6.

Domicile
a. What is Domicile?
b. Basic Principles of Domicile
c. Essential Elements to Acquire a Domicile of Choice
d. Domicile of Origin and Constructive Domicile
e. Legal Classifications of Domicile
i. Domicile of Origin
ii. Constructive Domicile
iii. Domicile of Choice

Paula T. Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/nov2000/gr_124371_2000.html
https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/llorente-v-court-of-appeals?q=G.R.%20No.%20124371#_

Facts:

Lorenzo N. Llorente, a serviceman in the U.S. Navy, married Paula Llorente in 1937 in Nabua,
Camarines Sur. Lorenzo later discovered that Paula had an adulterous relationship with his
brother, resulting in a child. Lorenzo and Paula signed an agreement to dissolve their marriage in
1946. Lorenzo returned to the U.S. and obtained a divorce decree from the Superior Court of
California in 1952.

In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente in Manila, unaware of the legal consequences of his
first marriage. Lorenzo and Alicia lived together for 25 years and had three children: Raul, Luz,
and Beverly. Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament in 1981, bequeathing his properties to
Alicia and their children.

After Lorenzo's death in 1985, Paula filed a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo's
estate, claiming her share of the conjugal properties. Alicia filed a counter-petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary, claiming that she and Lorenzo were co-owners of the properties
acquired during their 25-year relationship.

Issues:

1. Whether the divorce obtained by Lorenzo in California is valid in the Philippines.

2. Whether Alicia is entitled to inherit from Lorenzo.
3. Whether the will of Lorenzo, which bequeaths all his properties to Alicia and their
children, is valid under Philippine law.
4. Who are the rightful heirs to Lorenzo’s estate.

Decisions:
 1. Validity of the Divorce: The Supreme Court recognized the validity of the divorce
granted by the Superior Court of California. Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce, it is valid under U.S. law and applicable in the
Philippines due to the nationality principle.
2. Alicia’s Right to Inherit: The Court reversed the decision of the lower court that
declared Alicia as a "mere paramour" and held her co-ownership of properties with
Lorenzo as valid. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo’s will.
3. Validity of the Will: The Court noted that foreign law governs the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo’s will, as Lorenzo was a U.S. citizen at the time of his death. The Court
remanded the case to the trial court for the determination of the will's validity based on
U.S. law, which was not proven in the proceedings.
4. Rightful Heirs: The trial court was directed to determine the rightful heirs after
reviewing the foreign law applicable to the case.

The petition was granted, and the Court of Appeals decision was set aside. The case was
remanded for further proceedings.

Juan Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 (1989)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jun1989/gr_87193_1989.html
https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/frivaldo-v-commission-on-elections-19938?q=G.R.%20No.
%2087193#_

Facts:

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed the governor-elect of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and
assumed office. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities of Sorsogon, represented by
its president Salvador Estuye (who also sued in his personal capacity), filed a petition with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking to annul Frivaldo's election and proclamation on
the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized as a U.S. citizen on January
20, 1983.

Frivaldo admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the U.S., but claimed that he had
sought U.S. citizenship only for protection during the Marcos regime. He argued that the case
against him was essentially a quo warranto petition, which should have been filed within 10
days of his proclamation under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, and that the League
was not a proper party to file the petition.

Frivaldo requested a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses, but the COMELEC set the
case for hearing on the merits instead. His subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied,
prompting him to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, arguing
that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

In response, Estuye and the League argued that Frivaldo had not reacquired Philippine
citizenship by the time of the election. They contended that the petition was not a quo warranto
case but was meant to nullify Frivaldo's candidacy and remove him from office due to his
alienage. They also argued that they received proof of his U.S. naturalization only in September
1988, months after his proclamation.

The Solicitor General supported the position that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and was
disqualified from holding public office. He also contended that the challenge to Frivaldo’s
citizenship was not barred by Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code because it was not
strictly a quo warranto action but a broader challenge based on disqualification.

Frivaldo, in his reply, insisted that his U.S. citizenship was not voluntary and that he could not
have undergone formal repatriation before the election due to the lack of a Special Committee on
Naturalization. He further argued that his filing of a certificate of candidacy, in which he
declared himself a natural-born Filipino, was enough to restore his citizenship.

Issues:

1. Was Juan G. Frivaldo a Filipino citizen at the time of his election as governor of
Sorsogon?
2. Was the petition to annul Frivaldo's election barred by the 10-day filing requirement
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code?

Decisions:

1. On the issue of citizenship: The Supreme Court ruled that Juan G. Frivaldo was not a
Filipino citizen at the time of the 1988 election. By taking the oath of allegiance to the
United States in 1983, he had voluntarily renounced his Philippine citizenship. The Court
found his claim that he was coerced into becoming a U.S. citizen to be unconvincing,
noting that many other Filipinos in similar situations did not renounce their Philippine
citizenship. Frivaldo’s naturalization in the U.S. was a formal and voluntary act, and his
participation in the Philippine elections did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. The Court explained that regaining citizenship required formal repatriation
under Philippine law, which Frivaldo had not completed.
2. On the timeliness of the petition: The Supreme Court held that the 10-day period under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code did not apply because the petition was not a
simple quo warranto case. Instead, it sought to disqualify Frivaldo from office due to his
alien status, which is a continuing requirement for holding public office. The petition was
valid because the evidence of Frivaldo’s U.S. naturalization only came to light months
after his proclamation. The Court emphasized that the qualifications for public office
must be maintained throughout a person’s tenure, and once a qualification (such as
citizenship) is lost, the person’s right to hold office can be challenged.
Final Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed Frivaldo’s petition, declaring that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon. He
was ordered to vacate the office and surrender it to the duly elected vice-governor.

Imelda Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/sep1995/gr_119976_1995.html
https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/romualdez-marcos-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R.%20No.
%20119976

Facts:

1. Background:
o Imelda Romualdez Marcos was married to then-President Ferdinand Marcos in
1954. At that time, under Article 110 of the Civil Code, she was obliged to follow
her husband’s residence, but this did not equate to losing her domicile of origin.
2. Residency and Domicile:
o Article 110 of the Civil Code, reflecting a restatement of Spanish law, required a
wife to follow her husband to wherever he fixes his residence. This article
contemplates "actual residence" rather than "domicile," emphasizing the practical
aspect of living arrangements over the more fixed concept of domicile.
3. Post-Marriage Residences:
o Upon her return to the Philippines after her husband's presidency, Marcos
expressed intentions to rehabilitate her ancestral properties and secure a residence
in Tacloban, Leyte, while temporarily residing elsewhere.
4. Election Candidacy:
o In the 1995 election, Marcos sought a seat in the House of Representatives for the
First District of Leyte. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) raised issues
about her residency qualifications, questioning whether she met the legal
requirements.

Issues:

1. Residency vs. Domicile:

o The core issue was whether Imelda Marcos, having lived in various locations and
rehabilitated properties, had met the legal residency requirements for candidacy
under the laws governing domicile and residence.
2. Jurisdiction of COMELEC:
o Whether the COMELEC had jurisdiction to resolve the issue of Marcos’s
qualifications before the elections and whether its decisions were made within the
appropriate time frame.

Decisions:

1. Interpretation of Residence and Domicile:

 o The Supreme Court clarified that Article 110 of the Civil Code refers to "actual
residence" rather than "domicile." The intent behind the provision was to promote
family unity by consolidating the family's residence, which aligns with the
practical aspect of residency rather than the fixed nature of domicile.
o The Court noted that even if Marcos had gained a new residence upon marriage,
her domicile of origin remained intact. After her husband's death, she could revert
to or reassert her original domicile, as supported by her actions and expressed
intentions.
2. Jurisdiction of COMELEC:
o The Court ruled that the COMELEC’s decisions regarding Marcos’s
qualifications were valid despite concerns over timing. The jurisdictional limits
were interpreted as directory rather than mandatory, meaning the COMELEC did
not lose its authority to decide on pending cases merely due to timing issues.
o The Court also upheld that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) had no jurisdiction over Marcos’s qualifications before she was officially
a member of the House of Representatives.
3. Final Ruling:
o The Supreme Court determined that Imelda Marcos possessed the necessary
residency qualifications to run for the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte. It set aside the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions and directed
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim her as the duly elected
Representative.

Conclusion:

The case affirmed Marcos’s eligibility based on her residency qualifications and clarified the
interpretation of "residence" versus "domicile" in Philippine law. Additionally, the Supreme
Court reinforced the COMELEC’s jurisdictional authority and procedural adherence in electoral
matters.

Agapito Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/sep1995/gr_120265_1995.html
https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/aquino-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R.%20No.%20120265

Facts

1. Domicile and Residency:

o Agapito A. Aquino, a candidate for the congressional seat in Makati City's
Second District, declared in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992
 elections that he had been a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, for 52 years
prior to the election.
o Aquino's birth certificate indicated that Concepcion, Tarlac, was the birthplace of
his parents, reinforcing his longstanding connection to that area.
o Aquino's connection to Makati City was based on a lease agreement for a
condominium unit, which was for a period of two years. Aquino testified that his
intention was to reside in Makati for only one year, as he had other residences in
Metro Manila.
2. COMELEC Findings:
o The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) noted that Aquino's lease agreement
did not signify a permanent change of domicile, especially since it was for a short
duration and he had other residences in Manila or Quezon City.
o The COMELEC found that Aquino's claimed residence in Makati was likely an
attempt to qualify for the election rather than a genuine move from his original
domicile in Tarlac.

Issues

1. Domicile vs. Residence:

o The primary issue was whether Aquino had genuinely abandoned his domicile in
Concepcion, Tarlac, and established a new domicile in Makati City, as required
by the Constitution for eligibility to run for the congressional seat.
2. Effect of Disqualification on Election Results:
o Another issue was whether the votes cast for the disqualified candidate should be
transferred to the candidate with the next highest number of votes or whether
those votes should be considered invalid.

Decisions

1. Domicile and Residency:

o The court upheld the COMELEC’s decision, affirming that Aquino had not met
the constitutional residency requirement. The evidence showed that Aquino had
not sufficiently demonstrated a permanent change of domicile from Concepcion,
Tarlac, to Makati City.
2. Impact on Election Results:
o The court decided that the votes for a disqualified candidate could not be
transferred to the next highest candidate. It was held that such a practice would
disenfranchise voters and misrepresent their choices.
o Consequently, the court dismissed Aquino’s petition and affirmed the
COMELEC’s decision to disqualify him, ruling that the candidate receiving the
next highest votes could not be declared the winner.
Asistio v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_191124_2010.html
https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/asistio-v-trinidad-pe-aguirre?q=G.R.%20No.%20191124

Detailed Facts

1. Background:
o On January 26, 2010, Enrico R. Echiverri filed a Petition for Exclusion against
Luis A. Asistio before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 52, Caloocan
City, claiming that Asistio was not a resident of Caloocan City as listed in his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 elections.
2. Claims:
o Echiverri, also a candidate for Mayor, argued that Asistio’s address was non-
existent, supported by a certification from the Barangay Secretary and
discrepancies in the Voter’s List.
o Echiverri highlighted that Asistio’s previous COC listed a different address from
the one on his current COC, and verification showed Asistio was not registered at
the address claimed in his COC.
3. Proceedings in MeTC:
o The MeTC issued a Notice of Hearing to Asistio for hearings scheduled on
February 1, 2, and 3, 2010.
o Asistio filed an Answer, stating he resided at No. 116, P. Zamora St., Caloocan
City, and had mistakenly used the wrong address in his lease contract.
o On February 5, 2010, the MeTC ruled to remove Asistio’s name from the voter
list based on the alleged residency issues.
4. Proceedings in RTC:
o Asistio filed a Notice of Appeal and Appeal on February 10, 2010, and paid the
required appeal fees on February 11, 2010.
o Echiverri filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, arguing that the RTC lacked
jurisdiction due to the late payment of appeal fees.
o RTC Judge Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre initially allowed Echiverri’s
counsel to respond but later canceled this Order and granted the Motion to
Dismiss based on non-payment of docket fees.
5. Petition for Certiorari:
o Asistio filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, challenging Judge Aguirre’s
Order and seeking a Status Quo Ante Order to reinstate him as a voter.

Issues

1. Whether the RTC erred in dismissing Asistio’s appeal due to alleged late payment
of docket fees:
o The appeal was filed before the payment of docket fees was recorded, but the fees
were purchased on the same day.
2. Whether the MeTC’s decision to remove Asistio from the voter list was justified,
considering Asistio’s residency status and procedural issues:
 o The validity of the MeTC's decision was questioned, focusing on Asistio’s
claimed residence and procedural adherence.

Decisions

1. RTC Decision:
o RTC Judge Aguirre dismissed Asistio’s appeal, stating that the docket fees were
not paid simultaneously with the Notice of Appeal. This dismissal was based on
procedural grounds related to the payment of fees.
2. Supreme Court Decision:
o The Supreme Court reversed the RTC’s decision, stating that Asistio had
substantially complied with the procedural requirements for the appeal. The Court
emphasized that the late payment of fees should not overshadow the constitutional
right to vote and procedural fairness.
o The Court found that Asistio had maintained his domicile in Caloocan City and
that the MeTC’s decision to remove him from the voter list was not justified. It
ruled that residency and domicile issues should be resolved on substantive
grounds rather than technicalities.
o The Status Quo Ante Order issued on February 23, 2010, was made permanent,
reinstating Asistio as a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15,
Caloocan City.

The Supreme Court’s decision underscored the importance of resolving cases based on their
substantive merits rather than dismissing them on procedural technicalities.
7. Citizenship Article IV, 1987 Constitution
CASES:
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292
**LONG https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1971/oct1971/gr_21289_1971.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/moy-ya-lim-yao-v-commissioner-of-immigration

In Re: Ching, Bar Matter No. 914, October 01, 1999

https://lawphil.net/courts/bm/bm1999/bm_914_1999.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/re-vicente-d-ching?q=BAR%20MATTER%20No.
%20914

Co v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991

**LONG
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jul1991/gr_92191_92_92202_03_1991.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/co-v-house-of-representatives-electoral-tribunal?
q=G.R.%20Nos.%2092191-92

Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jun1996/gr_120295_1996.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/frivaldo-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R.
%20No.%20120295

Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/may1999/gr_135083_1999.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/mercado-v-manzano?q=G.R.%20No.%20135083

Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/may2001/gr_142840_2001.html
https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/bengson-iii-v-house-of-representatives-electoral-
tribunal?q=G.R.%20No.%20142840

Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 03, 2004

**LONG https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/mar2004/gr_161434_2004.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/tecson-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R.%20No.
%20161434

Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_176947_2009.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/cordora-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R.
%20No.%20176947

Japson v. COMELEC, G.R .No. 180088, Jan. 19,2009

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jan2009/gr_180088_2009.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/japzon-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R%20.No.
%20180088

Nestor A. Jacot v. Rogen T. Dal and COMELEC, G.R. No. 179848, Nov.27, 2008
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_179848_2008.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/jacot-v-dal?q=,%20G.R.%20No.%20179848

Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/may1999/gr_135083_1999.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/mercado-v-manzano?q=G.R.%20No.%20135083

Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543 (2000)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/aug2000/gr_137000_2000.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/valles-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R.%20No.
%20137000
Teodora Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, GR No. 198742, August 10, 2012
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_198742_2012.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/sobejana-condon-v-commission-on-elections?
q=GR%20No.%20198742

Rommel Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_191970_2012.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/jalosjos-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R.
%20No.%20191970

Svetlana Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 193314. FEBRUARY 26, 2013

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_193314_2013.html
https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/jalosjos-v-commission-on-elections-
56728?q=G.R.%20NO.%20193314

cont. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_193314_2013.html
https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/jalosjos-v-commission-on-elections-
57177?q=G.R.%20NO.%20193314

REYES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264. June 25, 2013

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_207264_2013.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/reyes-v-commission-on-elections-57139?q=G.R.
%20No.%20207264

Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/apr2013/gr_195649_2013.html

https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/maquiling-v-commission-on-elections?q=G.R.
%20No.%20195649