Module IV
Module IV
s, re ---- 1\1
is based on a contract of personal service.
~ .
T h ~ h a d relied on the landmark Indian Medic · ·
al Association v. V.P.
· · Shantha (1995 . ). judgeinent,
where doctors were held accountable under the CPA. The
The Court opined that the earlier Judgment in
Supreme Court in D.K. Gandhi questioned this precedent,
Indian Medical Association v. VP Shantha_(1995),
· a review
suggest mg · of V.P. Shantha, which
· cou ld po tent'ia ll Y wh' h h Id doctors accountable ·under tfie
1c . e . CPA
·
lead to doctors also being excluded from the CPA's pu~ie . should be reconsidered. The bench requested that'
w the Chief Justice ofl~dia refer V.P. Shantha for
in the future . The bench's decision was grounded in the idea
review by a larger bench, potentially excluding
that the relationship between a client and an advocafe
doctors from the CPA's scope just as advocates
resembles that of a master-servan{, which excludes advocates
were in this case.
from being covered by the CPA. L.. .:= == --- --- --- --- -'
In V.P. Shantha, the Court had made a clear distinction between
a "contract for services" (where professionals
exercise independence) and a "contract of service" (where one
party is subject to control by another). The
D.K. Gandhi bench, however, revisited this distinction, relyin
g on the Dharangadhra Chemical Works Lt~ v.
State of Saurashtra (1957) judgement, and argued that clients exerci
se considerable control over advocates,
thus classifying their relationship as a "contract of service." This
reasoning has been criticized for overstating
the extent of client control, as advocates often retain significant
professional discretion, much like doctors.
The D.K. Gandhi judgement ha§ been criticized for ignoring key
legislative intent. The CPA 's amendments,
including the addition of services like telecom, demonstrate that
the Act was not meant to be exclusionary, as
s':!_ggested by the Court. Moreover, in V.P. Shantha, the Court had
already clarified that doctors could fall under
the CPA, despite being subject to professional disciplinary contro
ls, an aspect that was overlooked in D.K.
~ i . The decision also ~uggested that professional services
like those offered by advocates and doctors ~e
inherently outside the CPA's purview, even though professions
like journalism are explicitly included. The
bench expressed concern t!_iat bringing all professionals under
the CPA could lead to a flood of litig ~ut
this argument was not supported with evidence. More troubling
was the suggestion to review V.P. Shantha, as
it could undo years of established jurisprudence holding profes
sionals acco?ntable for deficiencies in service.
Cases like Najrul Seikh v Dr. Sumit Banerjee (2024) and
a 2013 Supreme Court judgement on medical
negligence had expanded the reach of V.P. Shantha to hold
medical professionals liable for professional
misconduct, all of which now faces uncertainty due to the D.K.
Gandhi ruling . ---
_ e.-ad :- - ~ - = = ~ ~ ~ ds spoken or
th .::~ - :-
' ::;.==ma1 contempt" mea - ns th he th er by w or
' other act whatsoever
97111~'~
-=-:o-:;f-1;0- cn m e pu icat10n (w g o f any
Act . • ) f the do in
b ·s1"bl e representation ' or oth erwise o any matter or
.
signs, or y v1
W hIC -
.h
· or 1owers or tends to lo w er th e au t~ ority of, any cour
t; or
r
I
I
al is es or te nd s to sc andal1s e, se o f an y ju di ci al proceeding; o
scan. d . . e due cour ice
or te nd s to interfere with , th ct , th e ad m in istration o fjust
mterf er es tends to obst ru
~reJudices, or e w ith , or obstructs or
nds to in te rf er
~nterferes or te er ement o f
m any other m ann
' 1) , th e pe ti ti on er sought enforc
v. Union o fIndi
a & Ors. (201 e Government
oflndia in
t Si ng h B it ta tr od uc ed by th
aninderji ch had been in mber plates
In the case o f M P la te s (H S N P) scheme, whi e re qu ir ed standardized nu
ity Numbe r ty. The sche m the central
the High Secur en tif ic at io n and public safe sp ite cl ea r directives from
e vehicle id
to implement it
de
to regulate vehi
cle
2001 to enhanc l stat es fa ile d go ve rn m en t
features, but, se
vera
in March 2001
by the qmtral bedded
with security e w as no tif ie d iu m -b as ed ho logram and em
he HSNP schem in g a chrom improve
government. T ta m pe r- pr oo f features , includ to pr ev en t ve hicle theft and
across India w ith were intended igence in
pumber plates as si s nu m be rs . These plates sh ow ed re lu ctance or negl
engine and ch es tes
details such as pi te be in g m andated, the stat oc ia tio n o f R egistration Pla
ent capab!h t1es
. Des by the Ass heme's
Jaw enforcem 20 03 , a w ri t petition was filed rt , cl ea ri ng th e way for the sc
the scheme. By Supreme Cou
implementing w hi ch w as dismissed by the
tender proc es s,
iation, highligh
ting
challenging the Se cu ri ty A ss oc
otor Vehicles tor states
jmplementation
.
w as fil ed by the All-India M T he C ou rt is sued a d1rect1ve
r wi;it petitio n ya . not
In 2005, anothe cl ud in g H ar ya na and Meghala fo un d th at m any states had
, in il 2011 , it w as
by various states However, by Apr fering them an
additional
non-compliance in si x m on th s. d of fi ci al s, of
entation with on the concerne states based
to begin implem e C ou rt then called up th e C ou rt to classi fy the
I
ess. The Su pr em om pt in g states.
initiated the proc , pr og re ss re m ained minimal, pr s ag ai ns t th e non -comp liant
y. _Despite this pt proceeding
chance to compl e an d co ns id er initiating contem
complianc scheme.
on their level of ns id er ed by the Court w
ere:
pl em en ta (i on of the HSNP
es co nsions for th e im
The primary issu grant further exte negligence.
h ethe r th e C ou rt sh ou ld
ns titut ed inte ntional default or co ur t due to failure
in
I
y 'W of fi ci al s co nt em pt o f
tion of state liable for co
/ Whether the inac rt A ut ho rity of Haryana was
ns po
r the State Tra 'e ount.ed to
✓ Whethe th e sc he m e. y an d in ac tio n by state authori'ti s am d
impl em en tin g lo n ed dela e w a · t m the
ou rt ex am in ed whether the ro e C ou rt no te d that the schem s m rootor
M
uced ;-; --,...
The · Supreme C rts A ct, I97 I. Th d 41(6) of th e
pt of C ou ns 41 (3 ) an V eh ic les
the Contem . der Sectio b .
contem.pt under . . l lementat,on was mandato un t to issue directives t at must e strictly foll owed
d 1t~ lll
public interest , an sections empower the centra l overnmen h b
. T he se . . . .ial legal challen es to the sche me ac. e n reso Iv ed 2004 '
1t
Act , 1988 -ourt emphasized that the.m ile d t
o act u r over seven ears. The
C . dili ence and fa
by the states. The • udm · g Har ana exhibited. a lack of as willful 1. th si ht .
, mcl
but several states d this. dela unacceptable, m terpreting it neg igence rather an mere over
un rt d
. ns from the Cou , emonstrating a ac of genu I k in e m' t
Supreml! Cou. rt fo • at1o • ns or extensio e n tt o
t se ek cl an fic
The states did no ders.
or
comply with the
1 3 IP a g c
The Court held that the ~ctions
under the Contempt of Courts Ac
. . · th
..
(or ~a~llons) of t~e state au ·1~rities amounted to c1v1\ contempt, as defin~
ful disobedience of a court ord
ti
s
~~-
~~- ~s d.
>$ § .f
(
'-' ~ ,
t. C1v1\ contempt mvolves WI er or judgme1~ 't
and the Supreme Co·urt found the
behavior ofthe State Transp ort Authority of Haryana an d Is ·t ffi ·
o 1cia1s to tit
'
this description. The Court rejecte
d arguments that the delay was · t fon
umn en 1 al or that t I1e states ha d genuin .
ely
relied on legal advice, noting the h . . .
knowledgeable status and respon ·bility of the state aut ont1es . 1 1 - .
this fmding, the ~upreme Court si . J1 me with
· imposed fines on the respons1"bl ffi · \ includmg the Secretary
·
and the Commissioner of the Sta e o 1c1 a s, of Tra nsport
te Transport Authonty · fH
o ary ana . Each official was fined <2,000 . __,
provision for impnso· nm · , with a
ent m case of non-payment. Add. · \I th state was ord
cost of <50,000 to the Suprem 1t1o na Y, _e_ _ _ ere d to pay an
_ _--: ----:--;----:- -.--- exe mp~lary
e Court Legal Servic · es · ee. Th. enalty was inte
· Co mr rutt is P nde d not onl
pumshment but also as a deterr
ent, emphas1z · mg
· the · f ect . y. .as•. a
matters of public safety. importa nce o resp ing cou rt ord ers and pnontlzmg
.
The ruling reaffirmed the judicia
ry's role in holding government
for strict enforcement of court authorities accountabl~ and set
orders related ta public welfare. a ?recedept
state authorities in implementing It emphasized that inaction or
schemes of public importance negligence by
would be met with strict penalti would not be tolerated, and suc
es to uphold the rule oflaw. h conduct
I
,
eld the ame d
n ment,
17 I P a g e
-~".
·.::; ~
:
..... "'
§' 1
CJ '•.
.while Justice Gautam Patel strnck it-down : The·Supreme-Courtintervened, staying
'\ ~ i
the operation of the _9azctt~ -0 'S .
Notification related to the FCU , recognizing the case' s "serious constitutional
questions."
The amendments impose a duty on intermediaries to ensure no flagged content
is hosted, displayed, uploaded,
~hare d on their platfonns, with non-compliance potentially leading to
the loss of their "safe harbor"
immunity under Sectio11 79(1) of tire IT Act. However, significant concern
s arise due to the lack of 71ear
guidelines for what qualifies as "fake, false, or misleading" information.
The amendments encompass an
.;;.;~-; ,e scope, covering all "information" as defined by the IT Act, which
includes not only factual data but
also opinions, critiques, and analyses. J~tice Gokhale's interpretation of
the amendments, wherein she
conc~tualizes_!JUth as an absolute, objective fact, has received criticism for
oversimplifying the nature of
·irrlbr~ati~~- This perspective eq~ information with "truth. " dismiss
ing the nuances of subjective
interpretation and the· potential for government overreach.
_..
Justice Gokhale relies on dictionary definitions to interpret "fake. " "false,
" and "misleadinz , " terms that
remain undefined in both the Rules and the IT Act. She defines "fake" as non-ex
istent, "misleading" as giving
an incorrect or delusive impression, and "false" as anything that contradicts the
truth. These definitions l;ck
precision and objective standards, rendering them ambiguous and arbitr ~.
Additionally, the term ''bus ~
of the central government" is left undefined, expanding the rule's scope unpred
ictably and allowing for a wide
interpretation of what constitutes government-related information. This vaguen
ess in terminology, particularly
when applied to the legal definition of"information," permits broad censorship
powers with no specific legal
standards to guide their application, thus raising concerns of manifest arbitrar
iness.
The landmark S!]reya Singha/ v. Union q,LJndia case serves as a significant precede
nt, highlighting the dangers
of va~e legislative language. In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court invalida
ted Section 66A of the IT Act
for its vague and broad terms, which led to self-censorship as iudividuals feared
criminal liability without a
clear understanding of what content was prohibited. Similarly, the present amendm
ent could lead to a chilling
effect on speech, as intermediaries may indiscriminately censor content to avoid
litigation and potential ~ss
of immunity. By granting the government the power to decide what information
is "fake, false, or misleading"
without clear standards or a graded res.ponse policy, the amendment risks becomi
ng a tool for controlling the
narrative around government activitie.<..
Justice Gokhale also argues that the amendment only mandates "flagging" content
, not its direct removal, as
long as intermediaries demonstrate "reasonable e orts" to revent such
information's s read. However,
without a clear standard for "reasonable efforts, " intermediaries are left with
little guidance, incentivizing
them to over-remove flagged content to avoid penalties. This broad regulato
ry power, devoid of specific
guidelines, effectively allows the government to shape online discourse, as
any i::ontent inconsistent with the
_government's narrative may be flagged and removed without due process.
li se t10nal nature, is f h-
~ it ma y, by its fic a as1s Th
. vagueness. lea ves cit ize ns .
unsure o w ether
red 'fake •l''alse, or 111.1sleadina ,, h
~ ·''" · ·11 b conside .
pre ss1 on e Th . tnc. t1v .
1✓,:ex d
WI
. . . . , t us fos term tr self:-c ens ors hi
. 1s res e
.
11' ,r
s the ac tive and infio d ipa tio h d.
, \1,ronm•ent . . un erm me rm e pa rtic cracy requir , es sti ff
. . ns mu n bt at demo mg 1scourse on
efl •·
bli c int ere st. Co nseq uently th ese 1·llntta tto . .
easonableness
atters ot .pu ,
st e scrutm1zed under the test ofr
,ri titu tio
' as per Article 19 (2) of the Indian Cons n, a test that as th ~s_ec_o_n-d:p..a:..:.
:.: rt_:o:.:f_~th: e~a:n:a:.:ly_:s~1s_:':vi~ll~e~x~pl~o~
re. the
d fi ·1 exce ssi ve d . ~• ~ ~e
amen ment at s to meet due to its arbitrary scope.
""=== - - - - - - - - -- - - - ~an
( Contempt by Lawyers
mi scond t Of 1awyer such a · · I · . the jud ge. im posing
The uncourteous conduct or uc a s usm g ms u tm g wo rds agam st
the jud h .d. nin favorable
scandalous allegations on 1
n~g ~r sup pre ssi ng the facts and evidence for obtai
at th . dge, contempt of court.
ju gmen , ur mg a shoe g Jud ge to be pa rtia l, biase , un arr amounts to
~llegm of
- A lawyer who advises
his / J~ ge,
th gm en t or the ord er of the court is guilty of contempt
c ten s to disobey e jud . to him by the court, he is liable
court Further • wh en a 1awyer refuses or I·g to answer the question asked
· no. res emperate or
-~-r_c...,ontem t Of urt. The lawyer in his I d · s or arguments cannot use language which is int
----fo
P co . ., P ea mg
r dermines the dignity of the
court.
. loses his. temper 111 .
~p ar iamentary, which un · d · . . shouts or yells at him
, ,
ctfui to th e JU ge, questions his authonty
A lawyer who is disrespe s insulting or abusive langu
age, dictates the
pe ach me nt or tra nsf er, use
ge with im nistration of ~ e
~he court, threatens the jud es any act tha t int erferes or obstructs the admi
t, or do ,
J_udge to pass a favorable
judgmen
fou nd ed and fal se all ega tio ns of conuption on the judge
urt. A lawyer imposing tm rt, conV111cing the client to ma
ke a
amounts to contempt of co app eal to the app ell ate cou
unfair as a ground of tempt of court. Moreover,
a lawyer
accusing the judge to be tes tim am ou nts to con
ments ive false actiQg_ as
false affidavit, false docu ing bac k eve n aft er rep eat e regues s y 1e client, or
the client and not giv
withholding the ~d s of ficati on also amounts to contempt of
court.
g neces sary qu ali d his shoe towards
a lawyer without havin oca te cha nte d slo gans in court and even hurle
case, 1999 , the adv cate's
In re Na nd lal Ba lw an i pt of cou rt and wa s pu nis hed for the same. The advo
as gross criminal contem nafide and was made only to
escape
the court. This was taken t it wa s no t gen uin e or bo
court by saying tha
apology was rejected by the
punishment.
.
Magistrates persons acting
Contem_Jtt by Judges & urt Act, 1971 provides that judges, magistrates, and other
~s
{J j)J f the Contempt of Co
Section ~. However, this__section do
er co
for con tem pt of the_ir courts or a~y oth urt m
judicially can als o be held liable
the Jud ges or ma gis trate relatmg to any subordmate co
n or remark made by by the subordinate co ~. A jud
ge who
not apply to any observatio acd ec acj nd gm eo t pas sed
or revision of aoy confidence and
case of any pending appeal e he is hea rin g by his over actions or words loses the
rty to the cas cannot
insults the lawyer or any pa the adm inistra tio n of jus tice. A judge during a hearing
tru st of the people and the
reby also interferes "in ch an act b a ·ud e amount
to
· ·
ve the cou
~k a counsel to et out or lea
the
contempt of his court. tha t the law dec lared by the Supreme Court which is
itution of bidia pro~ des made by the
Article 141 of the Const in
_ Ind ia. Fu rth er, Art ic~ e 227 states that the ruling
g on all co~ts court conflicts with
apex court of India is bindin ma te cou rts exc ept when ~ Judgment of the high
sub ord tbe
High court shall be bindin
g on all
ord ina te cou rt not fol
_ low in i noring, or disobeying
Court ._In case o~ a sub ge or .
that passed by the Supreme am ou nts to con tem pt of the supenor court. In case ofju strate
law laid down by its superior .
court 1t d C wt h
. or avo1.d.mg the b.md.m .u ment assed b the Hi h 0 t en he
nn
0 f- sub
ordinate court purposely 1gno ord
.
ma te cou rt
or . d
had knowledge of the order m gment of ~e
rt. Wh .en the sub .
. li·able for contempt of cou . then
. y be held hab
1t ma le for cont~pt.
1s and deliberat ely disregard s 1t
H i~ Court
19 jP a ge
o'" •
~
0 ~
~ ·R
- ate
~f the judge or magistr ·
scandalizes, uses abusive language, acts furiously, lowers t.he aut hon~y
. of
the coun,
ii/ .
'\' "
f.;,
interferes in the judicial proceeding or administration of justice, or is found
acceptmg any kmd of · or
illegal grati cation for passing favorable judgment is also liable for contempt
of court. The Judicial Officers
Protection Act, J850, protects the persons acting as judicial officers from
contempt proc e~s. The
immunity or the protection granted under this Act applies to acts of Jud~es, Magist
rate, Justice of the peace,
Collector or other persons acting judicially in good faith within jurisdiction while
' .
discharging their duties.
In re: Justice C.S. Karn an is a landmark in Indian legal history, as it marks
one of the rare instances where a
sitting judge of a High Court was held in contempt by the Supreme Court.
The case primarily centers on
Justice Kaman's actions and statements that challenged the judiciary's ·integrit
y, leading to unpreceden~d
)egal proceedings against him. Justice Kaman was appointed as a judge of the
Madras High Court in 2009.
His tenure, however, was marked by several controversies, including allegations
of caste-based discrimination
and misconduct. In 2011, he complained to the National Commission for Schedu
led Castes (NCSC), allegipg
c~e-based harassment by fellow judges at Madras High Court. Despite these
claims, there was no immediate
legal action, and the issue remained unresolved, signaling the beginning of a series
of contentious incidents.
Justice Karnan's behavior escalated over the years. In 2014, he interrupted court
proceedings at the Madras
High Court, accusing the bench of bias in the appointment of judges.
This act was seen as highly
unconventional and disrespectful, prompting the Supreme Court to note the indeco
rous nature of his protesr
Subsequent Chief Justices of the Madras High Court reported incidents involvi
ng Justice Kaman, including
aggressive outbursts, unauthorized orders, and accusations against fellow judges.
He even issued suo motu
orders against administrative decisions, which were later stayed by the High Court
and the Supreme Court.In
2016, Justice Kaman was transferred to the Calcutta High Court. Instead of
complying, he stayed his own
transfer order and challenged the Supreme Court's authority, citing caste discrim
ination as the reason for his
defiance.
'
Justice Karnan's actions culminated in 2017 when l!_e wrote letters to the Prime
Minister, alleging com1ption
against 20 judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts The Supreme Court
initiated suo motu contempt
- proceedings, a rare move signaling the severity of the situation. Justice Kaman
refused to attend the contempt
proceedings and instead asked for a compensatory amount of Rs 14 crore
from the seven-judge bench
for "disturbing his mind and normal life". A seven-judge bench, led by then
Chief Justice J.S. Khehar,
stripped Justice Kaman of his judicial and administrative duties. Justice Kaman
responded defiantly, Justice
Kaman "ordered" the seven-judge bench to appear before him at his "residential
court," to face proceedings
.for insulting him in open court, issued non-bailable warrants against the seven
judges ordered the CBI to prqbe
his allegations against them, directed the Air Control Authority "On merits,
we are of the considered view, that
to restrain the seven judges from flying abroad and finally Sri Justice
C.S. Kaman, has committed
convicted the bench under the SC/ST Act for a term of 5 years. contempt of
1 the ;udiciary. His actions constitute
Ju_s_tl_c_e_Ka
_ rn
_a_n- re_fu_s_e_d:-t-o_a_tt_e-nd-:-:th:--e- c_o_n-te_m
_p_t_p_r_o_ce-e-:d::-in-g'-s-a-nd contempt of th is Court, and of th e Judiciary of
continued issuing orders, including a directive for the CBI to the gravest nature. ·Having found him guilty of
committing contempt, we convict him
i,nvestigate the judges. This prompted the Supreme Court to accordingly.
We are satisfied to punish him by
fssue a bailable warrant for his appearance, a first in Indian sentenc(ng
him to imprisonment for six months.
judicial history for a sitting judge. Justice Kaman ignored t~e perform As a consequence, the contemnor shall not
any administrative or judicial
warrant and escalated his actions by "convicting" the seven- functwns, "the
seven Judge Rench headed by
juage bench of the Supreme Court in his own "residential court." C~f Justice
IS Khehar had then observed.
Toe Supreme Court found Justice Kaman guilty of criminal contempt of cou~,
sentencing him to six ~on~s
· of imprisonment, the maximum punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. The Court also drrected
l
- - -- ----
21 P ag e
J
remarks arc aimed to · · e Court and administration o f justice, then it
wou~d be
treated as 'contempt of Co,m:t' •
23 IP ag e