Carrie Tolstedt, the former senior executive vice-president of Community Banking, began her

banking career at United Bank of Denver and joined Norwest Bank Nebraska in 1986. She left
for FirstMerit Corporation for a few years and then rejoined Norwest Corporation. Tolstedt
held several senior positions in Wells Fargo before heading the Community Banking team in
2008—the team that included employees who performed unethical sales acts. On July 12,
2016, Wells Fargo officially announced that Tolstedt would be retiring, effective July 31.
Tolstedt was expected to retire with USD 124 million, which included a mix of options, shares,
and restricted stock. Note that the amount was due to Tolstedt as a result of serving more
than 20 years at Wells Fargo and was unrelated to her retirement (Egan, 2016b). History of
Fraudulent Activities Accusations of fraudulent activity against Wells Fargo was not new and
continued after John G. Stumpf became President of Wells Fargo in 2005 (see Table 1). In
April 2016, Wells Fargo acknowledged that it was guilty of deceitfully certifying mortgages for
Federal Housing Administration insurance over the period from 2001 to 2008. It also did not
formally report several thousand loans that had material defects or were badly underwritten
during the period from 2002 to 2010. Eventually, a USD 1.2 billion settlement was made with
the Manhattan federal court (Stempel, 2016). Table 1. Timeline of Fake Accounts Scandal
With Key Dates and Incidences From November 2005 to April 2017 November 2005 Julie
Tishkoff, a former administrative assistant at Wells Fargo, informed the human resources
department that she had seen cases of employees opening bogus accounts, issuing
unrequested credit cards, and forging customer signatures. June 2009 Julie Tishkoff was fired
in 2009 and, in 2011, filed a lawsuit against the bank for wrongful termination. According to
the wrongful termination lawsuit, two of her supervisors ignored her complaints. As of
October 11, 2016, these two supervisors are still with the bank as regional presidents. March
2009 Two employees of the bank, Yesenia Guitron, and Judi Klosek complained to the bank
ethics hotline about unsolicited accounts created by colleagues. July, 2009 Six dismissed
employees in Montana filed lawsuits against Wells Fargo, claiming unethical sales practices.
The case was dismissed in 2011. August 2010 Ms. Guitron and Ms. Klosek were both fired, and
subsequently filed a joint wrongful termination lawsuit. SAGE © Thompson S. H. Teo and
Sheryl E. Kimes 2019 SAGE Business Cases Page 4 of 15 Wells Fargo Bank: The Fake Accounts
Scandal 2011 Wells Fargo introduced Quality-of-Sales Report Card in California. It also created
the current Sales and Service Conduct Oversight Team to identify wrongful acts through data
analytics. 2012 Wells Fargo started to lower employee sales goals. July, 2012 Ms. Guitron's
case was dismissed, announcing that Wells Fargo still had grounds to terminate her as she did
not achieve her sales goals and refused to meet with management. Ms. Klosek's case was
dismissed along with a personal settlement with the bank. 2013 Wells Fargo launched an
expanded set of training materials for managers, to strengthen the ethical behaviors of
employees. In the same year, Quality-of-Sale Report Card was integrated in retail banking
district managers' incentive compensation scheme. The bank also further enhanced its
oversight of possible unethical behaviors and altered its performance evaluation system to
place less emphasis on sales goals. Furthermore, a cross-functional oversight team for retail
banking sales integrity was formed for better identification of unethical behaviors. The
incentive compensation scheme was also altered a few times in the same year. December 21,
2013, The Los Angeles Times published their investigation on intense sales culture at Wells
Fargo, based on interviews with approximately three-dozen former and current employees
and customers. 2014 Several changes were made to the Wells Fargo employee incentive
compensation scheme to reduce the motivation for unethical behaviors. In the same year, the
simulated funding review by the Sales and Service Conduct Oversight Team was broadened to
national scope. 2015 Training materials and practices of Wells Fargo were further enhanced,
and an incentive scheme was further improved. May 4, 2015, Los Angeles City Attorney Mike
Feuer filed a suit against Wells Fargo in state court under unfair-business-practices law. Wells
Fargo was accused of violating state and federal law, misusing customers' confidential
information, and failing to alert customers that their information was misused. May 5, 2015,
Ancel Martinez, the Wells Fargo spokesman for the Los Angeles department, responded to the
initial allegations of fraud raised in May 2015 with an email. June 9, Wells Fargo responded in
court documents that the city of Los Angeles had no authority to SAGE © Thompson S. H. Teo
and Sheryl E. Kimes 2019 SAGE Business Cases Page 5 of 15 Wells Fargo Bank: The Fake
Accounts Scandal 2015 file the lawsuit since the National Bank Acts, adopted in 1863 and
1864, indicate that banks such as Wells Fargo are only accountable to federal regulators.
August 2015 Wells Fargo started to work with Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC), to evaluate
the extent of its fraudulent activities and identify affected customers. February 2016 Wells
Fargo started to process the remediation payments to affected customers identified by PwC.
On September 8, 2016, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), the Los Angeles
City Attorney, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) fined Wells Fargo a
total of USD 185 million. An official announcement was made on its webpage saying, "We
regret and take responsibility for any instances where customers may have received a product
that they did not request." On September 13, 2016, Wells Fargo announced that it would be
putting its employee sales goal program to an end, effective January 1, 2017. On the same
day, John Stumpf, the bank's CEO, appeared on CNBC news and said he accepted the blame
for the alleged false account opening practices but would not resign. In an interview with Wall
Street Journal, Stumpf insisted that corporate culture should not be blamed and implicitly
blamed a minority of low-level employees for not "honoring" bank culture. On September 14,
2016, FBI and federal prosecutors in California and New York opened an investigation into
Wells Fargo, with the potential to lead to the possibility of criminal charges. On September
16, 2016, The House of Representatives Financial Services Committee launched an
investigation targeting the alleged misdoing. An official letter was sent to the general counsel
of Wells Fargo, inviting four senior executives for transcribed interviews. On September 19,
2016, The Wells Fargo Board of Directors sent a letter to senators informing them of the
actions they took towards Carrie Tolstedt. September 20, 2016, During a Senate Banking
Committee hearing, Senator Elizabeth Warren asked John Stumpf to resign and return the
monetary gains he received during the period of allegations. September 22, 2016, A group of
senators asked the U.S. Department of Labor to launch an investigation into the actions of
Wells Fargo regarding the possible violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). SAGE ©
Thompson S. H. Teo and Sheryl E. Kimes 2019 SAGE Business Cases Page 6 of 15 Wells Fargo
Bank: The Fake Accounts Scandal Stumpf also left his position on the Federal Reserve Advisory
Council. On September 23, 2016, Six senators shared a letter with ABC News about the use by
Wells Fargo of forced arbitration clauses in its agreement for customer accounts. On
September 25, 2016, Two former Wells Fargo employees filed a class-action lawsuit seeking
USD 2.6 billion or more against the bank for workers who were penalized for not meeting
sales quotas. On September 26, 2016, Wells Fargo officials made an official statement that
they disagree with the allegations by two former employees, who filed a lawsuit on
September 22, 2016. On September 27, 2016, Wells Fargo announced that the Board of
Directors had agreed to allow John Stumpf to forgo USD 41 million in unvested stock. It also
announced that Carrie Tolstedt would also be giving up her USD 19 million in unvested stock
and she also agreed not to cash in outstanding options during the investigation period. On
September 28, 2016, The State Treasurer of California banned Wells Fargo from working with
the state. On September 29, 2016, John Stumpf testified before the House Financial Services.
October 12, 2016, John Stumpf officially left Wells Fargo. His position was assumed by Tim
Sloan as CEO and Stephen Sanger as Chairman. October 14, 2016, Public suspicion on possible
insider trading was raised after CBS News revealed that John Stumpf sold close to 3 million
shares in total on different dates in 2016. October 19, 2016, California Attorney General
Kamala Harris opened a criminal investigation into the fake accounts scandal. October 25,
2016, Wells Fargo launched a television advertisement campaign. SAGE © Thompson S. H. Teo
and Sheryl E. Kimes 2019 SAGE Business Cases Page 7 of 15 Wells Fargo Bank: The Fake
Accounts Scandal January 10, 2017, Wells Fargo announced a new compensation program for
retail bank team members. On January 13, 2017, Wells Fargo announced plans to close at
least 400 branches by the end of 2018. February 21, 2017, Four other senior managers in the
Wells Fargo Community Banking division, who were involved in the fraudulent incident, lost
their jobs, bonuses, unvested equity awards, and vested outstanding options. March 9, 2017,
The bank further restructured its consumer-banking division. March 21, 2017, CEO Tim Sloan
announced that Wells Fargo would launch a new multi-channel ad campaign called "Building
Better Every Day" in mid-April, in order to rebuild trust. March 29, 2017, Wells Fargo
preliminarily settled at USD 110 million with customers who claimed that the bank illegally
used their names to open bogus accounts and purchase products. April 10, 2017, Wells Fargo
clawed back another USD 75 million from the former CEO and top executives. Vested stock:
Company stocks that belong unconditionally to the employee. Unvested stock: Company
stocks that are not fully owned by the employee until certain conditions have been met, such
as working for the company for a specified number of years. Source: Compiled from the
authors' research. The Fake Accounts Scandal In December 2013, the Los Angeles Times
published a comprehensive article about Wells Fargo. The article was based on interviews
with 28 former and seven current Wells Fargo employees, lawsuits filed against the bank, and
a review of internal bank documents. The investigation focused on the intense sales culture
and the pressure on employees in cross-selling financial products. Employees were also
expected to sell no less than four financial products to 80% of their customers. In order to
achieve the sales target, employees opened unauthorized accounts for customers, created
credit card accounts, and even resorted to asking family members to open ghost accounts.
Top Wells Fargo executives were expected to meet the "Great 8" target—selling an average of
eight different financial products per household, which drove employees to resort to
unethical and fraudulent sales practices (Whitehouse, 2015). Some former Wells Fargo
employees claimed SAGE © Thompson S. H. Teo and Sheryl E. Kimes 2019 SAGE Business Cases
Page 8 of 15 Wells Fargo Bank: The Fake Accounts Scandal that managers trained them in
ways to inflate the sales figures. Furthermore, a former fraud analyst in Wells Fargo Bank
reported that she was asked to leave her job after reporting fraudulent practices of sales
staff. Instead of taking disciplinary or investigative actions on unethical sales staff, the bank
officials reprimanded her for not seeing the big picture (Hudson, 2016). Publication of an
investigation by the Los Angeles Times brought responses from several former Wells Fargo
employees and customers. For example, one employee left because she was "fed up with the
pressure to 'perform,' the shadiness of branches, the lack of integrity, and management's
failure for accountability" (Reckard, 2013). And Wells Fargo customers complained that they
were issued with credit cards and/or were issued new accounts without their explicit approval
(Reckard, 2013). In May 2015, an unfair-business-practices lawsuit was filed by the Los
Angeles City Attorney against Wells Fargo to seek remedies for customers in the state. Wells
Fargo was accused of driving employees to misuse customers' confidential information,
creating unapproved accounts, and charging fraudulent fees, thus violating California's Unfair
Competition Law. Bankers falsely told customers that in order to open a checking account
they had to obtain a savings account, credit card, and other financial products. Some bankers
even impersonated customers and registered online banking accounts for them, and falsely
told customers that no monthly fees would be needed for these additional accounts. These
sales tactics resulted in the opening of approximately 1.5 million deposit accounts and
564,433 credit card accounts without the permission of the customers concerned (Egan,
2016a). Past Controversies of Similar Incidents Several similar cases of unethical sales
practices had been reported before 2011. In 2005, a former administrative assistant at Wells
Fargo informed the human resources department that she had seen cases of employees
opening bogus accounts, issuing unrequested credit cards, and forging customer signatures.
However, she was fired in 2009 and had filed suit against the bank in 2011 for wrongful
termination. In 2009, six dismissed employees in Montana also filed lawsuits against Wells
Fargo, claiming unethical sales practices. Four years later, two Wells Fargo employees called
the ethics hotline set up by the bank to complain about unsolicited accounts created by
colleagues. As before, these employees were fired and, as a result, filed a joint wrongful
termination lawsuit against the bank (Kingston & Cowley, 2016). Past Actions Taken by Wells
Fargo In 2011, Wells Fargo had put in place a Quality-of-Sale Report Card to deter and detect
wrongful employee behaviors. Wells Fargo also created a Sales and Service Conduct Oversight
Team to filter out fraudulent activities through data analytics. Between 2012 and 2015, Wells
Fargo had lowered its branch-based employee sales goal by as much as 30%, in an effort to
reduce the motivation for employees to perform fraudulent activities. In 2013, Wells Fargo
introduced an expanded set of training materials for managers with the purpose of
strengthening ethical behavior among employees. The Quality-of-Sale Report Card was
integrated into the incentive compensation scheme operated by retail banking district
managers and the Wells Fargo performance evaluation system was amended to place less
emphasis on sales goals. From 2013 to 2015, Wells Fargo continued to enhance its oversight of
sales integrity issues and revise its incentive compensation scheme to reduce incidences of
employees performing unethical acts. Furthermore, between 2011 and 2015, the bank had
laid off approximately 1% of its workforce annually as a result of sales practices violations
(Committee of Financial Services, 2016). During the scandal period, Wells Fargo reported its
social commitments towards customers and stakeholders in its annual corporate social
responsibility (CSR) report. For instance, the Wells Fargo interim report in 2014 focused on
the importance of corporate social responsibility in its culture. In the 2016 "Shaping our CSR
passage © Thompson S. H. Teo and Sheryl E. Kimes 2019 SAGE Business Cases Page 9 of 15
Wells Fargo Bank: The Fake Accounts Scandal priorities" report (Wells Fargo, 2016), the bank
showed it had been actively collecting customer feedback and measuring customer
experience so as to better understand and satisfy customer needs. Wells Fargo Management's
Initial Response Ancel Martinez, the Wells Fargo spokesman for the Los Angeles department,
responded to the initial allegations of fraud in May 2015, stating "we will vigorously defend
ourselves against these allegations." Wells Fargo affirmed this in a public statement: "Wells
Fargo's culture is focused on the best interest of its customers and creating a supportive,
caring, and ethical environment for our team members. This includes... our commitment to
customers receiving only the products and services they need and will benefit from"
(Whitehouse, 2015). Response by Government Bureaus to Wells Fargo The suit filed by the Los
Angeles City Attorney spurred investigations by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB)—a U.S. government agency, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC)—an independent bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. According to the
lawsuit, the bank also had failed to notify affected customers when they discovered the sales
team violations. As a result, the city sought a civil penalty of USD 2,500 for each infringement
of California's Unfair Competition Law (Reckard, 2015). Investigations by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency The OCC detected several fraudulent sales activities at Wells
Fargo. These included the unauthorized creation of deposit or credit card accounts, transfer
of funds, and credit inquiries. Throughout their investigation, the OCC discovered several
causes of these fraudulent activities. First, the Community Banking division of Wells Fargo had
a misaligned incentive compensation program. Second, the bank lacked programs to identify
and prevent fraudulent sales activities. Third, the bank had inadequate audit coverage
because it did not take into account an enterprise-wide view of its sales practices. Fourth,
the bank lacked a customer complaint monitoring process (Whitehouse, 2015). Investigations
by Consumer Financial Protection Bureau The CFPB investigation produced similar findings to
the OCC probe. Their analysis revealed that Wells Fargo staff had opened approximately 1.5
million unauthorized deposit accounts. Funds from customers' authorized accounts were then
transferred to temporarily finance the new unauthorized accounts, which allowed employees
to be rewarded for opening new accounts, thus meeting the company sales quota. But these
actions by Wells Fargo staff also meant that customers were sometimes charged overdraft
fees or penalties for inadequate funds since the transfer of funds reduced the balance of their
original accounts. Staff also falsely applied for approximately 565,000 credit card accounts
without customer permission. As a result, some customers were charged annual fees, or
related finance or interest charges. Furthermore, some employees applied for, or activated,
debit cards and also created fake email addresses, and then enrolled customers in the
online-banking program without their authorization. As a result of discovering this, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ordered the bank to pay a USD 35 million civil
penalties (Assembly Banking and SAGE © Thompson S. H. Teo and Sheryl E. Kimes 2019 SAGE
Business Cases Page 10 of 15 Wells Fargo Bank: The Fake Accounts Scandal Finance
Committee, 2016). Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Enforcement Under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (legislation passed in the United
States in 2010 as a response to the financial crisis of 2008, and commonly known as the
Dodd-Frank Act), CFPB was authorized to take action against organizations breaching
consumer financial laws. As a result, in 2016, the CFPB took several actions against Wells
Fargo. First, the bank was asked to provide full refunds due to affected customers without
requiring any action from the customers themselves. Second, the Wells Fargo operating
procedures had to be reviewed by external consultants in order to prevent future improper
activities. Third, the bank was ordered to pay a USD 100 million penalties to the CFPB Civil
Penalty Fund, the largest penalty ever imposed by CFPB. Fourth, despite the initial claim by
the bank that, under federal law, the City of Los Angeles had no authority to sue Wells Fargo,
the bank settled with the city for a USD 50 million fine and USD 5 million for customer
remediation. Several other requirements were imposed for the settlement with the City of
Los Angeles, including sending stipulated written notices to credit card and deposit accounts
holders in California, establishing certain procedures and policies promoting transparency,
hiring an independent third-party consulting firm to identify affected customers with direct
monetary loss exceeding USD 1, and reimbursing identified customers within 90 days from the
settlement date. A mediation process for affected current or past customers was also
established. The bank was to send a notice to the customer about the mediation program
within 60 days of a complaint being made at any branch in California or through the bank's
feedback toll-free number. A bi-annual internal audit checking on the bank's compliance with
the obligations of the settlement was required for at least two years after the settlement
(Assembly Banking and Finance Committee, 2016). Aftermath of Verdict Subsequent Response
by Well Fargo In September 2016, after the settlements with the three government
authorities, Wells Fargo issued an official announcement on its webpage and announced its
commitment to take responsibility for the unsolicited accounts. Wells Fargo also confirmed
that it had dismissed approximately 5,300 employees who were involved in related fraudulent
activities (Merle, 2016). In a September 2016 Wall Street Journal interview, Stumpf said,
"There was no incentive to do bad things." He insisted that corporate culture should not be
blamed and implicitly blamed a minority of low-level employees for not "honoring" the bank's
culture (Bellware, 2016). In October 2016, Wells Fargo eliminated the employee sales goals
program that was believed to have been the main cause of the fake accounts scandal.
Consequences for John G. Stumpf and the Wells Fargo Management Team In September 2016,
Wells Fargo announced that Stumpf would forgo his USD 41 million in unvested stock,
voluntarily, and would not receive a salary. Similarly, Tolstedt gave up her USD 19 million in
unvested stock and her ability to cash in outstanding options during the investigation period.
Neither Stumpf nor Tolstedt SAGE © Thompson S. H. Teo and Sheryl E. Kimes 2019 SAGE
Business Cases Page 11 of 15 Wells Fargo Bank: The Fake Accounts Scandal would receive their
2016 bonuses. Four other senior managers in the Wells Fargo Community Banking division who
had been involved in the fake accounts scandal lost their jobs as well as their bonuses,
unvested equity awards, and vested outstanding options (McGrath, 2017). Consequences for
the Company In addition to the USD 185 million penalties, Wells Fargo was given a year-long
sanction by the California State Treasurer, terminating all state investment in Wells Fargo
securities, the contract of Wells Fargo as a broker-dealer and as the managing underwriter on
negotiated sales of California state bonds. Wells Fargo also announced plans to close at least
400 branches by the end of 2018 (Egan, 2017). The number of new checking accounts fell by
44% in November 2016 and 40% in January 2017, compared with a year earlier. Furthermore,
credit card applications dropped by 43% in December 2016 (Wieczner, 2017) compared with
the previous year and, in February 2017, applications for credit cards were 55% lower than for
the same period the previous year (Dugan, 2017). The Community Banking unit, the retail
division of Wells Fargo, also reported a 5% lower revenue in the fourth quarter of 2016 and a
14% decrease in profit compared with the previous year. Although the bank still managed to
earn a stable USD 21.6 billion in revenue in the fourth quarter of 2016, its profits dropped by
almost 6%, to USD 5.3 billion. Other than the financial impact on the firm, the scandal also
deeply scarred Wells Fargo's reputation. The negative perception of Wells Fargo increased
from 15% before the settlement to 52% after the settlement. It was predicted that the scandal
could cost the firm as much as USD 212 billion in deposits and USD 8 billion in sales over
one-and-a-half years (Shen, 2016).

Assignment requirements:
1. Identify and explain the structural variables that may have had an impact on the
behaviors of Wells Fargo employees. Your explanation should include the relationship to
motivation theories.
2. Should management have predicted and be held accountable for the employees or is the
accountability solely with the employees? Integrate your response from question 1.
behavior

Answer
1.) Identify and explain the structural variables that may have had an impact on the behaviors of
Wells Fargo employees. Your explanation should include the relationship to motivation
theories.

● American economic organization Wells Fargo became beating the chances in an awful
economy. During the economic disaster in 2008, the financial institution obtained
Wachovia to come to be the third-biggest financial institution through property
withinside the United States. A few years later, its developing sales and hovering
inventory added the business enterprise's cost to nearly $three hundred billion. But at
the back of this fulfillment became a business enterprise tradition that drove personnel
to open fraudulent money owed in try to attain lofty income dreams. Between 2011 and
2015, business enterprise personnel opened greater than 1. five million financial
institution money owed and carried out for over 565,000 credit score playing cards in
clients' names that won't be authorized. Much former personnel stated that business
enterprise income dreams had been not possible to meet, and incentives for
reimbursement and ongoing employment endorsed gaming the system. Wells Fargo
compelled personnel to cross-sell, presenting clients with one kind of product, which
includes checking or financial savings money owed, to additionally purchase different
kinds of products, which include credit score playing cards and loans. One former worker
defined it as a "grind-house," with co-workers "cracking beneathneath pressure."
Another former worker stated, "If you don't meet your answers you're now no longer a
group player. If you're bringing down the group then you may be fired and it is going to
be to your everlasting record."
 ● The organizational shape is crucial while enterprise goes well, however even greater
importantly while enterprise isn't. The power of a frontrunner lies in how they reply
below duress. Wells Fargo is one of the nation's largest banks and they're below
hearthplace for issuing greater than 1,000,000 sham bills without the consent of their
customers.
● The organizational shape of Wells Fargo appears to be a multidivisional shape as
maximum huge banks are. There is a board of directors, C-suite, company headquarters
in San Francisco, after which many divisions are underneath, with branches everywhere
in the nation. This sort of organizational shape is straightforward to mismanage, as there
are such a lot of transferring parts. Wells Fargo has fired 5,300 personnel so far, together
with financial institution managers and a few of their direct supervisors. Regulators have
asserted that the financial institution's inner way of life and incentive machine inspire
the 1. five million unauthorized debts that had been opened and 565,000 credit score
playing cards that had been signed up for. However, the financial institution's executives
do now no longer suppose that the way of life of the organization has something to do
with the case and the financial institution has now no longer allowed any executives to
go, aside from a well-timed retirement of the top of network banking months ago. The
evaluation of Wells Fargo's business enterprise with admiration to the factors of shape
can be vital in attending to the root of this hassle and stopping it from taking place again.

In general, based on my understanding of Wells Fargo's case is that they are forcing employees
on things they can't do easily or in a rush. Many employees are attempting to do things that are
against the rules and regulations and even to the company policy. They are being stressed and
their behavior change, obviously.

2. ) Should management have predicted and be held accountable for the employees' behavior or
is the accountability solely with the employees? Integrate your response from a question

Well, based on the case this two are important when a business is running. YES! The employer
or management must predict the accountability of their employees.

When we say, management must be held accountable for the employees' behavior mean, The
worker duty definition is the obligation of personnel to finish the obligations they may be
assigned, to carry out the obligations required via way of means of their process, and to be a gift
for his or her right shifts so one can satisfy or similarly the dreams of the organization. If
obligations aren't finished and the capabilities of the process aren't carried out properly, then
that worker may also be accountable for managing the repercussions.
It is important because Accountability at paintings is essential to a commercial enterprise's
fulfillment as a whole. Every employee, regardless of what stage of seniority is similarly
chargeable for helping withinside the fulfillment of the organization. In order to reap the desires
of the organization, lengthy and quick-term, it's far essential that each person withinside the
organization paintings collectively and proportion accountability. Employees who paint
collectively toward the identical usual intention assist their place of business to come to be
greater accountable, in flip make the commercial enterprise greater effective and efficient.
Accountability is ready possession and initiative. This way that after a worker says they may do
something, they comply with via and get it done. It's spotting that different group contributors
are dependent on the consequences of your paintings. It's approximately open, proactive
conversation to maintain group contributors knowledgeable of the fame of your commitments as
it has a right away effect on their capacity to gain their very own commitments. Taking
possession of paintings is ready taking initiative and doing the proper element for the business.
It's approximately taking obligation for consequences and now no longer assuming it's a person
else's obligation. It's the alternative of passing the buck. Ultimately, whilst group contributors
continually display possession and accountability, accept as true with is formed. You accept as
true with a person will do the proper element and accept as true with that they'll do what they
stated they'd do. Trust is the spine of high-appearing teams.

Employees now understand they'll be held responsible for their conduct in those areas. Holding
personnel responsible for precise movements facilitates a commercial enterprise to lessen its
danger of a hit lawsuit with the aid of using a worker who claims he changed into unfairly
disciplined. It has an effect on employer running culture, due to the fact Employees experience
like they can not consider their bosses. They experience devaluation. So it is a domino effect:
Low duty ends in mistrust, which ends up in low morale, which ends up in employee evaluation,
which ends up in low engagement, which ends up in low productivity.