G.R. No.

L-55300 March 15, 1990

FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL, the latter assisted by her husband,
FRANKLIN G. GACAL, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., and THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS,
in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SOUTH
COTABATO, BRANCH I, respondents.

FACTS:
• Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M. Gacal, Bonifacio S. Anislag and his
wife, Mansueta L. Anislag, and the late Elma de Guzman, were then passengers boarding
defendant's BAC 1-11 at Davao Airport for a flight to Manila
• Not knowing that on the same flight, Macalinog, Taurac Pendatum known as Commander
Zapata, Nasser Omar, Liling Pusuan Radia, Dimantong Dimarosing and Mike Randa, all
of Marawi City and members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were their
co-passengers, three (3) armed with grenades, two (2) with .45 caliber pistols, and one with
a .22 caliber pistol.
• Ten (10) minutes after take off at about 2:30 in the afternoon, the hijackers announced the
hijacking of the aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya.
• With the pilot explaining to them especially to its leader, Commander Zapata, of the
inherent fuel limitations of the plane and that they are not rated for international flights, the
hijackers directed the pilot to fly to Sabah.
• With the same explanation, they relented and directed the aircraft to land at Zamboanga
Airport, Zamboanga City for refueling.
• The aircraft landed at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 21, 1976 at Zamboanga Airport.
When the plane began to taxi at the runway, it was met by two armored cars of the military
with machine guns pointed at the plane, and it stopped there.
• The rebels thru its commander demanded that a DC-aircraft take them to Libya with the
President of the defendant company as hostage and that they be given $375,000 and six (6)
armalites, otherwise they will blow up the plane if their demands will not be met by the
government and Philippine Air Lines.
• Meanwhile, the passengers were not served any food nor water and it was only on May 23,
a Sunday, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon that they were served 1/4 slice of a
sandwich and 1/10 cup of PAL water.
• After that, relatives of the hijackers were allowed to board the plane but immediately after
they alighted therefrom, an armored car bumped the stairs. That commenced the battle
between the military and the hijackers which led ultimately to the liberation of the
surviving crew and the passengers, with the final score of ten (10) passengers and three (3)
hijackers dead on the spot and three (3) hijackers captured.

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 • City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt. Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal suffered injuries in the
course of her jumping out of the plane when it was peppered with bullets by the army and
after two (2) hand grenades exploded inside the plane
• Assistant City Fiscal Bonifacio S. Anislag escaped unhurt but Mrs. Anislag suffered a
fracture at the radial bone of her left elbow for which she was hospitalized and operated on
• Elma de Guzman died because of that battle.
• Hence, the action of damages instituted by the plaintiffs demanding the following damages

• The trial court, on August 26, 1980, dismissed the complaints finding that all the damages
sustained in the premises were attributed to force majeure.
• On September 12, 1980 the spouses Franklin G. Gacal and Corazon M. Gacal, plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 1701, filed a notice of appeal with the lower court
• Petitioners alleged that the main cause of the unfortunate incident is the gross, wanton and
inexcusable negligence of respondent Airline personnel in their failure to frisk the
passengers adequately in order to discover hidden weapons in the bodies of the six (6)
hijackers. They claimed that despite the prevalence of skyjacking, PAL did not use a metal
detector which is the most effective means of discovering potential skyjackers among the
passengers
• Respondent Airline averred that in the performance of its obligation to safely transport
passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, it has exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person with due regard to all circumstances, but the security
checks and measures and surveillance precautions in all flights, including the inspection of
baggages and cargo and frisking of passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and
rendered solely by military personnel who under appropriate authority had assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the Philippines.
o It concluded that the accident that befell RP-C1161 was caused by fortuitous event,
force majeure and other causes beyond the control of the respondent Airline.

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstances in the case at bar is a caso fortuito or force majeure which would
exempt an aircraft from payment of damages to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy
and whose personal belongings were lost during the incident.

RULING:
Yes.

Under the Civil Code, common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in their
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case (Article 1733).

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The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into
said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to
all the circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person

It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence and it must be shown
that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person as far
as human care and foresight can provide or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be responsible for those "events which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil Code).

In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a person from liability
under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following elements must concur:
a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will (the will
of the debtor or the obligor);
b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and
d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor

Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is,
therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same

In the case at bar, the failure to transport petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the
skyjacking incident staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF), without any connection with private respondent, hence,
independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers.

Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident which could have
been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of baggages
as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where
there was a military take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and the
inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and international flights.

These events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations in a nominal manner and
obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the performance of duty taken over by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to the exclusion of the former.

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Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been satisfied. Consequently the
existence of force majeure has been established exempting respondent PAL from the payment of
damages to its passengers who suffered death or injuries in their persons and for loss of their
baggages.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision
of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I is hereby AFFIRMED.

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G.R. No. L-82619 September 15, 1993

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO ZAPATOS, respondents.

FACTS:
• On 2 August 1976, private respondent was among the twenty-one (21) passengers of PAL
Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City.
• The routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato.
• While on flight and just about fifteen (15) minutes before landing at Ozamiz City, the pilot
received a radio message that the airport was closed due to heavy rains and inclement
weather and that he should proceed to Cotabato City instead.
• Upon arrival at Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their
options:
o To return to Cebu on Flight 560 of the same day and thence to Ozamiz City on 4
August 1975, or
o Take the next flight to Cebu the following day, or
o Remain at Cotabato and take the next available flight to Ozamiz City on 5 August
1975.
• The Station Agent likewise informed them that Flight 560 bound for Manila would make
a stop-over at Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers; that there were only six (6)
seats available as there were already confirmed passengers for Manila; and, that the basis
for priority would be the check-in sequence at Cebu.
• Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not accommodated because he checked-
in as passenger No. 9 on Flight 477. He insisted on being given priority over the confirmed
passengers in the accommodation, but the Station Agent refused private respondent's
demand explaining that the latter's predicament was not due to PAL's own doing but to be
a force majeure.
• Private respondent tried to stop the departure of Flight 560 as his personal belongings were
still on board. However, his plea fell on deaf ears.
• PAL then issued to private respondent a free ticket to Iligan city, which the latter received
under protest.
• Private respondent was left at the airport and could not even hitch a ride in the Ford Fiera
loaded with PAL personnel. PAL neither provided private respondent with transportation
from the airport to the city proper nor food and accommodation for his stay in Cotabato
City.
• The following day, private respondent purchased a PAL ticket to Iligan City. He informed
PAL personnel that he would not use the free ticket because he was filing a case against
PAL.

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 • In Iligan City, private respondent hired a car from the airport to Kolambugan, Lanao del
Norte, reaching Ozamiz City by crossing the bay in a launch. His personal effects including
the camera, which were valued at P2,000.00 were no longer recovered.
• On 25 November 1976, private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of
contract of carriage against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), before the then Court of First
Instance, now Regional Trial Court

• On 4 June 1981, the trial court rendered its decision. Judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant Philippine AirLines, Inc.
• PAL appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 28 February 1985, finding no reversible
error, affirmed the judgment of the court a quo.
• PAL asserts that it should not be charged with the task of looking after the passengers'
comfort and convenience because the diversion of the flight was due to a fortuitous event,
and that if made liable, an added burden is given to PAL which is over and beyond its
duties under the contract of carriage.

ISSUE:
Whether PAL is liable for damages.

RULING:
Yes.

Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous event.
Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the
business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal
with situations as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the
relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of destination
and has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise
extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded
passengers until they have reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed
considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato
City and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.

In Air France v. Carrascoso, the Court held that: “A contract to transport passengers is quite
different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation
which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty”.

As the appellate court correctly ruled:

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“It becomes the duty of defendant to provide all means of comfort and convenience to its
passengers when they would have to be left in a strange place in case of such by-passing. If the
cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the sole and only
cause (Art. 1755 CC., Art. 1733 C.C.) Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of
common carrier to deliver its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendant's failure to
provide comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using extraordinary diligence, the
cause of non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something
which defendant airline could have prevented, defendant becomes liable to plaintiff.”

WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification however that the
award of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is reduced to Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) while the exemplary damages of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is also reduced
to Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The award of actual damages in the amount Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) representing business losses occasioned by private respondent's being stranded
in Cotabato City is deleted.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 156034 October 1, 2003

DELSAN TRANSPORT LINES, INC., petitioner, vs.

C & A construction, inc., respondent.

FACTS:
• Respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila.
The project was completed in 1994 but it was not formally turned over to NHA.
• On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a
cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank.
• At around 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan
Express received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going
to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours.
• At approximately 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter
at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested.
• At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles
away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10
feet high.
• Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the
ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop
of the vessel.
• He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship
was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent.
• The damage caused by the incident amounted to P456,198.24
• Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
• Respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
• In its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event.
• On February 13, 1998, the complaint filed by respondent was dismissed.
o The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it had taken
all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident.
o Applying the "emergency rule", it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter
had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation.
o It further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it
cannot be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was
typhoon "Katring", which is an act of God.
• On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside.

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 o It found Capt. Jusep guilty of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the
North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner liable
for damages.

ISSUE:
Whether Capt. Jusep was negligent and is solidarily liable with petitioner.

RULING:
Yes.

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in
deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00
midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan19 that a
typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in
the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which
unfortunately was already congested.

The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge
at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure
of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take
immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that
the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse of more than 8 hours
thinking that the typhoon might change direction. He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to
rise instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the
difficulty of traveling at night. The hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not
transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was not very cloudy and there was
no weather disturbance yet.

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep
showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have
observed in the same situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have had greater chances
of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was
very near North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have time to seek
refuge in other ports.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the danger in
which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is not

Jagolino (3LM2)
applicable to the instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by
his own negligence.

Moreover, the Court find petitioner vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of
his employee. It should be stressed, however, that the required diligence of a good father of a
family pertains not only to the selection, but also to the supervision of employees. It is not enough
that the employees chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required
to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for
the proper performance of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and
monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the burden, petitioner should therefore be
held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED.1awphi1.nét The June
14, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034 ordering petitioner Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc., to pay respondent C & A Construction, Inc., damages in the amount of
P456,198.27, plus P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the award of P456,198.27 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from October 3, 1995,
until finality of this decision, and 12% per annum thereafter on the principal and interest (or any
part thereof) until full payment.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA,

ELENITA, OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian,
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
• Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 Bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its
way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon.
• There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor.
• At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction
of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into
a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
• Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be
helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan,
Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not
get out of the overturned bus.
• Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour,
came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on
one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned
bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped inside it.
• It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the
gasoline tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus
and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men
who answered the call for help set it on fire.
• By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five
minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
• After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600
as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to
Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire.
o The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan
was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including
himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it

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 o That at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his
death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him.
• The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the
latter endorsed the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus

RULING:
Yes.

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

“that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”

In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, the Court do not hesitate to hold
that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response
to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had
to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights
were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach
the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.

In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence
of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.
What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that

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in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the
carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and
1763.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and
from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan
and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with costs.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. L-39309 November 24, 1933

TEH LE KIM, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AERIAL TAXI CO., INC., defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
• On the morning of September 4, 1931, the plaintiff herein bought, in Manila, a passenger
ticket for a flight to Iloilo in one of the defendant company's hydroplanes starting from
Madrigal Field in Pasay.
• Inasmuch as the engine of the plane Mabuhay, in which he was to take the flight, was not
working satisfactorily, the said plaintiff had to wait for some time.
• Before the plane Mabuhay was put in condition for the flight, the plane Taal arrived and it
was decided to have the plaintiff make the flight therein.
• After an uneventful flight, the plane landed on the waters of Guimaras Strait, in front of
Iloilo, and taxied toward the beach until its pontoons struck bottom
• When the plane stopped. the pilot shut off the gasoline feed pipe, permitting the engine,
however, to continue to function until all the gasoline was drained from the feed pipe and
carburetor. This operation was necessary in accordance with the established practice of
aviation in order to avoid danger of fire which would exist if the pipes and carburetor
remained full of gasoline, and to prevent the sudden cooling of the engine which might
cause serious damage, especially to the valves.
• When the pilot observed that a banca was approaching rapidly on the right hand side of the
plane, he arose signalled and shouted to the boatman to keep his banca at a distance from
the plane, inasmuch as there were waves and quite a strong current, and he feared that the
banca, which had a high prow, might collide with the plane and damage either the wing or
the pontoon thereof.
• While he was doing this, he heard the propeller strike something. He immediately turned
off the switch and, looking on the other side, he saw Bohn picking up the plaintiff out of
the water.
• What really happened was that at the moment the pontoons touched bottom and while the
pilot was signalling to the banca, the plaintiff unfastened the straps around him and, not
even waiting to put on his hat, climbed over the door to the lower wing, went down the
ladder to the pontoon and walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller.
• The propeller first grazed his forehead and, as he threw up his arm, it was caught by the
revolving blades thereof and so injured that it had be amputated.
• Bohn and Garrett of Warner, Barnes & Co. upon seeing the plaintiff walking toward the
propeller, they shouted frantically and motioned to him to keep away from it, but they said
plaintiff took no heed of them.

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 • The usual procedure in discharging passengers from a hydroplane is to wait until the
propeller stops, then turn the plane around by hand so as to have the rear or tail and thereof
towards the beach, and then take the passengers to shore in a banca.
• The Court of First Instance of Manila absolved defendant Philippine Aerial Taxi Co., Inc.,
from the complaint, which was dismissed

ISSUE:
Whether the defendant entity has complied with its contractual obligation to carry the plaintiff-
appellant Teh Le Kim safe and sound to his destination.

RULING:
Yes.

The contract entered into by the plaintiff Teh Le Kim and the defendant entity Philippine Aerial
Taxi Co., Inc., was that upon payment of the price of the passage, which the carrier had received,
the latter would carry the former by air in one of its hydroplanes and put him, safe and sound, on
the beach at Iloilo.

In order to do this, it was necessary to wait for the propeller to stop, turn the rear or tail end of the
plane towards the shore, take the passengers out by the aforesaid rear or tail end thereof, place
them in a banca and take them ashore. By sheer common sense, the plaintiff ought to know that a
propeller, be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane, is dangerous while in motion and that to approach
it is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby. He ought to know furthermore that
inasmuch as the plane was on the water, he had to wait for a banca to take him ashore.
Notwithstanding the shouts and warning signals given him from the shore by the representatives
of the consignee firm, the plaintiff herein, not being a man of ordinary prudence, hastily left the
cabin of the plane, walked along one of the pontoons and directly into the revolving propeller,
while the banca which was to take him ashore was still some distance away and the pilot was
instructing the boatman to keep it at a safe distance from the plane.

Under such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand that the plaintiff-appellant acted with
reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in motion, and when the banca
was not yet in a position to take him. That the plaintiff-appellant's negligence alone was the direct
cause of the accident, is so clear that it is not necessary to cite authoritative opinions to support the
conclusion that the injury to his right arm and the subsequent amputation thereof were due entirely
and exclusively to his own imprudence and not to the slightest negligence attributable to the
defendant entity or to its agents. Therefore, he alone should suffer the consequences of his act.

Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with
the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

FACTS:
• At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano
went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100
meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier.
• He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation
canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to
see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass.
• He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and Javier
admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay for his
soaked palay.
• A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including
the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand,
which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from
Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg
with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.
• Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident.
• Javier was also brought to a physician. They went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health
physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to
Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
• Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence,
on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police
to formalize their amicable settlement
• At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General
Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and
was having convulsions.
• Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
• On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital.
• In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.

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 • Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano
guilty as charged.
o The lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence
of Urbano's unlawful act
o Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's death
• The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but
raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00
o The deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was
due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in
the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
o The proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with
tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all
the consequences of his unlawful act.
• Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was
based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven
o Sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept
Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said
province
o During the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which
irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that
water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced
o Due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals
and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and
ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes
o On November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier
catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions
• Motion was denied
• Petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and
that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and
tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like
tetanus germs.

ISSUE:
Whether the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was the wound inflicted by petitioner

RULING:
No.

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The reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs
at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking
incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should
have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time.

However, the more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the
appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or
a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.

As the Court ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al.

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible,
if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but
for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent
act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the
prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

The petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. However,
the discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather
unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 190022 February 15, 2012

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION, JAPHET ESTRANAS and BEN

SAGA, Petitioners, vs.
PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA, CRESENCIA A. NATIVIDAD,
HECTOR VIZCARA, JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO, Respondents.

FACTS:
• On May 14, 2004, at about three o’clock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was
driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his
companions
• While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR)
train, then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up
and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of
Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel,
sustained serious physical injuries.
• At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing.
Additionally, the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage was poorly maintained. The "Stop"
signage was already faded while the "Listen" signage was partly blocked by another
signboard.
• On September 15, 2004, respondents filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas
and Ben Saga, the alternate driver of the train, before the RTC
o In their complaint, the respondents alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities
and serious physical injuries sustained by the victims of the accident was the
petitioners’ gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures to prevent
injury to persons and properties.
o They pointed out that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon where the accident
happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or bell installed to
warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching train.
• After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated March 20, 2007, ruling in
favor of the respondents
• Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
• Subsequently, on July 21, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming the RTC
decision with modification with respect to the amount of damages awarded to the
respondents
o CA affirmed the RTC’s finding of negligence on the part of the petitioners.
o It concurred with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's failure to install
sufficient safety devices in the area, such as flagbars or safety railroad bars and
signage, was the proximate cause of the accident

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 • Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
recklessness of the driver of the jeepney. In utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by
PNR trains, he failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track
and thoughtlessly followed the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them.
• Respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and the CA that the petitioners' negligence
in maintaining adequate and necessary public safety devices in the area of the accident was
the proximate cause of the mishap.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

RULING:
Yes.

The records bear out that the factual circumstances of the case were meticulously scrutinized by
both the RTC and the CA before arriving at the same finding of negligence on the part of the
petitioners, and we found no compelling reason to disturb the same. Both courts ruled that the
petitioners fell short of the diligence expected of it, taking into consideration the nature of its
business, to forestall any untoward incident.

In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing
the tracks in order to give way to an approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar,
the "Stop, Look and Listen" signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate
to alert the public of the impending danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just
a dilapidated "Stop, Look and Listen" signage, is needed to give notice to the public. It is the
responsibility of the railroad company to use reasonable care to keep the signal devices in working
order. Failure to do so would be an indication of negligence. Having established the fact of
negligence on the part of the petitioners, they were rightfully held liable for damages.

Moreover, there was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents. The Court cannot
see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when they were not even aware of
the forthcoming danger.

It bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately before the collision did not manifest
even the slightest indication of an imminent harm. To begin with, the truck they were trailing was
able to safely cross the track. Likewise, there was no crossing bar to prevent them from proceeding
or, at least, a stoplight or signage to forewarn them of the approaching peril. Thus, relying on his
faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the impending danger. He
proceeded to cross the track and, all of a sudden, his jeepney was rammed by the train being

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operated by the petitioners. Even then, the circumstances before the collision negate the imputation
of contributory negligence on the part of the respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 21, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90021 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Jagolino (3LM2)
G.R. No. 206184 December 6, 2017

SPOUSES ED DANTE LATONIO AND MARY ANN LATONIO and the minor ED
CHRISTIAN LATONIO, Petitioners
vs.
MCGEORGE FOOD INDUSTRIES INC., CEBU GOLDEN FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC.,
and TYKE PHILIP LOMIBAO, Respondents

FACTS:
• On September 17, 2000, the petitioners, spouses Ed Dante and Mary Ann Latonio
accompanied their eight-month-old child Ed Christian to a birthday party at the
McDonald's Restaurant, Ayala Center, Cebu City.
• During the party and as part of the birthday package, McDonald's presented two mascots –
"Birdie" and "Grimace" - to entertain and dance for the guests. Respondent Tyke Philip
Lomibao (Lomibao ) was the person inside the "Birdie" mascot suit.
• After the mascots danced, guests had their pictures taken with them. Intending to have her
child's photo taken with the mascots, Mary Ann placed Ed Christian on a chair in front of
the mascot "Birdie." The mascot positioned itself behind the child and extended its "wings"
to give a good pose for the camera.
• As photos were about to be taken, Mary Ann released her hold of Ed Christian. Seconds
later, the child fell head first from the chair onto the floor.
• At about 9:30 in the evening of the same day, Mary Ann called up Cebu Golden Food to
inform them that their doctor advised them to get an x-ray examination on Ed Christian.
Cebu Golden Food then assured her that they were willing to shoulder the expenses for the
x-ray examination of Ed Christian.
• Later, McDonald’s reimbursed Mary Ann for the expenses incurred relative to the x-ray
examination. It further offered to pay the expenses for the CT scan to be conducted on Ed
Christian.
• However, after declining the offers of McGeorge Food Industries, Inc., licensor of Cebu
Golden Food, to assist in whatever medical attention would be required of Ed Christian,
the Latonios sent a Letter to McGeorge demanding for compensation in the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (₱15,000,000.00).
• As their demand remained unheeded, the Latonios caused the publication of the accident
in the local newspaper, Sun Star Cebu on February 8, 2001 with a headline "Food outlet
sued for ₱9 M damages".
• Simultaneously, the Latonios also instituted a complaint for damages and attorney's fees
against McGeorge.
• On March 3, 2009, the RTC, in Civil Case No. CEB-26126, issued a Decision in favor of
the plaintiffs and against defendants Tyke Philip Lomibao and Cebu Golden Foods, Inc.

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 o Trial court held Cebu Golden Food is liable because the proximate cause of Ed
Christian’s fall is the negligence of their employee, Lomibao.
• Cebu Golden Food and Lomibao filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals-Cebu City.
• On September 28, 2012, in its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's decision and said that the trial court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances
o Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and held that Ed Christian’s
mother, Mary Ann, is liable because the proximate cause of the child's fall was
Mary Ann's act of leaving her eightmonth- old child, Ed Christian, in the "hands"
of Lomibao who was at the time wearing the Birdie mascot costume.

ISSUE:
Whether the proximate cause of Ed Christian’s fall was the negligence of petitioner Mary Ann
Latonia.

RULING:
Yes.

Despite Mary Ann’s insistence that she made sure that her baby was safe and secured before she
released her grasp on Ed Christian, her own testimony revealed that she had, in fact, acted
negligently and carelessly.

As stated by the Court of Appeals:

“It is irresponsible for a mother to entrust the safety, even momentarily, of her eight- month-old
child to a mascot, not to mention a bird mascot in thick leather suit that had no arms to hold the
child and whose diminished ability to see, hear, feel, and move freely was readily apparent.
Moreover, by merely tapping the mascot and saying "papicture ta", Mary Ann Latonio cannot be
said to have "told, informed and instructed the mascot that she was letting the mascot hold the
baby momentarily." Releasing her grasp of the baby without waiting for any indication that the
mascot heard and understood her is just plain negligence on the part of Mary Ann.

To Our mind, what is more in accord with human experience and dictates of reason is that a diligent
mother would naturally ensure first and foremost the safety of her child before releasing her hold
on him. Such is not the case here. Mary Ann Latonio, in placing Ed Christian on a chair and
expecting a bird mascot to ensure the child's safety, utterly failed to observe the degree of diligence
expected of her as a mother of an eight-month- old baby.”

It is beyond dispute that the cause of Ed Christian’s fall is traceable to the negligent act of Mary
Ann of leaving him in the "hands" of Lomibao who was wearing the Birdie mascot suit. However,
it must be stressed that while indeed Lomibao has hands of his own, at the time of the incident he

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was wearing the Birdie mascot suit. Suffice it to say that the Birdie mascot suit have no hands but
instead have wings. Lomibao cannot possibly hold or grasp anything while wearing the thick
Birdie mascot suit. In fact, even if he wanted to hold Ed Christian or anything, he could not
possibly do so because he was wearing the Birdie mascot suit which do not even have hands or
fingers to be able to hold or grasp firmly.

Moreover, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents Cebu Golden Foods and
Lomibao, as well as their management and staff, they cannot be made liable to pay for the damages
prayed for by the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 28, 2012 and Resolution dated
January 31, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03079 are hereby AFFIRMED.

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G.R. No. 173146 November 25, 2009

AGUSAN DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (ANECO), represented by its

Manager ROMEO O. DAGANI, Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELITA BALEN and SPOUSES HERCULES and RHEA LARIOSA, Respondents.

FACTS:
• Petitioner Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO) is a duly organized and
registered consumers cooperative, engaged in supplying electricity in the province of
Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City.
• In 1981, ANECO installed an electric post in Purok 4, Ata-atahon, Nasipit, Agusan del
Norte, with its main distribution line of 13,000 kilovolts traversing Angelita Balen’s
residence.
• Balen’s father, Miguel, protested the installation with the District Engineer’s Office and
with ANECO, but his protest just fell on deaf ears.
• On July 25, 1992, Balen, Hercules Lariosa and Celestino Exclamado were electrocuted
while removing the television antenna (TV antenna) from Balen’s residence. The antenna
pole touched ANECO’s main distribution line which resulted in their electrocution.
• Exclamado died instantly, while Balen and Lariosa suffered extensive third degree burns.
• Respondents Balen and Lariosa (respondents) then lodged a complaint for damages against
ANECO with the RTC of Butuan City.
• After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents and against ANECO
• On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.
o It declared that the proximate cause of the accident could not have been the act or
omission of respondents, who were not negligent in taking down the antenna.
o The proximate cause of the injury sustained by respondents was ANECO’s
negligence in installing its main distribution line over Balen’s residence.
• ANECO, however, denied liability, arguing that the mere presence of the high-tension
wires over Balen’s residence did not cause respondents’ injuries. The proximate cause of
the accident, it claims, was respondents’ negligence in removing the TV antenna and in
allowing the pole to touch the high-tension wires

ISSUE:
Whether the proximate cause of the injury sustained by respondents was ANECO’s negligence in
installing its main distribution line over Balen’s residence

RULING:
Yes.

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The evidence extant in the record shows that the house of Miguel Balen already existed before the
high voltage wires were installed by ANECO above it. ANECO had to follow the minimum
clearance requirement of 3,050 under Part II of the Philippine Electrical Code for the installation
of its main distribution lines above the roofs of buildings or houses. Although ANECO followed
said clearance requirement, the installed lines were high voltage, consisting of open wires, i.e., not
covered with insulators, like rubber, and charged with 13, 200 volts.

Knowing that it was installing a main distribution line of high voltage over a populated area,
ANECO should have practiced caution, care and prudence by installing insulated wires, or else
found an unpopulated area for the said line to traverse. The court a quo correctly observed that
ANECO failed to show any compelling reason for the installation of the questioned wires over
Miguel Balen’s house.

Besides, there is scarcity of evidence in the records showing that ANECO put up the precautionary
sign: "WARNING-HIGH VOLTAGE-KEEP OUT" at or near the house of Miguel Balen as
required by the Philippine Electrical Code for installation of wires over 600 volts.

One of the tests for determining the existence of proximate cause is the foreseeability test, viz.:

“Where the particular harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant’s misconduct,
his act or omission is the legal cause thereof. Foreseeability is the fundamental test of the law of
negligence. To be negligent, the defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an
ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were
unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risk which made the actor’s conduct
negligent, it is obviously the consequence for the actor must be held legally responsible. Otherwise,
the legal duty is entirely defeated. Accordingly, the generalization may be formulated that all
particular consequences, that is, consequences which occur in a manner which was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant at the time of his misconduct are legally caused by his breach of duty”

Thus applying aforecited test, ANECO should have reasonably foreseen that, even if it complied
with the clearance requirements under the Philippine Electrical Code in installing the subject high
tension wires above Miguel Balen’s house, still a potential risk existed that people would get
electrocuted, considering that the wires were not insulated.

Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts’ findings, which are amply substantiated by the
evidence on record, clearly point to ANECO’s negligence as the proximate cause of the damages
suffered by respondents Balen and Lariosa. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this
factual conclusion. In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in sustaining the RTC.

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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66153 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Jagolino (3LM2)