Literature Review Notes:

Conventions, Maps, and Databases

● Interactive map
● AU Malabo Convention — Summary

Journalistic Articles:

● 2africa website
○ Positive testaments and Description of the project

● Four More Subsea Cables Disrupted Off Africa

○ Taken together, the East Africa and West Africa cable incidents are affecting network
traffic all over the continent, Microsoft said.
○ Internet service providers reroute traffic to alternative networks when a subsea
cable goes down, but with seven of Africa's international data links now severed, the
list of alternative options has been reduced.
○ 90 percent of all international data traffic passes beneath the sea, and securing this
economically-vital infrastructure is an increasingly important priority for Western
governments. Cables are high-value, remote, difficult to monitor, and largely
unprotected, especially in deep waters.

● Several Subsea Cables in 10 African Countries are Badly Damaged and Need to be
Repaired
○ Internet outages in at least 10 countries in Africa, many undersea cables damaged,
expected to take 5 weeks to repair.
○ seabed movement is one of the possible causes
○ But if only part of the cable is damaged, the impact will not be too great, unless the
cable between China and the United States is completely interrupted, then the
impact will indeed be greater.
○ Because the global Internet root server is in the United States, we visit many Web
sites, we have to resolve through the U.S. root server to be able to access normally.
○ Through this West African undersea internet outage, ZMS can observe that much of
Africa is changing the economic status and educational development of a region or
even a country through the internet zone.
○ Internet penetration in Africa is slowly rising, bringing the prospect of a digital
dividend to a continent that has long been mired in the digital divide.
○ In less than a decade, Africa's Internet has shifted from satellite connections to
low-cost submarine connections. New submarine fiber optics have significantly
increased data transmission capacity and greatly reduced transmission time and
costs.
○ Steve Song, the founder of Village Telecom, which aims to develop low-cost
hardware and software for telephony networks, says that today, with 16 undersea
 fiber optic cables connecting Africa to the Americas, Europe, and Asia, international
interconnections are no longer a big problem. Countries are thus able to share
information more directly within the continent and globally, which creates more
space for innovation, research, and education.
○ The second is the aging of the insulation itself, that is, internal failure. This time, it is
the external failure.
○ The first step is to use an optical time domain reflectometer (OTDR) to locate the
approximate fault location, and then with the help of an underwater robot, find the
exact location of the broken submarine cable through scanning and inspection.
○ The OTDR uses the principle of time-domain reflection to send and receive a
complete set of signals, which are reflected at the location of the break and
compares the reflected signals with the shape of the signals and the time of day
calculated by a mathematical algorithm to locate the exact position of the broken
fiber.
○ In the second step, the robot will be buried in the seabed fiber optic cable dug out,
and then cut it, respectively, the cut ends tied to the rope lowered on the ship and
pulled out of the sea.
○ The third step is on the ship to complete the repair fusion. This fusion splicing
process is quite complex because the cable must be fused to the hair-thin fiber one
by one.

● Undersea cables for Africa’s internet retrace history and leave digital gaps as they
connect continents
○ South Africa’s News24 reported that, while the cause of the damage had not been
confirmed, it was believed that “the cables snapped in shallow waters near the Ivory
Coast, where fishing vessels are likely to operate”.
○ [Case with South Africa] It’s the same as driving using a tool like Google Maps. If
there’s an accident on the road it finds another way to get you to your destination.
But, in several African countries – including Sierra Leone and Liberia – most of the
cables don’t have spurs (the equivalent of off-ramps on the road), so only one fibre
optic cable actually comes into the country. Internet traffic from these countries
basically stops when the cable breaks.
○ Landlocked countries rely on countries with landing stations. These stations are
highly securitized and ensure the subsea cable is plugged into terrestrial systems.
○ Jess Jahajeeah remarked difference in Angola’s connectivity after the South Atlantic
Cable System went into operation. Jess’ new book Capricious Connections refers to
“the fact that the cables wouldn’t do anything if it wasn’t for the infrastructure that
they plug into at various points.” This emphasizes the infrastructure as the most
foundational basis for genuine and encompassing connectivity, without it, landing
centers would still highlight the complexities of the digital divide (example of
landing center high tech against school nearby without electricity)
 ○ Not only infrastructure, but the know how to and the frameworks to allow it to go
beyond the abstract state in which it resides in the minds of those “who live right
beside it”
○ Colonial Infrastructure: The 2012 cable that connected one side of the Atlantic
Ocean to the other is laid almost exactly over the route of the transatlantic slave
trade, for example. Much of the basic cable map is layered over the routes of the
copper telegraph network that was essential for the British empire in the 1800s.
○ Most of Africa’s cables are maintained at sea by the remarkable crew of the ship
Léon Thévenin.
○ New talks emerged of digital colonialism and data as the new oil
○ Previosuly cables were constructed by a combination of private and public
companies, but now it is dominated by huge private companies
○ Given we all depend so much on digital tools, poorer countries often have little
choice but to accept the terms and conditions of wealthy corporate entities.

● How to Achieve African Digital Sovereignty

○ The global economy’s competitiveness is dependent on the efficient collection,
analysis and utilisation of extensive data to gain crucial insights and strategic
advantages. World leaders have long acknowledged this truth. In 2013 Chinese
leader Xi Jinping drew a parallel between data and oil, highlighting its immense
potential for productivity and opportunities.
○ However, the infancy of Africa’s tech landscape has led to an over-reliance on foreign
partners to provide digital infrastructure. External actors could thus wield
significant control over data, platforms, and technologies, leaving African nations
vulnerable to manipulation, exploitation, and digital colonialism.
○ Africa’s internet penetration needs an encompassing effort from all local and
regional stakeholders. The AU should develop digital policy framework. Privacy by
design and human rights in digital governance policies and the strengthening of
regulation/implementation capabilities should be prioritised.
○ The AU and regional economic communities should focus on strengthening the
digital innovation and incubator ecosystem. This will empower local innovators to
incubate and fund their ideas for scaling up.

● Motolani Peltola: “The pursuit of digital sovereignty and local data ownership has
implications for local capacity development”
○ The continent is witnessing an escalating trend in the adoption and implementation
of data protection and privacy regulations, exemplified by Nigeria's Nigeria Data
Protection Regulation (NDPR), South Africa's Protection of Personal Information Act
(POPIA), Kenya's Data Protection Act, Ghana's Data Protection Act, among others.
Notably, these regulations often draw inspiration from the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), albeit with certain deviations. In their approach to
data localisation, African countries exhibit a spectrum of approaches ranging from
hard localisation to soft localisation to hybrid localisation regulations.
○ The rationale behind the adoption of data localisation requirements includes
considerations for cybersecurity, data protection and privacy of citizens, economic
development, law enforcement, national security, and, controversially, government
censorship and surveillance.
○ Local hosting of data is envisioned as a means for African governments to maintain
control over critical data and data infrastructure, such as data centres, with some
countries designating them as critical information infrastructure to be protected as
strategic national assets yielding socioeconomic benefits. Given that Africa's share of
global data centre capacity is less than 1%, there is an imperative to develop these
digital infrastructures.
○ However, critics argue that if the entire infrastructure, technical expertise, and
support are provided by foreign firms, concerns about exposure to data
vulnerabilities remain unresolved.
○ African nations, like industrialized Western democracies, must navigate the
complexities of promoting digital sovereignty through data localization while
carefully crafting national data policies to avoid stifling economic growth through
adverse effects on trade and cross-border data flows.
○ The EU's data protection framework, including the GDPR, prioritizes individual
privacy and cross-border data flows, contrasting with Africa’s hybrid approach to
digital sovereignty, which blends state-centric and liberal (individual freedom and
right to privacy) models to address concerns over foreign technology firms’ use of
citizen data.
○ The U.S., favoring a liberal stance on data sovereignty, avoids stringent data
localization laws, reflecting the global influence of American tech companies and
their preference for unrestricted data flows; however, economic concerns and the
rise of digital infrastructure dominated by China in Africa prompt U.S. scrutiny and
opposition to data localization measures in countries like Nigeria and Kenya, citing
potential harm to both American businesses and the digital economy's growth.
○ China's approach to digital sovereignty is state-centric, emphasizing strong state
control over data and requiring local data storage, which has supported the growth
of domestic firms over foreign competitors. In Africa, China's significant investment
in digital infrastructure, such as data centers, and partnerships with governments to
develop national digital strategies, aligns with its broader Digital Silk Road
objectives to influence the digital landscape.
○ Recommendations:
■ Capacity building initiatives are essential, aiming to enhance individual,
organizational, and governmental expertise in creating and applying
effective data governance frameworks tailored to local priorities, including
training on data governance principles, regulations, and best practices.
■ Promoting standardization and policy harmonization across African nations
is crucial to facilitating interoperability and cross-border data flows,
enhancing continental trade under initiatives like the African Continental
Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), with the Malabo convention as a starting point.
 ■ Addressing policy discrepancies that exacerbate digital divides is vital;
regional policy harmonization is needed to ensure equitable access to data
and ICT services, thereby promoting equitable development.
■ Establishing collaborative platforms that include all stakeholders such as
civil society, regional bodies, and the private sector is key to developing a
cooperative data governance ecosystem that protects individual data and
fosters innovation and economic development.
■ Regional and international bodies play a critical role in strengthening
democratic institutions and civil society in Africa, particularly in contexts
where data localization might reduce internet freedom, emphasizing the
need for resources to uphold democratic processes and civil liberties.
■ Financial support for digital infrastructure development is crucial for
building the necessary framework for effective data governance and
management in Africa, thereby supporting economic development and
innovation initiatives.

● Russia’s offensive on “digital sovereignty” in Africa

○ Russia has significantly increased its influence in French-speaking African countries
like the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, primarily through
digital means. Russian media outlets like RT and Sputnik capitalized on the rapid
growth of the internet and social networks in these regions during the 2010s.
Additionally, the Wagner Group has been instrumental in spreading disinformation
and propaganda using troll factories and fake social media accounts.
○ Moscow now wants to go a step further and unite its African allies around the
concept of “digital sovereignty” against the West.
○ For example, a “declaration” on “information security” was adopted at the second
Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg in July 2023 aimed at increasing
cooperation in information technology.
○ Russia is one of the few countries in the world – alongside China, most notably – to
have its own digital ecosystem, the “Runet”, says Kevin Limonier, also deputy
director of the Geopolitical Laboratory of the Datasphere (Geode). The making of
internet happened in Russia seperately from the world. In terms of search engines
and social networks, companies like Yandex and VK serve as substitutes for the
American tech giants. Having a “sovereign Internet” allows for control of the political
arena and to defend “moral values”, a crucial issue for Vladimir Putin’s power.
○ Under a 2016 law, Russian security services have “backdoors” into national Internet
platforms. Among the tools for censure, the TSPUs (the Russian acronym for
“devices to fight threats”) are particularly effective. These take the form of ITD boxes
installed at the ISP level on network nodes that filter Internet traffic, including VPNs.
These devices are manufactured by Russian company IKS Holding, among others.
○ “Whether in Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger, the juntas in power are supported by
conservative religious movements. The convergence of interests between Moscow and
 the juntas relies on an ideological convergence based on political and social
conservatism and an undermining of democracy,” says Jonathan Guiffard.

Academic Articles:

● When a cable is not just a cable – Fellows’ seminar by Jess Auerbach

○ “The infrastructure is not neutral. There are far fewer cables in the South Atlantic
than the North Atlantic. For example, the City of London has four times the data
centre capacity of southern Africa. The cables themselves may be seen as of little
consequence but they are the basis of much bigger conversations.”
○ Auerbach pointed out that many of the routes followed in the laying of the cables
build on cable-lines originally laid to enable morse-code communication during
Europe and the US’s early wars. These were later converted to telephone lines and
the routes are now used for fibre-optic cables.
○ Eurocentrism is one of the main issues cause it maintains the idea of Africa at the
bottom of the world
○ Auerbach’s book abstract: The book will trace how Africa connects with and yet is
distinct from the global communication infrastructure. Some of the topics Auerbach
proposes to include are the linkages between land, sea and sky; data and the right to
know; data as a human right including social movements around universal basic
data; who knows what about us – management of personal data and data
surveillance; the intersection between maritime and international law; how to
govern the cables including the politics of where and when cables come up to land,
cable breakages and the dynamics of their maintenance and potential interception;
and, imagined futures.

● Security implications of digitalization: The dangers of data colonialism and the way
towards sustainable and sovereign management of environmental data - Matthias
Stürmer, Jasmin Nussbaumer, and Pascal Stöckli (PDF)
○ The Swiss government recently issued the first Digital Foreign Policy Strategy
addressing digital governance, sustainable development, Cybersecurity, and digital
self-determination (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2020). In particular, the
aim of strengthening digital self-determination connects well with this report which
expands on the topics data control and digital sovereignty
○ Since the rise of the Internet in the late 1990s IT corporations govern the cyberspace
by means of their technological leadership as Harvard Law School professor
Lawrence Lessig describes in his books “Code” (Lessig, 2000, 2006). Being a law
professor, he points out that in cyberspace “code is law”, meaning that regulation of
the Internet happens through the source code of software developers.
○ Recently scholars started using the term “digital governmentality” to emphasize the
logics of power and control on the Internet (Badouard et al., 2016; Barry, 2019).
■ The Power of Big Tech:
○ Apple and Google control the app environment of the mobile operating systems iOS
and Android, thus defining the rules of the game in the app stores. This is being
exploited e.g. in particular by Apple with its App Store because that is the only
access for iPhone and iPad users to install software (Shoemaker, 2019). This
confinement of customers has prompted the European Union to issue a formal
antitrust case against Apple in 2020 following complaints by Spotify that Apple
abuses its market power (Geradin and Katsifis, 2020).
○ Or in February 2021 Facebook requested the Australian Government to change its
media law since it would have forced the US company to 8 pay for showing
Australian news on its platform (Khalil, 2021). When the government did not do so,
Facebook blocked Australian news from being shared on its platform, which put
pressure on the country’s legislation process (Porter, 2021). These examples
illustrate how large tech companies control much of the digital space and show the
drastic measures they are willing to take to enforce their commercial interests, when
they appear at stake.
■ Concepts of Data Colonialism and Digital Sustainability
○ The concept of data colonialism has been elaborated by Couldry and Mejias (2019a,
2019b, 2019c) comparing the age of colonialization since the 15th century with
today’s technological conquests by big tech corporations. Similar to European
countries colonizing land and people in Africa, the Americas and Asia, nowadays
American and Chinese tech companies are conquering personal and governmental
data of the global population. Couldry and Mejias draw direct parallels between the
two eras regarding appropriation of resources (land/gold vs. data), big economic
profit for the colonizing powers, and their ‘positive’ ideologies to cover up real
problems.
○ These companies do this with considerable public relations and marketing for the
good cause. For instance, Facebook claims “we connect people” and Google's mission
is “to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and
useful.” Similarly, the colonial nations aspired for ideologies that were seemingly
desirable, such as the civilization of indigenous peoples
○ Kwet (2019) uses the similar term ‘digital colonialism’ analogous to ‘data
colonialism’ as conceptual framework to describe economic domination by US Big
Tech corporations. The ‘tech hegemony’ by GAFAM (Google/Alphabet, Amazon,
Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft) is growing based on the support of the US
government and thus the United States reinvents colonialism in the Global South.
Digital colonialism can be countered by ‘digital sovereignty’ i.e. restoring control and
ownership of key information and communications infrastructures (Pinto, 2018).
Digital sovereignty involves all digital infrastructures (IT hardware and network)
while the much older notion of ‘data sovereignty’ mainly focuses on the geographical
location of data in the cloud (Peterson et al., 2011).
■ Data Workflow
○ The data workflow is aligned with the data, information, and knowledge pyramid of
information systems research (Rowley, 2007; Ackoff, 1989). In this notion, data is
being processed into information that eventually leads to knowledge.
■ Risks of data sources - signs of colonialism
○ If raw data is collected by private companies via user generated data or own
technologies, the data providers are in full control of its processing and use. As data
owners they determine if they allow others to access the data or not, and if yes,
under what commercial conditions. By managing technical data access through
online platforms or application programming interfaces (API) and by letting users
sign general terms and conditions (GTC) they control in detail who can use the data
for what purpose
○ Data gathering usually takes place without transparency of what happens with the
data and without consideration of the consequences for the different stakeholders.
On an aggregated level there is the ethical risk that data collectors use the data not
in the interest of the inhabitants but for their commercial or political goals. This
demonstrates the concept of data colonialism.
○ This happens e.g. with local communities when their land is being mapped, with
business owners who use mobile apps for credit loans, or with researchers who
upload their programming scripts to the Google Earth Engine. Data appropriation
thus takes place with minimal or without any benefit for the data owners. This again
shows the characteristics of data colonialism where users provide cheap data as
property of corporations for their commercial purposes
■ Risks of data processing into information:
○ Users of the online platforms upload data and programming scripts to cloud
providers who are able to reuse these digital assets without compensating their
original creators. Thus they basically hand over their intellectual property to private
companies who are able to commercialize the software without limitations.
○ Competitive research in many data-driven fields is not possible anymore without the
digital services by cloud providers and IT companies. Especially in earth observation
data processing there are few alternatives to proprietary platforms like Google Earth
Engine, ESRI or PlanetLabs.
■ Risks of information aggregation into knowledge
○ Few big tech companies control most of the digital space
○ In the case of environmental data processing some, however, some providers like
Google with its Earth Engine do not inform about their pricing but offer their
services to governments and researchers at apparently no cost. This lack of
transparency about the business model raises the question of the real commercial
benefits for the providers
○ Private companies are attractive for skilled data scientists and programmers
because of pay level and career path. Therefore, the asymmetry between IT
companies and governments is growing since talented people are often lured into
choosing the private sector. Especially in developing and emerging countries,
working for IT companies is advantageous in terms of salary.
 ■ Consequences:
○ Monopolistic Behavior
○ As a result of dependence on proprietary products and in view of high switching
costs, authorities and scientists using proprietary data processing services have a
weak negotiation position.
○ Financial Uncertainty
○ The general terms and conditions (GTC) of cloud providers typically exclude any
liability and warranty. Thus, governments, researchers and every other user may
suddenly lose access to data and services in the cloud if there are no service level
agreements (SLA) or similar contracts.
■ Recommendations:
○ Increase awareness towards data sovereignty and digital sustainability
○ Use, invest into, and release digital public goods like open standard, open source
software, open data, open machine learning models, and crowd-sourced platforms.
○ Build and maintain publicly owned IT infrastructure

● Digital Sovereignty in Africa: The Albatross of Digital Transformation and Autonomy

by Tope Shola Akinyetun
○ the African Union’s Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030) which
aims to “harness digital technologies and innovation to transform African societies
and economies to promote Africa’s integration, generate inclusive economic growth,
stimulate job creation…and ensure Africa’s ownership of modern tools of digital
management.” The strategy also intends to help the continent achieve the objectives
of Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
○ Thus, DS is the call for greater strategic autonomy and self-determination in relation
to technology. It is a colloquial term expressing the desire to reduce reliance on
digital infrastructure and services from foreign providers, predominantly based in
the US.
○ Digital Sovereignty Definition:
■ The idea of sovereignty, which was influenced by Jean Bodin in the sixteenth
century, emphasizes the capacity to act independently of external
interference. It emphasizes the state’s rights in its role as the supreme
decision-making authority whose powers are vested in the ruler. The idea
underwent a paradigm shift in the 18th century when Jean-Jacques
Rousseau argued in favor of popular sovereignty over that of the ruling class.
The rise of contemporary democracy was buoyed by the idea of people’s
sovereignty, with the government acting as the people’s representatives. To
achieve this, a democratic state’s sovereignty entails guaranteeing the ability
of its citizens to exercise their inalienable rights. As a result, it accomplishes
the goal of enabling everyone to be recognized in their own personal rights
and to exercise their own authority.
 ○ The release of internal National Security Agency (NSA) documents in 2013 by
Edward Snowden revealed how US law enforcement and intelligence agencies were
monitoring and analyzing Internet data traffic around the world. This sparked a race
for control of the Internet’s global infrastructure.
○ G7’s B3W as a counter to Belt and Road Initiative
○ the ITU World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), held on
December 3-4, 2012, in Dubai, was supported by 89 countries, including many
African nations.
○ However, most African states do not have a comprehensive national framework for
governing and guiding digital transformation. Many African nations primarily rely
on Chinese technology firms for the entirety of their digital technology stack, from
mobile networks, submarine cables, and data centers to mobile devices and apps.
○ Dangers of Digital Sovereignty:
■ Although African countries complain about being excluded from decisions
regarding Internet governance, there are concerns that giving governments
more power over the Internet might encourage illiberal regimes to exert
more control over cyberspace (e.g., through censorship). Examples of
Ethiopia and Kenya with their digital partnerships with China

● Are we giving away too much online? - Nick Couldry,

○ When undertaking research for the book, Professors Couldry and Mejias found data
was being extracted from every aspect of human life. “We realized the closest
parallel was in the colonial land grab that happened around 1500 when Spain and
Portugal suddenly realized there was a whole new world they could grab for
themselves,” Professor Couldry says. What if Colonialism could evolve?
○ “We are increasingly going to be locked into a completely curated universe which is
governed by corporations rather than ourselves,” he warns. We are already starting
to see something like this in China, for example, where the platform WeChat – which
started off as an app to chat with your friends – is now being used for all aspects of
life.
○ “All these platforms work off the network effect,” he says. “The more people who are
on there, the more convenient it is for you to be on there and the more inconvenient
it is for you to step off.” Professors Couldry and Mejias call this a “civilising narrative”
– something which distracts us from the reality of what is going on and makes it
seem more palatable, even appealing. With data extraction, we are told that it will
make our lives more convenient, and we will be better connected to each other. With
historical colonialism, the notions of progress or Christian salvation were often given
as a justification.
○ However, on a macro level, when our data is aggregated it can be used in ways we
could never imagine. For example, it can be used to train algorithms to make
decisions that affect large groups of people. Decisions such as whether you receive
state support, are successful in a job application or have a visa approved. These
algorithms can be opaque and discriminatory, leaving us with little knowledge about
 how a decision was made. And, like historical colonialism, the effects are usually felt
most strongly by those who are already vulnerable.
○ Globally, it is estimated data centres will use between 3 and 13 per cent of all
electricity globally by the year 2030, compared to the one per cent they used in
2010. This electricity creates heat which needs to be cooled down using vast
amounts of fresh water. Thames Water has already expressed concern that its water
supplies are getting dangerously low and data centres are a key reason behind this.
○ This all paints a very bleak picture, but Professor Couldry doesn’t want us to despair.
He argues this future can be averted by a large, collective effort to resist data
colonialism’s injustices. “We can only change things together and we need to help
each other make these changes. This is what we try and offer in the book: a new
vision to help people understand that it doesn’t need to go this way.”
○ Not all actions have to be on a large scale. As is noted in the book, “even putting your
phone down for a couple of hours might be an act of defiance”. Likewise, refusing to
accept cookies when visiting a website might be a form of resistance – something
which apparently so far only 0.5 per cent of users do.

● Resisting Data Colonialism: A Practical Intervention - Theory on Demand

○ Colonialism has been based on social, economic, political, and epistemic oppressive
methods to secure the extraction and misappropriation of resources from different
geographies.1 Black, Indigenous and Peoples of Colour communities have
continuously faced violent forms of oppression, such as the aggressive dispossession
of lands and their natural resources, displacement, and the practice and
consequences of slavery since the Age of Discovery in the 15th century by European
empires. Throughout this colonial process, the continuous action of extraction of all
types of resources (e.g., natural, intellectual, political, and economical) has been
central
○ The exponential growth in computing power has transformed human experiences
into data, creating new patterns that generate capital value, especially as traditional
natural resource extraction became less viable due to environmental concerns and
the finite nature of physical resources. This shift led to the conceptualization of data
as a 'natural resource' viewed through a colonial lens, where data colonialism
emerges as a new form of exploitation, replicating historical oppression through
technology monopolies, aiming to raise awareness of its extractive nature and the
impact on individual, communal, and environmental levels.
○ Characteristics of Colonialism:
■ Authority: Colonies were governed through unequal political structures like
colonial administrations, monarchies, and militaries to ensure control over
resources.
■ Economy: There was a global imbalance in the distribution of benefits from
resource extraction, characterized by land appropriation, exploitative labor
practices, and control over natural resources.
 ■ Gender/Sexuality: Colonial powers objectified women and relegated them
to roles that supported capital accumulation through family structures,
reinforcing male-dominated societies.
■ Knowledge and Subjectivity: European ideological dominance over other
knowledge systems helped perpetuate cultural erasure, racism, and sexism,
reinforcing European hegemonic power.
○ The Matrix of Power and Digital Technologies:
■ Data colonialism is not conceived as a metaphor but as an epistemic and
pragmatic concept that aims to build awareness of the non-neutral and
negative consequences of the digital ecosystem.
■ Authority and Digital Tech:
● Surveillance, National Security and authoritarian empowerment.
Furthermore, the super-accelerated development of digital
technologies is expediting the decline of the ‘democratized,
decentralized and open-source Internet’ due to the concentration
and commodification of information by a deficient number of
stakeholders.29. Transnational American tech companies
significantly affect how global data is managed and controlled across
various jurisdictions. Regarding this issue, Couldry and Mejias claim
that transnational tech companies replicate practices from the
extractive industries (e.g., mining, lodging) through big data and
cloud services.31
● In the same regard, Shoshana Zuboff coined the term ‘surveillance
capitalism’ as a form to describe how tech companies ‘predict and
modify human behaviour as a means to produce revenue and market
control’.32 Moreover, she described a new form of an economic order
that generates a new social and political order through
non-transparent commercial practices of extraction, prediction and
sales. In this form, the logic of colonial practices continues and is
being fostered by the market.
■ Economy and Digital Tech:
● The economic dominance of private tech companies in the digital
sphere mirrors historic colonial practices of resource exploitation.
Just as legal doctrines like terra nullius justified the seizure of land
and resources from marginalized communities, contemporary legal
frameworks protect the oligarchic control of digital infrastructure
and intellectual resources by a few entities. These laws facilitate the
ongoing economic disparity by supporting the monopolistic hold
over critical digital assets (e.g., servers, cables, data) and intellectual
capital (e.g., expertise from top research institutions), often
sidelining smaller economies and communities from benefiting
equitably from the digital economy. This results in a digital
ecosystem that perpetuates historic inequalities, allowing major tech
 companies to profit extensively from user data through targeted
advertising and data mining.
■ Gender/ Sexuality and Digital Tech:
● This occurs through the biases of predominantly white male
developers influencing the design and functionality of digital
platforms, which then replicate these biases in digital interactions.
For example, the role of platforms like Facebook in spreading hate
speech and contributing to serious social conflicts, like the Rohingya
crisis in Myanmar, illustrates how digital spaces can exacerbate
real-world violence and discrimination. Additionally, the dominance
of the English language in digital technologies often marginalizes
non-English speaking communities, reinforcing a digital hegemony
that mirrors colonial power dynamics.
■ Knowledge and Digital Tech:
● The initial hope that the internet would be a universally open space
has been challenged by social media dynamics, where visibility and
political discourse are often limited to those with significant
followers or financial means to boost their presence. This
environment perpetuates traditional power imbalances, amplifying
dominant European and capitalist perspectives and sidelining
marginalized voices.

● Digital Colonialism: Neo-Colonialism of the Global South - Bhavna Dahiya (PDF)

○ Digital systems like Amazon and Uber are revolutionizing social sectors such as
commerce and urban transportation. They collect free raw data from
underdeveloped nations and transform it into digital expertise, which is thenused to
reorganize and dominate all industries.
○ Digital Colonialism: the decentralised capture and management of data from
individuals, with or without their official approval.
○ Efforts to fill in the technological gap between North and South: World Summit of
Informaton Society. The Tunis Agenda of 2005
○ UN structure for digital commerce. International law.
○ The existence of extensive data privacy regulation doesnt quite guarantee that
digital businesses will adhere if the advantage of the breach outweighs the expense
of penalty. Example of Uber and Google
○ The world’s disconnected people are contested terrain for cyber giants, because
whomever secures their digital aristocracy owns the secret to the future. Without a
question, the IT sector has a significant impact on how campaigns, governments, and
politics work.
○ Localizing digitization, storage of consumer data locally, while it could be restricting
essential info flows, it is a step toward building a rather more fair power balance and
regional regulations. Nationalizing data is about data transformed into a valuable
 asset for which huge tech corporations are forced to pay at a value that favours
people.

● Digital Colonialism: The 21st Century Scramble for Africa through the Extraction and
Control of User Data and the Limitations of Data Protection Laws - Danielle Coleman
○ To discuss the extraction, synthesis, and control of user data is to discuss the pulse of
commerce, the ever-looming power of large tech companies, and the shift of
human-emotional interaction to everything in our daily lives. However, to discuss
the extraction, synthesis, and control over user data and critical connectivity
infrastructure by Western tech companies in African countries with limited
infrastructure, limited data protection laws, and limited competition—combined
with social, political, and economic power imbalances and decades of resource
pillaging—is to discuss digital colonialism.
○ Colonization and the Role of Corporations:
■ At the center of this pillaging was a simple colonialist economic agenda, to
provide maximum economic benefit at a minimal price. 8 Accordingly,
investing in industrialization, improving the production processes, or
strengthening the overall economy of the colonies was not a priority.
○ Digital Colonialism:
■ Today’s colonialists, however, are digital. They build communication
infrastructures such as social media platforms and network connectivity for
the express purpose of harvesting data, churning a profit, and/or storing the
data as raw material for predictive analytics
■ “Digital colonialism” is the decentralized extraction and control of data from
citizens with or without their explicit consent “through communication
networks developed and owned by Western tech companies.” 32
■ As professors Hendricks, Marker, and Vestergaard from the University of
Copenhagen posit, this structure has four fundamental actors:
● (1) The Western tech companies who create and provide the
technology and infrastructure that harvest the data for ad targeting
and ad distribution; 33
● (2) The advertising and consulting firms who use the technology
provided by (1) to target various groups with highly personalized
ads and messages aimed at increasing profits; 34
● (3) The “local companies, parties, and organizations who pay (2) to
help them impose their different agendas for the respective
countries”; 35 and
● (4) The citizens who knowingly and unknowingly act as data sources
for (1) and as target groups for (2) and (3).
■ Data as a Resource:
● According to the Oxford New English Dictionary, currency is defined
as a system of assets, property, and resources owned by someone or
something in general use in a particular country. 38 Data is the new
 currency, and access to data—rather than money, natural resources,
or advanced weaponry—is now the most valuable asset available to
nation-states and corporations. 39
● It highlights how private tech companies, predominantly from the
West, dominate digital technology, shaping global data policies and
infrastructures that reflect and perpetuate economic disparities. This
dynamic mirrors colonial legacies, positioning data as a modern-day
natural resource exploited through sophisticated digital tracking
technologies and legal frameworks that benefit these tech giants.
These companies create detailed digital profiles used for targeted
advertising and other profit-driven purposes, exploiting consumer
behavior around the clock. The narrative critiques this model as a
form of digital colonialism, where Western companies extract
valuable data from African markets, drawing parallels to historical
colonial infrastructures that were built to extract physical resources
from colonized lands.
■ Limitation of Data Protection Laws:
● The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Kenya’s
Data Protection Laws:
○ While the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has
significantly influenced global data protection standards,
Africa displays a varied landscape in terms of personal data
protection laws. Seventeen African countries have enacted
comprehensive personal data protection legislation, with
three more—Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—developing
similar laws. The African Union's Convention on
Cybersecurity and Data Protection, adopted in 2014, aims to
provide a framework for member countries to incorporate
into national legislation, although it has only been ratified by
four out of fifty-four member jurisdictions and requires
ratification by fifteen to take effect. Common principles
shared between GDPR and some African countries’ data
protection laws include requirements for notice, choice and
consent, data security, access and correction, quality and
integrity, retention and destruction, registration with data
protection authorities, cross-border data transfers, breach
notification, and the appointment of a Data Protection Officer
(DPO).
○ Many of these themes are incorporated in Kenya’s 2018 Data
Protection Bill (DPB), which is said to mirror the GDPR. 100
Once passed, it will give Kenyan citizens a series of rights
including: 1) the right to ask companies to clearly explain,
using accessible language, how their personal data is being
 collected, used, and stored; 2) the right to request that their
personal data be deleted; and 3) the right to object to their
personal data being used for specific purposes like targeted
advertising.
● Violation of Data Privacy Laws:
○ Examples from the Global North of large tech companies like
Uber and Google Scholars.
● Limitations of Penalties, Fines, and Sanctions:
○ GDPR imposes hefty fines for data protection violations, up to
20 million euros or 4% of a firm’s global turnover, which
might still be a manageable risk for giants like Google if the
potential profits justify it. Conversely, Kenya’s Data Protection
Board (DBP) does not specify fines, leaving sanctions to the
discretion of the complaints commission, which could
potentially impose more impactful measures against large
tech companies. However, the effectiveness of such sanctions
is questionable as companies might dissolve to avoid
repercussions, exemplified by the situation with Cambridge
Analytica. This highlights a significant gap in enforcing
accountability among large tech entities.
● Mass Concentration of Data and Lack of Competition
Enforcement:
○ Another clear limit to data privacy laws is that the lack of
protection against the mass concentration of data by
dominant players is compounded by the lack of competition
enforcement measures. Competition, data protection, and
consumer protection law are inextricably related, and data
privacy legislation often does not take this into
account—Kenya’s DPB included. Without these protections,
enormous amounts of data will be centrally held and owned
by dominant players who have the resources to stomp out
their competition, leaving the fate of millions and sometimes
billions of people’s personal and sensitive data in the hands
of a select few. Facebook and Whatsapp Examples
● Consent:
○ The concept of consent in data protection is undermined by
factors like overwhelming market dominance, leading to
limited genuine choice for users. Surveys show that users,
particularly in developing regions, often do not understand
the extent or implications of their data being collected. This
issue is compounded by complex privacy policies that most
users do not read, meaning they often consent without fully
understanding what they agree to. Even when users give
 consent, it does not necessarily prevent data misuse, as tech
companies can still sell personal data to third parties without
significant oversight, as demonstrated by incidents like
Cambridge Analytica's exploitation of Facebook data.
● Limits to Defined Nation-State Privacy Laws:
○ The limits presented above are based on the current state of
technology. However, as technology continues to develop
rapidly, and large tech companies invest in a variety of beta
testing experiments, the limits of the current data protection
laws will only become more prominent. Privacy laws are
typically designed to “only be enforceable within defined
nation-state borders.” However, some speculate that large
tech-companies are seeking to exist outside of national
borders entirely. 137 For example, in 2013, mystery Google
barges were seen on the Western and Eastern coasts of the
United States. They appeared to be floating data centers, 138
perhaps an early attempt at sea-steading. 139 Sea-steading
“is the attempt to create non-governmental entities outside of
recognized borders and gain freedom from legal control.”
140. If large tech companies could create sea-steads, they
could operate in international waters, completely
unregulated, while owning the data of billions of users,
dodging data privacy laws altogether. 141

● Neo-Colonialism and the Poverty of ‘Development’ in Africa - Mark Langan (PDF)

○ The need for pan-african solutions to the crisis of development after formal
liberation
○ Nkrumah argued that regional formations like ECOWAS might prove a block to
continental African unity
○ This paper is about agency in state sovereignty
○ KEY FIGURE: William A. Brown
○ Brown argues that African states’ possession of legal and juridical sovereinty
enables African politicians to realise some meaningful political agency in their
diplomatic dealings with foreign partners.
○ Interventions in Africa - concept of ladder kicking
○ African states have the potential to challenge neocolonial relations, with discussion
of the democratic developmental state
○ “While African policy autonomy may indeed be severely compromised by the aid
relationship, the recognition of the right of African states to govern their own
societies is not seriously questioned by donors through the aid relationship”
○ African elites have a big say in deciding how much to give up to foreign partners and
most of them do give up a lot in return for basic governmental services that their
infant, weak states cannot deliver. This weakness is the result of the recent
 indepedncence from colonialism, weak economies, weak nationalism, colonial
borders and territories, the eurocentric nature of the international system, and elite
benefiting and engagement with neocolonial entities and practices
○ When offered foreign aid, those elites can still refuse
○ While it is recognized that the agency is limited to choosing who offers the aid rather
than the act of receiving aid itself, it is necessary for their project.
○ Donors also have the power to thwart the will of elites, example of SPAs and Ghana’s
ill fated PSIs.
○ Two types of agency: regressive and progressive. Progressive agency in the
neocolonial situation must be rethought in terms of strategies for equipping Africa’s
nation-states with a real, empirical sovereign power. Perhaps paradoxically, the best
avenue for this is via strengthening of pan-African institutions where sovereignty is
pooled among the individual African countries. “As discussed below, the agency of
civil society and nation-states can only be partial and incomplete in the absence of a
federal Union of African States as envisaged by Nkrumah” (Langan, 212)
○ Washington Consensus: African states are neopatrimonial, clientelistic, and broadly
corrupt. Their civil service capacity is reduced. NGOs fill in the gap and they got
direct relations to local communities. NGOs also attract highly educated Africans for
their international and financial rewarding experiences.
○ Co-opted NGOs, from a Gramscian framework, might help to maintain a neo-liberal
hegemony while frustrating the emergence of a counter-hegemonic bloc.
○ Ladder-kicking, when combined to short-term aid, is ladder-kicking nonetheless
(Chang 2003)
○ Trade unions have advocated for reconsideration of the potential of development
through free trade. Example of Southern African trade unionists with European
trade Unions
○ Developmental State: Mkandawire argues that there is no blueprint for African
states to follow for development. The developmental strategy aims at
industrialization and value addition; increased state intervention in economic
planning; insulating admin from corruption, and attractice nationalist discuourse to
boast the developmental state project.
○ The counter-argument to the democratic developmental state is the fact that
authoritarian regimes have reduced poverty before, example of Asian tigers. What is
asked of Africa is to combine the economic take off of the East Asian regimes with
respect for Western democractic standards.
○ Nkrumah advocated for the developmental state where government plays an
important role in achieving a mixed-market economy geared towards rapid
industrialisation and diversification
○ Nkrumah also advocated that foreign investment into Ghana would be subordinated
to the domestic needs of economic planning and the wellbeing of the citizenry
○ The legacy of colonialism in terms of weak economic capacity would necessitate
African elites to sooner or later accommodate themselves within neocolonial
 relations, or else to forfeit FDI and aid with the onset of what Fanon called austerity
regimes.
○ The political cohesion of African states would ensure that foreign partners do not
play the divide and rule game
○ Nyerere admitted in 1997 that, with hindsight, the federalist strategy of Nkrumah’s
Casablanca Group would have provided African countries with the clout to have
improved upon the colonial pattern of imbalanced trade. However, many African
elites had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided.
○ Pan-Africanism would augment the agency of African civil society and states to offer
transformative alternatives to (neo)colonial patterns of economic and political
relations. Trade, securitisation, migration, corporate power, UN SDGs all would
necessitate a pan-African unity as an essential component of pro-poor responses.
○ New regional and global powers do not offer a progressive alternative to the
traditional Western actors. They want a piece of the pie. Their interest is not in
solving the issue, but in maintaining that issue (ie corruption), so that their
engagement is justified and sustained, while behind the scenes a different kind of
engagement reflecting both the true intentions of those foreign actors, and the false
promises of the ‘development’ potential that could come out of those parternships.
Example of China and Turkey Page 227
○ Kwame Nkrumah's concept of mal-development refers to a condition where the
economic growth or development strategies implemented in a country, particularly
those influenced by external forces, do not lead to real improvements in the
well-being of the majority of its population. Instead, these strategies exacerbate
inequality, perpetuate dependency on foreign aid or capital, and fail to address the
socio-economic needs of the populace. Nkrumah critiqued the ways post-colonial
economies were shaped by the interests and systems of former colonial powers,
which often resulted in a form of development that benefitted a small elite and
foreign interests at the expense of broader national development. This concept
highlights the structural imbalances and inequities within global economic systems
and critiques the continuation of colonial patterns of exploitation and control under
the guise of modernization and development.

● Artificial Intelligence and the Risk of New Colonialism - Ussal Sahbaz

○ However, from an international affairs point of view, this article argues that the
most critical risk stems from the fundamentally centralizing and monopolizing
characteristics of AI, considering its requirements of scale both for companies and
countries. This in turn is likely to create winner-takes-all economics—the
principal beneficiaries of which would be data giants like the United States and
China—and bring the risk of a new “data colonialism.” Middle-sized emerging
markets like Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, or South Africa are in danger of
losing recently-gained economic power and international standing.
○ When discussing the implications of AI as a general-purpose technology, it is
important to understand that we are already at a post-Edison stage. The first AI
 algorithms were already developed by Alan Turing in 1957. The application was
constrained until recently, not because of the unavailability of fundamental
technology, but because of the unavailability of the computing power to collect
and process data.
○ At the moment, both computing power and AI algorithms are widely available
through cloud computing. The most difficult academic talent needed is not the
engineering or data science required to develop the algorithms, but the skills
involved in application—and this is also available in many places. What will
really make the difference in the AI application race is the availability of data.
○ Only a few small countries can position themselves as global AI innovation hubs
vis-à-vis the aforementioned two giants. Examples include Israel, Singapore, and
Estonia (and possibly the UAE, as a regional hub). These countries are so small
that their startups never target the local market and are born global from day zero.
They are also relatively stable rich economies that can grow or attract
entrepreneurial talent.
○ It is important to note that middle-income emerging market countries, unlike
small countries, have large populations that cannot be sustained only AI-based
innovations. So far, their economic development has been based on
manufacturing, which can create mass employment for relatively unskilled
workers. However, as AI impacts manufacturing by reducing the need for labor
through automation, there is a significant risk of manufacturing moving to
locations closer to large markets, such as the United States and China, since the
emerging markets will also lose their labor cost advantage to automation.
○ Medium-sized economies can leverage their collective data accessibly to attract
AI firms, advocating for a unified data standard to facilitate innovation across
industries. This strategic data use can challenge the dominance of major tech
corporations. Additionally, integrating diverse governmental and corporate data
sets within these economies could significantly enhance value creation, much like
India’s utilization of government-controlled data via India Stack and the EU’s
open banking regulations under PSD2. However, the effectiveness of such
strategies relies heavily on robust antitrust enforcement and innovative regulatory
measures like regulatory sandboxes, which allow experimentation and
development of AI applications. These efforts are critical in emerging markets to
counterbalance the overwhelming influence of tech giants and to preempt the
risks of data colonialism by establishing proactive international economic
strategies and engaging in global economic governance discussions.

● Navigating digital sovereignty in Africa: A review of key challenges and constraints -

TYLER VENSKE
○ The most obvious manifestation of the problem is a small number of Tech
conglomerates, including Google, Meta, Amazon, Twitter, Huawei, ZTE, Tencent,
 Alibaba, Baidu, China Telecom, and China Mobile, that collectively command over
90% of revenue and profits in the African market, underscoring glaring disparities
and inequities inherent in the global digital landscape (Blakeley, 2021).
○ Seeking technological assistance from the most appealing bidders has long-term
repercussions for the continents economic, political, and financial stability
○ At the same time, substantial hurdles to digital sovereignty have weakened Africa’s
participation in the global digital value chain and made the continent susceptible to
digital surveillance and control. The impact has been differentiated: on the one hand,
countries with secure, self-regulated information and data systems are better
positioned to safeguard their domestic environments (Hindman, 2018) while, on the
other, failure to attain stability due to external intrusion within the jurisdiction of
African nation-states is bound to impede digital sovereignty’s realisation,
undermining their capacity to protect and defend their territorial integrity and
citizenry (Kwet, 2019).
○ Sovereignty, derived from the Latin word superanus, is a multifaceted concept
widely and diversely interpreted, classified, and applied in international discourse
(Grimm, 2015).
○ This notion was further solidified by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, defining
sovereignty as the “unlimited and absolute power within the jurisdiction” (Zick,
2005, p. 231). It encapsulated the “whole body of rights and attributes that a state
possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other states, and also its relations
with [other states]” (International Court of Justice, 1949, pp. 39, 43).
○ Post-cold war consensus: As sovereignty transformed to align with this new
international standard, so did international law constraining states’ one-time
absolute sovereign power. Instead, cooperation amongst governments was
emphasised. Simultaneously, rights, protections, and attributes were allocated to the
state’s citizens (Deng, 2010). This shift in emphasis from state-centric sovereignty to
the nation itself was aptly termed national sovereignty (Grimm, 2015).
Consequently, sovereignty no longer primarily signified a state’s independence in its
relations with other states but became an overarching power encompassing all state
authorities (Pohle & Thiel, 2020)
○ The concept “digital sovereignty” here, therefore, refers, more expansively, to the
“state’s right and authority to regulate and exercise control over the technology,
services and digital data in use within a sovereign territory” (Pohle, 2020, p. 6),
which was triggered by the contest to political, economic, and legal
self-determination of nation-states and their citizens.
○ From a broad institutional and governance perspective – one that extends well
beyond romanticised understandings of globalisation - the profound levels of
privatisation and internationalisation in the digital landscape introduced
unprecedented threats to national security as the world became increasingly
interlinked through technology (Zuboff, 2019). Viewed from this perspective,
digitalisation’s potential and realised national security threats generated
 counter-tendencies and demands for nation-states to assert their authority and
safeguard sensitive information and citizens from exploitation (Monyae, 2021).
○ Snowden Effect: In so far as the global digital economy has disabled economic
sovereignty, it has also weakened the modalities through which countries are
governed. Evidence of this first came to light in 2013, when the release of internal
National Security Agency (NSA) documents by Edward Snowden revealed extensive
monitoring and analysis of internet traffic worldwide by US law enforcement and
intelligence agencies without the consent of other nations or their citizens (Ball,
2013)
○ Ironically, one of the fiercest critics of American digital dominance was China. In its
drive to secure the state and shift the global balance of power within the digital
space, China promoted and nurtured its domestic model of digital sovereignty as an
alternative to the Internet and transgressive data flows across national borders
(Creemers, 2016).
○ The official Chinese effort to define its homegrown model emerged in Article 40 of
the Personal Information Protection Law, which mandated digital infrastructure
operators to store locally collected data within China (China Briefing, 2021).
○ These companies’ strategic and operational postures provide a vivid description of
why Chinese corporate interests are viewed as extensions of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), with capabilities to collect intelligence, appropriate intellectual
property, and monitor users (Agbebi, 2022). Through the Belt and Road’s Digital Silk
Road initiative, China has propagated technology that promotes its vision of
regionalised Internet and localised data controls on a global scale (Yuan, 2019).
○ By the end of 2019, African internet penetration lagged 32.5% behind the global
average (Mackinnon, 2019). The escalating demand for digital services, coupled with
the mounting volume of data generation, has forecasted Africa’s digital economy to
reach a valuation of $180 billion by 2025, constituting approximately 7.2% of the
region’s prevailing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (International Telecommunication
Union [ITU], 2019).
○ African Unity: From the perspective of most African nations, there is broad
recognition of the centrality of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)
to their development trajectories, opening new pathways for many to leverage
digital technologies to their advantage (Monyae, 2021). The AU underscores the
significance of this overarching concern, aiming to connect every government,
business, and individual on the continent by 2030 (Xi, 2021). The AU recognises that
achieving digital transformation in Africa requires political commitment at the
highest levels to align policies and sector regulations and scale up investments and
resource allocation (Hruby, 2021).
○ Root causes and Barriers to Digital Sovereignty in Africa:
■ Lack of Digital Infrastrucutre
■ Coherency in legal frameworks
■ Dependence on external assistance
■ Data security and privacy concerns
 ■ Financial constraints
■ Capacity building and education
■ Unequal distribution of power
○ Recommendations:
■ First, collaboration with international partners is necessary, but it needs to
be underpinned by a clear vision of safeguarding Africa’s data and digital
infrastructure. Reducing reliance on single suppliers is essential.
Investments in home-grown solutions, robust data policies, and
comprehensive strategies are crucial to harnessing foreign investment to a
homegrown model of digital sovereignty. Second, African nation-states must
address technological challenges and develop strategies to maximise digital
development (Qobo, 2022). While external partners will continue to play a
role, the nature of these relationships should evolve from traditional
paternalistic models to ones that nurture mutual benefit by contributing
value to the African continent. This includes support and investment in
human capital and technology sharing without overly restrictive conditions.
■ Collaboration with international partners must prioritize safeguarding
Africa's data and digital infrastructure, promoting investments in local
solutions and robust data policies to enhance digital sovereignty.
■ African nations should transform their international partnerships from
paternalistic to mutually beneficial relationships, focusing on human capital
development and technology sharing.
■ To keep pace with the Fourth Industrial Revolution, African governments
need to heavily invest in digital infrastructure, utilizing international and
private investments to access advanced technologies.
■ Africa must develop stringent regulatory and legislative frameworks to
protect data assets and enhance digital sovereignty, ensuring these
regulations support inclusive digital trade and align with African norms.
■ Despite limited political will, the imperative for Africa is to establish a
resilient digital ecosystem that reduces dependency on single suppliers and
adapulates quickly to global digital advancements, which is crucial for
achieving sustainable economic growth and digital sovereignty.
● Constraints to recommendations:
○ The minimal political will to implement these strategies presents a
significant barrier, yet overcoming this challenge is essential for Africa to
efficiently allocate resources and boost economic productivity.