Unit 3: India’s Engagements with China (6 lectures)

Introduction
The relation between India and China is widely regarded as one of the central pillars of global
politics. The two Asian giants, India and China share much in common such as the
Himalayas, ancient civilization, colonial past, current challenges and future potentials. The
emergence of India and China was termed as the greatest events of the 20th century. China
and India are two of the oldest civilizations of the world. India was the first non communist
country to apprehend the Peopleís Republic of China in 1949 and started diplomatic relations
with China. Recently, India and China marked the year 2020 as the 70th anniversary of
diplomatic relations.
The significance of India and China relationship can be captured by some facts and figures.
Today India and China are the second and first largest populated countries in the world
respectively. China and India are the first and third largest GDP on PPP basis respectively.
Militarily, the two have the largest and the third largest standing armies. Both India and
China have nuclear weapons capability. These facts and figures speak about the significance
of India and China reationship.

Q. Discuss India-China relations in the post-Cold War era.

 Even before Independence, India’s relation with China has been a harmonious
one.
 Indian National Congress had also expressed its full support to the National
Liberation Movement in China.
 India gained Independence in 1947 and the Chinese Communist Party came to
power in 1949.
 Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister of India and Zhou Enlai, the then
Premier of China, signed the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954 which laid down the
five principles of peaceful co-existence.
 Despite the signing of the Panchsheel, Indo-China relations soon started to
deteriorate at the end of 1950s when China occupied Tibet.
 There were minor armed clashes between both the countries, but soon after, on
20 October 1962 a full scale war broke out over the issue of international border
claims between the two countries.
 The visits of the Indian President in 1992 and the Prime Minister in 1993 to China
focussed on improving the relations between the two nations.
 An agreement was signed in September 1993 to solve boundary disputes through
dialogues.
 However, China has continuously tried to illegally occupy Indian territory in
Eastern Laddakh and Arunachal Pradesh.

India-China relations in the post-Cold War era have been

characterized by a complex mix of cooperation, competition, and
occasional tensions. Let's discuss the key aspects of India-China
relations during this period:
1. Normalization of Relations:
Following the end of the Cold War, India and China sought to
normalize their relations and enhance bilateral cooperation.
In 1993, both countries signed the Agreement on the
Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of
 Actual Control (LAC), aimed at preventing border disputes.
Diplomatic engagements increased, and high-level visits
between leaders became more frequent.
2. Economic Engagement:
Economic ties between India and China have expanded
significantly in the post-Cold War era. Bilateral trade has
grown substantially, making China India's largest trading
partner. Both countries have sought to enhance economic
cooperation through initiatives such as the India-China
Strategic Economic Dialogue. However, the trade imbalance
in favor of China has remained a concern for India.
3. Border Disputes and Tensions:
Border disputes have been a longstanding issue in India-
China relations. The most significant dispute centers around
the undemarcated and disputed border areas, which led to a
brief but intense military conflict in 1962. While both
countries have made efforts to resolve the border issue
through negotiations, reaching a comprehensive resolution
remains a challenge. Tensions along the border have
periodically flared up, such as the Doklam standoff in 2017
and the border clashes in the Galwan Valley in 2020.
4. Regional Dynamics and Competition:
India and China have been competing for influence in the
region, particularly in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has raised concerns in
India due to its strategic implications and potential
encirclement of India. China's close ties with Pakistan,
including its support for infrastructure projects in Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir, have also strained India-China relations.
5. Multilateral Engagements:
Both India and China are active participants in multilateral
forums such as the United Nations, BRICS, and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). While they often cooperate
on global issues, differences emerge on various fronts,
including India's bid for permanent membership in the UN
Security Council and China's assertive stance in the South
China Sea.
6. Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges:
Efforts have been made to enhance cultural and people-to-
people exchanges between India and China. Educational and
cultural exchanges, tourism, and the promotion of yoga and
meditation have contributed to mutual understanding and
goodwill. However, people-to-people contacts have been
affected by occasional tensions and border disputes.
 7. Strategic Competition and Geopolitical Shifts:
India's growing strategic partnership with the United States
and its alignment with like-minded countries in the Indo-
Pacific region have added a new dimension to India-China
relations. China's expanding influence and assertive actions
in the region, coupled with its growing military capabilities,
have raised concerns in India and led to a recalibration of
India's strategic posture.
In summary, India-China relations in the post-Cold War era have
been characterized by efforts to normalize relations, economic
engagement, border disputes, regional competition, multilateral
engagements, cultural exchanges, and geopolitical shifts. While
there have been instances of cooperation, tensions and
disagreements persist, particularly related to border disputes,
regional influence, and strategic competition. Managing these
challenges and finding common ground remains crucial for
maintaining stability and promoting cooperation between the two
countries.

Q. The Indo-Sino relationship is characterized by a high level of conflict and

cooperation. Discuss.
Q. Examine the areas of conflict and cooperation in the India-China relations.
Q. Discuss major challenges confronting the India-China relationship.
India-China relations encompass both areas of conflict and
cooperation. Let's examine these aspects in detail:
Areas of Conflict:
1. Border Disputes: The unresolved border issue remains a
significant source of conflict between India and China. The
two countries have differing perceptions of the Line of Actual
Control (LAC), resulting in occasional border incursions and
tensions. The 1962 Sino-Indian War and subsequent military
clashes, such as the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the
Galwan Valley clash in 2020, highlight the persistent conflict
along the border.
2. Geopolitical Competition: India and China compete for
influence in the region, particularly in South Asia and the
Indian Ocean. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) raises
concerns in India due to its strategic implications, including
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. This competition for regional
dominance has the potential to create friction and conflicts
of interest.
 3. Regional Alliances: India's strategic partnerships with
countries like the United States, Japan, and Australia, as well
as its participation in initiatives such as the Quad
(Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), are viewed with suspicion
by China. China sees these alliances as attempts to contain
its rise and limit its influence in the region, leading to
heightened tensions and competition.
4. Trade Imbalance and Market Access: India has raised
concerns about the significant trade imbalance in favor of
China. Indian industries have expressed concerns about
market access issues, including non-tariff barriers and a lack
of a level playing field. These trade-related disputes have led
to conflicts and strained economic relations between the two
countries.
Areas of Cooperation:
1. Economic Engagement: Despite trade imbalances, India and
China have substantial economic ties. Bilateral trade has
grown significantly, and both countries have expressed a
desire to enhance economic cooperation. Chinese
investments in sectors such as infrastructure,
manufacturing, and technology in India have increased,
contributing to economic cooperation.
2. Multilateral Forums: India and China cooperate in various
multilateral forums, including the BRICS (Brazil, Russia,
India, China, South Africa) grouping, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). They often find
common ground on global issues like climate change,
sustainable development, and reforming international
institutions.
3. Cultural Exchanges and People-to-People Contacts: Efforts
have been made to enhance cultural and people-to-people
exchanges between India and China. Educational
collaborations, tourism, and the promotion of yoga and
meditation have contributed to mutual understanding and
goodwill.
4. Counterterrorism Cooperation: India and China have
cooperated in counterterrorism efforts, particularly within
the framework of the SCO. They have shared intelligence
and conducted joint military exercises to address common
security concerns related to terrorism and extremism.
5. Health and Pandemic Cooperation: The COVID-19 pandemic
highlighted the need for cooperation between India and
China. Despite initial tensions related to the outbreak, both
 countries collaborated on medical assistance, sharing
information, and supporting global efforts to combat the
pandemic.
It is important to note that while there are areas of cooperation,
conflicts and tensions persist in several key areas of the India-
China relationship. The resolution of border disputes, addressing
trade imbalances, and managing geopolitical competition remain
significant challenges for both countries. Constructive dialogue
and efforts to build trust are vital to promote cooperation and
manage conflicts between India and China.

The recent developments in India-China relations have raised concerns about

the possibility of a future conflict between the two nations. The use of Sun
Tzu's philosophy of winning without fighting has also been questioned, with
others arguing that China is preparing for war.

India and China's strained relationship has been fueled by recent Chinese
provocations, including the allocation of names to places in Arunachal
Pradesh, denial of visas to Indian media personnel, and President's
statements on preparing for war. These events have led to concerns about
China's intentions and the need for India to be prepared for any eventualities.

In this context, India's defence preparedness has come under scrutiny, with
the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence highlighting the need for
urgent modernisation of the armed forces.

What are the Key Disputes between India- China

Relations?
 Border Disputes:
o Western Sector (Ladakh):
 The Johnson Line proposed by the
British placed Aksai Chin in the
princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir.
 China rejected the Johnson Line and
favored the McDonald
Line, asserting control over Aksai
Chin.
 Though Aksai Chin is administered
by China, India’s official position on
the issue is that, by virtue of it
 being a part of Jammu and Kashmir
(Ladakh), the region remains an
integral part of India.
o Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and
Uttarakhand):
 The Middle Sector has a relatively
minor dispute, with India and China
exchanging maps where they
broadly agree on the LAC.
o Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and
Sikkim):
 China considers the McMahon
Line illegal and unacceptable
claiming that Tibetan
representatives who had signed the
1914 Convention held in Shimla
which delineated the McMahon Line
on the map did not have the right
to do so.
 Border Incursions:
o The border between India and China is not
clearly demarcated throughout and there is
no mutually agreed Line of Actual Control
(LAC) along certain stretches.
o Border confrontations have occurred in
different instances, including Demchok in
2014, Depsang in 2015, Doklam in 2017,
and the Galwan incident in 2020.

 Water Sharing:
o China's advantageous geographical
positioning creates an asymmetry that
allows it to capitalize on the reliance of
downstream nations, such as India, on
hydrological data.
 o There are concerns over China's dam-
building activities on transboundary rivers,
including the Brahmaputra, which have led
to tensions over water-sharing issues.
 Tibet Issue:
o India hosts the Tibetan government-in-exile
and spiritual leader the Dalai Lama, which
has been a point of contention with China.
o China accuses India of supporting Tibetan
separatism, while India maintains that it
respects the "One China" policy but allows
the Tibetan community to reside in India.
 Trade Imbalance:
o India’s trade deficit with China reached the
historically high level of USD 87 billion in
2022.
o Complex regulatory requirements,
intellectual property rights violations, and a
lack of transparency in business dealings
present challenges for Indian businesses
seeking access to the Chinese market.
 Concerns over Belt and Road Initiative (BRI):
o India's main objection to the BRI is that it
includes the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), which passes through the
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), a territory
that India claims as its own.
o India also argues that the BRI projects
should respect the international norms, rule
of law, and financial sustainability, and
should not create debt traps or
environmental and social risks for the host
countries.

What are the Causes of the India-China Conflict?

The Dispute: India-China relations have gone through cycles of conflict and cooperation over
nearly 75 years.
The most serious recent episodes of conflict were in Galwan Valley in Ladakh in 2020 and
in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh in 2022.
Observers on both sides of the border—the Line of Actual Control (LAC)—agree that the
number of serious military confrontations has increased since 2013.
No Clear Demarcation: The border between India and China is not clearly demarcated
throughout and there is no mutually agreed Line of Actual Control (LAC) along certain
stretches.
LAC came into existence after the 1962 Indo China war.
India-China border is divided into three sectors.
Western Sector : Ladakh
Middle Sector : Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand
Eastern Sector: Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim
Partnerships with each other's main enemies, including the Soviet Union/Russia and the
United States, have prevented them from becoming strategic partners and cooperating on
strategic matters.
The growing power gap between China and India, with China's GDP being five times that of
India's, has made it difficult for India to be accommodative without appearing to surrender.
Infrastructure build-up, particularly in Tibet, has led to a security dilemma in which military
relations go into a spiral that could tempt one side or both to go to war.

Q. Discuss the impact of the conflictual relationship with China on India's regional
politics in South Asia.
Q. Write an essay on India-China border disputes and trade relations.
Q. How the border dispute with China is posing a major challenge to India-China
bilateral relations? Discuss.
India shares 3,488km of border with China that runs along. The India-China
borders can be broken down into three sectors.

1. Western Sector – DISPUTED – This comprises the Aksai Chin

sector. This region which originally was a part of the state of
Jammu and Kashmir is claimed by China as part of its autonomous
Xinjiang region. After the 1962 war, it was administered by China.
It is the second largest Indo-China border area covering over
38000 sq. km. However, it is an uninhabited land. While India
claims the entire Aksai Chin territory as well as the Shaksgam
valley (Indian territory gifted to China by Pakistan-See Note),
China contests Indian control over Daulat Beg Oldi (a tehsil in Leh,
south of Aksai China is believed to host the world’s highest
airstrip)

Note: Sino-Pakistani Border Agreement: China and Pakistan

have an agreement known as the Sino-Pakistani border
agreement, which cedes a part of the Pakistani-administered
Kashmir region, Shaksgam Valley, to China. India has raised
concerns about this agreement, as it affects its claims in the
region.

2. Central Sector – UNDISPUTED – Although China has

recognized India’s sovereignty over Sikkim and had initiated the
trade at Nathu La pass, the Doklam fiasco could mean trouble at
all ends.

3. Eastern Sector – DISPUTED – The Arunachal Pradesh border

that China still claims to be its territory is the largest disputed
area, covering around 90000 sq. km. It was formally called the
North East Frontier Agency. During the 1962 war, the People’s
Liberation Army occupied it but they announced a unilateral
ceasefire and withdrew respecting the international boundary
(McMahon Line). However, it has continued to assert its claim
over the territory. Nowadays, almost the whole of Arunachal is
claimed by China. (Note: This is the reason why the visit of Dalai
Lama to Tawang Monastery became such a contentious bilateral
issue)

The two nations have held on to their

Johnson Line vs McDonald Line-
stands even on the Johnson line and McDonald line which
demarcates the territories of the two.

 Johnson Line – India’s accepted demarcation – It marks

Aksai Chin as an Indian territory
 McDonald Line – China’s stance – It marks Aksai Chin as
a Chinese territory

The India-China War of 1962

 The pretext of the war was a dispute over the

sovereignty of the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.
  But, in reality, there were many reasons and the
prominent one was China’s perception of India as a
threat to its rule of Tibet.
 The war was preceded by various conflicts and military
incidents between India and China throughout the
summer of 1962.
 Then on October 20, 1962, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) of China invaded India in Ladakh and across the
McMahon line in Arunachal Pradesh.
 Until the start of the war, India was confident that a war
would not happen and made little preparations.
 After a month-long War, China unilaterally declared a
ceasefire on 19 November 1962. By then China had
made significant advances on both fronts. India
suffered a huge setback and was badly defeated.
 China achieved its objective of acquiring control in the
Aksai Chin. In the eastern sector, their troops went back
to the north of the McMahon line.

India-China border conflicts after the war

 There have been several instances of Chinese troops

entering the Indian side and Indian troops entering the
Chinese side.
 Still, the Indo-China border has remained largely
peaceful, except in 1967 when there were two incidents
of armed conflict first at Nathu La and then at Cho La.
 The 1975 Sikkim merger, when Sikkim became an
Indian state, led to changes in the eastern sector.
 The 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish in the Sumdorong Chu
Valley in Arunachal Pradesh.
 The 2017 Doklam standoff, was a military standoff
involving India, China, and Bhutan in the Doklam
plateau, near the tri-junction of the three countries.
What is the Doklam issue?

 The offensive stand of China on Doko La (Doklam) and

India’s strong warning in return, is the latest addition to
the worries that spoil Indo-China relations.
 It started when India (Indian Army) objected to road
construction by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of
China in the Doklam plateau which China claims to be a
part of its Donglang region. However, India and Bhutan
recognize it as Doklam, a Bhutan territory.
 Later, China accused Indian troops of entering its
territory and India accused the Chinese of destroying its
bunkers (People’s Liberation Army bulldozed an old
bunker of the Indian army stationed in Doklam).
 Thereafter China stopped the passage of pilgrims
heading toward Kailash-Mansarovar through the Nathu
La pass, Sikkim. The route is a better alternative to the
Lepu Lekh route via Uttarakhand and was opened for
pilgrims in 2015.
 Hereafter, both India and China increased the presence
of their troops and since then there has been a war of
words especially from the Chinese state media.
 Although a military standoff was averted, diplomatic
negotiations have not yielded many results to cool off
the passions across the border.
Why is Doklam so critical?

 Doklam (Zhoglam or Droklam or Donglang) is a narrow

plateau lying in the tri-junction of India, China, and
Bhutan.
 China believes Doklam to be a disputed territory
between Bhutan and China.
 It, therefore, contests the presence of the Indian army in
the region as a transgression.
 The disputed region is very close to India’s Siliguri
Corridor which connects the seven northeastern states
to the Indian mainland.

Why is India supporting Bhutan in the Doklam issue?

Bhutan and India have a very cordial relationship as Bhutan and
China do not have formal relations.

 Bhutan has a very strategic position considering India’s

geography.
 To foster the relationship, India and Bhutan signed a
‘Friendship Treaty’ in 2007 that commits India to protect
Bhutan’s interests and the close coordination between
the two militaries.
 Also, India is worried that if the road is completed, it will
give China greater access to India’s strategically
vulnerable “chicken’s neck” (Siliguri Corridor) that links
the seven northeastern states to the Indian mainland.
Agreements and initiatives to resolve the border disputes

1. Shimla Agreement of 1914: To demarcate the boundary

between Tibet and North East India, a convention was held at
Shimla in 1914, representatives of all three i.e. Tibet, China, and
British India. After the discussion, the agreement was signed by
British India and Tibet but not by the Chinese officials. Presently
India recognizes the McMahon line, as agreed by the Shimla
convention, as the legal boundary between India and China.
However, China rejected the Shimla agreement and the McMahon
line, contending that Tibet was not a sovereign state and
therefore did not have the power to conclude treaties.

2. Panchsheel Agreement of 1954: The Panchsheel doctrine

indicated the willingness to ‘Respect each other’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity’. Although we have come a long way since,
from the 1962 war to the cold peace era of 1962-1989, to the
revived tensions of the present, the intent of the doctrine was
well directed. It must have acted as a safeguard against any such
disputes arising in the first place.

3. In 1989, India formed a Joint Working Group for

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and agreed to
mutually settle all border disputes.

4. India-China Agreements regarding the Line of Actual

Control (LAC): The LAC is the effective military border that
separates Indian-controlled areas of Jammu and Kashmir from
Aksai Chin. It is to be noted that this border is not a legally
recognized international boundary, but rather it is a practical
boundary. Conventionally, India considers the Johnson line of
1865, marked by a civil servant W.H. Johnson, which put Aksai
Chin in Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, China recognizes
the Macartney-Macdonald Line as the actual boundary which puts
Aksai Chin in the Xinjiang region of China. In 1993, when the then
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited China, ‘The Agreement
for Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the
LAC‘ was signed between India and China. In 1996 an agreement
took place on confidence-building measures in the military
field along the LAC.

5. In 2003 India and China signed a Declaration on Principles

for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation and also
mutually decided to appoint Special Representatives to
explore the framework of a boundary settlement from the political
perspective. The India-China relations received a major boost in
2003. China recognized India’s sovereignty over Sikkim. This
was also followed by a framework of Guiding principles and
political parameters to improve bilateral ties. It proposed a three-
step resolution to the border disputes:
a. A bilateral agreement on the laid down principles.
b. This was to be followed by an exchange of maps between the
two countries.
c. Once satisfied with the markings, the final demarcation of
borders was to take place.

6. In 2005 a protocol was agreed on Modalities for the

implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military
field along the LAC.

7. In 2012 India and China agreed on the establishment of a

working mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India
China borders.

The policies have not sufficed in realizing a solution to the long-

standing disputes. A status quo exists owing to the face-off
between the differential aspirations of the two nations. While
China’s support for the resolution of border disputes stands
subservient to the Tibet issue, India would continue to hold on to
the Tibet card unless the border disputes are resolved.
Besides, the changing global and regional picture – from China’s
move towards ‘assertive regionalism’, it is strengthening ties with
Pakistan and its complete disregard for counter-opinions on
contentious issues like the South-China Sea – has only worsened
the chances of a quick resolution.

Is the Indian border ready to face challenges?

 India is far ahead of what it was in 1962, both militarily

as well as infra-structurally. However, to undermine
China would be to relive the fallacies that led to the
1962 war.
 The ‘Theory of asymmetry’ does not hold ground when
dealing with China. Therefore, a rational policy of
dialogue is essential. Along with that, seeking gains on
the work that has already been done must be the target.

(Note: Theory of Asymmetry is an approach of capitalizing on the

huge asymmetry in resources by the major party, followed by a
show of magnanimity and conciliation. While this approach is a
possibility when dealing with Pakistan, it can’t be the way forward
in the case of China)

Drawbacks

 Contrasting the border readiness of the two, for

instance, we see stark distinctions, more often,
revealing a Chinese upper hand.
 As of now, only 21 of the proposed 73 roads have been
developed by India for the Indo-China border (Also the
revised target is now 2020 instead of the original target,
2012).
 China, on the other hand, developed and still developing
its borders under the pretext of CPEC, OBOR, or even
otherwise (as in the case of Doklam). This exposes how
we are lagging in the connectivity of our border posts.
 The ‘Mountain Strike Corps’ of India, specifically
proposed to be raised to check the Chinese influence,
has a strength that is much less than the proposed
strength. Along with that, the force is not yet equipped
with the advanced armories that were envisioned for
them.
Advantages

 The recent initiatives including the Dhola-Sadiya bridge

(Bhupen Hazarika Setu-9.2km-Connects Assam with
Arunachal Pradesh) are a welcome step as they help
bring down the travel time and as such, a military
response time as well.
 A Brahmos cruise missile regiment is being deployed in
Arunachal Pradesh. This signals Indian intentions to
China, which finds every opportunity to reiterate its
sanction over the territory.
 Many abandoned airstrips in India are also being
reactivated. Though thought-provoking, it is a step in
the right direction.

India-China: Other Bilateral Issues

The recent standoff is seen as a culmination of several
disagreements between India and China and the relations
between the two sides have soured in the last 2-3 years. A few of
them are:

 India’s entry into the UNSC and the NSG: China has
been opposing India’s entry into the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) and the Nuclear Supplier’s
Group (NSG).
 India’s opposition to the OBOR: India has been
opposing China’s flagship ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR)
initiative‘, as the ‘China Pakistan Economic Corridor
(CPEC)‘, a part of OBOR, passes through the Pakistan-
Occupied Kashmir (POK) and acceding to OBOR would
mean undermining India’s sovereignty.
 Strengthening of India-USA relations: China is
critical of India-USA relations and it is not merely a
coincidence that the escalation at the tri-junction
coincided with the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to the
United States. India supports the US and other countries
in reaffirming the freedom of navigation in international
waters, which includes the South China Sea. Along with
this, the ‘MALABAR Naval exercise’ between India,
Japan, and the USA is also a matter of worry for China.
 Issue of Tibet and Dalai Lama: The fact that Tibet’s
spiritual leader Dalai Lama lives in India is a tension
 area in India-China relations. The recent visit of the
Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh has been a matter of
conflict between the two sides.
 Issue of Masood Azhar: India’s bid to get Jaish-e-
Mohammad chief Masood Azhar to be declared as a UN-
designated terrorist has been blocked by China again
and again. China is the only country among the 15
members UNSC to have opposed the ban. China is of
the view that India is trying to pursue political gains in
the name of counter-terrorism.

Read: China-Tibet issue

Way forward
From the recent incidents, although the possibility of an India-
China armed conflict cannot be ruled out, any kind of military
conflict is not in the interest of any country. The need of the hour
is realizing that our ‘strategic partnership’ could serve us both
and help see Asia emerge as the core of the world economy. This
dream of the ‘India-China Millennium of Exceptional Synergies’
that the Prime Minister envisions, however, needs magnanimity
and willingness on the part of both nations.

Efforts to resolve the India-China border disputes have been

ongoing for decades through diplomatic negotiations. Various
rounds of border talks and agreements have been held to manage
tensions and prevent escalations. However, a final resolution of
the border disputes remains elusive, and the situation along the
Line of Actual Control can be tense and prone to periodic flare-
ups.

Both India and China recognize the importance of maintaining

peace and stability along their border, and diplomatic channels
remain open to seek peaceful resolutions to the disputes.

What have been the Border Dispute Settlement Mechanisms?

The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility:
It was signed in 1993, which called for a renunciation of the use of force, recognition of the
LAC, and the resolution of the border issue through negotiations.
The Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC:
It was signed in 1996, which laid down pledges on non-aggression, prior notification of large
troop movements, and exchange of maps to resolve disagreements over the LAC.
The Border Defence Co-operation Agreement:
It was signed in 2013 following the Depsang Valley incident.
What Should be the Way Forward?
Diplomatic Engagement:
It is crucial to maintain open channels of communication to avoid any misunderstandings or
escalation of tensions.
Reassess Defence Acquisition Plans:
India needs to re-evaluate its defence acquisition plans to ensure that they are geared towards
long-term sustainability, rather than just possessing capability.
Prepare for Potential Conflict:
India needs to prepare for the possibility of conflict with China, particularly given the
Chinese President's recent articulations at the National People's Congress.
This preparation should involve bolstering India's military capabilities, particularly in the
Indian Air Force, Indian Army, and Indian Navy.
Allocate Adequate Funds for Defence:
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence has recommended that allocation for
defence should be 3% of GDP to maintain India's deterrent posture.
The Indian government should seriously consider this recommendation and allocate sufficient
funds for defence, rather than relying on emergency armament purchases from abroad.
Emphasize Negotiations from a Position of Strength:
India should adopt a negotiating strategy that emphasizes its strength and power, rather than
capitulation.
This would involve casting a shadow of power across the bargaining table and making it clear
that India is prepared to defend its interests.
Border Infrastructure Development:
Development of infrastructure along the border, such as roads and bridges, can help both
countries access remote areas and reduce the possibility of any misunderstandings or
conflicts.

Q. China's growing stature in world politics is likely to undermine India's influence.

Discuss.
Questions come on China's growing power and challenges to India.
China's growing stature in world politics has the potential to
undermine India's influence on the global stage. Here are some
key points to consider in this context:
1. Economic Dominance: China's rapid economic growth and its
status as the world's second-largest economy have allowed
it to exert significant influence in global economic affairs.
China's manufacturing prowess, export capacity, and Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) investments have expanded its
economic reach, making it an attractive partner for countries
around the world. This economic dominance enables China
to leverage its economic clout to gain political influence and
challenge India's position.
 2. Regional Influence: China's assertive foreign policy and its
efforts to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region have
raised concerns in India. China's close ties with countries in
South Asia, particularly Pakistan, and its engagement in
infrastructure projects through the BRI have the potential to
limit India's influence in its immediate neighborhood. China's
growing naval capabilities and its increasing presence in the
Indian Ocean through initiatives like the String of Pearls
strategy also pose challenges for India's regional influence.
3. Geopolitical Competition: India and China have competing
visions for the region's geopolitical order. China's rise as a
major global power and its aspirations for a more prominent
role in international affairs may directly challenge India's
own ambitions. China's assertive actions, including territorial
disputes and its military buildup, can undermine India's
security interests and limit its influence.
4. Multilateral Diplomacy: China's active engagement in
multilateral forums, such as the United Nations, BRICS, and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), gives it a
platform to shape global agendas and influence decision-
making processes. China's growing influence in these forums
allows it to advocate for its own interests and potentially
dilute India's influence on key issues.
5. Technological Advancements: China's advancements in
technology, particularly in areas such as artificial
intelligence, 5G networks, and digital infrastructure, have
the potential to reshape global dynamics. China's
technological prowess and its efforts to export these
technologies globally can give it an advantage over India
and limit India's ability to compete in emerging sectors.
6. Global Initiatives: China's initiatives such as the BRI and the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) provide avenues
for China to extend its influence beyond its borders. These
initiatives offer financial and infrastructure support to
countries, which can attract them towards China and
potentially reduce their reliance on India.
Despite these challenges, it is important to note that India also
possesses strengths that can help maintain its influence:
1. Democratic Governance: India's democratic system, diverse
society, and strong institutions contribute to its soft power
and appeal as a responsible global actor. India's
commitment to democratic values, rule of law, and pluralism
can enhance its influence in the international arena.
 2. Strategic Partnerships: India has developed strategic
partnerships with countries like the United States, Japan,
Australia, and others. These partnerships provide India with
opportunities to counterbalance China's influence and
strengthen its position in global affairs.
3. Soft Power: India's rich cultural heritage, Bollywood, yoga,
and its contributions in various fields like science, literature,
and arts have helped establish its soft power. India's cultural
diplomacy and engagement with the Indian diaspora
worldwide contribute to its influence and global standing.
4. Global Challenges: India's active engagement in addressing
global challenges like climate change, sustainable
development, and counterterrorism enhances its
international standing. India's participation in global
initiatives and its role as a responsible stakeholder can
contribute to its influence.
While China's growing stature in world politics may pose
challenges to India's influence, India has the potential to
counterbalance and protect its interests through strategic
partnerships, soft power, and active engagement in addressing
global challenges. Effective diplomacy, economic reforms,
technological advancements, and building alliances are crucial for
India to maintain and enhance its influence on the global stage.

Recently, concluded first plenum of 19th Congress of Communist Party of China (CPC) helped in
consolidating Chinese President Xi Jinping position as a core leader, included his thought in the
constitution of the party as Xi Jinping thought of Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era
along with his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative(BRI); and finally his emphasis on Chinese military
modernisation, where army must be controlled by the communist party of China. Now, one needs to
carefully analyse the implications of these developments for Indian strategic and security interests in
particular and foreign policy in general. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping is the third most
influential political leader after Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in Chinese political history. China has
world’s second largest GDP in nominal terms $11,199,145 and hence, no short of money for Chinese
military modernisation.
As a chairman of Central Military Commission, Xi Jinping has reiterated ‘basic mechanisation’ by
2020, ‘complete modernisation’ by 2035; and finally having ‘world-class military’ by 2050.

China has increased their military spending 118 per cent between 2007 and 2016 along with biggest
military spender in Asia and Oceania. As the chairman of Central Military Commission (CMC),
Chinese President Xi Jinping has reiterated ‘basic mechanisation’ by 2020, ‘complete modernisation’
by 2035 and finally having ‘world-class military’ by 2050. He also asked the people’s liberation army
(PLA) to be prepared for not just fight but win a war at any time.
In this background, it would be important to observe profiles of some important diplomats and
military leaders. To begin with, one of the top diplomats, Yang Jiechi who is a state councillor; and
special representative of India-China Border Dispute Talk Mechanism has been retained as a
politburo and central committee (CC) member of the CPC.
The Central Committee (204 members) is the third largest decision-making body after Politburo
Standing Committee (7-members PBSC) and Politburo (25 members including PBSC) of the CPC. It is
also presumed that current foreign minister; Wang Yi will replace Yang Jiechi as a new state
councillor and special representative in upcoming next plenum of 19th Congress of CPC in March-
2018.
The head of Western Command of PLA in Sichuan, General Zhao Zongqi has been promoted as a
central committee member. He is in-charge of India-China boundary disputes on the ground and
played a very crucial role during 73-days long Doklam faceoff recently. General Xu Qiliang has been
retained as a vice-chairman CMC of the CPC. The names of newly elected vice-chairman Zhang
Youxia, and members of CMC are Wei Fenghe, Li Zuocheng, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmini. It is to be
noted that Chinese infrastructure development and logistics are in much better condition than Indian
side of the border. China is also working on hi-speed train projects to these border areas with central
parts of China.
Xi Jinping tries to build his legacy in next 30 years with the help of his ambitious Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) as a grand strategy of China.

One can say that Chinese President Xi Jinping tries to build his legacy in next 30 years with the help
of his ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a grand strategy of China. The Chinese official
argument behind BRI is that to build a world community of shared destiny based on the sovereignty
and national interests of every country in the world.
But what we notice in the case of their sensitivities towards ‘Indian sovereignty and national
interests’ that despite Indian government repetitive protests, China is already involved in
infrastructure development projects like construction of motorways, railways, bridges, tunnel and
dams in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), Pakistan. In fact,
China started building Karakoram highways in 1957 to increase their strategic influence in this
disputed PoK region. No doubt, China-Pakistan Military Nexus is a strategic reality, which has been
done against India. Today, both Chinese and Pakistani armies do joint patrolling in the disputed PoK
region.
With the help of BRI, China wants to increase their strategic influence in South Asia and the Indian
Ocean region. China is giving loans to India’s neighbouring countries, such as Nepal, Myanmar,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan. China’s new assertiveness towards South Asia and the
Indian Ocean region is a manifestation of asymmetric military and economic capabilities between
China and India.
One can witness this assertiveness and strategic signalling in the tone and tenor of psychological
warfare and threatening and immature words used against India during the recent 73-days long
Doklam faceoff. In fact, Doklam faceoff was an ad-hoc diplomatic victory because even Chinese PLA
Major General Qiao Liang justified withdrawal of troops in order to secure strategic position and to
host BRICS Xiament Summit 2017 between 3rd and 5th Sep-2017; and 19th congress of Chinese
communist party between 18th and 25th Oct-2017.
These South Asian countries like Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Pakistan are already raising the concerns
about repayment of Chinese loans and debts. There are some questions which need to be answered
in this context. What if these south small Asian countries default on their repayment of Chinese loan
and its high-interest rates?
If China is serious about building a world community of shared destiny based on the sovereignty and
national interests then, why it did not consult all the participating countries before unilaterally
setting the agendas for BRI forum at Beijing on 14-15 May 2017?
BRI is a Chinese initiative launched for safeguarding the Chinese strategic and national interests.

No doubt, BRI is a Chinese initiative launched for safeguarding the Chinese strategic and national
interests. In the foreseeable future, one cannot discount the possibilities of another India-China
boundary disputes because, in Chinese power calculus, India is considered as a junior power merely
due to asymmetry in economic and military capabilities of both countries.
China’s Rising Influence in South Asia
China has held its third multilateral dialogue virtually with countries from South
Asia to take forward closer cooperation on fighting Covid-19 and coordinating
their economic agendas, reflecting a new approach in Beijing’s
outreach to the region.
China’s Rising Influence in South Asia
Why in News
China has held its third multilateral dialogue virtually with countries from South
Asia to take forward closer cooperation on fighting Covid-19 and coordinating
their economic agendas, reflecting a new approach in Beijing’s
outreach to the region.

Key Points
Participating countries:

It brought together every country in the region barring India,

Bhutan and the Maldives, and was aimed at “anti-epidemic
cooperation and poverty reduction cooperation”.
The recent meeting was attended by all five countries that have taken
part in these dialogues: Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh.
All three dialogues have been attended by Pakistan and Nepal.
Engagements through other Platforms:

Previously at the July quadrilateral dialogue with Afghanistan,

Nepal and Pakistan, China’s proposed extending the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan, as well as taking forward
an economic corridor plan with Nepal, called the Trans-
Himalayan Multi-dimensional Connectivity Network.
Other Initiatives by China to Enhance Engagement in
South Asia:

According to the American Enterprise Institute’s China

Global Investment Tracker, China has committed around 100
billion USD in the economies of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives,
Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

China is now the largest overseas investor in the Maldives,

Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
Afghanistan:

Beijing was a part of the trilateral China-Pakistan-

Afghanistan foreign ministers dialogue which focuses on
facilitating Afghan domestic political reconciliation, enhancing regional
connectivity, and improving regional common development.
The trilateral discussions also agreed to push “forward under
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” and “to enhance
connectivity by extending the CPEC to Afghanistan”.
Bangladesh:

China and Bangladesh pledged to deepen defense cooperation, especially in

the areas of “defense industry and trade, training,
equipment and technology.
China is also the largest arms supplier of the Bangladeshi
military, providing 71.8% of weapons from 2008 to 2018.
Bhutan

It does not have diplomatic relations with China.

Maldives:

China’s relationship with the Maldives is near-exclusively focused on

leveraging BRI to develop Maldives as well as to raise Chinese influence
there to counter India.
Nepal:

Chinese President went to Nepal in 2019.

This was the first visit by a Chinese head of state in 23
years.
The countries have signed agreements to accelerate Infrastructure
building in Nepal and improve connectivity between
them.
Both the countries have also announced the launch of a feasibility
study of the China-Nepal cross-border railway.
Sri Lanka:

Sri Lanka handed over Hambantota port on a 99-year lease to China

to repay its loan back to china. Hambantota is geostrategically
located on the Indian Ocean, potentially bolstering Beijing’s
String of Pearls.
Concerns for India:

Security Concerns:

Growing cooperation between Pakistan and China.

Increasing nexus between Nepal and China.
Acceptance to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by south asian countries.
Leadership Roles in South Asia:

It shows increasing chinese presence in south asia and its acceptance by the
countries as a torch bearer for the region which India wants for itself.
Economic Concerns:

Over the past decade, China has replaced India as the major trading
partner of several South Asian countries. For instance, the
share of India’s trade with Maldives was 3.4 times that of China’s
in 2008. But by 2018, China’s total trade with Maldives
slightly exceeded that of India.
China’s trade with Bangladesh is now about twice that of
India. China’s trade with Nepal and Sri Lanka still lags India’s
trade with those countries but the gap has shrunk.
Way forward
India does not have the economic capacity as China. Thus it
should cooperate with China for the development of these countries such
that fruits of development collectively reach South Asia.
It should also strongly condemn the plans for extension of
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Further India should invest in these countries where China falls
short and maintain its good will in South Asia and prevent these nations
from slipping off from India’s Influence.

Conclusion:
Good neighbourhood relations are crucial for national stability and well-being.
If India is to disengage from economic involvement with China and build the
capacities and capabilities it needs in manufacturing, and in supply chain networks
closer home, it cannot be a prisoner of the short term.
It is time for India to boldly take the long view in this area as also on its South Asia
policy.
India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it
is time to take an active stand. Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are
circumscribed by the asymmetry in military power, resort must be sought in
realpolitik.
This would force China to reconsider its tactics and force it towards negotiations with
India.