0% found this document useful (0 votes)
44 views21 pages

Imcc-3 (Respondent) 1

This document is a memorial submitted to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana regarding a criminal appeal involving the appellant, State of Dimrhi, and the respondent, Suresh, who was previously acquitted of murder charges based on claims of legal insanity. The document outlines the jurisdiction, facts of the case, issues at hand, and arguments concerning the admissibility of dying declarations and the reliability of forensic evidence. It emphasizes the defense of legal insanity under the M’Naghten Rule, asserting that Suresh's mental state at the time of the incident precludes criminal liability.

Uploaded by

Alisha Mehta
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
44 views21 pages

Imcc-3 (Respondent) 1

This document is a memorial submitted to the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana regarding a criminal appeal involving the appellant, State of Dimrhi, and the respondent, Suresh, who was previously acquitted of murder charges based on claims of legal insanity. The document outlines the jurisdiction, facts of the case, issues at hand, and arguments concerning the admissibility of dying declarations and the reliability of forensic evidence. It emphasizes the defense of legal insanity under the M’Naghten Rule, asserting that Suresh's mental state at the time of the incident precludes criminal liability.

Uploaded by

Alisha Mehta
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 21

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF
Criminal Appeal No ....... /2024

STATE OF DIMRHI.........................................................................APPELLANT
Versus
SURESH ........................................................................................ RESPONDENT

APPEAL FILED UNDER ARTICLE 134 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF


INDIANA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUSTICES OF THE DIVISION


BENCH OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................2


INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..........................................................................................................3
CASE LAWS REFERRED ............................................................................................................................... 3
LEGISLATION REFERRED ............................................................................................................................. 4
BOOKS REFERRED/LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED ...................................................................................... 4
WEBSITES REFERRED ................................................................................................................................. 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .............................................................................................5
STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................6
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ............................................................................................................7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ....................................................................................................8
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ........................................................................................................9
1. Whether sufficient ground of legal insanity exists so as to exonerate the accused from
liability of murder? .......................................................................................................................9
2. Whether Navita’s dying declaration is legally admissible evidence to support the murder
charge? ........................................................................................................................................12
3. Whether Forensic evidence reliably determinant evidence to prove the offence? .................15
PRAYER .......................................................................................................................................19

Page | 1
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S. No. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM


1 AIR All India Reporter
2 Hon’Ble Honorable
3 Art. Article
4 v. versus
5 INS Indiana Nyaya Sanhita,2023
6 ISA Indiana Sakshya
Adhiniyam,2023
7 SC Supreme Court
8 SCC Supreme Court Cases
9 SCR Supreme Court Reports
10 SCW Supreme Court Weekly
11 ibid ibidem
12 Pg. Page
13 S. Section

Page | 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAWS REFERRED
Sr No. Cases Referred At
1 Queen-Empress v. K.N. Sahasram, 9
ILR (1894) 18 Bom 259
2 Sodeman v. The King, (1936) 55 9
CLR 192
3 Jai Lal v. Delhi Administration, 10
AIR 1970 SC 266
4 Ratan Lal v. State of Madhya 10
Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 1089
5 Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State 10
of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622
6 Shivendra Bahadur Singh v. State 10
of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1968 SC
1347
7 Ashok v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 11
AIR 1988 CrLJ 1738
8 T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of 11
Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 465
9 Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa, 11
(1987) 3 SCC 354
10 Shrikrishna v. State of 11
Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 605
11 Paparchi Goud v. State of Andhra 12
Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1411
12 Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya 12
Pradesh, (1974) 2 SCC 216
13 Kusa v. State of Orissa, (1980) 1 13
SCC 248
14 Nallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional 13
Officer, (2007) 10 SCC 405
15 Ganpat Mahadeo Jadhav v. State of 13
Maharashtra, (1998) 9 SCC 303
16 State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar, 13
(2005) 13 SCC 104
17 Gopal Singh v. State of Madhya 14
Pradesh, (1972) 2 SCC 596
18 Ramchandra Reddy v. Public 14
Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618
19 Bhagwan Das v. State of 14
Rajasthan, (1957) SCR 204
20 Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, 14
(1999) 6 SCC 437

Page | 3
21 Basanti v. State of Haryana, (2000) 15
2 SCC 711
22 Bajrang Singh v. State of Punjab, 15
(2004) 12 SCC 451
23 Hanumant v. State of Madhya 15
Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343
24 Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya 15
Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 458
25 State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh, 16
(1975) 2 SCC 82
26 State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, 16
(2006) 12 SCC 119
27 Rohit Singh v. State of Bihar, 16
(2020) 10 SCC 747
28 Brij Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 16
(1999) 6 SCC 361
29 State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, 17
(2000) 2 SCC 391
30 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State 17
of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116
31 Dahibhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. 17
State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC
1567
32 Bapu @ Gajraj Singh v. State of 17
Rajasthan, (2007) 7 SCC 78

LEGISLATION REFERRED
• The Constitution of India,1950
• The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023
• The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,2023

BOOKS REFERRED/LEGAL DATABASES REFERRED


• Hari Singh Gour, Indian Penal Code (15th Edition, Volume 1)
• Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code (35th Edition)
• Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence (27th Edition)
• Avtar Singh, Principles of The Law of Evidence (24th Edition)
• SCC ONLINE
• AIR ONLINE
WEBSITES REFERRED
1. https://blog.ipleaders.in
2. https://indiankanoon.org/
3. https://ili.ac.in/
4. https://www.scobserver.in

Page | 4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The respondent has appeared before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana in response to the
appeal filed by the appellant by invoking its jurisdiction under Article 134 of the Constitution of
Indiana, which empowers the Supreme Court to hear appeals in criminal cases involving
significant legal questions or cases of acquittal in serious offenses.
Article 134 of the Constitution of Indiana provides;
“Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters
(1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a
criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court-
(a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced him to death;
or
(b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its authority and
has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to death; or
(c) certifies under article 134A that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court:
Provided that an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such provisions as may be made
in that behalf under clause (1) of article 145 and to such conditions as the High Court may
establish or require.
(2) Parliament may by law confer on the Supreme Court any further powers to entertain and hear
appeals from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in
the territory of India subject to such conditions and limitations as may be specified in such law.”

Page | 5
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Suresh and Navita, citizens of the Democratic Republic of Indiana and residents of Dimrhi, were
married in 2015. Initially, their relationship was stable, but after the birth of their daughter,
Jenny, in 2017, Suresh’s behavior became increasingly violent. Navita took Suresh to a
psychiatrist, who diagnosed him with Bipolar Mood Disorder and prescribed treatment, but
Suresh’s aggression persisted.

On 5th December 2017 at 11am, loud noise of fighting, crying and shouting was coming from
the house of Suresh. Manish, a neighbor, found Navita unconscious, bleeding, and injured, with
Suresh hiding a 7-inch axe in the garden. Manish then called the Police and Navita was taken
to government hospital. On 6th December, 2017 Navita gained consciousness and gave her
statement in which she accused Suresh for attacking her with an axe. On 8th December Navita
died because of the injury in her lower abdomen which proved fatal. Suresh who was already
under arrest was charged with Section 302 of the IPC. Suresh pleaded that he was suffering
from bipolar disorder at the time of the offence hence he must be given an exception u/s 84 of
the IPC.

Suresh was found guilty of intentional murder of Navita and convicted under S.302 IPC and
sentenced to 10 years Rigorous Imprisonment by the Sessions Court. The accused feeling
aggrieved by the said judgment preferred an appeal before the High Court of Dimrhi and
accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court acquitted the accused from the charge of murder on having
found that the accused at the time of committing crime was suffering from both legal and
medical insanity.

Page | 6
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether sufficient ground of legal insanity exists so as to exonerate the accused from liability
of murder?
2. Whether deceased dying declaration legally admissible evidence in order to support the
murder charges?
3. Whether Forensic evidence reliably determinant evidence to prove the offence?

Page | 7
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that there exists sufficient ground so
as to exonerate the accused from the liability of murder.

The respondent respectfully submits there is sufficient ground of legal insanity as to


exonerate the accused from liability of murder. Suresh was suffering from a severe menta disorder
that impaired his cognitive ability, rendering him incapable of understanding the nature or
wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offense. There is a well-established principle, "Actus
Non Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea," which, in the literal sense means, an act does not make an
offender liable without a guilty mind. The Intention or guilty mind (Mens Rea) of the offender is
an integral part while committing a crime. The defense has satisfied its burden of proof through
medical evidence and meeting the requirements under S. 84 of IPC and the M’Naghten Rule.

2.) Whether deceased dying declaration legally admissible evidence in order to support the
murder charges ?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that deceased dying declaration does
not meet the legal standards in order to support the murder charges ? The respondent
respectfully submits that Navita’s dying declaration does not meet the standards of
admissibility and reliability under S. 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act. Doubts about her
mental fitness, the absence of corroboration, inconsistencies in her statement, and the
circumstances of its recording undermine its credibility. Furthermore, the statement does not
address Suresh’s established mental condition, failing to refute the defense of legal insanity.
Therefore, the dying declaration cannot be relied upon to support the murder charge against
Suresh.

3.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that the forensic evidence
presented by the prosecution is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The respondent respectfully submits that the forensic evidence presented by the prosecution is
unreliable and insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The fingerprints on the axe
do not establish intent, malice, or the timing of Suresh’s contact with the weapon. Procedural
lapses in evidence handling, lack of corroboration, and the failure to rebut the defense of legal
insanity further weaken the forensic findings.

Page | 8
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. Whether sufficient ground of legal insanity exists so as to exonerate the accused from
liability of murder?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that there exists sufficient ground so as to
exonerate the accused from the liability of murder which the defence will be proving on the
following grounds;
1. The M’Naghten Rule as the Basis for Legal Insanity under S. 84 of the IPC provides;
“Act of a person of unsound mind- Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the
time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act,
or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. This is known as the defense of legal
insanity.”
The M’Naghten Rule, which provides that a person is legally insane if, at the time of the
offense, they were suffering from a mental disorder that rendered them
incapable of understanding the nature of their act or distinguishing between right and wrong. The
M’Naghten Rule focuses on the cognitive ability of the accused at the exact time of the offense,
requiring proof that the accused was mentally incapable of rational judgment or comprehension
due to their mental condition.
In Queen-Empress v. K.N. Sahasram1 the Privy Council held that legal insanity is distinct from
medical insanity and must focus on the accused’s capacity to understand their actions during the
incident.
In R v. Arnold 2 in which Edward Arnold attempted to kill and even wound Lord Onslow and was tried for
the same. The evidence clearly showed that the accused was suffering from a mental disorder. Tracy, J)
observed: "If he was under the visitation of God and could not distinguish between good and evil, and
did not know what he did, though he committed the greatest offence, yet he could not be guilty of any
offence against any law whatsoever."

At the time of the offense, Suresh was experiencing a manic episode caused by Bipolar Mood
Disorder. Dr. Rohit (DW1) testified that this condition caused severe impairments in cognitive
functioning, rendering Suresh unable to comprehend the nature or wrongfulness of his actions.
Thus, the M’Naghten Rule applies, and Suresh qualifies for the defense of legal insanity.
Dr. Rohit, Suresh’s treating psychiatrist, confirmed that Suresh was diagnosed with Bipolar Mood
Disorder long before the incident. The disorder’s manic episodes cause extreme aggression, loss
of self-control, and impaired judgment, making the individual incapable of rational thought or
distinguishing right from wrong.

1 ILR (1894) 18 Bom 259


2 (1724) 16 St. Tr. 695

Page | 9
In Jai Lal v. Delhi Administration3 the Court held that expert testimony regarding the mental
state of the accused plays a critical role in determining whether the requirements for legal
insanity are satisfied.
In Ratan Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh4, It was held that medical evidence is decisive in
proving that the accused was incapable of rational thought or action at the time of the crime.
Suresh’s condition was well-documented, with prior medical consultations and prescriptions for
treatment. Despite these measures, his brother (DW2) testified to multiple instances of violent
behavior, illustrating the uncontrollable nature of his disorder. The expert testimony provided by
Dr. Rohit demonstrates that Suresh was suffering from severe cognitive impairment during the
offense, supporting the claim of legal insanity.
2. Inability to Recall Events Demonstrates Loss of Cognitive Control
Suresh’s statement to the police reveals his inability to recall the events. He claimed that he
found himself holding the axe and did not know how the assault occurred. Such disorientation
and memory loss are consistent with manic episodes in Bipolar Mood Disorder, where
individuals act without awareness or rational control.
In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra5, the Court observed that the accused’s
inability to recall the offense due to mental illness could substantiate legal insanity if
corroborated by medical evidence.
In Shivendra Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh6, it was held that disorientation and lack of
memory can demonstrate that the accused was in a state of unsound mind at the time of the
offense, supporting an insanity defense.
Suresh’s inability to recall the events clearly aligns with his mental disorder’s effects,
demonstrating that he lacked the mental capacity to understand or control his actions. This
supports the claim that he was legally insane at the time of the offense.
Actions taken before or after the crime are not determinative of legal insanity if the accused was
incapable of rational thought during the act.
While the prosecution will highlight Suresh’s act of hiding the axe as evidence of consciousness of
guilt, the defense asserts that this conduct does not negate the fact that Suresh was mentally
incapacitated during the assault. Post-offense actions could have been reflexive or driven by
confusion caused by his condition.

3 AIR 1970 SC 266


4 AIR 1970 SC 1089
5 AIR 1973 SC 2622
6 AIR 1968 SC 1347

Page | 10
In Ashok v. State of Madhya Pradesh7, the Court clarified that post-offense behavior is irrelevant
in determining legal insanity if the accused’s mental state at the time of the offense satisfies the
criteria for unsoundness of mind.
In T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka8, It was held that legal insanity must be assessed based
on the state of mind during the act itself, and post-offense actions do not negate the defense if
medical evidence supports cognitive impairment.
While Suresh attempted to hide the weapon, this action occurred after the assault and does not
reflect his mental state during the offense. The medical evidence establishes that he was
incapable of rational thought at the time, satisfying the legal criteria for insanity.
3. Defense Has Met the Burden of Proof by Preponderance of Probability
the burden of proving circumstances exonerating the accused, such as legal insanity, on the
defense. This burden is lower than the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt and requires
showing that insanity was more likely than not.
The defense has provided substantial evidence, including expert testimony, corroborative witness
statements, and documented medical history, to demonstrate that Suresh was suffering from a
mental condition that impaired his cognitive ability at the time of the offense.
In Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa9, the Court held that credible medical evidence and
corroborative testimony are sufficient to establish legal insanity by a preponderance of
probability.
In Shri krishna v. State of Maharashtra10, It was ruled that when medical evidence strongly
supports the insanity defense, the burden under S. 101 is satisfied.
The testimony of Dr. Rohit (DW1), combined with Suresh’s documented medical history and
corroborative accounts from DW2, demonstrates that it is more probable than not that Suresh
was legally insane at the time of the offense.
Therefore, in light of the above-mentioned grounds, the respondent submits that he qualifies for
the defense of legal insanity under S. 84 of IPC . At the time of the offense, he was suffering
from Bipolar Mood Disorder, which impaired his ability to understand the nature or
wrongfulness of his actions. Medical evidence, including testimony from his psychiatrist,
supports this claim. The prosecution has not disproved his lack of mens rea, and the defense has
met its burden of proof under S. 101 of the Indian Evidence Act .

7 AIR 1988 CrLJ 1738


8 (2001) 2 SCC 465
9 (1987) 3 SCC 354
10 (2000) 3 SCC 605

Page | 11
2. Whether deceased dying declaration legally admissible evidence in order to support the
murder charges ?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that Navita’s dying declaration does not meet
the legal standards of admissibility and reliability required under S. 26 of the ISA, and therefore,
it cannot be relied upon to support the charge of murder which the defence will be proving on the
following grounds;
1. Admissibility of a Dying Declaration Depends on the Declarant’s Mental Fitness at the
Time
S. 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, provides;
“Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is
relevant.- Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who
cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot
be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case
appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases,
namely:—
(a) when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that
person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made
them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever
may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question;”
S. 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act allows the admissibility of a dying declaration if the
declarant is in a fit mental state to make a statement about the cause of their death or the
circumstances of the transaction leading to it.
The respondent submits that Navita’s mental and physical condition at the time of making the
dying declaration raises serious doubts about her ability to provide a coherent and accurate
account of the incident.
In Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh 11, the Court emphasized that a dying declaration
made under extreme physical and emotional stress may lack reliability and cannot be accepted
without corroboration.
In Paparchi Goud v. State of Andhra Pradesh 12, the Court held that a dying declaration should
only be admitted if the declarant was in a fit mental condition, as verified by a medical
professional, to make a rational and voluntary statement.
Navita had suffered severe injuries and was reportedly unconscious before regaining
consciousness to make the statement. There is no medical certification confirming her mental

11 (1974) 2 SCC 216


12 AIR 1967 SC 1411

Page | 12
fitness at the time of making the declaration. In the absence of such certification, the
prosecution’s reliance on her statement is unwarranted.
2. Lack of Corroboration Undermines the Credibility of the Dying Declaration
While S. 32(1) does not mandate corroboration, courts have consistently held that
uncorroborated dying declarations must be scrutinized with caution, particularly when doubts exist
regarding the declarant’s mental fitness or the circumstances under which the declaration was made.

The respondent submits that Navita’s dying declaration lacks corroboration from independent
and reliable evidence. The forensic findings and circumstantial evidence do not conclusively
support her claim that Suresh intentionally attacked her.
In Kusa v. State of Orissa13, the Court ruled that dying declarations, while admissible, require
corroboration when there are inconsistencies or doubts regarding their authenticity.
In Nallapati Sivaiah v. Sub-Divisional Officer14, it was held that dying declarations made without
corroboration or proper verification of the declarant’s mental state should not be the sole basis
for conviction.
The prosecution has not provided corroborative evidence that aligns with Navita’s statement.
While forensic evidence shows Suresh’s fingerprints on the axe, it does not prove intent, nor
does it confirm that the attack occurred as described by Navita. The lack of corroboration
undermines the reliability of the dying declaration.
3. The Dying Declaration Contains Inconsistencies and Cannot Be Relied Upon
The respondent argues that Navita’s dying declaration contains inconsistencies that raise doubts
about its reliability. The statement does not provide a detailed sequence of events or explain how
Suresh, who claims he was unaware of his actions due to his mental condition, committed the
alleged assault.
In Ganpat Mahadeo Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra15, the Court observed that dying
declarations with inconsistencies or ambiguities must be treated with caution, and convictions
should not solely rely on them unless corroborated by other evidence.
In State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar16, the Court held that where a dying declaration is vague or
incomplete, its probative value is diminished, and it cannot be the sole basis for conviction.
Navita’s dying declaration vaguely accuses Suresh of attacking her with an axe but does not
explain the sequence of events or account for Suresh’s claim of unconsciousness. The
ambiguities in her statement weaken its reliability as evidence to support the charge.

13 (1980) 1 SCC 248


14 (2007) 10 SCC 405
15 (1998) 9 SCC 303
16 (2005) 13 SCC 104

Page | 13
4. Declaration made freely
In Gopal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh17, the Court ruled that dying declarations recorded by
police officers must be scrutinized with caution, as they are not recorded by neutral authorities.

The respondent contends that the circumstances under which Navita’s dying declaration was
recorded cast doubt on its voluntariness. The statement was recorded by SHO Rajesh (PW1),
who was not an impartial authority. The absence of a magistrate or medical professional at the
time of recording further reduces the declaration’s reliability.
In Ramchandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor18, the Court emphasized that dying declarations
recorded without the presence of a magistrate should not be relied upon unless corroborated by
independent evidence.
The recording of Navita’s statement by a police officer, without a magistrate or medical
professional to ensure impartiality and fitness, casts serious doubt on its voluntariness. The
possibility of external influence or misinterpretation cannot be ruled out.
5. The Dying Declaration Does Not Align with the Insanity Defense
The respondent submits that the dying declaration does not account for Suresh’s mental
condition at the time of the offense. Suresh was suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder, which
impaired his ability to understand or control his actions. The statement’s failure to consider his
mental state undermines its probative value.
In Bhagwan Das v. State of Rajasthan19, the Court held that a dying declaration must be
evaluated in light of all circumstances, including the accused’s mental state, to determine its
reliability.
In Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab20, it was observed that dying declarations made without
considering the surrounding circumstances, such as the mental state of the accused, might not
accurately reflect the incident.
Navita’s statement does not address Suresh’s established mental condition, which is central to the
case. Ignoring this critical context diminishes the declaration’s reliability and relevance in
determining criminal liability.
6. The Defense of Legal Insanity and S. 101 of the Indian Evidence Act
S. 101 of Indian Evidence Act places the burden of proving insanity on the defense, but it also
requires the prosecution to disprove the claim beyond reasonable doubt. A dying declaration that fails to
address the accused’s mental condition cannot refute the insanity defense effectively.

17 (1972) 2 SCC 596


18 (1976) 3 SCC 618
19 (1957) SCR 204
20 (1999) 6 SCC 437

Page | 14
The defense asserts that the prosecution’s reliance on Navita’s dying declaration does not
discharge its burden of proving intent or malice beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of
Suresh’s documented mental condition.
In Basanti v. State of Haryana21, the Court observed that dying declarations must align with
other evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In Bajrang Singh v. State of Punjab22, it was held that the prosecution’s case must account for all
defenses, including insanity, when relying on a dying declaration.
Application to Facts: The prosecution’s reliance on Navita’s statement fails to disprove Suresh’s
insanity defense, as it does not address his mental incapacity or provide independent evidence of
intent.
Therefore, in light of the above-mentioned grounds, the respondent contends that Navita’s dying
declaration is inadmissible and unreliable under S. 32(1) Indian Evidence Act. There is no
evidence that she was mentally fit to provide a coherent and voluntary statement at the time.
Additionally, the declaration lacks corroboration, contains inconsistencies, and does not
account for the respondent’s mental condition. As such, it cannot be relied upon to establish
guilt.

1. Whether Forensic evidence reliably determinant evidence to prove the offence?


It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble bench that the forensic evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt which the respondent will
be establishing on the following grounds;
1. Forensic Evidence Must Establish Intent Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
S. 39 of the ISA, allows for the admissibility of expert evidence, including forensic analysis, in
cases where specialized knowledge is required to understand the evidence or determine facts in
issue. It reads as;
“Opinions of experts. -(1) When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law or
of science or art, or any other field, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the
opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or any
other field, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts
and such persons are called experts.”
Forensic evidence is admissible under S. 39 of the ISA, which allows expert testimony to
establish facts. However, such evidence must be evaluated critically, particularly in cases
involving mental health defenses where intent is a critical element of the offense.
The respondent submits that the presence of fingerprints on the murder weapon only establishes
physical contact with the axe but does not prove that Suresh used it with intent to kill. Given

21 (2000) 2 SCC 711


Page | 15
22 (2004) 12 SCC 451

Page | 16
Suresh’s Bipolar Mood Disorder and his claim of unconsciousness during the incident, the
forensic evidence is insufficient to establish the required mens rea for murder.
In Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh23, the Court held that circumstantial and forensic
evidence must establish a chain of events that unerringly points to the guilt of the accused and
rules out any hypothesis of innocence.
In Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh24, the Court observed that forensic evidence alone,
without corroboration of intent, cannot sustain a conviction for an offense requiring mens rea.
The forensic evidence only shows that Suresh’s fingerprints were found on the axe. However,
this fact is consistent with Suresh’s statement that he found the axe in his hand after regaining
consciousness. The evidence fails to prove intent or rebut the possibility that Suresh acted
unconsciously due to his mental condition.
2. Fingerprints on the Weapon Do Not Establish Guilt
The prosecution’s reliance on Suresh’s fingerprints on the axe does not conclusively link him to
the intentional assault. The fingerprints could have been transferred before, during, or after the
incident, and the prosecution has not demonstrated when or how the prints were placed on the
weapon.
In State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh25, the Court held that the presence of fingerprints on a
weapon, without evidence of when and under what circumstances they were placed, does not
prove involvement in a crime.
In State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram26, the Court ruled that forensic evidence must be conclusive
and leave no room for alternate explanations to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The mere presence of Suresh’s fingerprints on the axe does not rule out the possibility that he
came into contact with it after Navita was injured, as he claims. The prosecution has failed to
establish that the fingerprints were placed at the time of the attack, rendering the evidence
inconclusive.
3. Procedural Gaps in Collecting and Handling Forensic Evidence
Forensic evidence must be collected, preserved, and analyzed following established protocols to
ensure its reliability. Any deviation from these procedures can compromise the evidence's
integrity and admissibility.
The respondent contends that procedural lapses in the handling of the axe and fingerprint
analysis raise questions about the evidence’s credibility. The prosecution has not demonstrated a

23 AIR 1952 SC 343


24 (2011) 4 SCC 458
25 (1975) 2 SCC 82
26 (2006) 12 SCC 119

Page | 17
clear chain of custody, nor has it provided documentation proving that the evidence was
collected and preserved in accordance with forensic standards.
In Rohit Singh v. State of Bihar27, the Court emphasized that forensic evidence must be collected
and handled in a manner that eliminates the possibility of contamination or tampering.
In Brij Lal v. State of Rajasthan28, it was held that a break in the chain of custody or improper
documentation of forensic analysis could render the evidence unreliable.
The prosecution has not provided detailed evidence of the chain of custody for the axe, nor has it
demonstrated that the fingerprint analysis was conducted without error. These procedural gaps
undermine the reliability of the forensic findings.
4. Forensic Evidence Must Be Corroborated by Other Credible Evidence
While forensic evidence is valuable, courts have consistently held that it must be corroborated by
other evidence, such as eyewitness testimony or motive, to sustain a conviction. Forensic
evidence alone cannot establish guilt, particularly when the mental state of the accused is in
question.
The forensic evidence does not align with Navita’s dying declaration, which is inconsistent and
incomplete. Additionally, the prosecution has not presented any eyewitnesses who saw Suresh
using the axe with intent to harm Navita.
In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh29 the Court held that forensic evidence must align with other
evidence to establish guilt conclusively.
In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra30, the Court observed that forensic
evidence is insufficient unless it corroborates other reliable evidence forming a complete chain.
In this case, forensic evidence is not corroborated by credible eyewitness testimony or consistent
circumstantial evidence. This lack of corroboration weakens its probative value and raises doubts
about its conclusiveness.
5. The Forensic Evidence Fails to Rebut the Defense of Legal Insanity
S. 108 of the ISA places the burden on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused had the required mens rea for the offense. Forensic evidence must not only establish
involvement in the act but also disprove any claim of insanity or cognitive impairment.
The forensic evidence does not address or rebut Suresh’s claim that he was suffering from a
manic episode at the time of the offense. Even if he held the axe, this fact does not establish that
he understood the nature or wrongfulness of his actions.

27 (2020) 10 SCC 747


28 (1999) 6 SCC 361
29 (2000) 2 SCC 391
30 (1984) 4 SCC 116

Page | 18
In Dahibhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat31, the Court held that evidence must
address and disprove the defense of insanity to establish criminal liability.
In Bapu Gajraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan32, it was observed that evidence failing to rebut the
insanity defense cannot form the sole basis for conviction.
The presence of fingerprints on the axe does not negate the fact that Suresh was incapable of
forming intent due to his mental condition. The forensic evidence fails to address his lack of
mens rea, rendering it insufficient to establish guilt.
Therefore, in light of the above-mentioned grounds, the respondent argues that the forensic
evidence, including fingerprints on the axe, is inconclusive and insufficient to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The presence of fingerprints only establishes contact with the weapon, not
intent or malice. Procedural gaps in the handling of the evidence further undermine its
credibility, and the prosecution has failed to rebut the defense of legal insanity, which negates
mens rea.

31 AIR 1964 SC 1567


32 (2007) 7 SCC 78

Page | 19
PRAYER
WHEREFORE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND
AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS HUMBLY PRAYED BY THE RESPONDENT THAT THIS
HON'BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED:
1. Uphold the Acquittal by the High Court: Affirm the judgment of the High Court of
Dimrhi, which acquitted the respondent on the grounds of legal insanity under S. 84 of
the IPC and dismiss the present appeal.
2. Hold that the Defense of Legal Insanity Applies: Declare that the respondent’s mental
condition at the time of the offense rendered him incapable of understanding the nature
and wrongfulness of his actions, thereby meeting the criteria for legal insanity as
provided under S. 84 of the IPC.
3. Disregard the Dying Declaration as Inadmissible: Reject Navita’s dying declaration as
inadmissible and unreliable evidence under S. 32 of the IEA, given the doubts regarding
her mental fitness, inconsistencies in her statement, and the lack of corroboration.
4. Hold that the Forensic Evidence Is Inconclusive: Declare that the forensic evidence,
including fingerprints on the axe, is insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, as it fails to prove intent or rebut the defense of legal insanity.

OR PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT
MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE RESPONDENT SHALL, AS IN DUTY BOUND,
EVER PRAY.

Page | 20

You might also like

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy