU) Each commanding officer is responsible for the defence of his ship. Therefore, under direct
attack, he may lift electronic and acoustic emission restrictions as necessary for self-defence.

b. (NU) Detached Unit. When detached, the commanding officer becomes responsible for
formulating the EP related to the ordered task, within the framework of the OTC/CWC’s overall EP.

8120 Voice Reporting

8121 (NU) (NMP) Procedures

(NR) (NMP) Procedures for EW voice reporting are in APP-01; those for AW are in APP-1 and APP-11.
8122 EW Reporting of Confidence Levels

a. (NU) Recognition of electronic emitters can be difficult, either because transmissions are short, or
because transmitted parameters are common to many emitters. False reports may not only lower the
confidence of the command in EW, but also may cause wrong decisions. Therefore, an operator is to
indicate his confidence in his assessment of an intercept.

b. (NU) Confidence levels as indicated are to be used in voice reporting:

(1) (NU) Confidence 1: Doubtful. The operator is unsure about the recognition of an intercept
because it is based on estimated rather than measured information.

(2) (NU) Confidence 2: Possible. The operator has some reservations on the recognition
of an intercept because it is based on limited intercept information and/or falls within common
parameters of other emitters.

(3) (NU) Confidence 3: Probable. Recognition of an intercept based on measured parameters

which, although coinciding with those of the stated emitter, are common to some other enemy and/
or friendly emitters. The EWC may ask for the spot numbers of alternative emitters.

(4) (NU) Confidence 4: Certain. A recognition of an intercept based on measured parameters

which coincides accurately with those of the state emitter.

(NU) Normally the OTC/CWC/PWCs will indicate in their operational signals the confidence
level required for preplanned responses (e.g., SAU/SAG detachment, orders for engagement, etc.).

8123 EW Intercept Bearing Accuracy

(NU) Bearing accuracy of an intercept must be reported as soon as it can be estimated to permit triangulation
of the source emitter. Bearing accuracy of any radar jamming experienced should be reported. Accuracy
should be reported by use of suffixes detailed at Article 3207.

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SECTION II—(NU) (NMP) EMISSION POLICY

8200 (NU) (NMP) Considerations

a. (NC) (NMP) The EP dictates the degree of freedom allowed in the use of electronic and acoustic
emitters in a force, the choice of which will be decided by the OTC’s/CWC’s assessment and the
advantage which may be gained by the enemy from any interception of them. Silence on transmitters
is the normal condition and transmitting is the result of a deliberate decision to radiate. The resultant
EP should:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Reflect and support the OTC’s/CWC’s aim.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Take account of the threat, capabilities, and tactics of the enemy.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Cover all aspects of warfare and address all emissions including:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Electro-optical, bridge dial illumination, cigarette glows, de-icing equipment,
funnel exhaust, and signal projectors.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Radiated acoustic noise, including nonessential underwater transmissions,
operation of auxiliary machinery, cavitation, and nonessential crew activity.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Provide sufficient warning by the use of pickets or specific units on which to base
a change in the policy.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Allow for the reaction time of sensors and weapons that have been silent, and the
time it takes to build up a picture on which to fight effectively.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Allow for the ROE in force.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Reflect the relative disposition of maritime units and areas of operation of
supporting aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.

(8) (NC) (NMP) Allow for periodic systems checks and maintenance.

(9) (NC) (NMP) Be sufficient for subordinate commanders to construct and recommend appropriate
EMCON plans. (See Article 8301.)

8201 (NU) (NMP) Silent Emission Policy

(NC) (NMP) Transmissions should always be reduced to the absolute minimum required to achieve the
aim of the mission. The OTC/CWC must consider the advantages and disadvantages of a silent EP when
formulating the EP, and continuously review the need to transmit.
a. (NC) (NMP) Some advantages of silent EP are:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Deny passive information.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Conceal identity of specific units.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Assist own passive sensors.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Achieve surprise.

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(5) (NC) (NMP) Deny intelligence from communications.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Deny fire control solutions to weapons fired on passive data.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Support to antiradiation missile (ARM) measures.

(8) (NC) (NMP) Provoke enemy emissions/radiations.

b. (NC) (NMP) Some disadvantages of silent EP are:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Reduction of warning time and range if enemy is silent.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Reduction of tactical picture.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Risk of surprise.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Reduction of control and coordination.

8202 (NU) (NMP) Enemy Contact

(NC) (NMP) Once the enemy has been detected, it is important that the degree of relaxation correctly
relates to the degree of threat posed. Therefore, not all restrictions should necessarily be lifted at the first
indication of enemy presence.
8210 (NU) (NMP) Breaking Silence

(NC) (NMP) There are certain occasions when a commanding officer may break emission silence,
although by doing so he violates the plan in force. If he does, the OTC/CWC must be informed. The fact
that silence has been broken by a unit does not automatically change the policy in force. Any change
must be reflected in the EMCON plan and ordered by the OTC/CWC.
a. (NC) (NMP) Standard occasions for breaking emission silence, which may be modified by the
OTC/ CWC, are:

(1) (NC) (NMP) To engage an enemy detected near or within weapon release range in self-defence
or in close defence of a high-value unit (HVU).

(2) (NC) (NMP) To prevent imminent collision, grounding, or aircraft crash.

(3) (NC) (NMP) When released by planned responses.

b. (NC) (NMP) Standard occasions for breaking radio silence, which may be modified by the OTC/
CWC or aircraft controlling authority, are:

(1) (NC) (NMP) To report contact with the enemy.

(2) (NC) (NMP) To answer the authenticated call of a senior officer, including an instruction to
acknowledge immediately.

(3) (NC) (NMP) To transmit a distress message.

(4) (NC) (NMP) To prevent friendly units being fired upon by friendly forces. This includes
reporting of ETA by joining aircraft.

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(5) (NC) (NMP) To report urgent defects which might prevent accomplishment of assigned
mission.

(6) (NC) (NMP) During exercises, to make communication and position checks as required by
peacetime regulations.

c. (NC) (NMP) Examples of OTC’s/CWC’s modifications might include:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Reporting unidentified radar, sonar, and ESM detections.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Transmitting negative enemy contact reports.

8220 (NU) (NMP) Post-Attack EMCON and COMSEC

(NC) (NMP) On completion of any action that will have lifted restrictions on emissions and COMSEC,
the ASWC/CWC/EWC/IWC/OTC must ensure that a return to a firm control of EMCON is executed and
that COMSEC rules are reimposed. This is in order to deny the enemy post-attack analysis from passive
sensors and will require him to conduct post-attack reconnaissance by other means.

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SECTION III—EMISSION CONTROL (EMCON)

8300 EMCON Considerations

(NU) The overall EP is promulgated by operation order or signal and describes the policy in broad terms
with a brief explanation of rationale. It must be in sufficient detail for both subordinate commanders to
apply the EMCON plan and MHQ to plan support operations accordingly.
(NU) The detailed control for each type of emission is achieved by an EMCON plan covering all
emissions. The OTC/CWC should promulgate, well in advance, a number of plans covering all options
related to the tactical situation and anticipated changes.
The IWC if designated provides overall guidance and intent within the OPTASK IW to support the
EMCON plan. This may include generalized statements and planning considerations as to the intent for
emission control of sensors for the TG as the TG transits to/from its AOO. The IWC if designated also
clearly highlights his EMCON pre-planned responses (PPR) as the threat or tactical situations changes
and how emissions will be controlled.
(NU) The tactical situations (TACSIT) are listed below:
0 Unknown.
1 Forces located and targeted.
2 Force location known; disposition unknown.
3 Forces not located.
(NU) Table 8-1 contains the standard format of an EMCON plan. Methods of signalling EMCON are
explained below. Every effort should be made to ensure that air, surface, and subsurface units tasked in
support are aware of the force’s EMCON plan before arrival. In addition, the OTC/CWC should signal
the EMCON plan in force as part of the joining message.
8301 (NU) (NMP) EMCON Objectives
a. (NC) (NMP) The EMCON plan is derived from the emission policy and is used by the OTC/CWC
to control all emitters in order to:
(1) (NC) (NMP) Gain maximum information.
(2) (NC) (NMP) Deny information to the enemy.
b. (NC) (NMP) The EMCON plan must:
(1) (NC) (NMP) Include all emitters.
(2) (NC) (NMP) Be easy to interpret and understand.
(3) (NC) (NMP) Be in effect at all times.
8310 Construction of EMCON Plans
a. (NU) In the EMCON plan format (Table 8-1):
(1) (NU) Index Numbers are used to designate the columns assigned to each type of emitter.
Spare numbered columns should be used to designate specific emitters whenever it is necessary to
issue separate overriding instructions.
(2) (NU) Index Letters are used to designate the lines assigned to each type of unit. Spare
lettered lines may be used for particular units, or alternatively, a unit may be detailed to use a line
other than that normally applicable by using the appropriate signal group from ATP-01, Vol. II.

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 SEARCH AI/FC/GMC
RADARS NAVAIDS ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES
HEIGHT FINDERS

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
38
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
INDEX NUMBERS

39
130
EQUIPMENT

TACTICAL UNITS

INDEX LETTERS
ALL JAMMERS
C/D BAND JAMMERS
E/F BAND JAMMERS
G/H BAND JAMMERS
I BAND JAMMERS
J BAND JAMMERS
K BAND JAMMERS
CHAFF CHARLIE
ALL DECM
ECHO ENHANCERS
RADAR DECOYS
COMM JAMMERS

ALL BANDS
A/B BANDS
C/D BANDS
E/F BANDS
G/H BANDS
I BAND
J BAND
K BAND
CCA/ASI RADAR
ALL BANDS
IFF MODE 4 TRANSPONDER 37
RADAR TRANSPONDER

E/F BANDS
G/H BANDS
I BAND
J BAND
K BAND
ALL NAVAIDS
UHF/VHF BEACON
LF/MF BEACON
RAD ALT DOPPLER
IFF 1/2/3 INTERROGATOR
IFF 1/2/3 TRANSPONDER
IFF MODE 4 INTERROGATOR 36
TACAN
AIS
A AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
B CRUISERS
C DESTROYERS/FRIGATES
D PATROL BOATS
E MINESWEEPER/HUNTER
F SUBMARINES
G LANDING SHIP/CRAFT
H
I
J MAIN BODY
K SCREEN UNITS
L PICKETS

8-9
M UNREP GROUP
N AMPHIBIOUS GROUP
O MERCHANTS/CONVOY
P
Q HELICOPTERS
R ASW AIRCRAFT
S ATTACK AIRCRAFT
T AEW AIRCRAFT

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U MP AIRCRAFT
V RECON AIRCRAFT
W STRIKE AIRCRAFT
X TANKER AIRCRAFT
Y CAP AIRCRAFT
Z
AA
AB
Table 8-1. (NU) Basic EMCON Plan Format (Sheet 1 of 2)

AC
AD
AE
AF
AG
AH
NOTE
When index numbers are not sufficent, an OTC may allocate additional numbers within the equipment category by prefixing the numerical "1"
and repeating as much of the number series as is needed (for example, add 185, 186, and 187 under " radio communications" after 89)

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EDITION (H) VERSION (1) 8-10
ALL EQUIPMENT 60
FATHOMETERS 61
UW TELEPHONE 62
TOWED DECOYS 63
SIMULATORS 64
IND ACTIVE DECOYS 65
SONAR BELOW 6 KHz 66
SONAR 6 15 KHz 67
SONAR ABOVE 15 KHz 68
EER/ACTIVE SONOBUOYS 69
SONAR JAMMERS 70
PROPELLER CAVITATION 71
ACOUSTIC

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
ALL UHF COMM 80
LINK UHF 81
UHF SHIP/SHIP 82
UHF SHIP/AIR 83
VHF 84
ALL HF/MF COMM 85
HF/MF SHIP/SHIP 86
HF/MF SHIP/SHORE 87
RADIO

HF/MF SHIP/AIR 88
LINK MF/HF 89
EHF SATCOM 180
COMMUNICATIONS

SHF SATCOM 181

UHF SATCOM 182
COMMERCIAL SATCOM 183
CELLULAR TELEPHONE 184
VISUAL COMM (DIR) 90

NATO-UNCLASSIFIED
VISUAL COMM (OMNI) 91
STARSHELL/FLARES 92
PANEL/MARKER LGTS 93
IR DECOYS 94
ILLUMINATION IR 95
OPTICAL

IR COMM 96
LASERS 97
ELECTRO-OPTICAL

NAV/POSITION LGTS 98
99

PICKETS
CRUISERS

MAIN BODY
SUBMARINES

MP AIRCRAFT
HELICOPTERS

CAP AIRCRAFT
PATROL BOATS

UNREP GROUP
SCREEN UNITS

AEW AIRCRAFT
ASW AIRCRAFT
EQUIPMENT

STRIKE AIRCRAFT
RECON AIRCRAFT
ATTACK AIRCRAFT

TANKER AIRCRAFT
AMPHIBIOUS GROUP
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
INDEX NUMBERS

LANDING SHIP/CRAFT

MERCHANTS/CONVOY
TACTICAL UNITS

MINESWEEPER/HUNTER
DESTROYERS/FRIGATES

I
J

Z
T
F

Y
X
V
S
P
K
E
B
A

U
R
N
H
D
C

Q
O
G

AF
AE
AB
AA
INDEX LETTERS

AH
AD
AC

AG
Table 8-1. (NU) Basic EMCON Plan Format (Sheet 2 of 2)
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b. (NU) The status of emissions required or allowed for each type of emitter by each type of unit
should be defined using a RSI from Table 8-2. RSIs provide sufficient flexibility to meet most
situations. A blank space in any EMCON plan is equivalent to the RSI “S” (silence). EMCON plans
can be ordered and/or amended by Operation Order or MTMS directives, or by using signal groups
from ATP-01, Vol. II, and signalled to aircraft by using the appropriate brevity code word. Generally,
original EMCON plans are designated by letters; for example, EMCON plan ALFA. Modified plans are
designated by the same letter as the original plan, followed by sequence number of the modification;
for example, EMCON plan ALFA ONE, ALFA TWO. Each modified plan should be considered to be
a separate EMCON plan. Units should keep a copy of each modified EMCON plan in order to be able
to revert to an earlier plan if required.

Table 8-2. (NU) Radiation Status Indicators

The following RSIs indicate when equipment may be operated without seeking the OTC/CWC’s
permission, or operated outside the standard occasions for breaking silence:
A Aircraft May be operated if essential for safe operation of aircraft and
helicopters.
B Night Between sunset and sunrise.
C Day Between sunrise and sunset.
D Distance When clear of nearest friendly unit or position designated. Distance
to be specified in miles (e.g., D30).
E Essential Transmission Essential transmissions may be made without seeking the
OTC/CWC’s permission. (Note 1)
G Guard To be operated or guarded (COMMS) by unit designated on behalf
of other units. (Note 2)
S Silence No emissions permitted without the permission of the OTC/CWC
or in accordance with the standard occasions for breaking silence.
Equipment that “leaks” in dummy load or in standby should be
switched off. (Note 3)
T Reduced Output Brilliance/output level reduced to the minimum level required for
safety and/or to obtain the required operational results.
U Transmitter Permitted Transmissions may be made. (Note 1)
X Specific Emissions The TCO/CWC must specify when the emitter may be used.
(Note 4)
NOTES:
1. Units should transmit for as short a time as possible to achieve the aim and should avoid emitters
that cause interference. Sonars may use random mode, scale, power, and frequency changes.
2. Details of guard ships and how they transmit information (e.g., data link) should be outlined in the
EP. The EMCON plan must ensure that guard ships are provided with the means to transfer data to
the force. Guardship duties can be rotated at irregular intervals between appropriate units. RSI “G”
for communications should detail one unit for a named circuit (e.g., radar guard ship RSI “G” for HF
JAAWSC). This should not be confused with setting watch on circuits as detailed in the OPTASK
COMMS.
3. A blank space in any EMCON plan is equivalent to the RSI “S” (silence).
4. XRAY is to be used to indicate unique occasions when an emitter may be used outside the standard
occasions for breaking silence and the occasions governed by the other RSIs. These may be, for
example, the deployment of decoys against radar satellites, the use of FC radars for height finding, or
the use of IFF systems. The OTC/CWC is to specify these occasions for each column.
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8320 (NU) (NMP) Emission Diagrams

a. (NC) (NMP) If the OTC/CWC needs emission diagrams, they should be promulgated within the
operation order or as part of the EMCON plan. The following factors should be considered when
preparing emission diagrams:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Duration of each transmission period. Whenever possible, the duration of
transmission should be varied to reduce the probability of intercept.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Random selection of emitters which operate at different frequencies. This reduces
the probability of intercept.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Time required for the various emitters to go from a standby to radiate condition.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Percentage of active acoustic and/or radar search required to meet mission
objectives.

b. (NC) (NMP) An example emission diagram is provided in Figure 8-1.

Emit (radar device) in intervals:

Minutes Frequency Power (percent)
00–10 D1 100
10–15 D3 50
15–18 D4 100
18–26 D2 100
26–38 D1 50
38–44 D3 100
44–55 D2 50
55–60 D4 100

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 8-1. (NU) (NMP) Emission Diagram Example

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SECTION IV—(NU) (NMP) ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC WARFARE TASKING

8400 (NU) (NMP) Tasking Objectives

a. (NC) (NMP) The objective of EAW tasking is to ensure that:

(1) (NC) (NMP) All emissions likely to be intercepted are covered by detection and analysis
facilities.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Active assets (e.g., ECM, active sonar, decoys, etc.) are deployed, briefed, and,
where appropriate, pre-tuned to counter the threat.

b. (NC) (NMP) Overall tasking policy is the responsibility of the OTC/CWC and should be adjusted
to meet changes in the tactical situation and equipment availability. The EWC through the IWC, when
implemented, and on behalf of the OTC/CWC, is responsible for the promulgation of, and changes to,
EW tasking signals. The ASWC, with support from the IWC, when implemented, is responsible for
the allocation, disposition, and tasking of acoustic resources.

8401 (NU) (NMP) Electronic Warfare Tasking

a. (NC) (NMP) Tasking Format. EW tasking is simplified by using a graphic format (such as the
one shown in Figure 8-2).

b. (NC) (NMP) Tasking Message. The EW tasking message is contained in APP-11.

8410 (NU) (NMP) ESM Tasking

a. (NC) (NMP) Factors To Be Considered. The EWC should take into account the following
factors before issuing his tasking instructions:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Characteristics of enemy equipment, especially of threat emitters. Care should be
taken to avoid operator overload. In an expected dense signal environment, tasking of significant
target radars should be added to threat radars.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Number, capabilities, and limitations of ESM equipment and associated platforms
in the force.

(3) (NC) (NMP) The disposition of units. There may be conflict between the requirements of
different warfare areas.

(4) (NC) (NMP) The priority of communications intercepts versus radar intercepts.

(5) (NC) (NMP) The number of communication circuits available.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Duration of the operation, if known.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Own emission policy.

b. (NC) (NMP) Equipment Characteristics Affecting Tasking. Considerations affecting

tasking of individual items of ESM equipment are:

(1) (NC) (NMP) High-probability, wideband, instantaneous frequency measurement equipment

should normally be tasked to cover the whole of their bands and/or one of the subbands, if
applicable.

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TARGET RADAR
THREAT RADAR
EW TASKING FORM
FREQUENCY (MHz)

2400 2600 2800 2900 3000 3900 4000

SPOT NO. NAME 2300 2500 2700 2850 2950 3300 3600 3950 4500

01134 (BN AS 15) X

T
01227 CROWN NEST X
H
03111 EGGHEAD X
R 03112 EYEGLASS X

E 03312 HEADBAND X

A 03525 STRONGHOLD X
03701 FINGERTIP X
T

UNIT EQUIPMENT TASKING FROM 050800Z TO 060800Z

E NORFOLK UAF

K. DOORMAN APECS II
S
0. FISHER DESMO
M
E3D LORAL

UNIT EQUIPMENT TASKING FROM 050800Z TO 060800Z

C EA6B ALQ-99

Notes: 1. The names and spot numbers are fictitious and only E/F band is shown.
2. Arrowheads indicate jammer tasking spot frequency.
3. ESM/ECM tasking is illustrative and does not reflect actual system capability.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 8-2. (NU) (NMP) EW Tasking Format

(2) (NC) (NMP) Low-probability narrowband equipment should be tasked to cover a portion of a
frequency band.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Units with automated recognition/classification equipment should be tasked to
the frequency range of threat emitters.

c. (NC) (NMP) Threat and Target Emitters. A threat emitter is an emitter normally associated
with a weapon system, the detection of which might indicate that an attack on the force is imminent
or in progress. A target emitter is an emitter, the detection of which would indicate the presence of
enemy forces.

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d. (NC) (NMP) Threat and Target Emitter List (EOB). The OTC/CWC is to issue a list of
threat and target emitters in the tasking message. The list of threat emitters will vary according to
the intelligence available and the tactical situation. Attention must be paid to the fact that some
surveillance emitters can be used for targeting purposes and their data used to assist missile launch.
Therefore, they are regarded as both target and threat emitters, depending on the tactical situation.

8411 (NU) (NMP) ECM Tasking

a. (NC) (NMP) Factors To Be Considered when tasking ECM equipment:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Characteristics of enemy equipment.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Number and disposition of jamming, deception, and neutralization platforms.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Characteristics of own equipment. Some jammers are ineffective against modern
guidance and homing systems, whilst others are for self-protection only.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Jammers should be tasked as far as possible to the emitters against which the
ship’s ESM equipment is tasked.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Emission policy.

b. (NC) (NMP) ECM Systems. These systems are divided into two main categories as follows:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Area Defence Systems. These are the systems that are tasked at force level.
Systems include force decoys and high-power noise and repeater jammers that may be capable of
screening units other than the jamming platform. The decoy deployment policy will be established
by the OTC/CWC and promulgated by operation order or signal.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Self-Defence Systems. Self-defence systems include chaff launchers (for
both deception and seduction), IR and ARM decoys, and various types of jammers. As self-defence
systems, employment of these assets resides with individual ships, unless otherwise ordered.

c. (NC) (NMP) Planned Responses. The OTC/CWC may order planned responses to be used
in reaction to threats. These pre-planned responses may be amplified within the OPTASK IW or
OPTASK EW if directed by the OTC. When these are initiated, ships carry out the appropriate ECM
responses. Careful consideration should be given to planned responses when one or more area defence
jammers are in force. Specific tasking instructions should always be given in this instance.

8420 (NU) (NMP) Acoustic Warfare Tasking

(NC) (NMP) The following factors should be considered in the allocation, disposition, and tasking of
acoustic warfare resources:
a. (NC) (NMP) Anticipated threat, including emission characteristics of enemy forces.

b. (NC) (NMP) Number and capabilities of own acoustic assets, including submarines and aircraft.

c. (NC) (NMP) Predicted detection ranges for active and passive equipment, and predicted intercept
ranges for active sonars.

d. (NC) (NMP) Radiated self-noise, including its effect upon own detection ranges, and assessed
detection ranges by enemy passive equipment.

e. (NC) (NMP) Emission policy.

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SECTION V—EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC

SUPPORT MEASURES

8500 Interception, Detection, and Direction Finding of Transmissions

a. (NU) The objective of ESM/AWSM search is to provide the tactical advantage of “first sighting”
by passive means. The first indication of an enemy’s presence may be provided by interception of his
emissions. In addition, early interception allows the timely preparation of countermeasures.

b. (NU) In order to conduct ESM/AWSM search for an enemy, complete and continuous coverage
of the frequency spectrum is required together with as wide a geographic dispersion of intercept
equipment as possible.

c. (NU) Intelligence sources may provide information on the frequencies emitted by the enemy and,
in certain cases, give actual frequencies used, or likely to be used. It is, therefore, possible for the
OTC/CWC to organize ESM/AWSM search to cover specific frequencies.

8510 Electromagnetic Interference of Search Equipment by Own Transmissions

a. (NU) Interference caused by radiations from electronic transmitters of ships in company may
reduce the effectiveness of passive sensors. Radars, in particular, by reason of their short pulses at peak
power, produce powerful harmonics that can make reception in a sensitive search receiver difficult in
adjacent bands, and almost impossible in the same band. It is possible to reduce this interference by
using a very narrow bandwidth, a filter, or a suppression device in the receiver. This may result in a
corresponding loss of intercept probability.

b. (NU) Interference may also be caused by accidental radiations, such as sparking in motors or
generators, or by lack of EMC.

8511 Acoustic Interference of Search Equipment by Own Transmissions

a. (NU) Interference caused either by own ship’s radiated noise or by active sonar transmissions can
reduce the effectiveness of sonar receivers both in own ship and other units in a force.

(1) (NU) Own ship’s radiated noise is sound that is inadvertently transmitted into the water,
predominantly by machinery, cavitation from propellers, ship’s movement, and flow noise. These
can be exacerbated by man-made noises caused by unsecured equipment and electrical/electronic
circuits in the ship. Radiated noise can be reduced but not eliminated by good husbandry of
machinery and propellers and general securing of equipment throughout the ship.

(2) (NU) Sonar transmissions can cause mutual interference with other units operating in the same
vicinity, particularly when two frequencies are close. This can be received directly or through
reverberations that increase background noise. Interference can be reduced by placing units with
similar sonar frequencies on opposite sides of the screen.

b. (NU) Passive sonar can be confused by high acoustic levels; for example, units in a departure
screen streaming noisemakers/operating echo sounders/transmitting on underwater telephone could
mask the acoustic signature of a heavy unit passing through the area from a listening submarine.

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8520 (NU) (NMP) Recording Enemy Emissions

(NC) (NMP) The recording of enemy emissions provides valuable information for intelligence databases.
Every opportunity to record received emissions should be exploited. The data will be held in national and
NATO databases like the NATO Emitter Database (NEDB). The NEDB is the primary source of data for
noncommunication emitters.
8530 (NU) (NMP) Localization and Analysis of Enemy Emissions

8531 (NU) (NMP) General

(NC) (NMP) Once an unknown emitter has been detected, immediate action is required to provide
early warning of possible enemy threats. The unknown emitter should be recognized/classified using
all parameters available. Its location should be determined by triangulation. Speed is of the essence and
timely early warning may not permit a detailed analysis.
8532 (NU) (NMP) Recognition, Classification, and Identification

a. (NC) (NMP) Recognition or classification is aided by:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Comparing parameters with current intelligence (or friendly equipment
characteristics) by manual or computer-assisted search of threat libraries.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Correlating data with data derived from other sensors.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Correlating data with intelligence information.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Operators’ experience.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Contact motion analysis.

b. (NC) (NMP) Identification of an emitter may not be possible at this early stage without further
analysis or because of ambiguities. In such cases, the emitter must be treated as an unknown.

8533 (NU) (NMP) Disposition of Units

(NC) (NMP) When stationing units, the following factors should be taken into account for localization:
a. (NC) (NMP) To obtain satisfactory triangulation, a broad baseline is necessary. Useful bearing cuts
are between about 30 degrees and 150 degrees. The optimum length of the baseline will depend on
the sensitivity and bearing accuracy of the equipment. To conduct triangulation, ESM units need to
communicate. This may be restricted by the emission policy in force, unless a standard occasion for
breaking radio silence can be invoked.

b. (NC) (NMP) To avoid mutual interference it may be necessary for units conducting passive search
to be separated from those using emitters in the same frequency band. Alternatively, emitters may be
directed to transmit away from passive search units.

c. (NC) (NMP) The need to have adequate cover in the direction of a known threat.

d. (NC) (NMP) The requirement to meet other needs, such as sonar and radar coverage, or
communications and weapon range.

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SECTION VI—(NU) (NMP) EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC

COUNTERMEASURES

8600 (NU) (NMP) Employment of Electronic and Acoustic Countermeasures

a. (NC) (NMP) General. ECM/ACM is action taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use
of the electromagnetic and acoustic spectrums. There are three subdivisions of ECM/ACM: jamming,
deception, and neutralization.

b. (NC) (NMP) Employment.

(1) (NC) (NMP) ECM/ACM are weapon systems and must be coordinated with other weapons to
counter air, surface, and subsurface threats. They involve deliberate reflection, jamming, radiation,
or reradiation of emissions and are detectable by the enemy. They are further divided into area and
self-defence countermeasures.

(2) (NC) (NMP) ECM/ACM can be used against all enemy emissions, including communications,
and can contribute significantly to the defence of a force under attack. They provide the OTC
with the ability to deny or, at least, reduce the effectiveness of enemy coordination, control,
communications, reconnaissance, and weapons systems. When employed against missiles or
homing torpedoes, ECM/ACM can be used for confusion, distraction, and seduction.

8610 (NU) (NMP) Jamming

(NC) (NMP) The deliberate radiation, reradiation, or reflection of emissions with the object of impairing
the use of communications, sensors, and weapons being used by an enemy.
8611 (NU) (NMP) The Objective and Effects of Jamming

a. (NC) (NMP) The objective of jamming is to reduce the fighting effectiveness of the enemy by
degrading the overall performance of his communications, sensors, and weapons systems.

b. (NC) (NMP) The following effects may also take place:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Create an additional load on the enemy’s other electronic and acoustic facilities.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Cause confusion to the enemy’s operators.

c. (NC) (NMP) Successful jamming is dependent upon knowledge of the enemy’s command, control
and communications and his weapon systems.

8612 (NU) (NMP) Jamming Considerations

(NC) (NMP) When jamming, the following should be considered:

a. (NC) (NMP) Loss of Tactical Surprise. The start of jamming may give the first warning to the
enemy of own presence or of the imminence of operations.

b. (NC) (NMP) Localization. The enemy can DF or localize the jamming transmitter. Since certain
weapons have a home-on-jam capability, the operation of jammers must be carefully considered.

c. (NC) (NMP) Interference With Own Units and Equipment. Jammers may interfere with:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Friendly equipment using similar frequencies in the vicinity of the jammer.

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(2) (NC) (NMP) Internal devices within the jamming unit.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Decoy effectiveness.

d. (NC) (NMP) JAMWARN. In order to minimise the impact of jamming on friendly forces
consideration should be given to the issuing of a jamming warning IAW APP-11.

8613 (NU) (NMP) Control of Electronic Jamming

a. (NC) (NMP) Subject to policies established by appropriate higher authority, the responsibility
for the control and organization of jamming rests with the OTC/CWC, although in some cases this
function may be delegated to the EWC.

b. (NC) (NMP) The OTC/CWC should order:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Transmissions that may be jammed without further orders.

(2) (NC) (NMP) The range beyond which jammers should not be used for fear of premature
disclosure.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Frequency bands in which jammers should be prepared to jam.

c. (NC) (NMP) The arrangements for jamming should be such that all important enemy targets are
covered. When sufficient units are available, jamming guards should be detailed in pairs.

d. (NC) (NMP) The two methods of jammer control are:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Positive—The OTC/CWC or delegated authority will control the use of all
equipment in the force.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Veto—Units employ their own equipment, keeping the OTC/CWC or delegated
authority informed. The OTC/CWC or delegated authority may override the actions.

8620 (NU) (NMP) Communications Jamming

a. (NC) (NMP) Jamming of communications, more than any other type of jamming, is subject to
policies established by higher authorities.

b. (NC) (NMP) Although special equipment may be designed for jamming communications, it is
possible to use normal communication transmitters, provided the transmission is suitably modulated.

c. (NC) (NMP) The omnidirectional nature of most communication antennas leaves them vulnerable
to jamming from any direction. The jamming antenna is also normally omnidirectional, so that
multiple targets can be jammed when desired.

d. (NC) (NMP) The effectiveness of jamming will depend on:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Relative positions of the jammer, transmitter, and receiving stations.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Power of the jammer and communication transmitters.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Type of communication signal that is being jammed.

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8630 (NU) (NMP) Deception

(NC) (NMP) The deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, or reflection of energy in a manner intended
to mislead an enemy in the interpretation or use of information received by his sensors. If deception is to
be effective, careful coordination is required to ensure that all sources of information to the enemy give
the same misleading picture.
8631 (NU) (NMP) Active Deception

a. (NC) (NMP) Deception repeaters are either on-board or off-board systems that return a false echo
to the receiver. They use echo enhancement, false target generation, and break-lock techniques. The
echoes may be altered to change range, bearing, and number or size of echoes. Deception can be:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Manipulative—By changing the characteristics of single pulses.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Imitative—By processing pulses without altering their characteristics or
generating new pulses with similar characteristics.

b. (NC) (NMP) Noise jammers introduce energy into an enemy sensor to create a deceptive threat
axis or mask own intentions.

8632 (NU) (NMP) Passive Deception

(NC) (NMP) The introduction of alternative echoes into an enemy’s sensor to mislead an operator or
weapon system. These echoes may be produced by decoys.
8650 (NU) (NMP) Electronic Neutralization

(NC) (NMP) The deliberate use of electromagnetic energy to either temporarily or permanently damage
enemy devices that rely exclusively on the electromagnetic spectrum. This implies the use of directed
energy systems. See AJP-3.6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, for additional information.

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SECTION VII—EMPLOYMENT OF ELECTRONIC AND ACOUSTIC PROTECTIVE

MEASURES

8700 General

a. (NU) The friendly use of the electronic and acoustic spectrums, with minimum risk of detection by
the enemy, is achieved as follows:

(1) (NU) The OTC/CWC issues his EP.

(2) (NU) The EP is promulgated, taking into account current communication or emission security
(COMSEC/EMSEC) guidance.

(3) (NU) The IWC (if designated)/spectrum manager produces EMCON/frequency management
plans, based on the EP, that friendly units should adhere to, unless released by standard occasions
for breaking radio silence, for instance.

b. (NU) Enemy ECM/ACM can be protected against by technical and tactical antijam measures.

8710 (NU) (NMP) EPM/APM Considerations

(NC) (NMP) The following factors and measures to counter enemy ESM/AWSM should be considered:
a. (NC) (NMP) Atmospheric and oceanographic conditions.

b. (NC) (NMP) Directional transmissions.

c. (NC) (NMP) Frequency management (e.g., frequency shifting, use of nonionospheric propagation,
and use of LPI techniques.

d. (NC) (NMP) The extent to which communications circuits may be used and the degree of security
required.

e. (NC) (NMP) Use of minimum power.

f. (NC) (NMP) Reduction of transmissions, including intermittent policy and avoiding the use of
unique emitters.

g. (NC) (NMP) Technical alteration of emission parameters.

h. (NC) (NMP) Use of War Reserve Modes (WARM).

8720 (NU) (NMP) Reducing the Effectiveness of ECM/ACM

(NC) (NMP) The enemy’s use of ECM/ACM can be protected against by using measures against
jamming, deception, and neutralization.
8721 (NU) (NMP) Reducing the Effectiveness of Jamming

(NC) (NMP) Measures to protect against jamming include:

a. (NC) (NMP) Destruction of the jammer.

b. (NC) (NMP) Dissemination of accurate information from unjammed units.

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c. (NC) (NMP) Disposition of assets.

d. (NC) (NMP) Technical EPM/APM measures in equipment.

e. (NC) (NMP) Frequency shifting (see Table 8-3).

f. (NC) (NMP) Communication antijam plans.

g. (NC) (NMP) Sensor antijam plans.

h. (NC) (NMP) Frequency diversity.

8722 (NU) (NMP) Measures Against Deception

(NC) (NMP) Protective measures against deception include:

a. (NC) (NMP) Frequency diversity.

b. (NC) (NMP) Exchange and comparison of data within a force to eliminate false information.

c. (NC) (NMP) Disposition of assets.

d. (NC) (NMP) Use of technical EPM/APM measures.

e. (NC) (NMP) Frequency shifting and authentication of communication circuits.

f. (NC) (NMP) Discreet identification.

8723 Reducing the Effectiveness of Electronic Neutralization

(NU) Measures to protect against electronic neutralization include:

a. (NU) Physical protection.

b. (NU) Technical EPM features.

8724 (NU) (NMP) Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference

a. (NC) (NMP) Meaconing is the deception of a navigation aid, such as TACAN or distance measuring
equipment, with the aim of decoying an aircraft from its intended course or destination. The term
“meaconing” can also be applied to the seduction of mobile SATCOM aerials by an airborne platform.
In both cases, meaconing is achieved by transmitting an alternative signal. In intrusion, an enemy
gains access to a communication system (voice or data link) and manages to insert false data or
instructions. Jamming and interference normally involve the use of electromagnetic energy to degrade
communication and radar/weapon systems to varying degrees.

b. (NC) (NMP) Whenever a meaconing, intrusion, jamming and interference (MIJI) incident is
experienced, the OTC/IWC (if designated) and EWC should be informed immediately. The EWC
should attempt to identify the source of the MIJI, so that the necessary actions can be taken to
reduce the effects. The area electronic warfare coordination cell (EWCC) may be able to assist in the
identification of MIJI sources.

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Table 8-3. (NU) (NMP) Standard Communication Antijam Measures/Procedures

MEASURE DESIGNATOR

Frequency shift to column or frequency(ies) on circuit(s) nominated. ONE

Start parallel keying on additional column(s) or frequency(ies) ordered. TWO

Change from current column to nominated column in COMPLAN ordered. THREE

Change from day to night or night to day frequency as appropriate. FOUR

OTC/CWC will direct units to part of radio spectrum clear of jamming after FIVE
ESM search.

Activate TF/TG MF. SIX

Set watch on UWT. SEVEN

Revert to morse on this circuit. EIGHT

NOTES:
1. Procedures for this use of antijam measures are contained in APP-01.
2. Measure may be ordered on the affected circuit or any other usable circuit, on the antijam
coordination circuit, or by prearranged visual or acoustic signal.
3. Where possible, one station is to remain on the affected circuit(s) to occupy the jammer.

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SECTION VIII—(NU) (NMP) AREAWIDE ELECTRONIC WARFARE COORDINATION

8800 (NU) (NMP) Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell

a. (NC) (NMP) EW impacts on all warfare activities. This impact has necessitated the creation of
an at-sea EWC. The EWC, working under the IWC (if designated), coordinates the activities of EW
assets within the force. It is essential that both at-sea and shore-based commanders at all levels have
experienced EW staffs to coordinate areawide EW assets and activities. To provide this intercommand
coordination function, an EWCC should be established by a commander in his area of responsibility
(AOR) when a joint force or more than one force is employed, thereby maximizing the impact of
limited EW resources.

b. (NC) (NMP) The EWCC is the IWC’s (if designated) mechanism for coordinating EW assets
within his AOR. It will be established as an integral part of the operations staff at the level(s) deemed
appropriate to support the operation, and will provide the means of coordinating all EW activities.

c. (NC) (NMP) EW efforts of the force managed by the EWC will be coordinated by the EWCC
with those of all other forces in the IWC’s (if designated) AOR to achieve overall control of the
electromagnetic spectrum. These coordination actions executed by the IWC (if designated) with the
support from his EWCC will serve to support the commander’s overall operational plan.

8801 (NU) (NMP) EWCC Responsibilities

(NC) (NMP) Consistent with the resources available, EWCC responsibilities include but are not
necessarily limited to:
a. (NC) (NMP) Planning.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Prepare EW aspects of operations plans, orders, and databases, including
recommendations on ROE for EW and NATO Precautionary System (NPS) measures.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Make recommendations to the IWC (if designated) on tasking component
commanders to provide EW support as required.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Identify requirements for intelligence support to EW operations.

b. (NC) (NMP) Coordination.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Coordinate activities of joint and single-Service EW components.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Coordinate administrative, logistic, and communication support to EW resources.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Recommend EW targets that support the commander’s C2W and information
operations plan.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Coordinate and prioritise requests for EW support.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Request EW support.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Coordinate EW mutual support.

(7) (NC) (NMP) In coordination with other cells and agencies, develop, update, and maintain
comprehensive EW databases.

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c. (NC) (NMP) Monitoring.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Ensure that all possible sources of EW information are exploited.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Ensure timely dissemination of EW-derived data.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Assist the IWC (if designated) in assessing the effects of hostile and friendly EW,
and aid the communication and information systems (CIS) staff in frequency deconfliction.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Maintain a current assessment of the EW resources available to the IWC (if
designated).

(5) (NC) (NMP) Disseminate tactical EOB updates obtained by nonorganic assets to subordinate
EW units.

d. (NC) (NMP) Direction.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Allocation of EW resources.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Implementation of EW plans.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Supervision of EW procedures.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Supervision of force EPM, including revising the Emissions Policy.

8802 (NU) (NMP) Additional EWCC Considerations

a. (NC) (NMP) The EWCC will continually collect and process information relevant to the conduct
of operations. This will include maintenance of comprehensive databases for:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Electronic order of battle.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL).

(3) (NC) (NMP) Areawide military, civil, and civilian frequency spectrum usage.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Friendly and enemy EW equipment capabilities.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion incidents.

b. (NC) (NMP) These databases will be valuable tools for both afloat and ashore commanders,
particularly in the areas of frequency management and tasking of limited EW resources.

c. (NC) (NMP) A fundamental responsibility of the EWCC is development of a JRFL to map use of
the electromagnetic spectrum within the area. It is composed of:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Taboo frequencies— Friendly frequencies on which jamming or other intentional
interference is prohibited.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Protected frequencies—Friendly frequencies on which interference is prohibited.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Guarded frequencies—Enemy frequencies used as a source of information and
on which jamming is therefore controlled.

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d. (NC) (NMP) The JRFL is vital to prevention of unintentional interference and assists in optimizing
the use of limited resources. The list is continually updated by the EWCC staff, who have specific
knowledge of operational requirements.

e. (NC) (NMP) The EWCC will maintain the JRFL for its AOR. It will need access to the radar
frequency and communications plans of any in-area maritime force(s) to resolve the inevitable
conflicts. This two-way flow of information is vital to the prevention of fratricide.

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PART III Above Water Warfare

Chapter 9—Antisurface Warfare

Chapter 10—Anti-air Warfare

Chapter 11—Naval Cooperation and Guidance

for Shipping

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CHAPTER 9 Antisurface Warfare

SECTION I—GENERAL

9100 General

a. (NU) This chapter contains tactical and procedural instructions for ships (including submarines)
and aircraft when operating against enemy surface forces. Its purpose is to:

(1) (NU) Specify tactics and procedures in antisurface operations.

(2) (NU) Enable commanders to issue orders and instructions to fulfil their responsibilities.

(3) (NU) Enable subordinates to understand and comply with orders and instructions received.

b. (NR) (NMP) Background information on antisurface warfare is contained in ATP-31.

9101 Definitions in ASUW Operations

(NU) ASUW operations may be split into two distinctive types of operations. These are defined as
follows:
a. (NU) Theatre ASUW Operations. These operations are conducted in a geographical area
unrelated to the protection of a specific surface force. These operations may be offensive or defensive
in areas where it may be possible for surface units to conduct surface/land attacks.

b. (NU) Integrated ASUW Operations. These operations are controlled by the task force/group
commander for his local area within an AOR and are designed to provide ASUW support to a force/
group at sea.

9102 Command in Antisurface Warfare

(NU) The regional component commander/OTC/CWC may delegate to the antisurface warfare
commander (ASUWC) the authority necessary to plan ASUW operations, to establish ASUW policy
and to control assigned ASUW assets to implement in the ASUW plan. The ASUWC’s superior retains
ultimate control with the option of command by veto. The OTC’s functions in surface warfare, including
those that may be delegated to the ASUWC, are summarized in Table 2-4.
a. (NU) Theatre ASUWC. Is responsible to the regional component commander for the conduct of
ASUW operations throughout his AOR, directs area-wide offensive ASUW operations, and provides
the supporting forces needed by task groups afloat for ASUW operations. The regional component
ASUWC collects, evaluates and disseminates regional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
information to the regional component commander and task groups operating in his AOR. He functions
as the operational control authority for assigned assets (for the regional component commander).

b. (NU) Task Force/Group ASUWC. Is responsible for the conduct of ASUW within the task
force/group. When CWC concept is being used, the task force/group ASUWC is responsible to the
CWC for the protection of the force against threats. He collects, evaluates and disseminates ASUW
surveillance information to the CWC, regional component ASUWC and the force. He also plans and
executes TACON of task force/group ASUW resources and coordinates with supporting commanders
and reports to the regional component ASUWC.

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9103 Definitions of ASUW Support Operations

a. (NU) Associated Support (AS). Units conducting ASUW for the regional component ASUWC
in AS are operating independently of a specified TF/TG, but may be tasked to provide contact
information to and receive intelligence from an OTC under the OPCON of a regional commander,
who coordinates tasking and movement in response to the OTC’s requirements.

b. (NU) Direct Support (DS). Unit(s) conducting DS are those in which the designated unit
provides ASUW support to a specified TF/TG. Tactical control of unit(s) in DS is exercised by the
OTC of the force being supported or a designated subordinate.

9104 Force Track Coordinator Surface and Subsurface

(NU) The OTC may delegate surface and subsurface surveillance to one of the warfare commanders.
They in turn can assign a FTC. In principle the designated force track coordinator surface and subsurface
perform the tasks described in Chapter 7, Article 7214.
9105 Concept of Antisurface Warfare

a. (NU) Antisurface warfare must make full use of the offensive potential of own surface, submarine,
and air forces in order to deny the enemy effective use of his surface forces.

b. (NU) Antisurface operations by surface ships and submarines include all actions to combat enemy
surface forces. In the case of an offensive antisurface action, a SAG will be formed. A SAG may
comprise surface ships and/or submarines. If the action is of a defensive nature, the OTC may either
detach a SAG to counter the surface threat, maintain the integrity of the force, or avoid any action
by altering course with the whole force, depending upon the significance of the surface threat as
compared to the air and subsurface threats.

c. (NU) Forces Employed. Antisurface operations may be carried out by:

(1) (NU) Ships.

(2) (NU) Fast patrol boats.

(3) (NU) Fixed-wing aircraft.

(4) (NU) Helicopters.

(5) (NU) Submarines.

(6) (NU) Coastal batteries (tactics and procedures are a national responsibility).

(7) (NU) Mining (see ATP-06).

(8) (NU) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs.)

(9) (NU) Coastal Radar Stations.

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NOTE
(NU) SUBMARINE OPERATIONS ARE NOT DEALT WITH IN THIS
CHAPTER. SAFETY PRECAUTIONS TO BE OBSERVED WHEN
COOPERATING WITH SUBMARINES ARE PRESCRIBED IN
CHAPTERS 6 AND 12.
(NR) (NMP) DETAILS OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS ARE SET
FORTH IN ATP-18.

d. (NU) Coordinated Operations. Antisurface operations may be carried out by a combination

of any of the single types of forces listed in paragraph c, in order to exploit the different advantages
of their sensor, weapon, and command capabilities. The most important combinations in coordinated
operations are dealt with in this chapter. The cooperation of those combinations not described must be
arranged for ad hoc using the procedural principles of this chapter.

9106 Surface Policy

a. (NU) Surface Threat. Whenever a surface threat is deemed to exist, the regional component
commander/OTC/CWC should promulgate a policy for surface action. An early and comprehensive
statement of intentions in an Operation Order/OPGEN/OPTASK will reduce the requirement for
messages, unless the situation changes.

b. (NU) Surface Policy. The Surface Policy can be stated in broad terms only, or specified in
detail as required. Table 9-1 contains a checkoff list, based on the phases of surface action outlined in
Article 9107. They may be used to prepare orders and to update and execute them.

c. (NU) Success of Surface Action. The success of surface action depends on a thorough
understanding of the Surface Policy, a good initial plan, and the initiative of commanding officers.

9107 Surface Action

a. (NU) Phases of Surface Action. Surface action can be broadly stated as taking place in the
following phases.

(1) (NU) Phase 1—Preparation.

(a) (NU) Events leading to the detection, localization, identification, and recognition of the
enemy.

(b) (NU) A review of the situation against the established policy, planning, and tasking.

(2) (NU) Phase 2—Detection, Localization, Identification, Recognition, and Target

Assignment.

(a) (NU) Assuming the optimum force offensive and defensive posture.

(b) (NU) The decision to join the enemy in battle.

(c) (NU) Selection and localization of particular enemy units as prime targets.

(d) (NU) Decision to request area commanders’ assets or to use force assets.

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Table 9-1. (NU) Surface Action Checkoff List (Sheet 1 of 5)

PHASE 1—PREPARATIONS PHASE 2—DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION,

AND TARGET ASSIGNMENT
a. (NU) Evaluate updated threat a. (NU) Determine employment of available
intelligence; SSM ships will be primary surveillance assets, including provision
threat; SAM ships must also be considered. of extra helicopters and tasking of ESM
Decide enemy’s most dangerous likely equipment of all aircraft.
courses of action, having determined
whether he has already been targeted by b. (NU) Determine employment of air,
other friendly forces. surface, and subsurface units, and
other support facilities to provide timely,
b. (NU) Consider surface surveillance continued, and accurate target localization,
priority in relation to ASW and AAW. identification, and recognition data.
c. (NU) Consider stationing of pickets, c. (NU) If appropriate, request support from
bulging the screen, and/or detaching SAGs area commanders’ forces.
or submarines.
d. (NU) In light of available target
d. (NU) Consider use of deception and localization, identification, and recognition
evasion. data, review force weapon release criteria.
e. (NU) Consider best use of assets, links, e. (NU) Consider employment of air,
and communications for targeting. subsurface, and surface units for attack.
f. (NU) Ensure emission policy is f. (NU) Review previously ordered, or order
appropriate to surface threat priority. appropriate surface action plans.
g. (NU) Consider retention or delegation g. (NU) Review Emission Policy.
of authority to initiate and coordinate OTH
attacks by LR antisurface ship missile h. (NU) Consider SSM missile seeker free
(ASSM). zone (MSFZ) and missile seeker tight zone
(MSTZ).
h. (NU) Consider target identification
criteria, required recognition level, required i. (NU) Determine SAG composition after
recognition confidence level, and weapons considering disposition and capabilities.
expenditure. j. (NU) Assign targets and promulgate clear
i. (NU) Consider target priorities and directions to participating units.
damage criteria.
j. (NU) Determine likely units to coordinate
and conduct OTH action, after considering
disposition, capabilities, etc.
k. (NU) Consider methods of damage
assessment.
l. (NU) Reevaluate jamming tasking.
m. (NU) Consider effects of weather,
e.g., on ship’s manoeuvrability and flying
operations.
n. (NU) Determine the execution of grid
locks, ensuring a matched picture with all
participating units.
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Table 9-1. (NU) Surface Action Checkoff List (Sheet 2 of 5)

PHASE 3—LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT PHASE 3—LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT (CONT.)

a. (NU) INITIATION. (b) (NU) Establish communications with
cooperating submarines, MPA, AEW, or
(1) (NU) Engage with air or, if appropriate,
subsurface assets. helicopters on their previously assigned nets,
ordering shift to SAG net as necessary.
(2) (NU) Unless tasks have already been
assigned, the OTC or ASUWC may: (c) (NU) The Air Strike Control Net is used to
pass position and intentions to friendly attack
(a) (NU) Detach a SAG with LR SSM assets aircraft deployed against assigned target.
and consider redisposition of remaining
forces. (d) (NU) Establish communications on the
(b) (NU) Order LR SSM attacks without TF/TG OTH Command Net if necessary.
forming a SAG. (3) (NU) SAGC may assume duties of LAAWC,
(c) (NU) Order OTH standard action plan, FTC-S, and ACU for the SAG.
and if not already specified:
(4) (NU) Reassess threat, open-fire range,
1. (NU) Target to be engaged. expected time of coming under fire, and missile
advantages and disadvantages.
2. (NU) When LR SSM are to be fired, or
time on target (TOT) for missiles. (5) (NU) Reassess current electronic warfare
3. (NU) Communications/links to be used. policy.

(d) (NU) Order any other, or combination of, (6) (NU) Employment of allocated air, surface
standard surface action plan(s). and subsurface assets to optimize OTH attacks.
Considerations include:
(3) (NU) If detaching a SAG, consider shifting
remainder of force to alternate SAG net. (a) (NU) Assessment of OTHT information.
b. (NU) SAG APPROACH. 1. (NU) Single passive bearing.
(1) (NU) SAG commander (SAGC) orders 2. (NU) Triangulation.
formation, disposition, course, and speed in
accordance with action plan(s). If no plan is 3. (NU) Deploying a target reporting unit
detailed, considerations are: (TRU).
(a) (NU) Formation/disposition. 4. (NU) Other sources.
(b) (NU) Freedom to manoeuvre. (b) (NU) Updating of plots, identification/
(c) (NU) Mutual support. recognition, and target selection.

(d) (NU) Separation to avoid single jammer (c) (NU) Obtaining best possible picture
beam width. of immediate area around target for
selection of optimum missile seeker settings
(e) (NU) Concealment of identities of
missile-armed ships. (e.g., weather, clutter, and proximity of other
units).
(2) (NU) Communications (unless specified
otherwise): (d) (NU) Selection TRU for passing accurate
data by link or voice.
(a) (NU) SAG uses appropriate HF/UHF/
Secure Voice circuits or visual signals, for (e) (NU) Stationing and protection of TRU.
manoeuvring and picture compilation.

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Table 9-1. (NU) Surface Action Checkoff List (Sheet 3 of 5)

PHASE 3—LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT (CONT.) PHASE 3—LONG-RANGE ENGAGEMENT (CONT.)

(f) (NU) Selection of LR SSM firing units. (2) (NU) If cooperating with surface attack
aircraft, establish “time windows” for arrival of
1. (NU) Available missiles and their
system. TOT for aircraft and missiles should not
seeker characteristics.
coincide; however, aircraft and missiles attacks
2. (NU) Accuracy of required target data. should be coordinated.

3. (NU) Spacing of other enemy units in (3) (NU) After damage assessment, reattack if
relation to intended line of SSM fire. results do not meet OTC’s Damage Criteria.

4. (NU) Direction of attack. d. (NU) POST-COMBAT.

(g) (NU) Safety of friendly forces, including (NU) OTC, ASUWC, or SAGC orders action to cease
MSFZ and MSTZ. and issues post-combat instructions (See phase 4,
paragraph d, below).
(7) (NU) Order coordination and employment of:
PHASE 4—SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT
(a) (NU) LR/SSM, including weapon release
criteria and fire distribution. a. (NU) INITIATION. Unless tasks have already been
assigned, the OTC will:
(b) (NU) Jammers.
(1) (NU) If appropriate, detach a SAG and
(c) (NU) Chaff-firing sectors and patterns for
consider redispositions of remaining units.
confusion and/or distraction.
(2) (NU) Consider main body evasion.
(8) (NU) Intentions, to include plans of approach
and post-combat rendezvous, must be passed (3) (NU) Order standard action plans and, if not
early since at a later stage communications are already specified:
likely to be saturated and/or jammed.
(a) (NU) Targets to be engaged.
(9) (NU) Action in case of damage.
(b) (NU) Communications/links to be used.
(a) (NU) Nominate standby SAGC.
(4) (NU) Verify position of own forces to avoid
(b) (NU) Action for own damaged ships. engagement of friendly units.
(10) (NU) Enemy contact report—SITREP to (5) (NU) Consider shifting remainder of force to
OTC/ASUWC. alternate SAG net.
c. COMBAT. b. (NU) APPROACH.
(1) OTH action is conducted according to the (1) (NU) Actions covering formation, disposition,
standard plan ordered, or as specified otherwise. communications, assumption of duties,
reassessment of threat and enemy’s intentions,
and EW policy as in preceding Phase 3,
paragraphs b.(1) to (5).
(2) (NU) Employment of allocated air,
submarine, and surface assets.

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Table 9-1. (NU) Surface Action Checkoff List (Sheet 4 of 5)

PHASE 4—SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT (CONT.) PHASE 4—SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT (CONT.)

(a) (NU) Assessment of target information. (4) (NU) Action in case of damage.
1. (NU) Single passive bearing. (a) (NU) Standby SAGC take command.
2. (NU) Triangulation. (b) (NU) Action for own damaged ships.
3. (NU) Deploying a TRU/forward (5) (NU) Missile/gunnery advantage/
observer. disadvantage.
4. (NU) Other sources (e.g., radar). (a) (NU) Maintain missile/gunner advantage.
(b) (NU) Updating plots, identification/ (b) (NU) Carry out action to assume
recognition, and selection of target. advantage if not presently held.
(c) (NU) Selection of TRU/forward observer. (NC) (NMP) If a gunnery disadvantage:
(d) (NU) Selection of firing units to include 1. (NC) (NMP) Zigzag before reaching
available SR SSM/surface-to-air in the enemy.
surface-to-surface (SASS).
2. (NC) (NMP) Cross weapon gap to own
(3) (NU) Order employment of: MER as quickly as possible and maintain
as fine an inclination as practicable.
(a) (NU) SR SSM/SASS—including weapon
release criteria and fire distribution. (6) (NC) (NMP) Fire control radar, consider:
(b) (NU) Guns. (a) (NC) (NMP) Switching on as late as
practicable.
1. (NU) Methods of verification and
control of fall of shot. (b) (NC) (NMP) Deception by using alternate
2. (NU) Control of opening of weapon radar.
area. (7) (NU) Enemy contact report—SITREP to OTC.
3. (NU) Control of opening fire. (8) (NU) Following the OTCs policy, order type
4. (NU) Pre-action calibration (PAC) and number of SR SSM/SASS to be fired. A
— range from enemy to conduct “cocktail mix” will make the enemy’s ASMD
— ESM aspects. difficult.

5. (NU) Ammunition type. (9) (NU) Consider use of surface- or

submarine-launched torpedoes and long-range
6. (NU) Wind finding. ASW weapons.
7. (NU) Illumination. c. (NU) COMBAT.
8. (NU) Fire distribution. (1) (NU) Open fire order—coordination of SR
SSM/SASS and guns.
(c) (NU) Jammers.
(NC) (NMP) SEE NOTE 1.
(d) (NU) Chaff-firing sectors and patterns for
(2) (NC) (NMP) SEE NOTE 2.
confusion and/or distraction.
(3) Reassess gunnery advantage/disadvantage;
change tactics accordingly.

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Table 9-1. (NU) Surface Action Checkoff List (Sheet 5 of 5)

PHASE 4—SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT PHASE 4—SHORT-RANGE ENGAGEMENT
(CONT.) (CONT.)
(4) (NU) Weapon arcs—adjust SAG formation to a d. (NU) POST-COMBAT.
course to maximise SAG weapon effectiveness.
(1) (NU) Individual ships report to SAGC.
(5) (NU) Fire distribution consider redistribution.
(a) (NU) Damage and assistance required.
(6) (NU) Ammunition expenditure—use burst fire
(b) (NU) Ammunition reports.
initially; continue burst fire until good hitting rate
achieved, then use continuous fire. (NC) (NMP) SEE NOTE 4.
(7) (NU) Jamming/chaff employment—continue (c) (NU) Fuel.
unless interference is caused to own gun/missile
control radar. (NC) (NMP) SEE NOTE 5.

(8) (NC) (NMP) SEE NOTE 3. (2) (NU) SAGC—SITREP to OTC.

(9) (NU) Damage reports—only if fighting (3) (NU) Update position of post-combat
capability is reduced. rendezvous (if required).

(10) (NU) Fall of shot reports—only if situation is (4) (NU) Update OTC Rendezvous/PIM.
confused. (5) (NU) Order formation, course, and speed.
(11) (NU) Reassess target priorities. Consider maximum sonar speed if significant
subsurface threat exists.
(NC) (NMP) NOTE 1—Normally at MER for guns,
but may be ordered otherwise. (6) (NU) Survivors—use helicopter assistance.

(NC) (NMP) NOTE 2—Attempt to stay between (7) (NU) Further action—re-engage, shadow, or
enemy and his objective. withdraw.

(NC) (NMP) NOTE 3—Smoke screen—consider as (NC) (NMP) NOTE 4—Only if below 50 percent.
defensive or deceptive measure. (NC) (NMP) NOTE 5—Only if below 50 percent.

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(e) (NU) Decision on the use of submarines for detection, identification, and possible attack
utilizing either torpedoes or antisurface ship missiles (ASSMs).

(f) (NU) Decision on the use of air attack units and/or employment of ASSMs to provide
defence in depth.

(g) (NU) Obtaining accurate target data for possible engagement.

(3) (NU) Phase 3—Long Range Engagement.

(a) (NU) Consideration of detaching air assets or submarines for long-range attacks.

(b) (NU) Detachment as necessary of long-range ASSM units in SAGs with supporting
submarines as appropriate or single units for long-range engagements.

(c) (NU) Conducting long-range attacks.

(d) (NU) Post-combat.

(4) (NU) Phase 4—Short-Range Engagement.

(a) (NU) Detachment of SAGs with short-range missiles, guns, and torpedoes.

(b) (NU) Conducting attacks.

(c) (NU) Post-combat.

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SECTION II—ANTISURFACE WARFARE BY SURFACE UNITS

9200 Surface Action Checkoff List

a. (NU) Checkoff List of Surface Action. Table 9-1 contains a checkoff list of points to be
considered during the four phases of surface action. Not all of the points in the table will apply to
every action, but they should be considered and disregarded if not appropriate.

b. (NU) Enemy SSMs. Enemy SSMs may be fired from over the horizon: that is, beyond the
launching platform’s active sensor ranges and at shorter or horizon range. With the horizon range
threat, appropriate factors in Table 9-1 must be considered early and plans quickly promulgated.
Indeed, under these circumstances, phases 2 and 4 may be compressed to run concurrently. Because
of the high level of expected EW activity, success at horizon range depends on careful planning,
thorough briefing, and minimal reliance on radio communications.

9201 Surface Action Group

a. (NU) SAG Commander. On formation of a SAG, the SAG commander is responsible for:

(1) (NU) The organization of the SAG and its tactical employment.

(2) (NU) The tactical control of aircraft assigned.

(3) (NU) EW coordination.

(4) (NU) Local AAW coordination.

(5) (NU) Keeping the OTC informed of the progress of the action.

b. (NU) Composition. SAG units should be compatible in weapons, sensors, speeds, and
manoeuvrability; however, if a capability such as a complete EW suite is available only in an
incompatible unit, that unit may have to be in the SAG despite any other shortcomings.
(NR) (NMP) The composition of a SAG for a particular operation depends on the factors listed in
ATP-31.

c. (NU) Communications. When the formation of the SAG is preplanned and adequate warning
is given, there will be no difficulty in activating a prepared communication plan. However, this may
not be the case when a SAG is formed in an emergency to counter a sudden threat. In this case, the
SAG may employ any already established control net as ordered by the OTC. Where appropriate, the
remainder of the force should switch to alternate circuits.

d. (NU) Electronic Warfare.

(1) (NU) On the formation of the SAG, control of EW in the SAG is automatically assumed by
the SAG commander. The SAG commander will reassign ESM tasking based on threat intelligence
and retask ECM assets in order to enhance warning and defence possibilities with minimum mutual
interference.

(2) (NU) Retasking of the SAG’s EW equipment to concentrate on the surface threat against
which the SAG has been detached requires the EWC to reconsider overall force EW tasking.
Threats no longer covered by SAG units may have to be reassigned to ensure complete threat
coverage within the force.

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e. (NU) Anti-air Warfare. As soon as possible after the SAG separates from the main body, the
SAG commander should become his own local AAW coordinator, controlling his own friendly aircraft
if they are available. This will add to the effectiveness of his forces, better ensure own aircraft safety,
and minimise the confusion that would result in divided aircraft control.

f. (NU) Antisurface Ship Missiles.

(1) (NU) ASSM systems are divided into three categories.

(a) (NU) Short range: Up to 20 miles (to-the-horizon range)

(b) (NU) Medium range: From 20 to 75 miles

(c) (NU) Long range: More than 75 miles.

(NU) The OTC or delegated authority should, if he has any choice, allocate units to the SAG with
ASSM systems of sufficiently superior range and lethality to ensure success without needlessly
wasting his most powerful assets.

(2) (NU) The conflicting use of SAM systems for AAW on the one hand and for SAM surface-to-air
in the surface-to-surface mode (SASS) on the other must be carefully weighed by the OTC. Systems
with more than one tracker can maintain both, although with reduced capabilities. However, most
medium- and long-range SAM systems have sufficient surface-to-surface capability to favourably
influence the outcome of the surface action.

9202 Surface Action Group Policy

(NU) In defence of the main body, the primary concern must be to remain between the enemy and the
main body. If the SAG has been detached to destroy, neutralize, or repel missile carrier(s), the SAG
should do so as far as possible from the main body or convoy. In formulating his policy, the SAG
commander must consider the following factors:
a. (NU) Relative capabilities of own and enemy forces.

b. (NU) Likely tactics of enemy forces.

c. (NU) The use of ECM. The SAG commander should make use of the ECM capability of ships of
the SAG to disrupt enemy fire control, surface warning sensors, missile systems, and communications.

d. (NU) The use of deception. When approaching the enemy, the SAG commander should consider
the use of physical and electronic measures designed to conceal the size and formation of the SAG.
The electronic emission pattern of the SAG must conform with the deception plan in use.

e. (NU) The formation. It is important that deployment into the chosen surface-action formation
should have been completed before action commences. The surface-action formation must allow
ships to engage with all their weapons, and to take avoiding action without endangering adjacent
ships. Unnecessarily large intervals between ships give an enemy with superior speed the opportunity
to concentrate on one part of the group at a time.

f. (NU) Pre-action fire control settings. It is vital that these are obtained as early in the action as
possible. Thus, initial settings on fire control equipment must be accurate. However, fire control is
vulnerable to jamming and therefore calibration involving fire control radar transmissions may be
inadvisable and should only be carried out on instruction from the SAG commander.

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g. (NU) Fire distribution.

(1) (NU) Normal fire distribution. Normal fire distribution entails the engagement of opposite
numbers of the enemy force and should as far as possible leave no enemy ship unengaged. If
concentration of fire is possible, major enemy ships should receive priority. Normal fire distribution
is automatically in force.

(2) (NU) Targets to individual units. The SAGC may make a fire distribution signal allotting
targets to individual units at any time before or during an action. Special signal groups are available
for this purpose.

h. (NU) Number of missiles to be fired in ASSM salvos.

9203–9209 Spare

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SECTION III—ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH AIR COOPERATION

9300 General

(NU) Air assets in support of antisurface warfare operations may be used for the detection of the enemy,
for locating, identification/recognition, and reporting in order to contribute to the surface picture and for
target data reporting and transmission. Independent and coordinated attacks on the enemy’s surface units
may be included. The type of support to be provided by air assets depends on operational requirements
and on the capabilities of the air assets. Air assets may also be used to distract the enemy’s attention from
own forces, and to disrupt the enemy’s C2.
9301 Antisurface Operations Support by Fixed-Wing Aircraft

a. (NU) The aim of antisurface operations by FW aircraft is to ensure the detection and engagement
of enemy surface forces in order to deny their effective employment. Fixed-wing aircraft may be
employed in:

(1) (NU) Attacks on enemy surface forces.

(2) (NU) Scouting, using any sensor to acquire tactical information.

b. (NU) Armed reconnaissance, a combination of both types, is possible, depending on the tactical
situation and available air assets.
(NR) (NMP) Detailed instructions are provided in ATP-31 and AJP-3.3.3.

9302 Antisurface Operations by Helicopters

a. (NU) The aim of antisurface operations by helicopters is to:

(1) (NU) Assist forces in the detection, localization, identification, recognition, and targeting of
hostile surface forces.

(2) (NU) Attack lightly defended enemy forces, especially FPBs equipped with SSMs.

b. (NU) Helicopters will normally be integrated with a surface force that may or may not have
other air support. They may be land based or shipborne. When two or more helicopters cooperate
against a particular surface threat, they form a HAG. The best-fitted helicopter should become HAG
commander (CONTROLLER).

c. (NU) Helicopters in antisurface operations may be employed in reconnaissance and attack and
may carry out controlled operations or act independently, as ordered by the OTC or the unit that the
OTC has assigned duty as HCU.

(1) (NU) Controlled Operations. When the helicopter has two-way communications with and
is within the radar range of the control unit, the helicopter is to operate under positive or advisory
control.

(2) (NU) Independent Operations. When the helicopter is beyond radar range and/or
communication range of the HCU, the helicopter is fully responsible for safety, navigation, and the
accomplishment of its task.

9303 Cooperation Between Fixed-Wing Aircraft and Helicopters

(NU) If helicopters and FW aircraft cooperate in engaging a surface target, the following rules will
apply. As the supporting aircraft approaches the target area and communications are established, the
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so, the helicopter may be requested to illuminate the target. Special precautions should be observed by
attack aircraft, particularly during periods of reduced visibility and at night, to ensure that the helicopter
is safely clear of dropped illumination devices, the attack flightpath, and weapon effects.
9304 Employment of a Helicopter Action Group

a. (NU) Alert State. The limited endurance of missile-armed helicopters prevents, in most cases,
the keeping of a HAG at airborne alert. Missile-armed helicopters should, therefore, normally be
placed at the highest possible alert state (see Chapter 3).

b. (NU) Selection of a HAG Rendezvous. The HAG rendezvous should normally be in the
direction of the threat, in order to make best use of the short on-task time of the helicopter.

c. (NU) Attack Procedure. The prime requirement for a successful missile attack is precise
information about the position, course, and speed of the target. The need for the missile-firing
helicopter to be in visual contact with and/or be pointed in the general direction of the target mainly
depends on the capability of the sensors available and the missile used. In case of a visual attack, a
flare-dropping helicopter may be used.

d. (NU) Provision of Helicopter Operating Facilities. When a SAG is to cooperate with a

HAG, units with helicopter refuelling facilities should be included in the SAG to increase the effective
range and endurance of the HAG.

9305–9309 Spare

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SECTION IV—(NU) (NMP) ANTISURFACE WARFARE WITH SUBSURFACE

COOPERATION

9400 (NU) (NMP) General

(NC) (NMP) Often the submarine may be best placed to deal with a surface threat. By virtue of its
covert nature, the attack submarine and especially the SSN is capable of long-term shadowing of and
subsequently attacking a surface contact. The submarine can also operate in waters where, perhaps due
to an unfavourable air situation, other units may not safely venture.
9401 (NU) (NMP) Weapons

(NC) (NMP) The submarine may use either torpedoes or ASSMs. Torpedo attacks usually mean that the
submarine has to close its target to within 10 nm or less and the fire control solution is obtained from its
own sensors (ESM), sonar, periscope, and/or even radar. ASSMs give the attack submarine the option of
a longer-range attack, if targeting data can be obtained.
9402 (NU) (NMP) ASSM Targeting

a. (NC) (NMP) Very rarely will it be possible for a submarine to exploit the full range of its ASSMs
using its own sensors. Often the passive nature of the sensors will require a cooperative target, and even
then, without extensive target motion analysis, the submarine may lack accurate range information.
Furthermore, it may be impossible to select one particular target within a group of ships.

b. (NC) (NMP) Link 11, if fitted, and national targeting systems do provide the submarine with a far
greater capability to select targets, generate long-range firing solutions, and avoid striking background
shipping. Another solution is to provide long-range targeting from a third party. Tradeoffs between
submarine covertness, possible counterdetection, and the data refinement necessary to generate a
sufficiently accurate firing solution must be considered.

9403 (NU) (NMP) Tactical Planning Considerations

a. (NC) (NMP) Preplanned Responses.

(NC) (NMP) Given the time delays sometimes inherent in submarine communications, well-formulated
preplanned responses are essential to ensure actions taken by submarines are in accord with task
group objectives. As applicable, this information should be included in OPTASK Supplements or
Submarine Assignment Request messages and updated by Submarine Force Summary messages as
changes occur. Information must be sufficiently detailed to ensure mission continuance should tactical
communications with the submarine be disrupted or when, for whatever reason, it is not feasible for
the submarine to communicate.

(1) (NC) (NMP) General Planning Considerations. Preplanned responses should reinforce
the capability of the submarine on its own accord to undertake offensive or defensive action in
consonance with the mission of the task group to which it is assigned. In essence, this means the
submarine must always know whether it is to 1) LOOK, TALK, TRACK; 2) LOOK, SHOOT,
TALK; 3) LOOK, TALK, SHOOT; or any other combination desired by the OTC. While
requirements will vary with the scenario and threat, at a minimum preplanned responses should
address desired actions the submarine is to take if:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Enemy surface or subsurface units are detected prior to commencement of
hostilities. Include specific ROE, as applicable.

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(b) (NC) (NMP) A target transits beyond the submarine’s engagement envelope or out of its
immediate waterspace area both prior to and during hostilities, as applicable.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Long-range cruise missile engagements are to be undertaken independently
or only after coordination with the SOCA.

(d) (NC) (NMP) OTH track data is inadequate to permit cruise missile employment.

(e) (NC) (NMP) Acoustic, electronic, or visual battle damage assessment (BDA) is desired and
how the submarine will be keyed to event timing and the location or direction of engagement.

(f) (NC) (NMP) Contact reporting (i.e., task group alertment) or contact engagement is
to take precedence; and when, how, and to whom the submarine should report under either
circumstance.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Submarine Target Priority List (TPL). Providing the submarine with a TPL
specified by the OTC (as may be developed jointly by the ASWC/ASUWC) is an essential part of
preparing for and executing submarine/task group operations. Because of the submarine’s unique
capabilities and/or the area in which it is operating, the TPL for a submarine may be quite different
from that of other elements of the force.

(a) (NC) (NMP) During the time the submarine is operating with a task group, the TPL
supersedes any previous target priority list, including that of the SUBOPAUTH, and becomes
especially important if submarine/task group tactical communications are disrupted. When
combined with available threat intelligence, the TPL provides guidance to the submarine
commanding officer upon which to base his specific tactical surveillance, search, and attack
plans. Additionally, it serves as a useful decision aid should the submarine be confronted with
multiple high-interest targets simultaneously.

(b) (NC) (NMP) The TPL may be conveyed to the submarine by governing OPTASK listing of
contacts of interest (if the OPTASK or extracts thereof are held by the submarine) and simply
referenced in subsequent messages, or be specifically addressed in the Submarine Assignment
Request message. In turn, it may be updated at any time during the course of operations in the
Submarine Force Summary, Submarine SITREP, or OPTASK supplemental message.

b. (NC) (NMP) Specific Target Planning and Engagement Execution. Refinement from a
general ASUW (or ASW) search role to engaging a specific target will necessarily depend upon the
manner in which the submarine is to undertake the engagement. If the intent is for it to position and
attack independently using organic sensors, initial tasking along with target location cueing (see aided
intercept in ATP-18) may be all that is necessary from the SOCA. On the other hand, submarine
attacks coordinated with other force assets normally will require detailed instructions, particularly if
third-party OTH targeting assistance or post-engagement BDA information is required.

c. (NC) (NMP) Contact Turnover. During coordinated submarine/task group operations, shifting
prosecution of a specific target between other force assets and a submarine, or between submarines,
may become necessary. This will generally occur when the target moves into or out of the submarine’s
area, and the area dimensions and/or designation cannot be changed rapidly. If requested by the
submarine(s) involved, the OTC should provide for aircraft communications relay. ATP-18 and
APP-11 contain, respectively, the procedures and the structured message formats to be used for
contact handover.

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9404 (NU) (NMP) Communications

(NC) (NMP) Communications with submarines differ significantly from those with other force assets and
present the most significant challenge in effecting submarine tasking and coordination. Especially in the
coordination of antisurface operations during rising tensions, some compromises between covertness and
coordination will be necessary to coordinate antisurface operations.
9405–9409 (NU) (NMP) Spare

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SECTION V—THIRD-PARTY TARGETING

9500 General

(NU) Weapon range of ASSM exceeding the sensor range of the missile-firing unit requires the evaluation
and transmission of target data by a third party acting as an external sensor. When there is a requirement
to disguise the presence or identity of a missile-carrying unit from a target within the firing-units sensor
horizon, third-party targeting may be used. Surveillance, identification, classification, recognition, and
reporting as a contribution to the surface picture compilation by this external sensor is a prerequisite
for the firing unit to decide target selection, weapon, and firing policy. Damage assessment after missile
engagement is another important function for an external sensor.
9501 Definitions

a. (NU) Third-Party Targeting (TPT). TPT is the evaluation and reporting/transmission of data
for the surface picture compilation and/or missile engagement by a target reporting unit (TRU).

b. (NU) Over-the-Horizon Targeting. OTHT is the location evaluation and reporting/transmission

of data for a target outside the active sensor horizon of a missile-firing unit by means of a TRU.

c. (NU) Disguised Targeting. This is the evaluation and reporting/transmission of data for an
enemy within sensor range of a missile-firing unit aimed to disguise its presence.

d. (NU) Remote Targeting. This is the evaluation of target data for a missile engagement by
means of a system-integrated remote sensor platform capable of midcourse and terminal command
override.

e. (NU) Target Reporting Unit. TRU is a sensor platform (manned or remotely piloted). This unit
is able to evaluate and report/transmit data for surface picture compilation and missile engagement to
a missile-firing unit.

f. (NU) Voice/RATT Reporting. This is the reporting of data for surface picture compilation and
missile engagement for a TRU to a missile-firing unit by voice/RATT.

g. (NU) Link Reporting. This is the transmission of data surface picture compilation and missile
engagement from a TRU to a missile-firing unit by automatic data transmission in real time (Link).

9502 Over-the-Horizon Targeting Considerations

a. (NU) Appropriate OPGEN or OPTASK ASUW. The OTC normally promulgates his
antisurface warfare policy using the appropriate OPGEN or OPTASK ASUW.

b. (NU) Employment of OTHT Weapons. Normally OTHT-capable weapons are force weapons
and therefore are employed as directed by the OTC or delegated authority.

c. (NU) Policy Considerations. The following is a list of items to be considered for inclusion in
the policy:

(1) (NU) Retain or delegate authority to initiate OTHT and coordination.

(2) (NU) Target priorities and desired results.

(3) (NU) Firing units in order of preference.

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(4) (NU) TRUs in order of preference.

(5) (NU) Force defensive action.

(6) (NU) SAG employment.

(7) (NU) Geographical and environmental aspects.

(8) (NU) EMCON.

(9) (NU) Sensor employment (including parameters of target vehicle emitters).

(10) (NU) Weapon release criteria.

(11) (NU) Mutual interference.

(12) (NU) Weapon economy.

(13) (NU) Damage assessment.

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SECTION VI—GUIDELINES FOR CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

9600 General

(NU) Non–Article 5 crisis response operations (CROs), such as noncombatant evacuation and maritime
interdiction, are invariably prompted by political/diplomatic considerations and as such are characterized
by the following:
a. (NU) Offensive Action. Offensive or aggressive action is unlikely to be permitted as a first
resort. Indeed a de-escalatory posture may be ordered initially. Nonetheless, diplomatic developments
may eventually require retaliatory/punitive action.

b. (NU) Enemy. There is unlikely to be a force or group who can be treated as an enemy in the
traditional manner.

c. (NU) Forces and Groups. The forces and groups in the area of operations may be aligned
on national, ethnic or religious lines. In the latter cases this may cut across established national
boundaries. This may in turn lead to ambivalent attitudes from neighboring states, and action may be
necessary with respect to apparently third-party nations.

d. (NU) Rules of Engagement. Freedom of action by own forces will be determined by ROE,
probably dictated by diplomatic rather than military imperatives.

e. (NU) Central Control. In addition to the prohibitions imposed by ROE, there are likely to be
other considerations in which real-time consultation is necessary both with a shore-based chain of
command and nonmilitary directing bodies (e.g., UN) before action is permitted.

f. (NU) Multinational Forces. The forces involved in enforcing any internationally directed
sanctions are themselves likely to be international in composition. They will therefore contain
disparate and dissimilar units with varying degrees and areas of expertise. This will in turn impact on
ROE interpretation, force disposition, force cohesiveness, tactics and procedures and prevention of
mutual interference.

g. (NU) Joint Operations. Crisis response operations are most likely to be “joint” by nature.
Command relationships (AJP-01) will reflect this. Maritime forces will require the support of other
services, including civil authorities, to achieve their mission, much as they will require maritime
support to achieve their own.

h. (NU) Geographical Constraints. Action in pursuit of the diplomatic aims of any operation is
likely to be permissible only within a defined geographic area. There is a high probability that this
area will include littoral waters.

i. (NU) Political Constraints. The level of involvement by individual Allied nations may differ
due to national commitments and policy. The degree of willingness to accept damage and casualties
will be a key factor.

j. (NU) The Media. Any operation is likely to take place under the spotlight of international media,
and indeed use of the media must be part of the commander’s concept of operations. Consequently,
media perception of the results of military decisions at all levels must always be a consideration.

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9601 Scope of Operations

(NU) While the nature of each individual operation is likely to have unique aspects, in all likelihood
unforeseen until the inception of the task, there are equally likely to be common threads running through
each operation. In broad terms the task will fall under the general headings described in AJP-3.4.
a. (NU) Demonstrate Forward Presence. The TF will need to establish an overt presence in the
area and to make all parties aware of its capabilities and intentions. This may also involve information
operations and the use of PsyOps and, in particular, media coverage in order to reach both the political
leaders and the community at large. In some cases this alone may achieve the aims of the TF.

b. (NU) Carry Out Surveillance. In order to establish its presence the TF will be required to carry
out surveillance of its designated area of operations in order to establish the optimum positions from
which to maintain that presence. In so doing, the TF will have to establish the following.

(1) (NU) Commercial and civilian traffic patterns both in the air and at sea.

(2) (NU) Traffic density.

(3) (NU) Military operational patterns in all three environments.

(4) (NU) Refine the impact of environmental factors on TF capabilities—in particular sensor
performance.

(NU) All these elements will impact directly on the integrity of the surveillance product and its
sustainability, as well as providing important baseline information for indications and warnings.

c. (NU) Carry Out Maritime Interdiction Operations. In view of the nature and range of
maritime sensors (both active and passive) and weapons, the TF’s area of interest and involvement is
over land. Some or all of the following activities may be involved.

(1) (NU) Monitoring military activity and movements in all three environments and reporting
such activity up the chain of command. Certain activity and movements may have been proscribed
by international (UN) edict and may attract intervention or retribution.

—(NU) Assets may be required to be on notice to carry out this task.

(2) (NU) Monitoring all traffic in order to enforce embargo orders on specified goods, persons,
and services.

—(NU) Assets will be required to be deployed to ensure that the integrity of the embargo is
maintained and to carry out enforcement action when needed.

(3) (NU) Providing protection of specified commercial shipping from interference by third parties.
In a scenario short of all-out conflict, politico-diplomatic imperatives and indeed risk levels may
dictate measures up to and including the introduction of Naval Supervision of Merchant Shipping. In
this situation alternative but less rigorous measures such as “accompaniment” may be appropriate.

—(NU) Assets will in all likelihood be required to be dedicated to this task alone.

(4) (NU) Taking enforcement action. In addition to maintaining a comprehensive search and
monitoring operation, when violations are detected, effective policing action will be required.

—(NU) Assets are required to be available from amongst those engaged in monitoring traffic.
Their diversion to enforcement must not endanger the integrity of the search.

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d. (NU) Carry Out Evacuation. This may involve the removal of civilian or military personnel in
a wide variety of possible scenarios. ATP-03.4.1.2, Multinational Maritime Support of Humanitarian
Operations, provides guidance on noncombatant evacuation operations. Common threads are likely
to be:

(1) (NU) The need for a landing force to organize and liaise with shore authorities or, in the worst
case, to provide protection. The nature of its task will determine its size and composition.

(2) (NU) Identification of an egress route. This brings the requirement for a port or beachhead
from which to carry out the evacuation or alternatively the uninterrupted use of an airhead, which
could involve a major land force operation to secure. An overland exit is also a possibility but will
involve maritime forces to a lesser degree.

(3) (NU) In the absence of air evacuation, the use of specialist shipping may be necessary to
beach and/or to embark military equipment or transport large numbers of personnel, together with
appropriate medical facilities.

(4) (NU) Resources required to carry out an evacuation on a large scale are likely to exceed what
is available in the area of operations. While assets should not be required at short notice for this
task, contingency planning must be carried out (in any case this may have already been done at the
national level) and units earmarked—in particular any specialist assets that have yet to be deployed
into theater. These must include logistic units to handle large-scale movements of personnel and
equipment, as well as medical units to receive evacuees and deal with welfare problems amongst
them.

(5) (NU) It is possible that the provision of assistance to shore may stop short of evacuation but
may necessitate the provision of humanitarian aid. In this instance many of the elements mentioned
above will still be required, but the emphasis will be on bringing them to the people affected. In
addition numbers involved are likely to be far higher with the consequent logistic load in providing
large amounts of food and other essentials.

9602 Operational Requirements

(NU) The force commander will require at his disposal:

a. (NU) Surveillance assets in all three environments. These should include long-range, long-endurance
shore-based aircraft to ensure wide area coverage.

b. (NU) Access to shore-based maritime and land intelligence analysis and reports. The ability to use
near-real-time wide area product utilizing overhead resources is highly advantageous, as is the ability
to send/receive classified imagery on line.

c. (NU) Access to information concerning civil air and sea movements, including commercial
information relating to cargo. This may require a shore support organization to filter and collate.

d. (NU) A clear command chain. This link to the political diplomatic decision-makers will be required
for real-time management of incidents to ensure that events are not allowed to damage diplomacy and
equally that military forces can negotiate relaxations to political directives to ensure their own safety.
A robust communications architecture will be required to support this.

e. (NU) Units ready or on notice to carry out follow-on tasks (e.g., sanction enforcement).

f. (NU) Logistic support afloat and/or ashore.

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9603 First-Stage Preparations

(NU) Even prior to departure for the operational area there are certain matters the task force commander
must address, some in conjunction with his operational authority. The TF commander must ensure the
following:
a. (NU) That the task, pertinent ROE and political policy are accurately and unambiguously defined.
In particular both politicians and the military must be agreed on the concept of what is both achievable
and allowed. This is of importance when dealing diplomatically with the nation or group against
whom the operation is directed and when planning information operations/media coverage. The task,
ROE and political policy must subsequently be promulgated widely in the OPGEN.

b. (NU) That the legal basis of the task is established and that the legal limits of what action is or is
not permitted are known. This must be thoroughly understood by all subordinate commanders.

c. (NU) The level of risk of damage and casualties that are politically acceptable has been established.

d. (NU) That an “in-depth” threat analysis is carried out on any likely aggressor nation.

e. (NU) That, in light of the above, the force mix and capabilities match the demands of the task. If
this is not the case, representations must be made to either alter or add to the TF or reduce the scope
of the task.

f. (NU) That a thorough environmental brief is obtained on the geographical area of operations. This
should include predictive analysis of weapon and sensor performance, particularly as affected by the
littoral environment.

g. (NU) That ROE are critically examined. The TF commander must be satisfied that:

(1) (NU) Self-defence of the force within the level of acceptable risk is possible in light of the
known capabilities of any potentially hostile nation or group.

(2) (NU) Units will be able to carry out their task. With a detailed knowledge of the characteristics
of his own units’ weapons and sensors coupled with examination of the restrictions placed on
their use, he must establish that the task remains achievable. In particular he must be sure that any
graduated response called for is possible and permissible with the weapons and sensors carried.
For example, weapons relying on a laser-based fire control system would not be available when
the use of lasers is prohibited.

(3) (NU) Intelligence gathering is permitted by the ROE profile.

(4) (NU) ROE changes required to meet foreseeable contingencies are highlighted and prepared.

(5) (NU) ROE are common to all TF units and similarly understood. In particular any national
reservations must be known. If ROE differences exist between units it should be clearly stated and
known to all.

h. (NU) If the examination process above reveals deficiencies, ROE requests are raised to remedy
them, including full justification for each additional rule or change.

i. (NU) A formal ROE brief is carried out for all units. In some cases it may be necessary for formal
certification of this briefing to be made to an external authority.

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j. (NU) That a pre-sail meeting is carried out between all participating forces, including shore-based
assets and HQs. This should cover briefing on the task and on individual units’ capabilities and
limitations in order that a full understanding of the commitment and individual potential contributions
is achieved. If units join the TF without attending this meeting, briefings should be carried out by
CTF/CTG staff on arrival.

k. (NU) That special predeployment training is carried out. Table 9-2 gives a suggested list of topics
to be covered. An operation of this nature will call on skills outside core warfighting disciplines.
Among the areas which may need extra attention are:

(1) (NU) ROE play.

(2) (NU) Boarding and searching.

(3) (NU) Merchant vessel protection (goal-keeping and anti-FAC).

(4) (NU) Theater-specific scenarios.

9604 Second-Stage Preparations

a. (NU) Once definition of the operational task and its associated restrictions and limitations have
been established, the TF commander may address the mechanics of setting up his force organization.

b. (NU) Command Arrangements. As stated above, it is most likely that an operation of this
nature will take place under the umbrella of a joint force multinational command structure, and
a full CJTF organization may be created. Relationships within this structure must be quickly and
unambiguously established in order to achieve a coherent force with specific aims. AJP-01 will assist
in achieving workable lines of communication to political/diplomatic authorities (as described above).
Within the maritime force, organization is naturally required. This may include the requirement for
a number of subcommanders, should the size of the geographical area dictate. A typical chain of
command might be:

(1) (NU) Joint Force Commander—not necessarily in a seagoing appointment.

(2) (NU) Maritime Component Commander—in operational control of all maritime forces
assigned.

(3) (NU) OTC/CWC—in tactical command of the maritime forces assigned.

(4) (NU) Sector Commander—of a geographical area conducting command and control of
units within an AOR, assigning and tasking air and surface units.

(5) (NU) Warfare Commanders—responsible in the traditional way for organizing their
particular area of warfare.

(6) (NU) On-Scene Commander—in charge of an incident.

(7) (NU) Force Track Coordinators—responsible for maintaining a recognized picture in

their environment.

(8) (NU) Liaison Officers—responsible for ensuring that commands and units to which they
are posted are fully aware of the capabilities of their parent unit/command.

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Table 9-2. (NU) Crisis Response Operations—Guidance Checkoff List (Sheet 1 of 2)

1. TASK CHARACTERISTICS 4. PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO DEPARTURE
Options for action, if any.
1st Stage
Is there an enemy?
Define task, ROE, political policy unambiguously in
Who is involved? conjunction with higher authorities.
Rules of Engagement. Define legal limits.
Who is controlling/directing? Level of risk of damage established.
Multinational forces—disparate units. Ensure ROE:
Joint operations in conjunction with other services and robust enough to permit self-defence
civil authorities.
permit task to be achieved
Merchant shipping aspects?
permit intelligence gathering
Are there geographical constraints?
ROE request?
Are there political constraints?
Threat analysis.
Environmental brief— include predictive analysis.
2. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS Pre-sail meeting.
Demonstrate forward presence? unit capabilities (weapons and surveillance)
Carry out surveillance? unit compatibilities (comms and data links)
civil traffic patterns Capabilities match task?
Role of merchant shipping ROE certification.
Trade lines of communications
traffic density
2nd Stage
military operating patterns
Command Arrangements.
environmental factors
including joint force set up relationships with
Carry out peacekeeping?
civil authorities, communications to support
monitor activity arrangements
enforce embargo Maritime force organization.
protect shipping Force disposition.
Carry out evacuation? take into account unit capabilities, Link architecture
landing forces Sustainability, patrol cycle.
specialist shipping Equipment maintenance.
beachhead/airhead Crew fatigue.
assets earmarked Maintenance of OC.
humanitarian aid required. Rotation of units—balance of on/off station time.
3. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS Logistics.
Surveillance assets? RAS.
Access to intelligence sources? Establish overland resupply.
Access to commercial intelligence? Nominate airhead arrangements.
Force mix appropriate? Nominate resupply ports for afloat support ships.
weapons Establish national logistic cells.
sensors Establish stand-off ports.
Command chain? Nominate ports and airfields to receive detained
Units at notice to carry out follow-on tasks. vessels and aircraft.
Logistic support ashore and afloat.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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Table 9-2. (NU) Crisis Response Operations—Guidance Checkoff List (Sheet 2 of 2)

5. EXECUTION Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping
Commonality—communications and links Gateway Shipping self-protective measures
procedures.
Coordination requirements with civil actors
Contingency planning—incident preparation.
Shipping reporting scheme, including NATO
IDCRIT. Shipping Centre role
Recognition confidence levels.
Advice and guidance to shipping
Weapon release criteria.
Deployed naval cooperation and guidance for
Weapon of choice—having considered ROE. shipping elements
Warnings—formulate agreed text. Passage coordination
Surveillance.
AWNIS
recognized surface picture (RSP)
Size of AOR v assets. Safety and security of navigation information
Picture compilation assets available? 6. MISCELLANEOUS
white shipping Boarding operations.
I&W patrol. Special forces required?
forward deployed Submarines in support.
vulnerability assessment advantages
protection if required May require SAT for waterspace management.
Information flow.
FPB operations.
Plan according to equipment limitations and
geographical and propagation constraints. support requirements
Duplication of effort. Tactical considerations—good for scouting.
avoid—use units’ capabilities to the full May require own AOR.
avoid multiple reporting Allocate liaison/gateway unit.
Air Integration. Air embargo.
command relationships identification difficulties
coordinated tasking with shore assets enforcement options
Force marshalling/airspace control
Prevention of mutual interference.
Records.
PR/media matters.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

(NU) A high priority should be given to the establishment of a Secure Command Net for CTG/CO
discussion; this can be particularly useful in preventing misunderstanding and ensuring commonality
of approach. A secure SATCOM High Command Net can serve the same function between OTCs and
shore command.

c. (NU) Force Disposition. The force disposition will take into consideration the capabilities of
units, the prevention of mutual interference and considerations regarding the cooperation of units
used to different tactics and procedures. The patrol areas defined inside the AOR should consider
average sensor ranges and some backup between units. The flagship should have a central position to
ensure good communications between units. The units assigned to patrol areas near “choke” points
should be Link 11 fitted and, if possible, have an organic helicopter. These units are likely candidates
to carry out the duties of MPACU for aircraft on surface picture compilation missions.

d. (NU) Sustainability/Patrol Cycle. Major considerations in determining time on task and

patrol cycles will be the areas to be covered, the number of units allocated and the expected duration
of the operation. In addition to the logistic aspects of sustainability, these and a number of other
considerations must influence the planning process.

(1) (NU) Equipment Maintenance—periodic upkeep in order to minimise operational defects.

Maintenance periods should be scheduled to last ten working days at two monthly intervals. Their
location must be carefully considered to ensure that adequate engineering support facilities are
available. Repair/depot ships, if available, can provide this support.

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(2) (NU) Crew Fatigue—stand-off port visits for rest and recreation combined with material
maintenance and logistic resupply. Rest and recreation visits should last at least four days to ensure
all members of a ship’s company can take leave.

(3) (NU) Maintenance of Operational Capability—patrol routines will not permit normal
military capability training. Thus, while surveillance and picture compilation skills will be honed,
other war-fighting skills will atrophy unless opportunities are provided to exercise them. This may
necessitate withdrawing units from the immediate theater to allow training activities to take place.
Where possible, passages should be in company to allow training to be progressed.

(4) (NU) Patrol Cycle—in order to plan rotation of units, the CTF/CTG must establish the
balance between “on station” and “off station” (in transit, training, port visit) time. Figures of
60 percent “on” and 40 percent “off” allow adequate time for maintenance and recreation. While
at sea, a cycle of six days operations, one day maintenance and one day rest gives a satisfactory
balance and allows the extended periods between port visits to be sustained. At pre-sail briefing,
units must make the CTF/CTG aware of any constraints (e.g., aircraft operating cycles) that
will affect their availability. Every effort should be made to establish a patrol operating cycle to
allow units to conduct proper planning and management in order to maintain unit efficiency and
effectiveness.

e. (NU) Logistics. Initial planning should anticipate a lengthy operation in which sustainability
will play a key role. The following areas may require attention:

(1) (NU) Replenishment at Sea Arrangements for food, stores, fuel and oils. Deficiencies
in this area would severely curtail patrol endurance and complicate patrol cycles.

(2) (NU) Overland Resupply. Feasibility and routes should be established. Use of this means
of resupply requires advance planning and good forecasting of future requirements. This method
is especially useful for unique national requirements and arrangements can normally be left to
national authorities. Host-nation support may be required to ease problems of clearances and
documentation.

(3) (NU) Airhead Arrangements. Similar to overland routes arrangements are normally made
by national authorities for routing of urgent stores items and personnel movements. Coordination
to determine the location of the airhead will be required to avoid duplication and to ensure that its
position is optimized for on-movement of stores and personnel, which may well fall to task force
assets to carry out.

(4) (NU) Resupply Ports. A port or ports should be designated as replenishment points for
store ships and oilers. Wherever possible these should be collocated with the airhead and be on an
overland route.

(5) (NU) Logistic Cells. The establishment of national cells ashore at airheads or resupply ports
is most advisable to ensure a prompt and efficient service to seagoing units. ALP-4.1, Multinational
Maritime Force Logistics, and AJP-4.6, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Joint Logistics Support Group,
should also be consulted when setting up multinational logistic arrangements.

(6) (NU) Stand-off Ports. A list of ports capable and willing to host ships during stand-off
from patrol should be drawn up. They must be categorized by size (i.e., capacity for size and
number of ships) and by distance from patrol areas in terms of steaming time, which can then
be related to operational notice for the area. The task force commander will likely wish to retain
the responsibility of designating ships to port visits, in conjunction with the relevant host-nation
authorities.

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(7) (NU) Diversion Ports/Airports. Preparations for the reception, detailed search and possible
detention of embargo breakers must be made. This will, in most instances, involve close liaison
with the competent local authorities. Anchorages should also be identified for use as holding areas
for vessels detained and awaiting search.

9605 Execution

a. (NU) Commonality. The task force commander must strive for commonality in communications
and data links, which will be the threads that hold the organization together. Factors that will be
critical in communications and will impinge on data link operations are as follows:

(1) (NU) Number of transmitters/receivers.

(2) (NU) Availability of satellite communications facilities.

(3) (NU) Availability and compatibility of secure speech equipment.

(4) (NU) Data-handling capacity of the circuits available.

(5) (NU) Location and environmental factors.

(6) (NU) Cryptologic equipment and keying material.

(7) (NU) Operator’s ability in the designated common language.

(8) (NU) Portable equipment (for use by liaison officers, etc.).

(NU) In data link terms, the capacity of the host AIO system is often the critical factor. Where
different links exist every effort should be made to ensure that data-forwarding facilities are available.
However, all units should be aware that certain elements of data may be stripped during this process.
This area should be examined during pre-sail conferences. These factors apply equally to air units.

b. (NU) Contingency Planning. At an early stage contingency planning should be carried out
to cater for all likely incidents and tested against the fullest range of “what if” scenarios in tactical
discussions involving all participants. Such plans will be heavily influenced by ROE considerations
and special attention should be paid to:

(1) (NU) Identification Criteria—elements required for identification of a contact. Standard

schemes exist (see Chapter 6, Table 6-15) but should be reexamined to ensure that ROE
requirements are met. Unit capabilities in this respect may differ (e.g., availability of IFF Mode IV,
height-finding). Care must therefore be taken to ensure that ROE are not breached as a result of a
unit attempting to achieve the necessary criteria. In situations short of all-out hostility it may be
expedient to use the terms Contact of Interest and Critical Contact of Interest or Possible Violator.
For unambiguous link information exchange an identification matrix will then be required (these
additional identities cannot be exchanged via link). Use of specific code words (changing or fixed)
for individual units or types of unit may also assist in clarity of picture compilation. The use of a
predetermined set of PIF/DI codes (either via link or voice reporting) may also assist in information
exchange. All of these will require definition in the task force commander’s instructions.

(2) (NU) Recognition Confidence Levels—the level and criteria required for achieving
recognition should also be examined in the light of ROE.

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(3) (NU) Weapon Release Criteria—this will require most careful definition in order to reflect
ROE intentions. This subject may require clarification discussions at the task definition stage with
those issuing the original directive.

(4) (NU) Weapon of Choice—having considered the ROE it may be desirable/necessary

to specify which weapons and types of ammunition may be used in each circumstance. In
general, in these situations weapons with man-in-the-loop target acquisition or engagement at
short (visual) ranges will allow more flexibility and minimise the risks of collateral damage and
misidentification. This will have important implications for overall force mix in general and for
which assets may be employed for these contingencies in particular.

(5) (NU) Warnings—In the graduated response situations permitted by ROE, warning will play
an integral part. The commander should ensure that standardized warnings are used to reflect ROE
and mission objectives. Instructions in this respect should be extended to include such matters as
the training and use of fire control systems and radars and the movement and manning of weapons.

(NU) Once these plans have been completed they must be given wide promulgation among the force and
good familiarity ensured, particularly once roulement of units commences and the original task force
members are replaced. Additionally, plans should be exercised to ensure that all elements, including
those ashore, are practiced and aware of their role. It will be of particular importance to ensure that
command and control communications links operate correctly to allow real-time management by the
higher command.

c. (NU) Surveillance. The success of the operation is likely to stand or fall on the ability of the force
to maintain adequate surveillance over its area of responsibility (AOR) as defined by the geographical
limits of the directive.
(NR) (NMP) ATP-31 (Chapters 6 and 8) provides much useful basic guidance on the conduct of
surveillance. The following is additional guidance and amplification:

(1) (NU) Recognized Surface Picture. A recognized surface picture (RSP) must be built
with the aim of positively identifying and continuously tracking all contacts in the AOR. Equally
important is wide and timely dissemination of the RSP. Data links will almost always be the best
method of achieving this. The RSP is designed to achieve one or more of the following:

(a) (NU) Detect all surface contacts in the AOR.

(b) (NU) Identify all tracks in the AOR to a level required by the type of operation.

(c) (NU) Hand over reporting responsibility between adjacent units.

(d) (NU) Identify a specific and defined contact of interest (COI) or critical contact of interest
(CCOI) in the AOR.

(e) (NU) Identify a specific type of COI in the AOR.

(f) (NU) Track an identified COI in the AOR.

(g) (NU) Take action against a unit to identify/intercept a COI.

(NU) It should be borne in mind that establishment and maintenance of the RSP (and recognized
air picture (RAP) (see below)) are highly asset-intensive and may require 24-hour airborne cover.
However, once traffic patterns and confidence in intelligence cuing have been established, the level
of activity may possibly be reduced.

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(2) (NU) Size of the AOR. This is governed by:

(a) (NU) The TF mission.

(b) (NU) Number of assets.

(c) (NU) The type of sensors available.

(d) (NU) The objective in building the RSP.

(e) (NU) The environmental conditions in the AOR.

(f) (NU) The targets’ characteristics.

(NU) Resolution of the possible conflict between the actual area over which satisfactory cover can
be achieved and the area laid down in the task directive should have been done in consultation with
shore authorities prior to sailing.

(3) (NU) Picture Compilation Assets may consist of some or all of the following:

(a) (NU) National intelligence sensors.

(b) (NU) MPA.

(c) (NU) Ship/carrier-based surveillance aircraft (FW or RW).

(d) (NU) Shore-based liaison officers in key ports.

(e) (NU) AEW aircraft.

(f) (NU) Submarines.

(g) (NU) Sonar.

(h) (NU) Comms HF/DF.

(NU) Each surveillance unit will possess one or more of the following capabilities:

(a) (NU) Radar.

(b) (NU) Electo-optical (EO)/visual devices.

(c) (NU) ESM.

(d) (NU) Towed array.

(NU) and information exchange capabilities:

(a) (NU) voice.

(b) (NU) RATT.

(c) (NU) Tactical Data Links (e.g., JMICS, Link 11/16).

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(4) (NU) Indications and Warning Patrol. It should be apparent from intelligence analysis
prior to arrival in theater where the focal points of the activity by the nation or group under
surveillance are located. Of particular interest is that activity, usually military in nature, which
poses threats to either the task force itself, the shipping it may be tasked to protect, the embargo it is
tasked to enforce, or the land forces it may be supporting. In these instances priority consideration
should be given to the establishment of Indications and Warning patrols. These will have the
following characteristics:

(a) (NU) Be forward deployed; thus the value of the intelligence and warning to be gained
must be weighed against the potential increased threat to the gatherer.

(b) (NU) Can be carried out by surface units or submarines.

(c) (NU) Units selected should possess sophisticated ESM equipment, including a comms
intercept and analysis capability and direct comms link to CTF/CTG as well as a good
self-defence capability.

(d) (NU) Contingency planning should include protective cover for the patrol.

(e) (NU) Covert option is available if a submarine is used.

(f) (NU) Give 24-hour surveillance. While air assets, in particular AEW and ESM aircraft, can
contribute, the prolonged cover required is likely to be too draining on probably limited assets.

(5) (NU) Information Flow. The task organization must ensure that a two-way flow of
information exists in all environments. While commonality of equipment will go some way to
ensuring this, attention must be paid to geographical and propagation constraints and plans made
accordingly.

(6) (NU) Duplication of Effort. With assets likely to be limited, every effort must be made to
ensure that units are used to their full capability, particularly in the area of surveillance, and that
their information is reported in a timely and efficient manner. Clearly, duplication of effort is not
only wasteful but may also lead to confusion if multiple reports are received on a single incident.

d. (NU) Air Integration. The task force commander will wish to employ air assets to assist in
achieving his tasks. Initially among these will be the surveillance function, but the latter stages of the
operation could extend to cover the full range of air capability both over sea and land. It is likely that
in all stages of the operation the demand for air assets will exceed the organic capability of the task
force to provide it. The commander will be required to address:

(1) (NU) Command relationships with respect to tasking of shore-based assets. This may be
done within the context of a joint command structure.

(2) (NU) Establishment of coordinated tasking of both shore and seaborne air assets to
ensure optimum and efficient utilization of resources. The landing of a suitably qualified liaison
officer from the maritime force to assist in this process is strongly recommended.

(3) (NU) Governmental agreement for hosting of other nations’ forward deployed aircraft
and their logistic support.

(4) (NU) The designation of a unit to maintain overall coordination of all aircraft
airborne within the AOR, with particular regard to Blue aircraft in order to prevent Blue-on-Blue
conflicts. The unit performing this task (force marshaller) will require a comprehensive radar,
IFF and ESM suite coupled with a very capable automated command system with access to Data
Links 11/16.

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(5) (NU) Participation in the message traffic regarding aircraft tasking and control
(especially relevant for the force marshaller).

(6) (NU) The establishment of the recognized air picture using the same principles as
those applied to the building of the RSP.

e. (NU) NCAGS Structure. There is no standard NCAGS organization, but NCAGS is tailored to
support the operational commander’s mission in the most efficient and effective way, depending on
the character of the actual operation. The NCAGS elements are to execute NCAGS plans and tasks in
a timely and accurate way, keeping the operational commander’s mission in mind at all times.

(NU) The following organic elements are identified:

(1) (NU) The operational commander is responsible for his mission and therefore has overall
responsibility for all NCAGS tasking and activities.

(2) (NU) The SO NCAGS is the first responsible authority on behalf of the operational commander
for all NCAGS aspects and activities. This includes NCAGS planning, preparation, execution,
evaluation, and organizational NCAGS matters. His primary tasks are to make sure that:

(a) (NU) The operational commander’s mission is supported in the best way.

(b) (NU) The OPTASK NCAGS and NCAGS-related directive are drafted.

(c) (NU) The NCAGS plans and tasks are effective and up-to-date.

(d) (NU) All members of the NCAGS staff, including deployed NCAGS elements, are fully
informed about the actual NCAGS plans and tasks.

(3) (NU) The Deployed NCAGS Element(s). If the operational situation requires, or other factors
will improve the execution of the commander’s mission, deployed NCAGS elements can be used.
The assignment and tasking will be decided by the operational commander but initiated by the SO
NCAGS. The SO NCAGS is responsible for the size, composition, and tasking of the assigned
deployed NCAGS element(s).

(4) (NU) NATO Shipping Centre Augmentation Element. The complexity of an operation may
require an augmentation of NCAGS personnel to the standard manning of the NATO Shipping
Centre (NSC).

(5) (NU) The NCAGS manning will be determined by factors such as the task assigned, the
complexity and volume of shipping, the duration of the operation, size of the AOO, and used
locations. For detailed information, see ATP-02, Vol. I.

f. (NU) Continuity of Approach. By their very nature crisis response operations tend to be of
unspecified duration and can become drawn-out affairs lasting, in some cases, many years. It is
therefore certain that units and individuals extending to the very top of the command chain will
change. In order to maintain the overall thrust of the operation and to ensure consistency of application
of its intended measures, it is vital that the means are put in place by the initial task force members
and its commander to pass on this vital information to their successors. This can best be achieved by:

(1) (NU) Issue of a simplified Operation Order covering items addressed in this section.

(2) (NU) Issue of Standing OPGENs and OPTASKs—these should be reviewed by newly
arrived commanders and revised as the operation develops.

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(3) (NU) Face-to-face handover briefings between units.

(4) (NU) CTG/CTF brief to newly arrived units.

(5) (NU) Newly arrived CTF/CTG face-to-face brief with area commander.

(6) (NU) Effective liaison between land forces and air forces deployed ashore and other
Allied commanders in the AOR.

9606 Miscellaneous

a. (NU) Boarding Operations. ATP-71 provides much comprehensive detailed guidance for the
conduct of boarding operations. This should be adopted or adapted to suit existing circumstances. In
any case, instructions to the TF will be required. Included in such instructions should be a standardized
set of warnings to be used should the target vessel/aircraft prove uncooperative. In the event that it is
assessed that opposed boardings are seen as a likely scenario, special training for select teams will be
required or special forces teams requested to be deployed.

b. (NU) Submarines in Support. The allocation of submarines to support these operations greatly
enhances the force’s capability in a number of areas:

(1) (NU) Indications and Warning Patrol—the covert nature of the submarine greatly
increases the commander’s options in the placement of the patrol. As a result it is likely to be in the
forefront of intelligence gathering. In allocating submarines to this type of operation the relative
capabilities and endurance of the different types (SSN v SSK v SSC) of submarine will have to be
considered. In general terms, the smaller the submarine the more units will be required to support
the patrol cycle.

(2) (NU) Psychological Operations—again the unseen covert nature of submarine operations
is a potent factor in creating uncertainty in the assessments of the opposing force and can be further
manipulated by public statements that are difficult to prove or disprove. Its largely independent
modus operandi allows the submarine to be the first or among the first units to reach an AOR.

(3) (NU) Exclusion Zone Enforcement—should ROE be robust enough to permit this mode
of operation, the submarine, again by virtue of its covertness, can exert a disproportionate influence
on the opposing forces’ activities.

(NU) The submarine’s most significant contribution is made by virtue of its covertness. It follows
from this that its use in overt operations (boarding/warning) will detract from its primary value. In any
case submarines are poorly equipped to conduct such evolutions. When submarines are allocated for
support, PMI and WSM problems will have to be addressed.

c. (NU) Fast Patrol Boat Operations. Fast patrol boats and similar craft may be able to
make significant contributions to both surveillance and interception of COIs. They have particular
advantages in the inshore environment and in operating against small fast craft, often used for
smuggling high-value cargo and personnel. The following should be kept in mind when considering
their employment:

(1) (NU) FPBs will require forward-based support either ashore or afloat, in or close to
their AOO for maintenance, fuel and crew rest.

(2) (NU) Weather may limit their operations but will also significantly affect their opponents.

(3) (NU) The effectiveness of FPBs in both surveillance and, if required, attack is greatly
enhanced by ensuring helicopter assets are assigned to cooperate and integrate into their operations.

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(4) (NU) FPBs should be assigned their own AOR in which to operate, together with
appropriate reporting chains. In times of actual conflict consideration should be given to excluding
all other units (other FPBs and assigned air assets) from this area to avoid Blue-on-Blue incidents.

(5) (NU) FPB Integration into a larger TF organization is made more effective by the allocation
of a liaison/gateway unit. This unit should carry out the functions of C2 of FPB operations,
participating on the FPB RATT circuit, providing air defence over the FPB operating areas, control
of air assets working with FPBs and relaying instructions and information from the ASUWC or
other commanders.

d. (NU) Air Embargo. While the enforcement of an air embargo should be addressed along the
lines suggested above, it does however present some unique problems. While control of regular
international civil air traffic may be quickly seized by means of withdrawal of facilities, the control of
internal light aviation, short-duration military flights, and clandestine resupply by air will prove to be:

(1) (NU) Asset-intensive to detect—in all probability requiring 24-hour coverage by

sophisticated AEW aircraft.

(2) (NU) Characterized by difficulty in positive identification to the required degree to

enable enforcement action to be taken.

(3) (NU) Characterized by a lack of enforcement options compared to the maritime

surface situation. Diversion/warning off may not be feasible with ROE insufficiently robust to allow
engagement. In addition, the duration of the contact may be too short to permit full consultation up
the chain of command, which is a prerequisite for action to be taken.

(NU) The assets carrying out this role are likely to be heavily augmented by, or completely derived
from, shore-based aircraft. This will, therefore, be an area in which close cooperation in command
relationships will be necessary.

e. (NU) Records. In order to be able to reconstruct incidents accurately for subsequent analysis,
public relations purposes and use in a court of law, it is vital that all units are ordered to take records
whenever an incident seems likely to occur until its completion. Some or all of the following may be
ordered:

(1) (NU) Unit navigational records.

(2) (NU) Narrative records either on tape or manuscript taken on the Bridge or in the Operations
Room/Combat Information Centre.

(3) (NU) Audio tapes of selected comms nets, normally those used in challenging merchant
vessels and in dealing with opposing units.

(4) (NU) Records from video cameras/EO devices slaved to fire control radars.

(5) (NU) Video records of surveillance radars.

(6) (NU) Records from combat system computers.

(7) (NU) Manuscript records as ordered from Maritime Analysis Handbook.

f. (NU) Prevention of Mutual Interference. In a multinational force the CTG needs to know the
main characteristics of all sensors and weapons and to issue technical instructions to avoid electronic
interference. Force disposition may also be influenced by the requirement to keep mutually interfering
units apart.

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g. (NU) PR Media/Matters. Relations with the media should, wherever possible, be proactive rather
than reactive. Indeed the media should be used at both government and task force level to demonstrate
presence, determination and capability. The fact that PR contact may be made at various levels and
at various locations underlines the vital necessity that a common line is taken by all concerned. The
Commander should ensure that:

(1) (NU) A clear media policy is established in the TF.

(2) (NU) Unit commanders are given a media briefing before arriving on station.

(3) (NU) Requests for media facilities are channeled to and approved by one authority.

(4) (NU) Written line-to-take press briefings are issued on a regular basis and updated as
a matter of urgency in the event of any development/incident even if only to confirm no change
has occurred. Where possible these briefs should consist of likely questions and agreed answers.

(5) (NU) Units should have experienced in their pre-deployment training, exercises where
unannounced contact with media representatives in the wake of an incident is rehearsed.

9607–9609 Spare

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CHAPTER 10 Anti-Air Warfare

10000 Introduction

(NU) Anti-air warfare (AAW) consists of those measures taken to defend a maritime force against attack
by airborne weapons launched from aircraft, ships, submarines, and land-based sites. AAW procedures
used by a naval force at sea when operating in isolation from shore air defence authorities are described
in this chapter. However, when ships are operating in or adjacent to a JOA, they are to coordinate their
AAW operations with those of the appropriate CAOC, JAOC, or AOC.
(NR) (NMP) Air-maritime coordination, including employment of the coordinated air/sea procedures
(CASP) for air defence, is described in AJP-3.3.3 and ATP-3.3.3.1. Principles of AAW operations are
contained in ATP-31.

NOTE

(NU) IN SOME COASTAL AREAS LLTRS AND TRANSIT

CORRIDORS THAT SERVE FOR COORDINATING AIR TRAFFIC
AND AD/AAW REPRESENT WEAPONS-TIGHT ZONES FOR
SURFACE UNITS, WHEN ACTIVATED. TRANSIT CORRIDORS
AND LLTRS ARE TEMPORARY AIR CORRIDORS OF DEFINED
DIMENSIONS THROUGH THE AREA OF ORGANIC, LOW-LEVEL
AIR DEFENCES OF SURFACE FORCES. (NR) (NMP) DETAILS
ARE IN ATP-40, ATP-31, AND RESPECTIVE NATO COMMANDERS’
AIRSPACE CONTROL PLANS.

10001 Command and Control in Anti-air Warfare

(NU) The OTC’s functions in anti-air warfare, including those that may be delegated to the AAWC, are
summarized in Table 2-3. When operating with a small force, the OTC will normally retain most of his
command functions; when operating with a larger force, the OTC will normally delegate most of his
command functions to the AAWC. Irrespective of any specific AAW duties that may have been assigned
to him, the commanding officer of each ship is responsible for the defence of his ship.
(NU) The threat, ROE, and TF/TG communications and control capabilities will determine whether or
not the OTC executes centralized control or decentralized control. In general, effective AAW is facilitated
by decentralized control when faced with a modern threat equipped with both high-speed ASSMs and
an ECM capability. The high-speed air threat and severe EW environment significantly compresses
air defence reaction time. This, coupled with lack of assured communications, requires that AAW be
executed in a decentralized manner once the battle is joined.
(NU) Prior to battle, preplanned responses are developed that must be consistent with any applicable
ROE. These preplanned responses are contained in the OPTASK AAW and form the basis of decentralized
execution.
10002 Sector Anti-air Warfare Commander

(NU) If the tactical situation dictates that the AAW area should be divided into sectors, a SAAWC may be
designated. Within his sector, an SAAWC will be subject to the overriding authority (veto) of the AAWC
but is otherwise vested with most of the prerogatives and responsibilities of the AAWC.
a. (NU) Direction Functions.

(1) (NU) Designating LAAWCs.

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(2) (NU) Assigning AAW aircraft to appropriate units for control.

(3) (NU) Initiating action against an air threat, if no action has been initiated by other units in his
sector.

(4) (NU) Exercising overriding authority (veto) over all actions initiated by other units in his
sector.

(5) Designating the sector fleet air defence identification zone coordinator.

(6) Designating the sector force marshaller.

b. (NU) Coordination Functions.

(1) (NU) Resolving with other SAAWCs problems of coordination on or near the border lines
between sectors, to ensure the efficient change of reporting responsibility and to avoid mutual
interference.

(2) (NU) Coordinating the effective employment of aircraft and missiles within his sector.

c. (NU) Control Function. Controlling the AAW communication nets within his sector.

d. (NU) Additional Duties.

(1) (NU) Requesting the launch of land-based alert aircraft if no carrier is allocated to his sector.

(2) (NU) Keeping the AAWC informed of evaluated threats, and of the location of friendlies that
could be mistaken as hostile.

(3) (NU) Issuing SITREPs for the benefit of the units in his sector.

10003 Local AAW Coordinator

(NU) When two or more ships are in company and within UHF range, a LAAWC will be designated. The
AAWC of a force will normally act as the LAAWC for his own local group. LAAWCs have the following
functions:
a. (NU) Direction Functions.

(1) (NU) Delegating, as appropriate, specified functions to other ships in his local AAW group.

(2) (NU) Establishing watch zones for ships in his group.

(3) (NU) Broadcasting the local air picture to ships of the group on the local AAW coordination net.

b. (NU) Coordination Functions.

(1) (NU) Correlating and evaluating reports from ships in company and, where appropriate,
relaying this information to the SAAWC or AAWC on the AAW coordination net.

(2) (NU) Issuing threat warnings: if the threat to the group warrants a higher warning than that in
effect for the force, the LAAWC is to keep the SAAWC or AAWC informed.

(3) (NU) Passing pertinent information to ships of the group regarding MEZs, weapons restriction
orders, safety sectors, and targets that have been designated to force weapon systems.

c. (NU) Control Function. Controlling the local AAW coordination net.

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10004 Force Track Coordinator—Air

(NU) The AAWC or SAAWC is normally responsible for air reporting and track coordination within the
force or sector respectively; he may assign this duty to another, more suitably equipped ship, if required,
as FTC-A. Responsibilities are found in Article 7213.
10005 Individual Ship Responsibilities

(NU) The following individual responsibilities always apply.

a. (NU) Self-Defence. Each commanding officer is responsible for the defence of his ship. When
his ship is under direct attack, qualifying orders, directives, or plans from higher authority do not
relieve him of this basic responsibility.

b. (NU) Degree of Readiness. Each commanding officer is responsible for establishing an

appropriate degree of readiness within his ship. The degree of readiness he sets must not be lower,
but may be higher, than that ordered by the OTC. The ship’s organization must ensure the proper
maintenance of the ordered readiness for as long as it is in force.

c. (NU) Reporting. Subject to any restrictions imposed by the EMCON plan, each unit is responsible
for reporting promptly to the appropriate anti-air warfare commander or coordinator all AAW
information that may be of local, sector, or force interest, including any deficiencies of equipment.

d. (NU) Initiation of AAW Measures. Each unit is responsible for initiating AAW measures
without delay, whenever available information indicates the necessity of such action.

10006–10009 Spare

10010 Stationing Anti-air Warfare Units

(NU) Although AAW requirements normally call for dispersion, other considerations, such as
antisubmarine warfare, mutual support, and emission policy, are likely to indicate the need for using
a closer formation, disposition, or screen. In any operations, the OTC will invariably have to reach an
optimum compromise between all requirements to meet the prevailing threats. AAW units are stationed
on true bearings irrespective of the direction of the AAW axis. AAW stations are promulgated by means
of the OPTASK AAW message. Further details on stationing are in Chapter 3.
10011 (NU) (NMP) Dispersion

(NR) (NMP) Dispersion has the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages
a. (NR) (NMP) Provides defence in depth.

b. (NR) (NMP) Makes the enemy’s recognition task difficult.

c. (NR) (NMP) Increases the coverage of sensors.

d. (NR) (NMP) Reduces the number of ships liable to damage by a single nuclear explosion.

e. (NR) (NMP) Provides good baselines for triangulation.

f. (NR) (NMP) When disposed upthreat, AAW forces are in a position to engage enemy bombers
prior to missile release.

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Disadvantages
(1) (NR) (NMP) Requires the use of long-range communications, which are vulnerable to
jamming, intrusion, and interception.

(2) (NR) (NMP) Provides less effective defence against surface and subsurface threats.

(3) (NR) (NMP) Increases the difficulty of maintaining grid lock.

(4) (NR) (NMP) Increases the difficulty of weapons coordination.

10012 Surface Pickets

(a) (NU) Picket ships are stationed primarily to extend the range of AAW measures. Surface
pickets are normally stationed to extend as far as practicable the AAW surveillance area,
recognition/identification, and control of aircraft.

(b) (NC) (NMP) An additional advantage is that the surface picket may be able to engage
enemy bombers prior to ASSM release.

(c) (NU) When the number of pickets is not sufficient for all-round coverage, stations on
or near an arc across the threat axis may be used to give effective detection capability in the
threatened sector. When attacks from only one general direction are likely, a second picket line
closer in may be used, in lieu of greater all-round protection.

(d) (NU) A picket whose main task is AAW is called a Watchdog. A picket that has been given
the primary duty concerning the identification of friendly aircraft is called a Tomcat.

10013 Aircraft Carriers

(NU) Carrier formations and dispositions are described in Chapter 3. Carrier and carrier air operations
are detailed in Chapter 6.
10014 Surface-to-Air Missile Ships

a. (NU) General. Surface-to-air missiles are divided into three categories according to range:

(1) (NU) Long-range—range over 50 nm.

(2) (NU) Medium-range—range of 10 to 50 nm.

(3) (NU) Short-range—range under 10 nm.

b. (NC) (NMP) Stationing. The following guidelines apply:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Long-range SAM ships are normally stationed as far upthreat as will permit early
detection and engagement of enemy bombers. Long-range SAM ships have better engagement
envelopes and better probabilities of kill against bombers than against ASSMs.

(a) (NC) (NMP) When stationed upthreat, ships may be teamed to increase AAW effectiveness
and ASW/ASUW self-defence capabilities. Alternate stations near the centre of the force, or
even downthreat, may allow SAM ships to provide defence against high-level, steep-diving
targets.

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(2) (NC) (NMP) Medium- and short-range SAM ships are normally stationed to protect an HVU,
such as a carrier or a logistics or amphibious ship. Distance from the supported unit may be up
to 10 nm and is dependent on the capability of the SAM system. A SAM ship should be given
freedom of movement to protect the unit from the most immediate threat.

10015 Units with Self-Defence Weapons

(NU) Ships equipped with self-defence weapons only must be stationed close to each other to provide
mutual support. This may be the only means of defending a force that lacks both fighter and missile
defences. Such formations should be limited to small groups when used in a nuclear environment or
under conditions in which dispersed or deceptive formations provide a better defence. These ships also
have the ability to contribute to the AAW defence of a force against certain missile flight profiles, if they
are stationed as close as possible to the unit(s) being protected. When ships are sailing in a 2W disposition
or in a screen centred in a HVU, the OTC/CWC/AAWC should determine the suitability of positioning
the best self-defence weapon-fitted ship in the closest sector to the HVU to act as main goalkeeper.
10016 Shotgun Position

(NC) (NMP) To support a HVU/MEU fitted with self-defence weapons, it is advantageous to position a
ship at medium range with anti-air warfare duty. This ship/position is called SHOTGUN. Her mission
is to reinforce the HVU/MEUs anti-air defence capability by adding another extended layer to the
HVU/MEUs self-defence to contribute to threat attrition. SHOTGUN should be stationed at HVU/
MEU’s weapons maximum operational range, close to threat axis.
10017–10019 Spare

10020 Anti-air Warfare Aircraft

(NU) AAW aircraft may be either land based or carrier based and, depending on the tactical situation,
may be ordered to beat ground or deck alert or on CAP. Land-based aircraft in particular will often
be supported by tanker aircraft for air-to-air refuelling (AAR) and should be stationed on a towline
promulgated in the OPTASK AAW or ACO.
(NR) (NMP) Greater detail is available in ATP-31.
10021 Airborne Early-Warning Aircraft

a. (NU) Capabilities. AEW aircraft are well suited for long-range detection and tracking of both
high- and low-altitude aircraft, for CAP control, and for surface search. Suitably equipped aircraft
can also relay communications (AUTOCAT), transmit information by data link, and intercept
electromagnetic emissions.

b. (NU) Stationing.

(1) (NU) AEW aircraft are stationed as directed by the OTC or AAWC in a barrier patrol line.

(2) (NR) (NMP) Points to consider when stationing AEW aircraft are listed in ATP-31.

(3) (NC) (NMP) The AEW barrier for older AEW aircraft is about 50 nm from ZZ at an altitude
up to 5,000 feet, so that a 90° sector will be covered. For modern AEW aircraft, distance from the
force can be up to 200 nm and the aircraft can be operated at altitudes of 20,000 to 30,000 feet to
provide optimum search, track, and height-finding capability. Normally, AEW aircraft should be
given freedom to select altitude and track on the barrier to optimize sensor employment.

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c. (NU) Procedures.

(1) (NU) Call signs for AEW aircraft consist of daily changing call signs or the code word ANY
FACE, followed by the barrier designator. Barrier designators are TANGO, UNIFORM, VICTOR,
XRAY, YANKEE, and ZULU. When a relieving AEW aircraft is airborne before its predecessor
has landed, the call sign must include a numeral suffix (i.e., ANY FACE TANGO is relieved by
ANY FACE TANGO ONE, which in turn is relieved by ANY FACE TANGO).

d. (NU) Capability of Other Aircraft.

(1) (NU) Modern CAP aircraft with extended radar ranges should be considered an AEW sensor,
particularly during periods when AEW aircraft are not airborne.

(2) (NU) However, intense and sophisticated enemy ECM may severely degrade/negate modern
CAP detection capabilities.

10022 Electronic Warfare Aircraft

(NU) Electronic warfare aircraft can be either land based, carrier based, or ship based. The primary
function of these aircraft is to provide ESM and ECM support to the force, as defined in Article 8101.
Coordination of the EW capabilities of these aircraft is normally exercised by the OTC through the IWC
(if designated).
10023 Aircraft Authentication on AAW Nets

(NU) Excessive use of authentication with single-seat aircraft is to be avoided. Authentication is

recommended over challenge and reply methods as it can be accomplished easily and quickly. For further
details, see Chapter 4.
10024–10029 Spare

10030 Anti-air Warfare Communications

(NU) Details are in Chapter 4.

10031–10039 Spare

10040 Anti-air Warfare Coordination

(NU) The cardinal principles of AAW organization—to ensure the quickest possible response to any
threat—are:
(1) (NU) Decentralized control to the lowest possible level, and the use of preplanned reactions
and responses contained in the OPTASK AAW.

(2) (NU) Control by veto, exercised by a commander/coordinator, who may apply a veto to an
action initiated by a subordinate unit.

(3) (NU) The integration of fighters, SAM ships, AEW and EW aircraft, and measures to counter
enemy targeting to provide defence in depth.

(NU) The degree of decentralized control depends on the situation. When operating in a confined area, in
an area of joint operations, or in an area where neutral units may be encountered, the AAWC may have
to retain centralized control.

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(NU) Examples of how the AAWC may control the air battle are given below.
a. (NU) Control by Veto. An example of control by veto is:
“This is (call sign) TAKING HOSTILE 3456 with STATION 4.”

“This is (call sign of AAWC) NEGAT HOSTILE 3456.”

b. (NU) Engagement Order. If the AAWC wishes a unit to engage a particular target, he is to issue
an engagement order; if the weapon to be used is a fighter, he is to state his intention to IDENTIFY or
to DESTROY the target. For example:

“(Call sign A), and (Call Sign B) this is (call sign of AAWC) (Call Sign A) TAKE Northern/Eastern/
Western/Southern package, (Call Sign B) TAKE Northern/Eastern/Western/Southern package.”
“(Call sign A), and (Call Sign B) this is (call sign of AAWC) (Call Sign A) TAKE Lead/Middle/
Trail, (Call Sign B) TAKE Lead/Middle/Trail.”

“(Call sign) this is (call sign of AAWC) TAKE HOSTILE 1007 with STATION 3 and DESTROY.”

c. (NU) MORE HELP. If the unit detailed to engage a raid cannot identify the target on radar or
needs further information, the unit calls for MORE HELP.
“This is (call sign) MORE HELP HOSTILE 1007.”
d. (NU) NOCAN. Any unit that cannot carry out the order of the AAWC is to say so, stating the
reason:

“This is (call sign) STATION 3 NOCAN—STATE LAMB ZERO—OUT.”

“This is (call sign) STATION 3 NOCAN—WEAPONS ZERO—OUT.”

e. (NU) COVER. If the AAWC wishes a long- or medium-range SAM-equipped ship to initiate
an engagement on a specified track up to the point of firing, he can order this by “COVER.” This
procedure allows a track to be designated to more than one firing unit without multiple engagement
of the track. For example:

“(Call sign(s)) this is (call sign AAWC) COVER HOSTILE 1234.”

“(Call sign) this is (call sign AAWC) TAKE HOSTILE 1234 WITH BIRDS. (Call sign(s))
COVER.”
10041 Methods of Anti-air Warfare Coordination

(NU) Rules for the integration of fighters and SAMs in anti-air warfare must:
(1) (NU) Minimise mutual interference.
(2) (NU) Prevent engagement between friendly units.

(3) (NU) Maximise weapon effectiveness.

a. (NU) Area Coordination. Fighters, SAMs, and ECM are employed in the same airspace. The
AAWC and SAAWC resolve any conflict by ordering one or the other to hold off—or he may order
specific engagements. This method is recommended for use against an enemy with little or no ECM
capability, when it is likely that a clear and coherent air picture can be maintained, communications
are good, and AAW coordination is of a high standard.

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b. (NU) Zone Coordination. Fighters and SAMs are employed in separated zones of airspace,
delineated by sector, altitude, and range from an origin as appropriate. Normally, safety sectors and
three types of zone—missile engagement zone, crossover zone, and fighter engagement zone—are
established (see Figure 10-1). They are promulgated by the AAWC and may be altered as necessary.
The positions and shapes of the zones will depend on weapon characteristics, availability of aircraft,
expenditure of missiles, and disposition of units. ECM may be employed in all zones.

c. (NU) Joint Coordination. Joint coordination combines advantages of area, zone and local
coordination by providing the ability to manage a wide space of engagement and the protection of
friendly assets. Further details are included in ATP-31.

d. (NU) Promulgation. The method of coordination is normally promulgated by the OPTASK AAW.
An operation order may, in addition, specify jammer frequency restrictions and the circumstances
under which the method of weapon coordination is automatically changed. It is the responsibility of
the AAWC to ensure that forces involved are aware of the method of coordination in use. Procedural
messages enable the AAWC to establish, change, or give warning of a change of method, as in the
following examples:

(1) (NU) Establish—“(Method) coordination is in force.”

(2) (NU) Change—“Cancel (method) coordination—assume (method) coordination.”

(3) (NU) Warning—“At (time)—cancel (method) coordination—(method) coordination will be

assumed.”

FIGHTER
ENGAGEMENT MISSILE ARC
ZONE
CROSSOVER
ZONE
CROSSOVER
ZONE
MISSILE
ENGAGEMENT
MISSILE ZONE
ENGAGEMENT 15 NM
ZONE 30 NM
FIGHTER
60 NM ENGAGEMENT
MED-RANGE ZONE
75 NM SAM SHIP

LONG-RANGE
SAM SHIP
SAFETY
SECTOR

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 10-1. (NU) Example of Zone Coordination

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e. (NU) Local Coordination. Local coordination only applies to the employment of self-defence
SAMs, ECM, and guns; it is not an alternative to area or zone coordination. The LAAWC will compile
and promulgate the local air picture to specifically enable ships to identify friendly aircraft and
prevent their engagements by friendly units. No further attempt to coordinate weapons employment is
normally made, and target engagement messages for self-defence weapons systems are not required.

10042 Missile Engagement Zone

a. (NU) Standard SAM MEZ. A MEZ is a zone around a ship or force in which targets are to be
engaged by ship’s missiles, in accordance with weapon control status/orders. Special features are:

(1) (NU) Friendly aircraft must not penetrate the MEZ unless positive clearance has been obtained
from the AAWC/SAAWC or LAAWC.

(2) (NU) Any change in status of a MEZ is promulgated to aircraft and friendly units by the
AAWC/SAAWC using the appropriate code words from APP-07.

b. (NU) Silent SAM MEZ. When covert, long- or medium-range, SAM-equipped ships are
stationed upthreat, a Silent SAM MEZ may be established; this has significant differences from the
MEZ described above. The key factors for ships operating a Silent SAM MEZ are:

(1) (NU) Ships remain covert, receiving the air picture via data links.

(2) (NU) Ships’ weapon control status is automatically WEAPONS FREE.

(3) (NU) The OPTASK AAW will contain details of MEZ size, position, and timing.

(4) (NU) No safety sectors are established in a Silent SAM MEZ.

(5) (NU) No friendly aircraft are allowed in the Silent SAM MEZ, except for AEW, ASW, and
ASUW aircraft that are required to operate in the Silent SAM MEZ, providing the following
criteria are met:

(a) (NU) SAM ships must be alerted to the mission, and the aircraft must be continuously
tracked and their position transmitted on data link.

(b) (NU) Grid lock between the data-link reporting unit and SAM ship is excellent.

10043 Crossover Zone

(NU) A crossover zone normally extends 15 nm beyond the MEZ, but the width may be varied by the
AAWC and is usually based on the speed of the assumed threat. When a controller anticipates that
an infringement of a crossover zone may occur, he is to request a countdown. The fighter is to give a
commentary on the interception, indicating when it expects to complete. The controller will instruct the
fighter to break off if necessary, so that the target can be engaged by an other weapon.
10044 Fighter Engagement Zone

(NU) Fighters have freedom of action within a FEZ to identify and engage air targets in accordance with
ROEs in force. If the AAWC wishes to engage a particular target in the FEZ with a long-range SAM, he is
to issue an engagement order assigning the target to a SAM system, ensuring that the fighter controlling
agency is so advised. When this order has been issued, a missile arc is automatically established.

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10045 Safety Sector

(NU) A safety sector is defined by the AAWC and, when required, coordinated with the responsible
ACA, in terms of origin, range, centre bearing, width, height band, time, and controlling agency. If
more than one safety sector is established, they should be numbered and designated. Safety sectors are
normally dormant and are activated by the AAWC/SAAWC.
10046 Watch Zones

(NU) When required, watch zones will be assigned to ships by the AAWC/SAAWC. Assignment of a
watch zone does not imply that the unit should not engage a target outside the sector, but that priority
must be given to surveillance and engagement within it.
10047 Positive ECM Control

(NU) When the necessity for concealing the presence of the force from the enemy is overriding, the
OTC will order positive control over ECM. Ships will wait for a specific order from the OTC, AAWC,
or SAAWC to employ ECM. This method applies only to area defence ECM and not to self-defence. See
also Chapter 8.
10048 Missile Arc

(NU) This is established automatically when an engagement order has been issued assigning a target in
the FEZ to a SAM system. Unless otherwise ordered by the AAWC, the missile arc is 10 degrees wide,
centred on the bearing of the target, and extends to the maximum range of the SAM.
10049 Spare

10050 (NU) (NMP) Antiship Missile Defence

10051 (NU) (NMP) Introduction

a. (NC) (NMP) Antiship missile defence is an integral part of AAW. It covers all aspects of defending
a ship or a group of ships against missile attack. The defensive measures involved range from
countertargeting, defeating the missile search and homing techniques, to engaging the threat with
missile and gun systems.

b. (NC) (NMP) With the broad range of missile threats that must be considered, ASMD is highly
complex. The problems are further compounded by a wide variety of chaff and other decoy systems
and an array of sophisticated missile, gun and jammer systems.

c. (NC) (NMP) An appreciation of the constraints of each defensive measure as well as consideration
of variable factors such as threat type, threat direction and meteorological conditions are essential.

d. (NC) (NMP) Taking account of these constraints, balanced against the requirements of other
warfare disciplines, the OTC or CO must resolve conflicts at the planning stage and issue detailed and
timely guidance for ASMD.

10052 (NU) (NMP) Threat

(NC) (NMP) In order to ensure that the most effective combination of ASMD countermeasures is
employed, it is necessary to have an accurate appreciation of the threat. To simplify this process, the
potential missile threat can be divided into generic groups based upon missile characteristics. The threat
is currently divided into five groups.
(NC) (NMP) For details on establishing criteria for each group see ATP-31.

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10053 ASMD Reactions

a. (NU) To assist in the timely co-ordination and execution of ASMD, a system of planned reactions
is necessary. These are to be made automatically, collectively, and/or individually by units and depend
on rapidity and simplicity. ASMD reactions are initiated by using the code word “ZIPPO,” followed
by a number or letter and (if applicable) a designation for the attacking missile which indicates the
type of attack and the reactions required. For planning purposes the ZIPPO groups (indicated by
numbers) may be subdivided for a better understanding of the respective missile´s function.

(NC) (NMP) The following ZIPPOs are to be used in voice procedures (groups) or for planning
purposes (subgroups):

ZIPPO C—Initiating Countertargeting measures.

ZIPPO 1—Counter an autonomous active RF or LIDAR homing missile. (subgroups 1a: non-imaging
and 1b: imaging seeker).

ZIPPO 2—Counter an autonomous passive RF antiradiation missile.

ZIPPO 3—Counter an autonomous passive infrared or E/O seeker missile. (subgroups 3a: non-imaging
and 3b: imaging seeker).

ZIPPO 4—Counter an autonomous dual or multi-mode seeker missile (subgroups 4a: mode switching,
4b: modes loosely coupled, 4c: modes tightly coupled (i.e. data fusion).

ZIPPO 5—Counter a platform-guided missile (own ship is tracked by a radar) (subgroups 5a:
semi-active radar guidance, 5b: command guidance (including command to line-of sight (CLOS)),
by radio or wire).

ZIPPO 6—Counter a platform-guided missile (own ship is tracked by an EO/IR tracker or imaging
aiming device) (subgroups 6a: any laser guidance, 6b: command guidance (including CLOS), by
radio or wire).

ZIPPO N—Counter the unidentified/late detected/pop-up missile threat.

(NC) (NMP) The area within which units react to the same ZIPPO is called the ZIPPO area. Unless
otherwise ordered, it is a circle radius 20 nm from ZZ. However, under certain circumstances it may
be necessary to select another centre and/or radius, which should be promulgated in the OPGEN or
OPTASK AAW.

b. (NR) (NMP) For command and control responsibilities and planning, promulgation and execution
of ASMD reactions see ATP-31 and ATP-55.

10054 (NU) (NMP) Considerations for ASMD

(NC) (NMP) The best defence against ASSMs is the neutralization of the launch or targeting platform(s)
before missile release. The following criteria must be considered in defence against the missile threat:
a. (NC) (NMP) Disposition and stationing considerations.

b. (NC) (NMP) Employment of AAW assets.

c. (NC) (NMP) Detection and determining type of attack.

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d. (NC) (NMP) Use of sensors and EMCON.

e. (NC) (NMP) Selection of ASMD countermeasures.

f. (NC) (NMP) Coordination of ASMD reactions.

g. (NC) (NMP) Planned ASMD reactions.

h. (NC) (NMP) Promulgation of ASMD reactions.

i. (NC) (NMP) Execution of ASMD reactions.

10055–10079 Spare

10080 Carrier Battle Group Air Defence Tactics

(NU) The key elements of carrier battle group air defence tactics are:
a. (NU) Destroy hostile missile platform prior to release of weapons.

b. (NU) Position forces in the outer defence zone based on indication and warning information for
engagement of hostile missile platforms.

c. (NU) Position forces in the inner defence zone for engagement of leakers and ASSM defence.

10081 Inner and Outer Defence Zones

(NU) Aircraft carrier battle group AAWCs are controlling two separate but interrelated forces: those
forces assigned to the ODZ and those within the IDZ. The former are primarily fighters, AEW aircraft,
and SAM ships with responsibilities for destroying missile platforms before missile launch; while the
latter are surface units with primary responsibilities for engagement of leakers and providing ASSM
defence for mission-essential forces. Due to the separation of forces by mission and distance, each
defence zone is essentially controlled as a separate entity. With the exception of “heads up” situations on
enemy penetrations, coordination problems mainly involve:
a. (NU) Identification of friendly aircraft operating within the IDZ or transiting between IDZ and
ODZ.

b. (NU) Nonorganic aircraft entering the AAW surveillance area.

10082 Inner Defence Zone

(NU) A circle around each CV whose radius is normally 100 nm but may be adjusted by the CWC based
on expected air threats and geographic considerations.
(NU) The primary AAW responsibility of IDZ units is to provide ASMD to mission-essential forces. This
is done through the coordinated employment of both hard-kill and soft-kill systems.
(NU) The IDZ will be defended primarily by SAM ships. IDZ AAW defences may be augmented by CAP
normally positioned overhead the CV under either IDZC or carrier control. Primary targets for SAM
ships will be ASMs and enemy aircraft that have penetrated ODZ defences.
10083 Outer Defence Zone

(NU) The ODZ is an area encompassing the AAW surveillance area outside the IDZ to a range equivalent
to the maximum sensor range of assets stationed outside the IDZ.

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(NU) The objective of AAW of ODZ is the early detection, identification, and destruction of the platforms
before missile launch. To accomplish this objective, fighters, ships, and AEW aircraft must be stationed
in sufficient numbers up-threat and at a distance that will ensure adequate warning and destruction of
enemy platforms before missile launch. Surface ships with long-range SAMs will be stationed in the
ODZ as either traditional AAW pickets or in a Silent SAM role. Coordination between SAM ships and
airborne assets is vital to avoid blue-on-blue engagements. ODZ forces must be prepared to execute
preplanned response to counter attacking forces in an active electronic environment.

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CHAPTER 11 Interaction with Merchant Shipping and

Safety of Navigation Management—Naval Cooperation and
Guidance for Shipping and Allied Worldwide Navigational
Information System and Leadthrough Operations
SECTION I—NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

11100 Reference

(U) ATP-02–Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) Manual.

11101 Description

1. (U) Maritime operations frequently affect merchant shipping; similarly, merchant shipping may
impact, or be involved in, maritime operations. NCAGS is the interface with merchant shipping in
support of the commander’s mission.

2. (U) NCAGS is the provision of cooperation, guidance, advice and assistance to merchant shipping in
support of the commander’s mission and to enhance the safety and security of merchant ships.

11102 Effects

1. (U) NCAGS enhances and contributes primarily to the following effects:

a. (U) Commander’s freedom of manoeuvre.

b. (U) Commander’s decision-making process.

c. (U) Effective and efficient commitment and use of military assets.

d. (U) Nation’s economic well-being and international stability.

e. (U) Free flow of maritime trade in the area of operations.

f. (U) Merchant shipping’s confidence in military operations.

11103 Operational Application

1. (U) NCAGS operates through the full spectrum of operations from peacetime to crisis contributing to
both the military and economic lines of development and therefore, must be considered at the early stages
of planning. In particular, NCAGS expertise should be incorporated into the staff composition where
interaction with civil maritime actors is either anticipated or desired.

2. (U) The NATO Shipping Centre provides the permanent NATO NCAGS capability under the
command of MARCOM, Northwood.

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SECTION II—ALLIED WORLDWIDE NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

11201 References

1. (U) AHP-01—Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System.

2. (U) Hague Convention 1907, Articles 3 & 5—Notification of Danger Zones and Removal of Mines
Post Conflict.

3. (U) San Remo Manual, Articles 98 & 101—Blockade Management and Embargoes and
Article 106—Maritime Exclusion Zones.

11202 Description

1. (U) AWNIS contributes to freedom of navigation by providing safety and security of navigation
information for military and merchant ships in support of maritime operations.

2. (U) The AWNIS capability delivers to military commanders and civil maritime actors assurance against
the additional risks to safety and security of navigation that are associated with maritime operations. It is
responsible for both classified and unclassified safety and security of navigation information.

3. (U) AWNIS fulfils the obligation upon a commander to comply with relevant legal conventions.

11203 Effects

1. (U) AWNIS contributes primarily to the following effects:

a. (U) Deconfliction of military and merchant shipping from threats and hazards to navigation.

b. (U) Maintenance of the freedom of navigation.

c. (U) Improved confidence and reassurance of military and civil maritime actors.

d. (U) Post-conflict stabilisation within the maritime domain.

11204 Operational Application

1. (U) AWNIS operates through the full spectrum of operations where there is a threat to navigational
safety. AWNIS contributes to both the military and economic lines of development and therefore, must
be considered at the early stages of planning. AWNIS expertise should be incorporated into the staff
composition.

2. (U) An AWNIS qualified officer is appointed as the safety of navigation information coordinator
(SONIC) to fulfil the safety and security of navigation management responsibilities.

3. (U) The permanent NATO AWNIS authority resides in the NSC under the command of MARCOM,
Northwood.

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SECTION III—LEADTHROUGH OPERATIONS

11301 Leadthrough Procedures for Surface Ships

a. (NU) Introduction. The aim of leadthrough is to lead transiting ships in staying as close as
possible to the centreline of a channel or any track ordered in an area. This article provides guidance
for surface ships transiting a channel utilizing a leadthrough vessel (LTV). Any vessel that has suitably
qualified personnel and accurate navigation means may be used as the LTV.

Notes:

1. (NU) The following considerations also apply to submarines on the surface or at periscope depth.

2. (NU) Leadthrough is not a MCM operation. Historically, leadthrough has been conducted through
channels where MCM effort has occurred.

b. (NU) Command and Control. Figure 11-1 provides an example C2 structure for leadthrough
operations.

c. (NU) Communications.

(1) (NU) Communications between LTV and vessel transiting minefield (VTMs) can be
accomplished by a variety of methods depending upon the EMCON policy in force. Electronic
emissions should be reduced to the absolute minimum as required by the tactical situation.
Available methods include:

(a) (NU) Automated identification system (AIS).

(b) (NU) Satellite phones (encrypted or unencrypted).

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 11-1. (NU) Example C2 Arrangements for Leadthrough Operations

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(c) (NU) UHF/VHF communications (encrypted).

(d) (NU) Lights.

(e) (NU) Flag hoists (daylight only).

(f) (NU) For naval forces, use standard communication systems.

(2) (NU) Commanding officers of LTV must be aware that masters of merchant ships only hold
ATP-02, which provides the necessary instructions for ships passing through mined areas.

(3) (NU) Use can also be made of signal groups from ATP-01, Volume II, when operating with
warships, or ATP-02, and the International Code of Signals when operating with merchant ships.
It should be noted that the International Flag outfit, held by merchant ships contains numerical
pennants, not flags.

d. (NU) Responsibilities.

(1) (NU) OTC of the VTMs. From 36 to 48 hours in advance of arrival, the OTC of the transiting
unit will:

(a) (NU) Submit a Leadthrough Request, informing the respective LTV tasking authority
about the ETA and composition of a convoy/naval force (VTMs) to be led through.

(b) (NU) Provide the CTU of VTMs/convoy commodore with tactical data (provided by OTC
LTV) which includes:

i. Extant Q-Messages.

ii. NAVWARNS.

iii. Channel position relative to Q route.

iv. Channel width.

v. Relevant communication frequencies.

vi. MCM units on task.

vii. Amplifying information.

(2) (NU) OTC of the LTVs. The OTC of the LTVs will:

(a) (NU) Order the CTU of the LTVs to execute the leadthrough operation.

(b) (NU) Obtain the following information from the MCMTA and provide to the OTC VTMs
and CTU LTVs:

i. Channel position relative to Q route.

ii. Channel width.

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iii. MCM units on task.

iv. Amplifying information.

(3) (NU) CTU of the LTVs. The CTU of the LTVs will provide Leadthrough Transit Instructions
well in advance. This task may be delegated to the LTV ordered to execute the leadthrough.

(4) (NU) Leadthrough Vessel. The LTV will:

(a) (NU) Conduct the leadthrough operation.

(b) (NU) Ensure that ordered distances are maintained.

(c) (NU) Ensure that vessels transiting the channel maintain the ordered track or centreline.

e. (NU) Coordinating Instructions.

(1) (NU) VTMs should keep station by true bearing from the LTV in order to proceed on the
centreline or on another track as ordered.

(2) (NU) Depending on sea state, visibility, method of navigation, manoeuvrability, and other
characteristics of transiting units, one LTV can lead a maximum of three VTMs; a ratio of one LTV
to one VTM is ideal.

(3) (NU) If rendezvous with a LTV is expected during darkness and the EMCON policy precludes
the use of electronic means listed in para 3 above, lights should be utilised. The first VTM of the
column is to show three white lights displaced vertically at the bow for identification purposes.
The LTV will point the rendezvous position, showing a white light over red. If more than one LTV
is employed, only the first LTV will show the lights mentioned. Other LTVs are to proceed to their
assigned stations and to show those lights after arrival.

(4) (NU) Units damaged by mine detonation and unable to proceed at the ordered speed should
attempt to manoeuvre clear of the channel’s centreline. In narrow and shallow channels, such as
harbour entrances, heavily damaged or sinking units should be grounded outside the main channel.

11302 Procedures for Submarines

a. (NC) (NMP) General Remarks.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Purpose. The purpose of this article is to provide the commanding officer of a
submarine with instructions for manoeuvring in mine danger areas. The prescribed procedure can
also be applied for a submarine passage between minefields, through an established channel in an
enemy minefield or a gap in a friendly minefield, or in waters difficult to navigate.

(2) (NC) (NMP) If a Leadthrough Operation is Ordered. The OTC of the MCM force is required
IAW paragraph 13060 to send the Transit Instructions message to the SUBOPAUTH, who in due
time will promulgate the message. The format must be amplified by the SUBOPAUTH/OTC of the
MCM force by a new paragraph, as follows:

(NC) (NMP) F. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR SUBMARINES

(NC) (NMP) 1. Rendezvous area
(NC) (NMP) 2. Rendezvous period/alternate rendezvous period
(NC) (NMP) 3. Danrunner will be unit indicated
(NC) (NMP) 4. Distance between danrunner and LTV, in yards
(NC) (NMP) 5. Communication instructions (frequencies; UWT available/not available).

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(3) (NC) (NMP) The Principle for a Leadthrough Operation. This should be to conceal the initial
rendezvous between submarine and LTV from the enemy. All measures that would disclose the
operation must be avoided. Only units equipped with UWT are suitable as LTVs/danrunners for
submerged submarines.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Channel. The channel has to be established in accordance with the appropriate
MW publications. All positions in the channel at which a change of course is required must be
marked by either a navigational buoy or a danbuoy.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) A TYPICAL MCM CHANNEL IS SHOWN IN FIGURE 11-2.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Responsibility for Submarine Safety. This rests with the commanding officer of
the submarine. The decisions whether to pass or not/whether to pass surfaced or submerged is also
up to the commanding officer of the submarine. It is of paramount importance that submarine and
LTV act in agreement and that mutual information does not create any doubts about the actions to
be taken. Tactical control, from the rendezvous until the end of the passage, is assigned to the OTC
of the MCM forces/commanding officer of the LTV.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Identification of LTVs. As long as the approaching submarine has not positively
identified its LTV, it remains absolutely covert. After identification, the submarine has to establish
communications with the LTV by appropriate means, taking into account the secrecy of the
Leadthrough. The LTV has to act in accordance with paragraph b.(2)(a) below, up to the moment
when the submarine starts to communicate. The danrunner should mark the channel entrance in a
position very close to the first datum/danbuoy, and subsequently proceed on the datum line, taking
up position abeam of the LTV.
E
LIN

E
LIN
OY
BU

ER
NT
CE

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure 11-2. (NU) Normal Channel With Offset Buoys

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b. (NC) (NMP) The Leadthrough.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Initial Rendezvous/Rendezvous Area. A geographical rendezvous area (ideally
circular with a radius of 2 nm) should be established well offset from the channel/ gap entrance. The
actual location and shape of the rendezvous area depend on various factors, such as time available,
tactical situations, topography, and environmental conditions. Any information in addition to that
exchanged prior to the Leadthrough listed in the Transit Instructions message should be exchanged
prior to the Leadthrough.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Establishing Rendezvous.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Action to be taken by LTV.

i. (NC) (NMP) Be in rendezvous area during rendezvous period/alternate rendezvous

period.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Keep watch on UWT, UHF, and VHF every 15 minutes.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Cavitate for three to five minutes in rendezvous period.

iv. (NC) (NMP) If necessary, after communications are established, pass to the submarine
additional information/orders, and any alterations to the original plan, with reference to
the Transit Instructions message.

v. (NC) (NMP) When the submarine reports in station, proceed at speed previously
ordered.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) THE LTV SHOULD ENDEAVOUR BY ALL SUITABLE

MEANS TO ASSIST THE SUBMARINE DURING THE DIFFICULT
IDENTIFICATION PHASE.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Action to be taken by the submarine.

i. (NC) (NMP) Approach rendezvous area.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Identify LTV by appropriate means.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Establish communication with the LTV on UWT/UHF using
authentication.

iv. (NC) (NMP) Take station astern of the LTV.

v. (NC) (NMP) Inform the LTV whether it will transit submerged, at periscope depth, or
surfaced.

vi. (NC) (NMP) Comply with transit instructions received.

vii. (NC) (NMP) Report when in station.

viii. (NC) (NMP) Action to be taken on failure to rendezvous. OTC of MCM forces to
report to OPCON/SUBOPAUTH.

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(3) (NC) (NMP) Responsibilities During Transit.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Responsibilities of LTV.

i. (NC) (NMP) Provide the submarine with up-to-date information:

— (NC) (NMP) Concerning the surface picture of the area when submarine transiting
submerged.

— (NC) (NMP) When it enters/leaves the swept channel/gap/safety lane.

— (NC) (NMP) On altering course and/or speed.

— (NC) (NMP) If there is any change to previous instructions.

— (NC) (NMP) Action to be taken in the event of attack.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Provide the submarine with an up-to-date position:

— (NC) (NMP) When it leaves the channel/gap/safety lane.

— (NC) (NMP) When it is released.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Assist the submarine in maintaining station, using all suitable means,
such as:

— (NC) (NMP) Showing a dimmed stern light and top light at night.

—(NC) (NMP) Using a danrunner (Situation ONE/TWO) as UWT relay station in order
to assist the submarine in measuring the distance to the LTV, if the latter is unable to
keep distance.

iv. (NC) (NMP) Report accomplishment of mission to SUBOPAUTH by OPCON.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Responsibilities of the Submarine.

i. (NC) (NMP) Maintain station ordered.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Inform the LTV whether its intention is to transit surfaced, at periscope
depth, or submerged during the passage, if different from previous intentions.

c. (NC) (NMP) Independent Transit. The tactical situation or the nonavailability of LTVs may
force a submarine to transit a well-marked channel or a mine-free gap (Situation ONE) without a LTV.
The SUBOPAUTH will order such independent transits of a submarine.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Responsibilities of the SUBOPAUTH.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Transmit Transit Instructions message to submarine in due time.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Ensure own forces are informed about submarine movement.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Responsibilities of Submarine.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Act in accordance with safety measures and procedures prescribed in this
chapter.

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(b) (NC) (NMP) Request activation of navigational lights in accordance with AHP-03, if
feasible.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Report ETA channel/gap entrance if possible.

d. (NC) (NMP) Submarine Capabilities in Leadthrough Operations.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Submerged State.

(a) (NC) (NMP) The submarine is capable of:

i. (NC) (NMP) Taking a bearing on the LTV:

— (NC) (NMP) By hydrophone array.

— (NC) (NMP) By mine detection sonar.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Measuring the distance of the LTV:

— (NC) (NMP) By angle measuring using hydrophone array. The distance between the
submarine and the LTV is calculated by measuring the angle between danrunner and
LTV; e.g., if the distance ordered is 300 yards, this angle is to be 70 at a distance of
900 yards between danrunner and LTV. (See Figure 11-3.)

— (NC) (NMP) By mine detection sonar.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Periscope Depth. The submarine can:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Take a bearing on the LTV by:

i. (NC) (NMP) Hydrophone array.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Mine detection sonar.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Radar.

iv. (C) (NMP) Periscope.

DANRUNNER LEAD VESSEL

DATUM BUOY
OR SUBMARINE
DAN BUOY

DATUM LINE CENTER LINE

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 11-3. (NU) (NMP) Measuring the Distance of the Lead Vessel

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(b) (NC) (NMP) Measure the distance of the LTV by:

i. (NC) (NMP) Angle measuring by hydrophone array as shown above.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Mine detection sonar.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Radar.

iv. (NC) (NMP) Periscope.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Surfaced State. The submarine can:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Take a bearing on the LTV by:

i. (NC) (NMP) Hydrophone array.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Radar.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Visual means.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Measure the distance of the LTV by:

i. (NC) (NMP) Angle measuring by hydrophone array as shown above.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Radar.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Visual means.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Communications.

(a) (NC) (NMP) The submarine will use:

i. (NC) (NMP) UWT as the primary communication system.

ii. (NC) (NMP) UHF as ordered.

(b) (NC) (NMP) In case of interference with UWT traffic by the wake of the LTV, the danrunner
has to be used as relay station. If this is not possible, switch to UHF frequency.

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PART IV Underwater Warfare

Chapter 12—Antisubmarine Warfare

Chapter 13—Naval Mine Warfare

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CHAPTER 12 Antisubmarine Warfare

SECTION I—GENERAL

12100 Introduction and Scope

(NU) This chapter lists the types of operation available to counter the submarine threat and details
tactical and procedural instructions for ships, submarines, and aircraft when operating individually or in
cooperation with other maritime forces.
(NR) (NMP) Amplification of and background information on the subjects presented in this chapter are
found in ATP-28, Vol. I. Details on submarine operations are found in ATP-18.
12101 Aim of ASW

(NU) The aim of ASW is to deny the enemy effective use of his submarines.
12102 ASW Tasks

(NU) In support of the above aim, ASW forces may be assigned the following tasks:
a. (NU) Location and neutralization or destruction of submarines at sea.

b. (NU) Ensuring the safe and timely arrival of shipping or forces at their destinations.

c. (NU) Protection of land targets from submarine attack.

d. (NU) Protection of inshore waterways from submarine insertion.

e. (NU) Denial of submarine operations in a specific area (detection and deterrence).

(1) (NU) Precursor operations.

(2) (NU) Barrier operations.

12103 ASW Principles

a. (NU) The successful planning and conduct of ASW depends on the application of principles
common to all forms of warfare. However, the nature of the submarines, the wide variation in types
and characteristics of ASW forces, and the effects of the environment within which these forces
operate, necessitate many special applications of these principles.

b. (NU) The following factors have a fundamental influence on ASW tactics:

(1) (NU) The submarine operates beneath the surface of the sea; it is manoeuvrable and can rapidly
vary speed and depth. This combination makes it a difficult, evasive target.

(2) (NU) The position of the submarine may become known only after it poses an immediate
threat or has conducted an attack.

(3) (NU) The ASW commander may be far from any particular scene of action. Thus, significant
responsibility is delegated as far down as unit levels.

(4) (NU) Local and/or scene-of-action commanders may be required to coordinate the actions of
a wide variety of ASW units.

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(5) (NU) Acoustic sensors are the primary means of detection and localization for both ASW
forces and enemy submarines. Acoustic detection and counterdetection ranges vary significantly
with equipment and environmental conditions.

(6) (NU) In most cases, helicopters and FW aircraft are currently considered to be immune from
attack by submerged enemy submarines. However, recent developments indicate that certain
submarines have or may receive the ability to launch an anti-aircraft missile.

c. (NU) Not withstanding, when submarines are operating at periscope depth there may be significant
non-acoustic detection opportunities (radar, IO/EO, visual and magnetic).

12104 General Considerations

a. (NU) Perhaps more than any other warfare discipline, effective ASW demands the coordinated
employment of a balanced mix of assets. This requires the ASWC to understand the capabilities
and limitations of all ASW platforms and systems. Using this knowledge, ASW operations must be
planned and executed to achieve optimal value from all arms available.

b. (NU) This chapter discusses the coordination of ASW at the scene of action. This will be the
responsibility of the SAC. At a higher level, the ASWC must take a wider view and consider the
employment of all ASW forces over the entire AOI.

c. (NU) In determining the best employment for his assets, the ASWC should consider the following
items:

(1) (NU) Mission.

(2) (NU) ASW posture, e.g., offensive or defensive.

(3) (NU) Objectives of ASW (e.g., deter, detect, destroy, etc.).

(4) (NU) Environment (e.g., geography, hydrography, oceanography, meteorology, shipping

density, ambient noise, etc.).

(5) (NU) Speed, time, and distance considerations.

(6) (NU) Threat evaluation (submarine/torpedo types and associated enemy forces).

(7) (NU) Own and supporting assets available (including performance/deficiencies).

(8) (NU) Comparison of own force and opposition capabilities and limitations.

(9) (NU) Possible, probable, and most dangerous enemy courses of action.

(10) (NU) Own courses of action to counter each of the enemy’s options.

(11) (NU) Logistics.

(12) (NU) Level of risk acceptable to own forces.

(13) (NU) ROE.

(14) (NU) Possible and likely future changes to the situation.

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(15) (NU) Communication, connectivity, coordination, and data fusion procedures.

(16) (NU) WSM.

(17) (NU) PMI.

d. (NU) Capabilities of the assets available will be found in OPSTAT UNIT signals.

12105 Definitions of ASW Operations

(NU) ASW may be split into two distinctive types of operations. These are defined as follows:
a. (NU) Area ASW Operations.

(NU) These operations are conducted in a geographical area unrelated to the protection of a specific
surface force. These operations may be offensive in nature in areas of high probability, or defensive in
areas where it may be possible for submarines to conduct antisurface/land attacks.

b. (NU) Task Force/Group ASW Operations.

(NU) These are operations controlled by the task force/group commander for his local area within a
regional area and are designed to prove ASW support to a force/group at sea.

12106 Command in ASW

(NU) The regional commander/CWC/OTC may delegate to the ASWC the authority necessary to plan
ASW operations, to establish ASW policy, and to control assigned assets to implement the ASW plan. The
ASWC’s superior retains ultimate control with the option of command override. The OTC’s functions
in antisubmarine warfare, including those that may be delegated to the ASWC, are summarized in
Table 2-4.
a. (NU) Area ASWC. Is responsible to the area commander for the conduct of ASW operations
throughout his AOR, directs area-wide offensive ASW operations, and provides the supporting
forces needed by task groups afloat for ASW protection. The regional ASWC collects, evaluates,
and disseminates area ASW surveillance information to the regional commander and task groups
operating in the area for which he is responsible. He functions as the operational control authority for
assigned assets (for the regional commander).

b. (NU) Task Force/Task Group ASWC. Is responsible for the conduct of ASW within the task
group. When the CWC concept is being used, the task group ASWC is responsible to the CWC
for the protection of the force against hostile threats. He collects, evaluates, and disseminates ASW
surveillance information to the CWC, regional ASWC, and the force. He also plans and exercises
TACON of task group ASW resources and coordinates with supporting commanders such as the
regional ASWC.

12107 ASWC Duties and Responsibilities

(NU) General duties and responsibilities of the ASWC can be divided into four primary areas:
a. (NU) Plan.

b. (NU) Coordinate.

c. (NU) Establish and maintain the tactical picture.

d. (NU) Exercise tactical control.

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12108 Authority of the ASWC

(NU) An OTC (regional commander/CWC) may delegate to the ASWC the authority necessary to plan
ASW operations, establish ASW policy, and control assigned assets to implement the ASW plan. The
ASWC’s superior retains ultimate control with the option of command override.
12109 Force Track Coordinator (Subsurface)

(NU) The OTC may delegate surface and subsurface surveillance duties to one of the relevant warfare
commanders, which in turn can assign an FTC. In principle, the designated FTC-S and FTC-SS perform
the tasks as described in Chapter 7, Article 7214.
12110 Definitions of ASW Support Operations

a. (NU) Area Operations. Generally conducted by units operating independently. Such operations
are conducted in geographic areas through which enemy submarines are likely to pass, or which are
likely to contain patrolling submarines. Areas may be related to the protection of maritime forces
scheduled to enter the area, or to provide defence in depth to distant forces. Operational control
of units conducting area operations remains with the regional commander. Tactical control of units
conducting regional operations is exercised by commanders subordinate to the regional commander.

b. (NU) Associated Support. Units conducting ASW for the regional ASWC in associated
support to a TF/TG operate independently of a specified task force/group, but may be tasked to
provide contact information to, and receive intelligence from, an OTC. The designated unit operates
under the OPCON of the regional commander, who coordinates tasking and movement in response to
the OTC’s requirements.
(NR) (NMP) Details on submarines conducting ASW in associated support are contained in
Article 12234 and ATP-18.

c. (NU) Direct Support. Units conducting DS are those in which the designated unit provides
ASW support to a specified task force/group. Tactical control of the DS unit is by the OTC of the force
being supported or a designated subordinate.
(NR) (NMP) Submarine DS procedures are described in Article 12235 and ATP-18.

d. (NC) (NMP) Integrated Operations. Integrated operations are those operations in which
a designated submarine provides ASW support to a specific task force/group. The submarine will
operate under TACOM of the OTC. During integrated operations, the assigning authority retains
OPCON. (NC) (NMP) Integrated operations are contained in Article 12236 and ATP-18.

e. (NC) (NMP) See Figure 12-1 for the relationship between regional, TF/TG ASWC and supporting
units in the regional ASWC area of operations.

12111–12119 Spare

12120 Ranges of ASW Sensors and Weapons

a. (NU) ASW Sensor and Weapon Equipment. These are classified by maximum range
capability as follows:

(1) (NU) Short range—under 5,000 yards.

(2) (NU) Medium range—5,000 to 15,000 yards.

(3) (NU) Long range—over 15,000 yards.

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Regional ASWC Area of Operation

Area
TF/TG ASWC Area of Operation Operations
Support Unit

Direct
Support
Unit

Integrated
Operations Associated
Support Support
Unit Unit

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 12-1. (NU) (NMP) Relationship Between Regional, TF/TG ASWC

and Supporting Units

b. (NU) Predicted Sonar Range (PSR). PSRs are determined by each unit for its sensors under
the existing environmental conditions. When mixed-layer and thermocline conditions exist, PSRs
are calculated for various sensor and target depth combinations in-layer and below layer. PSRs can
be determined for active or passive sensors, and depend on the sensor’s characteristics, operator’s
ability, environmental conditions, target source levels for passive operations, and depth locations of
sensor and target. PSRs should normally be determined on a 50 percent probability of detection, if not
otherwise stated. When convenient, units fitted with VDS may specify the minimum and maximum
figures of PSR for targets below layer depth and report the shallowest target depths at which these
figures are predicted.
(NR) (NMP) The method of calculation is in accordance with national doctrine but uses the general
principles laid down in ATP-28, Vol. I.

c. (NU) Tactical Sonar Range (TSR). The TSR for ships and helicopters is decided and
promulgated by the OTC or commander/coordinator to whom the duty is delegated. When sonars
of significantly different capabilities are present in the same force, the OTC may elect to promulgate
more than one TSR. TSR enables the ASWC or screen commander to station units to optimize ASW
defence. TSR is also used for calculating the distance apart at which units are stationed during ASW
action. TSR is based on reported PSRs and may make allowance for probable submarine depth and
other tactical consideration. For tactical convenience, TSRs are expressed in multiples of 500 yards
and normally should not be greater than the appropriate PSR.

12121–12129 Spare

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SECTION II—EMPLOYMENT OF ASW UNITS

12200 ASW Ships

12201 Surface Screens

(NU) The design and selection of ASW surface screens will depend on several factors. These factors are
listed in para 3611 in this publication.
a. (NU) Number of screening units available and their individual and collective weapons and sensor
fits.

b. (NU) Size and disposition of the force being screened.

c. (NU) Availability of ASW aircraft.

d. (NU) Anticipated threat.

e. (NU) Environmental conditions.

f. (NU) TSRs.

g. (NU) PIM, including any navigational constraints.

h. (NU) Requirement for command, control, and communication, including EP.

i. (NU) Requirement for supporting operations; for example, replenishment.

j. (NU) Requirement for other forms of defence; for example, AAW.

k. (NU) Requirement for nuclear spacing.

l. (NU) Deception policy.

(NR) (NMP) These and other factors are considered in ATP-28, Vol. I and in Chapters 3 and 18.
12202–12204 Spare

12205 Surface Ship Towed Arrays

12206 General Considerations

(NR) (NMP) (See also ATP-28, Vol. I)

a. (NU) Generally, the method of employing a towed array ship will depend on the type of array
fitted. Surveillance towed-array systems (SURTAS) tend to have an extremely long length and are
optimized for very slow towing speeds. For this reason, they are best suited to stationary operations
which allow them to patrol their stations at slow speed and to avoid frequent manoeuvres which
cause array destabilization and degrade its performance. Tactical towed array systems are specifically
designed for higher speeds and are the best option for moving-PIM operations such as convoy escort.
The actual performance of an array depends as well on its design. Due to the greater length of tow
cable critical angle-towed array systems tend to be less affected by tow ship noise than do arrays
towed from a depressor DTAS. Hence a CATAS will tend to provide better all-around ranges of initial
detection and tracking than can be expected of a DTAS.

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b. (NU) To enhance effectiveness as an ASW sensor system, it is necessary for a towed array ship
to reduce the range at which it may be counterdetected by the submarine. For this reason, the towed
array ship will tend to operate in as silent an EP as possible. It is therefore necessary for the OTC to
provide as much guidance as possible to the ship prior to its taking up station to avoid unnecessary
electromagnetic emissions which may reveal its presence. The following areas should be addressed
in appropriate messages/orders.

(1) (NU) The policy on contact reporting frequency.

(2) (NU) The relative importance of station-keeping versus contact holding.

(3) (NU) The degree of freedom allowed the towed array ship with respect to EMCON in order to
prosecute his contacts.

(4) (NU) Additional assets available to help prosecute contacts and the means of obtaining them.

(5) (NU) The OTC’s assessment of the tactical situation, together with a summary of the positions
of friendly, neutral, and hostile shipping, should be transmitted to the TAS ship as frequently as
possible.

(6) (NU) Anticipated changes to PIM and the time the TAS ship is to reposition with respect to it.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Acoustic Intelligence. Area commanders and the ASWC should promulgate
all current target acoustic intelligence in the form of a brief summary including the significant
sources, frequencies, source levels, modes of operation, and aspect dependencies of all targets of
interest in their subordinate’s area.

12207 Stationing of Towed Array Units

(NU) The selection of a station for a TAS ship is based on the following considerations:
a. (NU) Own Force Noise. The reduction of force noise levels reaching a towed array is an
important element in increasing its detection envelope. For this reason, all units operating near a
towed array ship should institute measures to reduce their radiated noise levels.

(NC) (NMP) For the same reason, the towed array ship’s station must be selected so as to be clear of
the force’s residual radiated noise. In particular, the direct path and convergence zone annulus must
be avoided. In this regard, degradation caused by tow ship noise and/or endfire gaps should also be
considered.

b. (NU) Reaction Time. TAS ships may be stationed ahead, astern, or on the flanks of a force.
Regardless of the relative position chosen, such ships should be stationed sufficiently far from the
force to allow the OTC time to react to detections made by the TAS ships. The actual distance will
depend on:

(1) (NU) Whether the expected threat is equipped with missiles, torpedoes, or a mixture of both.

(2) (NU) Whether the threat is from nuclear or diesel-electric submarines.

(3) (NU) The type of localization to be employed.

(4) (NU) The time to complete localization.

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(NC) (NMP) This time will vary from several minutes when ships are stationed to allow cross-fixing
to several hours for single-ship target motion analysis (TMA) localization.

(5) (NU) Detection envelopes. These will vary for different types of TAS.

(NC) (NMP) In addition, the detection range will vary depending on the direction from which
a submarine closes the force. For example, a ship stationed astern of the force can expect to
encounter submarines, moving, closing slowly relative to the force but at a higher and, thus, noisier
true speed than a TAS ship stationed ahead. Thus, the range of detection for a given system can be
increased, thereby providing more reaction time than by choice of station alone.

(6) (NU) Whether the OTC is primarily concerned with alertment to allow evasion or whether he
intends further prosecution.

(7) (NU) Other sensors and weapons such as ESM or area air defence fitted in the towed array
unit.

c. (NU) Communications. The communication fit of a towed array ship will affect the OTC’s
stationing decision as well. Ships should not be stationed at a distance from the OTC/ASWC such
that they are not capable of passing, on a real-time basis, contact information and of receiving orders
from the OTC/ASWC (see Chapter 4). Long-range communications are required between towed array
ships and the OTC/ASWC to:

(1) (NU) Station units.

(2) (NU) Report figure of merit and contact data to the OTC/ASWC.

(3) (NU) Request and coordinate nonorganic air support (from ashore).

(4) (NU) Assign aircraft to a TAS contact prosecution.

(5) (NU) Coordinate the TF/TG response to an ASW contact.

(6) (NU) Join MPA coming on task. This may be delegated to the ASWACU (see Chapter 6 for
MPA joining procedures).

d. (NU) Mutual Support. Because of the distance at which TAS ships can operate from the force,
mutual support for TAS ships should be considered in the following areas:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Defence Against Air Attack. TAS ships tend to operate in the covert mode;
therefore, they may be vulnerable to air attack. If unable to defend itself, some provision should be
made to include the TAS station in the force’s AAW defended area.

(2) (NU) Independent Localization and Attack. The TAS ship may be provided with an
independent localizing and attacking vehicle such as a helicopter or MPA.
(NC) (NMP) This may be necessary because TAS ships are capable of detecting contacts at
distances far greater than the effective range of their weapon systems and are often unable to
localize to attack criteria.

(3) (NU) Communications and Stationing Considerations. Depending on the limiting

lines of approach (LLA) and the frontal coverage desired, it may be advantageous to station towed
array ships specifically to allow for cross-fixing. In this event, it will be necessary to provide
reliable communications between the TAS ships. If equipment fitment or EMCON restrictions
prevent such communications, an acoustically quiet surface ship or an aircraft may be stationed
between the TAS ships to act as a relay unit.

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(NC) (NMP) If it is decided to position towed array ships to enable cross-fixing, the following points
are relevant:

(a) (NC) (NMP) The LLA for the anticipated threat should be covered by the TAS ships.

(b) (NC) (NMP) The TAS ships should be stationed to provide a significant overlap in their
passive coverage to maximise the probability of concurrent contact. A separation between TAS
ships equal to UHF communication range optimizes both probability of simultaneous contact
and UHF communications.

(c) (NC) (NMP) The ships should be stationed at a distance along PIM from the main body
sufficient to maximise coverage within the LLA while minimizing interference caused by
force-generated noise and providing sufficient reaction time for the OTC.

(d) (NC) (NMP) Depending on the TAS ship fitment, it may be necessary for the TAS
escort to employ sprint and search tactics to optimize detection opportunities in high SOA
situations. The OTC must be kept informed of the TAS escort’s requirement to conduct sprint
and search, as the possible resultant degradation to screen integrity must be considered when
formulating his overall ASW plan. If sufficient TAS escorts are available, the OTC should
consider coordinating their sprint and search cycles so that as one searches the other sprints.
In addition, it may be possible to employ sprint and search tactics as a means of generating
submarine movement. Generally, a short sprint/search cycle is preferable to a cycle which
employs a long period of sprint coupled with long search times. SOA in excess of 11 knots is
usually considered too high for moving PIM TAS operations, as the time spent searching is so
small compared to the time spent sprinting.

(e) (NC) (NMP) Delivery boy replenishment is recommended for towed array ships in the
outer screen. If, however, the towed array ship departs station for replenishment, the OTC
must determine the time to return to station and the method of screening in the interim.

12208 (NU) (NMP) Towed Array Screen Station Options

(NC) (NMP) Towed array surface ships may be stationed ahead in the outer or inner screen within the
LLA, or astern of the escorted force. The advantages and disadvantages are:
a. (NC) (NMP) Outer Screen.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Advantages. A station in the outer screen will optimize the TAS detection
envelope and the frontal coverage, and reduce interference caused by force-radiated noise. In
addition, it will provide the OTC with the most reaction time.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Disadvantages. In the distant outer screen, the problems associated with
command, control, and communication are made more difficult. It is more difficult to provide
individual TAS ships with mutual support. Localization and attack will probably require support
from air assets and take a significant amount of time to accomplish.

b. (NC) (NMP) Inner Screen.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Advantages. The OTC will have better control over the TAS ship due to
improved communications. At the same time, mutual support is more easily provided.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Disadvantages. The proximity of the TAS ship to the escorted force will
considerably reduce the reaction time available to the OTC as well as preclude totally effective use
of the frontal coverage available. In addition, the proximity of force-generated noise may reduce
the size of the TAS detection envelope.

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c. (NC) (NMP) Astern.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Advantages. The principal advantage of the astern station lies in covering the
rear of the force against the approach of the fast nuclear submarine. Escorts with a low passive
figure of merit or badly degraded forward endfire may be best employed in this role, particularly if
fitted with a broadband intercept capability.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Disadvantages. The use of a TAS ship astern of the force may reduce the
overall ASW coverage provided ahead within the LLA.

12209 Towed Array Zero-PIM Operations

(NU) Towed array ships may also be employed in zero-PIM operations such as barrier patrols, defended
lanes, and area surveillance. The OTC should consider these factors:
a. (NU) Selection of Station Size. In direct support operations, the OTC will have to decide on
the size of the area to be allocated to a towed array ship. The size of the area allocated will depend on
the expected initial PSR for the sensor involved against the anticipated threat. The actual size should
be such that the revisit time throughout the area will be small enough to ensure the target cannot
complete a transit through the area between TAS ship visits.

b. (NU) Selection of Search Type. When applied to towed array searchers, the sweep width
should be replaced by the expected PSR. The specific type of search will depend on the actual
operation. For example, to search an area of probability (AOP) or datum, the expanding square search
may provide the best results, whereas for defended lane operations, a linear or crossover patrol may
be appropriate.
(NR) (NMP) This is based on the criteria laid out in ATP-31 and ATP-28, Vol. I.

12210 ASW Helicopters

12211 General Considerations

(NU) Stationing of helicopter-carrying escorts in the screen should be made, if possible, to provide
optimum relative wind to facilitate launch and recovery without having the escorts leave their assigned
sectors. ASW helicopters may be fitted with sonobuoys, processors, dipping active/passive sonar,
airborne radars, FLIR, MAD, ESM and/or ASW torpedoes and depth bombs. When tasked within a
force, they may be considered as force assets or as extensions to ship’s sensors and weapon systems.
Helicopters fitted with sonobuoys and processors may be tasked in the same way as direct-support FW
aircraft. Screening stations for helicopters fitted with ASW sensors should be selected using similar
considerations to those for surface units (see Article 12201).
(NC) (NMP) However, today’s short PSRs against a predominantly SSK threat, combined with a limited
buoy capacity, make them more suited to reactive operations in response to a detection by another unit.
12212 ASW Helicopter Employment

(NU) ASW helicopters may be allocated for screening duties as indicated in Chapter 3 and may also be
ordered to carry out other ASW tasks.
(NR) (NMP) These tasks may be ordered by means of the airplans summarized in Table 6-14 and
described in ATP-28, Vol. I. Full details of airplans for dipping helicopters are in ATP-28, Vol. I.
12213–12219 Spare

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12220 ASW Fixed-Wing Aircraft

12221 General Considerations

a. (NU) Air Operations Procedures. Air operations procedures described in Chapter 5,

Section I, apply to the tasking of ASW aircraft. The OTC’s functions for both ASW and air coordination
are summarized in Tables 2-6 and 2-9.

b. (NU) Planning. The following factors should be considered in planning and controlling ASW
air operations:

(1) (NU) Overall tactical situation.

(2) (NU) Assumed or known capabilities and tactics of the enemy.

(3) (NU) Number, type, and capabilities of available aircraft, including sensors and weapons.

(4) (NU) Size and location of area of operations.

(5) (NU) Environmental conditions.

(6) (NU) Availability and characteristics of cooperating and/or supporting units, including ships,
submarines, and other aircraft.

(7) (NU) Frequency of coverage required (revisit time).

c. (NU) Tasking. Fixed-wing ASW aircraft may be ordered to carry out ASW tasks by means of
dedicated airplans.
(NR) (NMP) These are summarized in Table 6-15. Details of airplans are contained in ATP-28, Vol. I.

d. (NU) Rainforms. Since aircrews and air controllers must be thoroughly briefed, it is mandatory
that Form GREEN be sufficiently detailed. When land-based aircraft have been ordered to provide
support to a force at sea, the OTC of the force will be informed by means of a Form GREEN. When
organic air support is provided, the flying schedule will be promulgated by appropriate message.

12222 Conduct of Airplans for Fixed-Wing ASW Aircraft and Helicopters

a. (NU) Aircraft Flightpath. The flightpath of an aircraft within an assigned area depends on the
type of aircraft; on the search, localization, and navigation equipment available; and on environmental
conditions. An ASW aircraft joining a force should be prepared to inform the OTC of the maximum
size of the area that it can search effectively under the prevailing conditions.

b. (NU) Contact Investigation. When an airplan is ordered which requires an aircraft to investigate
a contact or bearing, it is essential that sufficient details of the contact or bearing be passed to the
aircraft to allow the aircraft commander to determine the most appropriate search and localization
procedures to be used.

c. (NU) Variations to Airplans. When an airplan is ordered, the order may include variations to
the airplan and any amplifying instructions not included in previous signals.

d. (NU) Relative Airplans. The term “relative” applied to an airplan implies that the area so
ordered shall assume the intended movement of the force. It does not affect the bearings associated
with airplans. These bearings are always given in degrees from true North.

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e. (NU) Change of PIM in Relative Airplans. The direction in which ships are to proceed may be
changed in many ways which may or may not require a change of airplan. To avoid misunderstandings,
whenever it is necessary to alter the PIM on which a relative airplan is based, the airplan is to be
reordered.

f. (NU) Accuracy of Airplan Origin, Datum, or Contact Position. When ordering an airplan,
it may be desirable to use radar to ensure that the origin of the airplan, datum, or contact position is
accurately established.

12223 Aircraft in Support of Towed Array Ships

(NU) The aircraft assigned is required to:

a. (NU) Join the AAWC/ASWC/ASWACU in direct support. In associated support and area
operations, the aircraft will cooperate with the towed array ship, depending on the disposition of
forces, to prosecute contacts.

b. (NU) Report contacts to the OTC/ASWC/ASWACU in direct support and to the area commander
and cooperating individual towed array ships in area operations. In associated support, report contacts
to the OTC/AWC/ASWACU and to the area commander.

c. (NU) Receive and acknowledge the SAC’s AOP, airplans, search plans, and attack plans when
contact is held.

d. (NU) Exchange precise target acoustic data (type of contact, frequencies, sources, Doppler,
complete bearing information, and target movement) with the SAC and other cooperating units when
contact is gained.
(NR) (NMP) See APP-01 for passive-contact handover procedures.

12224–12229 Spare

12230 ASW Submarines

12231 General Considerations

(NU) ASW submarines may be employed in the following levels of C2:

a. (NU) Area operations.

b. (NU) Associated support.

c. (NU) Direct support.

d. (NC) (NMP) Integrated operations.

12232 (NU) (NMP) Procedures for Coordinated Submarine/Task Group ASW

a. (NC) (NMP) Requesting Submarine Assignment. The OTC or SOCA submits requests for
submarines to the SUBOPAUTH per the format in ATP-18. This request should include the following
information and be of sufficient detail for the SUBOPAUTH to make a decision regarding submarine
assignment.

(1) (NC) (NMP) OTC of supported force and commander designated to function as SOCA.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Mission, intentions, and PIM of supported command.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Number of submarines requested and duration of support.

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(4) (NC) (NMP) Proposed employment of submarines.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Level of C2 requested: associated support, direct support, or integrated operations.
(6) (NC) (NMP) Desired AOO (location, size) and type of areas (SAA or JAA for support
operations and TGSA for integrated operations).
(7) (NC) (NMP) Tactical coordination information.
(8) (NC) (NMP) Threat intelligence/situation assessment.
(9) (NC) (NMP) Other amplifying information.
(10) (NC) (NMP) Nomination or request for a SEC and/or augmentation required for a SAT.
b. (NC) (NMP) Availability of Submarines. If SSNs (or diesel-electric submarines suitably fitted
with the necessary communication and sensor equipment) are available for coordinated operations, the
SUBOPAUTH will assign appropriate units, provide SUBNOTE coverage and submarine operating
areas (SAA or JAA for support operations and TGSA for integrated operations), provide personnel
augmentation as needed, and keep the OTC advised. The SUBOPAUTH will advise the OTC of
submarine assignments and their significant equipment configurations.
12233 (NU) (NMP) Employment of Submarines in Area Operations
(NC) (NMP) Submarines may be employed in area operations to conduct an individual area patrol.
Such submarines operate independently under the control of the SUBOPAUTH, who may assign them
specific tasks that are supportive of a surface force. These tasks are normally executed autonomously
with no requirement for the submarine to communicate or cooperate with the supported force. The
SUBOPAUTH retains tactical control and informs the supported force commander concerning task
status and completion.
12234 (NU) (NMP) Employment of Submarines in Associated Support
(NC) (NMP) A submarine conducting associated support operations is designated SSC(AS), SSK(AS),
or SSN(AS) as appropriate. This mode of support submarine operations is employed when on-scene
coordination with (but not direct control of) support submarines is required, or when the criteria for direct
support operations cannot be met. Tactical control is retained by the SUBOPAUTH, who coordinates
tasking of the submarine with the OTC’s support request. The SUBOPAUTH will assign and station the
submarine(s) using SUBNOTE and WSM message procedures in coordination with OTC’s requirements.
The OTC/SOCA will normally amplify submarine tasking using the Submarine Force Summary message.
Effective employment of associated support submarine(s) depends on the OTC/SOCA informing the
SUBOPAUTH of desires for submarine employment in a timely manner to allow adequate time for
repositioning. Dedicated communications are required. In associated support operations, the submarine
may communicate directly with OTC but must receive operational tasking and weapons release authority
from the SUBOPAUTH.
a. (NC) (NMP) Employment Options. Submarines in associated support may be employed by:
(1) (NC) (NMP) Using procedures described for direct support submarines.
(2) (NC) (NMP) Using tactics normally employed in area operations, but in coordination with the
OTC/SOCA and SUBOPAUTH.
b. (NC) (NMP) Report From Submarines. Supporting submarines should use report formats
contained in APP-01, APP-11, and ATP-18 to pass tactical, operational, and status information to the
OTC/SOCA and the SUBOPAUTH.
c. (NC) (NMP) Communication Windows. Three types of communication windows may be
ordered when using relay aircraft. Details are set forth in ATP-18.

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12235 (NU) (NMP) Employment of Submarines in Direct Support

a. (NC) (NMP) Submarines in direct support operate under the tactical control of the OTC or
designated subordinate commander who controls the movement and tactical actions of assigned
submarines within specific waterspace areas designated by the SUBOPAUTH (see Chapter 5). A
submarine conducting direct support is designated SSC(DC), SSK(DS), or SSN(DS) as appropriate.

b. (NC) (NMP) A direct support submarine will normally operate within a JAA. The OTC may
manoeuvre the submarine freely within the JAA (but will not direct the submarine to leave the
JAA) and is responsible for submarine safety within the JAA. The SUBOPAUTH is responsible
for promulgating the submarine’s WSM area and for preventing mutual interference between direct
support submarines and all other friendly units not under the OTC’s tactical command. ASW weapon
restrictions that protect friendly submarines from attack by friendly ASW forces are also described in
Chapter 5.

12236 (NU) (NMP) Employment of Submarines on Integrated Operations

a. (NC) (NMP) Submarines conducting integrated operations operate under the TACOM of an
at-sea commander. Upon receiving TACOM the OTC assumes the responsibility for all operations
and safety of the assigned submarines, including local WSM and PMI for their designated areas.

b. (NC) (NMP) This designated area is known as a TGSA. A TGSA is a stationary and geographically
defined area designated by the SUBOPAUTH in which one or more submarines are conducting
integrated operations. Upon receiving TACOM, the OTC assumes responsibility for all WSM/PMI
requirements, including, for example, promulgation of JAAs and ASWFAs. The rules and definitions
concerning WSM, ASW attacks, PMI and tactical coordination described elsewhere in ATP-01, Vol. 1
apply within TGSAs.

12237 (NU) (NMP) Tactical Employment Options

a. (NC) (NMP) Submarines operating in direct support or integrated operations may be used in, but
not restricted to, one or more of the following roles (see ATP-18, Chapter 13 for more details):

(1) (NC) (NMP) Transit operations.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Precursor operations.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Barrier operations.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Coordinated ASW/ASUW operations.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Aided intercept.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Tracking operations.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Delousing operations.

(8) (NC) (NMP) Land attack missile operations.

(9) (NC) (NMP) Naval minelaying operations.

(10) (NC) (NMP) Special operations.

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(11) (NC) (NMP) Submarines in support of amphibious warfare.

(12) (NC) (NMP) Intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance operations.

(13) (NC) (NMP) SAR.

b. (NC) (NMP) Speed of the Force. The speed of the force is a major determinant of how the
submarine can be employed and how effective it will be.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) SUPPORT SUBMARINES SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED

TO ADVANCE THROUGH STEPPED OPERATING AREAS AT
SOAS GREATER THAN 10 KNOTS FOR SSNS OR 4 KNOTS FOR
DIESEL-ELECTRIC SUBMARINES.

12238 (NU) (NMP) Command, Control and Communications in Submarine Direct

Support and Integrated Operations

a. (NC) (NMP) Shifting TACOM or TACON of Submarines. Procedures and requirements for
shifting TACOM or TACON are contained in Chapter 13 of ATP-18. Placing a submarine in direct
support/integrated operations, thereby shifting TACOM/TACON to the force commander (who may
then delegate TACON to a subordinate commander), is normally the best C2 option for coordinated
submarine/task group operations. If the assigned submarine’s primary warfare area tasking will be
ASW, the ASWC should be designated as the SOCA (see Chapter 2).

(1) (NC) (NMP) The SUBOPAUTH will use the Submarine Initial Assignment and Tasking
Message per ATP-18 to inform designated submarines of the shift in TACOM or TACON and relay
initial tasking and coordination information provided by the force commander.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Before the SUBOPAUTH will assign submarines in direct support or integrated
operations, a SEC must be designated and confirmed by name. Depending upon the number of
submarines assigned, the anticipated duration of the assignment and available assets, additional
SAT personnel may be required as watch standers and planners for the SEC. The SUBOPAUTH
may waive the requirement for an SEC.

b. (NC) (NMP) Relinquishment of TACOM or TACON. TACOM or TACON of submarines

will be returned to the SUBOPAUTH, as mutually agreed between the force commander and the
SUBOPAUTH, either upon the loss of all communications between the officer exercising tactical control
and the submarine, or whenever ordered by the SUBOPAUTH. When, for whatever reason, TACOM
or TACON is returned to the SUBOPAUTH, the OTC is responsible for sending a Relinquishment
of TACOM/TACON message per ATP-18. This message is intended to inform the SUBOPAUTH of
the submarine’s tactical situation when it has operated in direct support or integrated operations for
an extended period of time and the SUBOPAUTH has incomplete knowledge of submarine tasking.

c. (NC) (NMP) Communications. Communications requirements for submarine direct support or

integrated operations are extensive. Details are found in ATP-18.

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12239 (NU) (NMP) Stationing Considerations for Coordinated Operations with

Submarines

a. (NC) (NMP) Determining the Position(s). The SOCA, when proposing the position(s) of
JAAs and/or SAAs of submarines, should consider:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Number of submarines assigned and capabilities (particularly sonar equipment
and weapons).

(2) (NC) (NMP) Desired size of each submarine’s JAA and the separation between areas.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Separation required between the submarine and surface forces to avoid acoustic
interference.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Additional command, control and communication requirements.

b. (NC) (NMP) Acoustic Interference From Own Force. The position of the submarine relative
to own forces to minimise the effect of acoustic interference will depend on the sonar conditions and
the characteristics of own forces. As a rough guide, active sonar interferes with submarine passive
sonars within 10 nm of a surface force when an active search is directed away from the submarine,
and within 35 nm when the search is directed toward the submarine. Furthermore, masking of
enemy submarines by propulsion noise may occur if friendly ships are stationed in the search area
of the support submarine. Consideration must also be given to interference via convergence zone
propagation.

c. (NC) (NMP) JAA Size and Use of SGSA. A JAA must be sufficiently large to allow the
submarine the freedom of manoeuvre to carry out its patrol. SGSA procedures should be used
extensively to allow surface/air units the possibility for use of ASW weapons so that enemy
submarines are not given immunity from attack. Regarding paragraph b above, and in order to prevent
or minimise the adverse effects of ASW active sensors or surface forces or aircraft upon the operation
of friendly submarines, employment of these sensors should be carefully considered throughout the
SGSA. Appropriate coordination with the submarine is recommended. JAAs that have a common
boundary have the net effect of creating a safe haven along the adjoining boundary. Contacts in the
vicinity of that common boundary cannot be attacked by either submarine, nor can they be attacked
by air/surface units without first establishing a NOTACK with both friendly submarines. Separating
JAAs by a distance equal to or greater than the submarine torpedo weapon standoff distance allows
each submarine to engage subsurface targets outside the JAA and inside known ASW/FAS.

12240 (NU) (NMP) STOVEPIPE and SKYLIGHT Procedures

(NC) (NMP) A STOVEPIPE is a static haven declared from the surface to a specified depth, centred upon
a specified geographic point. The default radius is five nm and does not need to be explicitly stated. Other
radii have to be clearly stated in instructions/orders.
(NC) (NMP) A SKYLIGHT has the same function as a STOVEPIPE but is quadrilateral in shape
(e.g., rectangle, parallelogram or diamond). SKYLIGHTs are therefore easily used in conjunction with
grid systems (such as CGRS and 4W) in which rectangular areas are established. Designated areas within
such a grid system may be allocated as SKYLIGHTs. SKYLIGHTs may also be used outside a grid
system, but then have to be explicitly defined by coordinates (e.g., latitude and longitude).

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NOTE

(NC) (NMP) PMI AND WSM PROCEDURES, DESCRIBED IN THIS

PUBLICATION AND CONNECTED TO STOVEPIPES, ALSO APPLY
TO SKYLIGHTS.

a. (NC) (NMP) Whenever a single STOVEPIPE is established, it is promulgated as a geographic

position, specified depth, unit assigned, and effective period.

-EXAMPLE-

(NC) (NMP) STOVEPIPE, 3700N/0 01600W/7, SURFACE TO 150M6, FOR

BLUEFISH 131600Z1–141900Z5.

-OR-

(NC) (NMP) When there is the requirement to assign a different radius and not
the default radius, the STOVEPIPE is to be promulgated like:

-EXAMPLE-

(NC) (NMP) STOVEPIPE, 3700N/0 01600W/7, RADIUS 7 NM 7, SURFACE

TO 150M6, FOR BLUEFISH 131600Z1–141900Z5.

-OR-

(NC) (NMP) When there is a requirement to assign depth in feet, this would read:
STOVEPIPE, 3700N/0 01600W/7, SURFACE TO 400FT4, FOR BLUEFISH
131600Z1–141900Z5.

b. (NC) (NMP) Whenever a set of STOVEPIPEs is established, two STOVEPIPE plans are
available.

(1) (NC) (NMP) PLAN ALFA STOVEPIPEs are located at the intersection of each whole degree of
latitude with each whole degree of longitude and each half-degree of latitude with each half-degree
of longitude within the designated area.

(2) (NC) (NMP) PLAN BRAVO STOVEPIPEs are located at the intersection of each half-degree
of longitude with each whole degree of latitude and at each half-degree of latitude with each whole
degree of longitude within the designated area.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Whenever a STOVEPIPE lies on a boundary of the designated area, it shall
extend beyond the area to include the full 5-nm radius.

(4) (NC) (NMP) The establishment of a set of STOVEPIPEs is indicated as a STOVEPIPE PLAN,
a designated area, specified depth, unit assigned, and effective period.

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-EXAMPLE-

(NC) (NMP) STOVEPIPE PLAN BRAVO, 33N6 35N8 006E6 008E8, SURFACE
TO 150M6, FOR BLUEFISH 131600Z1–141900Z5.

-OR-

(NC) (NMP) When there is a requirement to express depth in feet, this would
read: STOVEPIPE PLAN BRAVO, 33N6 35N8 006E6 008E8, SURFACE TO
400FT4, FOR BLUEFISH 131600Z1–141900Z5.

12241 (NU) (NMP) Aided Intercept by Submarines

(NC) (NMP) Aided intercept is the process of providing information, directions, and advice to assist a
submarine to intercept any seaborne force. The degree of control depends on the circumstances of the
operation, the predictability of an opposition force’s movement, etc., but should always allow freedom
of manoeuvre to the friendly submarine. Because of the unpredictability of the target’s movement, the
submarine’s area may require frequent and timely modification. Coordination between the submarine,
SOCA, and SUBOPAUTH is essential. Details for conducting aided intercept are contained in ATP-l8.
a. (NC) (NMP) Tactical Control. Controllers must ensure that aircraft and other units under their
control are fully aware of the existence and position of the SAA or JAA in which the submarine(s) is
(are) operating. If the contact of interest leaves the submarine’s area, the SOCA must decide whether
to cancel the intercept tasking or to obtain a new waterspace area assignment from the SUBOPAUTH.

b. (NC) (NMP) Targeting. Targeting for an aided intercept involves the use of information inputs
from diverse sensors and platforms. Collection and analysis of this information prior to its being passed
on to the submarine is highly desirable. The submarine may otherwise receive conflicting contact
information without the means to determine which information is valid. Further, valuable search time
can be lost if raw information is transmitted to the submarine. It is the SOCA’s responsibility to ensure
that only necessary information is provided. The submarine broadcast control authority and the OTC/
SOCA have message screening responsibilities to ensure that only necessary traffic is passed to the
submarine.

c. (NC) (NMP) Coordination Required. The degree of coordination between the SOCA and
the submarine determines the success of aided intercept procedures. The SOCA must provide timely
information about the contact’s movements, while allowing for communication delays, so that the
submarine can achieve an intercept position well in advance of the contact of interest’s arrival at
the projected intercept point. Information provided to the submarine must indicate the quality and
timeliness of the information. The SOCA must be prepared to act with dispatch in response to revised
estimates of target motion.

d. (NC) (NMP) Tasking Message. The SOCA should issue a message initiating the aided intercept.
The SUBOPAUTH will promulgate this information to the submarine by use of BARNSTORM
procedures (see ATP-18). All ASW-capable units need to be apprised of JAAs or SAAs established in
support of the aided intercept operation. The mission tasking and ROE under which the aided intercept
is to be carried out are to be specified. The WHAT, WHERE, WHITHER, and WHEN components
in the message refer to the latest contact report on the target assigned by the Aided Intercept/BARN
STORM message.

12242–12249 Spare

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SECTION III—CONTACT PROSECUTION

12300 General Considerations

(NU) The reaction of units gaining contact on a hostile submarine will be influenced by:
a. (NU) The range at which contact was gained.

b. (NU) The capabilities and ranges of own ASW sensors and weapons.

c. (NU) The degree of threat to the force screened.

d. (NU) The classification of the target.

12301 Contact Classification

(NU) Classification is the method by which subordinate commanders inform their superiors and other
units of their opinions as to whether contacts which they have just detected or are investigating are
of submarine origin. Since classification is subject to the individual reactions of personnel who have
varying degrees of experience, classification terms are inevitably subjective in character. The maximum
possible degree of standardization is essential if senior officers and accompanying forces are to react
quickly and with confidence to contact reports. Classification terms are therefore intended as a guide;
reporting commanders may use their own judgement in interpreting the terms, always bearing in mind
the aim of such reports.
12302 Contact Classification Terms

a. (NU) CERTSUB (Certain Submarine Contact). A contact that has been sighted and
positively identified as a submarine is classified CERTSUB. Parameters for this assessment are: a
surfaced submarine; a submerged submarine; submarine masts, antennae, periscope or snorkel; a
missile emerging from the sea sighted and positively identified by competent personnel. If any doubt
exists about the certainty of the observation the contact should not be classified CERTSUB.

b. (NU) PROBSUB (Probable Submarine Contact). A contact that displays strong cumulative
evidence of being a submarine is classified PROBSUB. Evaluation of a contact obtained by one or
more of the following sensors may be followed by a PROBSUB classification: sonar, radar, electronic
intercept, MAD, passive or active sonobuoys, towed arrays, optronics, and other devices. The possible
means of sensor contact are numerous. The following guidelines illustrate the extent and quality of the
evidence that is required before a PROBSUB classification may be made.

(1) (NU) Contact by Active Sonar or Active Sonobuoy.

(a) (NU) Competent personnel report a firm sonar contact showing submarine characteristics.
(NC) (NMP) These include a plot of the submarine’s track consistently compatible with any
Doppler effect detected and exhibiting at least one of the following effects:

i. (NC) (NMP) Pronounced wake.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Propeller or distinctive submarine noises.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Characteristic silhouette from a bottomed-target sonar set or similar
high-resolution sonar sensor.

iv. (NC) (NMP) Sonar signals, sonar jamming, obvious decoys, or torpedo noises.

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(b) (NC) (NMP) When none of these effects appears, the contact must be confirmed by
another type of sensor. A contact held only by two different active sonars at the same time is
insufficient criteria for PROBSUB classification.

(2) (NU) Broadband Contact by Passive Sonar or Passive Sonobuoy. Consistent

tracking of a firm contact with courses, speeds, or other indications, which are compatible with
submarine characteristics and are confirmed by at least one other type of sensor.

(3) (NU) Radar Contact. Confirmation of a radar contact by at least one of the following,
obtained simultaneously or in close sequence:

(a) (NU) Search receiver contact on the same bearing and displaying characteristics of a
distinctive submarine radar.

(b) (NU) Active or passive sonobuoy or MAD tracking.

(c) (NU) Sonobuoy and MAD contact near datum.

(d) (NU) Sonar contact having submarine characteristics.

(e) (NU) LOFAR contact evaluated as submarine.

(4) (NC) (NMP) ESM Contact. All of the following conditions must be met:

(a) (NC) (NMP) The intercepted signal shows all of the characteristics of a distinctive known
submarine radar, and either:

i. (NC) (NMP) A fix is established by crossed ESM bearings, or

ii. (NC) (NMP) An ESM bearing is confirmed by a radar contact obtained simultaneously
or in close sequence.

(b) (NC) (NMP) There are no ASW units in the immediate area of the contact position, and
the ESM and radar contact appear or disappear at the same time.

(5) (NU) MAD Contact. MAD is normally a confirmatory sensor used in conjunction with other
sensors.
(NC) (NMP) In cases in which MAD is the initial detection or main classification sensor, there
must be:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Sufficient tracking information to give strong evidence of a submarine target,
and

(b) (NC) (NMP) Confirmation by at least one other type of sensor.

(6) (NU) Narrowband Passive Sonar Contact. A LOFAR signature is evaluated as a

submarine; if known, the type of submarine is to be included in the classification.

c. (NU) POSSUB (Possible Submarine Contact). A contact on which available information

indicates the likely presence of a submarine but there is insufficient evidence to justify a higher
classification. A classification of POSSUB may be given under any one or more of the following
conditions:

(1) (NU) An object thought to be a surfaced submarine, submerged submarine, submarine

periscope, or snorkel is sighted; but, because of poor visibility or the lack of competence of the
observer to recognize such objects, the criteria for CERTSUB cannot be supported.

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(2) (NU) Active or passive sonar, MAD, radar, ESM, active or passive sonobuoys, towed acoustic
arrays, and other devices; such contacts are investigated or tracked, without confirming all of the
characteristics listed for PROBSUB, but are suspected to be of submarine origin.

(3) (NU) Surface flares, blinker lights, tracer lights, and similar indications are thoroughly
investigated, do not lead to submarine sightings or sensor contact, but are suspected to be of
submarine origin.

(4) (NU) Surface ship HF/DF contact on a signal classified as being of submarine origin.

d. (NU) Confidence Level. The classification POSSUB must always be amplified by adding an
assessment of the confidence level. Confidence levels are specified as follows:

(1) (NU) LOW CONFIDENCE—A contact that can not be regarded as NONSUB and requires
further investigation. This assessment may be further amplified by using grades 1 and 2, 1 being
the lower grade.

(2) (NU) HIGH CONFIDENCE—A contact that from the evidence is firmly believed to be a
submarine but does not meet the criteria established for PROBSUB. This assessment may be
further amplified by using grades 3 and 4, 3 being the lower grade.

e. (NU) NONSUB (Nonsubmarine Contact). After investigation, a contact that is shown to

have characteristics that exclude the possibility that it is a submarine. NONSUB is a firm statement
that the classifier is entirely satisfied his contact is not a submarine. When a contact is lost which was
previously classified POSSUB or PROBSUB, it is dangerous and wrong to amend the classification
to NONSUB without the most thorough investigation.

12303 Contact Classification Process

(NU) In order to make an accurate assessment of the classification of a sonar contact the process at
Figure 12-2 should be followed. This process is not a definitive answer but is the most reliable method
for making the best assessment of any sonar contact.
12304 Contact Reporting

a. (NU) General Considerations.

(1) (NU) Initial Contact Reporting and Classification. To initiate rapid response to counter
what may be an imminent enemy attack, the initial contact (whether classified or not) must be
reported immediately. When not included in the initial report, a classification must be made in
the subsequent amplifying report. Where possible, contacts should additionally be amplified by
propulsion and class. Voice contact procedures are contained in APP/MPP-01. Enemy contact
reports are contained in APP-11.

(2) (NU) Subsequent Evaluation. Reclassification of a contact continues throughout the

entire ASW action, and subsequent reports by a unit may amend or amplify the classification.
Prosecuting units must continually review contact classification using other sensors as available.

(3) (NU) Command Responsibility. When more than one ASW unit is in contact, the SAC or
OTC (or ASWC if delegated) evaluates all information and classifications and reports the contact
together with his classification.

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DETECTION

INITIAL
CLASSIFICATION
(detecting platform)
POSSUB PROBSUB CERTSUB

CONFIDENCE

LOW HIGH

Seek NONSUB Seek PROBSUB/

indicators CERTSUB indicators

DATA
CORRELATION
Seek CERTSUB
indicators

Task additional
NONSUB NO platforms to
indicators? investigate/localize
Task additional
platforms to
investigate/localize
YES

PROB/ YES YES

CERTSUB
CERTSUB
indicators?
indicators?

NO NO

FINAL
CLASSIFICATION
(See note)
NONSUB PROBSUB CERTSUB
(ASWC)

NOTE:
During the data collection process, should information
indicate that a CERT/PROBSUB is not a submarine,
the ASWC may downgrade classification to NONSUB.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 12-2. (NU) (NMP) Initial Contact Flow Chart

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(4) (NR) (NMP) Conditions. Since environmental conditions must be considered in the
classification of contacts, ATP-28, Vol. I should be consulted for the effects of environmental
considerations on various sensors.
(5) (NU) Contact Information. The method in which contact was obtained, maintained, or
localized may be of assistance in assessing a passive acoustic contact report.
(NC) (NMP) In order to readily describe the method, single-letter designators from Table 12-1 may
be included in the amplifying data block of a Raid Report or Enemy Contact Report, e.g., “POSSUB
2251RED 123 TACK 456 ZULU-FOXTROT 10 NM POSSUB 225l.”
b. (NC) (NMP) Submarine Contact Reporting. The precedence of contact reporting (i.e., task
force alertment) or contact engagement; when, how, and to whom should the submarine report; and
under which circumstances, is highly dependent upon the scenario and the distance of the friendly
submarine from the force. Requirements placed on the submarine should be clearly specified by the
OTC/SOCA as a preplanned response in associated support, direct support and integrated operations.
c. (NC) (NMP) Choice of Reporting Method. The following guidelines are available to the
submarine:
(1) (NC) (NMP) If the initial contact report is made using a SLOT buoy and the first amplifying
report is made within 30 minutes using a SLOT buoy, and a relay aircraft is on station, then either
one or both of the reports will be delivered to the ASWC in approximately 95 percent of the cases.
(2) (NC) (NMP) Unless the contact was initially assessed as near, a loss of contact information for
10 minutes is good cause to come to periscope depth and report by radio.
(3) (NC) (NMP) When reporting by radio, it is appropriate to employ both UHF voice to an ASW
aircraft and a hard-copy message via satellite relay when such communication paths are available.
The hard-copy message provides accurate message delivery to the OTC/SOCA and the UHF voice
report keeps the on-scene ASW aircraft current as to contact information for coordinated contact
prosecution.
(4) (NC) (NMP) In the course of a contact prosecution, extended periods (greater than 20 minutes)
at periscope depth for the purpose of communications are to be avoided.
(5) (NC) (NMP) For purposes of contact reporting, a contact that is regained after more than
l hour of lost contact should be treated as a new contact if a lost contact report had been sent prior
to regaining contact.

Table 12-1. (NU) (NMP) Passive Acoustic Designation

Area of Probability F( ) Acoustic/Doppler/TMA derived AOP
(AOP) (accuracy estimate in miles)

M( ) Closest point of approach (CPA) (range

in yards)

Line of Bearing P Bearing from single sensor

Omnidirectional L( ) Convergence zone contact (first CZ range

in miles)

O Non-convergence zone contact

NATO UNCLASSIFIED (NMP)

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d. (NC) (NMP) ASW Aircraft Relaying Contact Reports. Initial contact reports and amplifying
reports will be relayed to the OTC/SOCA or other appropriate commander, exactly as received,
without delay. When SLOT buoys are used, the channel number, time of receipt and, when available,
SLOT location data will also be passed.

e. (NC) (NMP) TAS Contact Reports. Towed array ships will report contacts using standard
procedures (see Article 7220 and APP-11). However, during TAS contact prosecution, long-range
communications will be required (see Article 4162b) to:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Report contacts.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Exchange contact data with other towed array ships.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Report threat AOPs as a result of crossfixes or TMA.

12305–12309 Spare

12310 ASW Attack Policy

12311 General

a. (NU) Types of Attack. Attacks may be URGENT or DELIBERATE. The purpose of an URGENT
attack is to upset the submarine’s plan of action and gain the initiative in the engagement; speed of
action is essential and outweighs accuracy. The purpose of a DELIBERATE attack is destruction
of the hostile submarine using the most effective ASW weapon for the prevailing tactical situation.
Accuracy is more vital than speed. (Deliberate attack criteria are illustrated in Figure 12-3.)

b. (NC) (NMP) ASW Actions. These may be CLOSE (within 8,000 yards) or STANDOFF (outside
8,000 yards).

12312 (NU) (NMP) Surface Ship ASW Attack Policy (ROE Permitting)

a. (NC) (NMP) Sonar Contact:

(1) (NC) (NMP) If the contact is an immediate threat, carry out an urgent attack.

(2) (NC) (NMP) If the contact is not an immediate threat, take appropriate torpedo countermeasures
and carry out a deliberate attack employing medium- and long-range weapons or vectored attacks
whenever possible.

b. (NC) (NMP) Other Than Sonar Contact:

(1) (NC) (NMP) If the contact is an immediate threat, consider conducting an attack on available
information while manoeuvring to gain sonar contact and switching on other sensors ordered or
permitted by the EMCON plan.

(2) (NC) (NMP) If the contact is not an immediate threat, the detecting ship takes appropriate
countermeasures and manoeuvres to gain sonar contact but is not to leave her station or sector
unless authorized; however, other ships in sectors or patrolling stations should anticipate possible
detachment by moving toward the engaged side of their sector or patrol line.

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DETECTION

CLASSIFIED
PROB/CERTSUB

LOCALIZED

ROE YES
AND WSM ATTACK
REQ’T?

NO

HIGH NO
THREAT?

LOW
1. ALLOCATE ASSET(S)

2. MAINTAIN WEAPONS
DEDICATED
RELEASE BASED NO
TRACKING
ON ACCURACY
PLATFORMS
AVAILABLE

YES

1. TRACK CONTACT
AVAILABLE ASSETS 1. DROP

2. MAINTAIN ACCURACY 2. CONDUCT DATUM

REQUIRED ACCOMPLISH SEARCHES TO MARK
POSITION CONTROL
GROWTH

REEVALUATE
WSM, ROE, AND THREAT

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 12-3. (NU) (NMP) Attack Criteria Flow Chart

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NOTE
(NC) (NMP) DUE TO THE INCREASING CAPABILITY OF BOTH
SUBMARINES AND HEAVYWEIGHT TORPEDOES, SHIPS CAN BE
AT CONSIDERABLE RISK OF TORPEDO ATTACK, EVEN BEYOND
THE RANGE AT WHICH THEY MIGHT HOPE TO GAIN SONAR
CONTACT. THUS, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABOVE, THE OTC
SHOULD ENSURE THAT SHIPS SHOULD OPEN OUTSIDE THE
MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE TORPEDO FIRING RANGE (METFR) AT
THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, LEAVING AIRCRAFT TO PRESS
HOME ATTACKS ON THE SUBMARINE.

12313 (NU) (NMP) Fixed-Wing Aircraft ASW Attack Policy (ROE Permitting)

a. (NC) (NMP) Policy on Use of Weapons. Policy on the use of weapons must be specified at
briefings or during the joining procedure. In general, attack policy depends on the tactical situation
and on the classification of the contact. Fixed-wing aircraft should follow attack policy in force and,
if required, show appropriate IFF.

b. (NC) (NMP) Urgent Attacks. Regardless of the classification, urgent attacks are to be carried out
on contacts which pose an immediate threat. At the SAC’s discretion, aircraft may attack individually
or in coordination with other aircraft in accordance with the following:

(1) (NC) (NMP) CERTSUB or PROBSUB. Aircraft should carry out attacks as frequently as
opportunity offers, except in coordinated operations in which attacks are conducted in accordance
with the attack policy in force.

(2) (NC) (NMP) POSSUB, CONFIDENCE HIGH. Contact may be attacked by the first
available means unless otherwise directed.

(3) (NC) (NMP) POSSUB, CONFIDENCE LOW. Contact will be attacked if it presents an
immediate threat.

12314 (NU) (NMP) Helicopter ASW Attack Policy (ROE Permitting)

a. (NC) (NMP) Advanced Screening or Searching. Attack in accordance with the attack policy
in force. Show the appropriate IFF, if required.

b. (NC) (NMP) Screening (Deliberate Attack). Carry out a HOVERTAC in accordance with the
attack policy in force, or maintain contact until assisting units arrive.

c. (NC) (NMP) Screening (Urgent Attack). Carry out a HOVERTAC or SELFTAC if the contact
is an immediate threat and no other unit is in a better position.

12315 (NU) (NMP) Attack Restrictions when Operating with Submarines

a. (NC) (NMP) Requirements. ASW attack restrictions when operating with a submarine are
governed by the type of action area in which the submarine is operating. See Chapter 5.

(1) (NC) (NMP) No air or surface ASW attacks are permitted inside a SAA.

(2) (NC) (NMP) No aircraft (including helicopters) or surface units may attack a submarine
contact inside a JAA unless a SGSA or NOTACK area has been established per the procedures of
Chapter 6.

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NOTE
(NC) (NMP) NO AIRCRAFT OR SURFACE UNIT MAY ATTACK
A SUBMARINE CONTACT THAT IS WITHIN A NOTACK AREA.
ATTACKS MAY BE CONDUCTED WITHIN A SGSA PROVIDED A
NOTACK AREA HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. ATTACKS WITHIN
A JAA BUT OUTSIDE AN ESTABLISHED SGSA REQUIRE
AUTHORIZATION BY THE SGSA COORDINATING AUTHORITY.

(3) (NC) (NMP) ASW attacks are unrestricted in an ASWFA.

b. (NC) (NMP) Compensatory Allowances.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Air/Surface ASW Attacks. For any ASW engagement, air and surface
units shall apply a compensatory allowance that minimises the risk of that weapon inadvertently
entering an area containing a friendly submarine. Conceptually a compensatory allowance is a
weapons danger zone with a navigation safety buffer that applies to SAA, JAA, and activated SSL,
MEADOW, NOTACK and SGSA boundaries.

(2) (NC) (NMP) ASW Aircraft With Inoperable Navigation Systems. ASW aircraft
which cannot make an accurate assessment of navigation error because of inoperable navigation
equipment may not attack a submarine contact inside a JAA or within 10 nm of a SAA or JAA
boundary without authority, and then only while under the direction of another unit with an
adequate navigation capability, such as an ASW helicopter control ship.

12316 (NU) (NMP) Assigned Submarine ASW Attack Policy (ROE Permitting)

a. (NC) (NMP) Urgent Attacks. If a contact poses an immediate threat to friendly units an urgent
attack should be conducted if within weapons range. Otherwise, a contact report should be made IAW
Article 12303 to alert the force.

b. (NC) (NMP) Deliberate Attack. The OTC/SOCA should clearly specify preplanned responses
for assigned submarines, specifically identifying criteria when the submarine is expected to report
first and when it is expected to conduct a deliberate attack first. A SLOT buoy may be used in order to
simultaneously report the contact and conduct an attack (see Article 12304). If the contact cannot be
successfully reported using a SLOT buoy, the following factors should be considered when prioritising
force alertment or conducting attack:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Can the submarine localize the contact for attack before an assisting platform
would be able to attack.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Can the submarine localize the contact for attack before the contact is able to
close unalerted friendly units within its weapons range.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Can the submarine localize the contact for attack before the contact will transit
out of the friendly submarine’s assigned area.

12317 (NU) (NMP) Assessing Damage

(NR) (NMP) The standard method of damage assessment is set forth in ATP-28, Vol. I.
12318–12319 Spare

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12320 Coordinated ASW

12321 Datums

a. (NC) (NMP) Establishing a Datum. A datum may be established by the OTC, ASWC, SC,
SAU commander, SAC, or the last unit losing contact. A unit or authority establishing a datum will
report the following to the OTC and the appropriate commander in the sequence:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Datum established.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Datum position.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Datum error.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Last known course and speed of contact.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Datum time.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Source of information.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Classification of contact on which datum was established.

b. (NU) Designating a Datum. The datum is given the track number of the submarine or sonar
contact upon which it has been established. Subsequently, new datums established on the same contact
retain the original track designator.

12322 ASW Search Plans

(NU) Table 6-15 summarizes the ASW search plans available for use by ships or by ships and helicopters.
When helicopters are used, the letter H must be added as a suffix to the plan number.
(NR) (NMP) ASW surface searches are explained in ATP-28, Vol. I.
12323 Collision Hazard During ASW Operations

a. (NU) Safety Manoeuvres. ASW manoeuvring plans for multiship ASW action are designed
to reduce the collision hazard. However, International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at
Sea will take precedence over the manoeuvres established by the manoeuvring plans in use. If the
situation becomes confused, or if there is a possibility of collision, the first ship recognizing such a
danger is to order “Break off.” At this order, the operation is discontinued, ships are to manoeuvre to
avoid collision, and the action is resumed as soon as practicable.

b. (NU) Use of Navigation Lights. The attacking, directing, and assisting ships are required to
burn sidelights when multiship attacks or close searches are being conducted during night operations,
unless they are ordered to do otherwise. Dimmed sidelights may be used, but ships must have the
facilities to rapidly switch them to full brilliance in an emergency. Dimmed stern lights should also
be shown, whether or not they can be switched to full brilliance at short notice. This paragraph limits
neither the authority of the SAU commander to order navigation lights darkened at any time, nor that
of any commanding officer to turn them on at any time they are necessary.

NOTE
(NU) FOR LIGHTS TO BE SHOWN BY SHIPS, HELICOPTERS, OR
OTHER AIRCRAFT OPERATING TOGETHER AT NIGHT OR IN
LOW VISIBILITY, SEE CHAPTER 5.

c. (NU) Special Lights. Ships equipped with special lights are not to use such lights until their
characteristics and meanings have been disseminated by the OTC to other units.

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12324–12329 Spare

12330 Coordinated ASW Action

12331 Action on Gaining Contact

(NU) A unit gaining contact is to report IAW Chapter 5 and assume the duties of SAC if not part of a
SAU.
12332 Action by Units in the Vicinity of the Unit Gaining Contact

(NU) Units in the vicinity of a unit reporting initial contact are to take immediate action to render
assistance.
a. (NU) Surface Ship. The ship best placed to assist the detecting unit automatically acts as assisting
ship unless otherwise directed. It is to report that it is assuming the duties of the assisting ship. If the
detecting unit is an aircraft, the assisting ship may take control of the aircraft when in a position to
control the action. Adjacent ships fitted with long-range weapons or weapon-delivery helicopters are
to be prepared to provide immediate assistance.

b. (NU) Helicopter. Except when operating under close positive control, and when there is an
immediate threat to a ship or the force, the helicopter nearest the detecting unit is to proceed to support
the detecting unit and inform the detecting unit, HCU, or other appropriate authority of its intentions.
When operating under close positive control, the helicopter is to await orders from the HCU before
proceeding to assist the detecting unit.
(NC) (NMP) See Article 12345 if the detecting unit is a friendly submarine.

c. (NU) Fixed-Wing Aircraft. When an FW aircraft has received a request for assistance from
the detecting unit, and when the tactical situation permits, the aircraft is to close that unit and inform
the ASWACU of his intentions. The aircraft is to keep clear of weapon danger areas, using the limits
provided by the ASWACU.
(NC) (NMP) See Article 12345 if the detecting unit is a friendly submarine.

d. (NU) ASW Aircraft Control Unit. The ASWACU is to inform aircraft of the contact and:

(1) (NU) When an FW aircraft is in the vicinity of a contact that is an immediate threat, direct the
aircraft to close the unit in contact and ensure that it keeps clear of weapon danger areas.

(2) (NU) If directed, transfer control of the aircraft to the unit in contact or to another unit in the
vicinity of the contact.

e. (NU) Helicopter Control Unit. The ACU performing the duties of an HCU is to:

(1) (NU) Reassign helicopter screen stations as ordered by the OTC or appropriate commander.

(2) (NU) Inform helicopters of any contact that is an immediate threat.

(3) (NU) Direct the helicopter nearest the contact to a position in support of the detecting unit and:

(a) (NU) Inform the detecting unit of the helicopter’s availability, weapon load, and control
frequency in use.

(b) (NU) Be prepared to transfer control of the helicopter to the detecting unit, or the unit in
the vicinity of the contact that is most capable of assuming HCU duties. Transfer of control
may take place without further orders.

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NOTE

(NU) GUIDANCE IN ITEMS 2 AND 3 ABOVE APPLIES TO AN

AIRCRAFT PERFORMING HCU FUNCTIONS.

12333 Detaching ASW Forces

a. (NU) Designation and Dispatch of a Search and Attack Unit. A SAU may be dispatched
to assist at a scene of action or to conduct a search of a designated area. The dispatch of a SAU
is based on considerations of threat, mission, conditions, assets available, possibilities of evasion,
environmental conditions, and so on. The assessment of the total threat will determine the type and
number of units dispatched. The SAU may consist of ships and/or aircraft. Helicopters can provide
a rapid reactive capability, provided the distance is such that the time on task will be worthwhile.
Dispatching ships to a known scene of action may be exposing them to unacceptable and unnecessary
risk. In such circumstances it is for consideration that the SAU should consist of aircraft only.

b. (NU) OTC/ASWC Functions.

(1) (NU) The OTC’s general functions in ASW are in Table 2-4.

(2) (NU) Information required by SAU and SAU commander:

(a) (NU) Composition of the SAU and identity of the SAU commander.

(b) (NU) Identity of the SAC.

(c) (NU) Latest position, time, source of information, classification, and confidence level of
the contact.

(d) (NU) If applicable: Datum designation, datum position, datum error, last known course
and speed of contact, datum time, and SITREP.

c. (NU) SAU Communications. On dispatch of a SAU, responsibility for its communication

requirements is transferred from the OTC to the SAU commander. Normally, the existing ASW
circuits will continue to be manned by the SAU, with the remainder shifting to an alternative ASW
control frequency (Procedure Alfa, see ACP 176) or screen tactical frequency (Procedure Bravo). Use
should be made of standard tabulated messages, such as the ASW Action Table in ATP-01, Vol. II. The
single-letter manoeuvring signals may be used for SAU action.
(NC) (NMP) Careful thought must be given to the EP adopted by the SAU commander to avoid
alerting hostile units to the existence, composition, or position of the SAU.

12334 The SAU Commander

a. (NU) The SAU Commander’s Responsibilities.

(1) (NU) Forming the units assigned.

(2) (NU) Establishing communications on assigned SAU frequencies with units of the SAU and
with the SAC.

(3) (NU) Designating the appropriate ACU; however, ACU duties are normally best carried out
by the SAU commander.

(4) (NU) Establishing datums, as necessary.

(5) (NU) Promulgating helicopter alert states, if applicable.

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b. (NU) Information to Be Passed by SAU Commander to SAU.

(1) (NU) SITREP.

(2) (NU) Torpedo countermeasures to be employed.

(3) (NU) Intentions, including Plans RED and BLACK.

(4) (NU) If dispatched to assist at an existing scene of action:

(a) (NU) Identity of the SAC.

(b) (NU) Latest position, time, source of information, classification, and confidence level of
contact or:

(c) (NU) Datum time, datum position, datum designation, and datum error.

(d) (NU) ETA at contact or datum and, if applicable, the torpedo danger area (TDA).

c. (NC) (NMP) Information to Be Passed by SAU Commander to SAC.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Composition of SAU and call sign of SAU commander.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Direction of approach, ETA at contact or datum (with revisions as applicable).

(3) (NC) (NMP) Weapons available.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Significant sensors operating at reduced efficiency or out of commission.

(5) (NC) (NMP) If applicable:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Altitude and off-task time.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Intentions, if SWAP is contemplated, including time, and Plans RED and
BLACK.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Call signs of ACUs.

d. (NC) (NMP) Information to Be Passed by SAC to SAU Commander.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Position, course and speed of contact, or datum position, time and error, source,
and latest classification.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Information necessary to enable the SAU to close the contact or datum.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Number and type of weapons remaining.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Weapons in water and the run time remaining.

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(5) (NC) (NMP) Tactics and sensors employed.

(6) (NC) (NMP) If applicable:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Time remaining on task.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Number of attacks made, types of weapons used, and results.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Environmental conditions.

(d) (NC) (NMP) Actions or operations by the SAU that are likely to interfere with the
operations in progress.

(e) (NC) (NMP) Sonobuoys in use, description of pattern, RF channel numbers, type, time
laid, and life settings.

(f) (NC) (NMP) Plans RED and BLACK.

(g) (NC) (NMP) Submarine evasion tactics detected or believed to be in use.

12335 SAU Approach to a Contact or Datum

(NU) The method of approach and countermeasures to be applied depend on the tactical situation. The
SAU commander must balance the danger to the SAU against the subsurface threat to friendly forces that
may be targets for submarine-launched missiles and accept a calculated risk where necessary. Availability
of a medium-or long-range weapon delivery capability, especially in good sonar conditions, may allow
the SAU commander to use a more deliberate approach tactic than is necessary when only short- or
medium-range weapons are available.
a. (NC) (NMP) Methods of Approach by Surface Units. Conditions under which the following
approaches may be selected are summarized in Table 12-2.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Direct. When a unit is in contact, the search line should take a course to the
contact that allows for the submarine’s movement. When no unit is in contact, but time late is short
enough to permit a single sweep to cover the furthest-on circle, the search line should proceed
directly to the datum. Figure 12-4 maybe used to verify whether the furthest-on circle can be
covered with a single sweep. In any case, the search line should be formed at an appropriate search
distance, based on sonar conditions and the size of the area to be searched.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Offset. When direct approach is not suitable (that is, spacing to cover the
furthest-on circle would be too large for an acceptable probability of detection) or the direction of
the enemy cannot be predicted, the search line shall proceed on a course that is offset 10 degrees
to 30 degrees to one side of the direct course to the datum. The offset should normally be directed
toward the MLA of the screened unit. This offset permits conduct of a logical search of the area and
may deceive or persuade the submarine into steering a course away from the offset.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Intercept. This method is used when direct approach is not suitable and
the direction of the enemy can be predicted or when it is desired to place the SAU between the
submarine and his target.

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Table 12-2. (NU) (NMP) Selecting the Approach Method

UNITS SITUATION CONDITION APPROACH
In contact DIRECT
None in contact URGENT Datum position is within 6 miles of the main body or DIRECT
(see note 1) convoy TDZ.
Datum position is within 30° of the MLA of the main OFFSET
body or convoy and more than 6 nm from the main
body or convoy TDZ.
Datum position is more than 30° off the MLA of the INTERCEPT
main body or convoy and more than 6 nm from the
main body or convoy TDZ.
Submarine movement can be predicted. INTERCEPT
DELIBERATE Datum position is close enough to the SAU that DIRECT
(see note 2) the whole probability area can be covered by the
search line.
Probability area cannot be covered by the search OFFSET or MIXED
line and there is no evidence of a likely submarine. (see note 3)
NOTE
1. Urgent situation applies when time is not sufficient to construct a datum approach triangle.
2. Deliberate situation applies when time is sufficient to construct a datum approach triangle.
3. Mixed Approach: Certain ships make an offset approach while others make a silent direct approach.
NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

DATUM B

DATUM A
SAU BASE COURSE
AND SPEED

D
EE
-SP
I NE
MAR
SUB
A B
SAU SWEEP WIDTH

1. Datum A is inside triangle ABC:

Direct approach is suitable.

2. Datum B is outside triangle ABC:

Direct approach is not suitable.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 12-4. (NU) (NMP) Datum Approach Triangle

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b. (NC) (NMP) Approach Tactics.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Initial Approach. This approach should normally be made at maximum
available speed. However, if the tactical situation dictates, maximum sonar speed and evasive
steering may be used.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Final Approach. This approach begins at the time that the SAU first reaches
either the TDA or the TSR as measured from the furthest-on circle. The TDA extends outward
from the furthest-on circle distance equivalent to the assessed METFR. The SAU commander
should order:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Ships to proceed at optimum sonar speed or up to maximum sonar speed if
circumstances so dictate.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Employment of tactical countermeasures for which he can afford the time.
Zigzag plans XRAY and YANKEE from ATP-03 are specifically designed for use within the
TDA.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Use of material torpedo countermeasures. The use of these devices may
reduce sonar detection range.

c. (NC) (NMP) Antisubmarine Evasion and Torpedo Countermeasures to Be Executed

by a SAU.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Approach to the Torpedo Danger Area. Units should use maximum speed
and evasive steering (narrow weave or zigzag), or maintain a steady course as time and threat
permit, and leave towed decoys activated, depending on the tactical situation.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Before Entering Torpedo Danger Area. Units should carry out the
following measures:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Reduce to optimum sonar speed.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Execute zigzag plan XRAY or YANKEE from ATP-03.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Stream towed decoys (if not already done).

(d) (NC) (NMP) Activate/deactivate decoys depending on the tactical situation.

(e) (NC) (NMP) Consider the use of speed below cavitation speed.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Initial Action on Gaining Contact.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Report the contact.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Conduct urgent attack when the contact poses an immediate threat.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Ensure decoys are activated.

(d) (NC) (NMP) Carry out tactical countermeasures.

(e) (NC) (NMP) Continue with urgent or deliberate attack.

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(4) (NC) (NMP) During Medium- or Long-range Attacks. Within the limits of maintaining
sonar contact, units should:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Use inclinations toward (30° to 45°) or away from (135° to 150°) the
submarine.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Use regular alterations of course and/or speed. Although dependent on
the range from the submarine, alterations should be conducted every 6 to 8 minutes. Course
alterations should be of at least 30° and speed alterations of at least 3 knots.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Continue to employ towed decoys in accordance with current employment
doctrine for the decoy in use.

(d) (NC) (NMP) Use speeds less than cavitation speed if tactically acceptable.

(e) (NC) (NMP) If an attack with nuclear warhead torpedoes is likely, consider the advantages
of remaining within 6,000 yards.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Closing to Attack With Short-range Weapons. Should be avoided
due to the considerable risk to the attacking unit. Short-range weapons should be considered as
self-defence systems only.

12336 SAU Commander/SAC Intended Employment of Units

(NU) The SAC or SAU commander should promulgate, within the OTC’s policies, the intended
employment of units as soon as a contact is gained, under the heading Plan RED, and the intended
employment of units immediately after contact is lost, under the heading Plan BLACK. The purpose is
to advise all units, well in advance, of what is expected of them and to avoid confusion at the time that
contact is lost. An order to execute Plan RED or execute Plan BLACK is all that is required to initiate
the action; all units are then to proceed as previously directed. Plans RED and BLACK are normally
promulgated in the OPTASK ASW or its supplements.
a. (NC) (NMP) The SAC is Responsible for:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Promulgating Plan RED, including:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Disposition of units.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Types of attacks.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Employment of weapons.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Promulgating Plan BLACK.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Designating the attacking unit (if required.)

(4) (NC) (NMP) Designating the appropriate ACU.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Ordering countermeasures to be used.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Directing the homing of air and surface reinforcements to the contact.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Reviewing EMCON plan within the OTC’s EP.

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(8) (NC) (NMP) Specifying aircraft altitude separation.

(9) (NC) (NMP) Establishing additional datums, as necessary.

(10) (NC) (NMP) Informing the OTC of progress.

(11) (NC) (NMP) Executing time checks with the SAU commander.

(12) (NC) (NMP) Promulgating estimated submarine speed to be used in constructing furthest-on
circles.

(13) (NC) (NMP) Knowing the location of allocated submarine operating areas, and enforcing
attack restrictions when in their vicinity.

(14) (NC) (NMP) Designating datums, if specifically delegated by the OTC.

b. (NC) (NMP) SAU Commander Responsibilities. When contact is gained by a unit that is
part of a SAU, the SAU commander is responsible for:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Disposition of the air and surface units of the SAU.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Ordering torpedo countermeasures.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Assuming the duties of SAC.

12337 Aircraft Reports to the SAU

(NU) An aircraft at the scene of action shall transmit reports to the SAU to assist in closing the contact or
datum. However, attack procedures and maintaining contact take precedence over reporting. The aircraft
may indicate the position of the submarine contact or datum relative to the approaching unit or relative to
KINGPIN (an arbitrary reference position established by the aircraft). The procedures described below
may be used to indicate contact, datum, or KINGPIN.
a. (NU) Radar On Top. When an approaching unit holds the aircraft on radar, the commander of the
approaching unit may send the message “Request radar on top.” On receiving this signal, the aircraft
shall fly over the contact, datum, or KINGPIN and report, “On top contact (datum or KINGPIN) now,
now, NOW,” and using IFF squawk identity. The third “now” will be the on-top position.

b. (NU) Reverse Radar On Top. When an approaching unit does not hold the aircraft on radar,
the aircraft should try to determine using its own radar the position of the unit relative to the contact,
datum, or KINGPIN. The aircraft shall fly over the contact, datum, or KINGPIN and report, “On top
contact (datum or KINGPIN) now, now, NOW,” and transmit to the approaching unit the bearing and
distance from the approaching unit to the datum, contact, or KINGPIN.

c. (NU) Visual On Top. When the aircraft is sighted, the commander of the approaching unit may
send the message, “Request visual on top.” On receiving this signal, the aircraft shall fly in a shallow
dive over the contact, datum, or KINGPIN and signal, “On top contact (datum or KINGPIN) now,
now, NOW.” The aircraft is pulled out of the dive and a yellow flare may be fired on the transmission
of the third “NOW.”

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12338 (NU) (NMP) Changing Scene-of-Action Commander (SWAP)

(NC) (NMP) On occasion there may be a need to change the SAC. This could be due to the arrival
of a SAU to reinforce a scene of action or the transfer of SAC duties from a ship to an aircraft so that
ships can withdraw to a safe distance from the submarine. When approaching the scene of action, the
SAU commander directed to assume SAC duties must decide when to execute SWAP and must inform
the present SAC of his intention and of the estimated time of SWAP. The SAC should advise the SAU
commander to delay his approach if, in his opinion, the SAU may interfere with operations in progress.
Upon execution of SWAP, the SAU commander is to report this fact to all units at the scene and to
the OTC. The information flow contained in paragraph 12334.d should precede any SWAP. SWAP is
frequently appropriate immediately after a DOGBOX has been established.
12339 Spare

12340 (NU) (NMP) Action Following Contact when Direct Support Forces are Involved

(NC) (NMP) These contact prosecution procedures are designed for use by units in direct support.
Whenever submarines are in associated support, they are to keep the OTC/ASWC of the supported
forces informed and are to coordinate with the other ASW units of the supported force as specified in the
Submarine Force Summary message.
12341 (NU) (NMP) Submarine Gains Initial Contact

a. (NC) (NMP) On initial contact, the submarine shall carry out procedures in Articles 12304 and
12316. In general, the following sequence will be carried out:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Unless previously directed otherwise by the supported force commander, make
the initial contact report. If the contact is very close at initial detection, the submarine may not have
time to release a contact report prior to delivering an attack (ROE permitting). A post-attack report
via SLOT buoy or by established communications with the ASW aircraft or the ASWC/SOCA
should be sent as soon as possible after the attack.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Commence prosecution, proceeding as mission assignment and target motion
dictate.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Make amplifying report.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Be alert for downlink communication attempts (BELLRINGER).

(5) (NC) (NMP) Continue prosecution within the guidelines of the established ROE and/or
SAA/JAA boundary limitations. Consider contact handover alternatives.

b. (NC) (NMP) If attack is made, make post-attack report.

12342 (NU) (NMP) ASW Aircraft Gains Initial Contact

a. (NC) (NMP) On initial contact, the ASW aircraft carries out procedures in Articles 12304 and
12313/12314 and also the following:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Be prepared to use ESUS/SUS to initiate communications with the friendly
submarine in order to pass contact information when directed.

(2) (NC) (NMP) If localization appears probable, request that a NOTACK BULLPEN area be
established, if required (see Chapter 6).

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(3) (NC) (NMP) Ensure that attack authorization is received before descending below good
communications altitude.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Attack rules of this section apply.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Advise the ASWC of reduced SLOT buoy monitoring capability while at
low altitude.

(4) (NC) (NMP) If contact is established with the friendly submarine, conduct AIR/SUB
cooperation procedures.

12343 (NU) (NMP) Passive Sonar–Capable Surface Ship Gains Initial Contact

a. (NC) (NMP) On initial contact, the surface ship shall carry out a standard sequence:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Make contact report to ASWC, reporting both towed array true bearings if
appropriate (refine bearing when possible but do not delay initial report to resolve bearing
ambiguity).

(2) (NC) (NMP) Commence localization as SAC using ASW aircraft as feasible.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Send amplifying reports at least every 30 minutes to the ASWC (if contact is lost
or evaluated as nonsubmarine, make an immediate report).

(4) (NC) (NMP) Be prepared to initiate downlink communications to the friendly submarine, as
required (BELLRINGER).

(5) (NC) (NMP) Request NOTACK area be established, if required.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Observe attack rules of this section.

12344 (NU) (NMP) Coordinated Prosecution with Friendly Submarine

(NC) (NMP) A coordinated prosecution occurs when two or more platforms are cooperating in the
prosecution of a contact, based on an information exchange between the platforms or on direction
provided by the ASWC/SOCA. When a coordinated prosecution in a JAA evolves to the attack phase,
and the attack is to be delivered by a unit other than the friendly submarine involved, either NOTACK or
SGSA procedures must be followed.
12345 (NU) (NMP) ASW Aircraft Response to a Submarine-Generated Contact

a. (NC) (NMP) Contact Report on Enemy Submarines. When the aircraft receives a contact
report on an enemy submarine from the supporting submarine, it will proceed as though assistance is
required by the supporting submarine unless:

(1) (NC) (NMP) The report is a post-attack report,

(2) (NC) (NMP) Directed otherwise by the ASWC, or

(3) (NC) (NMP) The aircraft is prosecuting a contact, in which case it shall advise the ASWC of
the tactical situation and proceed as directed.

b. (NC) (NMP) Action When Assistance is Required. When responding to a submarine

contact report or Call for Assistance message (as in APP-01), the aircraft will inform the submarine

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of the approach method, request homing aids (if necessary), and provide ETA. The submarine will
then provide updated contact information to the aircraft shortly before its arrival on-top and/or in the
contact area. Procedures for providing assistance are in ATP-28, Vol. I.

12346 (NU) (NMP) Contact Handover

a. (NC) (NMP) General. The handover of an active contact from one platform to another normally
shall be accomplished as an intercept by the relief platform under direction of the ASWC/SOCA. In
the event that the ASWC/SOCA is not able to provide direction, handover will be coordinated and
conducted in real time, using two-way radio communication circuits. The unit assuming responsibility
for prosecution of the contact shall make a positive statement to the unit relinquishing the contact
that it has assumed the duties of contact prosecution. This positive handover will be reported to the
ASWC/SOCA.

b. (NC) (NMP) Submarine to Aircraft. Handover from submarine to aircraft will be initiated by
an exchange of call signs followed by the words, “Contact handover” (as in APP-01). The aircraft
will answer by indicating the latest amplifying report that it has copied or will indicate at this time
if unable to accept the Contact Handover message. The submarine will then transmit the Contact
Handover message, excluding that information which the aircraft has already received via amplifying
report information.

c. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft to Submarine. Contact handover from an aircraft to a submarine or

from/to any other unit will be accomplished as above with the exception of the amplifying report
information.

d. (NC) (NMP) Message Ordering. The following elements are to be included in the Contact
Handover message:

(1) (NC) (NMP) LOCATING (Number) SERIAL (Number).

(2) (NC) (NMP) Classification (and Confidence Level if POSSUB).

(3) (NC) (NMP) Type and operating mode.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Contact or datum position.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Course/speed in knots or contact movements in cardinal points of the compass.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Additional contact information.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Time of contact position (ZULU).

(8) (NC) (NMP) Submarine current position.

12347 (NU) (NMP) Submarine/Air Cooperation

(NC) (NMP) Procedures for air/submarine cooperation are fully detailed in ATP-28, Vol. I.
12348–12349 Spare

12350 (NU) (NMP) Ship-Towed Array Contact Prosecution (See also ATP-28, Vol. I.)

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12351 (NU) (NMP) Localization

(NC) (NMP) Localization of a ship’s towed array contact to attack criteria can be a lengthy process. The
methods available to conduct this localization are ship’s TMA, cross-fixing with another ship using its
towed array, or employing sensors from another unit, usually an aircraft.
a. (NC) (NMP) Target Motion Analysis. TMA requires no external assets or communication
circuits, but it is time consuming and can require manoeuvring by the ship. The present methods
of surface ship TMA do not result in a position accurate enough for an attack without additional
information from another sensor. TMA normally can generate an AOP of sufficient accuracy to allow
the OTC either to avoid the submarine through manoeuvring of his force or to dedicate other passive
assets such as an MPA to further localize the contact.

b. (NC) (NMP) Cross-Fixing. Cross-fixing provides a rapid method of contact localization,

although the resultant AOP will not be sufficiently small to allow for an attack. The contact’s AOP
should, however, be sufficiently refined to allow the OTC to avoid the contact by manoeuvres or to
task other active or passive assets to continue the localization. The disadvantages of cross-fixing
are that it requires ships to be stationed specifically for this purpose, that reliable communications
between the TAS ships are necessary, and that the probability of both TAS ships gaining contact
cannot be guaranteed. If PSRs are small then communications between cross-fixing units will not be
an issue. However, it might not be advantageous to have two TAS ships in such close proximity.

c. (NC) (NMP) Other Units. Cross-fixing plus TMA alone will not produce attack criteria. Ships
and aircraft can be tasked to localize a TAS contact. Aircraft are ideally suited for this because of their
range, speed, sensor fit, and weapons-carrying ability. In their absence, acoustically quiet ships can
be used in a SAU, but this is not without risk. Certain TAS ships have organic helicopter assets which
may be used to assist in localization.

12352 (NU) (NMP) TAS Ship/Aircraft Cooperation

(NC) (NMP) In general, an aircraft is the most effective unit to prosecute a TAS contact but only if clear,
concise, and specific tasking information is exchanged between the TAS ships and the aircraft. The
following activities should occur to accomplish a successful prosecution.
a. (NC) (NMP) OTC/Shore Authority. The OTC/shore authority should consider establishing a
procedure whereby the TAS ship can obtain support from an FW aircraft or helicopter to assist in the
localization of a TAS contact without a formal request to the OTC/shore authority. The procedure is to
be promulgated in the Form GREENs, OPGENs, or Joining Instructions. In any event, the TAS ship
must be aware of the means by which aircraft support is to be obtained.

b. (NC) (NMP) Gaining Contact. Upon gaining contact, the TAS ship sends a contact report to the
OTC/shore authority (see Article 12304.e).

c. (NC) (NMP) Localization. If localization is desired, the OTC/shore authority tasks an aircraft to
join the TAS ship for contact prosecution. If previously authorized, the TAS ship calls for assistance
and directs the assigned aircraft to join for contact prosecution.

d. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft Communication. The aircraft establishes communications with the TAS
unit, receives employment and contact information, and proceeds to investigate the bearing line or
AOP. The TAS ship is the SAC for the overall prosecution and is the ACU for the assigned aircraft.

e. (NC) (NMP) TAS Ship. The TAS ship can task the aircraft using airplans. Alternatively the
TAS ship can provide own position, target bearing and AOP, leaving the aircraft captain to decide
on detailed aircraft employment to localize the contact. The bearing origin may not be necessary to

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the TAS ship but could be indicated as a geographic or related position or by a sonobuoy. The TAS
ship may be required to radiate on radar, TACAN, or IFF interrogator in order to establish the point
of origin. Units must PLOT-LOCK unless both are GPS-fitted. The following information should be
included with the airplan:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Target bearing, bearing accuracy, time of bearing.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Acoustic signature information.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Range estimate, and how obtained.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Array depth.

(5) (NC) (NMP) Localization sensors to be employed.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Observed target behaviour.

f. (NC) (NMP) Investigation of the TAS Contact. During the aircraft’s investigation of the
TAS contact, the TAS ship is to pass to the aircraft updated contact information. The TAS ship either
maintains contact or resumes its patrol as previously directed by the OTC/shore authority. In the latter
case, the aircraft will assume the duties of the SAC once in contact.

NOTE

(NC) (NMP) DEPENDING ON THE SUBMARINE’S SPEED, TAS

BEARINGS AND TRACKING INFORMATION DECAYING
VERY SLOWLY, THIS INFORMATION MAY BE TACTICALLY
EXPLOITABLE FOR AN HOUR OR MORE AFTER LOSING
CONTACT.

g. (NC) (NMP) Aircraft Gains Contact. When the aircraft gains contact, it will pass contact
information to the TAS ship in the form of a Raid Report, unless otherwise directed by the OTC/shore
authority. Similar procedures can be used with other units, such as surface ship pouncers.

12353–12359 Spare

12360 Torpedo Attack Coordination

a. (NU) For attacks in which more than one ASW unit is involved in close prosecution, the attacking
unit must, upon attack, announce an area from which assisting units should remain clear for their
own safety. For torpedoes, an area (DOGBOX) is established within which units interfere with or are
endangered by running torpedoes. DOGBOX is based upon type of torpedo, method of employment,
and estimated acquisition range. The DOGBOX is time-limited to torpedo expiry.

b. (NU) The presence of surface ships or employment of other ASW weapons within a DOGBOX
may degrade the performance of the running torpedo. Therefore, the attacking unit must reconsider
the attack and cancel it if:

(1) (NU) There is a risk to a friendly unit, or

(2) (NU) The anticipated effect of the weapon is unacceptably degraded due to friendly unit
interference.

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12361 ASW Ship and Helicopter Attack and Support Methods

(NU) When helicopters are used in ASW attack and support methods, the letter H must be added as a
suffix to the method number. A description of ASW attack and support methods is found in Chapter 5
and ATP-28, Vol. I.
12362 ASW Ship Actions

a. (NU) Attacking Ship. The ship conducting an attack or using aircraft to conduct an attack is
considered to be the attacking ship. The attacking ship’s duties include:

(1) (NU) Delivering a deliberate or urgent attack, as appropriate, to keep maximum pressure on
the submarine.

(2) (NU) Indicating that she is the attacking ship and the weapon she will use.
(NC) (NMP) as directed by the SAC.

(3) (NU) Manoeuvring in accordance with the rules for the attack method ordered. If deemed
necessary to keep a constant range or open the contact, use a figure-of-eight manoeuvre to ensure
the stern is never pointed towards it. This will limit chances of the contact being lost in the stern
arcs of the sonar.

(4) (NU) Exchanging information and passing movements and intentions of own ship and attacking
aircraft under control.

(5) (NU) Indicating by signal immediately when the contact is lost or becomes doubtful.

(6) (NU) In a close ASW action, transferring the attacking ship responsibility to an assisting ship
holding contact as the situation dictates.

(7) (NU) Promulgating the torpedo interference/weapon danger (DOGBOX) where appropriate.

b. (NU) Assisting Ship. The assisting ship’s duties include:

(1) (NU) Manoeuvring to keep clear of the attacking ship and to avoid obstructing the attack.

(2) (NU) Manoeuvring in accordance with the rules for the attack method ordered, to gain and
maintain sonar contact and remain clear of torpedo interference/weapon danger (DOGBOX) areas.
If deemed necessary to keep a constant range or open the contact, use a figure-of-eight manoeuvre
to ensure the stern is never pointed towards it. This will limit chances of the contact being lost in
the stern arcs of the sonar.

(3) (NU) Exchanging information with the attacking ship.

(4) (NU) Reporting immediately when the contact is lost or becomes doubtful.

(5) (NU) Reporting when ready to assume the duties of attacking ship.

c. (NU) Supporting Ship. Ships not engaged in a close ASW action may be used in support.
(NC) (NMP) Medium range, long range, or VDS may best be employed in this role. Support ships may
then hold contact at long range. Such or aircraft may hold contact when the attacking and assisting
ships lose contact. Ships are ordered to support a close action in accordance with the rules for the
support method employed.

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NOTE
(NC) (NMP) MULTISHIP PARTICIPATION IN AN ASW ACTION
MAY C AUSE A CONSIDER ABLE INCREASE IN VOICE
COMMUNICATIONS. ASSISTING SHIP AND SUPPORTING SHIP(S)
SHOULD THEREFORE RESTRICT THEIR INFORMATION IN
SUCH A MANNER THAT THE ATTACKING SHIP’S DATA ON
WEAPON DELIVERY AND SAFETY FACTORS TAKE PRIORITY
OVER OTHER INFORMATION.

12363 Vectored Attacks

a. (NU) Rules. The rules for the conduct of VECTACs follow:

(1) (NU) The type of weapon must be agreed upon and the aircraft’s delivery speed and altitude
mutually understood.

(2) (NU) The attacking aircraft should be prepared to inform the controlling unit of the forward
throw of the weapon to be used and the desired splash point relative to the submarine.

NOTE

(NU) ALTERNATIVELY, A REVERSE RADAR VECTAC OR

INFOTAC COULD BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT THE NEED TO
FURNISH THE CONTROLLING UNIT WITH DELIVERY SPEED/
ALTITUDE, FORWARD THROW, OR DESIRED SPLASH POINT.

(3) (NU) All bearings and courses must be specified at the outset as either magnetic or true, and
ranges shall be given in hundreds of yards.

(4) (NU) The attacking aircraft should inform the controller of all weapon drops and MAD marks.

(5) (NU) When the unit in contact is a helicopter, FW aircraft overflying the helicopter must
maintain vertical separation of at least 200 feet.

(6) (NU) When more than one unit is in contact with the same target, only one unit shall conduct
VECTACs on that target at any given time. In this case, the SAC shall designate the controlling
unit. If the controlling unit is a ship, then that ship must also be designated as the attacking ship
IAW Article 12362.

(7) (NU) The attacking aircraft shall be informed of all contact course and speed changes.

(8) (NU) The controlling unit may at any time after initiating a VECTAC order “Cancel VECTAC.”
After this order is given, a subsequent attack must start with the full VECTAC procedure.

b. (NU) Methods. The methods of ordering and executing VECTACs are described below.

(1) (NU) Radar VECTAC. The attacking aircraft is directed to the weapon release point by the
controlling unit. The controlling unit initiates the attack by ordering “Execute radar VECTAC.”
During the run towards the target, the controlling unit passes correcting vectors as necessary and
frequent range information. The attack is ordered by “Stand by weapons,” followed by “Drop,
now, now, NOW.”

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(2) (NU) Reverse Radar VECTAC. The attacking aircraft uses its radar to determine the position
of the unit in contact and, from that unit, plots the range and bearing of the sonar contact. The unit
in contact orders, “Execute reverse radar VECTAC,” and the attacking aircraft will determine the
optimum splash point depending on the contact’s course and speed and the type of weapon. The
attacking aircraft manoeuvres, using its own navigation system, to the weapon release point for
release of the weapon.

(3) (NU) Informative VECTAC. The unit in contact gives target position, course, and speed
of the contact to the attacking aircraft to enable it to manoeuvre to the weapon release point.
The controlling unit orders, “Execute INFOTAC” and specifies the method of defining the target
position. This could be as a range/bearing relative to either the controlling unit or a marker/
reference point. With the widespread availability of GPS, target position is increasingly given in
Latitude/Longitude. The attacking aircraft plots the contact information, visually marks on top the
units in contact or marker to lock plots (if necessary), and is responsible for its own navigation to
the weapon release point and for the release of the weapon at the proper time.

(4) (NU) Visual VECTAC. The unit in contact gives the attacking aircraft a course and time to
fly, either from the controlling unit or a nominated marker, to the weapon release point. The attack
is ordered by, “Execute visual VECTAC,” and the departure point and approximate attack heading
are passed to the aircraft. The attacking aircraft makes a warning call, “Stand by 1 minute,” when
approximately 1 minute away from the departure point. The controlling unit then computes the
splash point for the expected attack time and the attack heading and time to fly. When the attacking
aircraft is on top of the departure point on the attack heading, the attacking aircraft reports “On
top, now, now, NOW.” The controlling unit then times the run and orders weapon release. A visual
VECTAC may be employed when the controlling unit cannot conduct a radar VECTAC and the
attacking aircraft has no navigation system.

c. (NU) Types of Attack. VECTACs may be either urgent or deliberate. Since the VECTAC is
considered to be primarily a form of deliberate attack, an urgent attack, if desired, must be specifically
ordered.

d. (NC) (NMP) MAD During VECTACs. Should a MAD-equipped aircraft on an urgent VECTAC
gain MAD contact prior to reaching the weapon release point, a weapon will be launched immediately.
When MAD contact is gained on a deliberate VECTAC, prior to reaching the weapon release point,
the attack should be conducted according to standard MAD procedures, with the controlling unit
continuing to provide target course and speed information.

12364 (NU) (NMP) MAD Verification Runs

(NC) (NMP) An informative or radar method may be used that is ordered in a similar way to a VECTAC
(for example, “Execute radar VECTAC”). Procedures are virtually the same as for a VECTAC except
that the aircraft will fly at a minimum safe altitude and will be directed to the submarine’s position. The
controlling unit shall state whether an attack is to be conducted by the aircraft, or by the controlling
unit, when MAD contact is gained. If the controlling ship intends to conduct the attack following MAD
verification, the aircraft will be advised, “Stand clear on MAD.” The aircraft will leave the area after
MAD detection and await further instructions.
12365–12369 Spare

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CHAPTER 13 Naval Mine Warfare

Note: (NU) All references to “mine warfare,” “mine countermeasures,” and “mines” throughout this
chapter refer to “naval mine warfare,” “naval mine countermeasures,”and “sea mines,” respectively.
13000 Introduction

a. (NU) Naval mine warfare includes the whole field of designing, producing, and laying mines
and the parallel effort of designing, producing, and operating all forms of mine countermeasures to
combat the adversary mining campaign (Figure 13-1). This chapter provides background knowledge
and instructions to commands and personnel not normally involved in mine warfare.

b. (NR) (NMP) For more detailed information, refer to ATP-02, ATP-06, ATP-24, and AHP-07.

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 13-1. (NU) The Naval Mine Warfare Family Tree

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13001 Mining

(NU) The aim of minelaying operations is to assist in the dislocation of the adversary’s war effort to the
maximum possible extent and to contribute to the security of our sea communications by the destruction
or threat of destruction of the adversary’s merchant and naval units.
13002 Types of Mines

a. (NU) In naval mine warfare a sea mine is defined as an explosive device laid in the water by
aircraft, submarines, or surface ships with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring
shipping from entering an area. The term does not include devices attached to the bottom of ships or
to harbour installations by personnel operating underwater, nor does it include devices which explode
immediately on expiration of a predetermined time after laying.

b. (NU) Sea mines can be classified in a variety of different categories. Common categories include:

(1) (NU) Position in the water.

(a) Drifting.

(b) In the volume.

(c) On the seabed.

(2) (NU) Method of actuation or firing system.

(a) Influence.

(b) Contact.

(c) Remote controlled.

(3) (NU) Intended purpose.

(a) Harbour defence.

(b) Sea lines of communications interdiction.

(c) Anti-invasion.

(d) Sea denial.

(4) (NU) Intended target.

(a) NMCM asset(s).

(b) Surface ships or vessels.

(c) Submarine.

(d) Helicopter.

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(5) (NU) Delivery method.

(a) Surface.

(b) Air.

(c) Submarine.

c. (NU) Types of settings used with mines include:

(1) (NU) Ship counts, which allow a certain number of ships to pass the mine before it detonates.

(2) (NU) Arming or rising delays, which prevent the mine from becoming active before a preset
time.

(3) (NU) Sterilizing time, which renders the mine inoperative after a preset time.

d. (NC) (NMP) Moored mines can normally be encountered in waters with depths up to 1000 metres,
although this is not necessarily the technical depth limitation. Mines used in antisubmarine minefields
can be laid in deeper water, but the mine casing will be moored above the case-crushing depth.
Categories of moored mines are detailed in ATP-06, Vol I.

e. (NC) (NMP) Ground mines can normally be encountered in water depths where they are most
effective against their intended target. This depth will be governed by the size of the charge in the
mine and other factors explained in ATP-06, Volume I and II. Generally, a ground mine with a charge
weight of 1000 kg will be effective in depths up to 70 metres against surface vessels. Ground mines
targeted against submarines are also laid in deeper waters.

f. (NC) (NMP) For detailed information on specific threat mines, refer to relevant intelligence
publications.

13003 Mineable Waters

a. (NU) Mineable waters are waters in which mines may be effectively used against submarines
or surface ships. The depth of the water may dictate the use of either moored or ground mines
(see Article 13002). Drifting mines can be encountered in any depth of water.

b. (NU) During the initial stages of a mining campaign, offensive operations are likely to be confined
to ports, harbours, and focal points where traffic concentrations can be foreseen.

13004 The Nature of a Minefield

(NU) As all minelaying operations will have a lasting effect on enemy as well as own operations, all
sources of intelligence should be used by planners. Where independent mines (a mine which is not
controlled by the user after laying) have been laid, the minefield presents the same danger to own forces
as to enemy forces. Operational advantages can be achieved by the use of arming or rising delays and
sterilizers that will activate and deactivate the minefield at preset times. If sterilizers are not used, the
minefield can be expected to create a danger for years.

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13005 Types of Mining

a. (NR) (NMP) Mining Operations. Mines can be used strategically or tactically.

(1) (NR) (NMP) Strategic Mining. Strategic mining operations are those calculated to reduce
and impede the enemy’s war potential by disrupting his seaborne communications.

(a) (NR) (NMP) Offensive Mining. An offensive minefield is laid in enemy territorial
waters or waters controlled by the enemy.

(b) (NR) (NMP) Defensive Mining. A defensive minefield is laid in international waters or
international straits which are normally under control of a NATO nation or the Alliance with
the declared intention of controlling shipping in defence of sea lines of communications.

(c) (NR) (NMP) Protective Mining. In naval mine warfare, a minefield laid in friendly
territorial waters to protect ports, harbours, anchorages, coasts and coastal routes.

(2) (NR) (NMP) Tactical Mining. Tactical maritime mining would be conducted in support of
a limited military objective, generally in a specific area of immediate tactical interest. Integration
of tactical mining into antisubmarine warfare and amphibious warfare is of special value and most
effective.

13006 Jettisoning Mines

a. (NR) (NMP) In some circumstances it may be necessary to jettison mines. For example, if:

(1) (NR) (NMP) The minelayer catches fire;

(2) (NR) (NMP) Weight of the mines causes loss of speed or stability so great that it represents an
intolerable hazard to the minelayer;

(3) (NR) (NMP) Other operations ordered at short notice do not permit the minelaying to be
completed as planned, or the transfer of mines;

(4) (NR) (NMP) If the minelayer is attacked or there is danger of the mines falling into enemy
hands.

b. (NR) (NMP) Jettisoned mines may be a serious hazard to friendly ships unless suitable precautions
are taken. Instructions concerning jettisoning should be included in operational orders to minelayers.
It is most important, no matter what the circumstances, that the minelayer record the location of all
jettisoned mines as accurately as possible and report them to higher authority as soon as feasible.
Orders to the minelayer include detailed specifications of pre-chosen areas into which mines should
be jettisoned if at all possible, together with instructions for dropping the mines armed or unarmed in
each area. (see also ATP-24, Volume II, Chapter 2).

13007 Minelaying Operations

(NU) Normally the MARCOM issues orders for the operation. These consist of directives, preparatory
orders, and final operation orders. Minelaying intentions and plans must be coordinated with subordinate
commanders to ensure that mining operations will not conflict with submarine and surface force
operations. Details of ordering minelaying operations are given in ATP-24, Vol II. Ships not equipped
with modern navigational systems or with degraded navigational systems still require a leadthrough IAW
Chapter 11 (NCAGS).

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13008 Information to Friendly Forces

a. (NU) Although the distribution of orders should be confined to units that are concerned directly,
the position, nature, and extent of a new minefield, or an addition to an existing minefield, must be
communicated to all other units that may transit the area. For this purpose AWNIS and the associated
Q-Messages are used.

b. (NR) (NMP) For details, see AHP-01, Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System
(AWNIS).

13009 (NU) (NMP) Procedures for and Methods of Surface Mining

(NR) (NMP) The procedure to be used is determined by the minelaying order. There are two mining
procedures: pattern mining and random mining. The minelaying method is the system according to
which the procedure of mining is implemented. The method to be used is to be determined by the OTC
of the minelaying force.
a. (NR) (NMP) Pattern Mining. This mining procedure involves laying a minefield in the form of
geographically predetermined mine lines.

b. (NR) (NMP) Random Mining. This mining procedure involves laying a minefield of practically
uniform density but with no recognizable pattern of mine distribution in a geographically predetermined
area. Random laying of mines hinders minehunting and clearance.

13010 (NU) (NMP) Protection of Surface Minelaying Forces

a. (NC) (NMP) Approach Phase. The OTC of the covering force will normally act in support
operations, Situation C (See Article 2181). The OTC of the minelaying force must ensure that
there is a clear understanding between the different forces involved as to their relative movements,
communications, tactical limitations, etc. During the transit to the minelaying area, the OTC of the
minelaying force will try to avoid contact with the adversary. The OTC of the NMW Force Protection
will operate in the direction of the threat. The primary aim of the force protection is to prevent
detection and attack of the minelaying force by the adversary. This may be achieved best by diverting
them away from the area to be mined.

b. (NC) (NMP) Minelaying Phase. Direct communication between the OTCs is of paramount
importance during the execution of a minelaying operation. To facilitate communication, code words
for the operation should be provided to the OTC of the protecting force prior to the start of the
operation. All communications directly concerned with minelaying (e.g., opposition contact reports,
ship-air) should be handled by the protecting force. The OTC of the minelaying force will usually
indicate, at a predetermined time before the event, the intention to start or complete minelaying. The
OTC of the protecting force must be kept informed on the progress of the lay, including:

(1) (NC) (NMP) Start of minelaying.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Any interruptions or breakdown.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Completion.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Jettisoning of mines.

13011 Naval Mine Countermeasures

a. (NU) The aim of naval mine countermeasures is to permit Allied warships and merchant vessels
to use the seas and enter and leave ports, as necessary, to further the war effort and support the

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population, without sustaining unacceptable damage or losses from enemy mines. This aim can be
achieved by offensive and defensive NMCM.

(1) (NU) Offensive NMCM is intended to prevent the enemy from successfully laying mines.
Included under this heading are:

(a) (NU) Strategic bomb/missile attacks.

(b) (NU) Attacks on enemy minelayers.

(c) (NU) Laying own offensive/defensive minefields.

(2) (NU) Defensive NMCM is designed to reduce the threat from mines after they have been laid.
They include:

(a) (NU) Passive countermeasures.

(b) (NU) Active countermeasures.

b. (NC) (NMP) Given the political will, the prevention of mining is always the preferable option;
this means utilization of offensive NMCM techniques to prevent mining. In the absence of this, the
most productive surveillance assets available should be brought to bear on the enemy in order that the
success of defensive MCM techniques might be more readily achieved once commenced.

13012 Passive Mine Countermeasures

a. (NU) Passive MCM is aimed at protecting naval and merchant shipping against the threat from
enemy mines (see also ATP-06, Vol II). These mine countermeasures are:

(1) (NU) Localizing the Threat. Localize the threat by:

(a) (NU) Concentrating shipping on routes and in channels by using convoys where possible,
so that less Active MCM is required. For more details on the routing of shipping see ATP-02,
Vol I.

(b) (NU) Warn shipping by issuing Navigational Warnings about mined and suspected mined
areas (see AHP-1).

(c) (NU) Determine the routes or diversions where it is assessed that no mining has taken
place taking into account operational requirements and geographical constraints.

(d) (NU) Closure of ports.

(2) (NU) Locating the Minefield. Locate the minefield by:

(a) (NU) Establishing mine-watching organizations.

(b) (NU) Gathering and assessing intelligence.

(c) (NU) Surveillance.

(d) (NU) Reconnaissance.

(3) (NU) Reducing the Risk. Reduce the risk to shipping by:

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(a) (NU) Applying self-protective measures (SPMs) (see Article 13014).

(b) (NU) Altering or adjusting navigational aids.

(4) (NU) Preparing the Battlespace.

(a) (NU) Conducting Rapid Environmental Assessment (REA).

(b) (NU) Information held by National Mine Warfare Data Centres.

(c) (NU) Conduct of Route Survey (RTSV).

(d) (NU) Gathering and assessing intelligence.

13013 Self-protective Measures

(NU) Self-protective measures are part of defensive MCM; they are those passive measures taken by any
vehicle to reduce the risk to the vehicle from mines. SPMs are achieved by tactical measures or material
means.
a. (NR) (NMP) Tactical Measures. The following factors should be considered:

(1) (NR) (NMP) Tide. Sailing at high water increases the distance between hull and mine. This
way enables a ship to sail over a buoyant moored-contact mine or reduce the influence detected by
an influence mine.

(2) (NR) (NMP) Current. The current will cause a moored mine to dip and will have the same
effect as tide. In good conditions, speed made good over the ground may be increased without
change of the speed through the water, and so risk from acoustic or pressure mines may be reduced.

(3) (NR) (NMP) Safe Depth. The safe depth will vary with the characteristics of the mine, the
speed of the ship, and the influence signatures of the ship. Safe depth information for specific
vessels against various mine types should be obtained from national authorities.

(4) (NR) (NMP) Safe Speed. Reducing speed reduces the pressure signature of a ship and generally
the acoustic signature also, and so will decrease the probability of actuating mines using these
influences.

b. (NR) (NMP) Material Means. This includes the use of various equipment to reduce the risk
from mines. They are as follows:

(1) (NR) (NMP) Degaussing equipment or other means, such as flashing, wiping, or deperming,
used for reducing or changing the magnetic signature.

(2) (NR) (NMP) Acoustic Measures. Ships should apply their noise quiet state procedures.

(3) (NR) (NMP) Shock Hardening. Used to minimise the effects of a mine explosion.

(4) (NR) (NMP) Damage Control States. Increase damage control readiness to minimise the
effects of a mine explosion.

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13014 (NU) (NMP) Conduct of Surface Ships in Mine Threat Areas

a. (NC) (NMP) All Mine Threats. The following measures should be taken by surface ships
operating in mine threat areas (MTAs).

(1) (NC) (NMP) Ship Underway. The measures are divided into general precautions, material
and personnel protective measures:

(a) (NC) (NMP) General Precautions.

i. (NC) (NMP) Use the deepest water available.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Do not proceed outside routes and channels controlled by own mine
warfare forces. Instructions on navigation in controlled channels issued by the appropriate
authority are to be followed (see Article 13017).

iii. (NC) (NMP) If there are no guidelines or controlled channels, avoid narrow passages,
and choke points. Mine lines across the general traffic should be expected.

iv. (NC) (NMP) Wherever possible select the route to pass over areas where the bottom
gradients are steep (e.g., margin of the continental shelf).

v. (NC) (NMP) Wherever possible, ships should pass over the same ground as deep draught
vessels. The shorter the distance between the ships in column, the less the danger from
influence mines with regard to the mines’ intercount dormant period. Where intelligence
indicates a complex threat mine may be present, then this measure should be reconsidered.

vi. (NC) (NMP) Do not throw anything overboard. Many objects that float may be
mistaken by lookouts for floating mines.

vii. (NC) (NMP) Be alert and observe the behaviour of other ships and aircraft in the
vicinity. Any type of ship, however small, may be used to lay mines (e.g., fishing vessels,
yachts, dhows, hovercraft, cargo ships, supply ships, etc.), as can helicopters and some
aircraft. Watch should be kept for any unusual or suspicious activity, such as the releasing
of objects into the sea that might indicate mining activity. Aircraft may release mines with
or without parachutes.

viii. (NC) (NMP) Reduce speed in order to limit acoustic signature and in particular
pressure signature in shallow water.

ix. (NC) (NMP) Avoid violent manoeuvres that generate noise.

x. (NC) (NMP) Ships should arrange to arrive at the entrance to ports or approach routes
at high tide.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Material Protective Measures.

i. (NC) (NMP) In all situations all ships must turn off cathodic protection 24 hours prior
to entering the suspected mined area or as soon as possible.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Switch on degaussing equipment prior to entering a mine threat area and
keep it on.

iii. (NC) (NMP) Ensure that the maximum degree of watertight integrity is maintained
below the main deck.

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iv. (NC) (NMP) Ensure that all equipment and stores are correctly stowed and secured
IAW the storage plan.

v. (NC) (NMP) Maintain a high degree of damage control readiness, with particular
emphasis on damage control equipment required to control leaks.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Personnel Protective Measures (PPMs).

i. (NC) (NMP) All personnel are to wear coveralls or action dress.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Arrange accommodations to avoid having personnel of the same specialty
in the same mess space. Consider evacuating the forward mess spaces (most probable zone
of impact with a drifting or moored contact mine).

iii. (NC) (NMP) Reduce the number of personnel remaining below the main deck or in
compartments below the waterline to the absolute minimum.

iv. (NC) (NMP) Order all personnel to put on safety helmets (hard hats) and life jackets to
be worn when on the upperdeck.

v. (NC) (NMP) Order all off-duty personnel who can do so to lie down on their bunks.

vi. (NC) (NMP) Personnel on the upper deck should stand clear of stays, antennas, and
overhanging parts of the superstructure.

vii. (NC) (NMP) When a mine is sighted close to the ship, personnel on watch and
personnel not lying down should be ordered to take up the brace position. This position
can only be held for a limited time and should only be ordered when danger is imminent.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Ship at Anchor or Alongside (Rafted Up). The following measures should
be considered by surface ships when at anchor or alongside (rafted up) within a mine threat area
(MTA).

(a) (NC) (NMP) Reduce movement and enforce noise quiet states.

(b) (NC) (NMP) Maintain a sharp lookout for aircraft or surface vessels laying mines.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Whenever possible, a helicopter reconnaissance should be carried out
up-wind and up-current of the anchorage.

(d) (NC) (NMP) Degaussing is operated as follows:

i. (NC) (NMP) Normally energized.

ii. (NC) (NMP) If mines, bombs, or any other unidentified objects are dropped close to
the ship:

• (NC) (NMP) The degaussing must remain unchanged, either ON or OFF, or

energized step by step if the ship is ordered to move.

• (NC) (NMP) The ship must not be moved until the appropriate authority has given
approval.

(e) (NC) (NMP) In the case of mining of a safe anchorage, the OTC should issue orders
concerning evacuation of the mined areas.

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b. (NC) (NMP) Floating and Moored Contact Mines. The definitions of a floating mine and
moored mine are contained in ATP-06, Volume I, Chapter 2.

(1) (NC) (NMP) Tactical Measures. The following measures, in addition to those at para 1
above, are to be taken by surface ships where floating and/or moored contact mines are considered
to be present.

(a) (NC) (NMP) Ships should be stopped or at anchor during the hours of darkness. When
available, a helicopter should be kept at readiness for reconnaissance duties.

(b) (NC) (NMP) If there are many floating mines, ships should remain stopped.

(c) (NC) (NMP) If the minefield density is high but there are no drifting mines, or if it is
considered that they present a lesser danger, then ships should anchor immediately in their
present position.

(d) (NC) (NMP) If operational circumstances allow, follow in the wake of a large merchant
ship. If in company with other warships, follow directly over the same ground as the ship
ahead at an appropriate distance to allow safe manoeuvring particularly in the event of the ship
ahead striking a mine.

(e) (NC) (NMP) Maintain an effective visual watch. Floating mines, however, only show
about 30 centimetres of their shape above water and are difficult to see. Indeed, their colour
may have been chosen for camouflage. Lookouts should be positioned as high as possible and
equipped with stabilized binoculars and polarized sunglasses.

(f) (NC) (NMP) Ships fitted with a sonar with a mine avoidance capability should operate it.
For WSM/PMI, the use of sonar must be approved by the OTC.

(g) (NC) (NMP) If ships have to move in mined waters during the hours of darkness, they
should take the following precautions:

i. (NC) (NMP) Set up the navigation radar to short range and maintain a surface search.
Floating mines can be detected in sea state 1 or less.

ii. (NC) (NMP) Carry out a helicopter reconnaissance ahead of the ship just before sunset
and at dawn. If the helicopter has a night capability, operate it in the role of forward
lookout (see paragraph (2) below).

iii. (NC) (NMP) If no other means is available, use a searchlight close to the stem to
provide lighting ahead of the ship. This can be worthwhile when proceeding slowly in a
smooth sea.

iv. (NC) (NMP) Proceed at slow speed so that if mines are detected, the way may be
checked to avoid entering the minefield.

v. (NC) (NMP) Use any available night vision equipment including light amplification
binoculars, infrared cameras, and other electro-optical systems.

(2) (NC) (NMP) Aerial Surveillance. A helicopter and/or suitable UAV can be utilised to
search for mines on or near the surface and therefore be an effective means of mine surveillance.
Conditions for aerial surveillance that favour detection are:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Clear sky, calm seas and clear water, in which the mine will contrast well
with the background water volume.

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(b) (NC) (NMP) Altitude of helicopter between 150 and 180 metres.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Scan angle, from the vertical to 40° from the vertical in all directions. The
sun behind the observer and 40° to 70° above the horizon.

c. (NC) (NMP) Mines Sighted on the Surface. The following measures are to be taken if one
or more mines are sighted on the surface. When a mine is sighted visually, it may be either a drifting
mine or part of a mine line (i.e., a minefield). To decide which is the case, the following indications
can be taken into account.

(1) (NC) (NMP) If several mines are sighted, this indicates the presence of a minefield that has
partly taken up the wrong depth.

(2) (NC) (NMP) If there is only one mine on the surface it should not be approached, as it may
have been laid shallow intentionally to attract ships into the centre of a pattern of properly laid
mines. Way should be taken off the ship, which should then withdraw, if possible, by retracing the
path through the same water.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Launch the helicopter or UAV as soon as possible to obtain an assessment of the
situation.

(4) (NC) (NMP) Use aerial surveillance to establish a safe exit route.

(5) (NC) (NMP) If available send a team (preferably clearance divers) by boat to identify the
mine.

(6) (NC) (NMP) Report the presence of the mine(s) to higher authority and to other ships in the
vicinity. The main information to be reported is as follows:

(a) (NC) (NMP) Whether the mine is drifting or is still attached to its sinker; whether fully
floating, just watching, or still submerged; and if the latter, the approximate depth.

(b) (NC) (NMP) The estimated diameter of the mine case and the proportion that is visible
above the water.

(c) (NC) (NMP) Any identifying features, such as the presence or absence of horns and their
number, the presence of snaglines, and any identifying marks on the case. The state of the case
should also be reported (e.g., very rusty, heavy marine fouling).

(d) (NC) (NMP) The position of the mine, together with the accuracy of this position and the
datum of the chart concerned.

(e) (NC) (NMP) If possible, take detailed photographs and video footage of the mine(s) to
accompany the follow-up report.

(7) (NC) (NMP) Mine Disposal. In every case, permission must be sought from the OTC to
deal with the mine. Render safe procedures should always be considered to gain information for
intelligence purposes. The following options are available:

(a) (NC) (NMP) If MCMVs are present in the vicinity, mark the mine, request that the mine
countermeasures vessel take control of disposal of the mine, hand over, and then leave the area.

(b) (NC) (NMP) If a clearance diving team is embarked and approval is given by the OTC,
task them to carry out a mine disposal operation.

(c) (NC)(NMP) For further information refer to ATP-24, Volume I, Chapter 4.

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13015 Active Mine Countermeasures

a. (NU) General Concept

(1) (NU) Responses to a mining attack must be immediate, with highest priority being given to
the most urgent objective. The responsible authority must assess the threat and available MCM
assets and, with the aid of contingency orders, plan the MCM operation. The immediate reaction
must be to gather data on the mine threat and battlespace as soon as possible. This may be done by
MCM systems, rapid environmental assessment (REA) systems, exploratory operations, reports
of mining, intelligence estimates, mine investigation and exploitation (MIE), and any other means
available. Exploratory operations may begin in accordance with contingency plans while the threat
estimate is still in progress. The choice of mine countermeasures becomes a continuing process
based on information as it is received. In all cases, where risk to the MCM unit permits, channels
are segmented and the various segments are cleared simultaneously. The general threat to the
MCM unit must be considered in the light of the objective together with the tactical considerations
and the number and type of MCM units available. The loss of MCM units will affect the level of
risk reduction and subsequent threat to follow-on traffic and thus the accepted MCM risk must be
as low as possible.

(2) (NU) As in any type of warfare scenario, MCM planning will normally follow the basic steps
below:

(a) (NU) Assess the threat.

(b) (NU) Assess the available MCM capabilities against the threat.

(c) (NU) Determine the MCM objective.

(d) (NU) Develop and implement the tactics.

b. (NU) Active MCM operations are all activities of MCM forces conducted with the aim of countering
enemy mining. This is accomplished by minesweeping, minehunting, or explosive ordnance disposal
which are defined as follows:

(1) (NU) Mine sweeping is the technique of countering mines by MCM units using mechanical
gear, which physically removes or destroys the mine, or using influence gear by producing, in the
volume, the influence field necessary to actuate it.

(2) (NU) Minehunting is the employment of ships, airborne equipment, unmanned systems,
marine mammal systems and/or divers to locate and dispose of individual mines.

(3) (NU) Explosive ordnance disposal is defined as the detection, identification and field evaluation,
rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance by suitably qualified
personnel.

c. (NC) (NMP) The details of planning, ordering, executing, and evaluating MCM operations are
given in ATP-06, Volumes I and II and ATP-24, Volume I. Statistical methods are used for planning,
evaluation and risk assessment of operations.

d. (NC) (NMP) Employment of active mine countermeasures is generally long and time-consuming
for reaching an acceptable level of risk.

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13016 Protection of MCM Forces

a. (NU) Due to their limited self defence capability, the MCM force may require AAW, ASUW, ASW,
and AASYW protection as well as protection from land based threats. When operating in mined
waters, MCM forces are limited in their ability to manoeuvre in channels and avoiding action cannot
be taken while engaged in MCM operations. This makes the MCM force vulnerable to enemy attack.
Warning should be issued in due time in order to enable the MCM force to take avoiding action. The
commander ordering the support will specify the support operation situation (A, B, or C). Normally
Situation C applies. See Article 2181.

b. (NU) However, it is unlikely that protecting forces will be able to operate in close proximity to the
MCM forces because of the mine threat and the associated lack of free manoeuvrability. Therefore
careful consideration must be given by both the protecting force commander and the MCM commander
to the requirements and limitations of the tactical situation.

13017 Transit of Surface Ships Through a Channel

a. (NU) Transiting ships equipped with modern navigation systems are perfectly capable of
independently transiting channels where MCM effort has been applied. The channel width must be at
least 6 x SDNE of the transitor plus the largest damage width of the mine threat (Wd).

Note. The following considerations also apply to submarines on the surface or at periscope depth.

b. (NU) General Considerations. This article provides supported forces and individual units
with instructions for manoeuvring through mined waters.

(1) (NU) The responsibility for the safety of merchant shipping rests with the NCAGS commander.
The NCAGS commander must decide whether merchant shipping will, or will not, transit mined
areas. The decision to pass naval units through mined waters rests with the OTC. Convoy
commodores and OTCs of naval units must ensure that their masters/captains are informed about
transit procedures. MCM authorities provide information related to the transit.

(a) (NU) It is important that the MCM tasking authority and the NCAGS commander
establish clear, reliable communications between themselves and their subordinate units at
sea. Figure 13-2 shows the sources and responsibilities for the flow of information in situations
that may arise when units transit mined areas.

(b) (NU) Units transiting a swept/hunted channel should keep station on the centreline or on
another track as ordered. Sea state, visibility, method of navigation, manoeuvrability, and other
characteristics of transiting units must be considered

(c) (NU) In the event of more than one ship transiting the area, the shorter the distance
between the ships in column, the less the danger from influence mines with regard to the
mines’ intercount dormant period.

(2) (NU) Safety Measures and Preparations. Take action in accordance with Article 13014.

(a) (NU) When a convoy is approaching, the Convoy Commodore must form his convoy
into a single column formation. Intership spacing is dependant on sizes of the ships and their
navigational/station-keeping capability. As a general rule, intership spacing should not exceed
1,000 yards.

(b) (NU) A naval force should pass in a single-column formation at standard distance or less,
if possible (See Article 3427), each unit navigating independently.

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Figure 13-2. (NU) Information Flow for Transits of Mined Waters (Sheet 1 of 2)

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Notes:
1. NMCM data will include:

a. Channel position relative to Q-Route

b. Channel width.

c. NMCM tactical frequencies.

d. NMCM units on task.

e. Amplifying information.

2. Transiting units data must include:

a. Number of units.

b. Names of units.

c. Approximate size.

d. Any manoeuvring limitations.

e. Maximum draft.

f. ETA

3. ETA Changes will be required if the transiting units are off their sailing schedule.

4. The NMCM Tasking Authority and OTC NMCM may be co-located.

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Figure 13-2. (NU) Information Flow for Transits of Mined Waters (Sheet 2 of 2)

(c) (NU) Other distances may be indicated by the OTC of the MCM force.

(d) (NU) To reduce the risk of actuating an influence mine, slow speed and minimum feasible
separation distance between transitors is essential. The reduction of speed reduces the pressure
and the acoustic signature; it will also reduce the rate of change of the magnetic signature.
However, the ship being led must never be forced to conduct excessive alterations to maintain
station. Therefore the speed and distance ordered will always be a compromise and must take
into account the manoeuvrability of the ship and the experience of its crew.

(3) (NU) A naval force, convoy, or independent unit transiting a channel without a lead through
vessel will be passed relevant instructions using the leadthrough transit instructions format of
APP-11; merchant vessels will use ATP-02, Volume II. Ships transiting swept/hunted channel
should review all available guidance including information contained in the following:

(a) (NU) Q-messages.

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(b) (NU) Routing/transit instructions.

(c) (NU) Channel information.

Note. See Chapter 11, Section III, for additional information on leadthrough operations.

(4) (NU) Units Damaged by Mines. Units damaged by mine detonation and unable to proceed at
the ordered speed should attempt to manoeuvre clear of the channel’s centreline. In narrow and
shallow channels, such as harbour entrances, heavily damaged or sinking units should be grounded
outside the main channel.

13018 (NU) Conduct of Submarines in Mine Threat Areas

(NU) See ATP-18, Chapter 5.

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PART V STRIKE/AMPHIBIOUS

Chapter 14—Strike Warfare

Chapter 15—Amphibious Operations

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CHAPTER 14 Strike Warfare

SECTION I—GENERAL

14100 Introduction and Scope

Strike operations may employ ballistic or cruise missiles, aircraft, naval surface fires, marines, and
special operations forces (SOF) to attack targets ashore and at sea. The term “strike warfare” is used in
the maritime domain and commonly includes joint fire support, interdiction, strategic attack, and close
air support. Amphibious operations may involve extensive application of strike warfare capabilities,
while amphibious raids are also a form of strike operations.
Strike warfare may be conducted by ballistic and cruise missile carrying submarines, fixed and rotary-wing
aircraft, surface action groups of one or more naval surface vessels fitted with these weapons.
14101 Missions

Maritime strike operations may be conducted to accomplish a number of operational objectives including
protecting sea lines of communication, denying the enemy commercial and military use of the seas,
protecting naval logistic support to deployed battle forces, and establishing maritime power projection.
Critical elements of maritime strike warfare include:
a. Surveillance Coordination and Surface Warfare

SSC in maritime ASUW provides reconnaissance and surveillance in support of the maritime
commander’s objectives. The SSC mission plays a critical role in establishing/maintaining the
common operational picture (COP). The objective of SW operations shall be the effective conduct of
surveillance, reconnaissance, and the engagement of all hostile surface threats prior to reaching their
maximum effective weapons release range on friendly units. ASUW operations will be governed by
the concept of a defence in depth, but will focus on offensive ASUW versus a littoral threat and the
need to conserve resources by allocating minimum assets to successfully counter the threat.

b. Maritime Air Support

MAS is air action against hostile surface targets at sea that require detailed integration of each air
mission with the fire and movement of maritime forces. The mission is conducted by any available
and suitably loaded aircraft in order to provide a rapid response to a hostile surface vessel when
directed. The procedures are more closely aligned with offensive air support (OAS) and JCAS missions
and are the evolutionary follow-on to “SLEDGEHAMMER, Screaming Eagle” and Maritime Air
Support Operations Centre tactics, which were designed to counter immediate threats and targets of
opportunity. Procedures are applicable for joint maritime operations (air) assets providing maritime
air support. Primary consideration is rapid response to counter hostile contacts closing the force. To
conduct effective MAS, the following conditions are essential; however, urgent force defence may
preclude obtaining all of the following:

1. Local air superiority

2. Local suppression of enemy air defences

3. Means to identify target to aircrew

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4. Weather conditions acceptable for target acquisition and weapons employment

5. Prompt response

6. Appropriate ordnance

7. Communications

8. Command and control.

c. Air Interdiction of Maritime Targets

AIMT in maritime SW differs from MAS in that detailed tactical integration with surface forces is
not required. This mission shares many common similarities with traditional AI, AR, and SCAR
missions. AIMT missions are classified as permissive or nonpermissive and can be executed using
preplanned or dynamic tasking.

1. Permissive AIMT assumes local air superiority, standoff from a threat is not required, and
identification of the contact can be provided by own ship or off-board sensors.

2. Nonpermissive AIMT assumes an acceptable level of risk is appropriate to support mission

objectives, appropriate ordnance is available, and identification can be provided by own ship or
off-board sensors.

d. Maritime Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance

Maritime SCAR is a quick-reaction mission that is flown for the purpose of acquiring and reporting
known or suspected targets and coordinating engagement of those targets. It provides mission leads to
an aviation battlespace manager who can assist in targeting to prevent redundant air strikes and help
expedite flow of maritime air-support aircraft into and out of target areas. SCAR is generally different
from AR missions in that the primary purpose is to locate and coordinate target neutralization or
destruction by multiple flights. General procedures consist of the following:

1. Alert crew/aircraft readiness will be IAW surface warfare commander (SUWC)/SCC DIM and
alert procedures.

2. Proceed to PB target(s) or assigned patrol area and conduct surveillance as outlined in SSC
procedures.

3. Verify preplanned targets’ location and monitor movement.

4. Provide target location, description, and weather conditions.

5. Provide target mark (if required) and recommend target tactics.

6. Confirm threat warning condition, weapons control status.

7. Pass current threat capabilities to strike aircraft as able.

8. Assist in the evaluation of bomb hit assessment (BHA) and recommend restrike(s) as necessary.

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e. Maritime Interdiction Operations Support

During boarding operations, SSC assets may be requested to provide support. Two primary support
roles for boarding parties include reconnaissance and show of force. In the reconnaissance role,
aircraft can provide awareness and force disposition to the boarding party. In the show of force role,
aircraft may orbit in the vicinity of the vessel to be boarded.

1. SLEDGEHAMMER Tactic. The SLEDGEHAMMER tactic is designed as a rapid response

in defence of friendly/neutral forces under attack or as a method to identify the intention of an
unknown contact. Any aircraft regardless of pre-assigned mission may be instructed to conduct a
SLEDGEHAMMER. The term―SLEDGEHAMMER is only used in an actual scenario.

2. The term―GANGPLANK is used for training only.

f. Combat Search and Rescue

The objective of CSAR is to effectively employ available assets to recover isolated personnel. Strike
assets may be tasked with the recovery of isolated personnel from hostile coastal waters and over
land. The OTC of any deployed unit or group of units is directly responsible for conducting rescue/
recovery operations for his own units. To ensure the effective and expeditious execution of CSAR
missions, the commander afloat will establish a Rescue Coordination Team (RCT). The exact position
of the survivor and the threat that hostile forces pose to a CSAR attempt must be determined as
quickly as possible. Situation and threat permitting, the on-scene commander (OSC) should attempt
to locate and initially authenticate the survivor(s), determine survivor(s) physical condition, and
note any geographic/cultural landmarks. The OSC should note any possible threats to the survivor
and neutralize any immediate threats. An immediate response is the preferred method to execute a
CSAR as it allows rescue forces to be on scene very quickly. CSAR mission execution requires OTC
approval.

14102 Air Operations in Overland Strike

a. Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles.

The Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) is an all-weather, long range, subsonic cruise missile
used for land attack warfare, launched from Navy surface ships and submarines. It flies more than
500 miles, navigating along a pre-programmed route that follows specific terrain features to the target.
Tactical land attack missiles can carry a 1,000-pound class high-explosive or a submunitions warhead.

TLAM operations require a lengthy mission planning process. Planners must identify a route extending
from a fixed starting point to the target. The route must be within the missiles’ range, must not contain
any obstacles to its flight such as steep mountains or concentrations of enemy air defences, and must
pass over terrain that would allow planners to prepare usable Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM)
maps and Digital Scene Mapping and Area Correlation (DSMAC) images. Planners must also
identify specific aim points on the target whose destruction will achieve the desired military effect.
Finally, planners must select a terminal manoeuvre—the manner in which the missile impacts the aim
point—and the number of missiles needed to achieve the desired level of destruction.

Planned missions are transferred to the TLAM-capable ship or submarine either through delivery of a
data transport device or through radio communications channels. Once a ship or submarine is tasked
to launch a TLAM, the process on board the launching vessel involves powering up the missile,
aligning its inertial navigation equipment, transferring the mission into the missile’s computer, and
then launching the missile.

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One of the most significant improvements to the Block III missile is its added ability to navigate to
targets using the GPS. GPS navigation frees the TLAM from having to fly over terrain that is suitable
for and has been mapped for terrain contour matching navigation. TLAM is weapon of choice for
critical, long range, precision strike missions against high value or heavily defended targets.

14103 Surface Warfare Considerations

While there are many similarities between air operations over land and sea, important differences exist:
(1) Lack of Visual/Terrain References at Sea. The lack of visual references adversely
affects not only the ability to navigate but also the ability to quickly orient an aircrew to the tactical
picture for safety and targeting. The lack of terrain eliminates the capability of low altitude aviation
assets to employ terrain masking for threat avoidance. Therefore, these assets will often be within
range of a surface ship’s weapon systems when attack criteria are achieved.

(2) Target Identification. Similarities in ship design, appearance, and density of surface traffic
require aircrew threat training tailored to the maritime environment.

(3) Naval Vessel Mobility. A vessel’s mobility coupled with poor weather conditions can
increase difficulties in performing visual identification and complicate targeting.

(4) Friendlies/Neutrals/Noncombatants. The vast majority of maritime vessels are

commercial shipping representing every major nation in the world. Their presence in the midst of
an emerging tactical picture has fratricide and collateral damage implications.

(5) Maritime Rules of Engagement. The maritime environment encompasses historical laws
of the sea which impact ROE (e.g., territorial waters versus high seas).

(6) Maritime Airspace Control. Nearly every combatant has a powerful radar sensor/weapons
system; as a result, maritime airspace control tends to be more positive vice procedural. This
emphasis on positive control involves more controlling agencies within the maritime domain.
(e.g., REDCROWN [RC], GREENCROWN [GC], STRIKE control)

(7) Tactical C2. While the maritime environment contains common tactical C2 such as a FAC[A]
and a SCAR, it also employs tactical C2 unique to the maritime environment such as a MAC and
an ACU.

(8) Composite Warfare Commander Nomenclature. Maritime forces are scalable in

size and capabilities; therefore, a unique naming convention has evolved to accommodate this
scalability within the CWC command structure.

(9) Naval Flight Operations. The very nature of naval flight operations is that they are mobile;
the large deck aircraft carriers and smaller combatant vessels possess aviation detachments. The
location of high-density flight operations is ever changing, requiring constant coordination for safe
deconfliction.

(10) Subsurface Operations. Deconfliction of surface warfare and subsurface operations will
be coordinated at the CWC level. Aircrew should immediately report the location of all submarines,
when spotted, to the CWC.

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SECTION II—PLANNING

14200 General

This section provides general guidance and information to support mission planning including relevant
air and water space conventions. The general planning and employment considerations previously
developed for air-to-ground missions serve as the baseline for maritime strike mission planning.
14201 Mission Planning Considerations

a. Time of Day. The time of day for a strike will typically be dictated on the ATO or other external
means. However, there are some planning considerations to keep in mind regardless of whether the
strike lead is given the opportunity to choose the timing for the mission. In general, nighttime offers a
number of tactical advantages for a strike, but other considerations might drive the strike to daytime.
If daylight is required to achieve target acquisition due to the type of weapon necessary to achieve
the desired weapons effects on the desired mean points of impact (DMPIs) then every effort should
be made to conduct the strike during daytime. For example, a target may be difficult to ID using IR
sensors because of target characteristics or camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) but may
be visually significant, thereby, driving the strike to a daytime mission. Another factor that could
force the strike to daytime is the expectation to conduct visual identification (VID) of enemy aircraft.
It is important to weigh the day/night decision against enemy pilot proficiency at night as well as the
enemy’s dependence on EO/VIS acquisition for surface-to-air systems.

b. Altitude Selection. Current tactics typically dictate a high-altitude attack profile for power
projection strikes. However, the following considerations might drive the strike to a low-altitude
profile to achieve mission success: target area weather might force the strike low due to either a
solid, high overcast layer that prevents the strikers from going above it or a lower layer when laser
guided weapons (LGWs) are required; and advanced surface-to-air systems (particularly double
digit RADAR SAMs) may force the strike to a low-altitude, terrain-masking profile. If deception or
surprise is required, low-altitude and/or EMCON may be the only method to achieve this.

c. Commander’s Intent. Whether participating in large-scale joint/coalition operations or setting

an air defence posture for a transiting CSG or ESG, planning begins with consideration and study
of the operational commander’s intent. Operational orders are the primary method by which an
operational commander disseminates intent for the operation and tasking for subordinate commanders.
Subordinate commanders will reference the OPORDs when creating specific tactical-level guidance.

14202 Timely and Accurate Intelligence

a. Obtain threat information. Threat information on adversary air-to-air and surface-to-air capabilities
is essential for employing appropriate tactics and planning support assets for SW force protection.

b. Obtain target description, locating data, and self-defence weapon systems information.

c. Obtain the COP or PICTURE/LOWDOWN to include friendly and enemy surface contacts and
CSG/ESG operational areas.

14203 Air Superiority

Theater-wide air superiority or supremacy is not required to conduct maritime air operations; however,
local air superiority is a key enabler. Multi-role aircraft with the capability to conduct self-escort into
the target area by carrying both air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons may be necessary in the absence
of local air superiority. Range limitations, aircraft loading, or tactics may degrade the effectiveness of
aircraft in completing their mission.

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14204 Suppression of Enemy Air Defences

The suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) level of effort is determined by the threat level and the
acceptable level of risk. It may be necessary to destroy or disrupt all or parts of an enemy’s integrated air
defence system prior to or during the execution of STW missions with air assets.
14205 Effective Communications

Communication nets between ship-based or airborne C2 and STW air assets must be clearly established
with dedicated frequencies considered in the development of the communications plan. Ideally, a
frequency will be associated with each mission to enable asset coordination.
14206 Weather

Weather conditions may complicate the mission. Poor weather conditions affect target search/ID,
targeting, and post mission assessment.
14207 Aircraft Capabilities

SW missions must be able to effectively locate, positively identify, and engage target vessels in all
environmental conditions. In almost all cases, target engagement will be against moving targets and
standoff capability (detection, identification, and targeting) is essential against a defended target. Often,
aircraft must be able to conduct STW missions at significant distances where fuel limits time on station.
Typically, one type aircraft cannot conduct all of these mission requirements simultaneously. Clear,
concise communication capability—both voice and tactical data link—is essential to mission success.
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CHAPTER 15 Amphibious Operations

SECTION I—INTRODUCTION

15100 General

1. This chapter contains a summary of NATO doctrine for amphibious operations. The detailed
information on this subject can be found in ATP-08, Vol I, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, and
ATP-08, Vol II, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Amphibious Operations.

2. An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force to
conduct LF operations in the littorals. The littorals include those land areas (and their adjacent sea and
associated air space) that are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea. In
amphibious operations an amphibious force manoeuvres into a position a position of advantage in the
littoral in respect to the enemy, from which force can be threatened or applied ashore. Such littoral
manoeuvre will be directed towards a decisive point or a critical vulnerability that impacts a centre
of gravity (COG). The term amphibious operation has often stirred visions of wave upon wave of
amphibious assault vehicles and landing craft approaching a well-defended beach in straight lines, such
as those well-known amphibious assaults that were necessary in World War II, While those amphibious
assaults are a matter of historical record, they are not the only, or even the most likely form of amphibious
operations. Current amphibious forces are more operationally manoeuvrable having the ability to project
forces from OTH, in some instances, proceeding directly to objectives by both air and surface means.

Amphibious operations require the unique ability to operate across the littorals. Amphibious operations
require a well-planned and integrated C2 framework to achieve unity of effort, increase speed of action,
and maximise the application of sea control and power projection capabilities.

3. Some waterborne operations such as riverine, river crossings, ferrying, shore-to-shore movement,
administrative debarkation, logistics over-the-shore, and water terminal operations may possess certain
characteristics and employ some of the techniques of an amphibious operation; however, the focus of
this chapter is the doctrine concerned with projecting and supporting the landing forces’ scheme of
manoeuvre ashore. As such, these other waterborne operations are not addressed in this chapter.

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15102 Utility of Amphibious Operations

An amphibious force (AF) provides a unique capability; as an integrated part of a maritime

capability—within a joint force, if applicable they have utility in all phases of a campaign, from benign
presence to the conduct of forced-entry combat operations. Whilst AF provide a wide range of options at
the tactical level, they also have distinct roles at the operational level. They can sail early in a developing
crisis situation and with the use of complementary information operations demonstrate a nation’s or
Alliance’s will and capability. AFs can, in common with all naval forces, transit international waters
without infringement of territorial boundaries, they can be kept ready off-shore (“poised”) almost
indefinitely, offering presence without occupation and deterrence without commitment of forces ashore.
An uncommitted AF is a factor in the estimate of an adversary theatre commander, and requires him to
retain coastal defence forces and a counter-balancing reserve as a contingency against the threat of an
amphibious landing. The (poised) LF can land on virtually any coast, at practically any time and place,
entirely independent of infrastructure ashore. Once the LF is ashore, it can be sustained for protracted
operations by its integral logistic organization and amphibious force ships. Once the decision to execute
an amphibious operation is taken, the amphibious force conducts operations at the tactical level; but
when the landing force is re-embarked, it can again play a role a the operational level, a sequence that
can be successively employed during the conduct of a campaign.

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15103 Types of Amphibious Operations

There are five types of amphibious operations: demonstration, raid, assault, withdrawal, and amphibious
force support to crisis response and other operations.
1. Demonstration. Amphibious demonstration is a type of amphibious operation conducted for the
purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force, with the expectation of deluding the enemy into an
unfavourable course of action (COA).

2. Raid. An amphibious raid is a type of amphibious operation involving swift incursion into or
temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Amphibious raids might be
conducted to accomplish one or more of the following:

a. Inflict loss or damage.

b. Obtain information.

c. Create a diversion.

d. Capture or evacuate individuals and/or equipment.

3. Assault. Amphibious assault is the principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing
a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Only amphibious assault involves the permanence of
establishing a LF ashore. The special measures required for a rapid build-up of combat power ashore,
from an initial zero capability, creates organizational and technical differences between amphibious
operations and land warfare.

4. Withdrawal. Amphibious withdrawal is: a type of amphibious operation involving the extraction of
forces by sea in naval ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

5. Amphibious Force Support to Crisis Response and Other Operations. The capabilities of
amphibious forces may be especially suited to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW) such
as NEOs and HA. NEOs may use amphibious raid techniques and require relatively minor adjustments
to planning. HA and disaster relief may require more flexibility during planning and execution based on
the assistance and/or relief required.

15104 Characteristics of an Amphibious Operation

1. Integration of Naval and Landing Forces. An amphibious operation requires extensive air,
maritime, land, space, and SOFs participation. It is typified by close integration of forces trained,
organized, and equipped for different combat functions.

2. Unity of Effort and Operational Coherence. The complexity of amphibious operations and
the vulnerability of forces engaged in amphibious operations require an exceptional degree of unity of
effort and operational coherence. Regardless of the command relationship between CATF and CLF, all
commanders require shared intelligence, a shared understanding of the operational environment, a COP,
understanding of the JFC’s intent, and open communications between the staffs. The effects of modern
weapons and sensors and their extended ranges both seaward and landward, further highlights the
need for closely integrated application of capabilities throughout the operational area. The JFC or joint
force maritime component commander (JFMCC) should integrate all of the naval assets such as strike,
ASW, and ASUW while at the same time coordinating the joint capabilities required for an amphibious
operation.

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3. Task Organized Based on Mission. Amphibious forces may deploy with similar task
organizations as mentioned above and can be quickly reinforced or augmented with other assets. No
standard organization is applicable to all situations that may be encountered in an amphibious operation.
The C2 capabilities of the amphibious force and LF facilitate the accomplishment of multiple and diverse
missions and the integration of naval and joint forces.

4. Gaining/Maintaining Access. An amphibious operation requires the amphibious force to gain and
maintain access for entry into the operational area. This access is critical to the success of an amphibious
operation. Access may be granted by a nation as a result of previous military engagements or diplomatic
agreements or actions and in other cases, it may have to be gained by shaping the operational area
through supporting operations. For the latter circumstance, the JFC in conjunction with the JFMCC, and
other component commanders employ their forces to establish the level of maritime and air superiority
necessary for the amphibious operation to occur. The JFC and JFMCC may establish and employ a
support force, which is a temporary organization comprised of initial and crisis response forces and SOFs,
which assist in preparing the AOA or AOO for amphibious operations by conducting operations such as
surveillance and reconnaissance, beach studies, military deception, seizure of supporting positions, naval
mine countermeasures (NMCM), preliminary bombardment, underwater demolitions, and air interdiction.
Integration of other naval components and SOF will enable complementary supporting operations. An
amphibious force, in conjunction with other joint assets, must have the capacity to continuously support
forces ashore during all phases of an amphibious operation.

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SECTION II—EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

15201 Sequence and Phasing of Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operations consist of distinct phases, though the sequence may vary, and phases tend to
overlap.
1. Planning. The planning phase denotes the period extending from the issue of the amphibious
initiating directive to embarkation. The conduct of an amphibious estimate by the staffs of CATF and
CLF will generate a number of basic decisions on which early schemes of manoeuvre will be based.
Although the planning phase exists in its own right, planning activity will be ongoing throughout the
operation. The plan itself will be changed to reflect the changing situation during the movement phase,
which will require continuous estimation on the part of both staffs.

2. Embarkation. The embarkation phase is the period during which the forces, with their equipment
and supplies, embark in assigned shipping. The order in which personnel, vehicles and equipment are
embarked in ships will reflect the intended scheme of manoeuvre developed during the planning phase.
As the plan evolves it may be necessary to adjust the way in which the force is configured and therefore,
have to reconfigure during re-embarkation or conduct a deliberate offload/reconfiguration when
compositing forward deployed forces.

3. Rehearsal. The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation is rehearsed
for the purpose of: (1) testing the adequacy of plans, the timing of detailed operations, and the combat
readiness of participating forces; (2) ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans; and (3) testing
communications. Rehearsals also provide an opportunity to reconfigure embarked forces and equipment.
Rehearsals may consist of actual landings or be conducted as command post exercises.

4. Movement to the AOA. The movement phase is the period during which the components of the
AF move from the points of embarkation or a position of forward deployment to the AOA, possibly via
rendezvous (RV), rehearsal and staging areas. This phase is deemed complete when all elements of the
LF arrive in their positions within the AOA.

5. Shaping Operations. Shaping operations encompass activities that occur during nearly every
phase of an amphibious operation to prepare the battle space for an amphibious operation. This phase
tends to take place primarily during the movement phase and early portion of the action phase. The
principal types of shaping operations are as follows.

a. Supporting operations inside and/or outside the AOA/AOO.

b. Amphibious advance force operations that take place prior to arrival of the amphibious force in
the AOA/AOO.

c. Pre-landing operations that take place after arrival of the amphibious force in the AOA/AOO.

6. Action. The action phase is the period that begins with the arrival of the AF in the AOA, encompasses
the accomplishment of the mission, and ends with the termination of the amphibious operation.

7. Termination. The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of

its mission or a change in the situation that renders that mission no longer achievable. When CATF and
CLF are satisfied that the conditions for the accomplishment of the mission have been met, they will
propose termination of the operation to the commander that initiated it.

a. Examples of these conditions include, but are not limited to:

(1) Objectives are achieved.

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(2) Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have been established ashore to ensure the continuous
landing of troops and material requisite for subsequent operations.

(3) Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities have been established
ashore.

(4) CLF has stated that he is ready to assume full responsibility for subsequent operations.

b. Options at termination at a minimum include:

(1) LF re-embarks and amphibious force reconstitutes for further amphibious operations.

(2) LF remains ashore and becomes the land component commander (LCC).

(3) LF remains ashore and transfer of authority (TOA) to ashore LCC.

(4) LF remains ashore and maintains relationship with the maritime component commander
(who retains land space); while LCC operates as an adjacent force; moving up the coast with LCC
inland, and LF paralleling the coast and sustained from the sea.

(5) A combination of the above.

c. Upon termination, the AOA will be disestablished. Within the parameters of the joint campaign,
responsibility for control of the area previously covered by the AOA may be transferred to the JFC or
another component commander, as appropriate.

d. The common superior will provide instructions for command arrangements and organization after
the termination of the amphibious operation. An aspect to consider is the requirement for amphibious
ships to remain in the littoral waters of the former AOA to support LF’s resupply or the sustainment of
other forces from the joint force operating ashore (i.e., elements from the LCC), casualty regulating/
evacuation operations, helicopter/tilt-rotor support operations and other supporting operations. If the
LF remains ashore, its integrity needs to be preserved and it must not be regrouped or reassigned
without the concurrence of the commander holding OPCOM. The phasing outlined above is the
ideal sequence; it can be characterised by the acronym PERMSAT (planning, embarkation, rehearsal,
movement, shaping, action, and termination). However, an amphibious force may deploy before a
mission is defined. This is especially true of forces deployed for forward presence. In this case, the
sequence of phases may occur in a different order (typically): embarkation, movement, planning,
rehearsal, shaping, action, and termination.

15202–15210 Spare

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SECTION III—COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

15301 Organization

1. Amphibious Task Force (ATF). An amphibious task force is a task organization of naval forces
and a landing force, with their organic aviation and other supporting forces, formed for the purpose of
conducting an amphibious operation. Amphibious forces are task-organized based on the mission. No
standard organization is applicable to all situations that may be encountered and thus the ATF consists
of different types of forces and a variety of types of ships. It may also have fixed-wing and helicopter
aircraft as well as landing craft.

2. Naval Forces. Naval assets are organized to employ offensive and defensive capabilities. Command
relationships between these groups will be established in the initiating directive.

Possible naval forces that are part of the AF or support the AF may include:

a. Transport Group(s). A formed body of ships that provides for the embarkation, movement to
the objective, landing and logistics support of the landing force. There may be one or more transport
groups depending on the scale and nature of the operation. They comprise both amphibious and
civilian shipping in which the LF may be embarked, including ships that host and operate landing
means (aviation and landing craft) be employed in the ship-to-shore movement. Surface landing
means may be organic or attached to the transport groups. Transport groups are formed to support the
landing of the assault echelon (AE) and assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) in the main landing, and
may be organized to support subsidiary landings. The number and type of ships in a transport group
will vary according to its role and functions within the amphibious operation.

b. Screening Group(s). Screening groups typically consist of naval combatants assigned for the
defence of the AF en route to the AOA and during operations in the AOA. Within the screening
group, elements are task organized to provide specific functions; e.g., air and missile defence, surface
warfare or antisubmarine warfare.

c Fire Support Group(s). A fire support group typically consists of naval combatants assigned to
support LF operations ashore by naval gunfire support (NGS) and guided missile support.

d. Naval Mine Warfare and/or Naval Mine Countermeasures Group(s). A NMW or

NMCM group typically consists of naval units that conduct surface mine laying and/or NMCM and
obstacle clearance operations, possibly as a part of the amphibious advance force.

e. Amphibious Advance Force Group(s). An amphibious advance force group typically

consists of specialised forces/units that precede the main body to the AOA in order to conduct tasks in
preparation of the action phase. These tasks may include, but are not limited to:

(1) Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR).

(2) Naval mine countermeasures/obstacle clearance operations.

(3) Hydrographic operations.

(4) Terminal guidance in support of assault waves (landing plan).

An advance force group may consist of elements from other groups within the amphibious force
elements from the LF, for example a reconnaissance unit from the ground combat element, may also
be included.

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f. Control Group(s). A control group typically consists of personnel, ships, and craft designated by
CATF to control movement ashore, fire support, and airspace management.

g. Carrier Strike Group(s). Carrier strike groups listed in the initiating directive or establishing
directive assigned to or in support of the amphibious force provide air, surface, and subsurface
protection and strike warfare. They establish local maritime and air superiority required to conduct
the amphibious operation.

h. Riverine Forces. The riverine environment is an inland, coastal or delta area comprising both
land and water, characterized by limited land lines of communications (LOC). The area is likely to
have extensive water surface and/or inland waterways (including lakes) that provide natural routes
for transportation and communications and therefore major direct avenues of approach for inland
objectives. It is three-dimensional, with surface, sub-surface, and air environments. Waterways serve
as primary LOC and frequently constitute key terrain; to control this key terrain, forces operating in
a riverine environment must be able to control all three environments (Review ATP 08, Volume II for
further details).

(1) Riverine forces fall into three main categories; expeditionary (in support of naval or land
operations), internal defence and in some nations, special operations. These categories are not in any
way exclusive and riverine forces are often used outside of their pure element. In this publication
we will only address the expeditionary category in support of amphibious operations. Some
riverine forces have evolved to be able to accomplish more than the expected riverine offensive
and defensive operations. They have been successfully adapted to undertake other missions in the
broad maritime security operations (MSO) field such as security cooperation operations, maritime
interdiction, force protection as well as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) operations.
In the end it is vital for the establishment of a local military superiority in areas of naval operations
The green and blue-water environment will most likely be directly commanded by the JFMCC.
Likewise, as power is projected inland, command and control could be shifted after termination to
the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or in either case, the riverine forces will be
assigned in command or supporting relationship to the appropriate battlespace commander.

3. Landing Force. The LF is the task organization of ground and aviation units assigned to an
amphibious operation. Its com+mander is the CLF. The LF may consist of the following elements:

a. A command element (CE).

b. A ground combat (“manoeuvre”) element (GCE).

c. A combat support (CS) element (e.g., landing force support party (LFSP), communication augments
(afloat/ashore), intelligence, targeting/fire support, etc.).

d. A combat service support (CSS)/combat logistics element (e.g., casualties (support/evacuation

procedures), air delivery (responsibility and procedures), salvage, mortuary affairs, etc.).

e. An aviation combat element (ACE).

4. Other Forces. Amphibious operations are often supported by task organizations that are not part of
the ATF. These forces serve specific tasks, such as helping to protect the ATF or shaping the battle-space.
Supporting naval, air, and SOF are assigned by the JFC or maritime/air/SOF component commander to
protect the ATF (and LF, when landed) during the amphibious operation. The request for these forces
may be originated by CATF or by the MCC, or even be tasked by the JFC himself. Specific instructions
must cover the relationships of these forces with the ATF.

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15302 Command and Control Relationships

Amphibious forces deploy with task organizations that can be reinforced or augmented with other assets.
No standard organization is applicable to all situations. The C2 capabilities of CATF and CLF facilitate
the accomplishment of multiple and diverse missions, and the integration with joint and multinational
forces.

1. Designation of Commands. CATF and CLF are designated in the initiating directive. CATF is
the Navy officer designated in the initiating directive as commander of an amphibious task force. CLF is
the officer designated in the initiating directive to command the landing force. Irrespective of the size of
the forces assigned, the CATF and CLF command the navy and landing force echelons for an amphibious
operation. Commanders of subordinate task groups within the amphibious force, if they have not been
named in the initiating directive, are designated by CATF or CLF, as appropriate.
2. Parallel Chains of Command. In amphibious operations the overall C2 relationships developed
by the JFC or MCC needs to be flexible to account for the differing amphibious C2 structures used
within NATO countries. The C2 relationships and organization described within this section may require
modification to allow the amphibious force to accomplish its assigned mission. The organization and
relationships chosen by the JFC will be based on the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force
capabilities, C2 capabilities, battlespace assigned, and recommendations of subordinate commanders
having close and continuous coordination during planning. The overall intent is not to limit the JFC’s or
MCC’s ability to organize the force or to establish necessary C2 relationships (i.e., TACOM, TACON,
or support), rather, to clearly describe how the various forces should carry out amphibious C2 whilst
highlighting the need for flexibility in the development of C2 relationships between the CATF, CLF and
other commanders.
The variety of amphibious C2 constructs utilised within NATO countries for the CATF and CLF include,
but are not limited to: the CATF with overall authority, a support relationship between CATF and CLF,
and an integrated CATF staff.
a. CATF with Overall Authority:

(1) In this C2 construct, the CATF provides for unity of command and is responsible for the
operation and, except during the planning phase, is vested with commensurate authority over
assigned forces to ensure the success of the operation. CATF, upon the commencement of the
operation (usually on embarkation of the LF aboard AF ships, unless otherwise indicated in the
initiating directive), assumes responsibility for the entire force and for the operation.

(2) Subject to the overall authority of CATF, responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore
and for the security of all personnel and installations located within the AOO or AOA ashore, is
vested in CLF. Regardless of rank, a forward-deployed afloat CLF will retain an equal status with
the CATF for planning the amphibious operation. Operational control or TACON of the LF is
vested in CATF as would be specified in the initiating directive for this construct.

(3) The CATF may delegate command authority to subordinate levels. CATF and CLF can, for
example, agree during the planning phase to delegate command authority over elements of the LF
to subordinate commanders (e.g., to the commander of an amphibious advance force that contains
part of the LF). In these cases, CATF exercises his command authority through the commander
of each subordinate command. Whenever CATF issues to such subordinate commanders an order
affecting an LF element, CLF is informed and consulted prior to issuance of the order. When
command authority over LF elements has been delegated below CATF’s level, the relationships
between such a commander and his related CLF element are in principle the same as those between
CATF and CLF. The direct chain of command of each major group commander of the AF is
re-established when the subordinate command is dissolved or when subelements of it are released

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back to their normal (parent) command. If other components participate in amphibious advance
force or attack group operations, the organization and principles expressed in would equally apply
at the advance-force/attack-group level. A subordinate commander may be delegated when:

(a) Simultaneous or near simultaneous actions are conducted in areas so widely separated as
to preclude effective C2 by a single tactical commander.

(b) Separate operations are conducted by a detached faction of the amphibious force, such as
the operations of an amphibious advance force with a corresponding LF.

(4) The CATF with overall authority and responsibility for the amphibious operation is used by
many NATO countries. Others, however, may establish a support or other relationship for the
CATF and CLF as described in the next sections.

b. CATF and CLF Support Relationship:

(1) In this construct, a support relationship is established between the CATF and the CLF and
is based on the complementary rather than similar nature and capabilities of the AF and LF. A
support relationship is appropriate when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or
sustain another force.

(2) In addition to an initiating directive, an establishing directive is normally issued to specify the
purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. The
establishing directive is typically developed after the initiating directive. Normally, the CATF and
CLF will develop a draft establishing directive during the planning phase to provide the specifics of
the support relationship. The commanders within the amphibious force submit the draft establishing
directive to the establishing authority for approval. The CATF and CLF will identify the events and
conditions for any shifts of the support relationship throughout the operation, ideally during the
planning phase, and forward them to the establishing authority for approval. It may also include,
but is not necessarily limited to, the following:

(a) Forces and other resources allocated to the supporting effort.

(b) Time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.

(c) Relative priority of the supporting effort. If there are many supporting efforts, this may, for
example, include a prioritisation of those supporting efforts.

(d) Authority, if any, of the supporting commander(s) to modify the supporting effort in the
event of an exceptional opportunity or an emergency.

(e) Degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

(f) Force protection responsibilities afloat and ashore.

(3) Unless limited by the establishing directive or the initiating directive, the supported commander
has the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes
the designation and prioritisation of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting
action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. A supported commander
may be designated for:

(a) The entire operation.

(b) A particular phase or stage of the operation.

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(c) A particular function.

(d) A combination of phases, stages, events, and functions.

(4) The CATF and CLF will identify the events and conditions for any shifts of the support
relationship throughout the operation, ideally during the planning phase, and forward them to
the establishing authority for approval. See Figure 15-1 for examples of when the relationship
might shift between commanders. Except in cases of emergencies, no significant decision will be
made by a commander in a chain of command that affects the plans, disposition, or intentions of a
commander in another chain of command without prior consultation. In emergency situations, the
commander making an emergency decision will notify corresponding commanders of the action at
the earliest practicable time.

Note. Timing of the transfer of authority will typically be mission/nation specific.

(5) The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and
communication methods to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander
will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment
and limitations of the support, assist in planning for the integration of the support into the supported
commander’s effort as a whole, and communicate support requirements throughout the supporting
commander’s organization. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs
of the supported force and take full action to fulfil them within existing capabilities, consistent with
priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. The establishing authority is responsible for
resolving issues when notified by either the supported or supporting commander that the supporting
commander cannot fulfil the needs of the supported commander.

(6) The United States employs the support C2 structure for its AF and LF, which establishes a
support relationship between the CATF and CLF.

Figure 15-1. Example of Shifts in Support Relationship

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c. Integrated CATF Staff:

(1) The roles of the CATF and CLF are combined into one commander, who is supported by a
combined naval and LF staff.
(2) The AF staff regrouping functions and individuals from the land and naval components,
augmented as necessary to form an integrated, cohesive, and collocated headquarters.
(3) A land component composed of a tactical staff, a manoeuvre element, a field engineer capability,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, direct and indirect fire support elements,
special elements (mission depending), and logistical support to include a role 1 medical capability.
(4) A naval component compromising amphibious ships (to include complement augmented
as necessary), landing craft, divers, logistical support and a role 2 medical capability and naval
special operations elements (mission depending).
(5) In order to rationalize the size of the AF staff while maintaining functionality and all capabilities;
depending on the situation (e.g., a single-ship deployer) some of the ship’s department staffs might be
required to merge within the AF staff construct thus avoiding duplication by utilizing existent capabilities.
(6) The CLF’s staff is occupying primary functions within the AF headquarters, based on a
judicious repartition of task/capability, and is working side-by-side with members of the naval staff
and ship’s company. In that respect, a plan must be devised to ensure a proper mix of CLF staff,
naval staff and ship’s company personnel. This plan is critically important as it helps create staff
synergy by judiciously allocating the ship’s physical spaces. This plan must also take into account
the distribution of communication resources and networks.
(7) The Netherlands may utilise a combined commander and staff for amphibious operations.
3. Parallel Chains of Command. The interrelation of LF tasks during the planning for and execution
of the amphibious operation requires the establishment of parallel chains of command and corresponding
commanders of components of the AF at all levels of the AF organization. The following fundamental
considerations govern the application of such a system of parallel command.
15303 Operational Areas
1. Amphibious Objective Area.
An AOA is a three-dimensional, geographical area (delineated for C2 purposes in the initiating directive
for an amphibious operation) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious
force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission
and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations—but not be so
large as to be beyond the CATF’s control capability or ability to defend. If the initiating directive does
not designate either the AOA or the amphibious force’s objectives, the CATF and CLF will determine
the necessary amphibious force objective(s) and request the associated AOA to accomplish the assigned
mission. Some of the factors that determine the size of the AOA are listed in Figure 15-2.
2. Position and Relationship of the AOA with Other AOOs.
The AOA is a control measure designed to maximise the safety of the amphibious force while allowing
it to complete its mission with as little restraint as possible. CATF and CLF must have the situational
awareness necessary to prevent fratricide and ensure effective engagement of the enemy within the AOA.
This continues until the termination of the amphibious operation and disestablishment of the AOA.
a. The responsibility for coordinating establishment of the AOA rests with the operational-level
commander who issued the initiating directive. Prior to issuing the initiating directive for the amphibious
operation, including provisions for establishment of the AOA, he will consult affected/concerned
commands/regional commands to ensure coordinated effort of Allied forces in the objective area.
b. An alternative to establishing an AOA is the establishment of an AOO with a high-density airspace
control zone (HIDACZ). See AJP-3.3.5 for further details.

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1. Location of amphibious force objectives.

2. Location and size of landing beaches and landing zones.
3. Topography and hydrography.
4. Friendly force weapon/sensor ranges and capabilities.
5. C2 capabilities of the amphibious force.
6. Composition, size, and disposition of amphibious force and anticipated follow-on forces, including
coalition and joint forces.
7. Enemy weapons/sensor ranges and capabilities.
8. Enemy force disposition.
9. Sea echelon area.

Figure 15-2. Factors that Determine the Size of the AOA/AOO with HIDACZ

15304 Command Relationships During Planning

1. Regardless of the command relationship construct used, when the initiating directive is received,
unique relationships are observed during the planning phase. The CATF, CLF, and other commanders
of the amphibious force are coequal in planning matters regardless of rank. Planning decisions should
be reached on a basis of common understanding of the mission, objectives, and tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) and on a free exchange of information. Any differences between commanders that
cannot be resolved are referred to the next higher command level applicable in the operation for decision.

2. CATF, in close coordination with the CLF, is responsible for the preparation of the overall ship-to-shore
movement and landing plan designed to support the LF scheme of manoeuvre.

3. Since immediate responsibility for the conduct of LF operations ashore is vested in CLF, the planning
and execution of the landing are of his utmost concern. AF participation consists generally in providing
support for the LF. This involves the analysis of LF proposals to determine their feasibility from the
standpoint of the remainder of the AF. The capability of providing necessary support is a primary factor
in evaluating and concurring in proposed LF plans and concepts. To guide LF operations ashore during
the action phase, the CLF and staff develop the LF plan for operations and the scheme of manoeuvre
ashore. During the initial preparation of the operation plan (OPLAN), based on the CLF’s guidance and
intent, the LF staff develops the LF concept of operations (CONOPS) ashore which consists of the fires
support plan, employment of the LF aviation, the engineer breaching plan, and the concept of logistics
support. This is the essential framework on which the OPLAN development is designed to support.

4. CLF commands the landing force support party. CATF directs naval beach group (NBG) elements to
form the beach party and to report to CLF for planning. Navy beach party commanders, as subordinates
of the LFSP, retain command of navy units ashore.

15305 Advance Force and Pre-Landing Operations

The joint force commander/joint force will shape the battlespace prior to the arrival of the ATF, however,
these shaping operations are not advance force operations. The difference is that the advance force is a
temporary organization within the amphibious task force, which precedes the main body to the AOA.
Its function is to participate in preparing the objective for the main assault by conducting such operations
as:
1. MCM operations with emphasis on clearing routes, obstacles, and mines in the transport areas, fire
support areas, and sea approaches to the landing beaches.

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2. Hydrographic reconnaissance of the landing beaches and seaward approaches.

3. Reconnaissance and surveillance of ATF objectives, landing beaches, landing zones, DZs, and high
speed avenues of approach into the objective.

4. Neutralization or destruction of adversary high value assets.

CATF designates the advanced force commander and CLF designates either an advanced force landing
commander or reconnaissance commander, depending on the mission.

Pre-landing operations comprise those operations conducted by the ATF upon its arrival in the AOA
and immediately prior to the commencement of the landing. As with the advance force operations, it
is conducted by forces organic to the ATF.

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PART VI OTHER

Chapter 16—Maritime Logistics and

Replenishment at Sea

Chapter 17—Chemical, Biological,

Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) (name change
from NBC)

Chapter 18—Force Protection

Chapter 19—Unmanned Systems

Chapter 20—Maritime Information Warfare

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CHAPTER 16 Maritime Logistics and

Replenishment at Sea
SECTION I—LOGISTICS

16000 General

At the tactical level, the purpose of logistic support is to ensure the provision, sustainment and recovery
of a combat unit, thus enabling the maintenance of combat capability and allowing the commander to
deliver effect at the time and place of their choosing. It is through maximization of sustained combat
effectiveness that logistics provides the foundation of combat power. Logistic support includes medical
and repair capabilities, movement of personnel, and the transport of the fuel, lubricants, ordnance, spare
parts, food and other provisions and the many stores required for missions. The art of logistics is how to
integrate the strategic, operational and tactical sustainment efforts within the JOA. The NATO logistics
support concept has been established in response to changing national force structures and the NATO
evolving enhanced mission spectrum. These concepts must be aligned and consistent with the principles
defined within AJP-04, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics.
16001 Principals

In order for the commander to execute their responsibilities efficiently, the logistic principles detailed in
AJP-04 must be observed. These are:
a. Foresight. Logistic foresight is the ability to predict and manage critical logistics constraints
to the commander’s freedom of action. Logistic planning should analyse the probable course of
future operations and forecast the likely requirement for personnel, materiel, equipment and services.
It should also address how the required resources are to be provided and moved into, around and
returned from the JOA. Gaining effective logistic foresight, particularly when information is limited,
will require a clear understanding of the commander’s intent, access to N2 and N3 information and
close liaison with N3 and N5 staffs. It must also be understood that tactical logistics activities will
often have a direct impact on operational or even strategic level activities and logisticians should
ensure that future plans are fully integrated with operational plans.

b. Economy. Logistic assets are often expensive and in short supply. Accordingly, mechanisms
must be in place to ensure that they are used in the most effective and efficient manner possible,
keeping in mind operational imperatives. This includes the consideration of in-theatre stocks, the
expected operational tempo, lines of communication, and expected re-supply lead times. Mutual
support structures and mechanisms, such as multinational logistic organizations and host-nation
support (HNS), should be in place to achieve economies of scale, increase reserve capacity/
capability and improve the overall quality of support. The goal is to achieve these advantages while
simultaneously minimizing procurement and operational costs. As such, every effort should be made
to deploy at maximum sustainability levels across all classes of supply and draw on national or Allied
support enablers (i.e., port agency contracts, afloat support assets etc.) en-route to or in the AOO.
This can include basic foodstuffs, fuel, water and other items if available and of sufficient quality,
along with contracting equipment from local suppliers within the host nation. This will ease the strain
and demands on the long-distance military logistical tail, enabling better support in providing vital
munitions, key military equipment, spares and personnel.

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c. Cooperation. Joint and multinational operations require a cooperative approach to logistics from
planning to execution. Tactical logistics planning should consider what joint enablers are available to
assist in maintaining sustainability whilst being careful not to overlook that cooperation flows in two
directions and there may be requirements to contribute resources to other units as well as receiving vital
support from other components. Close liaison with the group logistic coordinator (GLC) will ensure
that opportunities to access joint logistics enablers are maximised. It is also vital that logisticians
understand and accurately utilise the established C2 and rapid response (R2) requirements set in the
OPTASKLOG GLC.

d. Flexibility. Tactical plans must be established with the knowledge that unexpected events will
dictate changes to the plan and concept of execution. As a result, flexibility is important particularly
when developing logistic plans, which must respond quickly and efficiently to even minor changes
in the operational scenario. Additionally, no single support concept will suit all situations; concepts
must allow for unexpected or unusual scenarios. For instance, despite the advantages often provided
through multinational logistics, it is possible that the most appropriate support concept for a particular
operation may be through national support structures. The logistic concept must be flexible enough
to allow for this. Thus, formal structures and plans must be developed generically, with sufficient
flexibility built-in to allow tailoring to match the changing requirements of different JOAs or missions.
To ensure this works on operations, logistical structures should be fully implemented and tested both
in advance and at every exercise opportunity.

e. Simplicity. In order to ensure that logistic arrangements are as robust and as readily understood
as possible, they should be simple. Simple reporting mechanisms will ensure the accurate and efficient
dissemination of information to all those who require it. Different forms and paths for logistical
requests and convoluted plans for storing and shipping must be avoided. Success will come from early
detailed planning, simplicity, careful control, constant monitoring and transparency in the logistics
chain enabled through close liaison with all stakeholders.

16002 Logistic Planning

1. Logistic planning, conducted in the early stages of operational planning, enables coherent and
co-ordinated planning activity to be driven from an early stage. It constitutes a functional assessment
of the logistic capabilities of the contributing nations. The logistics plan gives the commander the
opportunity to modify his operational plan based on the supportability of his courses of action. Thus,
the logistic considerations are an integral part of the planning process. Items to be considered when
determining a logistic plan include mission and likely tasks, concept of operations, national requirements,
and compatibility and interoperability of systems.

2. The overall aim of logistic support planning for operations and exercises is to:

a. Define the logistics support concept.

b. Determine the organization and structure required to support the operation or exercise afloat and
ashore.

c Identify the requirements (including sustainability levels), shortfalls and necessary arrangements to
deploy, support and sustain NATO maritime operations.

d. Determine the availability of Allied or coalition military logistics enablers (i.e., strategic or tactical
air and afloat support assets).

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e. Determine the availability of and requirements for HNS, contractor support, or port agency services.

f. Identify the requirements and arrangements for redeployment, to include the preparation for
recovery of additional force elements, including personnel and equipment from the area of operations
to the home base.

16003 Afloat Support

1. Maritime force elements routinely access three levels of support in order to achieve the sustainability
needed to meet operational requirements:

a. Organic. Organic support is that logistic support contained within warships and afloat support
shipping.

b. Host-Nation Support. Where appropriate, the Maritime Component will utilise HNS for
requirements such as port services, shore based accommodations, transportation, food and water.

c. Re-supply. Re-supply is the support required in order to replace the expenditure of the classes of
supply not held organically or available through HNS. Due to the limited availability of air and sealift
assets, this type of logistic support is the most challenging. In order to meet Joint force integration
and prioritisation requirements, maritime force logisticians will need to closely liaise with the GLC to
enable adequate support arrangements.

2. A further advantage of afloat support is the availability of RAS. This means of transferring a wide
variety of items (including equipment, personnel, fuel, water, ammunition and general stores) whilst units
are underway either by rafting, line, aircraft or small boat. This provides greater flexibility for units that
are underway and engaged in operations outside the range of shore based services. Whilst this requires
detailed planning and careful management, it does allow both flexible afloat support and increased use
of Joint Sea Basing. Unlike dedicated naval auxiliary shipping, many merchant vessels used by navies
in times of crisis may lack the ability to transfer liquids or other items by line transfer. However they
can still often be used to conduct RAS using helicopters and boats to transfer a variety of general stores.

16004 Maritime Logistic Nodes

1. The principle nodes of the maritime logistics operational pipeline are the advance logistic support
site (ALSS) and forward logistic site(s) (FLS). A brief description of these nodes is provided below and
their actual use in theatre will be determined through the strategic and operational logistics planning
conducted by the force or group logistic coordinators. If an ALSS or FLS is to be established within
the AOO, details of their capabilities and C2 arrangements for their operation will be included in the
OPTASKLOG FLC/GLC accordingly:

a. ALSS. An ALSS is an expeditionary logistic support organization that is task organized to

facilitate the delivery of shore-based logistic support to forces, primarily afloat but also ashore. It is
the primary maritime entry and departure point for passengers, mail and cargo (PMC) moving within
an operating area. The ALSS is normally established at or near a secure airfield or seaport not in
close proximity to the operating forces. The ALSS acts as the hub of a ‘hub and spoke’ distribution
network that includes FLSs as spokes. An ALSS should also possess the requisite medical capability
to accept battle casualties and to hold such casualties until they can be returned to duty or evacuated
by national medical evacuation systems. Besides maritime forces afloat, the ALSS is also capable of
supporting special warfare units, shore-based aviation units, medical facilities, MCM units and other
shore based maritime organizations. ALSS staffing and equipment is made up from a combination of
member military forces, HNS and contracted support. The ALSS normally moves critical PMC to and
from its FLSs, using intra-theatre airlift or ground transport. PMC may also be delivered direct to the
multinational maritime force (MNMF) where feasible.

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b. FLS. A FLS is the forward-most shore-based transhipment point that provides the bridge between
an ALSS and forward-deployed maritime units. An FLS is typically established at an airfield or
seaport that is close to the main area of operations. Like the ALSS, the FLS is task organized and
staffed with functional capabilities derived from member nation military and host nation sources. The
FLS organization must remain flexible and agile as it may be called upon to relocate as the operation
area and supported forces afloat change location. While the range of support offered by an FLS is
normally less than that offered by an ALSS, its capabilities can range from very austere to near those
of an ALSS, including a supporting seaport.

2. Full details on concept of operation organization responsibilities activation and operation of ALSS
and FLS are contained within ALP-4.1.

16005 Forward Maintenance and Repair

Damage can occur to vessels operating within a MNMF as a result of a variety of circumstances, not just
as a consequence of battle damage from engaging an enemy. Normal wear and tear, non-battle damage
such as from collision, catastrophic failure of machinery, etc., may require emergent repair. Whilst initial
diagnosis and repair activities will draw on organic and national resources, access to wider military
engineering resources or HNS support arrangements within the AOO might be available through liaison
with the GLC or Group Repair Co-ordinator (RC). Ideally, the RC should have at his disposal in-theatre
Forward Maintenance and Repair (FMR) or Battle Damage Repair (BDR) facilities which can provide
limited first and second level repair to damaged MNMF units as defined in ALP-4.1. The availability
of FMR/BDR services and detailed instructions regarding the reporting of damage or defects will be
included in the OPTASKLOG GLC.

16006 Logistic Reporting

The information contained in logistic reports can be critical to the success or failure of an operation.
The reports must provide sufficient detail to enable commanders at all levels to appraise their logistic
capability in peacetime operations, and assess force sustainability in Non Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations (NA5CRO) as well as in combat operations. Logistic reports may take the form of status
reports, statement of requirements or instructions, or they may provide input to assessment reports made
by higher authorities. Whatever form they take, it is absolutely critical that logistics reports are accurate,
meaningful and timely. It must be borne in mind that reports at the tactical level do not necessarily reflect
the same information needed at the operational or strategic level. Detailed guidance on the content and
structure at all levels of the hierarchy of logistic reporting is contained in Chapter 4 of ALP-4.1 and
operation specific detail on reporting requirements will be promulgated in the OPTASKLOG GLC. It is
through this process, which starts with tactical-unit level that ultimately provides the commander with an
accurate picture of sustainability and associated logistics requirements for the current operation.

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SECTION II—REPLENISHMENT AT SEA

16200 Objectives

a. To allow maritime forces at sea to remain in the operating area as long as possible, the technique of
RAS is the primary means of sustaining afloat units while deployed. It is accomplished by means of
rigs between ships or transfer by helicopter. These operations are used for fuel, food, personnel, mail,
spare parts, and ammunition.

b. Replenishment operations must be accomplished within the existing operational tempo, in order
to deliver in due-time all necessary logistic support and minimise operational impact on force
organization and activities.

c. See ATP-/MTP16, Replenishment-at Sea for additional instructions and procedures.

16201 Command

RAS is accomplished under OTC responsibility. Depending on force organization and respective
seniority, the OTC should consider the recommendations of subordinate commanders within the task
organization. Points to be considered are:
a. Position and time of rendezvous.

b. General direction of movement during replenishment.

c. Course and speed during replenishment.

d. Civilian shipping and other traffic in the OA.

e. Danger areas.

16202 Operational Considerations

Replenishment at sea could have a significant impact on current operations tempo and must be considered
in the planning process. Flight operations, time-distance factors, and potential threats should be taken
in account. Replenishment operations can last for many hours and can put afloat units at risk during
restricted manoeuvring. Operational elements include:
a. Discretion needs: EMCON, lights.

b. Possible enemy interferences.

c. Joining of forces.

d. Alert state.

e. Weapons status.

f. Weather considerations.

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16203 Communications

a. Messages used for managing RAS are issued from the MTMS.

1. OPSTAT RASREQ. For use by a combatant ship to signal its requirements, either direct to
the supplying ship or to the OTC. In either case, the requirements must be submitted in a timely
fashion.

2. OPTASK RAS. For use by the OTC to promulgate the replenishment programme.

3. OPSTAT RAS. For use by supplying ships to provide customer ships with details of rigs and
types of stores that can be delivered from respective transfer stations.

4. OPSTAT UNIT. For use by all ships to promulgate details of transfer stations.

5. OPSTAT CARGO. For use by supplying ships to report cargo remaining to the OTC after an
RAS operation and on changing operational control.

b. Tactical communications are available by UHF, but also, in a more discreet manner, by flags or
flashing light signals.

c. Technical communications during the replenishment could be conducted by sound-powered

telephones, megaphones, portable radio, or hand signals with paddles.

16204 Other Ships

a. Civilian manned fleet auxiliaries from some NATO navies are able to conduct replenishment at sea.

b. Certain merchant tankers could have replenishment capabilities, mainly by the astern method.

c. Command relationships are described in ATP-16.

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CHAPTER 17 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and

Nuclear Defence
17000 Hazards from Nuclear Bursts

(NU) At the outset of warfare, it will be necessary to assume that any attack on a large or important
formation may be nuclear, and the possibility of a surprise attack by a nuclear-capable enemy cannot be
discounted. The effects of a nuclear burst will vary widely with the type of burst, yield, depth of water,
and meteorological situation. Specific geographical information pertaining to the characteristics, effects,
plotting, and forecasting of nuclear bursts can be found in ATP-45 (series). The most significant hazards
are:
a. (NU) Light flash, thermal radiation, and initial nuclear radiation effects, including transient
radiation effects on electronics (TREE).

b. (NU) Electromagnetic pulse (EMP).

c. (NU) Blast and underwater shock.

d. (NU) Residual radiation.

17001 Types of Bursts

a. (NU) Exoatmospheric or High-Altitude Bursts. These occur at or above 30 km altitude.

They will produce EMP over large areas of the earth’s surface and may damage electronic equipment.
Magnetohydrodynamic disturbances in the ionosphere may affect long-range communication (HF).
Disruption may last up to several hours, pending yield and height of burst.

b. (NU) Air Burst. This occurs within the atmosphere where the fireball does not touch the surface.
Significant fallout will not occur, but blast and thermal effects will be maximised in the area of weapon
effects.

c. (NU) Surface Burst. This occurs within the atmosphere where the fireball touches the surface,
producing a significant amount of fallout.

d. (NU) Underwater Burst. This will produce predominantly shock and base surge. The effects
will be modified by depth of burst, seabed reflection, and surface refraction.

17002 Flash and Initial Radiation Effects

(NU) Light flash, thermal radiation, and initial gamma radiation are of relatively short duration. Gamma
radiation damages all living organisms and some material, but material damage by some other weapon
effect, such as blast, is nearly always more significant. Ships must rely on their own protective measures
to shield against effects of light flash and thermal radiation and to reduce the effects of gamma radiation.
The effects of initial radiation on electronics (i.e., TREE), may be very great, especially on digital
systems. Electronics start to be affected at 105 centigrays/sec, and this may well be the only effect that a
small nuclear weapon would have on a ship. User checks are the only way of ascertaining whether or not
electronic equipment has been affected.

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17003 Electromagnetic Pulse

(NU) The EMP produced by high/low air bursts has strong magnetic and electronic fields that exist
for only a fraction of a second. These fields can induce large, transient currents that may burn out
electronic equipment or produce transient signal overloads and spurious signals on communication nets
and computer-driven systems. The EMP hazards depend on burst altitude and yield. For low-altitude
bursts, damage from other weapon effects will predominate. For high-altitude bursts, computer and
communication system upsets, caused by large transient signals injected into antennas and equipment
cables, may occur at ranges where no damage is produced by other nuclear effects. Communication
disruption as a result of interference with the ionosphere may last several hours.
17004 Blast and Underwater Shock

(NU) These hazards will have velocities in excess of the velocities of sound in air and water, allowing
little time, if any, for manoeuvring. They are the most damaging to ships and parked aircraft and so
determine the action to be taken prior to and immediately after burst. High-velocity surface winds and
high-water waves may be encountered beyond the radius of heavy to moderate blast damage, traveling
at velocities well below the speed of sound. Since the severity of these hazards decreases rapidly with
distance from ground zero and time after detonation, manoeuvres to increase the range from surface zero
will greatly reduce damage.
(NR) (NMP) (See Table 17-1.)
17005 Base Surge

(NU) Surface or subsurface bursts will produce a dense radioactive cloud or mist in the vicinity of
ground zero and a pool of highly contaminated water at the ground. This radioactive cloud or mist is
called base surge. The area of the base surge expansion must be avoided for at least 30 minutes and, if
conditions merit, for 90 minutes, even though it will tend to become invisible after about 4 minutes. The
size of the base surge will be governed by many factors, such as the depth of burst and weapon yield. The
contaminated pool of water at ground zero will be smaller than the area of the base surge but will present
a hazard that can last longer. It may preclude re-entering the ground zero area for as long as 3 hours.
17006 Residual Radiation

(NU) In surface and some underwater bursts, radioactive material is sucked up into the mushroom
cloud; some of this will return to the surface later as local fallout in the sector that is down the effective
downwind (EDW) from ground zero. This will cover varying distances up to several hundred miles,
depending on wind conditions at various levels, and will broaden as it moves. Manoeuvres to avoid this
fallout must therefore be based on the EDW. Should it be necessary to pass through fallout, washdown or
prewetting systems, if available, should be activated and passage delayed as long as possible. The longer
passage is delayed, the less hazardous fallout will be, because of the relatively short half-life of most
fission products. There is little danger in steaming through water where fallout has ceased.
17007 (NU) (NMP) Range of Effects

(NR) (NMP) Figure 17-1 shows the range of effects for airburst weapons. This figure is a composite
picture displaying the “worst case” situation. Figure 17-2 indicates range of base surge and is also a
composite graph displaying the “worst case” situation. Figure 17-3 shows underwater shock ranges from
a typical nuclear warhead displayed against water depth.
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 Type SEAWORTHINESS MOBILITY WEAPON DELIVER SERVICEABILITY
of
Burst Carriers Destroyers Carriers Destroyers All Ships Aircraft

90% 10% 90% 10% 90% 10% 90% 10% 90% 10%
LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS LOSS

Overpressure 40 25 12 15 8 12 8 8 3.5 1 2 1.5 1

(psi)

Air Burst*
10 KT 405 560 975 860 1,220 975 1,220 1,220 2,150 5,000 3,000 3,700 5,000
100 KT 900 1,200 2,100 1,860 2,630 2,100 2,630 2,630 4,650 11,000 6,500 8,000 11,000
5 MT 3,200 4,450 7,725 6,840 9,700 7,725 9,700 9,700 17,100 40,000 24,000 30,000 40,000

Surface Burst
10 KT 375 465 680 590 790 680 790 790 1,300 2,650 1,850 2,200 2,650
100 KT 810 1,000 1,470 1,270 1,700 1,470 1,700 1,700 2,800 5,700 4,000 4,800 5,700
5 MT 2,970 3,700 5,385 4,680 6,270 5,385 6,270 6,270 10,400 21,000 15,000 17,700 21,000

17-3
Subsurface
Burst**
10 KT/70M 450 450 610 610 675
10 KT/130M 675 675 935 935 1,040
750 750 1,275 1,275 1,430

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10 KT/300M

* Air burst at optimum height of burst. ** Damage ranges based on the following damage criteria:

90% LOSS 90% LOSS 90% LOSS

Seaworthiness Mobility Weapon Delivery

150 ft. lb/in2 5 ft/sec 4 ft./sec

Shock Wave Peak Peak
Energy Translational Translational
Velocity Velocity
Table 17-1. (NU) (NMP) Blast Damage Ranges in Yards From Ground Zero

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SHIP SEVERELY
1 DAMAGED
OR SINKS
10 5
2 CE
RANGE - THOUSANDS OF YARDS

NT
IGR
AY
SP
3 ER

EX MAY
SE NEG L
CO

PO S
UNHARDENED ND IGIBL
ER

SE UFF
4 ELECTRONICS TO M ADIATION

D ER
MAY SUFFER AN

HE D
DAMAGE

LI AM
CO A
5
SHIP AND

PT GE
WEAPON

ER
SHIPS, MEN, AND
6 SYSTEMS

S
WEAPONS

UP
DAMAGED

10
UNAFFECTED

PE
BU DEC

PS
7

R
RN K

I
3.5
1.5

S A FIR

PS
PS

ND ES
8

I
9 I
0.1 KT 1 KT 10 KT 100 KT 1 MT 5 MT 10 MT

Note: 1 RAD = 1 centigray (cgy)

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 17-1. (NU) (NMP) Above-Water Burst Effects

17010 Basic Concept of Defence

(NU) Evasive manoeuvring is an essential element of nuclear warfare defence. Ships, whether acting
independently or in formation, must take such individual and collective action as may be required to
avoid, to the maximum practicable degree, the immediate and residual hazards resulting from a nuclear
detonation. Basic predictions for defence against fallout are contained in ATP-45 (series). Table 17-2
provides an aide-memoire to the command of a ship for the correct reaction to a nuclear attack. The
warning time for such an attack, especially from a submarine, may be under 2 minutes. This would give
time to cancel relaxation to the gastight and watertight conditions of the ship, but may not allow a change
in the manning or material state to be made. Due consideration must be given to this before ordering a
higher degree of readiness.
17011 General Tactical Considerations

(NU) In a nuclear war, the most suitable nuclear defence disposition would be one where not more than
one ship would suffer sinking or severe damage from a single burst. Maintaining such a disposition may
not be tactically feasible considering the many factors involved, such as primary mission, geographic
area, weather, forces assigned, and relative importance of other potential threats. The OTC should select
a force disposition that effects the best compromise of all factors involved in a particular situation. When
the probability of nuclear attack exists there are a number of principles that should be considered.
(NR) (NMP) Figures 17-1, 17-2, and 17-3 will give the OTC a broad indication of the penalties that may
have to be incurred with any particular selected nuclear spacing.

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1 30 S
ECO
NDS
2 1M
RANGE - THOUSANDS OF YARDS

INU
TE
3 2M
INU
1. THESE CURVES DISPLAY THE
4 TE
WORST CASE FOR A COMBINA- M S
4 TION OF YIELD AND DEPTH OF IN
UT
BURST. ES
2. ANY ESTIMATES OF BASE SURGE
5 POSITION AFTER TWO MINUTES
MUST MAKE ALLOWANCE FOR
SURFACE WIND.
6 3. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 4 MIN
BASE SURGE WILL TEND TO BE-
COME INVISIBLE AND ITS DURA-
7 TION WILL LARGELY DEPEND
UPON METEOROLOGICAL CON-
DITIONS.
8 4. A POOL OF RADIOACTIVE WATER
WILL BE LEFT BEHIND IN AREAS
TRAVERSED BY BASE SURGE.
9
0.1 KT 1 KT 10 KT 100 KT 1 MT 5 MT 10 MT

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Figure 17-2. (NU) (NMP) Range of Effects of Base Surge (Underwater Burst)

17012 (NU) (NMP) Principles Affecting All Dispositions and Formations

a. (NR) (NMP) Spacing between ships should be such that not more than one heavy ship would be
sunk or severely damaged by a single nuclear burst. (In the absence of intelligence, a 1 MT threat
should be assumed.)

b. (NR) (NMP) Maximum ASW protection should be afforded major units as practicable.

c. (NR) (NMP) The speed of major units and their screen, if provided, should normally be as high as
possible. Speed in excess of optimum sonar speed is an OTC’s decision.

d. (NR) (NMP) Units should be stationed within the disposition or formation to provide the maximum
attainable degree of all-round air, surface, and subsurface surveillance.

e. (NR) (NMP) Should the spacing selected for major units be greater than effective UHF/VHF range,
it will be necessary either to accept the limited capability of UHF/VHF links or to break HF silence.

f. (NR) (NMP) Special considerations will apply in the case of operations involving underway
replenishment, minesweeping, and amphibious warfare groups, and in all operations in restricted
waters. The general considerations above should be followed as far as practicable.

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WEAPON: 5-KT TORPEDO

DEPTH OF
BURST: 110 METERS
SOURCE: DNA EM-1(N) PART II
3
NO SIGNIFICANT
EFFECTS WEAPONS SYSTEM
SUFFER DAMAGE

MOBILITY IMPAIRED
RANGE YARDS x 1000

1
SEAWORTHINESS IMPAIRED

SHIP SEVERELY DAMAGED

OR SINKS

DEPTH 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
METERS

NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NMP)

Figure 17-3. (NU) (NMP) Underwater Burst Effect Graph

17013 (NU) (NMP) Principles Affecting Carrier Group Formations

a. (NR) (NMP) Random stationing of units within the disposition and random courses and/or speeds
should be used to confuse search and attack aircraft and submarines and make more difficult the
pinpointing of high-value units.

b. (NR) (NMP) Units should be disposed in the direction of the expected air threat so as best to
provide defence in depth.

c. (NR) (NMP) AAW coordinators should occupy stations in the direction of the air threat.

d. (NR) (NMP) Carriers should not occupy stations on the boundaries of the disposition.

e. (NR) (NMP) When carriers are operated singly and when it is not possible to provide an ASW
screen, at least one SAM unit should be assigned a station adjacent to each carrier with secondary
duties as plane guard, as required.

f. (NR) (NMP) Radar pickets should be stationed at appropriate distances from disposition centre,
compatible with radar and communication capabilities, rather than in randomly selected positions.

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 PREPARATION AT BURST OR POST-BURST SUBSEQUENT ACTION
DETECTION OF
DETECTION OF
ATTACK
FALLOUT
1. Check total doses.
AIR BURST
2. Report fitness to OTC
1. Seach for damage.
1. Cancel reduction of IAW Article 17025.
1. Use antinuclear NEAR
ship’s CBRN readiness 2. Report IAW ATP-45.
spacing in formation or level. 1. Take cover.
disposition (see Figures
12-1, 12-2, and 12-3). 2. Turn to present end-on
2. If time permits,
aspect.
consider ordering a 1. Report IAW ATP-45.
2. Promulgate EDW and SUFACE/
higher shipboard CBRN
threat yield assessment. SUBSURFACE
readiness level. 2. Escorts find major
BURST units to protect.
3. Promulgate Point
Romeo. 1. Alter course to avoid
base surge at best 3. Report fitness to OTC
4. If using group speed. IAW Article 17025.
dispersion, check for
2. Shelter/deep shelter 4. Make for Point
interference with group
prewet/washdown. Romeo.
R/Vs. WARNING OF DISTANT
DISTANCE 1. Prewet/shelter on 3. Search for damage. 5. Monitor and carry out

17-7
5. Order fallout transit
ATTACK detection of fallout. detailed decontamination.
policy.
4. When clear of fallout,
2. Send fallout detection exposed personnel carry
1. Alter course to signal IAW ATP-45. out operational
avoid/lessen exposure to decontamination. 1. Report IAW ATP-45

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
3. Operate machinery for
fallout.
steady steaming. 5. Operate machinery for

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
NATO CONFIDENTIAL

2. Report fitness to OTC

2. Adjust speed to allow steady steaming if IAW Article 17025.
4. Rotate watches as necessary.
steady steaming.
necessary. 3. Monitor and carry out
6. Report IAW ATP-45. detailed decontamination
5. Maneuver to avoid
fallout if possible. as convenient.
Table 17-2. (NU) Nuclear Attack Aide-Memoire (Nuclear)

DISTANT
1. Exposed personnel
carry out operational
decontamination.

2. Report IAW ATP-45.

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g. (NR) (NMP) Maximum spacing between major units is desirable.

h. (NR) (NMP) Use of single-ship or multiple-ship stations will depend on the forces available and
the detection and deception equipment available.

i. (NR) (NMP) In situations in which the air threat is relatively small compared to that of the subsurface
threat and the use of nuclear warheads is expected, it may be desirable to use a screen within which
multiple carrier operations could be conducted at high speeds while screen destroyers patrol at speeds
both economical and favourable to sonar detection.

17014 Principles Affecting Convoy Formations

(NU) Ships in convoy should have simple and concise instructions concerning action to be taken in the
event of a nuclear attack. It is important that orders and instructions to ships in convoy should be issued
and understood before the convoy forms up. This is best done at the convoy conference. The size of the
convoy and other factors permitting, wide spacing of columns and ships in column is recommended.
If possible, the spacing of ships in columns and between columns should not be reduced below 1 mile.
Random formations should be considered in order to prevent easy recognition by the enemy.
(NR) (NMP) Merchant ship captains should be familiar with the merchant ship supplement to ATP-03.
17015 Action Prior to Nuclear Attack

a. (NU) Establishment of Formation Rendezvous (Point Romeo). OTCs of formations

are to promulgate a formation rendezvous at which ships can re-form following dispersal. OTCs
of dispositions are to be kept informed of the position of the formation rendezvous. If no Effective
Downwind Message (EDM) is issued, a signal from ATP-01, Vol. II, may be used.

b. (NU) Promulgation of Fallout Information. In the absence of reports from shore authorities,
the OTC will promulgate information to the formation in the form of a naval effective downwind
message, expanded to include information on Point Romeo. Details are in ATP-45 (series).

c. (NU) Operational Readiness for Fallout Transit. The OTC should state well in advance the
required operational readiness for his units should a fallout transit become inevitable. The OTC should
specify AAW, ASW, and ASUW degrees of readiness and the degree of readiness for engineering,
stating the maximum speed required for fallout transit. The OTC should also nominate guard ships
(e.g., radar, sonar, and EW guards), as many ships will be limited in operational performance during
the transit. In general, the OTC should re-examine the principles of readiness in Chapter 1 to match
the problem associated with fallout transit.

17016 Tactics Following a Nuclear Attack

(NU) Tactics to be employed and considerations are in Table 17-2.

17017–17019 Spare

17020 Selection of Formation Rendezvous

(NU) Point Romeo should be established relative to the formation centre, and the course and speed of the
rendezvous must be indicated. When a disposition incorporates more than one formation, each formation
should promulgate its own Point Romeo. Whenever possible, Point Romeo should be up the EDW from
the formation centre and at a distance equal to the area of immediate contamination plus the diameter of
the formation. In determining the position of Point Romeo, the OTC must consider the following factors:
a. (NU) Direction and strength of EDW.

b. (NU) Expected yield of the weapon.

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c. (NU) Threat.

d. (NU) Expected time for the force to re-form.

e. (NU) Direction in which the force is required to steam.

f. (NU) Dose rate and total doses that are acceptable.

g. (NU) Navigational restrictions.

h. (NU) Positions of other formations.

17021 (NU) (NMP) Emergency Rendezvous

(NC) (NMP) When no Point Romeo has been promulgated, the standard emergency rendezvous will be
10 miles up the EDW from the formation perimeter.
17022–17024 Spare

17025 Report On Operational Efficiency

(NU) After an attack all ships are to report their operational efficiency to the OTC. All ships must report
their capacity to:
a. (NU) Complete immediate operations.

b. (NU) Undertake a subsequent operation without delay (i.e., without rest, hospitalization, or
decontamination). (Table 17-3 may prove useful.)

17026–17030 Spare

17031–17039 Spare

17040 Biological Hazards

(NU) Biological warfare (BW) agents can be produced with little difficulty in a relatively short time. They
can be produced covertly using dual-purpose technology by those of modest education, using limited
tools and space. An adversary could use a production facility to manufacture prescription drugs one
day and be producing these agents the next day. BW agents are also relatively easy to obtain. Naturally
occurring viruses and bacteria that cause disease are obtainable from soil, water, animal reservoirs,
clinical specimens, and research labs. Toxins are biologically derived but display markedly different
characteristics from other BW agents. They more closely resemble chemical agents than biological agents
in the way they cause an effect but are like other BW agents in detection difficulty. Under favourable
meteorological conditions, a robust BW agent can remain effective after traveling hundreds of miles
downwind and covering very large areas. The primary aim of a BW agent attack is to produce disease
or sickness (not necessarily lethal) by the inhalation or ingestion of agents and thereby compromise the
fighting capacity of the ship. The impact of BW agents on the mission of a ship will vary according to
the type of agent used, its concentration, and method of delivery. Toxins may have an immediate effect
on any unprotected, exposed personnel. Other BW agents that require an incubation period will probably
not have an immediate incapacitating effect.

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Table 17-3. (NU) Commander’s Guide on Radiation Exposure States, Dose Levels, Probable Tactical
Effects1, and Risk of Exposure Criteria

Total Cumulative RES Probable Initial Tactical Effects Single Additional Exposure
Dose [A] (cGy)(2) Category(3) After Exposure(4) Criteria(5)
before additional
dose [B]
No Exposure – 0 R0 None Negligible Risk–75 cGy
Moderate Risk–100 cGy
Emergency Risk–125 cGy
Greater than 0 but not R1 Up to 1% incidence of LI(7) Negligible Risk if A+B ≤ 75 cGy
greater than 75(6) Moderate Risk if A+B ≤ 100 cGy
Emergency Risk if A+B ≤ 125 cGy
Greater than 75 but R2 Up to 5% incidence of LI(7). Any further exposure will exceed
not greater than 125(6) a negligible risk (A+B ≥ 75 cGy)
and could exceed a moderate risk
(A+B ≥ 100 cGy)
Greater than 125 R3 More than 5% incidence of LI Any further exposure will exceed
expected for the group, increasing the Emergency Risk limit (A+B ≥
with increased dose for short 125 cGy)
exposure times(7). Group probably
not able to perform complex
tasks; and sustained effort will
be hampered. Additional effects
information are found within Annex
C and D of STANAG 2083 (Ed7)(8).
Notes:
(1) Injury or exposure to other harmful agents may affect response to nuclear radiation.
(2) The figures in this column may be subject to change in light of future medical knowledge.
(3) Risk levels are graduated within each RES category in order to provide more stringent criteria as the total
nuclear radiation dose accumulated becomes more serious.
(4) Any radiation dose which induces nausea and vomiting makes it difficult to wear the mask, consequently
increasing the vulnerability to chemical hazards.
(5) Risk levels are defined as:

Risk Level % Incidence of

Latent Ineffectiveness(9)
Negligible 1
Moderate 2.5
Emergency 5

(6) If a unit’s dose within RES category R1 or R2 is unknown, the unit’s dose is assumed to be the midpoint
of that category.
(7) Latent effectiveness (LI) is the casualty criterion defined as the lowest dose at which personnel will:
(a) Become combat ineffective (less than 25% capable) at any time within 6 weeks post exposure
followed by death or recovery, or;
(b) Become performance degraded (i.e., 25-75% capable) within 3 hours post exposure and remain so
until death or recovery.
(8) Appropriate serials from Annex C of STANAG 2083 (Ed 7) may be appended to RES category R3 to
provide additional effects information at nations’ discretion.
(9) For healthy, rested, well-fed adults with no previous exposure (i.e., uninjured and fresh troops).
(10) Radiation exposure state (RES) categories may be useful in making the report required by Article
17025.
(11) Primary source of this table: STANAG 2083 (Edition 7) dated 02 September 2009.
(12) Abbreviations: cGy –centigray; RES – radiation exposure state; LI – latent ineffectiveness.

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17041 Survival of Agents

(NU) Factors which affect the ability of microorganisms to exist are:

a. (NU) Light. All light, especially sunlight, giving ultraviolet rays, shortens the life of most
organisms.

b. (NU) Humidity. Organisms vary in their response to humidity.

c. (NU) Temperature. Low temperature generally enhances the survival of microorganisms; the
effective life of some microorganisms diminishes with rising temperature. Temperature gradients will
also contribute to how quickly clouds of agents disperse.

17042 Wind

(NU) The speed and direction of the wind in relation to the target will be used to determine the release
point for an attack. Adverse wind conditions may cause postponement of an attack beyond acceptable
tactical limits.

17043 General Tactical Considerations

(NU) In planning biological warfare defence measures, the following should be taken into account:
a. (NU) By their very nature, BW agents lend themselves to covert delivery methods. These agents
can be delivered by emission from aircraft, ships, submarines, missiles, or land-based sources. Lack
of detection/warning equipment makes identification of the type and source of such attacks very
difficult and the initial attack may pass unnoticed.

b. (NU) Unless a detection system is fielded and operated, the first indication may be symptoms of
infection, which can be delayed for days after exposure.

c. (NU) Defence against biological attack places greater reliance on the medical organization for
detection, classification, treatment of casualties, and preventive actions to contain the spread of
infection and contamination.

d. (NU) The reduction in effectiveness of biological warfare agents caused by heat and light means
that the most likely time of attack will be during night hours when wind conditions are favourable.
When it is addressed that there is a threat of biological warfare attack, OTCs should endeavour to
ensure that personnel are protected particularly during the hours of darkness.

e. (NU) As stated above, a robust biological warfare agent can remain effective after traveling
hundreds of miles downwind and covering very large areas. Because of this large area coverage
capability, an attack using BW agents has the potential to be effective against reinforcement shipping.
The use of BW agents in the sabotage role also presents a hazard to ships in harbour or anchorage.

17044 Detection Methods

(NU) There is, at present, no means of detecting a biological attack. It is most important that medical
personnel are made aware of the threat so that they may adopt a suspicious outlook toward any signs
that an attack might have been made (e.g., a sudden widespread onset of an epidemic, rather than a slow
buildup).

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17045 Protection

a. (NU) In the absence of any means of detection, protective measures must be based on meeting
any possible attack fully prepared. When intelligence indicates the existence of a biological warfare
threat, respiratory protection should be adopted by collective or individual means. It is recommended
that all ships should close down to the maximum extent, in the same way as for a chemical or nuclear
threat, and that respirators should be worn continuously by all exposed personnel.

b. (NU) If installed, a ship’s deck washdown system is the most effective countermeasure available
against a BW attack if activated in a timely manner. BW agents that strike a ship already covered with
a flowing film of water are normally washed overboard. When the tactical situation allows, running a
zigzag course helps clear the ship of pools of water as the ship heels. It also improves the distribution
of the washdown system by varying the direction of the relative wind. BW agents that impact on dry
surfaces are not as easily removed.

c. (NU) On non-collective protection system (CPS) ships or non-CPS compartments on CPS ships,
proper setting of ventilation systems will provide some protection against a BW attack. The setting
of Circle WILLIAM will assist the ship in keeping some BW agents from entering the ventilation
ducting. Care should be taken to ensure that contamination is not trapped inside the ship when Circle
WILLIAM is invoked. The use of Circle WILLIAM will have a significant impact on the ship’s
warfighting capability due to heat stress for the Sailors and the potential of overheating mission
critical equipment.

Note. (NU) If so designated, Circle WILLIAM fittings are normally open but are secured to prevent
the spread of CBRN contaminants through the ventilation system. They are marked with a black W in
a black circle. The ship’s damage control assistant recommends which of these fittings to close.

17046 Hygiene

(NU) While the primary aim of biological attack is to infect target personnel individually, infections
caused by some biological warfare agents can be transmitted from person to person. Therefore, the
maintenance of high standards of personal and communal hygiene is important. When it is suspected
that an attack has occurred, strict personal hygiene should be observed, only well-cooked or canned food
should be eaten, and only properly packaged medical supplies used. (See AMedP-6 Edition 4.)
17047 Decontamination

(NU) Overall decontamination will not be required after an actual or suggested attack, although the use
of intermittent prewetting washdown is recommended. Contaminated clothing and spaces should be
dealt with in accordance with national instructions. If decontamination has to be undertaken on spaces
such as the sick bay, cleansing station, and galley, formalin and hypochlorite are effective wide-spectrum
germicides. Personnel cleansing is similar to that used for any other kind of contamination.
17048–17049 Spare

17050 Chemical Warfare

a. (NU) From the outset of conventional warfare, it must be assumed that chemical weapons could
be used against NATO naval forces. They could be used simultaneously with conventional weapons.
The possibility of covert chemical attack prior to commencement of general hostilities cannot be
discounted. The effects of chemical attack will vary widely depending on the agent used, its method
of delivery, and meteorological conditions.

b. (NU) Chemical weapons are most effective against unprotected personnel.

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c. (NU) One of the advantages of chemical weapons is that they cause the defender to wear protective
clothing, thereby increasing his stress factor and reducing his efficiency. These effects can also be
caused by the mere threat of attack unless the defender has adequate and reliable protective devices.
Therefore, it is imperative that collective protection be used to full effect to allow maximum possible
relaxation of CBRN personnel under threat conditions and after an attack.

17051 Delivery of Chemical Agents

(NU) Chemical attack against ships may be delivered as:

a. (NU) The warhead of a weapon aimed to hit the target and breach the citadel.

b. (NU) A vapor cloud released upwind of the target or through which ships may have to transit.

c. (NU) A spray released above the target by aircraft, bombs, shells, or missiles.

17052 Nature of Chemical Agents

(NU) The group of nerve agents is odorless, colourless, tasteless, and, for all practical purposes, invisible.
Blister agents, blood agents, and choking agents may also be invisible, but each has a characteristic odor.
Even with chemical detectors, the first indication of attack may be the onset of symptoms in personnel.
With washdown systems operating, some chemical agents may still be absorbed into paintwork, and the
subsequent vapor hazard could last for several days.
17053 Environmental Effects

a. (NU) The travel of toxic clouds and the persistence of chemical agents are influenced by
meteorological conditions as follows:

(1) (NU) Wind. Air stability, wind speed, and turbulence are the major factors governing agent
concentration, while wind direction determines the downwind hazard. Optimum wind speed for
toxic clouds is between five and eight knots. Vapor concentration and persistency of liquid agents
decrease as wind speed increases.

(2) (NU) Temperature. At high air temperatures, liquid agents evaporate faster, and the dosage
received could be larger and more quickly absorbed.

b. (NU) Some types of chemical agent are fully effective under arctic conditions.

c. (NU) Agents delivered in the warhead of a weapon aimed to hit the target are relatively unaffected
by meteorological conditions.

17054 Threat to Naval Forces

a. (NU) General Single-Spray Attacks. These attacks against one or more fully protected naval
ships on open sea are not likely; chemical clouds (aerosols) in maritime areas, however, are apt to
drift around for hours at levels where they pose no danger to ships but where they are a serious and
unexpected threat to unprotected naval aircrews during low-level operations. In general, chemical
attacks against shipping will be executed supplementary to conventional weapons attacks.

b. (NU) Coastal Operations. Concentrating ships in harbour and inshore waters where their
manoeuvrability is restricted increases their susceptibility to chemical attack and the likelihood of
enemy success. The embarkation and disembarkation phases of amphibious operations are particularly
susceptible to chemical attack, since the ships will be at least in a relaxed state of close-down condition.

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c. (NU) Open-Ocean Operations. A well-protected and well-trained naval force should be

capable of prolonged operations in a toxic environment. The threat of, or an attack by, chemical agents
could reduce the effectiveness of such a force. The success of a chemical attack, which will be most
likely from weapons aimed to breach the citadel, will depend on the preparedness of individual units,
protection devices, and the formation chosen.

17055 General Tactical Considerations

(NU) In spite of threatened or actual chemical attack, the force must continue its mission with its
disposition being dictated by the most serious threat present in a multithreat situation.
17056 OTC’s Considerations

(NU) When a chemical threat exists, the OTC should:

a. (NU) Order an appropriate degree of readiness and establish a washdown policy.

b. (NU) Consider possible changes to the disposition in view of prevailing and forecast wind direction
and speed.

c. (NU) Consider the desirability of stationing a ship or ships with automatic detection equipment
upwind of the force.

d. (NU) Station ships to avoid multiship contamination.

e. (NU) Establish a helicopter haven and fixed-wing aircraft diversion airfields.

f. (NU) Consider the desirability of continuing aircraft and flight deck operations.

g. (NU) Determine the necessity for scheduling underway replenishment operations in view of the
need to protect personnel and the risk of contamination if upper deck loads must be struck below.

17057 Chemical Attack

a. (NU) If a chemical threat is deemed to exist, a chemical attack must be assumed when:

(1) (NU) A ship comes under fire.

(2) (NU) Hostile or unidentified low-flying aircraft are sighted.

(3) (NU) Suspicious mist, smoke, droplets, splashes, or odors are noticed.

(4) (NU) Personnel suffer any of the symptoms of chemical agent poisoning.

(5) (NU) Any chemical detection system or device indicates the occurrences of chemical attack.

b. (NU) A unit observing any of the above is to broadcast the alarm to the force. The OTC shall
manoeuvre the force or order ships to manoeuvre independently to avoid further contamination,
depending on searoom and the tactical situation. Guidance to individual ships is given in Table 17-4.
Reports are to be made in accordance with ATP-45 (series).

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Table 17-4. (NU) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Aide-Memoire (Chemical)

Preparation Detection of Detection of Post-Attack Subsequent

Attacking Vehicle Chemical Attack Action

1. Consider effect of 1. Cancel VAPOR OR LIQUID 1. Report fitness to 1. Complete

wind speed and relaxations. Assume OTC. operational
1. Get clear at best
direction on first degrees of decontamination.
speed if searoom 2. Monitor citadel
disposition and, NBCD readiness.
permits. boundaries internally. 2. Order
if possible, avoid
2. Respirators and relaxations.
multiple-ship 2. All pre-wetting ON 3. Washdown for 20
gloves to be within
contamination. if CIWS not required. minutes. 3. Report to
reach inside citadel
Manoeuvre to make OTC.
2. Decide pre-wet and worn outside. 4. Manoeuvre/
pre-wetting effective.
policy and crash forced roll to ensure
3. Launch or strike
shutting down of 3. All personnel put efficient coverage,
down aircraft on
ventilation. on respirators. then change
deck.
detector papers and
3. OTC establish 4. Make attack report
4. All pre-wetting decontaminate; reset
helicopter haven and/ in accordance with
ON until Threat chemical alarm and
or fixed-wing aircraft ATP-45.
Warning RED, then detector units.
diversion airfield and
OFF during attack to CITADEL BREACH
realistic alert states, NOTE: The removal
allow use of CIWS.
turn-around, and re- 1. All personnel put of respirators is a
arm times in light of 5. Reduce ship’s on respirators and command decision.
threat. ventilation to gloves.
minimum required
4. Personnel outside
to reduce chance of 2. Control damage.
the citadel wear full
possible spread of 3. Restrict movement
protective clothing,
contamination. of men and spread of
keeping respirator and
gloves within reach, contamination.
and carry personal 4. Make attack report
issue of drug therapy. in accordance with
NOTE: To conserve ATP-45.
stocks, protective
suits should not be
worn unless a strong
probability of liquid
chemical attack exists.
5. Order taking
of nerve agent
pretreatment labels.
6. Order material
measures.
7. Minimise aircraft
and stores on deck.
Cover where possible
with a chemical agent-
resistant material.
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17058 Aircraft Operations

(NU) The operation of aircraft under a chemical threat warrants careful consideration. The employment
policy is the OTC’s decision and will depend on the threat situation. Reaction and turn-around times are
likely to be increased by the need for aircrews and flight deck personnel to wear protective clothing and
requirements for washdown.
17059 Contamination of Aircraft

a. (NU) Aircraft should only be on deck when necessary for operational reasons. Although external
contamination of aircraft is unlikely to affect their ability to fly, it will result in many contamination
control problems that will reduce the speed and efficiency of their operations. If the operational
situation permits, steps to avoid contamination should be taken. When chemical attack is imminent or
has taken place, the following actions should be taken as appropriate:

(1) (NU) Stow aircraft in hangars with doors shut and lift raised.

(2) (NU) Cover all openings and intakes on aircraft, paying particular attention to the internal
atmosphere of the aircraft.

(3) (NU) Launch aircraft to a helicopter haven or fixed-wing aircraft diversion airfield outside the
likely area of contamination (e.g., take aircraft under cover).

b. (NU) Commanding officers must thoroughly weigh recommended precautions and protective
measures under chemical threat against the required operational availability of own ship’s aircraft.

17060 CBRN Threat Levels and Responsibilities

(NU) The risk to the joint force depends on the CBRN threat and the vulnerability of the force given
its situation and CBRN defence capabilities. Table 17-5, taken from AJP-3.8, Allied Joint Doctrine for
Comprehensive Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence, presents descriptions of the
four standard NATO threat levels for adversary CBRN weapons and devices. The commander combines
information that he has received concerning the existing or expected CBRN threat with an analysis of the
vulnerability of his forces to that threat to decide upon all necessary risk mitigation measures, including
the appropriate shipboard readiness level/CBRN dress state (Table 17-6).

Table 17-5. (NU) CBRN Weapons or Devices—Threat Levels

CBRN WEAPONS OR DEVICES – THREAT LEVELS
Threat Level Code Description
A State or non-State actor has been identified who may
„„ possess either the capability or intention of targeting
LOW GGrreeeenn NATO forces or individuals. Although it is possible,
there are no other indications of use.
„ A State or non-State actor has been identified as
„
MEDIUM YYeellloow possessing both the capability and intention of targeting
w
NATO forces or individuals.
A State or non-State actor has been identified as
„„ possessing both the capability and intention of targeting
SIGNIFICANT Orange
Orange NATO forces or individuals, and will likely attempt to do
so in the near term.
A State or non-State actor has been identified as
„„ possessing both the capability and intention of targeting
HIGH RReedd NATO forces or individuals within a specific time frame
and/or against a specific target.

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Table 17-6. (NU) Shipboard CBRN Defence Readiness Levels

Shipboard Individual Protective Equipment (IPE)—Items of Dress Other Shipboard

CBRN CBRN Protective
Readiness
Measures
Level/Dress
State
Respirator Suit Foot Hand
Protection Protection
ZERO Individual protective equipment (IPE) onboard and -- Long term
inventoried; all personnel sized and assigned IPE; conduct vaccinations in
recurring training to insure proficiency in donning IPE. place;
-- CBRN information
management
system in place but
dormant
ONE Issued Issued Issued Issued -- CBRN information
and readily and readily and readily and readily management
available available available available system in place but
dormant
TWO Carried Readily Readily Carried -- Set condition
available available MODIFIED ZEBRA;
-- Activate detectors;
-- CBRN information
management
system active
THREE Carried Worn Worn Carried -- Set condition
ZEBRA;
-- Activate
intermittent
washdown (if
available)
-- CBRN information
management
system active
FOUR Worn Worn Worn Worn -- Set condition
CIRCLE WILLIAM;
-- Activate
continuous
washdown (if
available)
- CBRN information
management
system active
NATO UNCLASSIFIED

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CHAPTER 18 Maritime Force Protection

18000 Introduction

(NU) During peacetime or in crisis situations, as well as in war, there are a considerable range of situations
in which naval forces, or naval units acting independently (e.g., ships at anchor or at berths, naval forces
in coastal and confined waters, while under way, other) represent an attractive target, particularly in
the realm of asymmetric threats, where they face considerable vulnerability in the event of a direct or
clandestine attack, sabotage or criminal activity, conducted from the land, sea or air and performed by
hostile groups or extremist organizations, generally operating independently of governments in complex
regional scenarios.
(NU) Such actions are capable, by design or fault, of achieving disproportionate effects, thus gaining the
instigator an advantage probably not attainable through conventional means. The impact may or not be
catastrophic against the immediate target. The wider and true impact may be on public opinion, Allied
policy or military effectiveness.
(NU) Additionally, the expeditionary nature of Allied operations will require naval forces to operate in
a complex environment without a discernible front line or rear area, relying on organic capabilities and
available Allied joint forces or host nation (HN) support to provide adequate force protection (FP). FP
measures greatly contribute to deter potential attackers from their intentions.
(NU) The aim of this chapter is to provide tactical guidance to the OTC regarding asymmetric threats
and covers the issues that should be considered when planning for FP, whether independently, or in
association with Allied joint forces. The term FP used throughout this chapter is primarily associated
with the defence against asymmetric threats.
(NU) FP is a standing requirement for the operational security of naval forces while conducting the
maritime manoeuvre in response to asymmetric threats. Therefore, it is applicable to ships in harbour, at
anchor, or operating at sea. Nevertheless, it may be also considered during movements in open waters
namely when there are COIs or CCOIs.
(NC) (NMP) It is complemented in detail by the procedures laid down in ATP-74, Allied Maritime Force
Protection.
18001 The Threat

(NU) The following paragraphs define the asymmetric threat by means of some of its intrinsic
characteristics, namely the foreseeable group identities and motivations, the achievable goals, the
exploitable platforms and the associated weapons that can be connected with an asymmetric attack or
action against a naval force. The list does not pretend to be fully exhaustive and it’s understood that given
the nature of the asymmetric threat all naval and intelligence agents must permanently revise the listed
items, namely those that can directly affect the normal conduct of maritime operations.
(NU) Identities and Motivations. The following are the foreseeable group identities and motivations
related with asymmetric attacks:
(1) Terrorist activity, conducted either by trans-national, state-sponsored, indigenous or
non-aligned groups.

(2) Sabotage (military/civilian activity).

(3) Espionage (military/civilian activity).

(4) Direct military raid.

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(5) Criminal activity.

(6) Propaganda in order to provoke violent demonstrations against unit or aggressions against
crewmembers ashore.

(7) Other asymmetric attacks (e.g., cyberattacks).

(NU) Goals. The following are possible goals, which can be achieved through current possible
asymmetric actions:

(1) Attempt against physical integrity of personnel;

(2) Cause unrecoverable damage on individual units;

(3) Steal military or other relevant information or cause unrecoverable loss on physical and logical
CIS infrastructure;

(4) Affect crew and citizens morale;

(5) Promote propaganda through the media.

(6) Affect political will to continue maritime operations in area.

(NU) Platforms. The following are possible platforms, which can be used to conduct an asymmetric
action, grouped by environment:

(1) (NU) Underwater Threats.

(a) Attacking underwater or submerged vehicle, such as ROVs, AUVs, UUVs or

semi-submersibles.

(b) Swimmer or diver, with or without swimmer delivery capability, aiming to lay charges on
the hull, seabed or pier or carrying explosives on a suicide mission.

(2) (NU) Surface Threats.

(a) Small boats (fast and slow), with emphasis on fast inshore attack craft (FIAC) (manned or
unmanned), targeting a vessel to deliver a bomb or providing a platform to execute standoff
weapon attack.

(b) Radio-controlled boats containing explosives.

(c) Jet ski or windsurfer carrying suicide attacker.

(d) A commercial or leisure vessel that has been hijacked and is subsequently used to ram a
ship, which can be underway, at anchor or alongside.

(e) Bomb attack by commercial harbour craft like barges, pontoons, tugs, or pilot craft coming
alongside.

(f) Small boats with demonstrators, showing hostile intent against naval units.

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(3) (NU) Land Threats.

(a) Landward attack, including firing positions in direct line of sight or mortar attack, mobile
vehicles.

(b) Bomb attack.

(c) Gunman and drive-by shooting or grenade attack on the ship.

(d) Harbour demonstrations or riots.

(e) Stealth intrusion onboard.

(f) Kidnap, or attacks on members of the ship’s company ashore.

(4) (NU) Air Threats.

(a) Aircraft (manned or unmanned).

(b) Suicide planes and micro-lights.

(c) Para gliders and hang-gliders.

(d) Radio controlled/model aircraft or UAVs.

(e) Balloons.

(5) (NU) Information Operations Attacks on Command and Control.

(a) Electronic and electromagnetic attack through CIS infrastructure.

(b) Electromagnetic jamming in order to make communication between naval units, or

between OTC and naval authorities or HN, impossible.

(c) Disinformation toward local press or authorities, or toward naval units in order to create
anger or fear.

(d) Any kind of cyberattacks in order to create confusion or disruption of C2.

(6) (NU) Nuclear, Biological, Chemical or Radiological.

(a) Aerosols and liquids.

(b) Attacks on food, water and/or personnel.

(NU) Weapons. The following are possible weapons, which can be used to conduct an asymmetric
attack:

(1) Limpet mines.

(2) Conventional mines, demolition charges or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), manually
attached to the ship’s hull, pier, seabed or underwater surrounding area.

(3) Drifting mines or IEDs.

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(4) Underwater bomb vehicles (either suicide or unmanned).

(5) Surface crafts manned (suicide or not) and unmanned laden with explosives. This could be
either FIAC or large vessels (such as fuel barges, pilot boats, tugs, floating pontoons, etc.).

(6) Car bombs (either suicide or abandoned). The most powerful delivery method is the vehicle
bomb delivered in a car, truck or fuel tanker hijacked for just this purpose.

(7) Walk-on and run-on bomb (delivered by suicide bombers).

(8) Postal bombs delivered in mailboxes or envelopes.

(9) Grenades and explosive/incendiary improvised thrown devices.

(10) Light firearms, such as pistols and light machine guns (LMGs).

(11) Cold steel arms.

(12) Human bomb.

(13) Mortar firing.

(14) Heavy machine guns (HMGs);

(15) Guided standoff weapons, such as short-range guided missiles antitank guided missile/
man-portable air defence system.

(16) Standoff weapons, such as antitank or personnel rocket propelled grenades.

(17) Aircraft (suicide or unmanned/laden or not with explosives).

(18) Logical weapons.

(19) CBRN weapons in direct attack or sabotage by clandestine intrusion. This could also be
associated with vessels, aircraft and stealth means of intrusion/sabotage.

18002 (NU) (NMP) Foreseeable Scenarios

(NC) (NMP) Generally, the actions described will be conducted taking advantage from the surprise
effect, especially when units are conducting routine operations. For that reason a preparatory work has to
be developed, focused on the area where the force will transit, operate, anchor or berth under asymmetric
threat, based on command guidance, and available intelligence, regarding risks and threat identification,
together with available essential elements of information (EEI), aiming to deter those actions or, in the
limit, to reduce the surprise effect.
(NC) (NMP) The most credible scenario for a sabotage action will be with naval units alongside or at
anchor in harbours or anchorages, faced with a high level of indicators and warnings of either a raid
performed by special operations forces or a terrorist attack.

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(NC) (NMP) On the other hand, the most credible scenario for a direct attack action, apart the above
mentioned situations, occurs when:
a. (NC) (NMP) Naval units close to harbours or anchorages.

b. (NC) (NMP) Naval units are transiting in confined waters (straits or channels).

c. (NC) (NMP) Naval units are exercising the right of innocent passage in territorial waters.

d. (NC) (NMP) Naval units are exercising the right of transit passage in international straits or choke
points.

(NC) (NMP) Under these circumstances it is assessed that naval units are particularly vulnerable to
the asymmetric threat. Therefore, it is necessary to define the naval force threat warning system and
readiness state, aiming to deter and oppose the threat both above and under water. Additionally, naval
units should provide mutual support regarding FP posture in the event of an asymmetric attack and post
attack actions and recovery.
18003 Threat Assessments

(NU) A good indication of self-protective measures required will be gained from consideration of a
likely attacker’s aim and his planning factors. These will include:
a. (NU) The availability and method of targeting that can be utilised.

b. (NU) The availability and nature of weapons.

c. (NU) The likely level of training and experience coupled with the degree of understanding of the
maritime environment.

d. (NU) Any geographical or situational restraints that reduce a potential target’s movements. This
will dictate where attacks are likely to be most successful from the attacker’s perspective.

e. (NU) Oceanographic and environmental conditions, particularly weather and sea state, may
constraint the attacker’s ability to operate, particularly in open waters, and reduce his situational
awareness and weapon effectiveness.

(NU) The assessment of attacker’s capabilities, targeting ability, training, experience and availability
of weapons are the responsibility of intelligence agencies and should be available to the OTC prior to a
transit in confined waters or choke point, harbour or anchorage visit and approach transit. The assessment
of risk based on the threat assessment, location, weather conditions, and own assets’ criticality should
be within the capability of the OTC. The type of target is likely to influence the choice of weapons and
method of attack. However, it must be remembered that what might seem a logical method to our minds
is not necessarily the way the attacker might think. Beware to the unexpected or illogical approach.
18004–18009 Spare

18010 Command and Control

a. (NU) Command Responsibilities. At the strategic and operational level, the OPCON authority
is responsible to issue the security alert state for the force or unit acting independently in a designated
AOO. At the tactical level, the OTC has the overall responsibility to promulgate policies and plans to
provide adequate FP for units in transit, at anchor or in harbour. These will include, when applicable,
the appropriate liaison with HN, thus providing consistency in applying FP measures. It is important
that authorities and, responsibilities for FP be clearly articulated at all levels of command.

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b. (NU) Considerations on the Delegation of FP Functions. Although FP is an OTC

responsibility, as defined by the functions in Tables 2-2 and 2-16, situations will arise where the lack
of command and control capabilities to exercise some of those functions (e.g., for units conducting
port visits while the OTC remains at sea) and the need to maintain close liaison with HN authorities,
will advise the delegation of FP to a better suited unit.

c. (NU) The Force Protection Coordinator. The FPC should be designated in particular
circumstances (for example, when units are in harbour or at anchor, or conduct inshore transits in the
absence of the OTC), thus allowing more effective C2 of FP aspects of operations.

d. (NU) Host Nations. HNs are usually eager to provide visiting ships with adequate security and
will go to considerable lengths to ensure attacks are not carried out in ports under their jurisdiction.
At the initial planning phase, consultation and arrangements with HNs will be conducted by the
operational-level commander. It is vital for visiting ships to forge a close liaison with the HN
authorities. This may take the form of a visit in advance to discuss any security concerns, and the
establishment of liaison for the duration of the port visit, by means of HN liaison officers. The OTC
or FPC must be involved in the off-board security arrangements to ensure they are satisfactory, to
reinforce where necessary, and to agree on responses to incidents.

18011 Force Protection Functions

a. (NU) Planning

(1) (NU) Planning Process. FP planning is a cyclical process, which assesses the mission
criticality of all assets; assesses threats, vulnerabilities and risks; and prescribes appropriate
controls and measures to reduce or mitigate these vulnerabilities and risks. This process includes a
threat-vulnerability and risk analysis.

(2) (NU) Planning Steps. Although not inclusive, the FP planning process normally includes
the following steps:

(a) Mission Analysis. Identify the assigned and implied tasks through mission analysis.

(b) Criticality Assessment. Identify those assets that are critical to mission success.

(c) Threat Assessment. Determine likely threats to those assets that are critical to mission
success.

(d) Vulnerability Assessment. Identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited by the

threat and thereby affect mission success.

(e) Risk Assessment. Determine the risks to mission success from an assessment of the
ability of the threat to exploit identified vulnerabilities.

(f) Risk Management. Identify and implement appropriate FP measures to reduce

vulnerability or threat likelihood/impact and thereby reduce risk to a level acceptable to
command.

(g) Continuous Risk Assessment. Calculate and monitor the residual risk or gaps in
order to manage the mission.

(h) Incident Response and Recovery. Identify and implement incident response and
recovery measures, including developing and implementing emergency response and recovery
plans.

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(i) Supervise, Plan, and Review. Reassess and maintain FP measures throughout the
mission.

(j) Capabilities and Resources. Identify capabilities and available resources to implement
the required FP measures, including manning and readiness states. Liaise and complement
with HN support, where available and applicable. Identify and implement off-board security
arrangements to ensure they are satisfactory and reinforced where necessary.

(k) Command, Control, and CIS. Identify special requirements and local constraints.

(3) (NU) The FP Plan. The outcome of the planning process is the FP plan, promulgated by
means of an OPTASK FP HARBOUR, issued by the OTC, when naval forces are alongside or
at anchor. Additionally, fan OPGEN/OPTASK’s may be used and should include the necessary
paragraphs for FORCE PROTECTION in the surface and subsurface environments.

b. (NU) Coordination

(1) (NR) (NMP) Security Alert States. Security alert states are normal security arrangements
for the protection of military installations of NATO countries, established in accordance with local
standing orders, and are similar to those used for NATO-installations. The introduction of the
minimum measures outlined in the alert states will reflect a higher state of security protection
required to counter an increase of the perceived threat. Those security alert states, defined at the
strategic level, may obviously be used as an indicator and warning for a naval forces at sea, but
they are aimed at installations ashore.

(2) (NU) Force Protection Levels. FP levels, described in Article 18013, form the basis R
for detailed planning and arrangements regarding readiness, personnel, weapons and protective
measures. In association with the implementation of the FP levels, the OTC will promulgate a set
of dedicated internal protection measures (IPROMs) tailored to fulfil the operational requirements
of the tactical scenario where the force is operating. Units’ commanding officers are to implement
policies and guidance through internal protection and security plans in order to accomplish within-
force IPROMs. In addition, units can always raise these measures if deemed necessary, keeping
the OTC informed (FPC/CWC/PWC’s if delegated). Under permission from OTC may request
to reduce internal measures, indicating those IPROMs the unit is unable to comply with and the
reason for it.

(3) (NC) (NMP) Threat Warnings. Generally there is no specific requirement for a dedicated
asymmetric threat warning and the force will establish threat warnings by environment (air, surface,
subsurface, and land). The threat warning is informative only; therefore, force or individual unit
actions are not linked to it automatically. However the OTC (FPC/CWC/PWC’s if delegated) may
sometimes order measures of a temporary nature for use against asymmetric threats when a threat
warning is promulgated (e.g., changing the FP level or implementing IPROMs).

(4) (NC) (NMP) Operating Areas. For FP purposes, and within the OTC’s area of responsibility,
the following areas should be considered:

(a) Escorting Area. Area in which forces are required to assume a FP posture in protection
of HVU or MVs, while transiting across through coastal waters and choke points.

(b) Surveillance Area. Area established in order to allow OTC or designated FPC/CWC/
PWCs, the use of all assets and local shipping or surveillance sensors to develop a recognized
maritime picture (RMP) during transit, specifically the area in the vicinity of escorted units.
The extent of the area will depend on geographic constraints, assets capabilities and perceived
threat.

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(c) Warning Area. Area in which the operational commander considers that maritime
activities might be vulnerable to an asymmetric threat, based upon intelligence sources and
situational awareness from the theatre of operations (TOO). If required, OTC may establish
warning areas within AOR, based on his situational awareness keeping his OPCON informed.

(d) Landward/Seaward Operating Areas. In view of an overall asymmetric threat

assessment, warning areas may include harbours and anchorages with requirements for
protection towards both landward and seaward areas. Due to specific environment and
requirements, these areas are addressed separately and along with other environment FP details.

c. (NU) Direction and Tasking

(1) (NU) Direction. FP guidance must be clearly articulated in OTC’s policies, orders, plans,
directives, and instructions, and disseminated and delegated in a timely manner. It is important that
guidance be passed rapidly to subordinates, to ensure that each level of command understands the
OTC’s intent. It is important that provision be made within a force, as well as in individual ships,
for an organization to coordinate defence and establish degrees of readiness against the threat.
Command responsibilities are described in Chapter 2.

(2) (NU) Internal Protection Measures. The approach to developing protective measures
for assets should be based on a systematic process resulting in an integrated protective system.
The protective system focuses on protecting specific assets against defined threats, to acceptable
levels of protection. The system is organized in depth and contains mutually supporting elements
coordinated to prevent gaps or overlaps in responsibilities and performance.

(3) (NC) (NMP) The following measures are made when considering system-development
procedures:

(a) The available resources.

(b) The assets to be protected.

(c) The threat to specified assets.

(d) The risk levels applicable to specified assets.

(e) The applicable regulatory requirements for protecting the assets.

(f) The applicable level of protection for specified assets against the threat.

(g) Additional vulnerabilities to the assets (based on the threat).

(4) (NC) (NMP) These IPROMs, are described in ATP-74, and consist of a set of measures to be
accomplished by force and individual units, levelled according to the implemented FP level and the
threat assessment, aiming to achieve specific force and unit protection posture while minimizing
vulnerability to all sorts of asymmetric threats, in order to preserve force or unit war-fighting
potential, ensuring compliance of the primary mission.

(5) (NU) Preplanned Responses. When implementing reactions to an expected threat, they
can be aggregated in one common set of IPROMs, tailored as a preplanned response, aiming for
timely coordination and execution of asymmetric threat defence.

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(6) (NC) (NMP) A preplanned response, with various levels for different timing or threat distances,
is called the BANZAI plan and is described in depth in ATP-74.

(7) (NC) (NMP) BANZAI Plan Initiation. The preplanned responses are implemented by the
OTC (or FPC/CWC/PWC’s if delegated) order with the code word BANZAI, followed by a suffix
letter referring to the threat environment and bearing from reporting unit. If time permits, the
message may be amplified in plain language. Reactions can also be included at this point. These
are made automatically, collectively, and/or individually by independent units.

(8) (NC) (NMP) BANZAI Area. The area within which all units react to the same BANZAI plan.
Unless otherwise ordered, it is coincident with the established force security zone. However, under
certain circumstances, it may be necessary to select a larger area, which should be promulgated in
the OPGEN.

(9) (NU) Rules of Engagement. ROE are a primary method of authorizing FP measures.
Associated directives and instructions regarding ROE and other coordinating instructions must be
synchronized with FP measures.

(10) (NU) Tasking. Maximum use should be made of standardized formats for operation orders,
OPLANs, and other forms of directives for disseminating FP-specific guidance and information.
Nevertheless, the preferred tasking method will be by means of an OPTASK FP HARBOUR or an
OPGEN/OPTASK’s issued by the OTC (FPC/CWC/PWC’s if delegated).

(11) (NU) The Force Protection Operations Centre (FPOC). A FPOC should be
established onboard the OTC’s flagship, if FP functions not delegated, or, otherwise, onboard the
FPC. Following are the operational requirements for the unit hosting a FPOC:

(a) (NU) Accurate RMP available, with ability to exchange RAP with CRCs.

(b) (NU) Voice communications established with all force units.

(c) (NU) Ability to effectively direct FP weapons under the limits imposed by ROE or
self-defence and extended self-defence.

(d) (NU) Ability to record events and decisions taken, including those concerning warnings
conducted on suspected and hostile contacts.

18012 (NU) Security Alert States

a. (NR) (NMP) Declaration of Alert States. The declaration of alert states and the
implementations of measures may be decreed by the responsible authorities as a result of intelligence
received, or by the local commander following receipt of intelligence through official sources or
following an anonymous threat message. The alert states may be suffixed with the geographical
area deemed at risk.

b. (NR) (NMP) Security Alert States Definitions. The responsible authority ashore or the
operational commander for a designated TOO ashore may order the following security alert states
(IAW AJP-2.2, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Intelligence and Security Procedures):

(1) (NR) (NMP) Alert State ALPHA. There is a general threat of possible terrorist activity
against military installations and personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, but
the circumstances do not justify the full implementation of the measures of Alert State BRAVO.
The measures in this alert state must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

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(2) (NR) (NMP) Alert State BRAVO. There is an increased and more predictable threat of
terrorist activity. It must be possible to maintain this state for a period of weeks without causing
undue hardship, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating relations with
local authorities.

(3) (NR) (NMP) Alert State CHARLIE. This applies when an incident occurs or when intelligence
is received which indicates that some form of terrorist action against military installations and
personnel is an imminent possibility. The implementation of this measure for more than a short
period will probably create hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its
personnel.

(4) (NR) (NMP) Alert State DELTA. This applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack
has taken place or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific
location or person is likely. Normally this alert state is issued as a localized warning.

c. (NU) Ordering Alert States. The security alert states and/or selected security measures may be
ordered by the appropriate signals from ATP-01, Vol. II.

d. (NR) (NMP) Classification of Alert States. The full definitions of the alert states are
NATO-RESTRICTED. The names of the alert states, used alone, are NATO-UNCLASSIFIED and can
be used over insecure communication lines. This is a rapid way of passing initial information, which
can be followed up by an amplifying message whose classification would depend on the sensitivity of
its contents (e.g., source protection).

18013 (NU) Force Protection Levels

a. (NU) To simplify the FP posture against the threat, the OTC will implement force protection levels
(FPLs) that form the basis for detailed planning and arrangements regarding readiness, personnel,
weapons, protection measures, and other factors like external support and liaison with local authorities.

b. (NU) FPLs and the associated measures provide commanders with a common mechanism to
counter an identified threat to their respective forces, to increase vigilance and reduce risk. FPLs may
be implemented throughout the Alliance to apply to all NATO commands, or locally in response to a
local threat. FPLs complement the NATO security alert states. See the NATO Crisis Response System
Manual (NCRSM) for more information on the NATO security alert states.

c. (NU) To achieve this, five levels of force protection are defined. Each level has IPROMs associated
with it, with a commensurate scaling of manned weapons, lookouts and other escalating protection
measures that would correlate the established security alert state, threat warning and other available
indications and warnings.

d. (NU) The implementation of these FPLs would vary for different types of vessels (due to different
weapon fits and numbers of ships in company), and, in addition, detail could be varied within each
FPL for each occasion of implementation. This variation will allow the OTC to have pre-planned
degrees of response that can be adopted quickly yet retain the flexibility to cover all eventualities.

18014 (NU) Relationship Between Security Alert States and Force Protection Levels

a. (NR) (NMP) Security alert states provide reference to the establishment and implementation of
general security and protection measures, to be adopted in military facilities, including naval units
and naval forces.

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b. (NC) (NMP) Under the perception of increasing threat the security alert state will change,
thus increasing the number of adopted protection measures, aiming to prevent, deter and/or face
the asymmetric threat, either sabotage or direct attack, comprising also an increment in the damage
control readiness and capability.

18015 (NU) Definitions of Force Protection Levels

a. (NU) FP Level 5. Normal security measures. These measures apply when there is no expected
threat against Allied assets.

b. (NU) FP Level 4. These measures apply when there is an increased general threat, the nature and
extent of which are unpredictable, against Allied assets and when the circumstances do not justify the
full implementation of the measures contained in a more vigilant FPL. It may be necessary, however,
to implement certain selected measures from more vigilant FPL, as a result of intelligence received,
or as a deterrent. The measures outlined in FPL 4 must be applied with care to permit sustainability.

c. (NU) FP Level 3. These measures apply when there is an increased and more predictable threat
against NATO assets. It must be possible to maintain these measures for a period of weeks without
causing undue hardship, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating relations
with local authorities.

d. (NU) FP Level 2. These measures apply when intelligence is received indicating that some form
of unlawful action or attack is imminent against the Alliance. The implementation of this FPL for
more than a short period will disrupt and inconvenience normal operations.

e. (NU) FP Level 1. These measures apply after an unlawful action or attack has occurred.

18016 (NU) Implementation of Force Protection Levels

a. (NU) Declaration of FP Levels. The declaration of a FPL and the implementation of

IPROMs may be ordered by a joint force commander, the OTC (FPC/CWC/PWC’s if delegated) or a
commanding officer. Any such declaration must be based upon the threat assessment. Declaration of
or changes in a FPL must be reported by the most expedient means and subsequently confirmed via
message to subordinate units and to higher-level commanders.

b. (NR) (NMP) Signalling. The FPL is established or modified by means of a force protection level
implementation signal (FPLIMPL), as described in ATP-74 and APP-11.

c. (NU) Exemptions. A local commander may change a FPL to increase the vigilance directed
by higher command, but may not change a FPL to reduce the vigilance directed by higher command
without obtaining permission through the chain of command. All unconfirmed information received
should be referred to superiors in the chain of command and appropriate Alliance operations and
intelligence authorities for authentication.

18017 (NU) Force Protection Level Developing Process

a. (NC) (NMP) Before deploying to the TOO, or when deemed necessary (e.g., prior to units
proceeding to a port visit), the operational commander level or OTC will issue “Requests for
Information” to appropriate NMICC or Allied National Authorities, concerning the security situation
and the asymmetric threat situation (e.g., terrorist groups activities, organized crime, maritime piracy)
in the TOO, harbours and approaches or special areas of interest.

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b. (NC) (NMP) On reception of intelligence indicators or EEI, the OTC will conduct an overall
assessment of the situation and establish the appropriate FPL.

c. (NC) (NMP) The OTC (or FPC/CWC/PWC’s if delegated) will coordinate the force response
through the establishment of the appropriate readiness and internal protection measures.

18018–18019 Spare

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CHAPTER 19 Unmanned Systems

19000 Overview

Historically, maritime unmanned systems have been used as platforms for the collection of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance. However, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of MUS in tactical
missions. It has become common place in many mission areas to see imagery from a MUS including
reconnaissance or providing laser designation for manned aircraft. MUS have enhanced the situational
awareness of unit-level commanders by providing more accurate and immediate over-the-horizon
targeting and battle damage assessment. The adaptability, versatility, and cost effectiveness of MUS
continue to expand the commander’s warfighting capability and have become indispensable to successful
maritime operations.
19001 Background

Allied forces have a history of successfully operating MUS in maritime environments. In the years
since the Gulf War, MUS have proliferated rapidly throughout the armed forces. Several ship-based/
ship-capable MUS are currently being employed by nations and can be operated by either military
personnel or in some cases by contractors with varying degrees of supervision/oversight by military
personnel.
19002 Types of Unmanned Systems

Unmanned aircraft system is defined as a self-propelled air vehicle whose operation is either fully
autonomous (pre-programmed or real time adaptive mission control) or under minimal supervisory
control.
Unmanned surface vehicle is defined as a self-propelled surface vehicle whose operation is either fully
autonomous (pre-programmed or real time adaptive mission control) or under minimal supervisory
control.
Unmanned undersea vehicle is defined as a self-propelled submersible whose operation is either fully
autonomous (pre-programmed or real time adaptive mission control) or under minimal supervisory
control.
19003 Ship-based Missions

Ship-based MUS can be a powerful ISR tool for the combined force maritime component commander
(CFMCC). This section provides an overview of ship-based MUS operations in support of a variety of
maritime mission sets. See Figure 19-1 for key concepts.
19004 Mine Countermeasures

MCM mission requirements are driven by the maritime forces need to rapidly establish safe operating
areas, transit routes and SLOC. MUS can provide capability in a number of MCM mission areas including
detection, classification, localization, jamming and neutralizing operations. In addition, MUS can provide
commanders with intelligence on minefields, obstacles, and fortifications on the beach and inland areas.

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KEY CONCEPTS

MUS are particularly effective in the Fix, Track, and Assess phases of Dynamic Targeting.
MUS crewmembers should receive the same threat recognition and rules of engagement training as
their manned aircrew counterparts.
MUS provide valuable support to a variety of air, surface and subsurface missions

MUS can be used as spotters for naval fire missions.

Conducting transit operations while flying MUS requires careful pre-planning.

Ship-based MUS have a proven track record in maritime security operations.

Extended covert surveillance of suspect vessels makes MUS a valuable tool when conducting SW,
MIO and VBSS.

Figure 19-1. Key Concepts

19005 Expeditionary and Amphibious Operations

In a naval context, expeditionary warfare describes an operation initiated from the sea, usually on short
notice, consisting of forward deployed, or rapidly deployable, self-sustaining naval forces tailored to
achieve a clearly stated objective. Perhaps the best known form of expeditionary warfare is the amphibious
operation. Table 19-1 provides a brief summary of supporting roles that an embarked MUS could fill in
support of amphibious warfare. Amphibious operations take place across the range of military operations
and often provide support to other maritime operations.

19006 Maritime Security Operations

One of the major aspects of any MSO effort is the task of locating, identifying, and tracking vessels. AIS
is a valuable tool in MSO, significantly reducing force tasking and the number of vehicles queried. MUS
equipped with AIS are obviously a force multiplier for this mission.
MUS equipped with radar, AIS, or ESM can assist in sorting out the surface picture. MUS equipped with
EO/IR systems can be used to identify vessels and track contacts of interest.
Maritime security operations describe the actions of naval forces to combat sea-based terrorism and other
illegal activities. MUS provide a decisive advantage with over the horizon ISR and data link capability.
In addition, MSO may require inspections and, if necessary, boardings of vessels, known as visit, board,
search and seizure (VBSS). Extended covert surveillance of suspect vessels makes MUS a valuable tool
when conducting SW, MIO, and VBSS. Employment of MUS to gather critical data can help minimise
risk to personnel and high-value assets during these operations.

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Table 19-1. US Support Missions for Amphibious Warfare

ARG/MEU MISSION POTENTIAL US SUPPORT

Amphibious Assaults, Raids and Conduct reconnaissance of beach approach lanes to

Demonstrations (pre-assault identify topography, obstacles, and other potential hazards,
reconnaissance) as well as civilian and enemy activity in landing zones
and other objective areas. Provide non-obtrusive tactical
reconnaissance of helicopter ingress/egress routes and
helicopter landing zones (HLZs).

Amphibious Assaults, Raids and Contribute to common tactical picture; provide over watch
Demonstrations (ship-to-shore to craft in their assault lanes, craft landing zones (CLZs),
movement) etc. Assist in identifying any unknown surface craft posing
threat to assault waves; detect initial enemy reactions.

Amphibious Assaults, Raids and Provide pre/post-strike reconnaissance, spotting for

Demonstrations (fire support) indirect fires (NSFS and shore-based), and post-attack
bomb damage assessment (BDA).

Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Locate and assess condition of downed aircraft, survey
Personnel (TRAP) Missions HLZs, ingress/egress routes, and provide warning of
approaching threats. Maintain updates on survivor‘s
position and status.

Non-Combatant Evacuation Surveillance of key NEO collection points, landing zones,

Operations (NEO) and main evacuation routes. Indications of potential hostile
reactions, unruly crowds, etc.

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Initial damage assessment, trafficability assessment for

Relief Operations (HA/DR) and main supply routes, locating groups of survivors requiring
Defence Support to Civil Authorities assistance. IR capabilities can be particularly effective in
(DSCA) missions assisting with the location of survivors during periods of
darkness.

Strike Warfare Pre- and post-attack target damage assessment.

19007 Counter-Piracy

MUS support for this mission area could include maritime surveillance of suspect vessels, VBSS support,
and identifying possible pirate shore sites from among numerous littoral fishing villages. MUS can be
used to establish pattern of life (POL) data for suspected bases or mother ships. They can provide security
over watch of suspected pirate vessels and/or seized vessels. If a vessel is confirmed hostile, they can aid
in targeting and engagement. Like any other ISR mission conducted against shore sites, MUS operations
within territorial seas may (depending on the ROE and geopolitical situation) have to be coordinated with
the host nation ahead of time.

19008 Antisubmarine Warfare

MUS, specifically UUVs are a force multiplier for ASW operations and can operate in a variety of
conditions including foul weather and high sea states, deep and shallow water, tropical and arctic
environments and day and night operations. Additionally, UUVs operate fully submerged with potentially
low acoustic and electromagnetic signatures. In particular, they offer robust capability in the “Hold at
Risk” scenario where MUS can monitor submarines that exit a port or choke point.

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19009 Transit and Passage Operations

While all ships enjoy complete freedom of movement and operation on and over the high seas, navigational
rights are restricted within recognized territorial seas, straits, and archipelagic seas. A vessel conducting
innocent passage may not launch and recover aircraft (including MUS). Vessels conducting transit passage
(in a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 38 international strait) must
proceed continuously and expeditiously from one end to the other of the strait in their normal modes of
operation—which could include overflight by a MUS in company. Vessels conducting archipelagic sea
lane (ASL) transit are subject to generally the same restrictions as in transit passage.
So, while a warship may not have its MUS loiter independently over a strait or archipelagic sea lane,
it may be appropriate for a warship to operate a MUS while in transit to assist with force protection.
Both the transiting warship and the MUS must exercise due regard for the safety of navigation while
performing a continuous and expeditious transit. In any case, mission planners should ensure that the
pre-programmed lost link rally point is located outside of territorial seas and the strait and/or archipelagic
sea lane.
19010 Search and Rescue

Narrow field of view (FOV) parameters limit the ability of a MUS to conduct visual searches in SAR
situations. However, there are still a number of ways in which a MUS could aid an on-going SAR effort.
While a MUS makes a less than ideal daytime visual search platform over a wide area, it can be used
effectively to search the immediate area around a SAR datum. Additionally, its IR capabilities may make
the MUS a useful asset for an IR datum search being conducted at night. The MUS can also assist in a
SAR mission by serving as a communications relay platform.
If a survivor in the water has been located by other search means, but rescue will be delayed pending
arrival of suitable recovery platforms, a MUS can be used to maintain visual contact with the survivor. It
could also be used to keep track of floating debris fields which, though not the primary focus of the SAR,
might prove useful to an accident investigation if recovered later.
19011 Naval Surface Fire Support

Fire support missions can come in a variety of forms, to include battlefield air interdiction (BAI), CAS,
artillery, and NSFS. These actions can be carried out individually or as part of a complex combined arms
mission executed from the supporting arms coordinating centre (SACC) or a fire support coordination
centre ashore. They may be pre-planned missions designated on an ATO, or missions conducted in
reaction to emerging battlefield intelligence. In each instance, the MUS can provide valuable support.
A MUS can be used as a passive observer, providing pre- and post-strike imagery, or it can take a more
active role in assisting with attack execution.
The current set of ship-based MUS are likely to be treated as direct support assets, meaning that mission
tasking is unlikely to come from beyond the naval component. The one important exception to this rule
are those occasions where MUS are supporting SOF missions.
19012 Counter-FAC/FIAC Mission

A reasonably inexpensive collection of small boats, if not properly identified and engaged, could inflict
serious damage to vessels possessing superior firepower. FAC and FIAC can be described as small craft
built to operate in shallow coastal waters that pack an offensive punch that is potentially deadly to large
combatants. Tonnage varies from 300 pound personal watercraft to 200 ton (or greater) guided missile
patrol craft. Speed capabilities are typically greater than 30 knots. Weapons vary from small arms, to
surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and SAMs, or they may be loaded with explosives and employed as
waterborne improvised explosive devices (WBIED).

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Any ship-based MUS is capable of providing valuable assistance to the Find, Fix, Track, and Assess
phases of targeting.
Specific ways in which MUS can assist the SUWC/SCC and individual ships defending themselves
during a FAC/FIAC encounter include:
 Observation of potential embarkation/marshalling points and anticipated avenues of approach.

 Imagery of raid formations and rough estimates of attacking force size and composition.

 VID of larger FAC participating in the raid.

 Visual evidence of armament being carried by FAC/FIAC crews.

 Observation of information/activities which can aid the SUWC/SCC or ship’s tactical action
officer (TAO)/commanding officer with ROE and hostile intent determinations.

 Positional updates on swarm and advisories of erratic manoeuvring or sudden course changes.

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CHAPTER 20 Maritime Information Warfare

20000 Information Warfare

(NU) Information warfare emphasises the importance of information as a cross-cutting function that
formulates the backbone of other warfare areas. Principle warfare commanders will be required to fight
in an increasingly complex information environment (IE) and therefore must consider the application
of IW across the full spectrum of operations: warfighting, maritime security and defence engagement.
Commanders will need to defend their use of the IE to enable freedom of action and their ability to
conduct offensive and defensive activities within the IE.
20001 Command and Control in Information Warfare

a. (NU) The IWC is both a supporting and supported commander and assists the OTC/CWC in IW
related mission areas and taskings in theater. The IWC is responsible to the CWC to create, plan
and execute effects to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or deny the decisionmaking of adversaries while
protecting friendly forces. The IWC continuously assesses the IE to support warfare commanders’
objectives in accordance with CWC direction. Because the IWC is either in a supportive role or
is being supported by the other PWCs, it is important to understand that the IWC must be capable
of providing or maintaining sufficient tactical awareness to manage the information operations for
the force. In the early stages of any operation, it is estimated that the IWC will be in the supported
role principally concentrating his main efforts on the day-to-day functions and administrative
responsibilities such as setting up networks and communications links as well as ensuring defensive
cyber protocols are in-place, well understood and practiced. These two functional areas are called:
assured C2 and battlespace awareness. However, due to the uniqueness of the IWC, he will also have
functions whereby he is shaping the battlespace and thus require other warfare commanders to assist
in the execution of those duties assigned. This functional area is called integrated and joint operations.
Some examples of the IWC as the supported commander include but are not limited to:

(1) (NU) Countertargeting, EMCON/OPSEC, electromagnetic manoeuver warfare, TACSIT

management and assessment, defensive cyber operations, and maintaining the strategic to tactical
level narrative; and

(2) (NU) Coordinating the taskings of EW and surveillance air assets as part of the IWC functions
in the intelligence preparation of the battlespace.

b. (NU) The IWC additionally supports the operational level efforts to achieve electromagnetic
spectrum control. The IWC must be able to sense and exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, at the
same time maintain the forces’ electromagnetic agility and conduct electromagnetic fires. The IWC
must maintain the ability to assess and shape the IE, maintain information superiority, develop and
execute information operations effects and integrate those actions into the TG’s scheme of manoeuvre.
This close coordination between the warfare commanders is vital to the IW plan. As MIW warfighting
concepts evolve to counter the adversaries’ IW capabilities, it will be more evident that the IWC will
need to be in a supported role vice supporting role. The pressure on the TG, through the technological
developments of the adversary have resulted in the emergence of an increasingly complicated IE, which
is contested not only by our adversaries, but by all other parties. This presents NATO opportunities
to exploit, but also is a threat to our ability to defend. The IWC must adapt the conduct of operations,
from the strategic to the tactical level of war. He must effectively understand and fight in not only the
maritime, land, air and space domains, but also the IE that is dynamic, operating in sometimes limited
or denied environments as a result of an adversaries’ or the TG’s action.

20002 Information Technology

(NU) The emphasis in maintaining interoperability amongst NATO is a critical enabler to achieving
decision superiority. The IWC must maximise the use of the TG’s technology based solutions. The

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IWC needs to understand how to optimise sensor acquisition, fusion, and information dissemination
across the battlespace. As systems and their availability in maritime platforms develop, it will become
increasingly apparent that the provision of equipment to connect to an increased mass of information is a
far too simplistic approach to the problem. The skill and discipline of the IWC is to reduce the excessive
grappling of information through the application of warfare procedures and plans that maximise the
exploitation of that information and achieve information superiority and decision advantage. Technology
must support the information flow in a timely manner to inform decisive military decisions and actions
that generate a battle-winning effect on the adversary.
20003 Information Environment

(NU) The IWC needs to develop a comprehensive understanding of the IE to plan and conduct IW. The
IE must therefore be an important consideration when identifying the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIRs) and allocating resources. In order to identify those CCIRs, the IWC must fully
understand what information-related capabilities are available in the TG, what and how systems supports
the exchange of information to meet the CCIR and/or how does one access that specific piece of
information in order to fight in any one of the battlespaces.
20004 Information Superiority

(NU) Information superiority is the competitive advantage gained through the continuous, directed
and adaptive employment of relevant information functions, capabilities and behaviours. It is critical
to mission success and treats information as a centre of gravity which can be exploited, defended and
attacked. It enables the commander to better understand the situation and make decisions quicker and
better than their adversary, thus maintaining the tactical advantage. The commander can then shape the
IE to their advantage and to the disadvantage of their adversary. This can increase the commander’s
freedom of action and manoeuvre whilst limiting the adversary’s. Unable to keep pace, the adversary will
be presented, and ideally overwhelmed, with new problems before they can solve current ones.
20005 Assured Command and Control

(NU) Assured C2 protects our systems, our understanding, and our will and ability to operate in the IE.
Assured C2 is the set-up, establishment, and the protection of existing networks and communications
links and the resumptions of infected systems/files/databases. The commander’s information exchange
requirements must be coordinated through the operational and tactical level units. Due to the all-pervasive
nature of the IEs and cyberspace operations, defensive information measures and resumption plans must
be implemented with equal proficiency to ensure assured C2.
20006 Battlespace Awareness

(NU) Battlespace awareness (BSA) and its components are critical to all operations. It is the commander’s
tactical understanding of the strategic, operational and tactical environment in which the TF/TG is
operating. The IWC ensures that BSA is provided to the commander in order for him to understand the
tactical situation and accomplish a mission. BSA also enables the commander to adjust any scheme of
maneouvre while/if the situation develops. Failure to prioritize BSA activities increases the chances of
mission failure by increasing the likelihood of the adversary seizing the initiative placing the force in
an unfavourable condition. BSA encompasses intelligence and METOC analysis, the COP and fusion of
all tactical data obtained from sensors, organic and non-organic, as well as the strategic understanding
gained from joint task force commanders, regional operational level commanders and other information
found within operational plans and directives.
20007 Maritime Information Warfare—Integrated and Joint Operations

(NU) The maritime force must be proactive, but more importantly agile to react to a change in the IE and
commander’s plans to achieve mission effects. The IWC within maritime information warfare facilitates

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the relationships relative to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command when conducting
NATO missions and operations in order to achieve success in the IE. NATO’s approach to joint operations
at all levels will integrate a full spectrum approach through the various levels of command down to the
tactical level. The joint targeting process will be applied to ensure integration of IRCs with the other
lethal and non-lethal means. For those information activities developed at the strategic level, and planned
at the operational level, it is up to the IWC to formulate and then execute plans in accordance with the
OTC scheme of maneouvre.

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LEXICON
SECTION I—GLOSSARY

Terms and Definitions from AAP-06 are in italics.

acknowledgement. A message from the addressee informing the originator that his communication
has been received and is understood.

acoustic countermeasures (ACM). That division of acoustic warfare involving actions taken
to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum. Acoustic
countermeasures involve intentional underwater acoustic emissions for deception or jamming.

acoustic protective measures (APM). That division of acoustic warfare involving actions taken to
ensure friendly effective use of the underwater acoustic spectrum, despite the enemy’s use of acoustic
energy. Acoustic protective measures involve anti-acoustic warfare support measures and anti-acoustic
countermeasures, and may not involve underwater acoustic emissions.

acoustic warfare (AW). In an underwater environment, the use of acoustic energy to provoke, exploit,
restrict or prevent hostile use of the acoustic spectrum and the implementation of any measures taken
to restrict its use to friendly forces.

acoustic warfare support measures (AWSM). In an underwater environment, actions taken to

search for, intercept and identify radiated acoustic energy for the purpose of exploiting such radiation.
Note: The use of these measures involves no intentional underwater acoustic emission and is generally
not detectable by hostile forces.

active electronic protective measures. Detectable measures, such as altering transmitter

parameters as necessary, to ensure effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

active mine countermeasures. Countermeasures directed toward the destruction of mines after they
have been laid—including minesweeping, minehunting, and explosive ordnance disposal operations.

advance. The distance gained by a ship in the direction of the original course while turning.

airborne alert. A state of aircraft readiness wherein combat-equipped aircraft are airborne and ready
for immediate action.

airborne early warning (AEW). Air surveillance provided by AEW aircraft equipped with search
and height-finding radar and communications equipment.

air controller. An individual especially trained for and assigned the duty of the control (by use of
radio, radar, or other means) of such aircraft as may be allotted to him for operation within his area.

air corridor. A restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and established for the
purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces.

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air resource element coordinator (AREC). The officer who is assigned responsibility for
coordinating the employment of organic air assets other than those assigned to the helicopter element
coordinator.

aircraft control unit (ACU). A unit with facilities and personnel, including controllers, for conducting
aircraft control and which exercises tactical control of aircraft or a unit(s).

aircraft handover. The process of transferring control of aircraft from one controlling authority to
another.

air-to-air refuelling (AAR) towline. The line along which a tanker aircraft will be stationed for the
purpose of refuelling combat aircraft.

airway. A control area or portion thereof established in the form of a corridor marked with radio
navigational aids.

alert state. The maximum time in minutes required to bring an aircraft or weapons system (or part of
it) to immediate availability.

altitude. The vertical distance of a level, a point, or an object considered as a point, measured from
mean sea level.

anti-air warfare area. An area prescribed by the OTC which is kept under constant surveillance and
within which any air threat is opposed.

antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC). The officer delegated some or all of the OTC’s
detailed responsibilities for antisubmarine warfare, and granted the tactical control authority to
accomplish the associated missions and tasked to carry out those responsibilities. In ASW operations
with SSN(DS) in the direct support role, the ASWC is that officer who has tactical control of the ASW
assets, including the SSN(DS).

antisubmarine warfare free area (ASWFA). In naval warfare, a waterspace management area
in which no friendly submarines are operating and in which there are no restrictions on the use of
antisubmarine weapons.

antisurface ship missile (ASSM). Any missile (ASM, SASS, SSM, USM) used in the role of
attacking surface units.

approach corridor. A safety corridor established for direct return of friendly aircraft through the vital
area, including missile engagement zones if necessary.

approach sector. A safety sector more flexible than an approach corridor established for direct
return of friendly aircraft through the vital area, including missile engagement zones if necessary,
and normally designated in conjunction with the stationing in the sector of a tacan-equipped approach
control picket.

area operations. In maritime usage, operations conducted in a geographical area and not related to
the protection of a specific force.

associated support. In naval usage, operations in which a designated unit operates independently
of a specified force or group, but is tasked to provide contact information to, receive intelligence from
and, if authorized, to cooperate and coordinate operations with the supported force. Tactical control
of the unit remains with the assigning authority who coordinates tasking and movement of the unit in
response to the requirements of the supported force commander.

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asymmetric attack. Actions undertaken by state or non-state parties to circumvent or negate an

opponent’s strengths and capitalise on perceived weaknesses through the exploitation of dissimilar
values, strategies, organizations and capabilities. Such actions are capable, by design or fault, of
achieving disproportionate effects, thus gaining the instigator an advantage probably not attainable
through conventional means.

asymmetric threat. A threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar means or methods
to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses to obtain a
disproportionate result.

authentication. A security measure designed to protect a communication system against fraudulent

transmissions.

axis. A reference line originating at formation or disposition centre used for stationing units or
formations respectively.

barrier combat air patrol. A patrol of fighter aircraft employed between a force and an objective
area as a barrier across the probable direction of enemy attack. Used as far from the force as control
conditions permit, to give added protection against raids along the most direct approach routes.

barrier line. The line formed by a series of static devices or mobile units arranged for the purpose of
detecting, denying passage to, or destroying enemy submarines.

base course. A reference course or direction desired to be made good when evasive steering is being
carried out.

base speed. The speed resulting along the base course when evasive steering is being carried out.

bearing. The horizontal angle measured clockwise from a reference direction to a specified direction.

blind bombing zone. A restricted area (air, land, or sea) established for the purpose of permitting air
operations, unrestricted by the operations or possible attack of friendly forces.

bomb lines. Lines designated over land areas by ground forces which can be identified easily by
terrain features in order to delimit attacks by friendly aircraft.

brevity code. A code which provides no security but which has as its sole purpose the shortening of
messages rather than the concealment of their content.

BULLPEN (NC) (NMP). Code word for a submarine-generated search area (SGSA). See definition for
SGSA.

cavitation speed. The speed for an individual ship at which propeller blade cavitation is the
predominant factor in the ship’s acoustic signature.

Cartesian coordinate grid. The grid (Cartesian coordinate) used for rapid reporting of position in a
form compatible with ADP systems (see Chapter 2 for detailed description).

chaff. Strips of frequency-cut metal foil, wire, or metallized glass fibre used to reflect electromagnetic
energy, usually dropped from aircraft or expelled from shells or rockets as a radar countermeasure.

chain of command. The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through
which command is exercised.

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chainsaw. A two-phase AAW tactic designed to provide threat detection and engagement at extended
ranges from the Battle Group.

change of operational control (CHOP). The date and time (Greenwich Mean Time/Greenwich
Civil Time) at which the responsibility for operational control of a force or unit passes from one
operational control authority to another.

checkpoint. Geographical location on land or water above which the position of an aircraft in flight
may be determined by observation or by electronic means.

checksum digits. The summation of the numbers in positions, courses, speeds, and times to avoid
confusion caused by errors in transmission of RATT signals.

circular formation. A tactical arrangement of units stationed on concentric circles and oriented
clockwise from a formation axis to provide flexibility of manoeuvre while at the same time retaining
protection from air and subsurface threats.

close ASW action. An action in which one or more ASW units attempt to engage an enemy submarine
from within the TDA.

code word. A word which has been assigned a classification and a classified meaning to safeguard
intentions and information regarding a classified plan or operation.

column. A line in which ships form directly ahead or astern of the line guide.

combat air patrol (CAP). An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected,
the critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defence area, for the purpose of intercepting and
destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their targets.

command. The authority vested in a member of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and
control of military forces.

command system. The command system is formed by the chain of command and includes the means
necessary to distribute orders and collect, evaluate, and disseminate information.

communications intelligence (COMINT). Intelligence derived from electromagnetic

communications and communication systems by other than intended recipients or users.

composite warfare commander (CWC). That officer to whom the officer in tactical command has
assigned some or all of his authority and responsibilities for the overall direction and control of the
defence of his force.

confusion. Measures taken to make an enemy’s target identification and selection more difficult.

consolidation. The transfer of all types of cargo between replenishment ships to enable some of them
to be emptied so that they can return to base or reload.

contact lost. A target tracking term used to signify that a target believed to be still within sensor
coverage is temporarily lost but the termination of track plotting is not warranted.

contact mine. A mine detonated by physical contact.

contact report. A report indicating any detection of the enemy.

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control. The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organizations,
or other organizations not normally under his command, that encompasses the responsibility for
implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

control ship. The ship in a replenishment unit that controls the operation.

convergence zone. The annular zone, which occurs in the deep ocean, where spread sound rays
refracted from the depths arrive concentrated near the surface. The repeated occurrence of these
zones as concentric annuli to several hundred miles from the sound source depends on the refraction
of sound rays at depth and the reflection of these rays at the surface.

convoy. A number of merchant ships or naval auxiliaries, or both, usually escorted by warships and/or
aircraft, or a single merchant ship or naval auxiliary under surface escort, assembled and organized
for the purpose of passage together.

convoy escort. An escort to protect a convoy of vehicles from being scattered, destroyed or captured.

convoy route. The specific route assigned to each convoy by the appropriate routing authority.

coordination. The establishment in operations, according to a changing situation, of an orderly

correlation in time and place of planned actions in order to achieve the best overall result. In the
maritime environment, the term coordination may include certain specified control functions.

course made good over the ground (COG). The direction in which a ship has proceeded,
measured between two geographic positions.

course made good through the water (CTW). The direction in which the ship is proceeding,
resulting from the effect of weather but not the effect of current or tidal stream on the signalled or base
course.

critical angle towed-array system (CATAS). A towed-array system whose depth is dependent
upon towing ship speed and the length and weight of the towing cable only.

crossover zone. The airspace between a missile engagement zone and a fighter engagement zone to
separate the two for anti-air warfare and air coordination purposes.

customer ship. The ship in a replenishment unit that receives the transferred personnel and/or
supplies.

damage control. In naval usage, measures necessary aboard ship to preserve and re-establish water-
tight integrity, stability, manoeuvrability, and offensive power; to control list and trim; to effect rapid
repairs of materiel; to limit the spread of, and provide adequate protection from, fire; to limit the
spread of, remove the contamination by, and provide adequate protection from, toxic agents; and to
provide for care of wounded personnel.

data link. A communication link suitable for transmission of data.

data link reference point (DLRP). A geographic reference position representing the origin of a
Cartesian coordinate system in which track positions are reported within a force.

datum. Any numerical or geometrical quantity or set of such quantities which may serve as reference
or base for other quantities. Where the concept is geometric, the plural form is “datums” in contrast
to the normal plural “data.”

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datum error. An estimate of the degree of accuracy in the reported position of datum.

datum time. The time when contact with a submarine or suspected submarine was lost.

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification
of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

deck alert. An aircraft alert state expressing the time in minutes required for a specified number and
type of aircraft to become airborne after the order to launch has been given.

defence in depth. In maritime operations, the stationing of mutually supporting units or formations
designed to absorb and progressively weaken an attack, prevent initial observations of the whole
formation or disposition by the enemy, and allow the officer in tactical command to manoeuvre to
oppose the threat.

degree of readiness. The amount of operational capability of a unit which is currently available.

delegation of authority. An action by which a commander assigns to a subordinate commander a

clearly stated part of his authority.

deliberate attack. A type of offensive action characterized by preplanned coordinated employment of

fire power and manoeuvre to close with and destroy or capture the enemy.

departure point. A navigational check point used by aircraft as a marker for setting course.

depressed towed-array system (DTAS). A towed-array system which is taken to desired depth by
a towed body or depressor.

detection. The discovery by any means of the presence of a person, object or phenomenon of potential
military significance.

direction. The process of planning, decisionmaking, establishing priorities, formulating policies, and
imposing decisions.

direct support. 1. The support provided by a unit not attached or under the command of the supported
unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. 2. In
maritime usage, operations related to the protection of a specific force by other units, normally under
the tactical control of that force.

dispersion. The spreading or separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities which are
usually concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability.

disposition. 1. Distribution of the elements of a command within an area, usually the exact location of
each unit headquarters and the deployment of the forces subordinate to it. 2. A prescribed arrangement
of the stations to be occupied by the several formations and single ships of a fleet, for any purpose,
such as cruising, approach, maintaining contact, or battle.

disposition axis. A reference line for stationing two or more formations in relation to each other.

dissemination. The timely conveyance of intelligence in an appropriate form and by any suitable
means, to those who need it.

distance. The space in yards between ships in a line.

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distraction. Measures taken to offer alternative targets to a weapons control or missile homing system
so that a false target is selected.
diversion. A change made in a prescribed route for operational or tactical reasons. Except in the case
of aircraft, a diversion order will not constitute a change of destination.
division. A tactical unit/formation as follows: a. a major administrative and tactical unit/formation
which combines in itself the necessary arms and services required for sustained combat, larger than
a regiment/brigade and smaller than a corps; b. a number of naval vessels of similar type grouped
together for operational and administrative command, or a tactical unit of a naval aircraft squadron,
consisting of two or more sections; c. an air division is an air combat organization normally consisting
of two or more wings with appropriate service units. The combat wings of an air division will normally
contain similar type units.
drifting mine. A buoyant or neutrally buoyant mine free to move under the influence of waves, wind,
current, or tide.
electromagnetic spectrum. The entire and orderly distribution of electromagnetic waves according
to their frequency or wavelength. Note: The electromagnetic spectrum includes radio waves,
microwaves, heat radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, electromagnetic cosmic rays
and gamma rays.
electronic countermeasures (ECM). That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken
to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum through the use of
electromagnetic energy. There are three subdivisions of electronic countermeasures: electronic
jamming, electronic deception and electronic neutralization.
electronic deception. In electronic countermeasures, the deliberate radiation, re-radiation,
alteration, absorption or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse,
distract, or seduce an enemy or his electronic systems.
electronic intelligence (ELINT). Intelligence derived from electromagnetic, non-communications
transmissions.
electronic jamming. The deliberate radiation, reradiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy
with the object of impairing the effectiveness of hostile electronic devices, equipment or systems.
electronic neutralization. In electronic countermeasures, the deliberate use of electromagnetic
energy to either temporarily or permanently damage enemy devices which rely exclusively on the
electromagnetic spectrum.
electronic order of battle (EOB). A list of emitters used by a force or in a scenario with specific
information on the electromagnetic characteristics, parameters, locations and platforms of these
emitters.
electronic protective measures (EPM). That division of electronic warfare involving actions
taken to ensure effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s use of
electromagnetic energy. There are two subdivisions of electronic protective measures: active electronic
protective measures and passive electronic protective measures.
electronic warfare (EW). Military action that exploits electromagnetic energy to provide situational
awareness and achieve offensive and defensive effects.
electronic warfare support measures (ESM). That division of electronic warfare involving
actions taken to search for, intercept, and identify electromagnetic emissions and to locate their
sources for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. It provides a source of information required
for immediate decisions involving electronic countermeasures, electronic protective measures, and
other tactical actions.

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EMCON plan. The plan ordered by an OTC to effect his emission policy and implement emission
control.

emergency signals. A means of promulgating a threat requiring an expeditious or immediate action

as a result of either a subjective tactical decision or an automatic response, thereby sacrificing some
measure of evaluation.

emission control (EMCON). Selective control of emitted electromagnetic or acoustic energy. The aim
may be twofold: a. to minimize the enemy’s detection of emissions and exploitation of the information
so gained; b. to reduce electromagnetic interference thereby improving friendly sensor performance.

emission policy (EP). The policy which states what electromagnetic and acoustic emissions may be
allowed.

endurance. The time an aircraft can continue flying, or a ground vehicle or ship can continue operating,
under specified conditions; e.g., without refuelling.

escape course. Ships steer 90° away from fallout axis at maximum speed in order to leave the fallout
hazard area before fallout arrival.

escort. A combatant unit(s) assigned to accompany and protect another force or convoy.

estimated time of arrival (ETA). The time of arrival at the entrance to the harbour (passing
breakwaters), or, when point X is established, the time of arrival at point X. For aircraft, it is the time
of arrival from an airfield, target, CAP station, and so forth.

estimated time of departure (ETD). The time of passing the entrance to the harbour (passing
breakwaters), or, when point A is established, the time of passing point A. For aircraft, it is the time of
departure from an airfield, target, CPA station, and so forth.

evasion. Measures taken either to avoid or escape detection, or to break contact with a hostile or
potentially hostile unit.

fighter engagement zone (FEZ). The airspace beyond the cross-over zone out to limits as defined
by the OTC, taking into account the fighter’s combat radius and effective weapon range.

fleet. An organization of ships, aircraft, Marine forces, and shore-based activities all under the command
of a commander or a commander-in-chief who may exercise operational as well as administrative
control.

flight operations course and speed. The course and speed used by a ship when launching or
recovering aircraft.

flotilla. An administrative or tactical organization consisting of two or more squadrons together with
such additional ships as may be assigned as flagships or tenders.

formation. An ordered arrangement of two or more ships, units, or aircraft proceeding together under
a commander.

formation centre. A position designated by the OTC as the centre of a formation, normally the
geometric centre; station zero in a circular formation; also, the point of origin of a formation axis.

full command. The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to
subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within

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national services. Note: The term “command” as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of
authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full
command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning force to NATO, nations will delegate only
operational command or operational control.

furthest-on-circle. An expanding circle centred on a datum or search centre of which the radius at any
one time is a command estimate of maximum submarine travel from datum plus datum error.

GRASSHOPPER. A procedure allowing a transiting surface force, at short notice, the maximum
freedom for the use of ASW weapons by minimizing the size of a SAA or JTAA in the quickest
possible way.

grid lock. The procedure in the CCG system that is employed to reduce errors in reporting caused by
errors in the estimated position of the reporting unit.

grid origin. The centre of the grid in the CCG system from which X and Y coordinates originate; it is
based on a geographic reference position.

guard-ship. A ship detailed for a specific duty for the purpose of enabling other ships in company to
assume a lower degree of readiness.

guide. A ship on which other ships take station when forming up or keep station when formed; usually,
the ship on which all units of a formation (or all formation guides of a disposition) take and keep
station. Also see ATP-01, Vol. II, for further details.

hard kill. In ASMD hard-kill measures are those which directly damage a missile by impact.

height. The vertical distance of a level, a point, or an object considered as a point, measured from a
specific datum.

helicopter action group (HAG). A unit comprised of two or more helicopters which are assigned to
counter a particular surface threat.

helicopter dipping sonar. A sonar transducer deployed and recovered by a maritime patrol helicopter.

helicopter element coordinator (HEC). The officer who is assigned responsibility for the
coordination of employment of organic helicopters other than those retained by the AREC.

helicopter windline screen. A helicopter screen provided for a carrier temporarily during flight
operations, relative to the carrier’s track into the wind.

HOVERTAC. An attack conducted by a dipping helicopter on its own target while maintaining sonar
contact.

identification. The assignment of one of the six standard identities, based upon available data and the
determined identification criteria.

identification criteria. Criteria laid down by the OTC or delegated authority to determine which
standard identity can be assigned to a detected contact based on the available localization and
recognition data.

identification safety range (ISR). The minimum range to which an aircraft may close an assumed
friendly force without having been positively identified to ensure that the force does not mistake the
aircraft for enemy.

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independent. A merchant ship under naval control sailed singly and unescorted by a warship.

influence mine. A mine actuated by the effect of a target on some physical condition in the vicinity of
the mine or on radiations emanating from the mine.

inner defence zone (IDZ). A circle around each CV used to coordinate fighter and missile engagements.

inner defence zone coordinator (IDZC). The TDS tasked to coordinate fighter and missile
engagements within the IDZ.

integrated operations. Operations under which a designated unit is attached to a specific task force/
group under tactical command (TACOM) and tactical control (TACON) of the OTC of the specified
task force/group. Upon receiving TACOM, the OTC assumes the responsibility for all operations and
safety of the assigned unit. Operational control (OPCON) remains with the assigning authority.

intercepting search. A type of search designed to intercept an enemy whose previous position is
known and the limits of whose subsequent course and speed can be assumed.

joining. 1. The procedure whereby an aircraft commander transfers tactical control of his aircraft to
the officer in tactical command. 2. A ship or group of ships which have sailed independently and
subsequently rendezvous with a main body or convoy.

joint action area (JAA) (NC) (NMP). An area in which a single friendly submarine is operating in
coordination with air and/or surface forces. Air and surface ASW weapon employment is prohibited
throughout the JTAA unless a NOTACK area or a submarine-generated search area (SGSA) has been
established.

Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL). A listing of frequencies which map the use of the EM
spectrum within the area of responsibility. The JRL is composed of Taboo, Protected, and Guarded
Frequencies.

kill line. The kill line is a line around nominated friendly forces, promulgated by the OTC/PWC, stating
the range by which it is desired that the enemy has been engaged.

large ship. A ship over 137 metres (or 450 feet) in length.

line. A formation in which ships are formed along a straight line extending in any direction from the line
guide but not directly ahead or astern.

line of bearing. A line in which ships form in a straight line on a line guide in any direction except
ahead, astern, or abeam.

link. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communication facilities
between two points.

localization. The determination of positional information and the movements of a contact.

loose line abreast. A formation in which ships stay within 15 degrees of the Guide or ship indicated
relative to the base course.

MAD verification run (MADVEC) (NC) (NMP). A procedure in which aircraft are vectored by
information on radar methods to carry out MAD verification of a contact to assist in classification.

magnetic anomaly detector (MAD). A device which detects the presence of magnetic materials by
recording the distortions they produce in the normal magnetic field of the earth.

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main body. Any group of warships and naval auxiliaries, or a single ship escorted by warships and/or
aircraft, and not designated a convoy.

material torpedo countermeasures. Noise reduction methods, decoys, noisemakers, jammers,

degaussing equipment, and so forth, designed to reduce the effectiveness of torpedoes once they have
been fired.

maximum effective torpedo firing range (METFR). This is the maximum distance at which a
torpedo may be fired with a reasonable probability of achieving the desired result. This must include
the submarine’s ability to obtain adequate fire control information.

maximum sonar speed. The maximum speed at which an individual ship can proceed without
unacceptably degrading its sonar performance.

maximum speed. The highest speed at which a ship is capable of proceeding when using full power.

MEADOW. A static submarine haven effective only during the period, and in the area, that Operation
GRASSHOPPER is in effect.

mercantile convoy. A convoy consisting of merchant ships controlled by the naval cooperation and
guidance for shipping (NCAGS) organization.

military convoy. A land or maritime convoy that is controlled and reported as a military unit. A
maritime convoy can consist of any combination of merchant ships, auxiliaries or other military units.

military grid. Two sets of parallel lines intersecting at right angles and forming squares; the grid is
superimposed on maps, charts, and other similar representations of the surface of the earth in an
accurate and consistent manner to permit identification of ground locations with respect to other
locations and the computation of direction and distance to other points.

minehunting. Techniques for countering mines by mine hunters, based on determining the positions
of individual mines and concentrating countermeasures on those positions (includes mine location and
disposal).

minesweeping. The technique of searching for, or clearing mines using mechanical or explosion gear,
which physically removes or destroys the mine, or produces, in the area, the influence fields necessary
to actuate it.

missile engagement zone (MEZ). The airspace around a SAM ship in which missiles may be given
freedom of operation.

moving haven (MHN). A moving area of specified dimensions established about a submarine or
surface ship, extending about the ordered position along the track, and which is designated for use
in transit by the unit to prevent attack by friendly forces in wartime and to prevent or minimize
submerged interference among friendly forces in peacetime.

naval cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS). The provision of NATO military
cooperation, guidance, advice, assistance and supervision to merchant shipping to enhance the safety
of participating merchant ships and to support military operations.

normal speed. The speed at which ships are to proceed if a signalled speed has not been ordered.

NOTACK area (NC) (NMP). A small area established by the submarine within the JTAA to allow
friendly forces to prosecute a submarine contact within the remainder of the JTAA while continuing
to provide protection to the submarine.

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notice. The alert state in hours for a ship’s propulsion system.

officer in tactical command (OTC). In maritime usage, the senior officer present eligible to assume
command, or the officer to whom he has delegated tactical command. When a task organization
is established, the senior commander present of that organization becomes OTC unless otherwise
ordered.

oiler. A naval or merchant tanker specially equipped and rigged for replenishing other ships at sea.

operational command (OPCOM). The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks
to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational
and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note: It does not include responsibility
for administration.

operational control (OPCON). The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so
that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function,
time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It
does not include the authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned.
Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

operational speed. The highest speed at which ships will be required to proceed during a particular
operation or during a stated period.

operation order. A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for
the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

optimum sonar speed. The speed for an individual surface ship at which, over a period, it can
achieve a maximum swept area with its sonar in the prevailing environmental conditions.

order. A communication, written, oral, or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a
subordinate.

outer defence zone (ODZ). An area encompassing the AAW surveillance area outside the IDZ to a
range equivalent to the maximum sensor range of assets stationed outside the IDZ.

outer defence zone coordinator (ODZC). Unit tasked to coordinate the outer air battle and all
CAP entering the ODZ. The ODZC is normally an AEW aircraft.

passive EPM. Undetectable measures, such as those in operating procedures and technical features of
equipment, to ensure effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

passive mine countermeasures. Measures intended to localize the threat, locate the minefield, and
reduce the risk to shipping. These measures are not concerned with the physical destruction of mines.

patrol. A detachment of ground, sea, or air forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information or
carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping up, or security mission.

picket. A unit operating outside the outer limits of screen sectors and under the tactical control of the
OTC (or screen commander if delegated); it is stationed in a designated position with reference to the
appropriate axis, or in a geographic position for a specific purpose, such as air warning.

picture compilation. All actions and activities aimed at compiling a plot.

point A (NC) (NMP). A reference point near the harbour mouth at the inshore end of a swept channel.

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point O (NC) (NMP). A reference point to seaward of point X at which the cruising formation forms
or breaks up.

point X (NC) (NMP). A reference point at the seaward end of a swept channel, or when there is no
swept channel, at a point selected by the local authority.

point Y (NC) (NMP). A location to seaward of point O (seaward of a swept channel), along the voyage
course, at which large dispositions can form or break up when there is insufficient area at point O.

position and intended movement (PIM). A reference position established by the OTC at a given
time and a forecast of the course(s) and speed(s) expected to be made good over the ground.

precedence. A designation assigned to a message by the originator to indicate to communication

personnel the relative order of handling and to the addressee the order in which the message is to be
noted.

prevention of mutual interference. 1. Procedures to prevent interferences between active or

between active and passive electromagnetic or acoustic sensors of friendly forces.
2. In submarine operations, a system of procedures to prevent, on the one hand, submerged collisions
between friendly submarines, between submerged submarines and friendly ship towed bodies or
between submerged submarines and any other underwater object, and, on the other hand, interferences
with any underwater event.
probe. Any aircraft which carries out the visual identification of a specific target which has previously
been located by another means.

prudent limit of endurance. The time during which an aircraft can remain airborne and still retain
a given safety margin of fuel.

QQ. The standard position in the force for the centre of the front of the main body or convoy when not
in circular formation.

radar coverage. The limits within which objects can be detected by one or more radar stations.

radar picket. Any ship, aircraft, or vehicle, stationed at a distance from the force protected, for the
purpose of increasing the radar detection range.

radio silence. A condition in which all or certain radio equipment capable of radiation is kept
inoperative.

range. The distance between a given point and an object or target.

receiving ship. In replenishment at sea, the ship that receives the rig(s).

recognition. The determination of the nature of a detected person, object or phenomenon, and possibly
its class or type. This may include the determination of an individual within a particular class or type.

recognition confidence level. The degree of probability with which the recognition level is
established.

recognition level. The level to which a contact must be recognized as to platform type, class, or
individuality.

recognized picture. A compiled plot which satisfies the established criteria: the result of the picture
compilation process.

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reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods,

information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

reference position. The OTC’s promulgated estimate of his navigational position at a given time.

release criteria. Criteria laid down by the OTC or delegated authority to be satisfied before weapon
employment is authorized.

replenishment at sea (RAS). Those operations required to make a transfer of personnel and/or
supplies when at sea.

replenishment course and speed. The course and speed ordered by the OTC for the replenishment
unit’s guide.

replenishment ships. Ships loaded with or supplying certain supplies and services to warships at
sea.

replenishment unit. A group of ships consisting of one or more delivering ships with one or more
receiving ships replenishing and ships in waiting and/or lifeguard stations.

restricted area. 1. An area in which there are special restrictive measures employed to prevent or
minimize interference between friendly forces. 2. An airspace of defined dimensions, above the land
areas or territorial waters of a state, within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in accordance with
certain specified conditions.

route. The prescribed course to be travelled from a specific point of origin to a specific destination.

safety lane. Specified sea lane designated for use in transit by submarines and surface ships in order
to prevent attack by friendly forces.

safety sector. An airspace in the AAW area in which aircraft are safe from attack by friendly fighters,
missiles, or self-defence weapons.

safety zone. An area (land, sea, or air) reserved for non-combat operations of friendly aircraft, surface
ships, submarines or ground forces.

scene-of-action commander (SAC). The officer who assumes tactical control of assigned units in
a limited area, operating against a specific contact or datum. (Until such time as a SAU is formally
detached, the first unit reporting contact by any means (sonar, radar, visual, or ESM) shall be deemed
to be the scene of action commander.)

screen. An arrangement of ships, aircraft, and/or submarines to protect a main body or convoy.

screen centre. The point on which screen units are stationed, normally QQ or ZZ.

screen unit. A surface ship, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter, or submarine employed in a screen.

search and attack unit (SAU). The designation given to a unit separately organized or dispatched
from a formation to search for and attack submarines.

search centre. The origin or reference point of an ASW search when established at a point other than
datum.

sector. An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and for which it is responsible.

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sector method. The method of stationing units by designating sectors defined by boundaries and
depth limits from screen centre.

sector screen. A screen in which individual units are assigned particular sectors of responsibility
according to their sensors and capabilities.

seduction. Measures taken to break or move an enemy weapon control or missile homing system
away from its selected target.

self-identification. The indication by any act or means of your own friendly character or individuality.

self-protection mine countermeasures. All countermeasures, active or passive, taken by ships

underway for their self-protection.

SELFTAC. An attack conducted by a dipping helicopter on its own target after the helicopter has
broken dip.

sensor. An equipment which detects, and may indicate, and/or record objects and activities by means
of energy or particles emitted, reflected, or modified by objects.

sequence number. The number allocated to a ship by a unit commander to indicate its position in
the line.

shadowing. The observation of an enemy unit or force, usually as a sequel to surveillance or

reconnaissance, for the purpose of reporting its composition, location, movement, and any other
relevant information.

shipping cooperation point. A location where naval cooperation and guidance for shipping staff
gather and disseminate information on local merchant shipping and naval operations and provide the
means to brief merchant ships on risks, routeing and protective measures.

shore bombardment line. A ground line established to delimit bombardment by friendly surface
ships.

signalled course. The true course which is being or which is to be steered.

signalled speed. The speed in knots at which the Guide has been ordered to proceed.

signals intelligence (SIGINT). The generic term used to describe communications intelligence
and electronic intelligence when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of
intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two.

signature. The characteristic pattern of the target displayed by detection and identification equipment.

significant track. In air defence, tracks of aircraft or missiles which behave in an unusual manner
which warrants attention and could pose a threat to a defended area.

Silent SAM. An AAW tactic that places a long-range SAM ship in a silent posture. The tactical picture
is provided by an AEW aircraft via Link. When directed or when preplanned responses dictate, the
Silent SAM ship engages the raid under attack based on Link data.

situation report. A report giving the situation in the area of a reporting unit or formation.

small ship. A ship of 137 metres (or 450 feet) or less in length.

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soft kill. In ASMD soft-kill measures use devices such as ECM, chaff, or decoys to neutralize the
missile.

sonobuoy. An acoustic device, used mainly for the detection of submarines which, when activated,
transmits information by radio.

speed made good over the ground (SOG). The average speed at which a ship has covered the
distance between two geographic positions.

speed made good through the water (STW). The result of the effect of weather but not the effect
of current or tidal stream on the signalled or base speed.

speed of advance (SOA). In naval usage, the speed expected to be made good over the ground.

splash point. The point where a single weapon or the first weapon fired of a pattern should enter the
water to have the highest probability of destroying the target; its location depends on target course,
speed, and depth, and the characteristics of the weapon after it has entered the water.

squadron. An administrative or tactical organization consisting of two or more divisions of ships, plus
such additional ships as may be assigned as flagships or tenders.

standard distance. Unless otherwise ordered, 500 yards between small ships in a line and 1,000 yards
between a large ship and any other ship, large or small, in a line.

static havens. Specified sea areas for noncombat operations, including ship and submarine sanctuaries
announced by theater, fleet, or equivalent commanders and exercise areas reserved for submarine
operations and training in noncombat zones.

station. The position ordered by the OTC for a unit of a force when in formation or for a formation that
is part of a disposition.

stationing speed. A speed slower than operational speed, specified for reasons of fuel economy.

subdivision. A tactical organization of ships within a division.

submarine action area (SAA). A waterspace management area that contains one or more friendly
submarines which are the only units that may use antisubmarine weapons within that area.

submarine exercise area coordinator. An authority who publishes permanently established

national submarine exercise areas and lanes which have been agreed to by the nations concerned.

submarine-generated search area (NC) (NMP). A stationary, geographically defined area within
a JTAA in which a submarine will operate for a specified period of time. It is established by the
submarine commanding officer based upon the mission requirements of both the submarine and the
units with which it is operating. Once established, a commander or unit designated as the SGSA
coordinating authority may authorize attacks in the portions of the JTAA that lie outside the SGSA.
Within the SGSA, NOTACK rules apply.

submarine movement advisory authority. The authority who monitors movements of submarines
and ships operating variable depth sonar or towed arrays within his area of responsibility and advises
the submarine operating authorities and, if necessary, units concerned, of possible mutual interference.

submarine notice (SUBNOTE). A message report originated by a submarine operating authority

providing operational and movement instructions for submarines in peace and war, including transit
and patrol area information.

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submarine operating authority. The naval commander exercising operational control of submarines.

submarine operations coordinating authority (SOCA) (NC) (NMP). The warfare commander
who is assigned responsibility for the coordination and employment of support submarines.

submarine patrol area (SPA). A stationary area established to allow submarine operations
unimpeded by submerged mutual interference.

submarine safety lanes. Specified sea lanes used exclusively for submarines in transit to and from
assigned patrol zones.

supplying ship. The ship in a replenishment unit that provides the personnel and/or supplies to be
transferred.

support. The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any
other force.

support force. A force tasked by a higher authority to aid, protect, complement, or sustain another
force.

surface action group (SAG). A unit comprised of surface ships, which may be supported by
fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, formed to counter a surface threat. Unless the OTC has designated
a SAG commander, the senior of the commanding officers is the SAG commander.

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons,
or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.

surveillance combat air patrol. A patrol of fighter or attack aircraft employed over a hostile surface
force for the purpose of countering the SSM threat.

surveillance towed array system (SURTAS). A towed-array system primarily designed for
use in area ASW operations. It is normally a very long array designed to operate at low speed for
low-frequency detection of a submarine’s radiated noise.

sweep. An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft and other targets
of opportunity in an allocated area of operations.

tactical bomb lines. Bomb lines prescribed by a troop commander beyond which he considers that
properly coordinated bombing would not endanger his forces.

tactical command (TACOM). The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces
under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

tactical control (TACON). The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or
manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

tactical diameter. The distance along the perpendicular between the path of a ship on the original
course and the path of the same ship when steadied on an opposite course after turning through 180°
with a constant rudder angle.

tactical doctrine. The fundamental principles guiding the application of tactics.

tactical instructions. Directions and orders available for the execution of tactics.

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tactical procedures. Prescribed modes (and methods) of implementing tactical instructions.

tactical torpedo countermeasures (NC) (NMP). Manoeuvres, such as alterations of course or

speed and noise reduction and noise deception methods, designed to degrade a submarine’s fire control
solution or to avoid torpedoes that have been detected or are assumed to have been fired.

tactical towed array system (TACTAS). A towed-array system primarily designed for use in ASW
support operations. Its passive acoustic performance is optimized for submarine detection at higher
tow speeds.

target acquisition. The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit
the effective employment of weapons.

target combat air patrol. A patrol of fighter aircraft maintained over an enemy target area to destroy
hostile aircraft and to cover friendly shipping in the vicinity of the objective area in amphibious
operations.

target radar. A radar, the detection of which would indicate the presence of enemy forces or that an
attack is probable.

task designator. The number assigned to a task force, task group, or task element.

task element. A component of a task unit organized by the commander of the task unit or higher
authority for accomplishing a specific task.

task force. A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for
the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks.

task group. A component of a task force organized by the commander of the task force or higher
authority for accomplishing specific tasks.

task organization. The organization of forces for operational purposes to provide the necessary
flexibility for meeting changing operational requirements while retaining a clear indication of the
chain of command.

task unit. A component of a task group organized by the commander of a task group or higher authority
for accomplishing specific tasks.

threat and target emitters. A threat emitter is an emitter, normally associated with a weapon system,
the detection of which might indicate that an attack on the force is imminent or in progress. A target
emitter is an emitter, the detection of which would indicate the presence of enemy forces.

threat radar. A radar, the detection of which would indicate that an attack on the force is imminent or
in progress.

threat warning. A means by which a commander can rapidly promulgate the evaluated type and
degree of threat and specify the likelihood of attack.

time late of datum. The elapsed time between datum time and the arrival of a unit at datum.

time of attack. Time of arrival of the first weapon in the target area.

TOMCAT. A surface picket or picket group which is responsible for early identification of friendly
aircraft returning, and for acting as a reference point for such aircraft when they proceed through the
AAW area.

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torpedo danger area (TDA). An area which encompasses and extends beyond a submarine contact
threat datum furthest-on-circle or area-of-uncertainty by a distance equal to the threat submarine’s
METFR. This parameter is used by surface forces to maintain safe stand-off distances during ASW
prosecutions and submarine avoidance actions.

torpedo danger zone (TDZ) (NC) (NMP). An area which the submarine must enter in order to be
within maximum effective torpedo firing range.

torpedo interference area (DOGBOX). An area within which units may interfere with or be
endangered by ASW homing torpedoes.

track. 1. To display or record the successive positions of a moving object. 2. To lock on to a point of
radiation and obtain guidance therefrom. 3. To keep a gun properly aimed, or to point continuously
a target-locating instrument at a moving target. 4. The projection on the surface of the earth of the
path of a spacecraft, aircraft or ship, the direction of which path at any point is usually expressed in
degrees from North (true, magnetic, or grid).

transfer station. A ship’s designated area equipped for replenishment at sea.

TT. The standard position in the force for the present position of the originator of the message.

turning circle. The path of a ship with a constant rudder angle.

turn-together. A manoeuvre in which all ships turn simultaneously, maintaining their true bearings
and distances from the Guide.

type organization. The organization of units normally of the same type into flotillas/groups, squadrons,
divisions, and subdivisions mainly for administrative and logistic purposes.

unit. A ship, aircraft, or submarine; or a small group of ships and/or aircraft acting as an entity.

urgent attack. An attack delivered with maximum rapidity against an enemy submarine located in a
position such that it is considered an immediate threat, or as a measure to counter an enemy torpedo
attack.

UTM. The grid used for naval bombardment and similar purposes, especially when ground forces and
other forces are jointly engaged.

variable depth sonar (VDS). The term is normally used to describe a sonar whose transducer is
towed beneath the parent ship with the object of improving sonar detection ranges. Helicopter and
submarine sonars, although variable in depth, are not usually included.

vectored attack (VECTAC). Attack in which a weapon carrier unit (air, surface, or subsurface)
not holding contact on the target, is vectored to the weapon delivery point by a unit (air, surface, or
subsurface) which holds contact on the target.

voice call sign. A call sign provided primarily for voice communications.

war reserve modes (WRM). Characteristics or operating procedures of equipment or systems which
are held in reserve for war or crisis.

WATCHDOG. A surface picket whose main task is AAW.

watch zone. A sector in which the assigned ship is responsible, subject to no overriding weapon
coordination instructions from the AAWC, to ensure that air attacks on the unit or force do not take
place unopposed.

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waterspace management. In naval warfare, a system of procedures for the control of antisubmarine
weapons to prevent inadvertent engagement of friendly submarines.

weapon danger area. An area measured in degrees either side of the weapon firing bearing and
extending to the maximum safe range and maximum safe trajectory height of the weapon in use. For
torpedoes, a specific area based upon weapon entry point.

weapon danger zone. In ASW operations, an area in which friendly units may be endangered by a
friendly ASW weapon. The area comprising the weapon danger zone is based upon the type of weapon,
method of employment, run pattern of a properly operating weapon, and estimated acquisition range.
Upon launch of an ASW torpedo, this area may be designated a DOGBOX.

weapon release point. The point where a single weapon or the first weapon fired on a pattern is
released so that it enters the water at the splash point. For aircraft attacks, it allows for the aircraft’s
direction, speed, and altitude of approach, and the characteristics of the weapon.

weapon(s) system. A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials,
services, personnel and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.

wheel. A manoeuvre to alter course in such a manner that all ships will be in their former relative
positions on completion of the manoeuvre.

XX. The standard position in the force established by the OTC on which a search, enemy reporting, and
so forth, is to be based.

YY. The standard position in the force for the present position of the addressee of a message.

zero time. The exact hour immediately preceding the time of execution of a tactical action or manoeuvre
from which time measurement is recorded and reported in minutes. (If the time of execution is exactly
an hour, that time will be zero time.)

ZIPPO plan. A plan which provides for preplanned reactions to various maritime warfare threats.

ZZ. The standard position in the force for the centre of the force (not to be used in a convoy).

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SECTION II—LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR air-to-air refuelling

AAW anti-air warfare

AAWC anti-air warfare commander

AC air coordinator

ACA airspace control authority

ACM acoustic countermeasures

ACO Allied Command Operations

ACP Allied communications publication

ACU aircraft control unit

ADC air defence commander

AEW airborne early warning

AF amphibious force

AIMT air interdiction of maritime targets

AIS automated identification system

ALSS advance logistic support site

AOA amphibious objective area

AOC air operations centre

AOI area of interest

AOO area of operations

AOP area of probability

AOR area of responsibility

APM acoustic protective measures

ARCN air reporting and control net

AREC air resource element coordinator

ARM antiradiation missile

ALL UNMARKED ENTRIES IN THE LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ARE

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AS associated support

ASMD antiship missile defence

ASSM antisurface ship missile

ASUW antisurface warfare

ASUWC antisurface warfare commander

ASW antisubmarine warfare

ASWACU antisubmarine warfare aircraft control unit

ASWC antisubmarine warfare commander

ASWFA antisubmarine warfare free area

ATF amphibious task force

ATO air tasking order

AUV autonomous underwater vehicle

AW acoustic warfare

AWNIS Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System

AWSM acoustic warfare support measures

BDA battle damage assessment

BW biological warfare

C&R coordination and reporting

C2 command and control

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance

CAOC combined air operations centre

CAP combat air patrol

CASP coordinated air/sea procedures

CATAS critical angle towed-array system

CATF commander amphibious task force

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive

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CCG Cartesian coordinate grid

CCOI critical contact of interest

CFMCC combined force maritime component commander

CHOP change of operational control

CIS communication and information systems

CLF commander landing force

CMSC cruise missile strike coordinator

COA course of action

COI contact of interest

COMINT communications intelligence

COMPLAN communication plan

COMSEC communications security

CONOPS concept of operations

COP common operational picture

CORTAC corrected tactical

CPA closest point of approach

CRC control and reporting centre

CRO crisis response operation

CSAR combat search and rescue

CSG carrier strike group

CSP communications security protection

CSW course and speed made good through the water

CTF commander task force

CTG commander task group

CTU commander task unit

CWC composite warfare commander

DCG deception group

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DF direction finding

DLRP data link reference point

DNCS data net control station

DS direct support

DTAS depressed towed-array system

DTG day-time group

EAW electronic and acoustic warfare

ECB expendable communications buoy

ECM electronic countermeasures

EDW effective downwind

EEI essential elements of information

ELINT electronic intelligence

ELSEC electronic security

EMC electromagnetic compatibility

EMCON emission control

EMI electromagnetic interference

EMP electromagnetic pulse

EMSEC emission security

EO electro-optical

EOB electronic order of battle

EP emission policy

EPM electronic protective measures

ESG expeditionary strike group

ESM electronic warfare support measures

ETA estimated time of arrival

ETD estimated time of departure

EW electronic warfare

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EWC electronic warfare coordinator

EWCC electronic warfare coordination cell

FACA force air coordination area

FADIZ fleet air defence identification zone

FADIZ C fleet air defence identification zone coordinator

FEZ fighter engagement zone

FIAC fast inshore attack craft

FL flight level

FLC force logistic coordinator

FLS forward logistic site

FP force protection

FPB fast patrol boat

FPC force protection coordinator

FPL force protection level

FPOC force protection operations centre

FRU firing unit

FTC force track coordinator

FTC-A force track coordinator air

FTC-S force track coordinator surface

FTC-SS force track coordinator subsurface

FW fixed-wing

Georef World Geographic Reference System

GLC group logistic coordinator

GPS global positioning system

GRU grid reference unit

HAG helicopter action group

HCU helicopter control unit

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HEC helicopter element coordinator

HF high frequency

HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone

HIFR helicopter in-flight refuelling

HLZ helicopter landing zone

HN host nation

HNS host-nation support

HQ headquarters

HRP helicopter reference point

HVU high-value unit

IAW in accordance with

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ID identification

IDZ inner defence zone

IDZC inner defence zone coordinator

IE information environment

IED improvised explosive device

IFF identification, friend or foe

IFR instrument flight rules

IMC instrument meteorological conditions

IMO International Maritime Organization

IPROM internal protective measures

IR infrared

ISP identification safety point

ISR identification safety range

ITU International Telecommunication Union

IW information warfare

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JAA joint action area

JAAWSC joint anti-air warfare support and coordination

JAOC joint air operations centre

JF joint force

JFC joint force commander

JOA joint operations area

JRFL joint restricted frequency list

LAAWC local anti-air warfare coordinator

LAC launch area coordinator

LACAS local air coordination area

LCC land component commander

LASWC local antisubmarine warfare coordinator

LDR low data rate

LF landing force

LFSP landing force support party

LLA limiting lines of approach

LLTR low-level transit route

LOC lines of communications

LPI low probability of intercept

LRI limited range of intercept

LTV leadthrough vessel

MACA maritime air control authority

MAD magnetic anomaly detector

IW information warfare

MADVEC magnetic anomaly detector verification

MARCOM Allied maritime command

MAS maritime air support

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MATCONOF materiel control officer

MATELO Maritime Air Telecommunications Organization

MCC maritime component commander

MCM mine countermeasures

MCMV mine countermeasures vessel

METFR maximum effective torpedo firing range

MEU mission essential unit

MEZ missile engagement zone

MGRS military grid reference system

MHN moving haven

MHQ maritime headquarters

MICO maritime interface control officer

MIJI meaconing, intrusion, jamming and interference

MIO maritime interdiction operation

MIOC maritime interdiction operations commander

MISREP mission report

MLA mean line of advance

MMSI maritime mobile service identity

MNLC multinational logistic commander

MNMF multinational maritime force

MOVREP movement report

MPA maritime patrol aircraft

MRL maritime rear link

MRO military response option

MSC major subordinate commander

MSFZ missile seeker free zone

MSL mean sea level

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MSO maritime security operations

MSTZ missile seeker tight zone

MTF message text format

MTMS maritime tactical message system

MUS maritime unmanned systems

MW mine warfare

NAC North Atlantic Council

NAD non-acoustic detection

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBG naval beach group

NCAGS naval cooperation and guidance for shipping

NCS network control station

NEDB NATO Emitter Database

NEO non-combatant evacuation operation

NMCM naval mine countermeasures

NMW naval mine warfare

NMWC naval mine warfare coordinator

NSC NATO Shipping Centre

NTDS naval tactical data system

OAB outer air battle

OCA operational command authority

ODZ outer defence zone

ODZC outer defence zone coordinator

OPCOM operational command

OPCON operational control

OPDEC operational deception

OPGEN operations general

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OPLAN operation plan

OPORD operational order

OPSEC operations security

OPTASK operation task

OSC on-scene commander

OSSC on-scene surveillance coordinator

OTC officer in tactical command

OTH over-the-horizon

OTHT over-the-horizon targeting

PIM position and intended movement

PMI prevention of mutual interference

PRF pulse repetition frequency

PROTAC proposed tactical (amendment message)

PSR predicted sonar range

PU participating unit

PWC principal warfare commander

QRS quick reference system

RADC regional air defence commander

RADFREQ radar frequency

RADHAZ radiation hazards

RAP recognized air picture

RAS replenishment at sea

RATT radio teletype

RF radio frequency

RMP recognized maritime picture

ROE rules of engagement

ROV remotely operated vehicle

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RSI radiation status indicator

RSP recognized surface picture

RTC reduced tactical communication plan

RTF return to force

RW rotary wing

SAA submarine action area

SAAWC sector anti-air warfare coordinator

SAC scene-of-action commander

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAG surface action group

SAGC surface action group commander

SAM surface-to-air missile

SAR search and rescue

SASS surface-to-air in the surface-to-surface mode

SASWC sector antisubmarine warfare coordinator

SAT submarine advisory team

SATCOM satellite communications

SAU search and attack unit

SC screen commander

SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance

SCC sea combat commander

SCP shipping cooperation point

SCZ ship control zone

SEAC submarine exercise area coordinator

SEAD suppression of enemy air defences

SEC submarine element coordinator

SGSA submarine-generated search area

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SHF super-high frequency

SIF selective identification feature

SITREP situation report

SITSUM situation summary

SLCM sea-launched cruise missile

SLOC sea lines of communications

SLOT submarine-launched one-way tactical (buoy)

SMAA submarine movement advisory authority

SOA speed of advance

SOCA submarine operations coordinating authority

SOF special operations force

SOLAS safety of life at sea

SPA submarine patrol area

SPM self-protective measure

SRAD susceptibility radiation hazard designator

SSIXS submarine satellite information exchange subsystem

SSL submarine safety lane

SSM surface-to-surface missile

STW strike warfare

STWC strike warfare commander

SUBNOTE submarine notice

SUBOPAUTH submarine operating authority

SUS sound underwater signal

SUWC surface warfare commander

SW surface warfare

TACAN tactical air navigation

TACC tactical air control centre

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TACOM tactical command

TACON tactical control

TACSIT tactical situations

TAS towed array sonar

TCM torpedo countermeasures

TDA torpedo danger area

TDL tactical data link

TDS tactical data system

TDZ torpedo danger zone

TE task element

TF task force

TG task group

(NR) (NMP) TGSA task group submarine area

TLAM Tomhawk land and attack missile

TMA target motion analysis

TOO theatre of operations

TOT time on target

TPL target priority list

TPT third-party targeting

TRAD transmitter radiation hazard designator

TRU target reporting unit

TSR tactical sonar range

TTY teletype

TU task unit

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UHF ultrahigh frequency

URG underway replenishment group

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USW undersea warfare

UTM universal transverse Mercator

UUV unmanned undersea vehicle

UWT underwater telephone

VBSS visit, board, search and seizure

VDS variable depth sonar

VECTAC vectored attack

VHF very high frequency

VID visual, identification

VMF variable message format

VSTOL vertical and short takeoff and landing

VTOL vertical takeoff and landing

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WSM waterspace management

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INDEX
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Acoustic:
Countermeasures (definition) ............................................................................................................ 8-2
Activities ........................................................................................................................................ 8-3
Employment ................................................................................................................................. 8-18
Devices streamed, prevention of mutual interference between submerged submarines
and surface ships with towed acoustic ...................................................................................... 6-91
Intelligence ...................................................................................................................................... 12-7
Interference:
From own force .......................................................................................................................... 12-16
Own transmissions on search equipment ..................................................................................... 8-16
Protective measures (definition) ........................................................................................................ 8-2
Employment ................................................................................................................................. 8-21
Spectrum ............................................................................................................................................ 8-2
Warfare .............................................................................................................................................. 8-1
Coordination ................................................................................................................................. 2-18
Delegation of functions .................................................................................................................. 8-2
Support measures (definition) ........................................................................................................ 8-2
Tasking ......................................................................................................................................... 8-15
Acronyms, list of.......................................................................................................................... LOAA-1
Action......................................................................................................................................... 3-32, 15-4
Antisubmarine warfare actions ........................................................................................... 12-24, 12-29
Ship actions ................................................................................................................................ 12-42
Assistance is required, action when ............................................................................................... 12-38
Contact when direct support forces are involved, action following .............................................. 12-37
Gaining contact, action on .........................................................................................6-26, 12-29, 12-34
Increased tension, action at time of ................................................................................................. 6-91
Nuclear attack, action prior to ......................................................................................................... 17-8
Offensive .......................................................................................................................................... 9-20
Readiness for action......................................................................................................................... 3-32
Surface ............................................................................................................................................... 9-3
Suspected mutual interference, action on ........................................................................................ 6-89
Units in the vicinity of the unit gaining contact, action by............................................................ 12-29
When ship is damaged ..................................................................................................................... 3-29
Active:
Deception ......................................................................................................................................... 8-20
Electronic protective measures (definition) ....................................................................................... 8-1
Mine countermeasures ................................................................................................................... 13-12
Sonar or sonobuoy, contact by active ............................................................................................ 12-19
Advance force .......................................................................................................................... 15-6, 15-12
Advisories, surface ship notices and ................................................................................................... 6-76
After-action reports, engagement........................................................................................................ 7-20
Aided intercept by submarine ........................................................................................................... 12-18

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Air:
Attacks:
Towed array ship defence against................................................................................................. 12-8
Burst ............................................................................................................................................. 17-1
Combat report .................................................................................................................................. 7-19
Control:
Terms .............................................................................................................................................. 6-9
Cooperation in antisurface warfare.................................................................................................. 9-13
Coordination ............................................................................................................................. 2-18, 6-7
Communications ............................................................................................................................. 4-9
Force air coordination area ............................................................................................................. 6-5
Overlapping areas...................................................................................................................... 6-35
Coordinator:
Air resource element coordinator ................................................................................................. 2-22
Force track coordinator—air ............................................................................................... 7-16, 10-3
Corridors .......................................................................................................................................... 6-66
Defence tactics, carrier battle group air ......................................................................................... 10-12
Embargo ........................................................................................................................................... 9-34
Forces:
Command of air forces ................................................................................................................. 6-46
Integration ........................................................................................................................................ 9-31
Interdiction of Maritime Targets ...................................................................................................... 14-2
Operations ..............................................................................................4-18, 6-1, 6-2, 6-32, 6-45, 6-46
Operations procedures ................................................................................................................... 12-11
Picture, local situation and air ......................................................................................................... 7-19
Raid reports..........................................................................................................................7-17 to 7-19
Safety procedures ............................................................................................................................ 6-32
Superiority ....................................................................................................................................... 14-5
Support operations ............................................................................................................................. 6-1
Threats ............................................................................................................................................. 18-3
Tracks............................................................................................................................................... 3-10
Traffic control .................................................................................................................................. 6-49
Transport group................................................................................................................................ 15-6
Airborne coordinator ........................................................................................................................... 6-46
Aircraft:
Airplans, antisubmarine warfare aircraft ....................................................................................... 12-11
Alert states ....................................................................................................................................... 3-35
Antisurface operations ..................................................................................................................... 9-13
Area operations ......................................................................................................................... 2-15, 6-2
Associated support by maritime aircraft ............................................................................................ 6-1
Attack policy, antisubmarine warfare aircraft ............................................................................... 12-26
Attacks, coordinated aircraft and surface unit ................................................................................. 6-87
Authentication on nets .............................................................................................................. 4-7, 10-6
Blind bombing zone, aircraft in ....................................................................................................... 6-66
Carrier (See Carrier)
Chemical attack, aircraft operations in .......................................................................................... 17-14
Combat air patrol aircraft................................................................................................................. 10-6
Command of aircraft .......................................................................................................................... 2-5

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Communications .............................................................................................................................. 4-17

Antisubmarine aircraft .................................................................................................................. 4-13
During aircraft emergencies ......................................................................................................... 6-55
In towed array ship cooperation ................................................................................................. 12-40
Maritime interdiction operations .................................................................................................. 4-12
Contact handover with submarine ................................................................................................. 12-39
Contamination of aircraft............................................................................................................... 17-16
Continuous watch on airborne aircraft ............................................................................................ 6-55
Control unit ............................................................................................................................... 6-8, 6-45
Antisubmarine warfare air control unit ...................................................................................... 12-29
Cooperation ..................................................................................................................................... 16-2
Between aircraft and helicopters .................................................................................................. 9-13
TAS ship ..................................................................................................................................... 12-40
With fixed-wing aircraft ............................................................................................................... 6-38
Delays while operating aircraft, antisubmarine precautions during ................................................ 6-43
Direct support (See Direct support)
Distress, aircraft in ........................................................................................................................... 6-55
Escort of .............................................................................................................................. 6-55, 6-62
Early warning aircraft ...................................................................................................................... 10-5
Emergencies ..................................................................................................................................... 6-32
Emergency and rescue ............................................................................................................ 6-55, 6-56
Flight of aircraft, commander of........................................................................................................ 2-5
Flightpath ....................................................................................................................................... 12-11
Friendly aircraft approaching force ........................................................................................ 6-14, 6-34
Gains contact in cooperation with towed array ship...................................................................... 12-41
Identification and recognition:
By aircraft ..................................................................................................................................... 6-26
Of support aircraft ........................................................................................................................ 6-20
Joining ............................................................................................................................................. 3-33
Procedures ........................................................................................................ 6-12, 6-14, 6-20, 6-32
Shore-based aircraft joining procedures ....................................................................................... 6-32
Lane, aircraft in submarine safety ................................................................................................... 6-88
Lateral and vertical separation ......................................................................................................... 6-35
Launch and departure ...................................................................................................................... 6-49
Launching or recovering aircraft, ships engaged in......................................................................... 6-39
Lights by ships and aircraft, use of .................................................................................................. 6-37
Locking non-tactical data system aircraft into grid ......................................................................... 7-25
Lost aircraft control ......................................................................................................................... 6-55
Low-altitude rules ............................................................................................................................ 6-34
Mission designators ........................................................................................................................... 6-2
Not involved to keep clear ............................................................................................................... 6-55
NOTACK area, aircraft responsibility in establishing ..................................................................... 6-87
Off-task/on-task time, aircraft procedures at .......................................................................... 6-28, 6-29
Operations ........................................................................................................................................ 17-6
Passing information about contact ................................................................................................... 7-18
Reports to search attack unit ................................................................................................. 6-95, 12-36
Requests for carrier aircraft and shipborne tactical aircraft............................................................. 6-48
Rescue in vicinity of ships operating aircraft .................................................................................. 6-61

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Returning aircraft, procedures for.................................................................................................... 6-50

Safety .............................................................................................................................................. 6-66
Ship control zone ............................................................................................................................. 6-49
Shipborne aircraft operations........................................................................................................... 6-39
Signals, ships operating aircraft to make ......................................................................................... 6-61
Support:
Antisubmarine warfare support operations .................................................................................. 12-4
Antisurface operations support ..................................................................................................... 9-13
Towed array ship support ........................................................................................................... 12-12
Transit, aircraft in ......................................................................................................................... 6-12
Turnover procedures, maritime patrol aircraft ................................................................................. 6-27
Units carrying aircraft, responsibilities of ......................................................................................... 6-9
Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, ships operating ...................................................................... 6-39
Airmove messages .............................................................................................................................. 6-33
Airplans ............................................................................................................................................... 6-95
Accuracy of airplan origin ............................................................................................................. 12-12
Airspace:
Carrier strike group/expeditionary strike group .............................................................................. 6-52
Controlled airspace .......................................................................................................................... 6-66
Maritime airspace control ................................................................................................................ 14-4
Air/submarine communications .......................................................................................................... 4-14
Air/surface antisubmarine warfare attacks........................................................................................ 12-27
Alert:
Requirements ................................................................................................................................... 6-48
State for aircraft and weapons ................................................................................................ 3-35, 9-14
Allocation of waterspace management areas ............................................................................. 6-72, 6-74
Altitude ........................................................................................................................................ 3-4, 3-10
Low-altitude rules ............................................................................................................................ 6-34
Selection .......................................................................................................................................... 14-5
Separation in helicopter action group operations ............................................................................ 6-37
Amphibious:
Advanced force groups .................................................................................................................... 15-6
Assault ............................................................................................................................................. 15-2
Objective area ................................................................................................................................ 15-11
Operations ................................................................................................................................. 1-6, 15-1
Analysis of enemy emissions ....................................................................................................... 8-17
Characteristics of ......................................................................................................................... 15-2
Command in ................................................................................................................................. 2-10
Expeditionary and amphibious operations ................................................................................... 19-2
Utility of amphibious operations .................................................................................................. 15-1
Sequence and phasing of .............................................................................................................. 15-4
Task force ..................................................................................................................................... 15-6
Types of ........................................................................................................................................ 15-2
Anchorage:
Readiness in ..................................................................................................................................... 3-33
Anchoring:
In formation ..................................................................................................................................... 3-16
Ship as anchoring reference ............................................................................................................. 3-14
Anti-air warfare .......................................................................................................................... 9-11, 10-1
Aircraft............................................................................................................................................. 10-5

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Call signs ......................................................................................................................................... 4-11

Command and control in ................................................................................................................. 10-1
Commander ............................................................................................................................ 6-45, 10-1
Commander considerations ............................................................................................................. 2-20
Communications ....................................................................................................................... 4-9, 10-6
Coordination ........................................................................................................................... 10-6, 10-7
Coordinator ...................................................................................................................................... 10-2
Specific delegation considerations ............................................................................................... 2-20
Data links .................................................................................................................................. 4-4, 4-10
Formations ....................................................................................................................................... 3-19
Measures, initiation of ..................................................................................................................... 10-3
Nets:
Authentication on nets .................................................................................................................. 10-6
Combining nets............................................................................................................................. 4-10
Reporting and coordination nets..................................................................................................... 4-9
Stationing units ................................................................................................................................ 10-3
Surface action group ........................................................................................................................ 9-11
Anti-intruder activity ............................................................................................................................ 8-3
Antiship missile defence ........................................................................................................ 10-10, 10-11
Antisubmarine warfare............................................................................................ 1-6, 12-1, 12-29, 19-3
Actions ........................................................................................................................................... 12-24
Air effort, maximum effect from ..................................................................................................... 6-26
Aircraft:
Control unit................................................................................................................................. 12-29
Fixed-wing.................................................................................................................................. 12-11
Gains initial contact .................................................................................................................... 12-37
Procedures for............................................................................................................................... 6-73
Relaying contact reports ............................................................................................................. 12-24
Response to submarine-generated contact ................................................................................. 12-38
Urgent attacks ............................................................................................................................. 12-26
With inoperable navigation systems ........................................................................................... 12-27
Airplans ......................................................................................................................................... 12-11
Area operations ................................................................................................................................ 12-3
Attack:
Aircraft communications .............................................................................................................. 4-13
Air/surface attacks ...................................................................................................................... 12-27
Methods, ship and helicopter attack and support ....................................................................... 12-42
Policy for units ................................................................................................................ 12-24, 12-26
Rules ............................................................................................................................................. 6-83
Collision hazard during operations ................................................................................................ 12-28
Command......................................................................................................................................... 12-3
Communications .............................................................................................................................. 4-12
Compensatory allowances ............................................................................................................... 6-79
Coordinated operations .................................................................................................................. 12-28
Coordination and reporting net ........................................................................................................ 4-12
Coordinator
Search attack unit responsibilities .............................................................................................. 12-30
Specific delegation considerations ............................................................................................... 2-20
Detaching ASW forces .................................................................................................................. 12-30
Direct support operations................................................................................................................. 12-4

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Free area .......................................................................................................................................... 6-68

Grid .................................................................................................................................................... 3-5
Helicopters ..................................................................................................................................... 12-10
Interest, procedures within area of................................................................................................... 6-72
Mission designators .................................................................................................................. 6-2, 6-26
Nuclear attack; action prior to, and tactics following ...................................................................... 17-8
Operation ordered ............................................................................................................................ 6-26
Procedures for coordinated submarine/task group ........................................................................ 12-12
Ranges, sensor and weapon ............................................................................................................. 12-4
Responsibility, area of ..................................................................................................................... 6-69
Search plans ................................................................................................................................... 12-28
Ship .................................................................................................................................................. 12-6
Actions........................................................................................................................................ 12-42
Submarine ...................................................................................................................................... 12-12
Support operations by aircraft ........................................................................................................... 6-1
Weapon:
Restrictions ......................................................................................................... 5-3, 6-23, 6-67, 6-76
Antisurface ship missiles .................................................................................................................... 9-11
Targeting .......................................................................................................................................... 9-15
Antisurface warfare ............................................................................................................................... 9-1
Communications .............................................................................................................................. 4-11
Concept .............................................................................................................................................. 9-2
Operations by:
Fixed-wing aircraft ....................................................................................................................... 9-13
Helicopters.................................................................................................................................... 9-13
With subsurface cooperation ........................................................................................................... 9-15
Surface units ................................................................................................................................. 9-10
Approach ............................................................................................................................................. 6-50
Carrier approach procedures ............................................................................................................ 6-50
Contact or datum, search attack unit approach to .......................................................................... 12-32
Continuity ........................................................................................................................................ 9-32
Corridor .................................................................................................................................... 6-7, 6-50
Methods; direct, offset, and intercept approach ............................................................................. 12-32
Minelaying forces, approach phase of ............................................................................................. 13-5
Sectors ............................................................................................................................................. 6-52
Tactics to contact or datum ............................................................................................................ 12-32
Approaching force, friendly aircraft ................................................................................................... 6-14
Area:
Airplan ............................................................................................................................................. 6-23
Antisubmarine warfare:
Area of interest ............................................................................................................................. 6-72
Area of responsibility ................................................................................................................... 6-69
Free area ....................................................................................................................................... 6-68
BANZAI .......................................................................................................................................... 18-9
Classification, identification, and engagement .................................................................................. 5-1
Coordination .................................................................................................................................... 10-7
Defence system ................................................................................................................................ 8-15
Designated area, support.................................................................................................................. 2-14
Escorting .......................................................................................................................................... 18-7

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Force air coordination area ....................................................................................................... 4-10, 6-5

Overlapping areas ......................................................................................................................... 6-35
Force defence ..................................................................................................................................... 5-1
Joint action area .............................................................................................................6-69, 6-72, 6-73
Landward/seaward operating ........................................................................................................... 18-8
Mine threat ............................................................................................................................ 13-8, 13-16
NOTACK area .....................................................................................................................6-84 to 6-88
Operational .................................................................................................................................... 15-11
Operating ......................................................................................................................................... 18-7
Operations ..................................................................................................... 2-15, 4-17, 6-2, 12-3, 12-4
Employment of submarines ........................................................................................................ 12-13
Patrol areas, adjacent ....................................................................................................................... 6-32
Principal warfare area responsibilities ............................................................................................. 2-18
Restricted areas ....................................................................................................................... 6-65, 6-76
Submarine action area............................................................................................................. 6-68, 6-72
Submarine exercise ................................................................................................................. 6-89, 6-90
Submarine-generated search area .................................................................................................... 6-80
Configuration and duration ........................................................................................................... 6-81
Handover in .................................................................................................................................. 6-84
Surveillance area.................................................................................................... 5-1, 7-15, 7-16, 18-7
Task group submarine area .............................................................................................................. 6-69
Vital.................................................................................................................................................... 5-2
Waterspace management area .......................................................................................................... 6-67
Allocations, considerations in area ............................................................................................... 6-71
Procedures for request and allocation of WSM areas .................................................................. 6-74
Areawide electronic warfare coordination .......................................................................................... 8-24
Arrival:
And departure .................................................................................................................................. 3-16
Reporting time of arrival ................................................................................................................. 3-16
Assault, amphibious ............................................................................................................................ 15-2
Assistance is required, action when .................................................................................................. 12-38
Assisting ship .................................................................................................................................... 12-42
Associated support ..................................................................................2-15, 6-1, 6-32, 9-2, 12-4, 12-13
Attack:
Antisubmarine warfare attack (See Antisubmarine warfare)
Coordinated attack:
Aircraft/surface unit ..................................................................................................................... 6-87
Methods ...................................................................................................................................... 12-43
Independent localization and attack................................................................................................. 12-8
Leader .............................................................................................................................................. 6-46
Nuclear attack (See Nuclear)
Policy .......................................................................................................................12-24, 12-26, 12-27
Procedure ......................................................................................................................................... 9-14
Restrictions when operating with submarines ............................................................................... 12-26
Rules, submarine-generated search attack ....................................................................................... 6-83
Support............................................................................................................................................. 6-95
Towed array ship against air attack, defence of ............................................................................... 12-8
Types of attack ............................................................................................................................... 12-24
Vectored attack .............................................................................................................................. 12-43
Urgent attacks by fixed-wing aircraft ............................................................................................ 12-26

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Attacking ship ................................................................................................................................... 12-42

Authentication ....................................................................................................................................... 4-5
Aircraft authentication on anti-air warfare nets ............................................................................... 10-6
Policies............................................................................................................................................... 4-7
Tasking...................................................................................................................................... 6-1, 6-26
Authorities:
Maritime authorities:
Air control .................................................................................................................................... 4-18
Submarine movement, authorities for ............................................................................................. 6-89
Tasking...................................................................................................................................... 6-1, 6-26
Authority ...................................................................................................................................... 2-1, 6-64
ASWC .............................................................................................................................................. 12-4
Delegation of authority ............................................................................................................. 2-2, 2-19
Maritime air control authority ......................................................................................................... 4-18
Naval authority over landing force units ......................................................................................... 2-11
Responsibility, authority and ........................................................................................................... 2-20
SITREPs to operational control authority ....................................................................................... 4-18
Bad weather ........................................................................................................................................ 3-31
Bailout ................................................................................................................................................. 6-61
BARNSTORM procedures ................................................................................................................. 4-15
Base surge ........................................................................................................................................... 17-2
Battlespace awareness ......................................................................................................................... 20-2
Bearing:
Accuracy suffixes ............................................................................................................................... 3-9
Electronic warfare intercept bearing accuracy .................................................................................. 8-4
Distance, bearing and ........................................................................................................................ 3-5
True bearings, courses and............................................................................................................... 6-12
Berth numbers ..................................................................................................................................... 3-16
Biological hazards ............................................................................................................................... 17-9
Blast and underwater shock ................................................................................................................ 17-2
Blind bombing zones .......................................................................................................................... 6-66
Bomb:
Lines, shore bombardment and bomb.............................................................................................. 6-66
Breaking:
Radio silence.................................................................................................................................... 7-27
Silence ............................................................................................................................................... 8-6
Brevity........................................................................................................................................ 4-14, 7-15
Broadband contact by passive sonar or sonobuoy ............................................................................ 12-20
Broadcast control .................................................................................................................................. 6-9
Bulging the screen...................................................................................................................... 3-31, 6-41
Buoys:
Reference ......................................................................................................................................... 6-28
Satellite communication .................................................................................................................. 4-16
Submarine-launched one-way tactical .................................................................................... 4-16, 6-83
Bursts, nuclear..................................................................................................................................... 17-1
Call signs............................................................................................................................................... 4-3
Airborne early warning aircraft ....................................................................................................... 10-5
Anti-air warfare ............................................................................................................................... 4-11
Functional ........................................................................................................................................ 2-21

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Cancelling:
NOTACK area ................................................................................................................................. 6-87
Submarine-generated search area .................................................................................................... 6-83
Weapon control orders ....................................................................................................................... 5-4
Carrier:
Adjustment of movements by ships relative to carrier .................................................................... 6-39
Air operations .................................................................................................................................. 6-46
Aircraft............................................................................................................................................. 10-4
Approach procedures ....................................................................................................................... 6-50
Battle group air defence tactics...................................................................................................... 10-12
Convoy, carrier operating aircraft in ................................................................................................ 6-45
Dispositions ..................................................................................................................................... 3-20
Duties of carriers in a task group ..................................................................................................... 6-40
Principles affecting carrier group formations .................................................................................. 17-6
Requests for carrier aircraft ............................................................................................................. 6-48
Screening carriers during flight operations ...................................................................................... 3-28
Strike group ............................................................................................................................ 6-52, 15-7
Cartesian coordinate grid ...................................................................................................................... 3-5
CERTSUB classification (definition) ..................................................................................... 12-19, 12-26
Chain of command ................................................................................................................................ 2-2
Parallel .........................................................................................................................2-10, 15-8, 15-11
Change in:
Task organization assignments .......................................................................................................... 1-4
Change of:
Operational control ............................................................................................................................ 2-3
Position and intended movement in relative airplans .................................................................... 12-12
Type of control ................................................................................................................................. 6-10
Changing:
Data link reference point ................................................................................................................. 3-12
Depth of sector................................................................................................................................. 3-28
NOTACK area ................................................................................................................................. 6-87
Scene-of-action commander .......................................................................................................... 12-37
Sectors or patrol lines ...................................................................................................................... 3-31
Weapon control status ........................................................................................................................ 5-3
Checklist for aircraft joining a force ................................................................................................... 6-17
Checkoff list, surface action ......................................................................................................... 9-4, 9-10
Checksum digits .................................................................................................................................. 3-11
Chemical warfare .............................................................................................................................. 17-12
Circle, size of ........................................................................................................................................ 3-4
Classification:
Initial contact reporting and classification ..................................................................................... 12-21
Recognition, classification, and identification ................................................................................. 8-17
Classification, identification, and engagement area .............................................................................. 5-1
Close control ......................................................................................................................................... 6-9
Coastal convoy (See Convoy)
Collision:
Hazard during antisubmarine warfare operations .......................................................................... 12-28
Combat air patrol aircraft (See Aircraft)

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Command ..................................................................................................................................... 2-1, 16-5

Air forces, command of ................................................................................................................... 6-46
Aircraft, command of ........................................................................................................................ 2-5
Allied forces, command of ................................................................................................................ 2-5
Amphibious:
Warfare, command in ................................................................................................................... 2-10
Anti-air warfare, command and control in ...................................................................................... 10-1
Antisubmarine warfare, command in .............................................................................................. 12-3
Antisurface warfare, command in...................................................................................................... 9-1
Chain of command............................................................................................................................. 2-2
Delegation of command functions ................................................................................................... 2-16
Development of command structure................................................................................................ 2-16
Direct support and integrated operations; command, control and
communications in submarine .................................................................................................... 12-15
Exercising command ......................................................................................................................... 2-2
Full command .................................................................................................................................... 2-3
Large forces, command of ............................................................................................................... 2-16
Maritime forces, structure for the command of ................................................................................. 2-3
Maritime interdiction operations ..................................................................................................... 2-12
Mine countermeasures, command in ................................................................................................. 2-6
Net, task force/task group command ................................................................................................. 4-7
Officer in tactical command ............................................................................................................... 2-4
(See Officer in tactical command)
Operational command........................................................................................................................ 2-3
Operations, command during .......................................................................................................... 2-11
Options, command and control ........................................................................................................ 2-17
Parallel chains of command .................................................................................................. 2-10, 15-11
Relationships, command and control........................................................................................ 2-9, 15-8
Relationships during planning ....................................................................................................... 15-12
Relationships of the AOA with other AOOs .................................................................................. 15-11
Replenishment at sea, command during ............................................................................................ 2-5
Reports ............................................................................................................................................. 7-20
Responsibility ..............................................................................................................3-32, 12-21, 18-5
Submarine operations, command in .................................................................................................. 2-8
Support operations, command during .............................................................................................. 2-12
System ............................................................................................................................................... 2-2
Tactical command .............................................................................................................................. 2-4
At sea ............................................................................................................................................ 2-16
Transiting submarines, command relationships of .......................................................................... 6-88
Veto, command by ............................................................................................................................. 2-5
Command and Control ........................................................................................................................ 18-5
Anti-air warfare ............................................................................................................................... 10-1
Assured ............................................................................................................................................ 20-2
Communications .............................................................................................................................. 4-19
Information operations attacks ........................................................................................................ 18-3
Information warfare ......................................................................................................................... 20-1
Operations after loss of submarine .................................................................................................. 6-74
Relationships ................................................................................................................................... 15-8
Strike operations ....................................................................................................................... 2-8, 2-15
Surface ships .................................................................................................................................... 11-3

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Commander:
Aircraft, commander of ..................................................................................................................... 2-5
Composite warfare commander ....................................................................................................... 2-20
Considerations ................................................................................................................................. 2-20
Consultation between commanders and corresponding commanders ............................................. 2-11
Delegation to:
Functional group commanders ..................................................................................................... 2-26
Principal warfare commanders ..................................................................................................... 2-21
Screen commander ....................................................................................................................... 2-21
Designation of commanders ............................................................................................................ 2-10
Flight of aircraft, commander of........................................................................................................ 2-5
Principal warfare commanders ........................................................................................................ 2-20
Scene-of-action commander, changing.......................................................................................... 12-37
Sea combat commander .......................................................................................................... 2-24, 4-12
Search attack unit commander .........................................................................................12-31 to 12-36
Sector:
Anti-air warfare ............................................................................................................................ 10-1
Antisubmarine warfare ................................................................................................................... 1-4
Warfare commander ..................................................................................................................... 2-25
Strike commander ............................................................................................................................ 6-46
Surface action group commander .................................................................................................... 9-10
Sweep commander ........................................................................................................................... 6-46
Task groups, units, elements .............................................................................................................. 1-3
Warfare commander............................................................................................. 2-20, 7-20, 9-24, 14-1
Communications ................................................................................................................................... 4-1
Air coordination ...............................................................................................................2-18, 4-10, 6-7
Aircraft communications:
Direct support operations ............................................................................................................. 4-17
Towed array ship cooperation .................................................................................................... 12-40
Amphibious operations .................................................................................................................... 15-1
Anti-air warfare ................................................................................................................................. 4-9
Antisubmarine warfare ........................................................................................................... 4-12, 4-13
Antisurface warfare ......................................................................................................................... 4-11
Decentralized command and control ............................................................................................... 4-19
Deception ......................................................................................................................................... 8-20
Design of communication plan .......................................................................................................... 4-1
Distant ASW units ........................................................................................................................... 4-12
Electronic warfare............................................................................................................................ 4-20
Flashing light ................................................................................................................................... 6-43
Guidelines .......................................................................................................................................... 4-2
Helicopter communications ............................................................................................................. 4-18
In helicopter action group............................................................................................................. 6-37
Jamming.................................................................................................................................. 8-18, 8-19
Maritime interdiction operations ..................................................................................................... 4-12
Maritime patrol aircraft.................................................................................................................... 4-17
Naval cooperation and guidance for shipping ................................................................................. 4-17
Relay ................................................................................................................................................ 4-19
Satellite ............................................................................................................................................ 4-20
Sea combat commander ................................................................................................................... 4-12

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Search attack unit.................................................................................................................. 4-13, 12-30

Security .............................................................................................................................................. 4-5
Post-attack emission control and communications security ........................................................... 8-7
Submarine communications ................................................................................................... 4-14, 9-17
Direct support operations ................................................................................................ 12-13, 12-15
Supporting command ....................................................................................................................... 4-14
Surface action group ............................................................................................................... 4-11, 9-10
Surface ship ..................................................................................................................................... 4-13
Tactical communications plan .................................................................................................. 4-1, 4-16
Task force/task group ......................................................................................................................... 4-7
Towed array ship..................................................................................................................... 4-13, 12-8
Windows ........................................................................................................................................ 12-13
Special communication windows ................................................................................................. 4-16
Composite warfare commander .......................................................................................................... 2-20
Composition of surface action group .................................................................................................. 9-10
Compromise ........................................................................................................................................ 6-64
Confidence levels:
Electronic warfare reporting of.......................................................................................................... 8-4
For POSSUB classification ............................................................................................................ 12-21
Recognition ............................................................................................................................. 7-14, 9-28
Considerations for antiship missile defence ..................................................................................... 10-11
Contact:
Accuracy of airplan contact position ............................................................................................. 12-12
Antisubmarine warfare contact:
Classification ................................................................................................................12-19 to 12-21
Command responsibility for ....................................................................................................... 12-21
Information ................................................................................................................................. 12-23
Initial report ................................................................................................................................ 12-21
Prosecution ................................................................................................................................. 12-19
Subsequent evaluation ................................................................................................................ 12-21
Submarine gains initial contact .................................................................................................. 12-37
Approach tactics to contact or datum ............................................................................................ 12-32
Direct support forces are involved, action following contact when .............................................. 12-37
Enemy contact ................................................................................................................................... 8-6
By aircraft in transit ...................................................................................................................... 6-12
Reports.......................................................................................................................................... 7-17
Gaining contact, action on ............................................................................................................. 12-29
By aircraft ..................................................................................................................................... 6-26
On search................................................................................................................................... 7-10
Handover ....................................................................................................................................... 12-39
In submarine-generated search area during area operations ........................................................ 6-80
Investigation .................................................................................................................................. 12-11
In towed array ship and aircraft cooperation .............................................................................. 12-40
Passing information about contacts, responsibility for .................................................................... 7-17
Passive sonar capable surface ship gains initial contact ................................................................ 12-38
Reports ............................................................................................................................................. 7-17
By towed-array ship ................................................................................................................... 12-24
On enemy submarines ................................................................................................................ 12-38
Search attack unit’s approach to contact or datum ........................................................................ 12-32

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Submarine contact reporting .......................................................................................................... 12-23

Turnover........................................................................................................................................... 9-16
Unit gaining contact, action by units in vicinity of ....................................................................... 12-29
Control .................................................................................................................................................. 2-1
Air traffic control ............................................................................................................................. 6-49
Aircraft coordination ......................................................................................................................... 6-7
Aircraft control unit .......................................................................................................6-8, 6-45, 12-29
Assets, control and coordination of ................................................................................................. 2-26
Broadcast ........................................................................................................................................... 6-9
Central ............................................................................................................................................. 9-20
Change of:
Operational control ......................................................................................................................... 2-3
Type of control ............................................................................................................................. 6-10
Close .................................................................................................................................................. 6-9
Command and control (See Command)
Delegation to control units .............................................................................................................. 2-26
Electronic jamming, control of ........................................................................................................ 8-19
Groups ............................................................................................................................................. 15-7
Helicopter control unit .......................................................................................................... 3-29, 12-29
Inability to exercise control ............................................................................................................. 6-10
Loose ................................................................................................................................................. 6-9
Lost aircraft control ......................................................................................................................... 6-55
Maritime airspace ............................................................................................................................ 14-4
Net for:
Fighter/AEW control net .............................................................................................................. 4-10
Helicopter ..................................................................................................................................... 4-19
Maritime patrol aircraft ................................................................................................................ 4-18
Network control station .................................................................................................................. 4-2
Surface action group control net .................................................................................................. 4-11
Operational control ............................................................................................................................ 2-3
Qualifying weapon control status and orders ............................................................................. 5-3, 5-4
Relinquishment of tactical control ................................................................................................. 12-15
Screen helicopters, control of .......................................................................................................... 3-29
Shifting tactical control of direct support submarines ................................................................... 12-15
Tactical control ....................................................................................................................... 2-4, 12-18
Type of operations and control, factors determining ....................................................................... 6-10
Veto, control by................................................................................................................................ 10-7
Weapon control status and orders ............................................................................ 5-3, 5-4, 6-76, 6-77
Controlled:
Airspace ........................................................................................................................................... 6-66
Operations ................................................................................................................................. 6-9, 9-13
Waterspace ....................................................................................................................................... 6-67
Convoy:
Air operations in a convoy............................................................................................................... 6-45
Discipline, maintaining convoy ....................................................................................................... 3-28
Formations:
Maintaining ......................................................................................................................... 3-28, 3-29
Principles affecting ....................................................................................................................... 17-8
Main body ......................................................................................................................3-17, 3-23, 3-28

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Mercantile, military, and unescorted convoys ................................................................................. 2-18

Officer in tactical command’s responsibilities for convoy .............................................................. 2-18
Route position designators............................................................................................................... 3-14
Screens, instructions for convoy ...................................................................................................... 3-28
Support force in situation A, convoy and ........................................................................................ 2-19
Cooperation:
Antisurface warfare with subsurface cooperation ........................................................................... 9-15
Between aircraft and helicopters ..................................................................................................... 9-13
Principals ......................................................................................................................................... 16-2
Submarine/air cooperation ............................................................................................................. 12-39
Towed array ship/aircraft cooperation ........................................................................................... 12-40
With fixed-wing aircraft................................................................................................................... 6-38
Coordinated:
Aircraft/surface unit attacks............................................................................................................. 6-87
Air-defence ........................................................................................................................................ 6-7
Antisubmarine warfare ....................................................................................................... 12-28, 12-29
Antisurface operations ....................................................................................................................... 9-3
Attack methods .............................................................................................................................. 12-43
Prosecution of antisubmarine warfare contact with support submarine ........................................ 12-38
Coordinating:
Authority/unit, submarine-generated search area coordinating ...........................................6-80 to 6-84
Coordination .......................................................................................................................2-1, 7-15, 18-7
Aided intercept by submarine, coordination required for.............................................................. 12-18
Air coordination .................................................................................................................2-18, 6-5, 6-7
Anti-air warfare coordination ................................................................................................... 4-9, 10-6
Antijam .............................................................................................................................................. 4-2
Area coordination ............................................................................................................................ 10-7
Areawide electronic warfare ............................................................................................................ 8-24
Assets, control and coordination of ................................................................................................. 2-26
Direct ................................................................................................................................................. 8-2
Electronic and acoustic warfare coordination........................................................................... 2-18, 8-1
Force air coordination area ................................................................................................................ 6-5
Overlapping areas ......................................................................................................................... 6-35
Joint ................................................................................................................................................. 10-8
Local coordination ........................................................................................................................... 10-9
Maritime strike coordination and reconnaissance ........................................................................... 14-2
Mine warfare coordination .............................................................................................................. 2-18
Responsibilities ................................................................................................................2-18, 6-8, 6-73
Surveillance coordination ....................................................................................................... 7-16, 14-1
Tactical data link .............................................................................................................................. 2-18
Torpedo attack ............................................................................................................................... 12-41
Zone coordination ............................................................................................................................ 10-8
Coordinator:
Air resource element coordinator .................................................................................................... 2-22
Airborne coordinator ....................................................................................................................... 6-46
Delegation to coordinators............................................................................................................... 2-21
Electronic warfare coordinator ........................................................................................................ 2-21
Functions delegated to................................................................................................................. 8-2

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Force track coordinator:

Air ................................................................................................................................................. 7-16
Subsurface and surface .......................................................................................................... 7-16, 9-2
Inner defence zone coordinator ..................................................................................................... 10-12
Local anti-air warfare coordinator ................................................................................................... 10-2
Outer defence zone coordinator ..................................................................................................... 10-12
Responsibilities ................................................................................................................................ 2-20
Sector anti-air warfare commander ................................................................................................. 10-1
Standard call signs ............................................................................................................................. 4-3
Corridor, approach ................................................................................................................................ 6-7
Corridors, air ....................................................................................................................................... 6-66
CORTAC procedure message ............................................................................................................... 3-1
Countermarking .................................................................................................................................. 7-12
Countermeasures:
Electronic and acoustic .................................................................................................................... 8-18
Mine ........................................................................................................................................ 13-5, 13-6
Torpedo ............................................................................................................................................ 3-17
By search attack unit .................................................................................................................. 12-34
Countershadowing .............................................................................................................................. 7-12
Course:
Adjusting course in manoeuvring Method B ................................................................................... 6-41
Alteration of course ......................................................................................................................... 3-28
Relative wind, course and ................................................................................................................ 6-43
Resuming course and station in manoeuvring Methods B and C ........................................... 6-41, 6-42
Speed, course and/course and speed made good ............................................................................. 3-15
True bearings, course and ................................................................................................................ 6-12
Cover ................................................................................................................................................... 10-7
Covert:
AIS operating mode ......................................................................................................................... 7-30
Joining procedure ............................................................................................................................ 6-20
Tactics ................................................................................................................................................ 7-8
Crisis response:
Amphibious force support to crisis response and other operations ................................................. 15-2
Operations ........................................................................................................................................ 9-20
Cross-fixing ....................................................................................................................................... 12-40
Crossover zone .................................................................................................................................... 10-9
Cryptological activity............................................................................................................................ 8-3
Daily changing call signs ...................................................................................................................... 4-3
Damage, assessing ............................................................................................................................ 12-27
Damaged ship:
Action when ship is damaged .......................................................................................................... 3-29
Screen for damaged ship.................................................................................................................. 3-27
Danger:
Navigational danger ......................................................................................................................... 3-14
Dangerous to subsurface operations, operations inherently ............................................................... 6-90
Darkened ships, navigation lights on ................................................................................................ 12-28
Darkened helicopter operations .......................................................................................................... 6-52
Data:
Anti-air warfare data links ............................................................................................................... 4-10

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Compilation ............................................................................................................................ 7-15, 7-16

Link ........................................................................................................................................... 4-4, 7-15
Reference point............................................................................................................................. 3-12
Net control station ........................................................................................................................... 7-22
Datum:
Accuracy of airplan datum position............................................................................................... 12-12
Approach tactics to contact or datum ............................................................................................ 12-34
Establishing and designating datum .............................................................................................. 12-28
Search attack unit’s approach to contact or datum ..........................................................12-32 to 12-34
Decentralized command and control, communications for ................................................................ 4-19
Deception ............................................................................................................................................ 8-20
Measures against deception ............................................................................................................. 8-22
Risk of imitative deception ................................................................................................................ 4-6
Decision ................................................................................................................................................ 2-2
Decontamination ............................................................................................................................... 17-12
Defence:
Antiship missile defence ................................................................................................................ 10-10
Areas, force ........................................................................................................................................ 5-1
Carrier battle group air defence tactics .......................................................................................... 10-12
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear .............................................................................. 17-1
Collective at sea ................................................................................................................................. 1-1
Nuclear warfare defence concept..................................................................................................... 17-4
Suppression of enemy air ................................................................................................................ 14-6
Systems ............................................................................................................................................ 8-15
Towed array ship against air attack, defence of ............................................................................... 12-8
Defensive:
Mine countermeasures ..................................................................................................................... 13-6
Mining ............................................................................................................................................. 13-4
Definitions in antisurface warfare ........................................................................................................ 9-1
Definitions of antisurface warfare support operations .......................................................................... 9-2
Definitions, terms and ...........................................................................................................6-5, 6-9, 7-13
Degrees of readiness ...............................................................................................................3-32 to 3-34
Delegation of:
Authority ................................................................................................................................... 2-2, 2-19
Functions ......................................................................................................................................... 2-27
Force protection ............................................................................................................................ 18-6
Command......................................................................................................................................... 2-16
Electronic and acoustic warfare ......................................................................................................... 8-2
Tactical command ............................................................................................................................ 2-13
Delegation to commanders, coordinators, and control units...................................................2-21 to 2-26
Deliberate attack by screen helicopter ................................................................................12-24 to 12-27
Demonstration, amphibious ................................................................................................................ 15-2
Departure:
Arrival and departure ....................................................................................................................... 3-14
Launch and departure:
Fixed-wing aircraft ....................................................................................................................... 6-49
Helicopter ..................................................................................................................................... 6-49
Location ............................................................................................................................................. 6-5
Officer in tactical command’s responsibilities for ............................................................... 2-17, 2-19
Screen ..................................................................................................................................... 3-21, 3-25

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Depth ................................................................................................................................................... 3-10

Sector ...................................................................................................................................... 3-23, 3-28
Designating datum ............................................................................................................................ 12-28
Designation of:
Commands ....................................................................................................................................... 15-8
Commanders .................................................................................................................................... 2-10
For amphibious operation ............................................................................................................. 15-8
Guide, new ....................................................................................................................................... 6-41
Search attack unit........................................................................................................................... 12-30
Designation of commanders/parallel chains of command ......................................................... 2-10, 15-8
Designator:
Aircraft mission designators .............................................................................................................. 6-2
Antisubmarine warfare mission designators.................................................................................... 6-26
Convoy route position ..................................................................................................................... 3-14
Letters .............................................................................................................................................. 6-26
Task designators................................................................................................................................. 1-3
Destroyer:
Rescue destroyer ............................................................................................................2-26, 6-55, 6-56
Detection ...................................................................................................................................... 7-3, 8-16
Methods ......................................................................................................................................... 17-11
Mine detection report....................................................................................................................... 7-19
Picture compilation, detection in .............................................................................................. 7-1, 7-13
Deviation from specified sensor.......................................................................................................... 6-26
Diagrams, emission ............................................................................................................................. 8-12
Direct approach method .................................................................................................................... 12-32
Direct support............................................................................................................................... 2-15, 9-2
Action following contact when direct support forces are involved ............................................... 12-37
Air support operations ....................................................................................................................... 6-1
Antisubmarine warfare direct support operations............................................................................ 12-4
Communications with aircraft on direct support operations............................................................ 4-17
Employment of:
Aircraft on direct support ............................................................................................................. 6-25
Submarines in direct support ...................................................................................................... 12-14
Maritime aircraft, direct support by ................................................................................................. 6-32
Direction ............................................................................................................................................... 2-1
Electronic warfare, direction and coordination of .................................................................... 8-2, 8-24
Finding of transmissions .................................................................................................................. 8-16
Functions:
Force protection ............................................................................................................................ 18-8
Local anti-air warfare coordinator ................................................................................................ 10-2
Local warfare coordinator ............................................................................................................ 2-23
Sector anti-air warfare coordinator............................................................................................... 10-1
Sector warfare commanders ......................................................................................................... 2-25
Directive, initiating .......................................................................................... 2-7, 2-10, 2-11, 15-4, 15-9
Disguised targeting ............................................................................................................................. 9-18
Dispatch of search attack unit, designation and ................................................................................ 12-30
Dispersion ........................................................................................................................................... 10-3
Disposition:
Force ................................................................................................................................................ 9-26
Planning factors ............................................................................................................................... 3-20

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Principles affecting .......................................................................................................................... 17-5

Units, disposition of ......................................................................................................................... 8-17
Dissemination .............................................................................................................................. 7-5, 7-30
Distance:
Bearing and distance .......................................................................................................................... 3-5
Distress, aircraft in .............................................................................................................................. 6-55
Escort of ........................................................................................................................................... 6-55
Ditching............................................................................................................................................... 6-61
Diversion of ship to locate survivors .................................................................................................. 6-62
Diving restrictions............................................................................................................................... 6-89
DOWNLINK considerations .............................................................................................................. 4-16
Duties:
Of carriers in a task group ............................................................................................................... 6-40
Promulgation of duties..................................................................................................................... 2-27
Duty ................................................................................................................................................. 2-16
Carrier system .................................................................................................................................. 6-45
Ejection ............................................................................................................................................... 6-61
Electromagnetic:
Interference of search equipment by own transmissions ................................................................. 8-16
Pulse................................................................................................................................................. 17-2
Electronic:
Acoustic warfare, electronic and .............................................................................................. 2-18, 8-1
Countermeasures (definition) ............................................................................................................ 8-1
Activities ........................................................................................................................................ 8-3
Employment ................................................................................................................................. 8-18
Positive control ........................................................................................................................... 10-10
Reducing effectiveness of ............................................................................................................. 8-21
Tasking ......................................................................................................................................... 8-15
Jamming........................................................................................................................................... 8-19
Reducing effectiveness of ............................................................................................................. 8-21
Neutralization .................................................................................................................................. 8-20
Reducing effectiveness of ............................................................................................................. 8-22
Order of battle (emitter list) ...................................................................................................... 8-1, 8-15
Policy and detached units .................................................................................................................. 8-4
Protective measures (definition) ........................................................................................................ 8-3
Activities ........................................................................................................................................ 8-3
Employment ........................................................................................................................ 8-18, 8-21
Warfare (definition) ........................................................................................................................... 8-1
Activities ........................................................................................................................................ 8-3
Aircraft ......................................................................................................................................... 10-6
Areawide coordination ................................................................................................................. 8-24
Considerations ..................................................................................................................... 4-20, 8-25
Coordination ................................................................................................................................. 2-18
Coordination cell .......................................................................................................................... 8-24
Coordinator ................................................................................................................................... 2-21
Intercept bearing accuracy.............................................................................................................. 8-4
Reporting of confidence levels ....................................................................................................... 8-4
Satellite communications ............................................................................................................. 4-20
Surface action group ..................................................................................................................... 9-10

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Warfare support measures (definition)............................................................................................... 8-1

Activities ........................................................................................................................................ 8-3
Contact........................................................................................................................................ 12-20
Employment ................................................................................................................................. 8-16
Tasking ......................................................................................................................................... 8-13
Elements:
NCAGS ............................................................................................................................................ 11-1
Picture compilation elements............................................................................................................. 7-2
Task elements..................................................................................................................................... 1-3
Embarkation ........................................................................................................................................ 15-4
Emergencies, aircraft .......................................................................................................................... 6-32
Communications during .................................................................................................................. 6-55
Emergency:
Aircraft emergency and rescue ........................................................................................................ 6-55
Ditching ........................................................................................................................................... 6-62
Landing:
Ship............................................................................................................................................... 6-55
Manoeuvring for ........................................................................................................................... 6-42
Visual signals for .......................................................................................................................... 6-56
Rendezvous ...................................................................................................................................... 17-9
Signals ............................................................................................................................................. 3-33
Transit of surface forces .................................................................................................................. 6-74
Emission:
Control ...................................................................................................................................... 6-23, 8-8
Plan .......................................................................................................................................... 8-2, 8-8
Post-attack ...................................................................................................................................... 8-7
Security and ......................................................................................................................... 4-19, 7-27
Diagrams .......................................................................................................................................... 8-12
Enemy .............................................................................................................................................. 8-17
Policy .......................................................................................................................................... 4-7, 8-5
Silent emission policy ........................................................................................................................ 8-5
Emitter list (electronic order of battle)................................................................................................ 8-15
Emitters, threat and target ................................................................................................................... 8-14
Endurance ........................................................................................................................................... 3-16
Enemy:
Contact ............................................................................................................................................... 8-6
By aircraft in transit ...................................................................................................................... 6-12
Report on enemy submarines ..................................................................................................... 12-38
Reports.......................................................................................................................................... 7-17
Emissions ......................................................................................................................................... 8-17
Surface-to-surface missiles .............................................................................................................. 9-10
Engagement:
After-action reports .......................................................................................................................... 7-20
Long-range/short-range ..................................................................................................................... 9-9
Order of engagement ....................................................................................................................... 10-7
Rules of engagement ............................................................................................. 5-1, 9-20, 14-4, 18-9
Zones ............................................................................................................................................... 10-9
Engineering degrees of readiness........................................................................................................ 3-34

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Entry:
Gate .................................................................................................................................................... 6-5
Intervals ........................................................................................................................................... 3-16
Operations, officer in tactical command’s responsibilities for entry ............................................... 2-19
Screen ..................................................................................................................................... 3-21, 3-25
Escort:
Aircraft.................................................................................................................................... 6-55, 6-62
Distress, escort of aircraft in ............................................................................................................ 6-55
Leader .............................................................................................................................................. 6-46
Escorting area...................................................................................................................................... 18-7
Establishing:
Cartesian coordinate grid ................................................................................................................... 3-5
Datum ............................................................................................................................................ 12-28
NOTACK area ........................................................................................................................ 6-84, 6-86
Submarine-generated search area .................................................................................................... 6-84
Visual contact................................................................................................................................... 6-56
Evaluation .........................................................................................................................2-2, 3-32, 12-21
Evasion:
Antisubmarine ............................................................................................................................... 12-34
Evasive steering ......................................................................................................................... 3-17, 3-29
Exchanging data on positions, reporting and ...................................................................................... 3-12
Execution ..................................................................................................2-2, 2-5, 6-53, 6-75, 7-25, 9-28
Specific target planning and engagement execution ........................................................................... 9-16
Exercising command ............................................................................................................................. 2-2
Exit gate ................................................................................................................................................ 6-5
Exoatmospheric burst.......................................................................................................................... 17-1
Factors ........................................................................................................................................ 3-18, 6-52
Determining type of operations and control .................................................................................... 6-10
Disposition planning factors ............................................................................................................ 3-20
ECM tasking .................................................................................................................................... 8-15
ESM tasking .................................................................................................................................... 8-13
Tasking authority ............................................................................................................................. 6-26
Fallout ................................................................................................................................................. 17-8
Fighter air direction nets ..................................................................................................................... 4-10
Fighter engagement zone .................................................................................................................... 10-9
Filling a gap in the screen ................................................................................................................... 3-31
Final approach tactic ......................................................................................................................... 12-34
Fire support groups ............................................................................................................................. 15-6
First-stage preparations ....................................................................................................................... 9-23
Fixed-wing aircraft (See Aircraft)
Flash and initial radiation effects ........................................................................................................ 17-1
Flashing light communications ........................................................................................................... 6-43
Fleet air defence identification zone ......................................................................... 2-22, 4-10, 6-7, 6-20
Flight of aircraft, commander of ........................................................................................................... 2-5
Flight operations:
Manoeuvring for .............................................................................................................................. 6-40
Screening aircraft carrier during ...................................................................................................... 3-28
Ship movements during ................................................................................................................... 6-39
Flightpath, aircraft............................................................................................................................. 12-11
Flying sectors ...................................................................................................................................... 6-40

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Force:
Air coordination area (definition) ...................................................................................................... 6-5
Overlapping areas ......................................................................................................................... 6-35
Anti-air warfare nets ........................................................................................................................ 4-10
Coordination ...................................................................................................................................... 6-1
Defence area ...................................................................................................................................... 5-1
Marshaller .......................................................................................................................................... 6-8
Operations integral to a force ............................................................................................................ 6-2
Organization/readiness ...................................................................................................................... 3-1
Protection coordinator ..................................................................................................................... 2-24
Protection functions ......................................................................................................................... 18-6
Protection levels ........................................................................................................18-7, 18-10, 18-11
Protection levels developing process ............................................................................................. 18-11
Track coordinator—air ........................................................................................................... 7-16, 10-3
Air picture compilation ................................................................................................................ 7-16
Track coordinator—surface/subsurface ...........................................................................7-16, 9-2, 12-4
Formation:
Anchoring in formation ................................................................................................................... 3-14
Basic system of formations.............................................................................................................. 3-19
Maintaining convoy ......................................................................................................................... 3-29
Manoeuvring the whole formation together (Method A) ................................................................ 6-40
Principles affecting formations ............................................................................................... 17-5, 17-6
Rendezvous ...................................................................................................................................... 17-8
Strike ................................................................................................................................................ 6-46
Sweep............................................................................................................................................... 6-46
Foreseeable scenarios.......................................................................................................................... 18-4
Found report ........................................................................................................................................ 6-14
Free area, antisubmarine warfare ........................................................................................................ 6-68
FREEWHEEL ..................................................................................................................................... 6-81
Frequency management ........................................................................................................................ 8-2
Friendly:
Air tracks ......................................................................................................................................... 3-10
Aircraft approaching the force ......................................................................................................... 6-14
Effect on friendly electronic warfare support measures .................................................................. 4-20
Information to friendly forces.......................................................................................................... 13-5
Search for friendly force .................................................................................................................. 6-14
Submarine coordinated prosecution .............................................................................................. 12-38
Full:
Command........................................................................................................................................... 2-3
Function ........................................................................................................................................... 2-16
Control ............................................................................................................................................. 2-25
Coordination ...................................................................................................................................... 2-1
Direction ............................................................................................................................................ 2-1
Delegation of functions ................................................................................................................... 2-27
Command ....................................................................................................................................... 2-1
Electronic and acoustic warfare ..................................................................................................... 8-2
Functional:
Call signs ......................................................................................................................................... 2-21
Group ............................................................................................................................................... 2-21
Delegation to commander ............................................................................................................ 2-26

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Gates; handover, entry/exit, and marshalling........................................................................................ 6-5

Gateway unit ....................................................................................................................................... 7-24
General degrees of readiness .............................................................................................................. 3-34
General weapons restrictions ................................................................................................................ 5-3
Geographic reference system, world..................................................................................................... 3-2
Geographical constraints ..................................................................................................................... 9-20
GRASSHOPPER, Operation ..................................................................................................... 6-74, 6-75
Grid:
ASW grid ........................................................................................................................................... 3-5
Cartesian coordinate .......................................................................................................................... 3-5
Departure/entry screen ..................................................................................................................... 3-25
Lock procedure ................................................................................................................................ 7-25
Reference unit .................................................................................................................................. 7-24
Universal transverse mercator grid .................................................................................................... 3-4
Group:
Communications ................................................................................................................................ 4-7
Carrier battle group ........................................................................................................................ 10-12
Carrier strike group .......................................................................................................................... 6-52
Fire support groups .......................................................................................................................... 15-6
Forces and groups ............................................................................................................................ 9-20
Functional group .............................................................................................................................. 2-21
Delegation to commander ............................................................................................................ 2-26
Helicopter action group .......................................................................................................... 6-37, 9-14
Naval beach group ......................................................................................................................... 15-12
Surface action group ............................................................................................................... 4-11, 9-10
Task group ......................................................................................................................................... 1-3
Duties............................................................................................................................................ 6-40
Operation ............................................................................................................................. 6-80, 6-82
PIM ............................................................................................................................................... 3-16
Submarine area ............................................................................................................................. 6-69
Guard ships ......................................................................................................................................... 3-33
GUERRILLA procedures.................................................................................................................... 4-16
Guide:
Screen unit as Guide in Method B ................................................................................................... 6-42
When manoeuvring by Method A.................................................................................................... 6-41
Handover:
Contact handover ........................................................................................................................... 12-39
Gate .................................................................................................................................................... 6-5
Radar and nonradar handover .......................................................................................................... 6-20
Submarine-generated search area handover during area operations................................................ 6-84
Harbour:
Readiness in harbour ....................................................................................................................... 3-33
Reference points .............................................................................................................................. 3-13
States of readiness in harbour ............................................................................................... 18-9, 18-10
Havens, submarine and surface ship .......................................................................................6-69 to 6-71
Hazard:
Antisubmarine warfare operations, hazard of collision during ..................................................... 12-28
Biological......................................................................................................................................... 17-9
Navigational..................................................................................................................................... 3-31

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Nuclear bursts, hazards from ........................................................................................................... 17-1

Radiation hazards ................................................................................................................... 6-77, 6-78
Helicopter............................................................................................................................................ 6-33
Action group ........................................................................................................................... 6-37, 9-14
Advanced screening or searching helicopter ................................................................................. 12-26
Antisubmarine warfare helicopter:
Airplans ............................................................................................................................. 6-95, 12-11
Attack policy .............................................................................................................................. 12-27
Employment ............................................................................................................................... 12-10
Methods, attack and support ....................................................................................................... 12-42
Antisurface operations ..................................................................................................................... 9-13
Assists detecting unit ..................................................................................................................... 12-29
Communications and control nets .......................................................................................... 4-18, 4-19
Control of screen helicopters ........................................................................................................... 3-29
Control unit ........................................................................................................................... 3-29, 12-29
Cooperation between aircraft and helicopters ................................................................................. 9-13
Dip or hover, helicopter in ...................................................................................................... 3-31, 6-34
Dipping sonar .................................................................................................................................. 6-91
Element coordinator ........................................................................................................................ 2-22
Flying of helicopters ........................................................................................................................ 6-34
In-flight refuelling............................................................................................................................ 6-39
Joining procedure ............................................................................................................................ 6-16
Joining/rejoining .............................................................................................................................. 6-33
Lateral and vertical separation ......................................................................................................... 6-35
Launch and departure ...................................................................................................................... 6-49
Low-altitude rules ............................................................................................................................ 6-34
Position of ship operating helicopters ............................................................................................. 6-34
Reference point ................................................................................................................................ 3-13
Rescue helicopter .................................................................................................................... 6-55, 6-60
Rescue station .................................................................................................................................. 6-60
Screen, helicopter in ........................................................................................................................ 3-29
Sector screen, conduct of helicopters in .......................................................................................... 3-28
Ship control zone ............................................................................................................................. 6-49
Silent/darkened operations .............................................................................................................. 6-52
Station for helicopter ship operations .............................................................................................. 6-60
Station keeping in screen ................................................................................................................. 3-31
Transit .............................................................................................................................................. 6-32
Windline screen ...................................................................................................................... 3-21, 3-25
High-altitude:
Burst................................................................................................................................................. 17-1
High-power transmitting equipment, ships fitted with .............................................................. 6-77, 6-78
Hygiene ............................................................................................................................................. 17-12
Identification ....................................................................................................................................... 7-14
And recognition ...................................................................................................................... 6-21, 6-64
By aircraft ..................................................................................................................................... 6-26
Of support aircraft ........................................................................................................................ 6-20
Procedures .................................................................................................................................... 6-21
Criteria .................................................................................................................................... 7-14, 9-28
Emergency identification friend or foe ............................................................................................ 6-55
Picture compilation, identification in.......................................................................................... 7-3, 7-5

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Recognition, and classification; identification ................................................................................. 8-17

Safety point ........................................................................................................................................ 6-7
Safety range ....................................................................................................................................... 6-5
Target ............................................................................................................................................... 14-4
Identity manoeuvre and identification friend or foe/selective identification feature identity .... 6-21, 6-22
Imitative deception, risk of ................................................................................................................... 4-6
Implementation of:
Force protection levels................................................................................................................... 18-11
Procedures ....................................................................................................................................... 6-63
Independent:
Action in peacetime ......................................................................................................................... 6-43
Localization and attack .................................................................................................................... 12-8
Method of manoeuvring (Method B)............................................................................................... 6-40
Operations ................................................................................................................................. 6-9, 9-13
Position and intended movement of independent unit..................................................................... 3-16
Individual power ................................................................................................................................... 2-1
Information:
Environment .................................................................................................................................... 20-2
Exchange between shadowing and relieving units .......................................................................... 7-11
Fallout information, promulgating .................................................................................................. 17-8
Friendly forces, information about minefields to ............................................................................ 13-5
Passing information about contacts ................................................................................................. 7-17
In search attack unit operations ....................................................................................... 12-31, 12-32
Required by officer in tactical command ......................................................................................... 7-17
Superiority ....................................................................................................................................... 20-2
Technology ...................................................................................................................................... 20-1
Warfare ............................................................................................................................1-5, 2-20, 20-2
Informative vectored attack method ................................................................................................. 12-44
Informing officer in tactical command:
Of operations in his vicinity .............................................................................................................. 6-2
Infringements in war ........................................................................................................................... 6-35
Initial:
Approach ....................................................................................................................................... 12-34
Contact reporting and classification .............................................................................................. 12-21
Contact, unit gains initial .................................................................................................... 12-37, 12-38
Position in manoeuvring Methods B and C ............................................................................ 6-41, 6-42
Radiation effects, flash and initial.................................................................................................... 17-1
Responses to detection....................................................................................................................... 5-1
Support submarine, initial antisubmarine warfare contact report from ......................................... 12-37
Inner:
Defence zone ................................................................................................................................. 10-12
Screen ............................................................................................................................2-26, 3-22, 12-9
Inoperable:
Equipment ........................................................................................................................................ 3-32
Navigation systems (aircraft)......................................................................................................... 12-27
Intercept:
Aided intercept by submarine ........................................................................................................ 12-18
Approach method .......................................................................................................................... 12-32
Bearing accuracy ............................................................................................................................... 8-4
Interception of transmissions .............................................................................................................. 8-16

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Interest, procedures within area of ...................................................................................................... 6-72

Interference (See Acoustic interference and Mutual interference)
Internet protocol chat rooms ................................................................................................................. 4-8
Interceptor coordination and reporting net ......................................................................................... 4-10
Intervals............................................................................................................................................... 3-16
Jamming ..................................................................................................................................... 8-18, 8-19
Interference, meaconing, intrusion .................................................................................................. 8-22
Reducing effectiveness of ................................................................................................................ 8-21
Jettisoning mines................................................................................................................................. 13-4
Joining ................................................................................................................................................. 3-33
Instructions message ........................................................................................................................ 6-14
Link 11 ............................................................................................................................................. 6-12
Procedures ....................................................................................................................................... 6-14
Abbreviated joining procedure ..................................................................................................... 6-15
Covert joining procedure .............................................................................................................. 6-20
Helicopters.................................................................................................................................... 6-33
Shore-based aircraft ...................................................................................................................... 6-32
Report on joining a screen ............................................................................................................... 3-30
Support aircraft ................................................................................................................................ 6-12
Joint:
Action area .....................................................................................................................6-69, 6-72, 6-74
For support submarine ................................................................................................................ 12-16
Anti-air warfare shore coordination net........................................................................................... 4-10
Keep clear:
Aircraft not involved to ................................................................................................................... 6-55
Landing:
Circuit .............................................................................................................................................. 6-39
Emergency landing:
Manoeuvring for ........................................................................................................................... 6-42
Ship............................................................................................................................................... 6-55
Force:
In amphibious operation ............................................................................................................... 15-7
Naval authority over units ............................................................................................................ 2-11
Lanes, submarine safety ............................................................................................................. 6-69, 6-88
Large forces, command of .................................................................................................................. 2-16
Lateral and vertical separation ............................................................................................................ 6-35
Launch and:
Departure:
Fixed-wing aircraft ....................................................................................................................... 6-49
Helicopters.................................................................................................................................... 6-49
Recovery of aircraft:
Ships engaged in ........................................................................................................................... 6-39
Unscheduled operations ............................................................................................................... 6-49
Leadthrough operation ........................................................................................................................ 11-3
Lead-time requirements ...................................................................................................................... 4-15
Lighting measures ............................................................................................................................... 6-43
Lights:
Navigation lights, use of ................................................................................................................ 12-28
Ships and aircraft, use of lights by .................................................................................................. 6-37
Special lights.................................................................................................................................. 12-28

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Limited strike ...................................................................................................................................... 6-48

Link:
Anti-air warfare data links ............................................................................................................... 4-10
Broadcast unit .................................................................................................................................. 7-24
Integration with standard tactical doctrine ...................................................................................... 7-21
Link 11, tactical use of..................................................................................................................... 7-21
Waveform ..................................................................................................................................... 7-22
Management units............................................................................................................................ 7-22
Reporting ......................................................................................................................................... 9-18
Types of data link............................................................................................................................... 4-4
Wide-area link operations ................................................................................................................ 7-22
Local:
Antiair warfare:
Coordination net ............................................................................................................................. 4-9
Coordinator ................................................................................................................................... 10-2
Coordination .................................................................................................................................... 10-9
Situation and air picture ................................................................................................................... 7-19
Warfare coordinator ......................................................................................................................... 2-23
Localization.......................................................................................................................7-4, 7-14, 12-40
Enemy emissions, localization of .................................................................................................... 8-17
Independent localization and attack................................................................................................. 12-8
Jamming transmitter, localization of ............................................................................................... 8-18
Surface action .................................................................................................................................... 9-3
Picture compilation, localization in ...................................................................................................... 7-4
Loose control ........................................................................................................................................ 6-9
Loss of submarine command and control, operations after ................................................................ 6-74
Lost:
Aircraft control ................................................................................................................................ 6-55
Low-altitude rules for aircraft ............................................................................................................. 6-34
Low-visibility recovery operations ..................................................................................................... 6-43
Magnetic anomaly detection:
Contact ........................................................................................................................................... 12-20
During vectored attack................................................................................................................... 12-44
Verification runs ............................................................................................................................. 12-44
Main body:
Evasive steering by main body ........................................................................................................ 3-17
Stationing by sector method ............................................................................................................ 3-23
Manoeuvre .......................................................................................................................................... 3-17
Safety manoeuvres ......................................................................................................................... 12-28
Disposition ....................................................................................................................................... 3-20
Emergency landings, manoeuvring for ............................................................................................ 6-42
Flight operations, manoeuvring for ................................................................................................. 6-40
Independent method of manoeuvring (Method B) .......................................................................... 6-40
Low-visibility recovery operations, manoeuvring for ..................................................................... 6-43
Method C, manoeuvring to operate aircraft in................................................................................. 6-42
Methods A, B, and C for manoeuvring with carrier ............................................................6-40 to 6-42
Sector screen, manoeuvring with..................................................................................................... 3-28
Special manoeuvring rules............................................................................................................... 3-30
Whole formation together (Method A), manoeuvring ..................................................................... 6-40

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Maritime:
Air control authorities ...................................................................................................................... 4-18
Air support ....................................................................................................................................... 14-1
Assistance .......................................................................................................................................... 1-7
Component commander ................................................................................................................... 9-24
Components ....................................................................................................................................... 1-2
Counterterrorism ................................................................................................................................ 1-6
Direct support by maritime aircraft ................................................................................................... 6-1
Force protection in harbour ............................................................................................................. 18-1
Information warfare ................................................................................................................ 20-1, 20-2
Interdiction operations ......................................................................................... 2-12, 4-12, 9-21, 14-3
Logistics.................................................................................................................................... 1-7, 16-3
Message formats .............................................................................................................................. 2-54
Patrol aircraft:
Communications ........................................................................................................................... 4-17
Turnover procedures ..................................................................................................................... 6-27
Rear link .......................................................................................................................................... 4-15
Rules of engagement ....................................................................................................................... 14-4
Safety procedures for maritime air operations................................................................................. 6-32
Security operations ................................................................................................................... 1-1, 19-2
Strike warfare .................................................................................................................................... 1-5
Structure for command of maritime forces........................................................................................ 2-3
Threats .................................................................................................................................18-1 to 18-4
Marking ............................................................................................................................................... 7-12
Marshal procedures ............................................................................................................................. 6-50
Marshalling gate.................................................................................................................................... 6-5
MAYDAY ........................................................................................................................................... 6-56
Meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference .............................................................................. 8-22
MEADOW (definition) ....................................................................................................................... 6-75
Mercantile convoy .............................................................................................................................. 2-18
Message:
Airmove messages ........................................................................................................................... 6-33
Electronic warfare tasking message................................................................................................. 8-13
Formats ..........................................................................................................................2-53, 2-54, 6-74
Found and Not Found messages ...................................................................................................... 6-15
Joining instructions message ........................................................................................................... 6-14
NOTACK area message ................................................................................................................... 6-88
Ordering contact handover ............................................................................................................ 12-39
Tactical messages, use of radio teletype for ...................................................................................... 4-4
Tasking message for intercept by submarine ................................................................................. 12-18
Miles, reporting bearing and distance in ............................................................................................... 3-5
Military convoy................................................................................................................................... 2-18
Stationing by sector method ............................................................................................................ 3-23
Mine:
Countermeasures ...........................................................................................................13-1, 13-5, 19-1
Active ........................................................................................................................................... 13-2
Command in operations.................................................................................................................. 2-6
Passive .......................................................................................................................................... 13-6
Units ............................................................................................................................................... 2-6
Detection report ............................................................................................................................... 7-19

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Self-protective measures.................................................................................................................. 13-7

Types of mines ................................................................................................................................. 13-2
Warfare ............................................................................................................................1-6, 13-1, 15-6
Activities ...................................................................................................................................... 6-93
Coordination ................................................................................................................................. 2-18
Coordinator ................................................................................................................................... 2-23
Mineable waters .................................................................................................................................. 13-3
Mined area, transit through:
Ships .............................................................................................................................................. 13-13
Minefield:
Locating the minefield ..................................................................................................................... 13-6
Nature of minefield .......................................................................................................................... 13-3
Minelaying ................................................................................................................................. 13-4, 13-5
Mining ........................................................................................................................................ 13-2, 13-4
Miscellaneous ..................................................................................................................................... 9-33
Missile:
Arc ................................................................................................................................................. 10-10
Engagement zone ............................................................................................................................. 10-9
Mission designators, aircraft and antisubmarine warfare ............................................................ 6-2, 6-26
Mission, NCAGS ................................................................................................................................ 11-1
Modification of submarine-generated search area .............................................................................. 6-83
MORE HELP ...................................................................................................................................... 10-7
Movement:
Amphibious objective area, movement to ....................................................................................... 15-4
Position and intended movement ..................................................................................................... 3-15
Preliminary movements for replenishment........................................................................................ 2-6
Reporting System ............................................................................................................................ 3-15
Ship movement during flight operations ......................................................................................... 6-39
Submarine movement ...................................................................................................................... 6-89
Moving haven:
Submarine ............................................................................................................................... 6-70, 6-71
Surface ship ..................................................................................................................................... 6-71
Mutual interference:
Action on suspected mutual interference......................................................................................... 6-89
Measures to avoid mutual interference ............................................................................................ 6-63
Prevention of mutual interference ................................................................................................... 9-34
Between submerged submarines and surface ships with towed acoustic devices streamed ........ 6-91
Mine warfare activities and submarines ....................................................................................... 6-93
Submarine operations ................................................................................................................... 6-67
Waterspace management .............................................................................................................. 6-67
Mutual support for towed-array ship .................................................................................................. 12-8
Narrowband passive sonar contact.................................................................................................... 12-20
Naval:
Authority over landing force units................................................................................................... 2-11
Cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS)—command relationships ................................ 2-11
Cooperation and guidance for shipping ........................................................................................... 11-1
Cooperation and guidance for shipping communications ............................................................... 4-17
Forces in amphibious operation ....................................................................................................... 15-1
Mine warfare............................................................................................................................. 1-6, 13-1
Surface fire support .......................................................................................................................... 19-4

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Navigation:
Antisubmarine warfare aircraft with inoperable navigation systems ............................................ 12-27
Use of navigation lights ................................................................................................................. 12-28
Navigational:
Danger ............................................................................................................................................. 3-14
Hazards ............................................................................................................................................ 3-31
Network control station......................................................................................................................... 4-2
Data .................................................................................................................................................. 7-22
Nets, communication .............................................................................................................4-7 to 4-12
Nets, FADIZ and FACA...................................................................................................................... 4-10
Neutralization, electronic:
Reducing effectiveness of ....................................................................................................... 8-20, 8-22
NOCAN .............................................................................................................................................. 10-7
Noise, own force ................................................................................................................................. 12-7
Nonarrival of relief ............................................................................................................................. 6-29
Nonradar handover.............................................................................................................................. 6-20
NONSUB classification (definition) ................................................................................................. 12-21
Non-tactical data system units, execution of grid locks by ................................................................ 7-25
Not Found message ............................................................................................................................. 6-14
NOTACK area.........................................................................................................................6-84 to 6-88
Notice .................................................................................................................................................. 3-33
Of intention ...................................................................................................................................... 6-89
To get underway .............................................................................................................................. 13-8
Notices, surface ship ........................................................................................................................... 6-76
And advisories ................................................................................................................................. 6-76
Nuclear:
Action prior to nuclear attack .......................................................................................................... 17-8
Bursts, types of nuclear ................................................................................................................... 17-1
Tactics following nuclear attack ...................................................................................................... 17-8
Nuclear, biological, and chemical .......................................................................................1-6, 17-1, 18-3
Degrees of defence readiness........................................................................................................... 3-34
Graduated levels of threat and minimum individual protection ...................................................... 3-34
Numbers:
Berth ................................................................................................................................................ 3-16
Index .................................................................................................................................................. 8-8
Task force........................................................................................................................................... 1-2
Offensive:
Action .............................................................................................................................................. 9-20
Air operations .................................................................................................................................. 6-46
Mining ............................................................................................................................................. 13-4
Operations ........................................................................................................................................ 6-48
Offensive mine countermeasures ........................................................................................................ 13-6
Officer in tactical command .................................................................................................................. 2-4
Chemical warfare, officer in tactical command’s considerations in .............................................. 17-14
Convoy, responsibility for ............................................................................................................... 2-18
Departure and entry operations, responsibility for .......................................................................... 2-19
Emission policy ................................................................................................................................. 8-5
Functions for departure and entry operations .................................................................................. 2-19
Information required by officer in tactical command ...................................................................... 7-17
Informing the officer in tactical command of operations in his vicinity ........................................... 6-2

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Passing information about contacts ................................................................................................. 7-17

Radar is detected, officer in tactical command’s considerations when target or threat ................... 9-17
Responsibilities ................................................................................................................................ 2-17
Search attack unit, responsibilities for ........................................................................................... 12-30
Towed array ship/aircraft cooperation, officer in tactical command’s role in ............................... 12-40
Offset approach method .................................................................................................................... 12-32
Off-task/on-task time, aircraft procedures at ............................................................................. 6-28, 6-29
On top.................................................................................................................................................. 7-26
Radar and reverse radar ................................................................................................................. 12-36
Visual ............................................................................................................................................. 12-36
Operational:
Application ............................................................................................................................. 11-1, 11-2
Areas .............................................................................................................................................. 15-11
Capabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 3-32
Change of operational control ........................................................................................................... 2-3
Command........................................................................................................................................... 2-3
Considerations ................................................................................................................................. 16-5
Control ...................................................................................................................................... 2-3, 4-18
Dispositions ..................................................................................................................................... 3-20
Efficiency, report on operational ...................................................................................................... 17-9
Employment, Link 11 ...................................................................................................................... 7-22
Planning AIS .................................................................................................................................... 7-29
Readiness for fallout transit ............................................................................................................. 17-8
Requirements ................................................................................................................................... 9-22
Situation ............................................................................................................................................. 7-2
Operations:
Antisubmarine integrated ................................................................................................................ 12-4
Carry out maritime interdiction ....................................................................................................... 9-21
Factors determining type of ............................................................................................................. 6-10
Guidelines for crisis response .......................................................................................................... 9-20
OPSTATs CARGO and UNIT...............................................................................................2-5, 2-6, 16-6
OPTASK:
ASUW.............................................................................................................................................. 9-18
RAS ...................................................................................................................................2-5, 2-6, 16-6
Options:
Command and control ..................................................................................................................... 2-17
Tactical employment ...................................................................................................................... 12-14
Towed array screen station .............................................................................................................. 12-9
Ordering:
Authentication policy ........................................................................................................................ 4-7
Patrol or search ......................................................................................................................... 7-9, 7-10
Organization .................................................................................................................................... 3-33
Amphibious operation, organization for .......................................................................................... 15-2
NCAGS ............................................................................................................................................ 11-1
QRS ................................................................................................................................................... 3-9
Task, type, and warfare ...................................................................................................................... 1-2
Origin, accuracy of airplan ............................................................................................................... 12-12

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Outer:
Defence zone ................................................................................................................................. 10-12
Screen .............................................................................................................................................. 3-22
Towed array ship stations in ......................................................................................................... 12-9
Over-the-horizon targeting .................................................................................................................. 9-18
Overt tactics ................................................................................................................................. 7-8, 7-30
Own force:
Acoustic interference ..................................................................................................................... 12-16
Noise ................................................................................................................................................ 12-7
Parallel chains of command ............................................................................................2-10, 15-8, 15-11
Particular degrees of readiness............................................................................................................ 3-34
Passive:
Deception ......................................................................................................................................... 8-20
Electronic protection measures (definition) ....................................................................................... 8-1
Initial contact, passive sonar capable surface ship gains ............................................................... 12-38
Mine countermeasures ..................................................................................................................... 13-6
Sonar contact, narrowband passive................................................................................................ 12-20
Sonar or sonobuoy, broadband contact by passive ........................................................................ 12-20
Sonobuoy procedures .................................................................................................................... 12-20
Patrol ..................................................................................................................................................... 7-9
Adjacent patrol areas ....................................................................................................................... 6-32
Cycle ....................................................................................................................................... 9-26, 9-27
Indications and warning.......................................................................................................... 9-31, 9-33
Lines ................................................................................................................................................ 3-31
Pattern mining ..................................................................................................................................... 13-5
Pattern time ......................................................................................................................................... 6-27
Peacetime ................................................................................................................................... 6-70, 6-94
Independent action ........................................................................................................................... 6-43
Special precautions for submarine operations ................................................................................. 6-89
Person.................................................................................................................................................... 2-1
Picket ships ......................................................................................................................................... 2-26
Pickets ................................................................................................................................................. 3-30
Surface ............................................................................................................................................. 10-4
Picture compilation ........................................................................................................................ 7-1, 7-2
And weapon employment ................................................................................................................ 7-13
Assets ............................................................................................................................................... 9-30
Pilot voice report ................................................................................................................................. 6-56
Plan:
Antisubmarine warfare search ....................................................................................................... 12-28
Communications ....................................................................................................................... 4-1, 4-19
Emission control ................................................................................................................7-29, 8-2, 8-8
Force protection ............................................................................................................................... 18-7
IMC vertical separation plan ........................................................................................................... 6-35
Picture compilation ............................................................................................................................ 7-1
Ship .................................................................................................................................................. 6-95
Standard surface action ...................................................................................................................... 9-3
Tactical communications ................................................................................................................. 4-16

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Planned:
Antiship missile defence reactions ................................................................................................ 10-11
Responses .......................................................................................................................................... 5-1
Electronic countermeasures .......................................................................................................... 8-15
Planning:
Antiship missile defence reactions ................................................................................................ 10-11
Antisubmarine warfare air operations ........................................................................................... 12-11
Force protection functions ............................................................................................................... 18-6
Logistic planning ............................................................................................................................. 16-2
Relationships during planning .............................................................................................. 2-10, 15-12
Scouting operations ........................................................................................................................... 7-7
Point ........................................................................................................................................... 6-27, 6-28
A, X, O, and Y ................................................................................................................................. 3-13
Identification safety point .................................................................................................................. 6-7
Reference points .................................................................................................. 3-12, 3-13, 3-14, 6-65
Romeo .............................................................................................................................................. 17-8
Policy:
AIS policy ........................................................................................................................................ 7-30
Antisubmarine warfare attack ............................................................................................. 12-24, 12-27
Authentication ................................................................................................................................... 4-7
Considerations ................................................................................................................................. 9-18
Emission ............................................................................................................................................ 8-5
Surface ............................................................................................................................................... 9-3
Surface action group ............................................................................................................... 9-11, 10-5
Position ................................................................................................................................................. 3-2
Accuracy suffixes ............................................................................................................................... 3-9
Airplans, change of position and intended movement in relative ................................................. 12-12
Designators, convoy route position ................................................................................................. 3-14
Doubt of position ............................................................................................................................. 3-14
Exchanging data on positions, reporting and................................................................................... 3-14
Movement, position and intended ................................................................................................... 3-15
Own position, reporting ................................................................................................................... 7-26
Reporting position .................................................................................................................. 3-10, 7-26
Altitude or depth ......................................................................................................................... 3-8
Reports ...................................................................................................................................... 3-13
Ship operating helicopters, position of ............................................................................................ 6-39
Standard positions............................................................................................................................ 3-12
Towed array ship zero position and intended movement operations ............................................. 12-10
Positive control ................................................................................................................................... 6-10
Electronic countermeasures ........................................................................................................... 10-10
POSSUB classification (definition)........................................................................................ 12-20, 12-26
Post-attack emission control and communications security ................................................................. 8-7
Precautions:
Delays while operating aircraft, antisubmarine precautions during ................................................ 6-43
Submarine operations, precautions for peacetime ........................................................................... 6-89
Surface ship precautions ......................................................................................................... 6-76, 13-8
Predicted sonar range .......................................................................................................................... 12-5

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Preparations:
First-stage ........................................................................................................................................ 9-23
Second-stage .................................................................................................................................... 9-24
Preplanned responses ................................................................................................................. 9-15, 18-8
Prevention of mutual interference .............................................................................................. 6-67, 9-34
Between submerged submarines and surface ships with towed acoustic devices streamed... 6-91, 6-93
Principals ......................................................................................................................................... 17-1
Principal warfare:
Area responsibilities ........................................................................................................................ 2-18
Commanders .................................................................................................................................... 2-21
PROBSUB classification (definition) .................................................................................... 12-19, 12-26
Programme, replenishment ................................................................................................................... 2-6
Promulgation of:
Anti-air warfare coordination method ............................................................................................. 10-8
Duties ............................................................................................................................................... 2-27
Fallout information .......................................................................................................................... 17-8
Planned responses .............................................................................................................................. 5-1
PROTAC amendment message ............................................................................................................. 3-1
Protection .......................................................................................................................................... 17-12
Individual protection; levels of nuclear, biological, chemical threat and ...................................... 17-16
Protective:
Mining ............................................................................................................................................. 13-4
MCM forces ..................................................................................................................................... 13-3
Password ............................................................................................................................................ 4-8
Surface minelaying forces ............................................................................................................... 13-5
Publications, reference ........................................................................................................................ 7-15
Qualifying weapon control status and orders........................................................................5-3, 5-4, 6-77
Quick reference system ......................................................................................................................... 3-6
Radar:
Contact ........................................................................................................................................... 12-20
Grid lock ................................................................................................................................. 7-25, 7-26
Handover ......................................................................................................................................... 6-20
On top ............................................................................................................................................ 12-36
Satellite Communications ................................................................................................................ 6-78
Vectored attack method....................................................................................................... 12-43, 12-44
Radiation:
Flash and initial radiation effects ..................................................................................................... 17-1
Hazards ................................................................................................................................... 6-77, 6-78
Residual radiation ............................................................................................................................ 17-2
Status indicators ............................................................................................................................... 8-11
Radio silence, breaking ................................................................................................................ 7-27, 8-6
Radio teletype:
Direct support aircraft procedures ................................................................................................... 4-17
Tactical messages, use for.................................................................................................................. 4-4
Voice/radio teletype reporting................................................................................................... 4-4, 9-18
Raid:
Amphibious raid .............................................................................................................................. 15-2
Reports .................................................................................................................................7-17 to 7-19
Random:
Mining ............................................................................................................................................. 13-5

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Range:
Antisubmarine warfare sensors and weapons, range of................................................................... 12-4
Effects, range of ............................................................................................................................... 17-2
Identification safety range.................................................................................................................. 6-5
Predicted sonar range....................................................................................................................... 12-5
Tactical sonar range ......................................................................................................................... 12-5
Rapid amendment of tactics and procedures ........................................................................................ 3-1
Rapid tasking mesage readback ................................................................................................. 6-24, 6-25
Rapid tasking procedures for MPA joining a force ............................................................................. 6-22
Reaction time ...................................................................................................................................... 12-7
Reactions: Antiship missile defence ................................................................................................. 10-11
Readiness:
Action, readiness for ........................................................................................................................ 3-32
Degrees of readiness ............................................................................................................... 3-32, 3-34
In anti-air warfare ......................................................................................................................... 10-3
Fallout transit, operational readiness for ......................................................................................... 17-8
Harbour or anchorage, readiness in ................................................................................................. 3-33
Self-protective measures in mine warfare ....................................................................................... 13-8
Underway, readiness to get .............................................................................................................. 13-8
Ready:
Deck system ..................................................................................................................................... 6-40
Recognition .................................................................................................................................. 7-4, 7-14
Aircraft, recognition by ................................................................................................................... 6-26
Classification, and identification; recognition ................................................................................. 8-17
Confidence level ..................................................................................................................... 7-14, 9-28
Identification/recognition................................................................................................................. 6-64
Picture compilation, recognition in ................................................................................................... 7-3
Procedures ....................................................................................................................................... 6-21
Support aircraft, recognition of........................................................................................................ 6-20
Reconnaissance ..................................................................................................................................... 7-9
Maritime strike coordination ........................................................................................................... 14-2
Recording enemy emissions ............................................................................................................... 8-17
Recovery:
Aircraft............................................................................................................................................. 6-54
Manoeuvres:
Operations, manoeuvring for low-visibility recovery ..................................................................... 6-43
Planning ........................................................................................................................................... 18-6
Unscheduled launch and recovery operations ................................................................................. 6-49
Rectangle, size of .................................................................................................................................. 3-4
Reference:
Point ...............................................................................................................................3-12, 3-14, 6-65
Data link ....................................................................................................................................... 3-12
Harbour ......................................................................................................................................... 3-13
Helicopter ..................................................................................................................................... 3-13
Ship as anchoring............................................................................................................................. 3-14
Systems ....................................................................................................................................... 3-2, 3-6
Rehearsal ............................................................................................................................................. 15-4
Rejoining:
Helicopters, rejoining of .................................................................................................................. 6-33

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Screen, rejoining the ........................................................................................................................ 3-30

Relationship between security alert states and force protection levels.......................................... 18-10
Relative:
Airplans .............................................................................................................................. 12-11, 12-12
Course and relative wind ................................................................................................................. 6-43
Relaying of contact reports by antisubmarine warfare aircraft ......................................................... 12-24
Relief, nonarrival of ............................................................................................................................ 6-29
Relieving units, information exchange between shadowing and ........................................................ 7-11
Relinquishment of tactical control .................................................................................................... 12-15
Remote targeting ................................................................................................................................. 9-18
Rendezvous:
Emergency rendezvous .................................................................................................................... 17-9
Formation rendezvous ..................................................................................................................... 17-8
Selection of a helicopter action group ............................................................................................. 9-14
Replenishment:
At sea ............................................................................................................................................... 16-1
Command during replenishment ....................................................................................................... 2-5
Method of execution .......................................................................................................................... 2-5
Screen units, replenishment of......................................................................................................... 3-31
Sea arrangements ............................................................................................................................. 9-27
Report:
Air combat ....................................................................................................................................... 7-19
Air raid ............................................................................................................................................. 7-18
Aircraft operating ............................................................................................................................ 7-14
Antisubmarine warfare:
Contact..........................................................................................................................12-24 to 12-27
Contact .......................................................................................................................7-17, 12-21, 12-38
Enemy contact ................................................................................................................................. 7-17
Engagement after-action .................................................................................................................. 7-20
Mine detection ................................................................................................................................. 7-19
Movement ........................................................................................................................................ 3-15
Operational efficiency ...................................................................................................................... 17-9
Other ................................................................................................................................................ 7-19
Pilot voice ........................................................................................................................................ 6-56
Position ................................................................................................................................... 3-13, 3-15
Raid .................................................................................................................................................. 7-17
Screen, report on joining a ............................................................................................................... 3-30
Search attack unit, aircraft reports to the ....................................................................................... 12-36
Situation ........................................................................................................................................... 7-20
Submarines, reports from .............................................................................................................. 12-13
Surface and subsurface raid ............................................................................................................. 7-19
Towed array ship contact ............................................................................................................... 12-24
Warfare commander......................................................................................................................... 7-20
Reporting:
Anti-air warfare, reporting in........................................................................................................... 10-3
Choice of reporting method ........................................................................................................... 12-23
Contact reporting, initial reporting and classification.................................................................... 12-21
Data on position, reporting and exchanging .................................................................................... 3-14
Electronic warfare, reporting of confidence levels ............................................................................ 8-4
Emission control, reporting during restricted .................................................................................. 7-27
Link reporting .................................................................................................................................. 9-18

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Logistic reporting ............................................................................................................................ 16-4

Movement reporting system ............................................................................................................ 3-15
Net ...................................................................................................................................4-9, 4-10, 4-12
OPSTAT CARGO .............................................................................................................................. 2-6
Own position, reporting ................................................................................................................... 7-26
Position, reporting ........................................................................................................................... 3-12
Submarine reporting ............................................................................................................... 4-14, 4-17
Support submarine, contact reporting by ....................................................................................... 12-23
Target reporting................................................................................................................................ 9-18
Task force/task group ......................................................................................................................... 4-8
Time of arrival, reporting................................................................................................................. 3-16
Voice reporting procedures ..................................................................................................... 8-44, 9-18
Request for
Carrier and shipborne aircraft .......................................................................................................... 6-48
Change to SUBNOTE ..................................................................................................................... 6-71
NOTACK area ................................................................................................................................. 6-84
Support submarine ......................................................................................................................... 12-12
Rescue:
Aircraft emergency and rescue ........................................................................................................ 6-55
Destroyer ......................................................................................................................................... 2-26
Distress, rescue of aircraft in ........................................................................................................... 6-55
Helicopter ........................................................................................................................................ 6-60
Operations ............................................................................................................................... 6-43, 6-56
Search and rescue ..................................................................................................................... 1-7, 19-4
Stations ............................................................................................................................................ 6-60
Survivors, rescue of ......................................................................................................................... 3-29
Residual radiation ............................................................................................................................... 17-2
Responses, planned ...................................................................................................................... 5-1, 8-15
Responsibilities ................................................................................................................................... 2-17
Aircraft control unit ........................................................................................................................... 6-8
ASWC duties ................................................................................................................................... 12-3
Convoy............................................................................................................................................. 2-18
Command................................................................................................................................ 3-32, 18-5
Departure and entry operations........................................................................................................ 2-19
Electronic warfare coordination cell................................................................................................ 8-24
Individual ship .......................................................................................................................... 8-4, 10-3
NOTACK area, establishing ............................................................................................................ 6-87
Readiness ......................................................................................................................................... 3-33
Search attack unit commander .........................................................................................12-30 to 12-32
Units carrying aircraft ........................................................................................................................ 6-9
Warfare commander and coordinator .............................................................................................. 2-20
Responsibility ...................................................................................................................2-16, 2-20, 6-64
Antisubmarine warfare area of responsibility.................................................................................. 6-69
Authority and responsibility ..................................................................................................... 2-1, 2-20
Command responsibility for antisubmarine warfare contacts ....................................................... 12-21
Contacts, responsibility for passing information about ................................................................... 7-17
Disabled submarine, responsibility to assist .................................................................................... 6-88
NOTACK area ........................................................................................................................ 6-84, 6-87

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Restricted:
Areas ................................................................................................................................................ 6-65
Procedures for surface ships entering ........................................................................................... 6-76
Emission control, reporting during .................................................................................................. 7-27
Waters .............................................................................................................................................. 6-70
Restrictions:
Aircraft............................................................................................................................................. 6-29
Attack restrictions when operating with support submarines ........................................................ 12-26
Diving restrictions ........................................................................................................................... 6-89
Subdivision, restriction on ................................................................................................................. 1-3
Weapon restrictions .........................................................................................................5-3, 6-23, 6-76
Resuming:
Course and station in manoeuvring Methods B and C ........................................................... 6-41, 6-42
Returning aircraft, procedure for ........................................................................................................ 6-50
Reverse radar:
Grid lock .......................................................................................................................................... 7-26
On top ............................................................................................................................................ 12-36
Vectored attack method.................................................................................................................. 12-44
Right of way........................................................................................................................................ 3-31
Ships launching/recovering aircraft ................................................................................................. 6-39
Ships over screen units .................................................................................................................... 3-28
Romeo, point ....................................................................................................................................... 17-8
Routes and reference points ....................................................................................................... 3-14, 6-65
Rules:
Attack rules, submarine ................................................................................................................... 6-83
Engagement, rules of ............................................................................................. 5-1, 9-20, 14-4, 18-9
Low-altitude rules ............................................................................................................................ 6-34
Manoeuvring, rules for .................................................................................................................... 3-17
Vectored attack, rules for ............................................................................................................... 12-43
Safety:
Aircraft, safety of ............................................................................................................................. 6-76
Helicopters, safety of ....................................................................................................................... 6-33
Identification safety point .................................................................................................................. 6-7
Identification safety range.................................................................................................................. 6-5
Lanes, submarine safety ......................................................................................................... 6-69, 6-88
Manoeuvres ................................................................................................................................... 12-28
Maritime air operations, safety procedures for ................................................................................ 6-32
Precautions.............................................................................................................................. 6-63, 6-92
Procedures .............................................................................................................................. 6-76, 6-79
Sectors .................................................................................................................................. 6-66, 10-10
Submarine safety procedures ........................................................................................................... 6-79
Satellite communication...................................................................................................................... 4-20
Scene-of-action:
Changing commander................................................................................................................. 12-37
Scouting ......................................................................................................................................7-5 to 7-8
Screen:
Adjusting the screen ........................................................................................................................ 3-28
Adjustment....................................................................................................................................... 3-31
Bulging the screen ........................................................................................................................... 3-31
Delegation to ................................................................................................................................ 2-21

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Convoy screens, instructions for ..................................................................................................... 3-28

Construction of ASW screens .......................................................................................................... 3-23
Damaged ships, screen for ............................................................................................................... 3-27
Departure and entry ......................................................................................................................... 3-25
Descriptions of screens .................................................................................................................... 3-23
Equipment failure, effect on screen of ............................................................................................. 3-31
Evasive steering by screen units ...................................................................................................... 3-17
Filling a gap in the screen ................................................................................................................ 3-31
Helicopters ....................................................................................................................................... 3-29
Control of helicopter in sector screen........................................................................................... 3-29
Departure/screen entry ................................................................................................................. 3-21
Helicopter windline screen ........................................................................................................... 3-25
Inner and outer screens ................................................................................................................. 3-22
Instructions for individual screen units ........................................................................................ 3-30
Operating within the screen in manoeuvring Method C .............................................................. 6-42
Rescue outside screen ................................................................................................................... 6-61
Sector screen................................................................................................................................. 3-21
Selection and design ..................................................................................................................... 3-21
Stationing screen units.................................................................................................................. 3-22
Surface screens ............................................................................................................................. 12-6
Towed array ship:
In screen ....................................................................................................................................... 3-31
Screen station options ................................................................................................................... 12-9
Types of screen ................................................................................................................................ 3-21
Unit as Guide in manoeuvring Method B ........................................................................................ 6-42
Screening:
Aircraft carrier during flight operations........................................................................................... 3-28
Groups ............................................................................................................................................. 15-6
Helicopter:
Advanced screening helicopter .................................................................................................. 12-26
Deliberate or urgent attack by screening helicopter ................................................................... 12-26
Sea combat commander communications ........................................................................................... 4-12
Search.................................................................................................................................................. 7-10
Attack unit:
Aircraft reports to ....................................................................................................................... 12-36
Approach to contact or datum .................................................................................................... 12-32
Commander ................................................................................................................................ 12-30
Change of ................................................................................................................................ 12-37
Intended employment of units................................................................................................. 12-35
Communications ......................................................................................................................... 12-30
Designation and dispatch of ....................................................................................................... 12-30
Equipment on own transmissions, interference of search ............................................................... 8-16
Friendly force, search for................................................................................................................. 6-14
Plans, antisubmarine warfare search.............................................................................................. 12-28
Selection of search type for towed array ship................................................................................ 12-10
Submarine-generated search area ........................................................................................6-80 to 6-86
Sector(s):
Commander, sector antiair warfare ......................................................................................... 9-24, 10-1
Flying sectors ................................................................................................................................... 6-40

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Safety sectors ........................................................................................................................ 6-66, 10-10

Screen ............................................................................................................................3-21, 3-23, 3-28
Taking up or changing sectors ......................................................................................................... 3-31
Warfare commanders ....................................................................................................................... 2-25
Security:
Alert states ......................................................................................................... 9-14, 18-7, 18-9, 18-10
Communications security .................................................................................................................. 4-5
Emission control, security and......................................................................................................... 7-27
Emission security ............................................................................................................................. 4-19
Grid, security of the ......................................................................................................................... 7-26
Selection criteria for scouting ............................................................................................................ 7-7
Selection of:
Formation rendezvous ..................................................................................................................... 17-8
Station size and search type for towed array ships ........................................................................ 12-10
Target reporting unit ........................................................................................................................ 9-18
Self-defence:
Electronic countermeasures systems ............................................................................................... 8-15
Individual ship responsibilities ........................................................................................................ 10-3
Units with self-defence weapons ..................................................................................................... 10-5
Self-identification, initiation of ........................................................................................................... 6-64
Self-protective measures against mine threat ..................................................................................... 13-8
Senior officer’s orders to keep clear.................................................................................................... 6-55
Sensor:
Deviation from specified sensor ...................................................................................................... 6-26
Ranges of antisubmarine warfare sensors........................................................................................ 12-4
Selecting sensors for scouting ........................................................................................................... 7-7
Separation:
Altitude ............................................................................................................................................ 6-37
IFR ................................................................................................................................................... 6-53
Lateral and vertical separation ......................................................................................................... 6-35
Transit separation............................................................................................................................. 6-32
Vertical separation in instrument meteorological conditions........................................................... 6-35
Sequence:
Of amphibious operations ................................................................................................................ 15-4
Shadowing........................................................................................................................................... 7-11
Information exchange between shadowing and relieving units....................................................... 7-11
Shifting tactical control of direct support submarines ...................................................................... 12-15
Ship:
Adjustment of movements by ships relative to carrier .................................................................... 6-39
Aircraft in distress, ship responsibility for ...................................................................................... 6-55
Aircraft, ships operating:
Minor adjustments by ................................................................................................................... 6-41
Rescue in vicinity of ..................................................................................................................... 6-61
To make signals ............................................................................................................................ 6-61
Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft ............................................................................................. 6-39
Anchoring reference, ship as ........................................................................................................... 3-12
Anti-air warfare responsibilities of individual ship ......................................................................... 10-3
Antisubmarine warfare ship............................................................................................................. 12-6
Assisting and attacking ships ......................................................................................................... 12-42
Control zone .................................................................................................................................... 6-49

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Damaged ships, screen for ............................................................................................................... 3-27

Darkened ships, navigation lights on ............................................................................................. 12-28
Darkening ships ............................................................................................................................. 12-28
Diversion of ship to locate survivors ............................................................................................... 6-62
Emergency landing ship .................................................................................................................. 6-55
Flight operations, ship movements during ...................................................................................... 6-39
Guide, designated ship as/ship which is to be ................................................................................. 6-41
Helicopters, positioning of ships operating ..................................................................................... 6-39
Inner screen, ships in the ................................................................................................................. 2-26
Launching or recovering aircraft, ships engaged in......................................................................... 6-39
Lights by ships and aircraft, use of .................................................................................................. 6-37
Methods, ship and helicopter attack and support........................................................................... 12-42
Mined area:
Conduct of surface ships in:
Ship at anchor or along side ...................................................................................................... 13-9
Ship at sea ................................................................................................................................. 13-8
Transit of ships through .............................................................................................................. 13-13
Readiness of ships ........................................................................................................................... 3-33
Replenishment, ships engaged in....................................................................................................... 2-6
Rescue destroyer ............................................................................................................2-26, 6-55, 6-56
Right of way of ships launching or recovering aircraft ................................................................... 6-39
Sector screen, conduct of ships in ................................................................................................... 3-28
Supporting ship .............................................................................................................................. 12-42
Surface ship (See Surface ship)
Surface-to-air missile ships ............................................................................................................. 10-4
Towed array ship (See Towed array ship)
Shipborne aircraft operations .............................................................................................................. 6-39
Shipping:
Naval cooperation and guidance for ..............................................................................2-11, 4-17, 11-1
Shore:
Authority role in towed array ship/aircraft cooperation ................................................................ 12-40
Bombardment and bomb lines ......................................................................................................... 6-66
Shotgun position ................................................................................................................................. 10-5
Signal:
Emergency signals ........................................................................................................................... 3-33
Manoeuvring Method A, signals used in ......................................................................................... 6-41
Maximum use of visual signals ....................................................................................................... 6-56
Position and intended movement signal .......................................................................................... 3-16
Ship operating aircraft to make signals ........................................................................................... 6-61
Signalled speed, change in............................................................................................................... 3-16
Signalling ....................................................................................................................................... 18-11
Single-letter visual signals ............................................................................................................... 4-12
Sound underwater signal ................................................................................................................. 4-16
Silence, breaking .......................................................................................................................... 7-27, 8-6
Silent:
Darkened helicopter operations ....................................................................................................... 6-52
Emission policy ................................................................................................................................. 8-5
Surface-to-air missile engagement zone .......................................................................................... 10-9

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Single:
Letter visual signals for surface action group .................................................................................. 4-12
Spray attacks threat to Naval forces ................................................................................................ 17-3
Situation:
Appreciation of situation ................................................................................................................... 2-2
Example of procedure ...................................................................................................................... 6-24
Local air ........................................................................................................................................... 7-19
Operational ........................................................................................................................................ 7-2
Operations:
Situation A ..................................................................................................................2-13, 2-19, 6-45
Situation B ........................................................................................................................... 2-13, 6-45
Situation C ..................................................................................................................2-13, 2-14, 6-45
Report to operational control authority by maritime patrol aircraft ................................................ 4-18
Reports and summaries .................................................................................................................... 7-20
Size of:
Area of responsibility ...................................................................................................................... 9-30
Circle ................................................................................................................................................. 3-4
Joint action area ............................................................................................................................. 12-16
NOTACK area ................................................................................................................................. 6-86
Rectangle ........................................................................................................................................... 3-4
Sonar:
Active sonar contact ...................................................................................................................... 12-19
Contact ........................................................................................................................................... 12-24
Helicopter dipping sonar ................................................................................................................. 6-91
Keyed sonar ..................................................................................................................................... 4-16
Passive sonar contact ..................................................................................................................... 12-38
Broadband .................................................................................................................................. 12-20
Narrowband ................................................................................................................................ 12-20
Ranges, predicted and tactical sonar................................................................................................ 12-5
TAS ship .......................................................................................................................................... 3-30
Sonobuoy:
Active sonobuoy contact ............................................................................................................... 12-19
Operations ........................................................................................................................................ 6-26
Passive sonobuoy:
Broadband contact ...................................................................................................................... 12-20
Procedures .................................................................................................................................. 12-20
Turnover procedures ........................................................................................................................ 6-30
Sound underwater signal ..................................................................................................................... 4-16
Specific turnover procedures............................................................................................................... 6-28
Speed:
Changing speed................................................................................................................................ 3-15
Course and speed/course and speed made good .............................................................................. 3-15
Force .............................................................................................................................................. 12-15
Ordering speed, method of .............................................................................................................. 3-15
Replenishment speed ....................................................................................................................... 3-15
Signalled speed, change in............................................................................................................... 3-15
Speed of transmission versus security ............................................................................................. 7-27
Standard:
Call signs for warfare commanders and coordinators ....................................................................... 4-3
Integration with standard tactical doctrine ...................................................................................... 7-21

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Positions........................................................................................................................................... 3-12
Rules, low altitude (fixed-wing aircraft).......................................................................................... 6-34
Surface-to-air missile engagement zone .......................................................................................... 10-9
Station:
Data net control station .................................................................................................................... 7-22
Helicopter rescue station.................................................................................................................. 6-60
Network control station ..................................................................................................................... 4-2
Resuming:
Station in manoeuvring Methods B and C .......................................................................6-41 to 6-42
Towed array ship stations ............................................................................................3-30, 12-7, 12-10
Station keeping:
By helicopter in screen .................................................................................................................... 3-31
Stationing ............................................................................................................................................ 10-5
Airborne early warning aircraft ....................................................................................................... 10-5
Anti-air warfare units....................................................................................................................... 10-3
Considerations for coordinated operations with submarines ......................................................... 12-16
Main body or military convoy, sector screen................................................................................... 3-23
Screen units...................................................................................................................................... 3-22
Support submarines ....................................................................................................................... 12-16
Surface-to-air missile ships ............................................................................................................. 10-4
Towed array ship options ................................................................................................................. 12-9
Towed array units ............................................................................................................................ 12-7
STOVEPIPE procedures ................................................................................................................... 12-16
Strategic:
Mining ............................................................................................................................................. 13-4
Use of satellites ................................................................................................................................ 4-20
Strike commander, formations, and operations .................................................................................. 6-46
Structure for command of maritime forces ........................................................................................... 2-3
Subdivision, restriction on .................................................................................................................... 1-3
Submarine/air cooperation ................................................................................................................ 12-39
Submarine-generated search area ................................................................................6-80 to 6-84, 12-16
Submarines................................................................................................................................. 2-26, 4-12
Action area .............................................................................................................................. 6-68, 6-72
Aided intercept by submarine ........................................................................................................ 12-18
Aircraft response to submarine contact ......................................................................................... 12-38
Antisubmarine warfare submarines ............................................................................................... 12-12
Area operations, submarine in ....................................................................................................... 12-13
As TRU ............................................................................................................................................ 9-18
Associated support, submarine in .................................................................................................. 12-13
Blind bombing zone, submarine in .................................................................................................. 6-66
Broadcast ......................................................................................................................................... 4-15
Command and control .............................................................................................................. 2-8, 2-15
Command in submarine operations ................................................................................................... 2-8
Communications .............................................................................................................................. 4-14
Contact handover with aircraft ...................................................................................................... 12-39
Coordinator, submarine element ...................................................................................................... 2-23
Direct support, submarine in ......................................................................................................... 12-14
Disabled submarine, responsibility to assist .................................................................................... 6-88
Enemy submarine, contact report on ............................................................................................. 12-38
Exercise areas, mutual interference in submarine .................................................................. 6-89, 6-90

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Havens .................................................................................................................................6-69 to 6-71

Joint action area .............................................................................................................6-69, 6-72, 6-73
Movements, authorities for .............................................................................................................. 6-89
Moving haven ......................................................................................................................... 6-70, 6-71
NOTACK area, submarine
responsibility in establishing ..................................................................................................... 6-84
Operations ........................................................................................................................................ 4-18
Operations after loss of submarine command and control .............................................................. 6-74
Passing information about contact ................................................................................................... 7-18
Peacetime submarine operations, special precautions for ............................................................... 6-89
Prevention of mutual interference
between submerged submarines and surface ships with towed acoustic
devices streamed ....................................................................................................................... 6-91
Procedures ..................................................................................................................................... 11-15
Procedures within submarine action area or joint action area ......................................................... 6-72
Protection against submarine attack:
Reconnaissance .................................................................................................................................. 7-9
Reporting ......................................................................................................................................... 4-17
Reports from submarines ............................................................................................................... 12-14
Safety:
Lane ..................................................................................................................................... 6-69, 6-88
Procedures .................................................................................................................................... 6-79
Shadowing ....................................................................................................................................... 7-11
Support submarine:
Attack restrictions when operating with ..................................................................................... 12-26
Communications with................................................................................................................... 4-14
Contact reporting by ................................................................................................................... 12-23
Coordinated contact prosecution with ........................................................................................ 12-38
Gains initial contact .................................................................................................................... 12-37
Procedures .................................................................................................................................. 12-12
Requesting .................................................................................................................................. 12-12
Shifting tactical control of .......................................................................................................... 12-15
Target priority list ......................................................................................................................... 9-16
Tactical communications ................................................................................................................. 4-16
Threat area, antisubmarine evasion in submarine.......................................................................... 12-34
Transiting submarines, command relationships of .......................................................................... 6-88
Windows:
For submarine in associated support .......................................................................................... 12-13
Special communication windows ................................................................................................. 4-16
SUBNOTE procedures........................................................................................................................ 6-89
Subsurface:
Antisurface warfare with subsurface cooperation ........................................................................... 9-15
Force track coordinator—subsurface...............................................................................7-16, 9-2, 12-4
Operations ........................................................................................................................................ 14-4
Operations inherently dangerous to subsurface operations ............................................................. 6-90
Raid reports...................................................................................................................................... 7-19
Suffixes, position/bearing accuracy ...................................................................................................... 3-9
Support:
Air support operations ....................................................................................................................... 6-1

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Aircraft (See Aircraft)

Associated support ...........................................................................................................2-15, 6-1, 12-4
Command during support operations .............................................................................................. 2-12
Direct support ....................................................................................................................2-15, 6-1, 9-2
Force and convoy in situation A ...................................................................................................... 2-13
Joint AAW support and coordination net ......................................................................................... 4-10
Maritime authorities, support operations tasked by........................................................................... 6-1
Methods, antisubmarine warfare ship and helicopter attack and support...................................... 12-42
Situations A, B, and C ............................................................................................................ 2-13, 2-14
Submarine (See Submarines)
Surface minelaying operations, support of ...................................................................................... 13-5
Supporting commands communications ............................................................................................. 4-14
Supporting ship ................................................................................................................................. 12-42
Surface:
Access of surface force to submarine action area or joint action area............................................. 6-72
Action ................................................................................................................................................ 9-2
Air coordination ............................................................................................................................... 4-10
Air/surface antisubmarine warfare attacks .................................................................................... 12-27
Burst................................................................................................................................................. 17-1
Commander, surface action group ................................................................................................... 9-10
Communications:
Antisurface action group .............................................................................................................. 4-11
Surface warfare............................................................................................................................. 4-11
Coordinated aircraft/surface unit attacks ......................................................................................... 6-87
Emergency transit of surface force through submarine action area or joint action area ................. 6-74
Force track coordinator—surface ............................................................................................. 7-16, 9-2
Group, surface action ....................................................................................................................... 9-10
Minelaying ....................................................................................................................................... 13-5
Pickets .............................................................................................................................................. 10-4
Picture .............................................................................................................................................. 9-29
Policy ................................................................................................................................................. 9-3
Raid reports...................................................................................................................................... 7-18
Screens ............................................................................................................................................. 12-6
Ship (See Surface ship)
Success of surface action ................................................................................................................... 9-3
Surveillance by aircraft ...................................................................................................................... 7-8
Threat ................................................................................................................................................. 9-3
Surface ship:
Attack policy, surface ship antisubmarine warfare ........................................................................ 12-24
Blind bombing zone, surface ship in ............................................................................................... 6-66
Communications .............................................................................................................................. 4-13
Detecting unit, surface ship assists ................................................................................................ 12-29
Gains initial contact, passive sonar capable surface ship .............................................................. 12-38
Havens .................................................................................................................................6-69 to 6-71
Notices ............................................................................................................................................. 6-76
Passing information about contact ................................................................................................... 7-17
Precautions, special surface ship ..................................................................................................... 6-76
Prevention of mutual interference between submerged submarines and surface ships
with towed acoustic devices streamed ...................................................................................... 6-93

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Procedures for entering restricted areas........................................................................................... 6-76

Reconnaissance .................................................................................................................................. 7-9
Safety lanes ...................................................................................................................................... 6-90
Shadowing ....................................................................................................................................... 7-11
Submarine safety lane, surface ship in ............................................................................................ 6-69
Towed arrays .................................................................................................................................... 12-7
Surface-to-air missile:
Missile engagement zone................................................................................................................. 10-9
Ships ................................................................................................................................................ 10-4
Surveillance:
Area .......................................................................................................................................... 5-1, 7-15
Coordination and data compilation.................................................................................................... 7-1
Survival of agents ............................................................................................................................. 17-11
Survivors:
Diversion of ship to locate survivors ............................................................................................... 6-62
Rescue of survivors ......................................................................................................................... 3-29
Sweep commander, formations, and operations ................................................................................. 6-46
Tacan method of grid lock .................................................................................................................. 7-26
Tactical:
Aided intercept by submarine, tactical control of.......................................................................... 12-18
Command........................................................................................................................................... 2-4
At sea ............................................................................................................................................ 2-16
Officer in tactical command ........................................................................................................... 2-4
Communications .............................................................................................................................. 4-16
Communications plans ...................................................................................................................... 4-1
Considerations in:
Chemical warfare ....................................................................................................................... 17-12
Nuclear warfare ............................................................................................................................ 17-1
Control ............................................................................................................................................... 2-4
Data links, tactical use of ................................................................................................................. 7-21
Link 4 and 11, tactical use of .................................................................................................. 7-21, 7-22
Mining ............................................................................................................................................. 13-2
Nets, task force/task group and screen .............................................................................................. 4-8
Procedures ......................................................................................................................................... 6-9
Relinquishment of tactical control ................................................................................................. 12-15
Satellites, tactical use of .................................................................................................................. 4-20
Shifting tactical control of direct support submarines ................................................................... 12-15
Sonar range ...................................................................................................................................... 12-5
Tactics:
Carrier battle group air defence tactics .......................................................................................... 10-12
Following nuclear attack ................................................................................................................. 17-8
Overt and covert tactics ..................................................................................................................... 7-7
Rapid amendment of tactics .............................................................................................................. 3-1
Taking:
Sectors or patrol lines, taking up ..................................................................................................... 3-31
Target:
Data, accuracy of target ................................................................................................................... 9-18
Motion analysis.............................................................................................................................. 12-40

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Motion analysis.............................................................................................................................. 12-40

Reporting ......................................................................................................................................... 9-18
Unit ............................................................................................................................................... 9-18
Submarine target priority list ........................................................................................................... 9-16
Targeting:
Aided intercept by submarine, targeting for .................................................................................. 12-18
Third-party targeting ........................................................................................................................ 9-18
Task ............................................................................................................................................ 6-23, 7-11
Designators ........................................................................................................................................ 1-3
Force numbers ................................................................................................................................... 1-2
Group:
Duties of carriers in ...................................................................................................................... 6-40
Operations ........................................................................................................................... 6-80, 6-82
Position and intended movement ................................................................................................. 3-13
Groups, units, and elements ............................................................................................................... 1-3
Nets, task force/group reporting ........................................................................................................ 4-8
Organization ...................................................................................................................................... 1-2
Changes in assignments.................................................................................................................. 1-4
Tasking .............................................................................................................................................. 12-11
Authorities ................................................................................................................................ 6-1, 6-26
Electronic warfare............................................................................................................................ 8-13
Message for aided intercept by submarine .................................................................................... 12-18
Methods ........................................................................................................................................... 2-53
Objectives for electronic and acoustic warfare................................................................................ 8-13
Rapid ....................................................................................................................................... 6-22, 6-24
Support aircraft .................................................................................................................................. 6-2
Tattletale .............................................................................................................................................. 7-12
Tension, action at time of increased .................................................................................................... 6-91
Termination of amphibious operation ................................................................................................. 15-4
Terms and definitions .......................................................................................................................... 7-13
Third-party targeting ........................................................................................................................... 9-18
Threat:
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 18-6
Surface threat ..................................................................................................................................... 9-3
Warnings ........................................................................................................................3-34, 3-35, 18-7
Time:
Reaction time ................................................................................................................................... 12-7
Torpedo countermeasures ................................................................................................................. 12-34
Towed acoustic devices streamed, prevention of mutual interference between
submerged submarines and surface ships with ......................................................................... 6-91
Towed array ship ................................................................................................. 2-26, 3-30, 12-12, 12-24
Aircraft support of towed array ship................................................................................... 12-12, 12-40
Antisurface warfare, towed array ship in......................................................................................... 9-13
Communications ..................................................................................................................... 4-11, 12-8
Contact prosecution ....................................................................................................................... 12-39
Contact reports ............................................................................................................................... 12-24
Investigation of contact in towed array ship/aircraft cooperation ................................................. 12-41
Screen, towed array ship in.............................................................................................................. 3-30
Stationing of towed array ships ...........................................................................................12-7 to 12-9

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Towed arrays, surface ship .................................................................................................................. 12-6

Transit:
Emergency transit of surface forces through submarine action area or joint action area ................ 6-74
Fallout transit, operational readiness for ......................................................................................... 17-8
Helicopters, transit of ...................................................................................................................... 6-33
Instruction for aircraft ...................................................................................................................... 6-12
Mined area, transit through:
Ships ........................................................................................................................................... 13-13
Submarines ................................................................................................................................. 13-16
Passage operations ........................................................................................................................... 19-4
Separation ........................................................................................................................................ 6-32
Transiting submarines, command relationships of ............................................................................. 6-88
Transmission speed versus security .................................................................................................... 7-27
Transmissions; interference of, and interception, detection, and direction-finding of ....................... 8-16
Transmitting equipment, ships fitted with high-power .............................................................. 6-77, 6-78
Transport groups ................................................................................................................................. 15-6
True:
Courses and true bearings ................................................................................................................ 6-12
Turnover procedures .................................................................................................................. 6-28, 9-16
Maritime patrol aircraft to maritime patrol aircraft ......................................................................... 6-27
Sonobuoy ......................................................................................................................................... 6-30
Turns used in manoeuvring Method A ................................................................................................ 6-41
Type organization .................................................................................................................................. 1-2
Types of data links ................................................................................................................................ 4-4
Typical ASW reporting requirements ................................................................................................. 4-14
Underwater:
Blast and underwater shock ............................................................................................................. 17-2
Burst................................................................................................................................................. 17-1
Sound underwater signal ................................................................................................................. 4-16
Threats ............................................................................................................................................. 18-2
Underway, readiness to get underway ................................................................................................ 13-8
Unescorted convoy.............................................................................................................................. 2-19
Units:
Closing or rejoining ......................................................................................................................... 3-30
Disposition of units .......................................................................................................................... 8-17
Joining ............................................................................................................................................. 6-14
Selecting units for scouting ............................................................................................................... 7-7
Task units ........................................................................................................................................... 1-3
Universal transverse mercator grid ....................................................................................................... 3-4
Unscheduled launch and recovery operations..................................................................................... 6-49
UPLINK considerations ...................................................................................................................... 4-16
Urgent:
Attack by fixed-wing aircraft and screening helicopter................................................................. 12-26
Contact investigation ....................................................................................................................... 6-93
Mining ............................................................................................................................................. 13-2
Variations to airplans......................................................................................................................... 12-11
Vectored attacks ................................................................................................................................ 12-43
Vertical:
Separation, lateral and vertical ........................................................................................................ 6-35
Takeoff and landing aircraft, ships operating vertical ..................................................................... 6-39

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Veto:
Command by...................................................................................................................................... 2-5
Control by ........................................................................................................................................ 10-7
Visual:
Contact between ship and aircraft in distress .................................................................................. 6-56
Lack of ............................................................................................................................................. 14-4
On top ............................................................................................................................................ 12-36
Signals for:
Surface action group ..................................................................................................................... 4-12
Vectored attack method.................................................................................................................. 12-44
Vital area ............................................................................................................................................... 5-2
Voice:
Pilot .................................................................................................................................................. 6-56
Reporting procedures ......................................................................................................................... 8-4
Voice/radio teletype reporting ............................................................................................................. 9-18
Warfare:
Commanders .................................................................................................................................... 2-20
Reports.......................................................................................................................................... 7-20
Standard call signs .......................................................................................................................... 4-3
Organization ...................................................................................................................................... 1-2
Warning ...................................................................................................................................... 3-32, 9-29
Area ................................................................................................................................................. 18-8
Patrol ....................................................................................................................................... 9-31, 9-33
Threat ...........................................................................................................................3-33, 3-35, 18-17
Wartime ...................................................................................................................................... 6-70, 6-71
Procedures .............................................................................................................................. 6-93, 6-94
Watch zones ...................................................................................................................................... 10-10
Waterspace management ..................................................................................................................... 6-67
Allocation procedures ............................................................................................................. 6-72, 6-74
Implementation of waterspace management procedures ................................................................. 6-63
Waveform, Link 11 ............................................................................................................................. 7-22
Weapon................................................................................................................................................ 18-3
Alert states ....................................................................................................................................... 3-35
Control status and orders ............................................................................................................ 5-3, 5-4
Nuclear weapons (See Nuclear)
Picture compilation and weapon employment................................................................................. 7-13
Policy on use of weapons by aircraft ............................................................................................. 12-26
Ranges of antisubmarine warfare weapons ..................................................................................... 12-4
Restrictions ......................................................................................................................5-3, 6-23, 6-76
Self-defence weapons, units with .................................................................................................... 10-5
Use of weapons by submarine ......................................................................................................... 9-15
Wide-area link operations ................................................................................................................... 7-22
Wind ................................................................................................................................6-43, 7-11, 17-13
Windows:
For submarine in associated support ............................................................................................. 12-13
Special communication windows .................................................................................................... 4-16
Withdrawal, amphibious ..................................................................................................................... 15-2
World geographic reference system ...................................................................................................... 3-2

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Yards, reporting bearing and range in hundreds of ............................................................................... 3-6

Zero position and intended movement operation, towed array ship ................................................. 12-10
ZIPPO ............................................................................................................................................... 10-11
Zone(s):
Blind bombing ................................................................................................................................. 6-66
Coordination .................................................................................................................................... 10-8
Crossover and engagement zones .................................................................................................... 10-9
Fighter engagement zone ................................................................................................................. 10-9
Inner and outer defence ................................................................................................................. 10-12
Missile engagement ......................................................................................................................... 10-9
Ship control...................................................................................................................................... 6-49
Watch zones ................................................................................................................................... 10-10

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MAY 2021 13-1 thru 13-16
MAY 2021 XLIX, L
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MAY 2021 LI, LII
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