109 Phil.

629

[ G.R. No. L-14628. September 30, 1960 ]

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of the Court of
Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant, filed with said court of
first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child
of said petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral damages for alleged breach of
promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the later, but
denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered
petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which
was, on February 16 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a
decision the dispositive part of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as

the natural daughter of defendant, and! confirming the order pendente lite, ordering
defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00),
payable on or before the fifth day of every month; sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff
the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and
compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral
damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees
for plaintiff, with costs against defendant."

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual
and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.

The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of
promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance under
writer in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February, 1954, Soledad
advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action,
which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.

Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted
the recovery of damages for breach of promise to marry. Articles 43 and 44 of said Code provides:

ART. 43. "A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract
 marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such
promise is sought."

ART. 44. "If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a
minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration
of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without just cause
refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she
may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.

"The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be
brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage."

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philipipnes, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs.
Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced * * * upon the faith of such
promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the
Philippines deemed it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the
Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

"Articles 43 and 44 of the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these
articles are not in force in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the proposed Civil
Code not only as to the aspects treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is
advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to
betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral
damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing
a marriage engagement to be broken."

Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I,
Title III, Book I thereof:

"ART. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly."

"ART. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed x directly by the future spouses."

"ART. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or
guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a
female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the
parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for
damages in case of breach of the promise."

"ART. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is
not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian."

"ART. 60. In cases referred to in the preceding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected."

"ART. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought."

"ART. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved
party even though a minor without the assistance of his or her parent or guardian. Should
the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action."

"ART. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and
pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering."

ART. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the
affianced parties, who causes a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for
damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected."
 "ART. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall
be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the
promise of the marriage."

These articles were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in
the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:

"The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866.
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that
no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called
Balm suits in many of the American States.

See statutes of:

Florida 1945— pp.

................................................................................................................... 1342-1344
Maryland 1945—
................................................................................................................ pp.1759-1762
Nevada
1943— p. 75
..................................................................................................................
Maine 1941— pp.
.................................................................................................................... 140-141
New Hampshire
1941— p. 223
.......................................................................................................
California
1939— p. 1245
...............................................................................................................
Massachusetts
1938— p. 326
.......................................................................................................
Indiana
1936— p. 1009
.................................................................................................................
Michigan
1935— p. 201
...............................................................................................................
New York
1935
..............................................................................................................
Pennsylvania
p. 450
.........................................................................................................

"The Commission perhaps thought that it has followed the more progressive trend in
legislation when it provided for breach cf promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the
creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years
of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong
direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)"

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and
manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the
award of moral damages made by the lower court is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals
said in justification of said award:

"Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seductive powers, plaintiff-

appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of
her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-
appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from
him under the provisions of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code."

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding
and those following the one cited by the Court' of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph
strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Articles
337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find
ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant—who was around thirty-six (36) years
of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be—when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bifid" him "by paving a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00
for the support of the child; (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly
failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and
compensatory damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The
Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25— consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child—and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.

With the elimination of this award for moral damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutierrez
David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: October 23, 2014

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