Topic

Sino-India Relationship in 21st century.

Acknowledgement
I would like to express my special gratitude to my professor Barnali
Barman, for providing me with their guidance throughout the assignment,
which has made it possible for me to work dedicatedly and provided me
with required informations whenever needed.
Though, it’s an individual tutorial work but the immense help which I got
from my classmates made me understood the importance of team work. We
helped each other and I guess we all are benefited through this process of
communicating and interacting with each other throughout the tutorial
work. I’m very grateful to them too.
List of contents
• Introduction.
• Historical Background.
• Growing Alliances and Partnership in 21st century.
• Rivalry : Analysis.
• Overview.
• Conclusion.
• Bibliography/Webliography.
Introduction
India and China have been touted by academicians, strategic experts,
economic forecasters, politicians and journalists as the two
emergingpowers of the 21st century. According to Robyn Meredith, the rise
of China and India 'is about a major shift in the post-Cold War
geopolitics,about quenching a growing thirst for oil, and about
massiveenvironmental change. This is tectonic economics: the rise of India
and China has caused the entire earth's economic and political landscape to
shift before our eyes.'1 The elements of national power, as outlined by Hans
Morgenthau, are evidently present in both nation-states, including a large
territory with strategic depth, as well as a huge population which can be
engaged in military pursuits and defence of the country. The classical
elements of national power were corroborated in the last three decades with
the rising economic potential of both countries after they abolished their
respective socialist models of growth to a more market-oriented, capitalist
economic order. Furthermore, both India and China boast of a historical
and old civilizational identity spanning thousands of years. In the 20th
centuiy, relations between India and China have oscillated from congenial
to conflictual, primarily because of strategic conflicts over border areas and
a rivalry over regional supremacy. This factor does not and has not
eliminated the potential forcooperation between the two states and it is an
analysis of the trends of cooperation and conflict in the 21st century
between India and China that the present paper is concerned with.
The analysis of cooperation and conflict between the two states is
exemplified by estimating the variables of regional and global politics. As
far as regional politics is concerned, I will concentrate primarily on
Pakistan as an important factor in the development of India-China
relations. Historically, the enmity between India and China after the 1962
border war was exploited most favourably by Pakistan in order counter
India. Since the 1960s, Pakistan has been courting the friendship of China
and, likewise, any future rapprochement between India (an enemy) and
China (a friend) is bound to be consequential for Pakistani diplomacy as
well as regional power configuration. What are the implications of such a
rapprochement between India and China for Pakistan and the South Asian
region? Will India and China come closer to each other, realizing perhaps
that joint benefits of economic cooperation far outweigh their rivalry over
strategic issues and regional supremacy?
Furthermore, when it comes to global politics, the present paper will take
the role of the United States (US) into consideration. The economic success
of both China and India is dependent on the favourable economic
assistance which the US has provided in terms of access to its domestic
market as well as large-scale investment by American Transnational
Corporations (TNCs). It may be assumed that both India and China will
need the US and that the US will need both India and China in the
foreseeable future. In other words, the logic of economic interaction and
interdependence will continue to define the broad parameters of the India-
China-US nexus. In terms of realpolitik, on the other hand, the US China
relational parameter borders on tension and instability as opposed to the
US-India nexus which is stable and strategically less threatening. The
essential questions remain: What are the implications of rapprochement
between India and China for the US and the structure of the international
system? Will the US instrumentalize India against China (which it
construes as a rising global power challenging American hegemony and
interests) thus hindering the prospects of cooperation between the two
states.
Historical Background
India-China relations have undergone dramatic changes over the pastfive decades,
ranging from benign warmth in the 1950s, deep hostility in the 1960s and 1970s, to a
rapprochement in the 1980s, and a readjustment since the demise of the Soviet Union.2
In the initial years, since the Chinese Communist Revolution, India and China
developed good and cordial relations as neighbours who professed a belief insocialism
as the driving economic policy of growth, however, with different political systems, one
democratic and the other Communist. India was the first among non-Communist
countries to recognize the People's Republic of China, a recognition that was withheld by
the US for almost 22 years. Former Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru
China as a potential partner in the Asian region and in line with this spirit signed the
historic Panchsheel Agreement, promoting peaceful coexistence with his Chinese
counterpart Zhou Enlai in 1954.3 The preamble to the agreement enumerated five
principles of peaceful coexistence, or Panchsheel, as the basis of bilateral and
multilateral relations: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal
affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.
The initial warmth between the two states gave way to rivalry after China utilized brute
force to repress the Buddhists in Tibet, prompting the Dalai Lama to seek refuge and
flee his native place. In a rare gesture of support, India granted asylum to the Dalai
Lama and contravened an important part of the Panchsheel Agreement by interfering in
the internal affairs of China. Whether India’s grant of asylum was a humanitarian
response or part of a policy designed to encircle China as Mao Zedong claimed5,
relations between the two states nosedived and degenerated into a border conflict.
China and India share one of the largest undemarcated and disputed borders in the
world with no treaty ever formally delimiting the disputed boundary, which affects over
125,000 sq kms in three different sectors.6 The three different sectors or areas are: a)
the western sector consisting of the boundary of Ladakh with Xinjiang and Tibet where
both China and India claim the Aksai Chin plateau; b) the eastern sector comprising the
boundary between Tibet and India’s North-East Frontier Agency where India claimed
that the boundary ran along the McMahon Line, which China contested, and c) the
central sector where a dispute exists along the boundary between Tibet and the Indian
provinces of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.
Here an interesting matter of fact requires mentioning. As tensions between India and
China escalated in the wake of the former’s grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama and the
latter’s increased assertiveness over the undemarcated border regions, the Indian army
braced itself for a future war with China. Chief of Army Staff General Subayya
Thimayya, envisaged China as a threat to India and was perceptibly more influenced by
the former president of Pakistan Ayub Khan’s proposal for joint defence arrangements
between India and Pakistan to counter China.
However, the civilian leadership under prime minister Nehru and defence minister
Krishna Menon disagreed for they anticipated wrongly that China would not go to war
with India. When the war came in 1962, General Thimayya was proved right and the
entire civilian leadership gravely discredited. The India-China border war was “brutal,
nasty and short’ resulting in a resounding military success for the Chinese and a major
heartbreak for Nehru, who perhaps did not withstand the pains accruing from the war
and passed away two years later in 1964. The border war intensified India-China rivalry
and the ‘enemy’ image came to define relations between the two states. Further
developments, such as the Chinese acquisition of the nuclear weapon in 1964 and
India’s role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 as well as its own nuclear
weapons test in 1974, strained India-China relations. However, by the end of the 1970s,
a change in the mutual relationship was witnessed, primarily due to China’s growing
and increased association with, and its entry into, the US dominated global capitalist
economy. The pragmatism that the Chinese displayed under Deng Xiaoping overturned
the essential basis of their socialist order and philosophy and also signalled a sea change
in their diplomacy. Under Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the Communist Party, China
demonstrated its restraint and non-involvement in inter-South Asian conflicts (such as
Kashmir or the problems of the Sri Lankan Tamils or the dispute over the Ganges water
between Bangladesh and India or questions such as Assam and Punjab) and also a
recognition for the first time that it might be counter-productive to build South Asian
relationships ignoring India or at the cost of India.9 Border skirmishes were witnessed,
though, during the 1980s, when armed clashes occurred in the Sumdorong Chu area of
the disputed eastern sector of the border.10 Furthermore, in 1986, China protested
when India granted full statehood to Arunachal Pradesh and disapproved India’s claim
that Arunachal Pradesh (formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency) formed an
integral part of its territory.
Fortunately, a full-scale war was averted thanks to political sagacity, as well as to the
mutual restraint shown by both sides. India-China relations gained a boost with the visit
of the former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in December 1988. During
his meetings with China’s senior leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, Gandhi emphasized
the promotion of ‘peaceful and friendly ties between India and China on the basis of the
doctrine of peaceful coexistence. The joint press communiqué which was issued at the
end of the meeting outlined the fundamental elements of how the two states were
engaging with each other and abandoning the hostility that had marred their relations
since the border war. As far as the border conflict was concerned, the two sides agreed to
settle the issue through peaceful and friendly consultations as well as to develop their
relations actively in other fields. On the issue of Tibet, the Indian government reiterated
that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities
would not be permitted on Indian soil.Finally, expressing the change in Cold War
politics that was manifesting itself in 1988 with the US and Soviet Union coming closer
to each other, both India and China held the common view that
‘confrontation was giving way to dialogue and tension to relaxation.’ The changed
atmosphere in mutual ties was strengthened further during the post-Cold War era with
the former prime minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to China in September 1993 which led
to the signing of an important agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity
along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border areas. It provided for regular
meetings and consultations between defence personnel, such as local commanders, as
well as verifiable Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and procedures including
advance notice of military manoeuvres and mechanisms for handling possible air
intrusions on either side to obviate inadvertent conflict.16 Narasimha Rao’s visit was
reciprocated in 1996 when the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited India,
which, in essence, was the first visit by a head of state from China to India. The visit
resulted in an agreement on CBMs in the Military Field along the LAC. Furthermore,
Indians noted with relief that China no longer endorsed Pakistan's position on
Kashmir,urged a bilateral dispute and peaceful resolution to the dispute.
Growing alliances and
partnership in 21st century
After a growing realization of the realities of the post-Cold War era,mutual relations were
strengthened further in the war on terror. There was a temporary lull in relations after the
Indian nuclear tests of 1998 when the BJP-led government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and
defenceminister George Fernandes labelled China as a potential source of threat but relations
were normalized after external affairs minister Jaswant Singh's visit to China in June 1999. In
the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, the former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji paid a five-
daystate visit to India from 14 to 18 January 2002. The visit also came at a time when relations
between Pakistan and India were on an all-time low after the terrorist attack on the Indian
parliament in December 2001.
The Chinese government was quick in strongly condemning the terrorist attack and reiterated
the Chinese position that the India-Pakistan dispute should be resolved through
negotiations.India-China relations were given a further boost with the former prime minster
Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China in June 2003. Vajpayee reiterated the growing sense of
linkage between the two countries by stating that, 'the world around us has changed
dramatically.... As two of the world's largest and most populous developing countries, India and
China should remain in close touch on global issues of concern to developing countries.'20
During Vajpayee's visit, the two sides signed the Declaration on Principles for Relations and
Comprehensive Cooperation which emphasized, among other things, the promotion of
exchanges in culture, education, science and technology, media, youth and people-to-people
relations. The two sides agreed to set up cultural centres in each other's capitals and facilitate
their establishment. Both sides also agreed to work towards the enhancement of direct air and
shipping links, tourism, exchange hydrological data in the flood season on common rivers,
cooperation in agriculture, dairy, food processing, health and other sectors. As far as the border
dispute was concerned, India and China signed an agreement on the 'Political Parameters and
Guiding Principles for Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question' whilst Premier Wen
Jiabao was in Delhi in April 2005.
Article I of the agreement stipulated: 'The differences on the boundary question should not be
allowed to affect the overall development of bilateral relations. The two sides will resolve the
boundary question through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or
threaten to use force against the other by any means.'22 The agreement further noted that the
'two sides will give due consideration to each other's strategic and reasonable interests, and the
principle of mutual and equal security' and that 'within the agreed framework of the final
boundary settlement, the delineation of the boundary will be carried out utilizing means such as
modern cartographic and surveying practices and joint surveys. India-China ties were cemented
further through economic exchanges which served to augment interdependence between the two
states. China emerged as India's largest trading partner, replacing the US, in the April 2008-
February 2009 period. During his visit to India in 2002, the former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji
said that together India and China could dominate the world's information technology markets.
"You are number one in terms of software, we are number one in terms of hardware...together
we can make the world's number one Bilateral trade between the two countries hit 60 billion
dollars in 2010 and by 2050, the two nations are tipped to be the world's two leading
economies.
In 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao visited India accompanied by some 400 Chinese business leaders,
the largest team of business leaders ever to visit India and a delegation which was much larger
than those headed by leaders of the US and UK. During the visit, India and China agreed upon a
new 100 billion dollars trade target by 2015 as well as measures topromote greater Indian
exports to China to reduce India's trade deficit. The growing India-China political, economic and
cultural exchanges andcooperation signify a radical transformation in ties as compared to the
1960s and 1970s. Though India and China need each other as economic partners of substance, a
geostrategic rivalry between the two is evident as well. The next two sections detail the
intricacies of an incipient and (asof now) contained geostrategic rivalry between the two by
focusing on regional politics (Pakistan) and global politics.
Rivalry : Analysis
Stand-Off.
There have been brief stand-offs between the two militaries since 1962; the most significant
taking place in 1986, when India mobilised 200,000 troops to the region and one that ended
typically with the negotiation of a diplomatic process. The border defence cooperation
agreement signed in 2013 is just the latest manifestation of the repetitive practice that has been
dragging on for 20 years with no promise of significant compromise by either side.

The entrenched views are illustrated by both states with Prime Minister Modi pledging to
defend the disputed territories and China publishing a map incorporating them to its own.
These tensions are further reflected in a poll, which found that 72 per cent of Indians were
fearful the issue could spark conflict

Strategic Hedging.
China supports Pakistan; a rival and security concern for India. From 2007 to 2011 64 per cent
of Chinese military exports went to Pakistan. When US and India finalised a civilian nuclear deal
in 2008, China also announced an agreement to help expand Pakistan’s nuclear capability.
India, in a similar fashion, has been expanding its diplomatic network into South East Asia.
Alongside recent moves to deepen defence and energy ties, India also pledged to
support Vietnam in national defence in 2013. In addition, India has formed close relations with
Japan; itself currently engaged in maritime disputes with China.

By aligning itself with China’s regional competitors, India’s strategic hedging implies a different
path than its traditional position of non-alignment, as the 1962 war with China that left India
without allies or support showed that this strategy may have been a mistake. Its current
attempts at establishing partnership appear to be directed towards overcoming the past
isolation

Maritime Competition
Roughly 89 per cent of China’s energy is sourced via the Indian Ocean, which also channels 93
per cent of India’s oil. This indicates that competition—but not conflict itself—may be inevitable.
Control of the Indian Ocean has long been equated to the ‘domination of Asia’; a characteristic
attributed to the US. The fact that the US spends roughly 77 per cent of its defence budget in
Asia—while China spends seven and India four per cent—indicates that China’s primary concern
in the Indian Ocean is not India, but the US.
China and India have competing territorial and maritime claims with competition being the
governing principle in Sino-Indian relations. However, the rise in their respective military
capabilities does not provide a likely indicator for future likelihood of conflict. In fact, both
countries have indicated a willingness to resolve border disputes in the most recent BRICS
summit in Brazil on July. China also holds a surprisingly good record of conflict resolution with
regards to land border disputes, having resolved 12 of its 14 boundary disputes with neighbours.

For the time being, China is more concerned with the US power in the region while India is
developing its own foothold in the Indian Ocean. And even though both countries’ track records
prove unlikely to provide a permanent solution, both India and China are likely to avoid
immediate conflict.
Overview
In 2000, Indian President K R Narayanan visited China on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and India.

In 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji visited India. Both sides agreed to enhance mutual
understanding and trust and promote exchanges and cooperation in various fields.

In 2003, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China. The two sides signed The
Declaration on the Principles and Comprehensive Cooperation in China-India Relations,
and agreed to establish the special representatives meeting mechanism on India-China
boundary question.

In 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao visited India. China and India signed the Joint Statement
and declared the establishment of the strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and
prosperity. The two sides welcomed signing of the Agreement on the Political
Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary
Question.

In 2006, President Hu Jintao visited India. The two sides signed a Joint Declaration to
formulate the ten-pronged strategy for deepening the strategic and cooperative
partnership.

In 2008, Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh visited China. "A Shared Vision for
the 21st Century" was agreed upon by the two governments.

In 2010, Indian President Patil visited China in May, which coincided with the 60th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and India. In
December, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India and the two sides issued a Joint
Communiqué.

2011 was the "China-India Exchange Year". Both sides held a series of people-to-people
and cultural exchange activities, and signed a memorandum on joint compilation for the
"Encyclopedia of India-China Cultural Contacts". A 500-member Indian youth
delegation visited China.
2012 was the “Year of China-India Friendship and Cooperation”. President Hu Jintao
and Premier Wen Jiabao met with Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh
respectively on the sidelines of the 4th BRICS Summit and the United Nations
Conference on Sustainable Development. A 500-member Chinese youth delegation
visited India.

In 2013, President Xi Jinping met with Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh on
the sidelines of the 5th BRICS Summit in Durban, South Africa in March. Premier Li
Keqiang visited India in May and the two sides released a Joint Statement. Prime
Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited China in October.

2014 is the "China-India Friendly Exchange Year". In September, President Xi Jinping

paid a state visit to India and visited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's home state
of Gujarat. The two sides issued Joint Statement on Building a Closer Developmental
Partnership. In the same year, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang met with
Prime Minister Modi respectively on the sidelines of the 6th BRICS Summit and the
Leaders' Meetings on East Asia Cooperation in Myanmar.

In 2015, Indian Prime Minister Modi visited China and went to President Xi Jinping's
hometown Xi'an. In the same year, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang met
with Prime Minister Modi respectively on the sidelines of the 7th BRICS Summit in Ufa
and the Leaders' Meetings on East Asia Cooperation in Malaysia. China decided to open
the Nathu La Pass to Indian official pilgrims to Xizang. India celebrated the India
Tourism Year in China.

In 2016, Indian President Mukherjee visited China. Prime Minister Modi visited China
to attend the G20 Summit in Hangzhou and met with President Xi Jinping on the
sidelines. President Xi Jinping visited India to participate in the 8th BRICS Summit in
Goa and met with Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines. China celebrated China
Tourism Year in India.

In 2017, President Xi Jinping met with Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines of the SCO
Summit in Astana. Prime Minister Modi visited China to attend the 9th BRICS Summit
in Xiamen and met with President Xi Jinping on the sidelines.

In 2018, President Xi Jinping held an informal meeting with Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi in Wuhan. They had in-depth discussions and reached broad consensus
on the overarching, long-term and strategic issues of global and bilateral importance and
their respective visions for national development as well as domestic and foreign
policies. The informal meeting set up a new model of exchanges between two leaders
and became a milestone in the history of bilateral relations. In the same year, Prime
Minister Modi visited China to attend the SCO Summit in Qingdao and met with
President Xi Jinping on the sidelines. The two leaders met again on the sidelines of the
10th BRICS Summit and the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires later in the year.

In 2019, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi held the second informal
meeting in Chennai, reaffirmed the Wuhan consensus and agreed to build a closer
partnership for development, enhance the in-depth strategic communication, promote
mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, and advance exchanges and mutual
learning between the two civilizations. In the same year, President Xi Jinping met with
Prime Minister Modi on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Bishkek and the 11th
BRICS Summit.

2020 marks the year of the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations
between China and India. It is also China-India Year of Cultural and People-to-People
Exchanges. The two sides agreed to hold 70 celebratory activities to demonstrate the
historic connection between the two civilizations as well as their growing bilateral
relationship over the years, and further deepen people-to-people exchanges between the
two countries at all levels, including between their respective legislatures, businesses,
academics, cultural and youth organizations as well as the defense forces.
Conclusion
A liberal-optimist view of India-China relations in the 21st century would point to how economic
interdependence is fostering and will foster the development of friendly, good neighbourly
relations between the two countries based on mutual benefit and trust. This was expressed
through the term 'Chindia' first coined by India's politician Jairam denote the emerging
economic prowess of India and China.
According to this viewpoint, ‘China is the ‘world factory^ with advantages in manufacturing,
agriculture and special zones construction. And India, as the ‘world office’, has strong points in
information technology, software in particular, pharmaceuticals and the service industry.’44
Both India and China share a complementarity that can exude great benefits for the people of
the two countries. However, as trends indicate, the present volume of trade between the two
countries is tilted in favour of China, a concern which has been voiced repeatedly by the Indian
government. Though China is India’s largest trading partner, the same is not the case for China
which trades more with the US, South Korea and Japan as compared to India. On the other
hand, a realist-pessimist view of India and China borders on the emerging development of a
regional rivalry and yet unresolved border tensions. In this regard, China’s recent
announcement of opening its first military base in the Indian Ocean in the Seychelles is viewed
by India as China’s policy of ‘strategic encirclement.’
Moreover, the India China-Pakistan-US nexus points to how all four states are tied together in a
complex security structure which involves both bandwagoning and balancing, or in other words,
engagement and containment. Pakistan China relations annoyed India; India-US relations irked
China. The US sees India as an effective counterweight against China while China views
Pakistan as an important strategic ally against India, especially if the latter continues to ally
closely with the US. Finally, both India and China as political, economic and military powers
could contribute to the emergence of a multipolar global order and stand in opposition to the
US. However, the reality (for now) is that both states need the US and until that time, the
possibility of global realignment of political power remain bleak.
Bibliography
• Neighbours, Major Powers And Indian Foreign Policy by
Aneek Chatterjee. Published by Orient BlackSwan, 2017.

Webliography
• https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325544980_India-
China_Relations_in_the_21st_Century_Impact_on_Regional_and_Global_Politics
• https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/china-india-relations-twenty-first-century-
decoding-border-disputes-critical
• https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/china-india-relations-twenty-first-century-
decoding-border-disputes-critical