China–India relations

The People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India

established bilateral relations in 1950. India and China have
China–India relations
historically maintained peaceful relations for thousands of years
of recorded history, but the harmony of their relationship has
varied in modern times, after the Chinese Communist Party's
victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and especially post
the Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China.
The two nations have sought economic cooperation with each
other, while frequent border disputes and economic nationalism
in both countries are a major point of contention.

Cultural and economic relations between China and India date

China India
back to ancient times. The Silk Road not only served as a
major trade route between India and China, but is also credited Diplomatic mission
for facilitating the spread of Buddhism from India to East Embassy of China, Embassy of India,
Asia.[1] During the 19th century, China was involved in a New Delhi Beijing
growing opium trade with the East India Company, which
exported opium grown in India.[2][3] During World War II, both
British India and the Republic of China (ROC) played a crucial role in
halting the progress of Imperial Japan.[4] After India became
independent in 1947, it established relations with the ROC. The
modern Sino-Indian diplomatic relationship began in 1950, when
India was among the first noncommunist countries to end formal
relations with the Republic of China and recognise the PRC as the
legitimate government of both Mainland China and Taiwan. China
Indo-Chinese cuisine
and India are two of the major regional powers in Asia, and are the
two most populous countries and among the fastest growing major
economies in the world.

Growth in diplomatic and economic influence has increased the

significance of their bilateral relationship. Between 2008 and 2021,
China has been India's largest trading partner, and the two countries
have also extended their strategic and military relations.[5][6][7][8]
President Xi with Prime Minister
However, conflict of interest leads to hostility. India has a large trade
Modi, during the G20 Summit in
deficit that is favoured towards China. The two countries failed to
2016
resolve their border dispute and Indian media outlets have repeatedly
reported Chinese military incursions into Indian territory.[9] And
relations between contemporary China and India have been characterised by border disputes, resulting in
three military conflicts – the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the border clashes in Nathu La and Cho La in 1967,
and the 1987 Sumdorong Chu standoff.[10] However, since the late 1980s, both countries have successfully
rebuilt diplomatic and economic ties. Since 2013, border disputes have reemerged to take centre stage in the
two countries' mutual relations. In early 2018, the two armies got engaged in a standoff at the Doklam
plateau along the disputed Bhutan-China border.[11] Since summer 2020, armed standoffs and skirmishes at
multiple locations along the entire Sino-Indian border escalated. A serious clash occurred in the Galwan
Valley, resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers and many Chinese soldiers.[12] Both countries have
steadily established military infrastructure along border areas, including amidst the 2020 China–India
skirmishes.[9][13] Additionally, India remains wary about China's strong strategic bilateral relations with
Pakistan,[14] and China's funding to the separatist groups in Northeast India,[15] while China has expressed
concerns about Indian military and economic activities in the disputed South China Sea[16] as well as
hosting of anti-China activity from Tibetan exiles.[17][18] Today, the South Asian region is the premier site
of intensified great power competition between China and India.[19]

Geopolitical overview
China and India are separated by the Himalayas.
China and India today share a border, with Nepal and
Bhutan acting as buffer states. Parts of the disputed
Kashmir region claimed by India (J&K and Ladakh)
are claimed and administered by either Pakistan (Azad
Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan) or by the PRC (Aksai
Chin). The Government of Pakistan, on its maps,
shows the Aksai Chin area as mostly within China and
labels the boundary "Frontier Undefined", while India
holds that Aksai Chin is illegally occupied by the
PRC. China and India also dispute most of Arunachal
Pradesh. Eastern and Southern Asia.

Not only is China's India policy shaped by greater (The border between the People's Republic of
competition with the United States, but there are also China and the Republic of India over Arunachal
real structural issues in India-China relations that Pradesh/South Tibet reflects actual control,
exacerbate discord. These stem largely from China's without dotted line showing claims.)
attempts to keep India at arm's length in the Indo-
Pacific region. There are clear differences in the
regional order in Asia that the two countries desire—India seeks a multipolar order, of which India is one of
the main poles, while China seeks a single pole, of which India is not a pole at all.[20]

History

Antiquity

Etched carnelian beads of Indus valley origin have been excavated from various archaeological sites in
China dating from the Western Zhou and Spring and Autumn period (early half of 1st millennium BCE) to
the Han and Jin dynasties, indicating early cultural exchanges.[22]

China and India have also had some contact before the transmission of Buddhism. References to a people
called the Chinas, are found in ancient Indian literature. The Indian epic Mahabharata (c. 5th century
BCE) contains references to "China", which may have been referring to the Qin state which later became
the Qin dynasty. Chanakya (c. 350–283 BCE), the prime minister of the Maurya Empire, refers to Chinese
silk as "cinamsuka" (Chinese silk dress) and "cinapatta" (Chinese silk bundle) in his Arthashastra.[24]
 The first records of contact between
China and India were written
during the 2nd century BCE,
especially following the expedition
of Zhang Qian to Central Asia
(138–114 BCE).[25] Buddhism was
transmitted from India to China in
the 1st century CE.[26] Trade
relations via the Silk Road acted as Xiangqi, or Chinese chess, which,
economic contact between the two like Western Chess is believed to be
regions. In the Records of the descended from the Indian chess
Etched carnelian beads, Grand Historian, Zhang Qian (d. game of chaturanga.[23] The earliest
Harappa Culture.[21] Such 113 BCE) and Sima Qian (145–90 indications reveal the game may
beads were imported from BCE) make references to have been played as early as the
India to China in the early "Shendu", which may have been third century BCE.
half of 1st millennium referring to the Indus Valley (the
BCE. [22] Sindh province in modern
Pakistan), originally known as "Sindhu" in Sanskrit. When Yunnan was
annexed by the Han dynasty in the 1st century, Chinese authorities reported
an Indian "Shendu" community living there.[27]

A Greco-Roman text Periplus of the Erythraean Sea (mid 1st century AD) describes the annual fair in
present-day Northeast India, on the border with China.

Every year, there turns up at the border of Thina a certain tribe, short in body and very flat-
faced  ... called Sêsatai  ... They come with their wives and children bearing great packs
resembling mats of green leaves and then remain at some spot on the border between them and
those on the Thina side, and they hold a festival for several days, spreading out the mats under
them, and then take off for their own homes in the interior.

— Periplus, §65[28]

Middle Ages

From the 1st century onwards, many Indian scholars and monks traveled to China, such as Batuo (fl. 464–
495 CE)—first abbot of the Shaolin Monastery—and Bodhidharma—founder of Chan/Zen Buddhism—
while many Chinese scholars and monks also traveled to India, such as Xuanzang (b. 604) and I Ching
(635–713), both of whom were students at Nalanda University in Bihar. Xuanzang wrote the Great Tang
Records on the Western Regions, an account of his journey to India, which later inspired Wu Cheng'en's
Ming dynasty novel Journey to the West, one of the Four Great Classical Novels of Chinese literature.
According to some, St. Thomas the Apostle travelled from India to China and back (see Perumalil, A.C.
The Apostle in India. Patna, 1971: 5–54.)

Tamil dynasties

The Cholas maintained a good relationship with the Chinese. Arrays of ancient Chinese coins have been
found in the Cholas homeland (i.e. Thanjavur, Tiruvarur, and Pudukkottai districts of Tamil Nadu,
India).[29]
Under Rajaraja Chola and his son Rajendra Chola, the Cholas had strong
trading links with the Chinese Song dynasty.[30][31][32] The Chola dynasty
had strong influence over present-day Indonesia (Sri Vijaya Empire )

Many sources describe Bodhidharma, the founder of the Zen school of

Buddhism in China, as a prince of the Pallava dynasty.[33]

Tang and Harsha dynasties

During the 7th century, Tang dynasty China gained control over large
portions of the Silk Road and Central Asia.

During the 8th century, the astronomical table of sines by the Indian
astronomer and mathematician, Aryabhatta (476–550), were translated into
the Chinese astronomical and mathematical book of the Treatise on
Astrology of the Kaiyuan Era (Kaiyuan Zhanjing), compiled in 718 CE
during the Tang dynasty.[34] The Kaiyuan Zhanjing was compiled by
Gautama Siddha, an astronomer and astrologer born in Chang'an, and
whose family was originally from India. He was also notable for his
translation of the Navagraha calendar into Chinese.

Yuan dynasty

A rich merchant from the Ma'bar Sultanate, Abu Ali (P'aehali) 孛哈里 (or
布哈爾 Buhaer), was associated closely with the Ma'bar royal family. After
a fallout with the Ma'bar family, he moved to Yuan dynasty China and Ambassador from Central
received a Korean woman as his wife and a job from the Emperor. The 中天竺
India ( Zhong
woman was formerly 桑哥 Sangha's wife and her father was 蔡仁揆 채송 Tianzhu) to the court of the
년 Ch'ae In'gyu during the reign of忠烈 Chungnyeol of Goryeo, recorded Tang dynasty. Wanghuitu
in the Dongguk Tonggam, Goryeosa and 留夢炎 中俺集
Liu Mengyan's 王会图
( ) circa 650 CE.
Zhong'anji. 桑哥
[35][36] Sangha was a Tibetan. [37] Tamil Hindu Indian
merchants traded in Quanzhou during the Yuan
dynasty.[38][39][40][41] Hindu statues were found in Quanzhou
dating to this period.[42]

According to Badauni and Ferishta, the Delhi Sultanate under

Muhammad bin Tughluq had ambitions to invade China.
There existed a direct trade relationship between China and the
Delhi Sultanate. Ibn Battuta mentions that the Yuan Emperor
had sent an embassy to Muhammad for reconstruction of a
sacked temple at Sambhal.
Chola Empire under Rajendra Chola c.
1030 C.E.
Ming dynasty

Between 1405 and 1433, Ming dynasty China sponsored a series of seven naval expeditions led by
Admiral Zheng He. Zheng He visited numerous Indian kingdoms and ports, including the Malabar coast,
Bengal, and Ceylon, the Persian Gulf, Arabia, and later expeditions ventured down as far as Malindi in
what is now Kenya. Throughout his travels, Zheng He liberally dispensed Chinese gifts of silk, porcelain,
and other goods. In return, he received rich and unusual presents, including African zebras and giraffes.
Zheng He and his company paid respect to local deities and
customs, and in Ceylon, they erected a monument (Galle Trilingual
Inscription) honouring Buddha, Allah, and Vishnu. Bengal sent
twelve diplomatic missions to Nanjing between 1405 and 1439.[43]

After the Ming treasure voyages, private Chinese traders continued

operating in the eastern Indian Ocean. Chinese junks could
frequently be seen in the ports of the Vijayanagara Empire, carrying
silks and other products.[44] The ports of Mangalore, Honavar,
Bhatkal, Barkur, Cochin, Cannanore, Machilipatnam, and
Dharmadam were important, for they provided secure harbors for
traders from China.[45] On the other hand, Vijayanagara exports to
China intensified and included cotton, spices, jewels, semi-precious
stones, ivory, rhino horn, ebony, amber, coral, and aromatic
products such as perfumes.

The Mughals may have attempted to reach the Chinese market. Stele installed in Calicut by Zheng
According to East India Company official William Hawkins, He (modern replica)
Emperor Jahangir's wardrobe master was ordered to replace a
valuable porcelain. To fulfill the task, the wardrobe master traveled
to China but found nothing of equivalent value.

Qing dynasty

The Bhois of Orissa maintained minor maritime trade links with China. This is noted from the Manchu
language memorials and edicts depicting contacts under the reign of the Qing dynasty in China, when the
Qianlong Emperor received a gift from the Brahmin (Ch. Polomen 婆羅門 , Ma. Bolomen) envoy of a ruler
whose Manchu name was Birakišora han of Utg’ali (Ch. Wutegali bilaqishila han 烏特噶里畢拉奇碩拉
汗 ), who is described as a ruler in Eastern India. Hence, referring to Birakisore Deva I of Khurda (1736–
1793) who styled himself as Gajapati, the ruler of Utkala. Many of the gosains entering Tibet from China
passed through his territory when visiting the Jagannath temple at Puri.[46]

The reign of Tipu Sultan in Mysore saw Chinese technology used for sugar production,[47] and
sandalwood was exported to China.[48] Tipu’s and Mysore’s tryst with silk began in the early 1780s when
he received an ambassador from the Qing dynasty-ruled China at his court. The ambassador presented him
with a silk cloth. Tipu was said to be enchanted by the item to such an extent that he resolved to introduce
its production in his kingdom. He sent a return journey to China, which returned after twelve years.[49]

After the Qing expansion into the Himalayas, there was increased contact with South Asia, which often
manifested in the form of tributary relations. The Qing were obliged to defend their subservient state,
Badakhshan, against the Afghans and Marathas, though no major clash with the Marathas ever took place.
The Afghans gained the initiative and defeated the Marathas at Panipat in 1761. The battle's outcome was
used by the Afghans to intimidate the Qing.[50]

Sino-Sikh War

In the 18th to 19th centuries, the Sikh Empire expanded into neighbouring lands. It had annexed Ladakh
into the state of Jammu in 1834. In 1841, they invaded Tibet and overran parts of western Tibet. Chinese
forces defeated the Sikh army in December 1841, forcing the Sikh army to withdraw, and in turn, entered
Ladakh and besieged Leh, where they were, in turn, defeated by the Sikh Army. At this point, neither side
wished to continue the conflict, as the Sikhs were embroiled in tensions with the British that would lead up
to the First Anglo-Sikh War, while the Chinese were in the midst of
the First Opium War. The Sikhs claimed victory. The two parties
signed a treaty in September 1842, which stipulated no
transgressions or interference in the other country's frontiers.[51]

British Raj

Indian soldiers, known as "sepoys", who were in British service

participated in the First and Second Opium Wars against Qing
China. Indian sepoys were also involved in the suppression of the
Boxer Rebellion in 1900, in addition to serving as guards in the
British colony of Hong Kong and foreign concessions such as the
Shanghai International Settlement. The Chinese slur "Yindu A San"
(Indian number three) was used to describe Indian soldiers in
British service.

Republic of China
A Chinese barber in Goa, early 1800s
Hu Shih, the Chinese ambassador to the United States from 1938 to
1942, commented, albeit critically, on India's Buddhism almost
completely subsuming Chinese society upon its introduction.[54]

ASIA is one. The Himalayas divide, only to

accentuate, two mighty civilizations, the Chinese with
its communism of Confucius, and the Indian with its
individualism of the Vedas. But not even the snowy
Epitaph of Major Hsiao Chu Ching at
barriers can interrupt for one moment that broad
expanse of love for the Ultimate and Universal, which Jairampur cemetery[52][53]
is the common thought-inheritance of every Asiatic
race, enabling them to produce all the great religions of
the world and distinguishing them from those maritime
peoples of the Mediterranean and the Baltic, who love
to dwell on the Particular, and to search out the means,
not the end, of life.[55]

While never having actually visited India in his lifetime, Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Republic of China,
occasionally spoke and wrote of India as a fellow Asian nation that was likewise subject to harsh Western
exploitation, and frequently called for a Pan-Asian united front against all unjust imperialism. In a 1921
speech, Sun stated: "The Indians have long been oppressed by the British. They have now reacted with a
change in their revolutionary thinking...There is progress in their revolutionary spirit, they will not be
cowed down by Britain."[56][57] To this day, there is a prominent street named Sun Yat-sen street in an old
Chinatown in Calcutta, now known as Kolkata.

In 1924, on his major tour of several major Chinese cities, giving lectures about using their shared Asian
values and traditional spirituality to help together promote world peace, Rabindranath Tagore was invited to
Canton by Sun Yat-sen, an invitation which he declined. There was considerably mixed reception to Tagore
from the Chinese students and intellectuals. For example, a major Buddhist association in Shanghai stated
that for seven hundred years, they had "waited for a message from India", while others, mostly modernizers
and communists, outright rejected his ideals, stating that they did not "want philosophy, we want
materialism" and "not wisdom, but power".[58]

Believing that then-Republican China and British India were "sister

nations from the dawn of history" who needed to transform their
"ancient friendship into a new camaraderie of two freedom-loving
nations", Jawaharlal Nehru visited China in 1939 as an honored
guest of the government. Highly praising both Chiang Kai-shek
and his wife Song Meiling, Nehru referred to Chiang as "not only a
great Chinese, but a great Asiatic and world figure...one of the top
most leaders of the world...a successful general and captain in
war", and Song as "full of vitality and charm...a star hope for the
Chinese people...a symbol of China's invincibility". During his
visit, Chiang and Nehru shared a bunker one night when Japanese
bombers attacked Chongqing in late August, with Chiang recording
a favorable impression of Nehru in his diary; the Chiangs also
Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Song
regularly wrote Nehru during his time in prison and even after their
Meiling with Mahatma Gandhi and
1942 visit to India.[59][60]
Jawaharlal Nehru
Partially to enlist India's aid against both Japanese and Western
imperialism in exchange for China's support for Indian
independence, the Chiangs visited British India in 1942 and met
with Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The
Chiangs also sought to present their nation as a potential third
option for the Indian people to ally themselves with, with public
sympathies at the time sharply split between the British and the
Japanese, who actively tried to sway India's population with
pledges to liberate Asia if they would help their efforts against the
British. Despite pledges of mutual friendship and future
cooperation between the two peoples, Chiang argued that, while
Gandhi's non-violent resistance was not necessarily invalid for the
Indian people, it was an unrealistic worldview on a global context.
Gandhi, who had at the time insisted on India refraining from
participating in any war unless India was first given complete The Chiangs with Mahatma Gandhi
independence, in turn, later noted that, although "fun was had by in Calcutta in 1942
all...I would not say that I had learnt anything, and there was
nothing that we could teach him."[61][62] In their meeting in
Calcutta, Jinnah tried to persuade Chiang, who had pressed Britain to relinquish India as soon as possible,
of the necessity of establishing a separate nation for Muslims in the subcontinent, to which Chiang, who
apparently recognized the Indian National Congress as the sole nationalist force in the country, replied that
if ten crores of Muslims could live peacefully with other communities in China, then there was no true
necessity as he saw it of a separate state for a smaller population of nine crores of Muslims living in
India.[63] While the public reception to the Chiangs was mostly positive, some reacted less favorably to the
Chiangs' presence in India, with Jinnah believing that Chiang Kai-shek lacked proper understanding of
Indian society and feeling he was biased in favor of Nehru and Gandhi while neglecting the demands of
other religious communities,[64] with his newspaper Dawn calling him a "meddlesome marshal", while
other Indian Muslims, such as Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, expressed mistrust for the couple's motives,
believing that their government wanted to eventually expand its influence to Indochina and the
subcontinent after the British departure.[65]
For his part, Chiang apparently believed none of the major Indian leaders could help his government
meaningfully. As an ardent nationalist who lived through China's internally turbulent years, he felt that
Jinnah was "dishonest" and was being used by the British to divide the peoples of India and, by extension,
Asia, with he and his wife Song believing that cooperation between Indian religious communities was
difficult but possible. At the same time, he also felt genuinely disappointed by Gandhi, with whom he
initially had high expectations, and noted afterwards that "he knows and loves only India, and doesn't care
about other places and peoples". Having been unable to make Gandhi change his views about satyagraha,
even after arguing that some of their enemies, such as the Japanese, would make the preaching of non-
violence impossible, Chiang, himself raised a Buddhist, blamed "traditional Indian philosophy" for his sole
focus on endurance of suffering rather than revolutionary zeal necessary to rally and unite the Asian
peoples.[66] Nevertheless, the Chiangs continued to commit themselves to supporting the Indian
independence movement from afar, mostly via diplomacy, with Song Meiling writing to Nehru
encouragingly: "We shall leave nothing undone in assisting you to gain freedom and independence. Our
hearts are drawn to you, and...the bond of affection between you and us has been strengthened by our
visit....When you are discouraged and weary...remember that you are not alone in your struggle, for at all
times we are with you in spirit."[67]

Although their meetings had ended on a positive note, with Gandhi offering to adopt Song as a "daughter"
in his ashram if Chiang left her there as his ambassador to India after she asked to be taught about his non-
violent principles, and giving her his spinning wheel as a farewell gift, both sides were met with
considerable obstacles in the aftermath.[68] After the Chiangs tried to seek U.S. President Franklin
Roosevelt's help in persuading Winston Churchill to give India independence during the war, Roosevelt
suggested splitting India's territory in two in the hopes of resolving tensions, to which Song replied that
both she and Chiang felt that "India was as indivisible as China". Gandhi wrote to Chiang shortly
afterwards, seeking to clarify his stance: "I need hardly give you my assurance that, as the author of the
new move in India, I shall take no hasty action. And whatever action I may recommend will be governed
by the consideration that it should not injure China, or encourage Japanese aggression. I am trying to enlist
world opinion in favor of a proposition which to me appears self-proved and which must lead to the
strengthening of India and China's defence." Chiang sent a cable to Washington upon reading Gandhi's
letter, and advised Roosevelt that the best course of action would be to "restore complete freedom" to India,
but Churchill reportedly threatened to end Britain's alliance with China should the Chiangs continue to try
to interfere with Indian affairs.[69][70]

In 1942, a division of the Kuomintang's armies entered India as the Chinese Army in India in their struggle
against Japanese expansion in Southeast Asia. Dwarkanath Kotnis and four other Indian physicians
traveled to war-torn China to provide medical assistance against the Imperial Japanese Army.[71][72]

Post independence
On 15 August 1947, India gained independence from the British. The newly independent India established
diplomatic relations with the ROC. On 1 October 1949, the Chinese People's Liberation Army defeated the
Kuomintang (the ROC's ruling Nationalist Party) and took over Mainland China, establishing the PRC.
Soon afterwards, India became a federal, democratic republic after its constitution came into effect on 26
January 1950.

1950s

India established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 1 April Their last telegrame to us is an act of
1950, the first non-communist/socialist nation in Asia to do gross discourtesy [...] It looks as
so.[74] Pakistan continued to recognize the ROC until though it is not a friend speaking in
1951.[75] that language but a potential enemy
[...] for the first time, after centuries,
The relationship between India and a newly communist China India’s defence has to concentrate
started out on an optimistic note. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first itself on two fronts simultaneously.
prime minister of India, and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai [...] In our calculations we shall now
articulated a vision of an internationalist foreign policy have to reckon with communist
governed by the ethics of the Panchsheel (Five Principles of China in the north and in the north-
Peaceful Coexistence).[76] However, there was notable east, a communist China which has
skepticism on the Indian side from the very beginning about definite ambitions and aims and
Chinese intentions. For example, Bhimrao Ambedkar was which does not, in any way, seem
surprised that Nehru took Panchsheel seriously, [77] while friendly disposed towards us.
Acharya Kriplani said that Panchsheel was "born in sin".[77]
Nehru himself was disappointed when it became clear that the
Excerpt from Home Minister Sardar
two countries had a conflict of interest in Tibet, which had
Patel's letter to Prime Minister
traditionally served as a buffer zone.
Jawaharlal Nehru, November 7,
China viewed Tibet as a part of its territory. The preceding 1950[73]
government of the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek
also claimed Tibet as Chinese territory. However, he was
unable to re-assert control. Mao saw Indian concern over Tibet as a manifestation of interference in the
internal affairs of the PRC. The PRC reasserted control over Tibet and to end Tibetan Buddhism and
feudalism, which it did by force of arms in 1950. To avoid antagonizing the PRC, Nehru informed Chinese
leaders that India had no political ambitions or territorial ambitions and did not seek special privileges in
Tibet, but that traditional trading rights must continue. With Indian support, Tibetan delegates signed an
agreement in May 1951 recognizing PRC sovereignty but guaranteeing that the existing political and social
system of Tibet would continue.

In October 1954, China and India signed an agreement

regarding Tibet, whereby India recognised Tibet as part of
China, with China accepting the continuance of the previous
trade arrangements. Observers noted the agreement heavily
favored China.[78]

It is the popular perception that the catchphrase of India's

diplomacy with China in the 1950s was Hindi-Chini bhai-
bhai, which means, in Hindi, "Indians and Chinese are
brothers".[79] Nehru sought to initiate a more direct dialogue Founding of the Sino-Indian Friendship
between the peoples of China and India in culture and Association on 16 May 1952 in Beijing.
literature. Around then, the Indian artist (painter) Beohar
Rammanohar Sinha, who had earlier decorated the pages of
the original Constitution of India, was sent to China in 1957 on a Government of India fellowship to
establish a direct cross-cultural and inter-civilization bridge. Noted Indian scholar Rahul Sankrityayan and
diplomat Natwar Singh were also there, and Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan paid a visit to the PRC.

After signing the 1954 agreement, India published new maps showing defined borders, as it became
apprehensive that China might make claims on Indian territory.[80] Two major territorial disputes existed
between China and India, which remained dormant until 1959. In the northeast, Indian territory included
the Assam Himalayan region up to the McMahon Line, which China did not recognise as a legal boundary.
In the western sector, Indian territory inherited from the British Raj included the Aksai Chin plateau, which
Chinese maps started showing as Chinese territory in the 1940s, if not earlier.[81] When India discovered
that China built a road through the region, border clashes and Indian protests became more frequent. In
January 1959, PRC premier Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru,
pointing out that no government in China had accepted as
legal the McMahon Line, which the 1914 Simla Convention
defined as the eastern section of the border between India and
Tibet.

In March 1959, the Dalai Lama, spiritual and temporal head of

the Tibet, sought sanctuary in Dharmsala, Himachal Pradesh,
where he established the Tibetan government-in-exile.
Thousands of Tibetan refugees settled in northwestern India.
Relations between India and China deteriorated after India Chairman Mao Zedong of the Chinese
provided the Dalai Lama sanctuary.[82] The PRC accused Communist Party and Prime Minister
India of expansionism and imperialism in Tibet and throughout Jawaharlal Nehru. In April 1954, India and
the PRC signed an eight-year agreement
the Himalayan region.
on Tibet that became the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence (or Panchsheel).
1960s Jawaharlal Nehru of India, during the
latter's state visit to China, October 1954.

Border disputes resulted in a short border war between the

People's Republic of China and India on 20 October 1962.[82] The
border clash resulted in an overall defeat of India as the PRC
pushed the Indian forces to within 48 km of the Assam plains in the
northeast. It also occupied strategic points in the Aksai Chin and
Demchok regions of Ladakh, before declaring a unilateral ceasefire
on 21 November. It claimed that it withdrew to 20  km behind its
contended line of control. India disagreed with the claim.

"I don't want to know what happened

in the past. All I want to know is who
are my commanders, where are the
Chinese, how much ammunition
have I got…" Disputed territories of India

Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw During the Sino-Indian border conflict, India's Communist
recalling 1962 when he was Party was accused by the Indian government of being pro-
appointed to take charge of NEFA PRC, and many of its political leaders were jailed.
following the resignation of Kaul and Subsequently, the Communist Party of India (CPI) split with
Menon in the aftermath of the China the leftist section, forming the Communist Party of India
India war.[83] (Marxist) in 1964.

Relations between the PRC and India deteriorated during the

rest of the 1960s and the early 1970s, while China–Pakistan
relations improved and Sino-Soviet relations worsened. The PRC backed Pakistan in its 1965 war with
India, and issued "ultimatums" threatening military action at its own border. The threats only served to
damage Pakistan's relations with the western powers.[84] In late 1967, there were two more conflicts
between Indian and Chinese forces at their contested border, in Sikkim, known as the Nathu La and Cho
La clashes. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, but India came out in a better position than the PRC.

Between 1967 and 1971, an all-weather road was built across the Aksai Chin territory claimed by India,
linking the PRC's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan.
The PRC continued an active propaganda campaign
against India and supplied ideological, financial, and
other assistance to dissident groups, especially to tribes
in northeastern India. The PRC accused India of
assisting the Khampa rebels in Tibet. Sri Lanka played
the role of chief negotiator for the withdrawal of
Chinese troops from the Indian territory. Both
countries agreed to Colombo's proposals.[85][86]

Chinese demonstrations against Indian

1970s "reactionary factions" in Beijing in 1967.

In August 1971, India signed a Treaty of Peace,

Friendship, and Co-operation with the Soviet Union. The PRC sided with Pakistan in its December 1971
war with India. Although China strongly condemned India, it did not carry out its veiled threat to intervene
on Pakistan's behalf. By this time, the PRC had replaced the Republic of China in the UN, where its
representatives denounced India as being a "tool of Soviet expansionism."

India and the PRC renewed efforts to improve relations after Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's
Congress party lost the 1977 elections to Morarji Desai's Janata Party. In 1978, the Indian Minister of
External Affairs Atal Bihari Vajpayee made a landmark visit to Beijing, an impetus to both countries to
officially re-establish diplomatic relations in 1979. The PRC modified its pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir
and appeared willing to remain silent on India's absorption of Sikkim and its special advisory relationship
with Bhutan. The PRC's leaders agreed to discuss the boundary issue, India's priority, as the first step to a
broadening of relations. The two countries hosted each other's news agencies, and Mount Kailash and
Mansarowar Lake in Tibet, the home of the Hindu pantheon, were opened to annual pilgrimages.

1980s

In 1981, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Huang Hua, made a landmark
visit to New Delhi.[87] PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang concurrently toured Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh.

In 1980, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved a plan to upgrade the deployment of forces around
the Line of Actual Control. India also undertook infrastructural development in disputed areas.[88][89] In
1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh.
In the winter of 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops to the Sumdorong Chu before the Indian team
could arrive and built a helipad at Wandung.[90] Surprised by the Chinese occupation, India's then Chief of
Army Staff, General K.Sundarji, airlifted a brigade to the region.[89][91] Chinese troops could not move
any further into the valley and were forced to move away from the valley.[92] By 1987, Beijing's reaction
was similar to that in 1962 and this prompted many Western diplomats to predict war. However, Indian
foreign minister N.D. Tiwari and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi travelled to Beijing to negotiate a mutual de-
escalation.[89]

India and the PRC held eight rounds of border negotiations between December 1981 and November 1987.
In 1985, the PRC insisted on mutual concessions without defining the exact terms of its "package proposal"
or where the actual line of control lay. In 1986 and 1987, the negotiations achieved nothing, given the
charges exchanged between the two countries of military encroachment in the Sumdorung Chu Valley.
China's construction of a military post and helicopter pad in the area in 1986 and India's grant of statehood
to Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North-East Frontier Agency) in February 1987 caused both sides to
deploy troops to the area. The PRC relayed warnings that it would "teach India a lesson" if it did not cease
"nibbling" at Chinese territory. By the summer of 1987, however, both sides had backed away from
conflict and denied military clashes had taken place.

A warming trend in relations was facilitated by Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988. The two
sides issued a joint communiqué that stressed the need to restore friendly relations on the basis of the
Panchsheel. India and the People's Republic of China agreed to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement
while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute. The communiqué also expressed
China's concern about agitation by Tibetan separatists in India and reiterated that anti-China political
activities by expatriate Tibetans would not be tolerated. Rajiv Gandhi signed bilateral agreements on
science and technology co-operation, established direct air links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides
also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations between foreign ministers, set up a joint committee on
economic and scientific co-operation, and a joint working group on the boundary issue. The latter group
was to be led by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs.

1990s

Top-level dialogue continued with the December 1991 visit of PRC premier Li Peng to India and the May
1992 visit to China of Indian president R. Venkataraman. Six rounds of talks of the Indian-Chinese Joint
Working Group on the Border Issue were held between December 1988 and June 1993. Progress was also
made in reducing tensions on the border via mutual troop reductions, regular meetings of local military
commanders, and advance notification about military exercises. In July 1992, Sharad Pawar visited Beijing,
the first Indian Minister of Defence to do so. Consulates reopened in Bombay (Mumbai) and Shanghai in
December 1992.

In 1993, the sixth-round of the joint working group talks was held in New Delhi but resulted in only minor
developments. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and Premier Li Peng signed a border agreement dealing with
cross-border trade, cooperation on environmental issues (e.g. Pollution, Animal extinction, Global
warming, etc.), and radio and television broadcasting. A senior-level Chinese military delegation made a
goodwill visit to India in December 1993 aimed at "fostering confidence-building measures between the
defence forces of the two countries." The visit, however, came at a time when China was providing greater
military support to Burma. The presence of Chinese radar technicians in Burma's Coco Islands, which
border India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands, caused concern in India.

In January 1994, Beijing announced that it not only favored a negotiated solution on Kashmir, but also
opposed any form of independence for the region. Talks were held in New Delhi in February aimed at
confirming established "confidence-building measures", discussing clarification of the "line of actual
control", reduction of armed forces along the line, and prior information about forthcoming military
exercises. China's hope for settlement of the boundary issue was reiterated.

In 1995, talks by the India-China Expert Group led to an agreement to set up two additional points of
contact along the 4,000 km border to facilitate meetings between military personnel. The two sides were
reportedly "seriously engaged" in defining the McMahon Line and the line of actual control vis-à-vis
military exercises and prevention of air intrusion. Talks were held in Beijing in July and in New Delhi in
August to improve border security, combat cross-border crimes, and on additional troop withdrawals from
the border. These talks further reduced tensions.[93]

There was little notice taken in Beijing of the April 1995 announcement of the opening of the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Centre in New Delhi. The centre serves as the representative office of the Republic
of China (Taiwan) and is the counterpart of the India-Taipei Association located in Taiwan. Both
institutions share the goal of improving India-ROC relations, which have been strained since New Delhi's
recognition of Beijing in 1950.
China-Indian relations hit a low point in 1998 following India's nuclear tests. Indian Defence Minister
George Fernandes declared that "“in my perception of national security, China is enemy No 1....and any
person who is concerned about India's security must agree with that fact",[94] hinting that India developed
nuclear weapons in defence against China's nuclear arsenal. In 1998, China was one of the strongest
international critics of India's nuclear tests and entry into the nuclear club. During the 1999 Kargil War,
China voiced support for Pakistan, but also counseled Pakistan to withdraw its forces.

2000s

In a major embarrassment for China, the 17th Karmapa, Urgyen

Trinley Dorje, who was proclaimed by China, made a dramatic
escape from Tibet to the Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim. Chinese
officials were in a quandary on this issue as any protest to India on
the issue would mean an explicit endorsement on India's
governance of Sikkim, which the Chinese still hadn't recognised. In
2003, China officially recognised Indian sovereignty over Sikkim
as the two countries moved towards resolving their border disputes.
Indian and Chinese officers at Nathu
In 2004, the two countries proposed opening up the Nathula and
La. Nathu La was re-opened in 2006
Jelepla Passes in Sikkim. 2004 was a milestone in China-Indian
following numerous bilateral trade
bilateral trade, surpassing the US$10  billion mark for the first time.
agreements. The opening of the pass
In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Bangalore to
is expected to bolster the economy
push for increased China-Indian cooperation in high-tech of the region and play a key role in
industries. Wen stated that the 21st century will be "the Asian the growing China-Indian trade.
century of the IT industry." Regarding the issue of India gaining a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Wen Jiabao initially
seemed to support the idea, but had returned to a neutral position.

In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in 2005, China was granted
observer status. While other countries in the region are ready to consider China for permanent membership
in the SAARC, India seemed reluctant.

In 2005, China and India signed the 'Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity'.[95]
However, there has been very little, if any, strategic convergence between the two countries.[96]

Issues surrounding energy have risen in significance. Both countries have growing energy demand to
support economic growth. Both countries signed an agreement in 2006 to envisage ONGC Videsh Ltd
(OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) placing joint bids for promising projects.

In 2006, China and India re-opened the Nathula pass for trading; Nathula had been closed for 44 years
prior to 2006. The re-opening of border trade helps to ease the economic isolation of the region.[97] In
November 2006, China and India had a verbal spat over the claim of the north-east Indian state of
Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that China was occupying 38,000 square kilometres of its territory in
Kashmir, while China claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own.[98]

In 2007, China denied the application for visa from an Indian Administrative Service officer in Arunachal
Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is a territory of China, he would not need a visa to
visit his own country.[99] Later in December 2007, China reversed its policy by granting a visa to Marpe
Sora, an Arunachal-born professor in computer science.[100][101] In January 2008, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh visited China to discuss trade, commerce, defence, military, and various other issues.
Until 2008, the British Government's position remained the same as it had been since the Simla Accord of
1913: that China held suzerainty over Tibet but not sovereignty. Britain revised this view on 29 October
2008, when it recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet through its website.[102][103][104] The Economist
stated that although the British Foreign Office's website does not use the word sovereignty, officials at the
Foreign Office said "it means that, as far as Britain is concerned, 'Tibet is part of China. Full stop.'"[105]
This change in Britain's position affects India's claim to its North Eastern territories, which rely on the same
Simla Accord that Britain's prior position on Tibet's sovereignty was based upon.[106]

In October 2009, the Asian Development Bank formally acknowledged Arunachal Pradesh as part of India
and approved a loan to India for a development project there. Earlier, China had exercised pressure on the
bank to cease the loan.[107] However, India succeeded in securing the loan with the help of the United
States and Japan. China expressed displeasure at the ADB.[108][109]

A public opinion poll of the entire population of China conducted by Pew in spring 2008 showed that
"views about India are mixed at best – 25% say India is a partner, while a similar number (24%) describe it
as an enemy".[110]

2010s

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid an official visit to India from 15 to 17 December 2010, at the invitation
of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.[111] He was accompanied by 400 Chinese business leaders, who
wished to sign business deals with Indian companies.[112] During this visit, Premier Wen Jiabao said "India
and China are two very populous countries with ancient civilisations, friendship between the two countries
has a time-honoured history, which can be dated back 2,000 years".[113]

In April 2011, during the BRICS summit in Sanya, Hainan, China,[114] the two countries agreed to restore
defence cooperation and China had hinted that it may reverse its policy of administering stapled visas to
residents of Jammu and Kashmir.[115][116] This practice was later stopped,[117] and as a result, defence ties
were resumed between the two countries and joint military drills were expected.

In the March 2012 BRICS summit in New Delhi, CCP General Secretary and Chinese President Hu Jintao
told Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that "it is China's unswerving policy to develop China-Indian
friendship, deepen strategic cooperation, and seek common development". Other topics were discussed,
including border dispute problems and a unified BRICS central bank.[118] In April 2012, in response to
India's test of an Agni-V missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to Beijing, the PRC called for the
two countries to "cherish the hard-earned momentum of co-operation".[119]

The 2013 Depsang standoff lasted for three weeks, before

being defused on 5 May 2013.[120] Days before a trip by
Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid to China, Khurshid
said that both countries had a shared interest in not having the
border issue exacerbate or "destroy" long-term progress in
relations. The Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops in
exchange for an Indian agreement to demolish several "live-in
bunkers" 250  km to the south, in the disputed Chumar
sector.[121] Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made his first foreign
visit to India on 18 May 2013.[122][123] Indian President The BRICS leaders in the 2019 G20
Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Arunachal Pradesh in late Osaka summit.
November 2013 and mentioning in his speech that the area
was an "integral and important part of India" angered Beijing,
and retaliatory statements followed.[124][125]
Xi Jinping was one of the top world leaders to visit New Delhi after Narendra Modi took over as Prime
Minister of India in 2014.[126] India's insistence to raise the South China Sea in various multilateral forums
subsequently did not help that beginning once again, the relationship facing suspicion from Indian
administration and media alike.[127] In September 2014, the relationship took a sting as troops of the
People's Liberation Army reportedly entered two kilometres inside the Line of Actual Control in the
Chumar sector.[128] The next month, V. K. Singh said that China and India had come to a "convergence of
views" on the threat of terrorism emanating from Pakistan.[129] According to a 2014 BBC World Service
Poll, 23% of Indians viewed China positively, with 47% expressing a negative view, whereas 27% of
Chinese people viewed India positively, with 35% expressing a negative view.[130] A 2014 survey
conducted by the Pew Research Center showed 72% of Indians were concerned that territorial disputes
between China and neighbouring countries could lead to a military conflict.[131]

China and India have been working together to produce films

together, such as Kung Fu Yoga starring Jackie Chan.[132]
However, disruptions have risen again due to China building
trade routes, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, with
Pakistan on disputed Kashmir territory.[133] On 16 June 2017,
Chinese troops with construction vehicles and road-building
equipment began extending an existing road southward in
Doklam, a territory which is claimed by both China as well as
India's ally Bhutan.[134][135][136][137][138][139][140] On 18 June
2017, around 270 Indian troops, with weapons and two
bulldozers, entered Doklam to stop the Chinese troops from The Chinese President and Indian Prime
constructing the road. [136][137][141][142] Among other charges, Minister witnessing the signing of a
China accused India of illegal intrusion into its territory—what memorandum of understanding between
it called the mutually agreed China-India boundary, and the Chinese and Indian foreign affairs
violation of its territorial sovereignty and UN Charter.[143] India ministers on opening a new route for
Indian pilgrimage (Kailash Mansarovar
accused China of changing the status quo in violation of a 2012
Yatra) to the Tibet Autonomous Region of
understanding between the two governments regarding the tri-
the People's Republic of China, in New
junction boundary points and causing "security concerns",
Delhi in 2014
which were widely understood as its concerns with the strategic
Siliguri Corridor.[144][145] India media reported that on June
28, Bhutan issued a demarche, demanding that China cease road-building in Doklam and leave the area as
is.[146] The Minister of External Affairs of India at the time, Sushma Swaraj, asserted that if China
unilaterally altered the status-quo of the tri-junction point between China-India and Bhutan, the nation
would be posing a challenge to India's security.[147] China repeatedly stated that India's withdrawal was a
prerequisite for meaningful dialogue.[148][149] On 21 July 2017, the Minister of External Affairs of India
Sushma Swaraj said that for dialogue, both India and China must withdraw their troops.[150] On 2 August
2017, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China published a document claiming that Indian border forces had
illegally crossed the border between China and India and detailed China's position on the
matter.[151][152][153][154] The document said that China notified India regarding its plan to construct a road
in advance, "in full reflection of China's goodwill".[155] The Indian Foreign Ministry replied by referring
towards their earlier press release on this matter, as opposed to a point-by-point rebuttal.[156] On 28 August
2017, China and India reached a consensus to end the border stand-off.[157]

In May 2018, the two countries agreed to coordinate their development programmes in Afghanistan in the
areas of health, education, and food security.[158] In 2019, India reiterated that it would not join China's
Belt and Road Initiative, stating that it cannot accept a project that ignores concerns about its territorial
integrity.[159] On 11 October 2019, President Xi Jinping met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi at
Mahabalipuram, Tamil Nadu, India, for a second informal meeting between India and China.[160] Modi
and Xi Jinping met 18 times between 2014 and 2019.[161]

China offered public health and economic assistance to India in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
although India refused per the United States' request.[162]: 1 4 

2020s

On 10 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops clashed in Nathu La,

Sikkim, leaving 11 soldiers injured.[163][164][165] Following the
skirmishes in Sikkim, tensions between the two countries grew in
Ladakh, with a buildup of troops at multiple locations.[166] There
were 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of PLA soldiers
killed on the night of 15/16 June.[167] China reinforced troops near
the Indian border with Tibet, Chinese state media reported.[168]
Bilateral agreements between India and China prevent the use of
guns along the line of actual control. However, these skirmishes
The disputed territory of Kashmir is
saw the first shots, warning shots, being fired in decades.[169][170]
administered by Pakistan (green and
lime), India (blue and turquoise) and
Following the deaths, Prime Minister Modi addressed the nation
China (yellow).
about the incident, saying that "the sacrifice made by our soldiers
will not go in vain", while the Indian foreign minister told the
Chinese foreign minister that Chinese actions in Galwan were "pre-
meditated".[171] Following the Galwan Valley clash on 15 June 2020, there were renewed calls across
India to boycott Chinese goods. However, numerous Indian government officials said that border tensions
would have little impact on trade.[172][173]

On 29 June 2020, the Indian government banned 59 widely-used Chinese mobile phone and desktop
applications in response to rising tensions and escalating diplomatic dispute between the two nations.[174]
On 19 August, The Times of India reported that the ministry of external affairs of India has been told that
visas for Chinese businessmen, academics, industry experts, and advocacy groups will need prior security
clearance, and the measures are similar to those that have long been employed with Pakistan.[175] On 19
September, India police arrested a freelance journalist for passing sensitive information to Chinese
intelligence.[176]

On 27 October 2020, the United States and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement,
enabling greater information-sharing and further defense cooperation, to counter China's growing military
power in the region.[177]

After the 2022 visit by Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India responded, "Like
many other countries, India, too, is concerned at recent developments. We urge the exercise of restraint,
avoidance of unilateral actions to change status quo, de-escalation of tensions, and efforts to maintain peace
and stability in the region."[178] India stopped reiterating the so-called "One China" policy as early as
2010.[179]
In September 2022, India and China pulled back soldiers from a friction point along the line of actual
control. However, according to India's Ministry for External Affairs, the situation on the Line of Actual
Control is "still not normal".[180] The Diplomat has reported that normalcy around the border between the
countries seems unlikely and may not develop further.[181]

Triangular relations
The United States and Russia (previously Soviet Union) have been a consistent part of developments in
Chinese and Indian relations.

As a major power, Japan has also been part of China–India relations, with initiatives such as the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Pakistan and China share warm relations that drive Chinese infrastructure
projects in the disputed territory of northern Kashmir. The Middle East, Latin America, and Africa are
places where both India and China engage and compete. The Middle East is important to both countries in
terms of their energy security. In Africa, China and India seem most engaged across a wide variety of
issues, from development to peacekeeping. In South Asia and South-East Asia, a power balance struggle
between China and India is seen in triangular relations.[182]

Nepal

Nepal's geostrategic situation during periods of heightened tensions between China and India, such as
during the 1962 war, resulted in varying shades of cautionary neutrality when making statements. Nepal's
Permanent Representative stated, "we do not want to pass judgement on the merits of Sino-Indian border
dispute. As a country friendly to both...". Tulsi Giri, then the Nepalese foreign minister, stated, "Nepal's
relations with India will remain close [...] Yet, Nepal has a 600-mile boundary with China, China has now
emerged as a great power. Friendly relations with our northern neighbour (China) should be the natural aim
of the country's foreign policy."[183] During the time Tibet was independent, Nepal played the role as an
important buffer state and was central to influence between the regions.[184]

The China-Nepal-India Economic Corridor (CNIEC) was proposed by China in April 2018.[185] It is an
extension of the agreed upon China-Nepal Trans-Himalayan Multi-dimensional Connectivity Network into
India. While China and Nepal have shown favourable reactions towards CNIEC, India is "indifferent".[186]
This indifference is postulated to stem from CNIEC being a part of BRI, China's growing influence over
Nepal, and an end to "India's monopoly over Nepal's transit points and Nepal's attempt to end its
dependency on India".[186]

United States

On 11 November 1950, Sri Aurobindo wrote in Mother India,[187]

"The gesture that can save is to take a firm line with China, denounce openly her nefarious
intentions, stand without reservations by the USA [...] Militarily, China is almost ten times as
strong as we are, but India as the spearhead of an American defence of democracy can easily
halt Mao’s mechanised millions."

On 28 March 1963, Sudhir Ghosh recorded the President of the United States John F Kennedy's reaction
on reading Sri Aurobindo's words, "One great Indian, Nehru, showed you the path of non-alignment
between China and America, and another great Indian Aurobindo, showed you another way of survival.
The choice is up to the people of India." Earlier in the meeting, Ghosh recorded Kennedy's reaction to a
letter from Nehru, "He indignantly said that only a few months earlier when Mr Nehru was overwhelmed
by the power of Communist China, he made desperate appeal to him for air protection, and non-alignment
or no non-alignment, the President had to respond. He added sarcastically that Mr Nehru's conversion
lasted only a few days".[187]

Unlike the left-wing diplomatic leanings of the Indian Congress Party, the BJP administration has
strengthened its strategic partnership with the United States.[188] China faces combined challenges to its
influence with its neighbors, and because it sees a growing threat from India and the United States'
cooperation, it has exaggerated the discord between the two countries to divide and conquer its rivals.[20]

India participated in the restart of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,[189] and has strengthened the military,
diplomatic, and economic cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia.[189] More recently,
after the deadly Chinese-initiated clash at Galwan Valley in June 2020, preceded by the 2017 Doklam
standoff, the U.S.-based think tank, the Center for Foreign Relations, explained that there was a significant
ramp-up in QUAD activity.[190][189][191] The group cites how, since 2020, the group has looked beyond
regional cooperation and have focused on checking Chinese regional behavior, with the four navies
performing their first joint exercise in over a decade in November 2020. This was specifically initiated by
India in response to the border skirmishes.[191]

Indo-Pacific

Pakistan, and more importantly, Myanmar, other than India itself, are potential land routes into the Indian
Ocean. Pan Qi, Vice Minister for Communications, wrote in 1985 that China would need to find an outlet
for its landlocked provinces. At the time, he suggested routes to the Indian Ocean through Myanmar.[192]

In the same vein of invigorating relationships with geopolitical allies, India has also strengthened their Look
East Policy, transforming it into the Act East Policy under the Modi administration.[193][194] The rebranded
Act East Policy has an increased focus on infrastructure projects, such as the Agartala-Akhaura Rail Project
and the Asian Trilateral Highway.[195] Such geopolitical connectivity measures improved India's alliances
with the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam to check Chinese dominance.[194][196] These soft power
measures also enhance Indian border security.[193][196]

Military relations

Border clashes

Since the 1950s, during the term of India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India and China have
repeatedly encountered border disputes at the Line of Actual Control, delineating the border between the
two nations.[197] The first Sino-India border war broke out in 1962 at the Aksai Chin region, escalating into
a month-long military conflict.[197] Initiating the conflict, China took advantage of global concern about the
ongoing Cuban missile crisis to time their regional invasion in hopes of building a military road in India's
Ladakh region.[198]
During the Narendra Modi administration, bloody clashes erupted again on the Sino-Indian border.[190]
The strategic alliance between China and Pakistan, and the vigorous arming of the Pakistani forces, make
India face the threat of a two-front war.[199] Indian officials said the huge differences between the two sides
on the border issue "eroded the entire basis" of their relationship.[200]

Military exercises

China and India conduct a joint military exercise called 'Exercise

Hand–in–Hand'.[201] The exercise began in 2007, with the second
edition taking place in 2008.[202] The third, fifth, and seventh
editions of Hand-in-Hand were conducted in China in 2013, 2015,
and 2018, respectively, while the fourth edition and sixth editions
were held in India in 2014 and 2016.[203] The eighth edition was INS Kora (P61) escorting PLA Navy
held in India in 2019.[204] While bilateral military exercises Ship Weifang off Visakhapatnam,
between India and China have ceased over the past few years, India, in May 2014, during their visit
to the Indian Navy's Eastern Naval
India is still accepting invitations from Russia for multilateral armed
Command.
forces exercises that also happen to host Chinese soldiers.[205]

Water sharing and hydro–politics

A total of seven rivers that start in Tibet flow through India —
Indus, Satlej, Karnali (Ghaghara), Subansiri, Brahmaputra, and
Lohit (and its tributary Dulai).[206]

Brahma Chellaney has written that "India's formal recognition of

Chinese sovereignty over Tibet constitutes the single biggest
security blunder with lasting consequences for Indian territorial and
river-water interests".[207]
Chinese fishing nets in Kochi,
India has concern with China's water–diversion, dam–building, and Kerala, India.
inter–river plans. More so, in a conflict, India fears that China can
use the rivers as leverage. China has already constructed ten dams
on the Bhramaputra and its tributaries, such as the Zangmu Dam, and there has been talk of China building
a mega–dam at the "great bend" called the Motuo Dam. India's concerns also stem from the fact that China
does not cooperate with regard to timely sharing of information related to projects which would impact
water sharing, nor does China allow Indian experts to visit dam sites. There are a number of memoranda of
understanding on hydrological data sharing between the two countries with regard to the Brahmaputra,
including emergency management.[208]

An alternate view is also presented in relation to "misinformation spread by some (Indian) newspapers" and
the waters of Brahmaputra — "80 percent of the waters of the Brahmaputra emanate from the north side of
the Himalayas in China and that that country cannot be the sole arbiter of its international waters. This is
not right. Eighty percent of the waters of the mighty Brahmaputra are picked up after it enters India" and
that Chinese activities have helped India by reducing annual flood intensity in the north-east.[206]

Economic relations
India-China economic relations have been institutionalized through the Joint Economic Group and
Business Council, as well as more focused efforts such as the "Agreement on the Avoidance of Double
Taxation".[209]

China and India have developed their own complementary skills following a period in which they had cut
themselves off from each other. By 2007, while China excelled at cost-effective manufacturing, India was
skilled in cost effective designing and development. In 2007, Tarun Khanna wrote in Harvard Business
Review that "The simplest, and most powerful, way of combining China and India is to focus on hardware
in China and on software in India."[210] In the 2009 book "Getting China and India Right", the authors
suggest a China plus India strategy so as to strategically benefit from both India's and China's scale,
complementary strengths, and reducing the risk of being unilaterally present.[211]

There are cases when Indian companies have gone to China and done well, such as Mahindra and
Mahindra, while Chinese companies such as Huawei have done well in India. Huawei set up its Indian unit
in 1999 and by 2007, had 1500 engineers. Huawei's Bangalore unit, already one of Huawei's most
important research and development centres, was Capability Maturity Model Level 5 certified in 2003.[210]

In the oil sector, there is competition and engagement — China's Sinopec and China National Petroleum
Corporation and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation fight over oil assets in some regions, while
winning bids as joint ventures in others such as Syria, Colombia, Angola, and Venezuela.[210]

India imported $65.3 billion worth of goods from China in the fiscal year ended March 2020, and exported
$16.6 billion, according to the commerce ministry.[212]

Bilateral trade

China is India's 2nd largest trading partner.[213][214]

In June 2012, China asserted that "Sino-Indian ties" could

be the most "important bilateral partnership of the India – China trade at a glance (USD billion)[215]
century", seemingly substantiated by current Prime
Minister Narenda Modi's historic visit to China in May
2015.[216][217] At that pivotal visit, Wen Jiabao, the Premier of China, and Manmohan Singh, the Prime
Minister of India set a goal to increase Indo-Chinese bilateral trade to USD $100 billion by 2015.[218] At
the India-China Business Forum in Shanghai, Modi claimed that China and India would pool together their
manufacturing capabilities, citing initiative examples, such as building “50 million houses by 2022”,
"develop[ing] smart cities and mega industrial corridors”, and refining FDI policy and modernizing railway
systems together.[217]

Following that conference, bilateral trade between China and India touched USD $89.6 billion in 2017–18,
with the trade deficit widening to US$62.9 billion in China's favor.[219][220] In 2017, the volume of
bilateral trade between India & China stood at US$84.5 billion.[221] This figure excludes bilateral trade
between India and Hong Kong, which stands at another USD $34 billion.[222][223] Chinese imports from
India amounted to $16.4 billion, or 0.8% of its overall imports, and 4.2% of India's overall exports in 2014.
Major commodities exported from India to China were: cotton; gems, precious metals, coins; copper; ores,
slag, ash; organic chemicals; salt, sulphur, stone, cement; machines, engines, and pumps. Chinese exports to
India amounted to $58.4 billion or 2.3% of its overall exports, which made up approximately 12.6% of
India's overall imports in 2014.[224][223] Major commodities exported from China to India were: electronic
equipment; machines, engines, pumps; organic chemicals; fertilizers; iron and steel; plastics; iron or steel
products; gems, precious metals, coins; ships, boats; medical, and technical equipment.[224][223]
In 2020, in a departure from the
previous pledges of collaboration,
Modi instituted bans on Chinese
products, including both intangible
apps (Tiktok) and tangible goods (toys
and furniture).[225][226][227]
Furthermore, the Modi administration
created the Phased Manufacturing
Program to encourage India-based
cellphone assembly and
manufacturing. [225] Under guidance
from this legislation and the
accompanying task force to reduce
import dependence, India raised import Bilateral trade between India and China. India's imports from China
duties on electronic items produced in — 2010 to 2019.
China, as well as a laundry list of
ancillary goods.[225][227]

In 2018, a Standing Committee on Commerce chaired by Naresh Gujral submitted a report on the 'Impact
of Chinese Goods on Indian Industry.'[228] The report pointed out insufficient implementation of existing
anti-dumping laws, reliance on Chinese raw materials in sectors such as pharmaceuticals, reliance on
Chinese imports in India's National Solar Mission, Goods and Services Tax on certain products resulting in
increased imports from China, and Indian smart city administrations preferring Chinese bicycles over Indian
ones.[228] According to a 2021 survey published in ThePrint, 43% of Indians did not buy ‘Made in China’
products since the Galwan clash the previous year.[229] Modi also took notice of Swadeshi Jagran Manch's
(SJM) campaigns, launching or reviving 220 out of 370 anti-dumping suits against Chinese items ranging
from steels, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals.[143][227]

See also
China–India relations

Chindian People of mixed Indian and Chinese ancestry

BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
China in the Mahabharata
Chindia – China and India together in general, and their economies in particular
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation
Bhutan–China relations
Bhutan–India relations
India–Hong Kong relations
China Study Group
India–Tibet relations
Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China
Five Fingers of Tibet
Look East policy (India)

Border disputes

Sino-Indian border dispute

 Aksai Chin – controlled by China and claimed by India.
Chinese salami slicing strategy
Tawang District – controlled by India and claimed by China.
Shaksgam Valley – controlled by China and claimed by India (Conferred to China in 1963
by Pakistan), Trans-Karakoram Tract.
Bhutan–China border

Sports

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Further reading
Bajpai, Kanti, Selina Ho, and Manjari Chatterjee Miller, eds. Routledge Handbook of China–
India Relations (Routledge, 2020). excerpt (https://www.amazon.com/Routledge-Handbook-
China-India-Relations-Bajpai-ebook/dp/B0855JQYJJ/)
Bagchi, Prabodh Chandra, Bangwei Wang, and Tansen Sen. 2012. India and China:
interactions through Buddhism and diplomacy : a collection of essays by Professor Prabodh
Chandra Bagchi. Singapore: ISEAS Pub.
Bayram, Duygu Çağla. "The Geopolitical Scenarios of the 'Quad' Countries, The United
States, Japan, Australia and India." in Global Maritime Geopolitics (Transnational Press
London, 2022) pp 167–185. online (https://www.tplondon.com/product/maritime-geopolitics/)
Bhat, R. B., & Wu, C. (2014). Xuan Zhang's mission to the West with Monkey King. New
Delhi : Aditya Prakashan, 2014.
Chandra, Lokesh. 2016. India and China. New Delhi : International Academy of Indian
Culture and Aditya Prakashan, 2016.
Casson, Lionel, ed. (1989), The Periplus Maris Erythraei: Text With Introduction, Translation,
and Commentary (https://books.google.com/books?id=qQWYkSs51rEC), Princeton:
Princeton University Press, ISBN 0-691-04060-5.
Chaudhuri, S. K. (2011). Sanskrit in China and Japan. New Delhi: International Academy of
Indian Culture and Aditya Prakashan.
Chellaney, Brahma, "Rising Powers, Rising Tensions: The Troubled China-India
Relationship," SAIS Review (2012) 32#2 pp. 99–108 in Project MUSE (http://muse.jhu.edu/j
ournals/sais_review/v032/32.2.chellaney.html)
Davies, Henry Rudolph. 1970. Yün-nan, the link between India and the Yangtze. Taipei:
Ch'eng wen.
De, B. W. T. (2011). The Buddhist tradition in India, China & Japan. New York: Vintage
Books.
Deepak, B.R. & Tripathi, D.P. The Future of India China Relations (http://www.free-press-rele
ase.com/news-the-future-of-india-china-relations-1346254066.html) "India China Relations
– Future Perspectives", Vij Books, July 2012
Forbes, Andrew; Henley, David (2011). "Past, present and future commercial Sino-Indian
links via Sikkim," in: China's Ancient Tea Horse Road. Chiang Mai: Cognoscenti Books.
ASIN: B005DQV7Q2
Frankel, Francine R., and Harry Harding. The India-China Relationship: What the United
States Needs to Know (https://web.archive.org/web/20090304185843/http://www.asiasociet
y.org/publications/indiachina01.html). Columbia University Press: 2004. ISBN 0-231-13237-
9.
Garver, John W. China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's
Republic (2015), pp 146–62, 435–44, 734–57.
Garver, John W. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. University
of Washington Press: 2002. ISBN 0-295-98074-5.
Gokhale, Vijay. "The road from Galwan: the future of India-China Relations." Carnegie India
10 (2021) online (https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Gokhale_Galwan.pdf).
Harris, Tina (2013). Geographical Diversions: Tibetan Trade, Global Transactions (https://bo
oks.google.com/books?id=RU58AAAAQBAJ). University of Georgia Press, United States.
ISBN 0820345733. pp. 208.
Hongyu Wang, ‘Sino-Indian Relations: Present and Future’, Asian Survey 35:6, June 1995.
Jain, Sandhya, & Jain, Meenakshi (2011). The India they saw: Foreign accounts. New Delhi:
Ocean Books. Contains material about Chinese Buddhist pilgrims and explorers to India.
Kondapalli, Srikanth, eds. China's Military and India (2012)
Kondapalli, Srikanth. "India-China Relations." in Forging New Partnerships, Breaching New
Frontiers: India's Diplomacy during the UPA Rule 2004–14 (2022): 86+.
Ling Zhu, ’China-Pakistan Alliance against India’, UPI Asia.com, 9 September 2008, in
Jagannath P. Panda, Dragon Looks South: Current Drives in China's South Asian
Neighbourhood Policy, in China and its neighbours (ed. Srikant Kondapalli, Emi Mifune),
Pentagon Press, New Delhi 2010.
Lintner, Bertil. Great game east: India, China, and the struggle for Asia's most volatile frontier
(Yale University Press, 2015)
Liping Xia, ‘The Evolution of Chinese Views Toward Cbms’, in Michael Krepon, Dominique
M. McCoy, and Matthew C.J. Rudolp (Eds.), A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures
for Regional Security, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993.
Lu, Chih H.. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute: A Legal Study. Greenwood Press: 1986.
ISBN 0-313-25024-3.
Malone, David M., C. Raja Mohan, and Srinath Raghavan, eds. The Oxford handbook of
Indian foreign policy (2015) excerpt (https://www.amazon.com/Oxford-Handbook-Indian-Fore
ign-Policy/dp/0198799063/) pp 356–369.
Nilakanta Sastri, K. A. (2002) [1955]. A history of South India from prehistoric times to the fall
of Vijayanagar. New Delhi: Indian Branch, Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-560686-
7.
K. M. Panikkar (1957). India and China. A study of cultural relations. Asia Pub. House:
Bombay.
Paul, T.V. et al. eds. The China-India Rivalry in the Globalization Era (2018) excerpt (https://
www.amazon.com/China-India-Rivalry-Globalization-South-Affairs/dp/1626165998/)
Sen, Tansen. Buddhism, Diplomacy, and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations,
600–1400. University of Hawaii Press: 2003. ISBN 0-8248-2593-4.
Shabbir, Muhammad Omer, Rabia Bashir, and Sara Saleem. "Geo-Strategic importance of
Indian Ocean: clash of interests between China and India." Journal of Indian Studies 5.1
(2019): 47–60. online (http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/indianStudies/PDF/4_v5_1_19.pdf)
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Jing Dong Yuan. China and India: Cooperation or
Conflict? Lynne Rienner Publishers: 2003. ISBN 1-58826-169-7.
 Talone, Andrew J. How the United States Can Reinforce India as a Counterbalance to China
in the Indian Ocean Region from a Military Standpoint (US Army Command and General
Staff College, 2019) online (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085438.pdf)
Varadarajan, S. India, China and the Asian Axis of Oil (https://web.archive.org/web/2006070
8085440/http://www.hindu.com/2006/01/24/stories/2006012403181000.htm), January 2006
Yutang, Lin. 1942. The wisdom of China and India. New York: Random House.
Yoder, Brandon K., and Kanti Bajpai. "Introduction: Explaining Cooperation and Rivalry in
China-India Relations." Journal of Contemporary China (2022): 1–16.

External links
White Paper on Indo-Chinese Relations (https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/898911/
1/02_VIII_12-09-1959_p15_p85_PII.pdf)
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru : White Paper on Indo-Chinese Relations (https://eparlib.ni
c.in/bitstream/123456789/809075/1/pms_02_08_12-09-1959.pdf)
Paper II Containing Notes Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between The Governments
of India and China During September-November 1959 (https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/12345
6789/899521/1/02_IX_16-11-1959_p74_p74_PII.pdfWhite)

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