TC -02

MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2023

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

(UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.)

IN THE MATTER OF:

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. _____/2023

(Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.)

STATE OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA …………………………………………………………… RESPONDENT

- VERSUS –

PURUSH and Ors. …………………………………………………………………………………….... APPELLANT

HUMBLE SUBMISSION BEFORE THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS

COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND
HARYANA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………3
TABLE OF CASES…………………………………………………………………………3
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………….5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………………………..6
STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………………………….7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES………………………………………………………………….8
ISSUE 1
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE CHARGED
UNDER SECTION 304B OF IPC READ WITH SECION 34 OF IPC?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE CHARGED
UNDER SECTION 498A OF IPC READ WITH SECTION 34 OF IPC?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE OF DECEASED UNDER
SECTION 306 OF IPC READ WITH SECTION 34 OF IPC?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………….9-10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………………11
PRAYER ……..………………………………………………………………………….. 22

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES REFERRED
 Akula Ravinder v. State of AP, AIR 1991 SC 1142
 Arbind Kumar Ambasta v. State of Jharkhand, 2002 Cr. LJ 3973(Jhar)
 Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR (2010) 12 SCC 350
 Atbir v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), AIR (2010) 9 SCC 1
 Brij Bhushan Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 2001 CriLJ 1384
 Chhotanney v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 2013
 Dasrath v. State of M.P., AIR 2010 SC 2592
 Gagan Kanojia v. State of Punjab, AIR (2006) 13 SCC 516
 Gananth Pattanaik v. State of Orissa, AIR (2002) 2 SCC 619
 Inder Raj Malik v. Sumita Malik, AIR (1986) Cr.LJ 1510
 Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 103
 Jivendra Kumar v. Jaidrath Singh & Ors., AIR (2000) 3 SCC 154
 K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR (1976) 3 SCC 618
 Kailyaperumal v. State of Tamil Naidu, AIR 2003 SC 3828
 Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat, AIR (2013) 15 SCC (Cri) 688
 Kansa Behra v. State of Orissa, AIR (1987) SC 1507
 Kashmir Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 2013 SC 1039
 Keshab Chandra Panda v. State of Orissa, AIR (1995) Cr.LJ 174 (Ori)
 Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (2013) 4 SCC 177
 Kundala Bala Subranayam v. State of A.P., AIR 1993 Cr.LJ 1635
 M. Srinivasulu v. State of A.P., AIR (2007) 12 SCC 443
 Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of A.P. AIR (1994) 4 SCC 182
 Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., AIR (2017) 6 SCC 1
 Muthu Kutty v. State of Tamil Naidu, AIR (2005) 9 SCC 113
 Nand Kishore v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 Cr.LJ3706
 Nathu v. State of U.P., AIR 1956 SC 56
 Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1998 SC 958
 Public Prosecutor v. Somasundaram and Ors., AIR 1959 Mad 323
 Rajammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (1993) Cr.LJ 3029 (Mad.)
 Rajbir v. State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 568
 Ram Badan Sharma v. State of Bihar, AIR (2006) 10 SCC 11547
 Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, AIR (2011) 11 SCC 111
 S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., AIR 1996 SCC (4) 596
 Sachin Jana v. State of West Bengal, AIR (2008) 3 SCC 390
 Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR (2005) 12 SCC 72
 Satya Naryan Tiwari v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 Cr.LJ 445
 Shanti Behal v. State of Delhi Administration, AIR 1994 Cr.LJ 2043

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 Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and Others, AIR 1991 2173
 State of A.P. v. Raj Gopal Asawa, AIR 2004 SC 1993
 State of H.P. v. Rajiv Jassi, AIR 2016 (12) SCC 682
 State of Maharashtra v. Shivaji Anandrao, AIR 2002 Cr.LJ 4198
 State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh, AIR 1989 Cr.LJ (NOC) 13 (P&H)
 State of Punjab v. Fauja Singh, AIR (1997) 3 Cr.LJ 170 (P&H)
 State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840
 State of U.P. v. Randhir, AIR 1959 All 727
 Sunil Bajaj v. State of M.P., AIR (2001) 9 SCC 417
 Surender Chauhan v. State of M.P., AIR (2004) 4 SCC 110
 Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (2008) 16 SCC 155
 U. Suvetha v. State, AIR 2009 SC (Suppl.) 1451
 Waikhom Yaima Singh v. State of Manipur, AIR 2011 Cr.LJ 2673
BOOKS/JOURNALS REFERRED:

STATUTES
 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
 The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Act 28 of 1961).
 The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 1 of 1872).
 The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860).
 The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Act 43 of 2005).
BOOKS
 The Indian Penal Code, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, 25th Edition.
 The Indian Penal Code, S.N. Mishra, 22nd Edition.
 The Law of Evidence, K.A. Pandey, 8th Edition.
 Bare Act of The Indian Penal Code, 1860.
 Bare Act of The Indian Law of Evidence, 1872.
DICTIONARIES, ONLINE WEBSITES & WEBSITES
 B.A. Gamer, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition (2004).
 SCC Online
 Lexis Nexis
 Aiyar, P Ramanatha, The Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition (2006)

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION ACTUAL TERM

sec section

ss. Multiple sections

para. paragraph

pp pages

& And

v. Versus

HC High Court

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

Para. Paragraph

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellant, in the instant matter has approached the Hon’ble High Court of
under Section 380 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The
Respondent No.1 humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble High Court .

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Naari, daughter of Pitamah was married to Purush, a police constable on 25th

November, 1982. After the marriage, Naari shifted to her new home where her
husband lived with his father (Ahankar), mother (Agyani), brother (Lovh and
Krodh) and sister (Viskanya).
Soon after the marriage Naari realized that her in-laws were disappointed by the
low dowry given in marriage. They also thought that Naari was a poor match
for their police constable son. Purush proved to be a heartless husband who
often indulged in rebuking and beating Naari for passing family secrets to her
parents. Naari visited her parents whenever she got an opportunity and each
time she narrated the incident of her humiliation, ill-treatment and beatings.
After one of her visits Pitamah accompanied her to her new home and got an
assurance from Ahankar that in future the family would take special care of her
sensitive nature. For about two months, Pitamah received no information about
his daughter.
Concerned about Naari's welfare, Pitamah sent his two younger daughters to the
house of Purush. On 1st June, 1983, Pitamah received intimation from a
neighbour of Purush that Naari had received burn injuries and was lying in a
critical condition in G.T.B. Hospital. Before Pitamah could reach the hospital,
Naari succumbed to the hundred percent burn injuries.
Purush, Ahankar, Agyani, Lobh, Krodh and Viskanya were arrested and put on
trial for an offence under sections 406 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. All
the six accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. Agyani in her statement under
section 313, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 told that while cooking
food on a kerosene stove the deceased caught fire accidentally.
However, neither of the accused had any sign of fire injuries in their person. The
prosecution mainly relies the oral testimony of Pitamah and the two sisters
about the post marriage harassment of Naari.
The trial Court Convicted all the six accused under sections 406 and 498A of
the Indian Penal Code and each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of five years. The accused appealed against their conviction.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE

CHARGED UNDER SECTION 304B OF IPC READ WITH SECION 34 OF
IPC?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR THE OFFENCE

CHARGED UNDER SECTION 498A OF IPC READ WITH SECTION 34 OF
IPC?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE ACCUSED ABETTED THE SUICIDE OF DECEASED

UNDER SECTION 306 OF IPC READ WITH SECTION 34 OF IPC?

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STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS

CONTENTION 1: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR THE

OFFENCE OF DOWRY DEATH READ WITH SECTION 34 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the accused, Purush,
Ahankar, Agyani, Lobh, Krodh and Viskanya are guilty of the offence of
subjecting the deceased. Further, the accused are guilty of causing Dowry Death
under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by ruthlessly setting Naari
alive on kerosene stove due to insufficient dowry. Lastly, the accused are also
guilty under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,1860 as the criminal act is
done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of Dowry
Death. Therefore, the accused are guilty for the offence of dowry death read
with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

CONTENTION 2: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE

CHARGED UNDER SECTION 498A READ WITH SECTION 34 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused, are guilty the
offence of cruelty under Section 498A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 by ruthlessly
Naari heartless husband who often indulged in rebuking and beating and
harassment for low dowry and unlawful demand. Lastly, the accused are also
guilty under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as the criminal act is
done by several persons, in furtherance of the common intention of cruelty.
Therefore, the accused are guilty for the offence of cruelty read with section 34
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

CONTENTION 3: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE

CHARGED DECEASED UNDER SEC 306 READ WITH SECTION 34
OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused, are guilty the
offence of suicide under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 by ruthlessly

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Naari was always harassed by her husband because of his low dowry, due to
which the Naari became mentally disturbed. Lastly the accused are also guilty
under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as the criminal act is done by
furtherance of the common intention of suicide. Therefore, the accused are
guilty for the offence of cruelty read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

CONTENTION 1: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR THE

OFFENCE UNDER SECTION 304B READ WITH SECTION 34 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.

“An impotent beggar believes in begging for money and a potent beggar
believes in begging for dowry”1
1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused, Purush
and other fiver member are guilty for the offences of dowry death under
Section 304B and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 read with
Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
1.1 THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE U/S 304B,
IPC
1.It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the accused is guilty of
offences under Section of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Section 304B of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In this case of Inder Raj Malik v. Sunita Malik2, it
was held by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court that a person can be
convicted both under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as well as under
Section 304B of IPC.
2.Further, Section 4 of the of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 19613 states, “If any
person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or
guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to
ten thousand rupees.”
3. The term "Dowry" as per Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 19614
means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
marriage; or (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any other
person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person at or before or any
time after the marriage. In addition to this, Dowry also refers to the property
1
Sir P.S. Jagadeesh Kumar.
2
(1986) Cr.LJ 1510.
3
The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Act 28 of 1961), s.4.
4
The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Act 28 of 1961), s.2.

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which a woman brings to her husband in marriage, or the effects which the wife
brings to the husband to support the expenses of marriage.5
4. In S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh,6 the Supreme Court was of the
opinion that the phrase demand for dowry' was to be flexibly interpreted. In this
case, this meant that any ‘demand’ of money, property or valuable security
made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his
parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the ambit of ‘dowry’
under the Act.
5. In the instant case, the factum clearly elucidates that Naari did not receive
proper treatment from her husband. Purush was continuously making dowry
demands from time to time from his in laws.7 After a lot of pressurizing a dowry
of Rs 20 lakh was given in the disguise of loan which becomes quite clear when
he refused to return the money, thus asking for the dowry indirectly which
comes under the ambit of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
6. Further, in State of A.P. v. Raj Gopal Asawa,8 it was held that it is not always
necessary that there be any agreement for dowry even demand of dowry on
other ingredients being satisfied is punishable. Also, in Pawan Kumar v. State of
Haryana,9 it was held that when persistent demands for TV and scooter are
made from the bride after marriage or from her parents, it would constitute to be
in connection with the marriage and it would be a case of demand of dowry
within the meaning of Section 304B, IPC.
7. In addition, in Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat,10 persistent
demands were made for money from the bride or her parents after the manage,
for the purpose of business, it was held that it would constitute to be in
connection with the marriage and it would be a case of demand of dowry made
by the accused persons as the constant demand could be said to have fallen
within the ambit of "dowry" since it had touched the roots of the marriage, since
not fulfilling the demand meant the destruction of the marital relations and ill
treatment of the deceased.

Dowry, Black’s Law Dictionary, 581, (8th ed. 2004).

5
6
1996 SCC (4) 596.
7
Moot Proposition 3
8
AIR 2004 SC 1993.
9
AIR 1998 SC 958.
10
(2013) 15 SCC(Cri) 688.

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8. Similarly, in the light of the facts of the case, the accused, Purush is guilty of
the offence of demanding dowry as he used to constantly demand money from
his in laws from time to time and even demanded a loan from his in laws in
1982. Hence, it would constitute to be in connection with the marriage and it
would be a case of demand of dowry.11
9. Moreover, in the absence of there being any specific purpose for demanding
the loan of 50 lac rupees there is a presumption that this amounts to dowry as
was held in the case of Jivendra Kumar v. Jaidrath Singh & Ors,12 it was held
that, any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the
persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at
any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a
married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the
marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point
otherwise."
10. Further, in Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana,13 the Supreme Court
confirmed that where a husband has demanded a specific sum from his father-
in-law and on it not being given, has tortured and harassed his wife, this will
qualify as a demand for 'dowry'.
11. Also, the accused are guilty of the offence of Dowry Death under Section
304B of the Indian Penal Code, 186014 which states, "Where the death of a
woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage & it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand
for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or
relative shall be deemed to have caused her death."
12. In order to prove the guilt of the defense under Section 304B IPC, the
prosecution has to prove following ingredients:
1. The death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or
otherwise than under normal circumstances.15
2. Such death should have occurred within 1 years of her marriage.16

11
Moot Proposition 3.
12
(2003) 3 SCC 154.
13
(2010) 12 SCC 350.
14
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s.304B.
15
Akula Ravinder v. State of A.P., AIR 1991 SC 1142.
16
Arbind Kumar Ambasta v. State of Jharkhand, 2002 Cr. LJ 3973(Jharkhand).

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3. She must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
family member of her husband.
4. Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for
dowry.17
13. In the instant case, all the ingredients of dowry death have been met fair and
square as the death of the deceased happened in other than under normal
circumstances where she was burnt to death. Also, such death occurred within
the one year of her marriage. The deceased was also subjected to cruelty &
harassment by her husband. And such cruelty was in connection of the demand
of dowry of money. Hence the accused is guilty of the offence of Dowry death.
14. Further, in the case of, the Hon'ble court held that that the expression "soon"
is not to be construed as synonymous with "immediate". Days or months are not
what is to be seen. What must be bome in mind is that the word "soon" does not
mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the great
social evil that has led to the enactment of section 304B would make it clear
that the expression is a relative expression. Time lags may differ from case to
case. All that is necessary is that the demand for dowry should not be stale but
should be the continuing cause for the death of the married woman under
section 304B."
15. Further, Section 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 deals with
"Presumption as to Dowry Death' and reads as follows. "When the question is
whether a person has committed dowry death of a woman and it is shown that
soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty
or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall
presume that such person had caused the Dowry Death."
16. Also, in Nand Kishore v. State of Maharashtra,18 it was held that there must
be nexus between cruelty & harassment to raise the presumption under Section
113B of the evidence Act. In the case of Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N.19 it was
held that the presumption under Section 113B shall be raised only on the proof
of following essentials:
1. When the accused is tried for the offence under section 304B.
2. The woman has subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his
relatives.

17
Kashmir Kaur v. State of Punjab AIR 2013 SC 1039; Dasrath v. State of M.P., AIR 2010 SC 2592; Pawan Kumar v.
State of Haryana, (1998) 3 SCC 309; Sunil Bajaj v. State of M.P., (2001) 9 SCC 417.
18
1995 Cr.LJ 3706.
19
AIR 2003 SC 3828.

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3. Such cruelty or harassment was for in connection with any demand for
dowry.
4. Such cruelty or harassment was taking place before her death.20
17. In the instant case, the accused are being tried for the offence of dowry
death as the deceased was subjected to cruelty by her husband for the demand of
dowry. Such cruelty ended up burning the deceased girl and ultimately the death
of the deceased. Further, the presumption can also be drawn from drinking &
beating habits of the husband.
18. Also, the burden of proof in respect of above Sections 3, 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 is under Section 8-A of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961,
which reads as follows. “Where any person is prosecuted for taking or abetting
the taking of any dowry under Section 3, or the demanding of dowry under
Section 4, the burden of proving that he had not committed an offence under
those sections shall be on him.”
19. Similarly, in the case of Shanti Behal v. State (Delhi Admin.),21 the husband
& the mother- in-law of the deceased were charged with harassment, cruelty and
maltreatment & demand of Dowry. The victim’s dying declaration was
corroborated by medical & other evidence and the Hon’ble High Court upheld
the sentence under section 302B.
20. In addition to this, in Soni Devrajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and
Others,22 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Section 304B of the IPC and
the cognate provisions are meant for eradication of the social evil of dowry,
which has been the bane of Indian society and continues unabated in spite of
emancipation of women and the women’s liberalization movement. Also, in
Nathu v. State of UP,23 the Allahabad High Court observed that, dowry death is
worse than murder.
21. In the case at hand, all the ingredients of the above-mentioned crimes are
complete & hence, all the accused are guilty of the offence charged under
Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Section 304B of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860.

20
Keshab Chandra Panda v. State of Orissa, 1995 Cr.LJ 174 (Ori); M. Srinivasulu v. State of A.P. , 2007 (12) SCC
443; Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 4 SCC 177; Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 155;
Ram Badan Sharma v. State of Bihar (2006) 10 SCC 115.
21
1994 Cr.LJ 2043.
22
1991 AIR 2173.
23
AIR 1956 SC 56.

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1.2 THAT THE ACCUSED SHALL BE JOINTLY HELD GUILTY U/S

34, IPC.
22. The accused is also guilty under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
which elucidates that when a criminal act is done by several persons, in
furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for
that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
23. This section is intended to meet cases in which it may be difficult to
distinguish between the acts of the individual members of a party or to prove
what part was exactly taken by each of them in furtherance of the common
intention of all.24 To constitute common intention, it is necessary that the
intention of each one of them was known to the rest of them & was shared by
them.25
24. It is also pertinent to note that section 34 is the rule of evidence. When a
young wife was burnt to death by her accused husband & the in-laws because
they were unhappy over the insufficient dowry, they were held liable to be
convicted under Section 302B read with Section 34.26
25. Further, in Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana,27 it was held that to apply
Section 34, apart from the fact that there should be two or more accused, two
factors must be established: (i) common intention, and (ii) participation of
accused in the commission of an offence.
26. Similarly, in the present case, both the husband and the 5 family member
had the common intention i.e., dowry and this can be perceived from the facts
that the relation between the accused and the deceased was not amicable due to
some differences on various occasions. Further. Since the deceased was residing
in her matrimonial house, it is safe to believe that the co accused, her mother-in-
law, was well aware about the cruelty and harassment meted out to the deceased
in demand of dowry.
27. Hence, the accused are guilty of offences under Section 304B read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

24
Sachin Jana v. State of West Bengal (2008) 3 SCC 390.
25 th
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Indian Penal Code, 34 Edition Lexis Nexis, Section 34.
26
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840.
27
AIR 1999 SC 1083’ Surender Chauhan v. State of M.P., (2000) 4 SCC 110.

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CONTENTION 2: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE

CHARGED UNDER SECTION 498A READ WITH SECTION 34 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.

21. THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE U/S 498A IPC.

28. It is humbly submitted that all the accused are guilty of the offence of
cruelty for dowry under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which
states, "Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years & shall also be liable to fine.28
29. Further, in order to prove the offence under Section 498A the following
conditions must be fulfilled:
a. The women must be married
b. She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment &
c. Such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of the
woman or by the relative of her husband.29
30. In the light of the facts of the case, the deceased. Naari had been married to
the accused, Purush since 25th November, 198230 and she had been subjected to
cruelty by her husband which is evident as the drinking of the husband coupled
with beating, constant abuses and taunts amount to cruelty within the meaning
of Section 198 which refers to
a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman
to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman, or
b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing
her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to
her to meet such demand.

28
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s.498A.
29
U. Suvetha v. State, AIR 2009 SC (Suppl.) 1451.
30
Moot Proposition, 2.

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All this affected her mental health so adversely that she was prompted to slit her
own wrist.31
31. Further, she was also subject to mental harassment as the relationship
between the deceased & her husband continued to be estranged which is evident
as Purush kept on demanding money from his in laws from time to time32 along
with the burden to look after the family and their girl child. Thereby, completely
meeting all the essentials fair and square without a shadow of doubt.
32. Also, the Supreme Court held in the case of Gananth Pattanaik v. State of
Orissa,33 that cruelty for the purpose of offence need not be physical. Even
mental torture or abnormal behavior may amount to cruelty & harassment in a
given case.
33. Similarly in the instant case, along with physical fights. Naari was also
mentally tortured when her husband, the accused vented out his frustration on
her in a drunken state. Moreover, she was even extremely hurt when her
husband blamed her for being from a family of beggars.34 Consequently, she
was pushed towards depression and mood swings35 and even was pushed to the
extent of leaving her matrimonial house.36
33. In Satya Narayan Tiwari v. State of UP,37 the deceased had been subjected to
cruelty by her husband & mother-in-law over the demand of Maruti Car as
dowry and persistently pressed by them after about six months of the marriage
& continue till her death. The accused in this case was convicted under section
498A & 304B IPC.
34. In addition to this, the accused was also subjected to domestic violence as
per Section 3 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
This Section covers both (i) physical abuse and (ii) verbal and emotional abuse.
35. In the instant case, Naari was a victim of domestic violence in the sense of
physical abuse which is evident when on many occasions, fights turned
physical. She was also verbally and emotionally abused after being blamed for

31
Moot Proposition, 4.
32
Moot Proposition, 3.
33
(2002) 2SCC 619.
34
Moot Proposition, 4.
35
Moot Proposition, 6.
36
Moot Proposition, 5.
37
2011 Cr.LJ 445.

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coming from a family of beggars38 which hurt her emotionally, so much that she
tried to slit her own wrist and remained distressed.
36. Hence, the accused are guilty of offence under Section 498A of Indian Penal
Code, 1860.

2.2 THAT THE ACCUSED SHALL BE JOINTLY HELD GUILTY U/S 34,
IPC.
37. The accused is also guilty under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
which elucidates that when a criminal act is done by several persons, in
furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for
that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
38. This section is intended to meet cases in which it may be difficult to
distinguish between the acts of the individual members of a party or to prove
what part was exactly taken by each of them in furtherance of the common
intention of all.39 To constitute common intention, it is necessary that the
intention of each one of them was known to the rest of them & was shared by
them.40
39. It is also pertinent to note that section 34 is the rule of evidence. When a
young wife was burnt to death by her accused husband & the in-laws because
they were unhappy over the insufficient dowry, they were held liable to be
convicted under Section 302B read with Section 34.41
40. Further, in Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana,42 it was held that to apply
Section 34, apart from the fact that there should be two or more accused, two
factors must be established: (i) common intention, and (ii) participation of
accused in the commission of an offence.
41. Similarly, in the present case, both the husband and the 5 family member
had the common intention i.e., dowry and this can be perceived from the facts
that the relation between the accused and the deceased was not amicable due to
some differences on various occasions. Further. Since the deceased was residing
in her matrimonial house, it is safe to believe that the co accused, her mother-in-

38
Moot Proposition, 4.
39
Sachin Jana v. State of West Bengal (2008) 3 SCC 390.
40 th
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, Indian Penal Code, 34 Edition Lexis Nexis, Section 34.
41
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840.
42
AIR 1999 SC 1083’ Surender Chauhan v. State of M.P., (2000) 4 SCC 110.

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law, was well aware about the cruelty and harassment meted out to the deceased
in demand of dowry.
42. Hence, the accused are guilty of offences under Section 304B read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

CONTENTION 3: THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE

CHARGED DECEASED UNDER SEC 306 OF THE INDIAN PENAL
CODE, 1860

3.1 THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF OFFENCE U/S 306 OF IPC

43. It is humbly submitted that all the accused are guilty of the offence of
abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 which
states, "Whoever if any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission
of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.43
44. Further, in order to prove the offence under Section 306 the following
conditions must be fulfilled:
a. There should be a suicide.
b. The person should have abetted in commission of suicide in accordance with
Section 107 of Indian Penal Code.44
3.2 NAARI HAS COMMITED SUICIDE.
45. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that it is evident from the
facts of the case that the deceased has died kerosene stove. Further injury marks
found on the back of the deceased shows that physical cruelty has been
committed upon her in addition to the mental injury.
It is humbly submitted that the fact, Naari was under depression and was taking
medicine after consultation of doctor "suggests that she had knowledge as to
what amount of medicine is to be consumed. Jatin Sharma v. Sonali Chauhan45
can be relied upon wherein it was said by the court that in cases of death due to
drug overdosing under circumstances where matrimonial life is not going
43
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s.306.
44
Kisan Pilaji Gangaram Khatale and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr.LJ 130.
45
Jatin Sharma v. Sonali Chauhan, AIR 1996 SC 230.

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smoothly and one spouse has threatened to commit suicide, it is reasonable to

presume that the case is of suicide.
It is therefore can reasonably be presumed that she has taken the kerosene stove
in excessive quantity intentionally in order to commit suicide only after getting
more depressed because of the incidents happened earlier whereby she was
subjected to cruelty by her husband.
3.3 SECTION 113A OF THE EVIDENCE ACT, 1862 IS ATTRACTED IN
THE INSTANT CASE
46. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court and proved above that the
accused has subjected his wife with cruelty as defined under Sec. 498A of IPC.
Further it is submitted that since Naari has died on 1st June, 1983,46 within one
years of her marriage Sec. 113-A of IEA is attracted in the instant case.
47. The essential ingredients for raising presumption under Sec. 113-A age
following:
1. Wife has committed suicide within seven years of her marriage.
2. That her husband or relative of her husband subjected her to cruelty. 47
In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Yadla Ramga Rao & ors.,48 it has been
held by the High Court that where the husband conduct was cruel to the extent
that it has led his wife to commit suicide in that case the offence of abetment of
committing suicide punishable under section 306 of IPC would be clearly met
out against accused and for that purpose the presumption under Section 113-A
of Evidence Act can be raised against him.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that abetment to commit
suicide is a mental process of instigating a person to commit suicide. Reliance
can be placed on Neni v. State of Rajasthan,49 wherein the facts of the case were
quite similar to the instant case; it was held by the court that such suicide has
been abetted by accused (husband).
It is therefore humbly submitted that in the instant case continuous illicit
relationship of accused with other woman and presence of incriminating
pictures of Riya and some other persons on accused50 and quarrel between
accused and his wife51 clearly suggests that deceased was subjected to cruelty
46
Moot Proposition, 3
47
Jagdeesh Chand v. State of Haryana, 1988 Cr.LJ 1048.
48
State of A.P. v. Yadla Ramga Rao & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 11.
49
Neni v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Cr.LJ 4527.
50
Moot Proposition, 3
51
Moot Proposition, 1

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for a long period of time and has been driven by the acts of the accused to
commit suicide.
In the case of Ramesh Baburao Patil v. State of Madhya Pradesh,52 where
treatment with cruelty meted out to wife was proved and where she committed
suicide within 1 years of her marriage court held that 113-A spring into action
and accused was liable under section 306 of IPC.
It is therefore humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the accused has
abetted his wife to commit suicide and is liable to be punished under Section
306 of IPC.

52
Ramesh Baburao Patil v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2002 Cr.LJ 3364.

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PRAYER

In light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, the Counsels on behalf of the Respondent humbly pray before
the Hon'ble High Court at Punjab and Haryana to kindly adjudge and declare
that: -
a) Appeal filed by the appellant should be quashed.
b) The order passed by the trail court should be reinstated.

AND/OR
Pass any other order which the bench deems fit in the best interest of Justice,
Equity and Good Conscience, and for this act of kindness the Counsels on
behalf of the Respondent as in duty bound shall forever pray.

All of which is respectfully submitted

SD/-
Counsels for Respondent

Memorial on behalf of the Respondent