388 Thinking Skills

Nickerson RS (1998) Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous Further Reading

phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Halpern DF (1996) Thinking Critically about Critical
Psychology 2(2): 175±220. Thinking. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Stanovich KE (1999) Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Shermer M (2001) The Borderlands of Science. New York,
Differences in Reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence NY: Oxford University Press.
Erlbaum.
Weisberg RW (1993) Creativity: Beyond the Myth of Genius.
New York, NY: Freeman.

Thought Experiments Intermediate article

Tamar Szabo Gendler, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, USA

CONTENTS
What are thought experiments? Philosophical and empirical theories of thought
Kinds of thought experiments experimental cognition
Uses of thought experiments in philosophical cognitive Controversies and issues regarding the use of thought
science experiments

Thought experiment: to perform a thought experi- programmed computer might manifest under-
ment is to reason about an imaginary scenario with standing, Searle asks his reader to consider
the aim of confirming or disconfirming some whether a person locked in a room with a sheaf of
hypothesis or theory. Chinese characters and a set of instructions enab-
ling her to select certain batches of characters
(`answers') when prompted by certain other
WHAT ARE THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS? batches of characters (`questions') would be pro-
To perform a thought experiment is to reason about perly credited with understanding Chinese. (Searle
an imaginary scenario with the aim of confirming expects his reader to give a negative answer.) Other
or disconfirming some hypothesis or theory. In its examples are presented and discussed below.
original usage, the expression was reserved for Although Ernst Mach is generally credited with
cases intended to evoke intuitions about the phys- having coined the expression Gedankenexperiment in
ical world; more recently, it has also been used to his 1897 essay of the same name, and although
refer to cases intended to evoke intuitions concern- contemporary German, English, and French usage
ing the proper application of nearly any descriptive can be traced to Mach's writings, the expression
or evaluative concept. Gedankenexperiment appears in the Danish Kantian
So, for instance, Galileo's famous refutation of Hans Christian OÈ rsted's 1811 `Prolegomenon to the
the Aristotelian view that heavy bodies fall faster General Theory of Nature', and a term for experi-
than light ones is a paradigmatic example of a ment with thoughts ± mit Gedanken experimentieren ±
scientific thought experiment concerning the phys- can be found in a 1793 entry to German polymath
ical world. Galileo asks his reader to imagine a Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's `Common Place
heavier body strapped to a lighter one, and shows Book' (cf. Lichtenberg, 1793/1983; Mach, 1897;
that the Aristotelian is committed to saying that the Mach, 1905/1976; Schildknecht, 1990, pp. 147ff;
joined object will fall both faster and more slowly Witt-Hansen, 1976).
than the heavier body alone. By contrast, John In any case, use of the method antedated its
Searle's (1980, 1984) case of the Chinese Room is a labeling by several thousand years, having been
classic example of a philosophical thought experi- employed by ancient and medieval philosophers
ment concerning the application of our concepts. In and natural philosophers, and by scientists and phil-
an effort to undermine the thesis that a suitably osophers in the early modern and contemporary
 Thought Experiments 389

periods (for representative discussions, see happen in a given imaginary scenario assuming
Rescher, 1991; King, 1991; and other papers col- that natural laws are held constant; the latter in-
lected in Horowitz and Massey, 1991). After the volve asking the reader to decide whether a par-
publication of Mach's 1897 essay, the term itself ticular scenario is logically or metaphysically
seems to have taken roughly four decades to possible, or whether a given concept applies to
become widespread in scientific circles. (Despite such a scenario. Bealer maintains that the term
his extensive reading of Mach, for instance, Ein- `thought experiment' should be reserved for cases
stein appears not to have used the expression in of the former sort, roughly the class generally re-
his own writings. In general, however, it is difficult ferred to as `scientific thought experiments'. Tamar
to trace reliably the term's history, as later editions Szabo Gendler (2000, pp. 25±27) suggests a slightly
of works often interpolate it where it was not ori- different taxonomy, distinguishing between factive
ginally used.) Employment of the expression and conceptual/valuational thought experiments.
`thought experiment' in its philosophical sense Factive thought experiments are those where the
seems to have begun sometime in the 1970s, and it question asked is naturally described as `what
was only in the last decade of the twentieth century would happen?'; conceptual/valuational thought
that philosophical reference works began to in- experiments are those where the question asked
clude entries for the term. (For an extensive bibli- is naturally described as `how should we describe
ography of the philosophical literature on thought or evaluate this outcome?' Thought experiments
experiment, see Gendler, 2000, pp. 229±250.) that are factive tend to be those involving scientific
Given how broadly the term is used, it seems that subject matter; thought experiments that are con-
nearly any imaginary example might reasonably be ceptual/valuational tend to be those involving
termed a `thought experiment'. As a matter of philosophical subject matter.
sociological fact, however, the expression tends to James Robert Brown (1991) provides a taxonomy
be reserved for cases involving a certain degree of of scientific thought experiments that has gained
visualization, complexity, or novelty. So, for in- some currency in certain philosophy of science
stance, although they describe imaginary scenarios circles. Brown distinguishes between destructive
whose consideration may play some role in con- and constructive thought experiments, subdividing
firming or disconfirming some hypothesis or the latter category into mediative, conjectural, and
theory, simple examples in physics books (`a direct. Destructive thought experiments are those
car travelling at 65 miles per hour strikes a con- involving imaginary examples designed to raise
crete wall ¼') are rarely considered material for difficulties for a particular theory; constructive
thought experiments, nor are their equally austere thought experiments are those aimed at establish-
analogs in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, law, ing a positive result. Within the class of con-
and so on. structive thought experiments, mediative thought
experiments are those which facilitate the drawing
of a conclusion from a specific, well-articulated
KINDS OF THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS theory; conjectural thought experiments are those
Although a number of taxonomies for thought ex- where thinking about an imaginary scenario causes
periments have been proposed, none has become us to consider a phenomenon for which we then
canonical. Perhaps the most widely accepted dis- provide some sort of theoretical explanation; direct
tinction is between scientific and philosophical thought experiments are those that directly yield
thought experiments, though these categories are a well-established theory. Thought experiments
rarely made precise: scientific thought experi- that are simultaneously destructive and direct-
ments are simply those concerning scientific constructive Brown calls platonic, since, he claims,
subject matter, philosophical thought experiments they give us a priori knowledge of nature.
those concerning nonscientific subject matter Other taxonomies have also been proposed,
(cf., for instance, Horowitz and Massey, 1991; though like those described above, none has gained
Sorensen, 1992). canonical status. Nicholas Rescher (1991), for in-
A more sharply focused version of the scientific/ stance, distinguishes between thought experiments
nonscientific distinction is made by George Bealer that are explanatory and those that are refutatory,
(1998, pp. 207±208), who distinguishes imaginary offering further subdivisions into six more
cases that are used to evoke physical intuitions precisely articulated methods. Sarah Thomason
from those used to evoke intuitions about the ap- (1991) divides thought experiments in linguistics
plication of nonphysical concepts. The former in- into two categories: those that identify what sort
volve asking the reader to determine what would of evidence might be conclusive in testing a
390 Thought Experiments

particular theory, and those that test linguistic vision. Jackson asks what would happen if Mary
hypotheses by providing introspective data (these were released from her confinement and shown
might be called `experiments-in-thought'). D. A. a red object: would Mary learn anything new?
Anapolitanos (1991) offers a six-celled taxonomy Jackson (1982) expects his reader to agree that the
of thought experiments in mathematics; Richard answer is `yes', and concludes that what Mary has
Gale (1991) distinguishes thought experiments learned when she has learned what it is like to see
that yield clear-cut counterexamples from those red is a nonphysical fact.
that result in undecideable cases; Allen Janis
(1991) distinguishes three ways in which thought
Parfit's Fission Case
experiments in physics might fail; Roy Sorensen
(1992, pp. 197±202) classifies thought experi- In an effort to undermine the view that personal
ments on the basis of whether the corresponding identity is what properly underlies our concern for
actual experiment is gratuitous, unaffordable, or our future continuants, Derek Parfit (1984/1987)
impossible; Pierre Duhem (1914/1954, p. 202) simi- discusses a pair of cases involving brain transplants
larly distinguishes merely unperformed experi- from an individual in whom all cognitively rele-
ments, experiments which could not be performed vant features are realized in duplicate ± once in the
with precision, physically unperformable experi- left half of the brain, and once in the right. In the
ments, and absurd experiments; and SoÈren HaÈggq- first scenario, the left half of the original person's
vist (1996, pp. 136±159) and Kathleen Wilkes brain is transplanted into the body of his decere-
(1988, chap. 1) each present principles for distin- brated identical triplet, resulting in an individual
guishing successful from unsuccessful thought qualitatively identical to the original in all bodily
experiments. and psychological characteristics, while the right
half of the original brain is destroyed. In the second
scenario, both the left and right halves of the brain
USES OF THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN
of the original individual are transplanted, each
PHILOSOPHICAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE into the decerebrated body of one of his identical
In the cognitive science literature, the term `thought triplets, resulting in two individuals each qualita-
experiment' is generally used to refer to some tively identical to the original in all bodily and
widely discussed imaginary case designed to psychological characteristics. Parfit suggests that
evoke intuitions about the proper application of a the relation between the original individual and
concept such as `meaning' or `consciousness'. So, his successor in the first case is a relation of per-
for instance, among the cases generally referred to sonal identity, and a fortiori is sufficient to render
as `thought experiments' are Frank Jackson's case his prudential concern for that continuer rational.
of Mary the Color Scientist, Derek Parfit's case of In the second case, the relation between the original
fission, Hilary Putnam's case of Twin Earth, and individual and each of his two continuers is intrin-
John Searle's case of the Chinese Room. For what- sically identical to that in the first case; hence,
ever reason, discussions of zombies and inverted contends Parfit, it is sufficient to render prudent-
spectra are less commonly referred to as `thought ial concern for each of them rational. But a relation
experiments', though slight variations on them, of identity does not hold between the original indi-
such as Ned Block's case of inverted Earth, gener- vidual and both of his two continuers (since iden-
ally are. Each of these cases is described briefly tity is a one±one relation). So, concludes Parfit,
below, followed by a discussion of some of their identity is not what matters in making prudential
common features. concern rational.

Jackson's Mary Putnam's Twin Earth

In an effort to undermine the view that all facts are In an effort to show that an individual's social or
physical facts, Frank Jackson (1982) presents the physical environment is partly determinative or
example of Mary, a person who has never had constitutive of that individual's mental states,
color experiences, having been confined all her Hilary Putnam (1975) presents the example of
life to a black and white room and denied all access Twin Earth, a planet identical to Earth in all re-
to color-involving visual stimuli. Mary is also a spects but one: the substance that plays the
brilliant scientist who specializes in the neuro- macro-role of Earthly water is not H2O, but a sub-
physiology of vision, and who knows all physical stance with a different chemical structure that Put-
facts (including all neurological facts) about color nam calls XYZ. Putnam imagines two individuals:
 Thought Experiments 391

one on Earth named Oscar, and his molecule-for- described; (b) an intuition concerning the scenario
molecule Twin-Earth duplicate Twin-Oscar. Put- is presented with the assumption that it will be
nam holds that when Oscar says water he refers endorsed, or some argument is presented for why
to water (that is, H2O), but that when Twin-Oscar a particular evaluation of the scenario is correct;
says water he refers to twin-water (that is, XYZ). and (c) this intuition or evaluation is then taken as
So, concludes Putnam, reference is at least partly a datum in understanding something about cases
determined by physical environment. (See also beyond the scenario. So, for instance, in the case of
Burge, 1979 for a number of parallel cases). (See Twin Earth, the imaginary scenario described
Externalism) posits the existence of the planet on which some-
thing qualitatively identical to water has the chem-
ical structure XYZ; the intuition Putnam expects
Searle's Chinese Room
the scenario to evoke is that speakers of English
See the description in opening section. and speakers of Twin-English refer to something
different by their use of the word water; and the
larger lesson is that `meanings [or at least reference]
Zombies ain't just in the head' (Putnam, 1975, p. 227, italics
In an effort to bring out certain issues related to the omitted). In the case of fission, the imaginary scen-
nature of conscious experience and the plausibility ario posits a pair of cases where the relations
of physicalism, numerous philosophers have dis- between the earlier and later individual(s) are
cussed the case of zombies, beings molecule-for- qualitatively indistinguishable, but differ in their
molecule identical to human beings but who lack identity properties; Parfit's arguments aim to show
all conscious experience (cf. Kirk, 1974; Dennett, that this gives us a case where prudential concern
1991; Chalmers, 1996). On the basis of such cases, for a nonidentical continuer is rational; the larger
some have concluded that consciousness cannot be lesson is that `personal identity is not what matters'
fully explained in physical terms. (Parfit 1984/1987, p. 255, italics omitted).
Challenges to particular thought experiments
may come at any of these three levels: (a0 ) inco-
Inverted Spectrum and Inverted Earth
herence criticisms: the scenario described is in
In an effort to illuminate various issues relating some sense incoherent; (b0 ) misleading intuition/
to the status of qualia, materialism, behaviorism unsound argument criticisms: although the scen-
and consciousness, numerous philosophers have ario described is coherent, the intuition it generates
employed a case first introduced by John Locke is unreliable or the argument establishing the cor-
(1689/1975 at II:XXXII:15). In its simplest form, rect evaluation of the scenario is unsound; or (c0 )
the Inverted Spectrum example hypothesizes an inapplicability criticisms: although the scenario de-
individual whose visual experience on seeing, scribed is coherent and the evaluation of the scen-
say, yellow is qualitatively identical to the visual ario correct, the conclusion drawn on its basis is
experience of a normal person seeing, say, blue. mistaken. So, for example, some have argued (a0 )
Variations on the case abound. For instance, in that fission is biologically or physically or concep-
arguing against certain representationalist and tually impossible; others (b0 ) that though the scen-
functionalist accounts of qualia, Ned Block (1990) ario described is coherent, it does not present us
introduces the example of Inverted Earth, a planet with a case where someone would bear a relation of
whose colors are inverted, so that grass on Inverted rational prudential concern to a nonidentical con-
Earth is red and the sky on Inverted Earth is yellow. tinuer; and others (c0 ) that though the scenario pre-
A person is transported to Inverted Earth, and sents a case where someone would bear a relation
given color-inverting contact lenses that cause of rational prudential concern to a nonidentical
everything on Inverted Earth to appear to her to continuer, this does not show that identity is not
be normally colored (cf. also Shoemaker, 1982; what matters for rational prudential concern in
Chalmers, 1996). (See Functionalism; Materialism; ordinary cases.
Qualia)
PHILOSOPHICAL AND EMPIRICAL
Discussion of Common Features of THEORIES OF THOUGHT
the Above EXPERIMENTAL COGNITION
Appellation notwithstanding, such cases tend to Perhaps the most perplexing question raised by the
share the following features: (a) a scenario is technique of thought experiment is the epistemic
392 Thought Experiments

puzzle articulated sharply by Thomas Kuhn: `How, CONTROVERSIES AND ISSUES

relying exclusively on familiar data, can a thought REGARDING THE USE OF THOUGHT
experiment lead to new knowledge?' (Kuhn, 1964/ EXPERIMENTS
1977, p. 241). The question can be broken in two: (a)
how can thought experiments lead to beliefs that Controversies concerning thought experiments can
are properly classified as new? (b) how can thought be divided into two main categories: controversies
experiments lead to beliefs that are properly classi- about the standard interpretations of particular
fied as knowledge? thought experiments, and controversies about the
Classic rationalist discussions answer both ques- utility of the methodology itself. Even those whose
tions simultaneously by suggesting that in cer- concern is with the methodology itself, however,
tain cases, thought experimental reasoning can tend to be opposed to the use of far-fetched
lead to rational insight and thereby give access examples, rather than to the technique of reasoning
to a priori truths (for a modern defence see about imaginary cases as such.
Brown, 1991). Classic empiricist answers, such as Controversies about particular thought experi-
Mach's, suggest that thought experiments provide ments are generally expressions of substantive
access to unsystematized empirical knowledge philosophical disagreements. For instance, debates
itself acquired through experience or evolution. about what, if anything, Mary learns when she
The justification for beliefs formed thereby is thus leaves the black-and-white room; about whether
parasitic on the basic knowledge; their novelty the person locked in the Chinese Room under-
is a consequence of its having been previously stands Chinese and if not, what that shows; about
unavailable in propositional form. Kuhn's own whether zombies are negatively conceivable (not
answer is that thought experiments work by for- a priori incoherent) or positively conceivable (veri-
cing a simultaneous rethinking of conceptual struc- fied by a clearly and distinctly conceivable scen-
tures and the information they contain, and in this ario), and if so what that implies about the status of
way are able to yield beliefs that are both novel and physicalism or the nature of consciousness ± each
justified. involves conducting a significant philosophical
Recent discussions of thought experimental debate primarily through discussion of a parti-
cognition have tended to focus on whether the cular imaginary case. Similarly, debates about
structured contemplation of imaginary examples the proper understanding of particular scientific
produces distinctive sorts of cognitive access, thought experiments ± for instance, Einstein and
rendering thought experiment epistemically indis- Bohr's 1930 debate concerning the clock-in-the-box
pensable. In a series of articles, John Norton (1991, ± can also be understood along these lines (cf. Bohr,
1996) has argued against this position, defending 1949). Occasionally, however, disagreements about
instead the view that thought experiments are a particular case are better understood as disputes
arguments of a certain sort. Norton's view has about the methodology of thought experiment; this
been widely discussed and criticized by those is particularly striking in debates about whether
who, following Mach (1905/1976, 1933/1960), the concept of personal identity is sufficiently
hold that at least some knowledge accessed by far-reaching to deliver reliable intuitions about
thought experiment is nonpropositional or noncon- fission cases.
ceptual, and that contemplation of imaginary cases In general, uneasiness with the methodology of
gives us access to that knowledge in a way that thought experiment tends to be focused on thought
argument alone cannot (cf. Arthur, 1999; Brown, experiments involving far-fetched cases, though
1991; Gendler, 2000, chap. 2). Some, such as there are certain strands of Marxist thought that
Nancy Nersessian (1993) and Nenad Miscevic stress the importance of focusing on the actual
(1992), have tried to make Mach's notion more rather than the hypothetical, and strains of moral
precise by assimilating the technique of thought particularism that suggest that no situation may
experiment to recent psychological work on mental stand in as surrogate for another (cf. Dancy, 1985).
modeling. Others, such as Daniel Dennett (1984), Far more typical, however, are discussions such as
have suggested that many philosophical thought those of Kathleen Wilkes (1988), who expresses
experiments are best understood as `intuition misgivings about the use of wildly fantastic im-
pumps'. Yet others stress the parallels between aginary cases in discussions of personal identity
thought experiments and actual experiments, on the grounds that the intuitions they evoke are
contending that similar explanations can be unreliable as guides to our actual conceptual com-
offered for the utility of each (cf. Sorensen, 1992; mitments. W. V. O. Quine (1972) expresses simi-
Gooding, 1992). lar reservations, claiming that our concepts are
 Thought Experiments 393

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(e.g. Gale, 1991). of Minnesota Press.
Chalmers D (1996) The Conscious Mind. New York and
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Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
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