CISM
CISM
Study Guide
Exam CISM
CONTENTS AT A GLANCE
Part V
Glossary
Introduction
Part V
Figure Credits
Figure 2-1 Courtesy Xhienne: SWOT pt.svg, CC BY-SA 2.5,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2838770.
Figure 2-2 Adapted from the Business Model for Information Security,
ISACA.
Figure 2-3 Adapted from the University of Southern California Marshall
School of Business Institute for Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection, USA.
Figure 2-5 Courtesy The Open Group.
Figure 2-7 Courtesy High Tech Security Solutions magazine.
Figure 3-1 Source: National Institute for Standards and Technology.
Figure 6-8 Courtesy Bluefoxicy at en.wikipedia.org.
Figure 7-4 Source: NASA.
Figure 7-6 Courtesy Gustavo Basso.
Figure 7-7 Courtesy John Crowley at en.wikipedia.org.
The dizzying pace of information systems innovation has made vast expanses
of information available to organizations and the public. Design flaws and
technical vulnerabilities often bring unintended consequences, usually in the
form of information theft and disclosure. Attacks from nation-states and
cybercriminal organizations are increasing dramatically. The result is a
patchwork of laws, regulations, and standards such as Sarbanes–Oxley,
GDPR, CCPA, Gramm–Leach-Bliley, HIPAA, PCI DSS, PIPEDA, NERC
CIP, CMMC, and scores of U.S. state laws requiring public disclosure of
security breaches involving private information. The relatively new
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has become a
prominent voice in the United States, and executive orders require
organizations to improve defenses and disclose breaches. As a result of these
laws and regulatory agencies, organizations are required or incentivized to
build or improve their information security programs to avoid security
breaches, penalties, sanctions, lawsuits, and embarrassing news headlines.
These developments continue to drive demand for information security
professionals and information security leaders. These highly sought-after
professionals play a crucial role in developing better information security
programs that reduce risk and improve confidence in effective systems and
data protection.
The Certified Information Security Manager (CISM) certification,
established in 2002, has become the leading certification for information
security management. Demand for the CISM certification has grown so much
that the once-per-year certification exam was changed to twice per year in
2005 and is now offered continually. In 2005, the CISM certification was
accredited by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) under the
international standard ISO/IEC 17024:2012 and is also one of the few
certifications formally approved by the U.S. Department of Defense in its
Information Assurance Technical category (DoD 8570.01-M). In 2018 and
• The topics covered in each chapter are listed in the first section to help
map out your study.
• Tips in each chapter offer great information about how the concepts
you’re reading about apply in a place I like to call “the real world.”
Often, they may give you more information on a topic covered in the
text.
• Exam Tips are included to highlight areas you need to focus on for the
exam. They won’t give you any exam answers, but they help you know
about important topics you may see on the test.
• Notes may be included in a chapter as well. These bits of information
are relevant to the discussion and point out extra information.
• Fifteen practice questions at the end of each chapter are designed to
enable you to attempt some exam questions on the topics covered in
the domain.
• Access to an online question bank is available from TotalTester
Online, customizable practice exam software with 300 practice exam
questions.
• A glossary contains about 650 terms used in the information security
management profession.
Experience Requirements
To qualify for CISM certification, you must have completed the equivalent of
five years of total work experience in information security management.
Additional details on the minimum certification requirements, substitution
options, and various examples are discussed next.
All work experience must be completed within the ten-year period before
completing the certification application or within five years from the date of
initially passing the CISM exam. You will need to complete a separate
Verification of Work Experience form for each segment of experience.
Two Years
• Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) in good standing
• Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) in good
standing
• MBA or master’s degree in information security or a related field;
transcripts or a letter confirming degree status must be sent from the
university attended to obtain the experience waiver
One Year
• Bachelor’s degree in information security or a related field
• Skill-based or general security certification
• One full year of information systems management experience
The candidate would need to send the following with their application to
prove the experience requirements are met:
TIP Read the CISM certification qualifications on the ISACA web site.
ISACA changes the qualification rules from time to time, and I want you to
have the most up-to-date information available.
Exam Questions
Exam Coverage
The CISM exam is quite broad in its scope. It covers four job practice areas,
as shown in Table 2.
NOTE You are not permitted to display the CISM moniker until you have
completed certification. Passing the exam is not sufficient to use the CISM
anywhere, including e-mail, résumés, correspondence, or social media.
After you’ve submitted the application, you will wait approximately eight
weeks for processing. Then, if your application is approved, you will receive
an e-mail notification, followed by a package in the postal mail containing
your letter of certification, certificate, and a copy of the Continuing
Professional Education Policy. You can then proudly display your certificate
and use the “CISM” designation on your résumé, e-mail, social media
profiles, and business cards.
NOTE You are permitted to use the CISM moniker only after receiving
your certification letter from ISACA.
Continuing Education
The goal of professional continuing education requirements is to ensure that
individuals maintain CISM-related knowledge to help them successfully
develop and manage security management programs. To maintain CISM
certification, individuals must obtain 120 continuing education hours within
• Name of attendee
• Name of sponsoring organization
• Activity title
• Activity description
• Activity date
• Number of CPE hours awarded
Revocation of Certification
A CISM-certified individual may have his or her certification revoked for the
following reasons:
Volunteer
As a nonprofit organization, ISACA relies upon volunteers to enrich its
programs and events. There are many ways to help, and one or more of these
volunteer opportunities may suit you:
Summary
Becoming and being a CISM professional is a lifestyle, not just a one-time
event. It takes motivation, skill, good judgment, persistence, and proficiency
to be a strong and effective leader in information security management. The
CISM certification was designed to help you navigate the security
Supporting Tasks in the CISM job practice that align with the Information
Security Governance / Enterprise Governance domain include:
These and other governance activities are carried out through scripted
interactions among key business and IT executives at regular intervals.
Meetings will include a discussion of the impact of regulatory changes,
alignment with business objectives, effectiveness of measurements, recent
incidents, recent audits, and risk assessments. Other discussions may include
changes to the business, recent business results, and any anticipated business
events such as mergers or acquisitions.
There are two key results of an effective security governance program:
Business Alignment
An organization’s information security program needs to fit into the rest of
the organization. This means that the program needs to understand and align
with the organization’s highest-level guiding principles, including the
following:
• Mission Why does the organization exist? Who does it serve and
through what products and services?
• Goals and objectives What goals does the organization hope to
achieve, and when does it want to accomplish them?
• Strategy What activities need to occur to fulfill the organization’s
goals and objectives?
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture is the term that describes how people within an
organization treat one another and how they get things done. Many
organizations establish a set of values that defines the norms of professional
behavior. Terms such as respect, collaboration, and teamwork are often used
in these values. Some organizations publish formal value statements and print
them for display in lobbies, offices, and conference rooms.
The way an organization’s leaders treat one another and the rest of the
organization’s employees sets an example for behavioral norms. Often, these
Ethics
Most organizations, particularly professional ones, have requirements for a
code of conduct or professional ethics. This is especially true in the
cybersecurity and risk management professions. These codes of ethics
regulate the behavior of professionals and ensure that those professionals
maintain high standards of conduct. Most industry-recognized professional
certifications also require adherence to a code of ethics, and ISACA is no
exception.
ISACA’s Code of Professional Ethics is available at
www.isaca.org/credentialing/code-of-professional-ethics and is imposed
upon all organizational members and certification holders. If a professional
bound to uphold those ethical standards fails to do so, ISACA implements
procedures for filing a complaint. The ISACA Code of Professional Ethics
includes provisions for the following (paraphrased here):
Organizational Roles
Information security governance is most effective when every person in the
organization knows what is expected of them. Better organizations develop
formal roles and responsibilities so that personnel will have a clearer idea of
their part in all matters related to the protection of systems, information, and
• IT auditor
• Systems engineer
• Accounts receivable manager
• Individual contributor
• Supervisor
• Manager
• Senior manager
• Director
• Senior director
• Executive director
• Vice president
• Senior vice president
• Executive vice president
• President
• Chief executive officer
• Member, board of directors
• Advisor, board of directors
Note that this should not be considered a complete listing of ranks. Larger
organizations also include the modifiers assistant (as in assistant director),
general (general manager), managing (managing director), and first (first
vice president).
A responsibility is a statement of activities that a person is expected to
perform. Like roles, responsibilities are typically documented in position
descriptions and job descriptions. Typical responsibilities include the
following:
RACI Charts
Many organizations utilize RACI (Responsible, Accountable, Consulted,
Informed) charts to denote key responsibilities in business processes,
projects, tasks, and other activities. A RACI chart assigns levels of
responsibility to individuals and groups. The development of a RACI chart
helps personnel determine roles for various business activities. A typical
RACI chart follows.
This RACI chart specifies the roles carried out by several parties in the
user account access request process.
The four roles in a RACI chart are defined as follows:
Often, one or more board members will have business finance experience
to bring financial management oversight to the organization. In the case of
U.S. public companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires board members to
form an audit committee; one or more audit committee members are required
to have financial management experience. External financial audits and
internal audit activities are often accountable directly to the audit committee
to oversee the organization’s financial management activities. As the issue of
Executive Management
Executive management is responsible for carrying out directives issued by
the board of directors. Information security management includes ensuring
that sufficient organizational resources are devoted to implementing a
security program and developing and maintaining security controls to protect
critical assets.
Executive management must ensure that priorities are balanced. In the
case of IT and information security, these functions are usually tightly
coupled but sometimes in conflict. IT’s primary mission is to develop and
operate business-enabling capabilities through the use of information
systems, while information security’s mission includes risk management,
security, privacy, and compliance. Executive management must ensure that
these two sometimes-conflicting missions are successful.
Typical IT- and security-related executive position titles include the
following:
Custodial Responsibilities
In many organizations, asset owners are not involved in the day-to-day
activities related to managing their assets, particularly when those assets are
information systems and the data stored within them. Instead, somebody (or
several people) in the IT organization acts as a proxy for asset owners and
makes access grants and other decisions on their behalf. While this is a
common practice, it is often carried too far, resulting in the asset owner being
virtually uninvolved and uninformed. Instead, asset owners should be aware
of, and periodically review, activities carried out by people, groups, and
Software Development
Positions in software development are involved in the design, development,
and testing of software applications.
Data Management
Positions related to data management are responsible for developing and
implementing database designs and maintaining databases. These positions
are concerned with data within applications and data flows between
applications.
EXAM TIP The roles of data manager, database architect, big data
architect, database administrator, database analyst, and data scientist are
distinct from data owners. Don’t confuse them on the exam. The former are
IT department roles for managing data models and data technology, whereas
the latter (data owner) governs the business use of and access to data in
information systems.
Network Management
Positions in network management are responsible for designing, building,
monitoring, and maintaining voice and data communications networks,
including connections to outside business partners and the Internet.
Systems Management
Positions in systems management are responsible for the architecture, design,
building, and maintenance of servers and operating systems. This may
include desktop operating systems as well. Personnel in these positions also
design and manage virtualized environments and microsegmentation.
IT Operations
Positions in operations are responsible for day-to-day operational tasks that
may include networks, servers, databases, and applications.
When cloud development and operations are more common, the word
“cloud” may eventually disappear from these and other job titles.
Business Resilience
Personnel in positions related to business resilience are responsible for
various activities that ensure the organization can continue operations despite
disruptive events.
Security Audit
Service Desk
Positions at the service desk are responsible for providing frontline support
services to IT and IT customers.
Quality Assurance
Positions in quality assurance are responsible for evaluating IT systems and
processes to confirm their accuracy and effectiveness.
Other Roles
Other roles in IT and security organizations include the following:
General Staff
The rank and file in an organization may or may not have explicit
information security responsibilities, as determined by executive
management’s understanding of the broad capabilities of information systems
and the personnel who use them.
Typically, general staff security-related responsibilities include the
following:
Monitoring Responsibilities
The practice of monitoring responsibilities helps an organization confirm that
the correct jobs are being carried out in the right way. There is no single
approach, but several activities provide information to management,
including the following:
Chapter Review
Information security governance is the top-down management and control of
security and risk management in an organization. Governance is usually
undertaken through a steering committee that consists of executives from
throughout the organization. The steering committee is responsible for setting
overall strategic direction and policy, ensuring that security strategy aligns
with the organization’s IT and business strategy and objectives. The
directives of the steering committee are carried out through projects and tasks
that steer the security organization toward strategic objectives. The steering
committee can monitor progress through metrics and a balanced scorecard.
For an information security program to be successful, it must align with
the business and its overall mission, goals and objectives, and strategy. The
security program must consider the organization’s notion of asset value,
culture, risk tolerance/appetite, legal obligations, and market conditions. A
successful and aligned security program does not lead the organization but
enables and supports it to carry out its mission and pursue its goals.
Security governance is accomplished using the same means as IT
governance: it begins with board-level involvement that sets the tone for risk
appetite and is carried out through the chief information security officer, who
develops security and privacy policies, as well as strategic security programs,
including software assurance, change management, vendor management,
configuration management, incident management, vulnerability management,
security awareness training, and identity and access management.
Security governance is used to establish roles and responsibilities for
security-related activities throughout all layers of the organization, from the
board of directors to individual staff. Roles and responsibilities are defined in
job descriptions, policy and process documents, and RACI charts.
The board of directors in the defined team is responsible for overseeing all
activities in an organization. Boards select and manage a chief executive
Notes
• The addition of information security as part of fiduciary duty by board
members and executives is an important and growing trend in business
today.
• Security executives and the board of directors are responsible for
implementing a security governance model encompassing information
security strategy and mandates. As a result, the industry is seeing a
shift from a passive to a more active board with regard to cybersecurity
issues.
• A security program should align with the organization’s overall
Questions
1. An organization is subject to healthcare regulations that govern
individual health data protection requirements. Which of the following
describes this type of governance?
A. External
B. Internal
C. Regulatory
D. Professional
Answers
1. A. Laws and regulations are a form of external governance.
2. B. This describes an external source of governance in the form of
Supporting Tasks in the CISM job practice that align with the Information
Security Governance / Information Security Strategy domain include:
Strategy Objectives
A strategy is the plan to achieve an objective. The objective (or objectives) is
the desired future state of the organization’s security posture and level of risk.
There are, in addition, objectives of a strategy. These objectives are as
follows:
• Business alignment The desired future state, and the strategy to get
there, must be in alignment with the organization and its strategy and
objectives.
• Risk appetite alignment An organization’s information security
program implicitly drives an organization toward a specific level of
risk, which may or may not align with the organization’s true level of
risk appetite.
• Effective risk management A security program must include a risk
Strategy Participants
An information security leader needs to involve a number of key stakeholders
and others in developing a strategy that is business aligned and that has a
reasonable chance to succeed. The most important resources for the
development of an information security program strategy are the opinions,
observations, and analytical abilities of a number of key personnel in the
organization, including the following:
Strategy Resources
Before a strategy can be developed, it is first necessary to understand
everything that is in place currently. A strategy describes how goals and
objectives are to be met. Without knowing the starting place of a journey, it is
not possible to chart a course to the journey’s destination. Before future
security capabilities can be mapped out, it’s necessary to understand an
organization’s current state and capabilities. The differences can be seen as a
gap that needs to be filled, whether that means employing tools, technologies,
skills, policies, or practices.
More than simply defining point A in a journey to point B, existing
resources also paint a picture of an organization’s current capabilities,
including behaviors, skills, and practices, and how they contribute to the
organization’s current security posture.
Two types of inputs must be considered: those that will influence the
development of strategic objectives, and those that define the current state of
• Risk assessments
• Threat assessments
When suitable risk and threat assessments have been completed, the
security strategist can then develop strategic objectives, or, if they have been
created already, validate that the established strategic objectives will
satisfactorily address risks and threats identified in those assessments.
Next, security strategists can examine several other inputs that help them
understand the workings of the current security program, including the
following:
• Risk assessments
• Threat assessments
• Policy
• Standards
• Guidelines
• Processes and procedures
• Architecture
• Controls
• Skills
• Metrics
• Assets
• Risk register
• Vulnerability assessments
• Insurance
• Critical data
• Business impact analysis
• Security incident log
• Outsourced services
Risk Assessments
A strategist should choose to have a risk assessment performed to reveal risks
present in the organization. This helps the strategist understand threat
scenarios and their estimated impact and frequency of occurrence. The results
of a risk assessment give the strategist valuable information on the types of
resources required to bring risks down to acceptable levels. This is vital for
developing and validating strategic objectives.
Any historical record of risk assessments may give the strategist a better
idea of the maturity of the organization’s security program, as well as an
indication of whether risks in the past had been mitigated. If older risk
assessments indicate significant risks that are still present in newer risk
assessments, or if risk assessments are performed only for compliance
purposes and not for making actual improvements in the organization’s
security posture, you could wonder whether the organization places much
credence in those risk assessments.
Risk assessments should drive the actual creation of strategic objectives.
Otherwise, there is a danger that strategic objectives may not include changes
to an organization’s security program and the protective measures needed to
reduce significant risks.
The strategist should also request corporate risk assessments to feed into
the strategy; many times, IT risk assessments are technology focused. By
reviewing and using the corporate risk assessment, the strategist can better
align the security strategy with the organization’s business objectives.
Threat Assessments
Strategists should have a threat assessment performed so that they can better
understand relevant threats. This assessment provides the strategist with
information about the types of threats most likely to have an impact on the
organization, regardless of the effectiveness of controls.
Policy
An organization’s security policy, as well as its practices in relation to its
policy, may say a great deal about its desired current state. Security policy
can be thought of as an organization’s internal laws and regulations with
regard to the protection of important assets (as well as personnel safety).
Examination of current security policy can reveal a lot about what behaviors
are required in the organization.
The following are a few aspects of security policy:
Standards
An organization’s security standards describe, in detail, the methods,
techniques, technologies, specifications, brands, and configurations to be
used throughout the organization. As with security policy, it is important to
understand the organization’s standards, including the breadth of coverage,
strictness, compliance, and last review and update. These all tell the security
manager the extent to which an organization’s security standards are used—if
at all.
In addition to the aforementioned characteristics, it is important to know
how the organization’s standards were developed and how good they are. For
instance, are there device-hardening standards, and are they aligned to or
derived from industry-recognized standards such as those from the Center for
Internet Security (CIS), National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST), European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), Defense
Guidelines
While an organization’s guidelines are not “the law” per se, the presence of
guidelines may signal higher than average organizational maturity. Many
organizations don’t go beyond creating policies and standards, so the
presence of proper guidelines means that the organization may have (or had
in the past) sufficient resources or prioritization to make documenting
guidance on policies important enough to do.
According to their very nature, guidelines are typically written for
personnel who need a little extra guidance on how to adhere to policies.
Like other types of security program documents, guidelines should be
reviewed and updated regularly. Because guidelines bridge rarely changing
policy with often-changing technologies and practices, a strategist examining
guidelines should find them being changed frequently—or they may be found
to be irrelevant. But that, too, is possibly evidence of an attempt to improve
maturity or communications (or both) but with the absence of long-term
commitment.
Architecture
An organization’s architecture—its documentation of systems, networks, data
flows, and other aspects of its environment—gives the security strategist a lot
of useful information about how the organization has implemented its
information systems.
Although it’s good to look for and examine network diagrams, system
diagrams, data flow diagrams, and so forth, it’s nearly as valuable to find
good and consistent designs even if they aren’t documented anywhere. I’d
rather see an organization’s infrastructure as modern, effective, and
consistent versus a collection of outdated diagrams or, worse yet, inconsistent
uses of technologies and techniques throughout an organization. Whether or
not architecture diagrams exist is a concern that is similar to that regarding
policies, standards, guidelines, and other artifacts.
Equally important here is whether the architecture of technology
effectively supports the organization. Does the organization’s technology,
and the way that the technology has been implemented, adequately support
the organization’s goals, objectives, and operations? Like so many other
aspects of information security and IT, alignment with the business and its
goals and objectives is critical and cannot be disregarded. Making key
changes in this regard may need to be part of an overall strategy.
Another aspect of architecture is known as technical debt. This term
represents two characteristics of an organization’s infrastructure:
Controls
The presence of controls—and the control framework—speaks volumes
about the organization’s security program. Controls, however, may exist only
on paper and not in practice. It is useful to read about the organization’s
controls, but on paper alone, they offer little information about whether the
controls are actually being implemented. It’s even more important to know
whether they are effective.
When examining control documentation, the strategist should look for
details such as control owners, the purpose and scope of controls, related
process and procedure documents, and other metadata that will help the
strategist understand their purpose.
Next, the strategist should look for artifacts or interview personnel to
determine whether specific controls are in place. Again, the presence of
documentation alone may not indicate whether controls are actually being
implemented or whether documentation is just more shelfware. Interviewing
personnel and observing controls in action is a better way to see whether
controls are in place.
Internal and external audits, discussed later in the “Audits” section, are
another way to understand control effectiveness.
A strategist will want to understand whether the controls in place are part
of a control framework such as COBIT, ISO/IEC 27002, NIST SP 800-53,
NIST SP 800-171, HIPAA, or PCI DSS. But more than that, the strategist
should know whether all controls in the control framework are implemented
—or have some been omitted? The reason for omission may vary from
Skills
An inventory of skills provides the strategist with an idea of what staff
members are able to accomplish. This is useful on a few levels:
Metrics
Metrics indicate the state of an information security program over time.
Proper metrics help personnel see how effectively the security program is
protecting the organization; this is a key consideration for the people
developing long-term strategies.
If metrics are properly established, they’ll serve as a guide for the long-
term effectiveness of security controls. This helps the strategist understand
what works well and where improvement opportunities may be. The strategist
can then design end states with more certainty and confidence than if metrics
didn’t exist.
When examining metrics, a strategist needs to understand the audience.
For example, were security metrics developed for internal security
operations’ use only, or were the metrics developed for consumption by other
audiences, such as internal users, senior management, or the board of
directors? Next, the strategist will want to look for evidence that metrics were
delivered to these audiences and whether metrics were ever used as a reason
for making tactical or strategic changes in the security program.
Metrics are discussed fully in Chapter 5.
Assets
It is often said among information security professionals, “You cannot protect
what you cannot find.” This refers to assets in an organization—namely,
servers, network devices, end-user workstations, and mobile devices—but
also application software and software tools. Because many security incidents
involve the exploitation of a vulnerability (usually with malware),
organizations must have effective vulnerability management programs in
place. The life-cycle process in a vulnerability management program is as
follows:
Risk Register
A risk register, also known as a risk ledger, can offer the strategist a great
deal of insight into risk management and risk analysis activities in the
organization. Depending on the detail available in the risk register a strategist
may be able to discern the following:
A risk register is the business record reflecting the history and findings
from risk assessments, threat assessments, vulnerability assessments, security
incidents, and other activities. Its content reflects the types of activities
occurring in the information security program and the significant results of
those activities.
The lack of a risk register would indicate that the organization’s security
management program is not taking a risk-based approach. Instead, the
organization may be compliance-based or, worse yet, asset-based or ad hoc.
These approaches are signs of lower maturity, where the organization’s
security personnel are mainly reactive and do little planning.
Vulnerability Assessments
Strategists may choose to have a vulnerability assessment performed so that
they may better understand the current security posture of the organization’s
technology infrastructure. The vulnerability assessment may target network
devices, appliances, operating systems, subsystems such as web servers and
database management systems, and applications—or any suitable
combination thereof.
The results of a vulnerability assessment will tell the strategist several
things about the organization, including the following:
Critical Data
Most organizations do not have an accurate notion regarding the location and
use of their critical data. Organizations usually use key business applications
that store and process critical data, but in most organizations, copies of parts
of their critical data also reside in many other places, including internal file
servers, sanctioned data storage services such as Box and Dropbox, and
unsanctioned data storage services and cloud-based applications.
Though this section is not about the cloud and cloud services, the
existence and ease of use of cloud services make it easy for individuals and
groups in an organization to upload critical data to these services. The fact
that many cloud-based services offer low-cost and zero-cost services
encourages this phenomenon all the more. This has given rise to the
colloquial phrase “bring your own app” (BYOA) to describe this growing
problem. Most organizations have lost sight of all the locations and uses of
their critical data, whether sanctioned or not.
The strategist should seek to understand the extent to which the
organization’s data in the cloud is a part of an overall architecture, including
the use of cloud regions that are employed for resilience purposes. This will
Outsourced Services
Most organizations outsource a good portion of their IT systems and services.
Audits
Internal and external audits can tell the strategist quite a bit about the state of
the organization’s security program. A careful examination of audit findings
can potentially provide significant details on control effectiveness,
• Objective The objective or purpose of the audit tells the reader why
the audit took place. This often provides additional insight into why
certain people, processes, or technologies were examined while others
were apparently omitted. For example, was an audit performed because
it is required by regulation or another requirement, or was it performed
voluntarily as another means of organization improvement?
• Scope The scope of an audit tells the reader which technologies,
business processes, business locations, or other aspects of the
organization were examined.
• Qualifications of auditors An audit is only as effective as its
auditors are skilled and experienced in performing audits, as well as
their familiarity with the things being audited. An IT auditor with little
operational IT experience is not going to be as effective and as
insightful as an IT auditor with a background in some aspect of IT
engineering or operations.
• Audit methodologies It is important for the reader to understand the
audit methodologies used in any particular audit. For instance, did the
auditor interview personnel, examine systems and records, observe
personnel performing their tasks, or perform tasks of their own?
Equally important are sampling methodologies, including how samples
are selected and who performs the selection.
The security strategist needs to consider the bigger picture: mainly, is the
organization using audit results to drive improvements in the organization, or
are audit reports merely shelfware shown to regulators on their annual visit?
Culture
The culture of an organization can tell the strategist a lot about the state of
security. Many people mistakenly believe that information security is all
about technology. While technology is part of security, the most important
aspect of information security is people. No amount of technology can
Maturity
The characteristics of a security management program discussed in this
section all contribute to the overall maturity of the organization’s program.
Although the maturity level of the program doesn’t tell the strategist
everything they need to know about the program, the strategist’s observations
of the overall program will provide a “thumb in the air” feeling for its overall
maturity.
The strategist will probably find that the maturity levels of various aspects
of the organization’s security program vary widely. For instance, the
organization may have mature asset management and vulnerability
management programs but be lacking in other areas such as internal audit and
security awareness.
The levels of maturity are discussed in greater detail in the next section.
Maturity also plays a part during a gap assessment, also discussed in the next
section.
Risk Appetite
Every organization has a risk appetite, although most have not formally
documented it. A security strategist needs to understand business leaders’
implicit and explicit risk appetite, which is manifested in many ways:
Strategy Development
After performing risk and threat assessments and carefully reviewing the
state of the security program through the examination of artifacts, the
strategist can develop strategic objectives. Generally speaking, strategic
objectives will fall into one of these categories:
Once one or more objectives have been identified, the security strategist
will undertake several activities that are required to meet the objectives.
These activities are explained in the remainder of this section.
The strategist must consider many inputs before developing objectives and
strategies to achieve them. These inputs serve a critical purpose: to help the
strategist understand the organization’s current state. The journey to
developing and achieving a strategy is not possible without understanding the
journey’s starting point, which are discussed in the previous section,
“Strategy Resources.”
Gap Assessment
To implement a security strategy and accomplish objectives, security
professionals often spend too much time focusing on the end goal and not
enough time on the starting point. Without sufficient knowledge of the
starting point, accomplishing objectives will be more difficult, and achieving
success will be less certain.
A gap assessment should focus on several aspects of a security program,
including one or more of the following:
Not all security strategists are familiar with maturity models. Strategists
unaccustomed to capability maturity models need to understand two
important characteristics of maturity models and how they are used:
Policy Development
The execution of a security strategy may result in additions or improvements
The Fast Car Company recently implemented its first security incident
and event monitoring system that produces alerts whenever actionable
security events occur. Prior to implementing the SIEM, IT and security
personnel would examine security logs every day to see whether any
security events had occurred in the past 24 hours.
Security policies are supposed to align with current capabilities and are
not a vision statement describing future capabilities. This is the case whether
policies are addressing the use of technologies or business processes. It’s
generally considered unwise to develop a security policy that requires an
activity that the organization is incapable of performing.
Industries generally consider security policies as being out-of-date if they
are not examined and updated annually. This is not saying that security
policies are required to be updated annually, but they should be examined and
approved annually and updated as needed.
It is a common practice to structure the organization’s security policy
using one or more relevant standards or frameworks, though this is not
generally required for most industries. Common standards and frameworks
used in this way include
• NIST SP 800-53
Controls Development
When an organization executes or updates a security strategy, this often
means that the organization has made changes to its security-related
capabilities. This, in turn, may necessitate changes to one or more aspects of
existing controls, as well as the development of new controls and the
retirement of controls that are no longer necessary.
Standards Development
An organization executing a security strategy may find that one or more of its
standards are impacted or that new standards need to be developed.
While policies define what is to be done, standards define how policies are
to be carried out. For instance, a policy may stipulate that strong passwords
are to be used for end-user authentication. A password standard, then, would
be more specific by defining the length, complexity, and other characteristics
of a strong password.
Where policies are designed to be durable and long-lasting, they do so at
the expense of being somewhat unspecific. Standards take on the burden of
being more specific, but they also change more frequently, because they are
closer to the technology and are concerned with the details of the
implementation of policy.
Standards need to be developed carefully, for several reasons:
• Job descriptions
• Department charter documents
• Department policy documents
• Roles and responsibility sections of process documents
Strategy Constraints
While the development of a new security strategy may bring hope and
optimism to the security team, there is no guarantee that changes in an
organization can be implemented without friction and even opposition.
Instead, the security manager should anticipate many constraints and
obstacles and be prepared to maneuver around, over, or through them.
No security manager plans to fail. However, the failure to anticipate
obstacles and constraints may result in the failure to execute even the best
strategy. The presence of an excellent strategy, even with executive support,
does not mean that obstacles and constraints will simply get out of the way.
Instead, obstacles and constraints represent the realities of human behavior,
as well as structural and operational realities that may present challenges to
the security manager and the organization as a whole. There is apt meaning to
the phrase “the devil’s in the details.”
Typical constraints, obstacles, and other issues are discussed in this
section.
Normalcy Bias
People at all levels can suffer from normalcy bias, a pattern of thinking in
which people believe that because a disaster or breach has never occurred, it
will never occur. Normalcy bias manifests itself in many situations, the
common theme being a general lack of personal and corporate preparedness
for disastrous events. This may be part of the reason that organizations do not
take information security seriously—they have never had a breach before.
Experienced information security professionals understand that an
organization claiming to have not suffered from security breaches in the past
may simply be unaware of them because of a lack of visibility into events in
their environment. A common saying in the information security profession
is, “There are two types of organizations: those that have been breached and
those that do not yet realize they have been breached.”
Culture
Organizational culture, according to the Business Dictionary
(www.businessdictionary.com), is the collection of values and behaviors that
“contribute to the unique social and psychological environment of an
organization.” In other words, it’s the way that people think and act in an
organization and how people feel as employees.
Aspects of organizational culture that are important for the security
strategist to understand include the following:
Organizational Structure
The security strategist must understand the organization’s command-and-
control structure, which is often reflected by the organizational chart.
However, there may be an undocumented aspect to the org chart, which is
actually more important: who is responsible for what activities, functions,
and assets. In other words, security strategists must understand “who owns
what turf” and develop collaborative relationships with those individuals and
groups to implement a successful strategy. As with other considerations in a
security strategy, alignment with written and unwritten organizational
structures is the key to success.
Staff Capabilities
A security strategy generally represents the introduction of new capabilities,
as well as changes or upgrades to existing capabilities. A strategy cannot be
expected to succeed if the new or changed capabilities do not align with what
staff members are able to do. A gap analysis to understand the present state of
the organization’s security program (discussed earlier in this chapter) needs
to include staff knowledge, skills, and capabilities. Where gaps are found, the
strategy needs to include training or other activities to impart the necessary
skills and language to staff.
This is not limited to technical workers who design, build, and manage
information systems and applications. To the extent that all staff members are
impacted by some change introduced by the strategy, those staff members
need to be informed or trained so that they, too, will be successful.
For example, an organization that needs to improve its ability to protect
sensitive data includes the development of a data protection program in its
strategy. The strategy for data protection includes the development of a data
classification scheme with data-handling policies and procedures for data at
each classification level and in each use case. This is a high-impact endeavor
that will require that many, if not all, workers in the organization be trained in
Time
As security strategies take shape, each initiative will have its own project
plan with associated timelines for executing various tasks. Realistic project
planning is needed so that everyone will know when project and strategy
Acceptable Risk
NOTE BMIS is described fully in the document, The Business Model for
Information Security, from ISACA, available at www.isaca.org/bmis.
People The people element in the BMIS model represents all of the people
in an organization, whether full-time employees or temporary workers,
contractors, or consultants. Further, as an organization outsources its
operations to other organizations, the people in those organizations are also
part of this element in BMIS. Like the other elements in the BMIS model,
people cannot be studied by themselves but instead must be considered
alongside the other elements of process, technology, and organization.
Process The process element in the BMIS model represents the formal
structure of all defined activities in the organization, which together help the
organization achieve its strategic objectives. Process defines practices and
• Policies
• Standards
• Guidelines
• Process documentation
• Resource allocation
• Compliance
Enabling and Support The enabling and support DI connects the process
and technology elements. The purpose of this DI is the enablement and
support of business processes by technology. Put another way, business
processes are faster and more accurate with IT than they would be if they
were performed manually.
In an appropriate relationship between business processes and technology,
the structure of business processes determines how technology will support
them. Unfortunately, many organizations compromise their business
processes by having capabilities in poorly selected or poorly designed
technology determine how business processes operate. Although it is not
feasible for technology to support every whim and nuance in a business
process, many organizations take the other extreme by selecting technology
that does not align with their business processes or the organization’s mission
and objectives and changing their processes to match capabilities provided by
technology. This level of compromise is detrimental to the organization.
A part of the disconnect between business processes and the technologies
that do not fully support them is that technology experts often do not
sufficiently understand the business processes they support, and business
owners and users do not sufficiently understand the technologies supporting
them. To paint with a broad brush, technology people and businesspeople
think differently about technology and business and often find it difficult to
understand each other enough to make technology’s support of business
Human Factors The human factors DI connects the people and technology
elements. The purpose of this DI is the interaction between people and
information systems. This is an extensively studied and researched topic,
sometimes known as human–computer interaction (HCI). The elements of
information systems that people interact with are often known as user
interfaces (UIs); considerable research is devoted to the improvement of UIs
to make software and systems easier to use and more intuitive.
From an information security perspective, information systems need to
implement security requirements in ways that do not impede users’
interaction wherever possible. Where users have choices to make while
interacting with a system, security features and functions need to be easy to
use and intuitive. Further, users should not be able to easily circumvent
security controls put in place to protect systems and data. Finally, systems
should be designed so that they cannot be abused or that their use permits
abuse of other assets.
Many considerations need to be included in the design of information
systems (both hardware and software):
Using BMIS
Organizations employ BMIS to help them better understand how their people,
processes, and technologies help to protect the overall organization. BMIS
helps the strategist understand the holistic relationships between various
aspects (the elements) in the organization and the factors that influence them
(the dynamic interconnections).
The structure of BMIS itself is a key factor in its success. Equally
important, however, is the ability for holistic thinking rather than detailed
thinking. It is vital to understand that BMIS shows how everything is
connected to everything else. A change introduced at any element or DI will
affect other elements and DIs and will most likely affect the adjacent
elements and DIs the most. Considering, again, the structure of BMIS, refer
to Figure 2-2.
When a security analyst or strategist is pondering an incident, problem, or
situation, they identify the element or DI in the BMIS that corresponds to the
subject of the matter. Next, they identify the adjacent elements or DIs and
think about the relationships: these represent aspects in the organization that
would be related or affected. Examining one element, noting the DI
connecting it to another element, helps identify the nature of the connecting
Figure 2-3 BMIS enabling and support life cycle (Adapted from The
University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business, Institute for
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, USA)
• Preliminary
• Architecture vision
NOTE Many readers of ISO/IEC 27001 gloss over the core of the standard,
the seven sections of requirements for managing an ISMS, and instead focus
on the appendix with its list of controls. The controls in the appendix are
there for the reader’s convenience and are fully explained in the companion
standard, ISO/IEC 27002.
Note that the text of the CSF claims that these tiers are not maturity levels,
but upon reading the tier descriptions, it is difficult to come to any other
conclusion.
For implementation in the private sector, the CSF can be customized into
• Prepare
• Categorize
• Select
• Implement
• Assess
• Authorize
• Monitor
Strategic Planning
In strategic planning, one or more persons develop the steps and resources
required to achieve a desired end state. In the context of information security,
strategic planning should include the steps and resources required for
principal functions of the information security program to adequately protect
the organization’s information assets and to continue doing so despite
changes in threats, defensive techniques, technologies, and even the
organization’s overall strategic objectives.
In the “Strategy Resources” section earlier in this chapter, I discuss the
inputs that help a security leader gain a comprehensive understanding of the
current state of an information security program. In some cases, those inputs
are also the resources required to make the necessary changes to the program
to bring it closer to its desired end state. Additional resources may be
required, either to help the security leader better understand the program’s
current state or to develop or improve components that will be a part of the
new end state.
Unless only minor improvements are needed in an organization’s
information security program, it is likely that several individual steps are
required to transform the program from its current state to the desired end
state. The security leader is likely to develop a roadmap that defines and
describes those steps. The leader may need to develop one or more business
case statements to obtain the necessary resources to execute the roadmap.
Both are described here.
Roadmap Development
Once strategic objectives, risk and threat assessments, and gap analyses have
Figure 2-7 Sample roadmap for identity and access management initiative
(Courtesy of High Tech Security Solutions Magazine)
Chapter Review
A strategy is a plan to achieve a defined set of objectives to enable the vision
of the organization to be successfully achieved. Objectives are the desired
future states in an organization and, in the context of information security, in
the organization’s information security program. A strategy should be
business aligned, and it should deliver value, optimize resources, and be
measurable.
To be successful, an information security program must align with the
business and its overall mission, goals and objectives, and strategy. The
security program must take into account the organization’s notion of asset
value, culture, risk tolerance/appetite, legal obligations, and market
conditions. A successful and aligned security program does not lead the
organization but enables and supports it as it carries out its mission and
pursues its goals.
Many resources are needed for the development of a strategy, including
several types of information that reveal the current state of the organization,
such as risk assessments, vulnerability assessments, threat assessments,
business impact analysis, metrics, risk register, and incident log. Several
other inputs are required that define the structure of the security program,
including policy, standards, guidelines, processes and procedures,
architecture, controls, staff skills, insurance, and outsourced services. It is
critical that the security leader understand the culture of the security team, the
IT department, and the entire organization.
Notes
Questions
1. What are the elements of the Business Model for Information Security
(BMIS)?
A. Culture, governing, architecture, emergence, enabling and support,
human factors
B. People, process, technology
C. Organization, people, process, technology
D. Financial, customer, internal processes, innovation, and learning
2. The best definition of a strategy is:
A. The objective to achieve a plan
B. The plan to achieve an objective
C. The plan to achieve business alignment
D. The plan to reduce risk
3. As part of understanding the organization’s current state, a security
strategist is examining the organization’s security policy. What does the
policy tell the strategist?
A. The level of management commitment to security
B. The compliance level of the organization
C. The maturity level of the organization
D. None of these
4. A security strategist has examined several business processes and has
Answers
1. C. The elements of BMIS are organization, people, process, and
technology. The dynamic interconnections (DIs) are culture, governing,
architecture, emergence, enabling and support, and human factors.
Supporting Tasks in the CISM job practice that align with the Information
Security Risk Management / Information Security Risk Assessment domain
include:
• Culture
• Mission, objectives, and goals
• Management structure
• Management support
• Industry sector
• Market conditions
• Applicable laws, regulations, and other legal obligations
• Stated or unstated risk tolerance
• Financial health
• Operating locations
Risk Objectives
A vital part of strategy development is the determination of desired risk
levels. One of the inputs to strategy development is the understanding of the
current level of risk, and the desired future state may also have an associated
level of risk.
It is quite difficult to quantify risk, even for the most mature organizations.
Getting risk to a reasonable “high/medium/low” is simpler, though less
straightforward, and difficult to do consistently across an organization. In
specific instances, the costs of individual controls can be known, and the
costs of theoretical losses can be estimated, but doing this across an entire
risk-control framework is tedious, yet uncertain, because the probabilities of
occurrence for threat events amounts to little more than guesswork. Spending
too much time analyzing risks brings diminishing returns.
Still, in a general sense, a key part of a security strategy may well be the
reduction of risk (it could also be cost reduction or compliance
improvement). When this is the case, the strategist will need to employ a
method for determining before-and-after risk levels that are reasonable and
credible. For the sake of consistency, a better approach would be the use of a
methodology—however specific or general—that fits with other strategies
and discussions involving risk.
• Culture
• Organizational maturity
• Management structure
• Management support
• Market conditions
• Regulatory and legal requirements
Possibly the most important factor that will enable or constrain security
managers as they develop a risk management strategy is the development of
key relationships throughout the organization. When a security manager
develops and implements a risk management strategy, he or she is acting as a
change agent in the organization. The security manager is subtly but
intentionally driving key changes in the organization through changes in
people, processes, and technologies. This role as a security catalyst is an
ongoing journey that will become a way of life as the organization becomes a
Risk managers can take two main approaches when considering existing
frameworks: use a single framework that has the best alignment with the
organization’s practices, or use elements from one or more frameworks to
build the organization’s risk management program. As noted earlier in the
chapter, several considerations influence the decision.
• Program scope
• Information risk objectives
• Information risk policy
• Risk appetite/tolerance
• Roles and responsibilities
• Risk management life-cycle process
• Risk management documentation
• Management review
• Market conditions
• Economic conditions
• Applicable laws and regulations
• Social and political environments
• External stakeholders, including regulators, business partners,
suppliers, and customers
• External threats and threat actors
Risks at one tier sometimes inform adjacent tiers. For instance, a surge in
asset-level risks may indicate defects in process-level risks, or even a shift in
workforce priorities. Similarly, the presence of multiple process-level risks
may be an indication of macro issues that should be addressed at the
enterprise level.
Gap Analysis
As security managers design the organization’s information risk management
program, they envision the desired end state, which is often based on one or
more information risk frameworks, as discussed earlier in this section. But
when it comes to developing actual plans for implementing components of
the program, the security manager must understand the current state of the
program, even if there is no formal program at all. To do this, the security
manager should conduct a gap analysis to determine which characteristics of
the current state can remain, which aspects should be discarded, which
should be replaced, and which should be added.
For example, suppose a security manager examines an organization’s
existing change control process. She finds only a log of changes and e-mail
attachments containing management approvals for changes. Her gap analysis
External Support
Setting up a new information risk management program involves a great deal
of knowledge and details. Even the most experienced information security
managers may find themselves lacking in a few areas. For instance, a new
security manager may have worked previously in an organization without an
existing risk management program, or the security manager may have worked
in a different industry sector in the past. Or perhaps the organization may use
tools, technologies, or processes that are unfamiliar to the security manager.
Fortunately, a wealth of information is available to security managers, which
will help to supplement their existing knowledge and skills so that they can
proceed with building and running an information risk management program
with more confidence and with better assurances of positive outcomes.
Here are some of these information sources:
FAIR also focuses on the concept of asset value and liability. For example,
a customer list is an asset because the organization can reach its customers to
solicit new business; however, the customer list is also a liability because of
the impact on the organization if the customer list is obtained by an
unauthorized person.
FAIR guides a risk manager through an analysis of threat agents and the
different ways in which a threat agent acts upon an asset:
Collect Data (RE1) The data collection process aligns with some of the risk
identification processes previously described. During this process, risk
management personnel develop a model for data collection, which provides
for standardized data formats, measurements, and common data definitions.
Data is collected on the various aspects of the organization and risk scenarios,
including the business’s operating environment, risk factors, threat sources
and events, vulnerability data, and asset data. Data is also collected on the
effectiveness of existing controls in the organization.
Analyze Risk (RE2) In this part of the framework, the organization begins to
assess and analyze risk. First, it defines the risk analysis scope. The scope
determines how broad and deep the risk analysis efforts will be, what areas
the risk analysis will cover, and which assets will be examined for risk. To
complete this part of the process, you’ll need to consider all the
documentation assembled up to this point: risk scenarios, asset inventories,
breakdowns of business processes, prioritization of assets, and so on. This
will help frame the risk analysis as well as determine scope.
During this step, IT risk is also estimated. This involves determining
likelihood and impact values associated with the developed risk scenarios. In
addition, it involves consideration of existing controls and how effective they
are as currently installed and functioning. Likelihood and impact values are
considered after existing controls are considered.
Although risk response is the subject of Chapter 4, the identification and
consideration of possible risk response options are also part of this step of the
process. The person assessing the risk may recommend several different
response options, based on the identified risk. What risk options an
organization will use is determined later in the process and typically with the
input and approval of senior management. Risk response options should be
recommended that reduce risk to an acceptable level directly based on the
Threat Identification
The identification of threats is a key step in a risk assessment. A threat is
defined as an event that, if realized, would bring harm to an asset and, thus, to
the organization.
In the security industry, the key terms involved with risk assessments are
often misunderstood and misused. These terms are distinguished from one
another in this way: a threat is the actual action that would cause harm, not
the person or group (generically known as an actor or threat actor) associated
with it. A threat is also not a weakness that may permit a threat to occur; that
is known as a vulnerability, discussed earlier in this chapter.
Threats are typically classified as external or internal, as intentional or
unintentional, and as human-made or natural. The origin of many threats is
outside the control of the organization but not necessarily out of their
awareness. A good security manager can develop a list of threats that are
likely (more or less) to occur to any given asset.
When performing a risk assessment, the security manager needs to
develop a complete list of threats for use in the risk assessment. Because it’s
Upon capturing threat events from one or both of these sources, the security
manager may identify a few additional threats not found in these lists. These
additional threats may be specific to the organization’s location, business
model, or other factors.
A security manager will typically remove a few of the threats from the list
that do not apply to the organization. For instance, an organization located far
inland is not going to be affected by tsunamis, so this threat source can be
eliminated. Similarly, in an organization located in an area not affected by
tornados, volcanos, or earthquakes, these threat sources can be removed.
Internal Threats
Internal threats originate within the organization and are most often
associated with employees of the organization. Quite possibly, internal
employees may be the intentional actors behind these threats.
Security managers need to understand the nature of internal threats and the
interaction between personnel and information systems. A wide range of
events can take place that constitute threats, including the following:
After understanding all the ways that something can go wrong, security
managers may sometimes wonder if things can ever proceed as planned!
An important concept for a security manager to understand is this: while
employees are at the top of a short list of potential threat actors, employees
are the same actors who need to be given broad access to sensitive data to do
their jobs and for the organization to function. Though there have been
marginal improvements in technologies such as data loss prevention (DLP),
employers have no choice but to trust employees by giving them access to
virtually all of the organization’s information, with the hope that they will not
accidentally or deliberately abuse those privileges with potential to cause the
organization great harm.
Examples of employees “going rogue” include the following:
It may be useful to build a short list of threat actors (the people or groups
that would initiate a threat event), but remember that these are not the threats
themselves. Building such a list may help the security manager identify
additional threat events that may not be on the list.
Table 3-4 contains a list of internal and external natural threats.
External Threats
Like internal threats, threats that originate outside of the organization can
include both deliberate and accidental actions. External threats can also be
human-made or associated with naturally occurring events.
The security manager performing a risk assessment needs to understand
the full range of threat actors, along with their motivations. This is
particularly important for organizations where specific types of threat actors
or motivations are more common. For example, certain industries such as
aerospace and weapons manufacturers attract industrial espionage and
intelligence agencies, and certain industries attract hacktivists.
Table 3-5 contains a list of external threat actors, and Table 3-6 lists the
motivations behind these actors.
The term “APT” was developed in the early 2000s to describe a new kind
of adversary that worked slowly but effectively to compromise a target
organization. Prior to APTs, threat actors were unsophisticated and conducted
operations that ran for short periods of time, a few days at most. But as more
organizations put more valuable information assets online, threat actors
became craftier and more resourceful; they resorted to longer-term campaigns
to study a target for long periods of time before attacking it, and once an
attack began, it would carry on for months or longer. APTs would
compromise multiple systems inside the target organization and use a variety
of stealthy techniques to establish and maintain a presence using as many
NOTE The term “APT” is not used often nowadays, although its definition
is largely unchanged. APTs were discussed more often when these techniques
were new. But today, the techniques used by a multitude of cybercriminal
organizations, along with hundreds if not thousands of talented, individual
threat actors, resemble the APTs of a dozen years ago. Today APTs are not
novel but routine.
Emerging Threats
The theater in which cyberwarfare takes place today is constantly changing
and evolving. Several forces are at work, as explained in Table 3-7, that
continually “push the envelope” in the areas of attack techniques as well as
defense techniques.
Risk Identification
During risk identification, various scenarios are studied for each asset to
identify which risks pose the greatest potential for realization. Several
• Threats All realistic threat scenarios are examined for each asset to
determine which are most likely to occur.
• Threat actors The risk manager must understand the variety of threat
actors and know which ones are more motivated to target the
organization and for what reasons. This further illuminates the
likelihood that a given threat scenario will occur.
• Vulnerabilities For all assets, business processes, and staff members
being examined, vulnerabilities need to be identified. Then various
threat scenarios are examined to determine which ones are more likely
as a result of corresponding vulnerabilities.
• Asset value The value of each asset is an important factor to include
in risk analysis. As described earlier, assets may be valued in several
ways. For instance, a customer database may have a modest recovery
cost if it is damaged or destroyed; however, if that same customer
database is stolen and sold on the black market, the value of the data
may be much higher to cybercriminals, and the resulting costs to the
organization to mitigate the harm done to customers may be higher
still. Other ways to examine asset value is through the revenue derived
from the asset’s existence or use.
• Impact The risk manager examines vulnerabilities, threats (with
threat actors), and asset value and estimates the impact of the different
threat scenarios. Impact is considered separately from asset value,
because some threat scenarios have minimal correlation with asset
value but are instead related to reputation damage. Breaches of privacy
data can result in high mitigation costs and reduced business. Breaches
of hospital data can threaten patient care. Breaches in almost any IoT
context can result in extensive service interruptions and life safety
issues.
Likelihood
In risk assessments, likelihood is an important dimension that helps a risk
manager understand several aspects related to the unfolding of a threat event.
The likelihood of a serious security incident has less to do with technical
details and more to do with the thought process of an adversary.
Considerations related to likelihood include the following:
Impact
In the context of information security, an impact is the actual or expected
result of some action, such as a threat or disaster. During a risk assessment,
impact is perhaps the most important attribute for a risk manager to
understand in a threat scenario. A risk assessment can describe all types of
threat scenarios, the reasons behind them, and how they can be minimized. If
the risk manager fails to understand the impact of these scenarios, he or she
cannot determine the level of importance imposed by one threat factor versus
another, in terms of the urgency to mitigate the risk.
A wide range of possible impact scenarios include the following:
Some of these impact scenarios are easier to analyze in qualitative terms than
others, and the magnitude of most of these is difficult to quantify except in
specific threat scenarios.
One of the main tools in the business continuity and disaster planning
world, the business impact analysis (BIA), is highly useful for information
security managers. A BIA can be conducted as part of a risk assessment or
separate from it. A BIA differs from a risk assessment in this way: A risk
assessment is used to identify risks and, perhaps, suggested remedies. A BIA
• Asset value
• Threat scenarios
• Threat probabilities
• Relevant vulnerabilities
• Existing controls and their effectiveness
• Impact
Gathering Information
A security manager needs to gather a considerable amount of information to
ensure that that the risk analysis and the risk assessment are valuable and
complete. Several sources are available, including the following:
• Asset value (AV) The value of the asset is usually (but not
necessarily) the asset’s replacement value. Depending on the type of
asset, different values may need to be considered.
• Exposure factor (EF) The financial loss that results from the
realization of a threat is expressed as a percentage of the asset’s total
value. Most threats do not completely eliminate the asset’s value;
instead, they reduce its value. For example, if an organization’s
$120,000 server is rendered unbootable because of malware, the server
will still have salvage value, even if that is only 10 percent of the
asset’s actual value. In this case, the EF would be 90 percent. Note that
different threats have different impacts on EF, because the realization
of different threats will cause varying amounts of damage to assets.
• Single loss expectancy (SLE) This value represents the financial loss
when a threat scenario occurs one time. SLE is defined as AV × EF.
Note that different threats have a varied impact on EF, so those threats
will also have the same multiplicative effect on SLE.
• Annualized rate of occurrence (ARO) This is an estimate of the
number of times that a threat will occur per year. If the probability of
the threat is 1 in 50 (one occurrence every 50 years), ARO is expressed
ALE is based upon the verifiable values AV, EF, and SLE, but because
ARO is only an estimate, ALE is only as good as ARO. Depending upon the
value of the asset, the risk manager may need to take extra care to develop the
best possible estimate for ARO, based upon whatever data is available.
Sources for estimates include the following:
OCTAVE
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation
(OCTAVE) is a risk analysis approach developed by Carnegie Mellon
University. The latest version, OCTAVE Allegro, is used to assess
information security risks so that an organization can obtain meaningful
results from a risk assessment.
The OCTAVE Allegro methodology uses eight steps:
Bow-Tie Analysis
A bow-tie analysis uses diagrams to analyze and explain relationships
Because no two organizations (or their risk assessment results) are alike,
this type of analysis is likely to identify themes of risk treatment that may
have broad implications across many risks. For example, an organization may
have several tactical risks, all associated with access management and
vulnerability management. Rather than treating individual tactical risks, a
better approach may be to improve or reorganize the access or vulnerability
management programs from the top down, resulting in many identified risks
being mitigated in a programmatic fashion. Organizations need to consider
Risk Ownership
When considering the results of a risk assessment, the organization needs to
assign individual risks to individual people, typically middle- to upper-
management business leaders. These leaders, who should also have
ownership of controls that operate within their span of control, have budget,
staff, and other resources used in daily business operations. These are the risk
owners, and, to the extent that there is a formal policy or statement on risk
tolerance or risk appetite, they should be the people making risk treatment
decisions for risks in their domain. To the extent that these individuals are
accountable for operations in their part of the organization, they should also
be responsible for risk decisions, including risk treatment, in their operational
areas. A simple concept to approach risk ownership is that if nobody owns
the risk, then nobody is accountable for managing the risk, which will lead to
a great probability of the risk becoming an active issue with negative impacts
on the business, along with the possible identification of a scapegoat who will
be blamed if an event occurs. The scapegoat is usually the person responsible
for information security.
Risk Treatment
In risk treatment, management makes a choice regarding the disposition of
each identified risk. Management can choose to accept the risk, mitigate the
risk, transfer it to another organization, or avoid the activity altogether. Risk
treatment is described in detail in Chapter 4.
Controls
A common outcome of risk treatment, when mitigation is chosen, is the
enactment of controls. Put another way, when an organization identifies a risk
in a risk assessment, the organization may decide to develop (or improve) a
control that will mitigate the risk that was found. Controls are measures put
in place to ensure a desired outcome. Controls can come in the form of
• Both seek to discover risks and develop remedies for events that
threaten business operations and the ongoing viability of an
organization.
• Both rely on risk assessments to identify risks that will require
mitigation.
• Both can rely on the results of a business impact analysis to better
understand the criticality of business processes and the
interdependency of processes and assets.
Residual Risk
Risk treatment rarely eliminates all risk; instead, risk treatment will reduce
the probability and/or the impact of a specific threat. The leftover, or residual,
risk should be entered into the risk register for its own round of risk
treatment. Depending upon the nature of the original risk, an individual risk
may undergo two or more cycles of risk treatment, until finally, the residual
risk is accepted and the risk matter closed.
• Architecture
• Software development
• Change management
• Configuration management
• Incident and problem management
• Physical security
• Information risk and enterprise risk management
• Human resource management
• Project management
Architecture
IT architects and solution architects create macro- and micro-level designs
for networks, systems, applications, integrations, and other technology
components. These activities should be reviewed by security subject matter
experts such as security architects to ensure that the work of IT and solution
architects do not introduce new, undesired risk to the organization.
Software Development
Developers, in the creation and maintenance of software programs,
sometimes introduce software defects (commonly known as bugs) in their
programs, resulting in unexpected behavior. This unexpected behavior may
include calculation errors or errors in the way that information is displayed,
read from storage, or written to storage. Sometimes, these defects can be
exploited by a user or attacker to trick the software program into performing
unexpected or unwanted activities.
Unless software developers are specifically aware of the security
implications of the use of specific functions and calculations, they may
unknowingly introduce benign to serious security defects in their programs.
Some of these defects may be easily discovered with scanning programs or
other techniques, while others may remain undiscovered for years. Often, a
Change Management
Change management is the IT function used to control changes made to an IT
environment. The purpose of change management is to reduce the likelihood
that proposed changes will introduce unexpected risks, which could lead to
unplanned outages and security incidents.
A basic change management process begins with a formal request for
change, which includes several specific pieces of information:
Configuration Management
Configuration management is the IT function by which the configuration of
components in an IT environment is independently recorded. Configuration
management is usually supported by the automated tools used to inventory
and control system configurations, but sometimes manual means are used. A
configuration management database (CMDB) is the repository for this
information.
Configuration management can be thought of as the creation of a historical
record of the configuration of devices and systems. This historical record can
sometimes be useful during troubleshooting, in support of investigations, as
personnel need to understand in detail any changes in configuration that may
have occurred in a system that could account for an incident or problem.
Security and risk considerations in configuration management are as
follows:
Physical Security
Physical security is mainly concerned with the development and management
of controls to protect physical assets, workplaces, and personnel. There is
significant intersection between information security and physical security:
information security relies upon physical security controls for the protection
of information processing and communications equipment. While some of
this equipment resides in data centers, some also resides in workplaces where
Project Management
Whether a centralized project management office is utilized or project
managers are scattered throughout an organization, security and risk are
essential elements of program management and project planning. There are
several ways in which security and risk should be incorporated into projects,
including the following:
Chapter Review
Risk management is the core of an organization’s information security
program. By using risk management techniques to identify risks and
understand the probability of their occurrence and impact upon the
organization, risk managers can help the organization prioritize scarce
resources to reduce risk effectively. The proper application of risk
management helps an organization reduce the frequency and impact of
security incidents through improved resilience and preparation.
When implementing a risk management program, the organization must
consider several characteristics, including its risk tolerance, management
Notes
• Like other activities in information security, measuring the benefits of
an information risk management program can be difficult, mainly
because it is difficult to identify security events that did not occur
Questions
1. A risk manager is planning a first-ever risk assessment in an
organization. What is the best approach for ensuring success?
A. Interview personnel separately so that their responses can be
compared.
B. Select a framework that matches the organization’s control
framework.
C. Work with executive management to determine the correct scope.
D. Do not inform executive management until the risk assessment has
been completed.
2. A security manager has completed a vulnerability scan and has
identified numerous vulnerabilities in production servers. What is the
best course of action?
A. Notify the production servers’ asset owners.
B. Conduct a formal investigation.
C. Place a single entry into the risk register.
D. Put individual vulnerability entries into the risk register.
3. The concept of security tasks in the context of a SaaS or IaaS
Answers
1. C. The best approach for success in an organization’s risk management
program, and during risk assessments, is to have support from executive
management. Executives need to define the scope of the risk
management program, whether by business unit, geography, or other
means.
2. A. Most organizations do not place individual vulnerabilities into a risk
register. The risk register is primarily for strategic issues, not tactical
issues such as individual vulnerabilities. However, if the vulnerability
scan report was an indication of a broken process or broken technology,
then that matter of brokenness may qualify as a valid risk register entry.
3. D. The shared responsibility model, sometimes known as a shared
responsibility matrix, depicts the operational model for SaaS and IaaS
providers where client organizations have some security responsibilities
Supporting Tasks in the CISM job practice that align with the Information
Security Risk Management / Information Security Risk Response domain
include:
• Risk mitigation
• Risk transfer
• Risk avoidance
• Risk acceptance
These four actions are explained in more detail in the following sections.
The decision to ignore a known risk is different from an organization
ignoring an unknown risk, which is usually a result of a risk assessment or
Risk Mitigation
Risk mitigation is one of four choices that an organization can take when
confronted with a risk. Risk mitigation, aka risk reduction, involves the
implementation of some solution that will reduce an identified risk—for
example, by changing a process or procedure, changing how a security
control functions, or adding a security control. In another example, the risk of
advanced malware being introduced onto a server can be mitigated with
advanced malware prevention software or a network-based intrusion
prevention system. Either of these solutions would constitute mitigation of
some of this risk on a given asset.
An organization usually makes a decision to implement some form of risk
mitigation only after performing a cost analysis to determine whether the
reduction of risk is worth the expenditure of risk mitigation. Sometimes,
however, an asset’s value is difficult to measure, or there may be a high
degree of goodwill associated with the asset. For example, the value of a
customer database that contains sensitive data, including bank account or
credit card information, may itself be low; however, the impact of a breach of
this database may be higher than its book value because of the loss of
business or negative publicity that may result.
During the risk analysis phase of risk management, a risk analyst will
explore one or more potential ways of mitigating risk and will document the
time, effort, and cost involved for each. The development of multiple options
helps inform those responsible for making risk treatment decisions.
Risk mitigation may, at times, result in a task that can be carried out in a
relatively short period of time. However, risk mitigation may also involve
Risk Transfer
Risk transfer, or risk sharing, means that some or all of the risk is being
transferred to some external entity, such as an insurance company, service
provider, business process outsourcer (BPO), or business partner. The risk
transfer option is selected when an organization does not have the operational
or financial capacity to accept the risk and when risk mitigation is not the best
choice.
When an organization purchases an insurance policy to protect an asset
against damage or loss, the insurance company is assuming a part of the risk
EXAM TIP CISM candidates need to understand that the use of a risk
transfer scheme does not totally absolve an organization of its
responsibilities; organizations may still retain responsibility—and more
importantly, accountability—if there is loss of data, revenue, or customers.
Additionally, legal liabilities may also be involved.
Risk Avoidance
Risk Acceptance
Management may be willing to accept an identified risk as is, with no effort
taken to reduce it. Risk acceptance is an option in which the organization
finds the presence of a risk acceptable and determines that it requires no
reduction or mitigation. Risk acceptance also takes place (sometimes
implicitly) for residual risk, after other forms of risk treatment have been
applied.
If only risk acceptance were this simple. Further analysis of risk
acceptance shows that there are conditions under which an organization will
elect to accept risk:
• The cost of risk mitigation is greater than the value of the asset being
protected.
• The impact of compromise is low, or the value or classification of the
asset is low.
• The value of the asset may have changed during the year.
• The value of the business activity related to the asset may have
changed during the year.
• The potency of threats may have changed during the year, potentially
leading to a higher risk rating.
• The cost of mitigation may have changed during the year, potentially
leading to greater feasibility for risk mitigation or transfer.
As with other risk treatment activities, detailed records help the security
manager better track matters such as risk assessment review.
Risk Ownership
Depending on how the organization is structured and how the risk
management strategy has been developed, risk ownership may be assigned to
one or several different managers, spanning multiple functional areas. This is
because the risk that affects one area likely affects other areas as well, so
many different people may have responsibility for affected areas and be
required to deal with and respond to risk.
Changes in Risk
As risk managers or security managers routinely monitor risks, they should
inform risk owners of any change in risk, whether the risk increases,
decreases, or changes in some other way. This will help the risk owner
continue to own the risk by being fully informed and aware of the nature of
the risk as it changes over time. For instance, a risk associated with a
limitation in password length and complexity in a business application may
have been accepted years ago, but with the proliferation of attacks on systems
with weak passwords, the risk manager may rate the risk as being more likely
to occur, which may push the risk into a higher category that will compel the
business to change its risk treatment from accept to mitigate.
Changes in Personnel
Risk or security managers need to manage risk ownership actively when
personnel changes occur in an organization. When a person designated as the
owner of one or more risks leaves the organization or is transferred
elsewhere, the ownership of risk should remain with the position and be
assigned to the replacement individual. If the position is not filled, ownership
should be transferred to the next higher-up in the organization.
In such circumstances, a person may not have the same view or comfort
level with the risk(s) they have inherited. Risks that a predecessor accepted in
the past may seem too high for the new risk manager, who may want to
perform risk treatment again in the hope that mitigation or transfer will be
chosen.
Control Ownership
Control owners should have the authority to make decisions about the
operation of their controls to ensure that these activities and outcomes can be
assured.
Some controls may have multiple instantiations and, thus, multiple control
owners. For instance, a control related to system authentication may apply to
numerous information systems managed by multiple personnel. Each of those
personnel may be considered a control owner for such a control.
Management of the framework of controls, including their scope,
NOTE Risk, asset, and control owners are not always the same person, in
the same functional area, or even in the same organization. It’s important that
you identify these particular owners early in the assessment process and
maintain careful coordination and communication between these and other
relevant stakeholders within the boundaries of your authority and assessment
scope. Having different types of owners can result in politically sensitive
issues that revolve around resourcing, responsibility, accountability, and
sometimes even blame.
Risk Documentation
Any business process that warrants the time and effort to execute deserves to
be documented so that it can be performed consistently and correctly. An
Chapter Review
An information security program comprises all the activities used to identify
and treat risks. At tactical and strategic levels, all activities in a program
fulfill this purpose. A security program is outcomes based; when a strategy is
developed, the objectives of the strategy are desired end states or outcomes.
Tasks and projects carried out in the program bring the organization closer to
these desired outcomes.
Risk treatment is the activity in risk management whereby the
organization chooses how to handle an identified risk. The four risk treatment
choices are accept, mitigate, transfer, and avoid. Risk treatment decisions
should be made by the affected line-of-business owner, executive
management, or security steering committee empowered by executive
Notes
Questions
1. A gaming software startup company does not employ penetration testing
of its software. This is an example of:
A. High tolerance of risk
B. Noncompliance
C. Irresponsibility
D. Outsourcing
2. The categories of risk treatment are:
A. Risk avoidance, risk transfer, risk mitigation, and risk acceptance
B. Risk avoidance, risk transfer, and risk mitigation
C. Risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer, risk mitigation, and
risk acceptance
D. Risk avoidance, risk treatment, risk mitigation, and risk acceptance
3. When would it make sense to spend $50,000 to protect an asset worth
$10,000?
A. The protective measure reduces threat impact by more than 90
Supporting Tasks in the CISM job practice that align with the Information
Security Program / Information Security Program Development domain
include:
Trends
Fueled by the sharp increase in the number and impact of ransomware attacks
on private organizations and government agencies, cybersecurity is getting
more attention in the media and boardrooms than in the past. The United
States and other countries have been issuing advisories, directives, and edicts
and enacting new laws and regulations requiring greater transparency of
security incidents, and many are requiring that one or more board members
have cybersecurity experience.
Further, the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of
2022 expands on Executive Order 14208 by requiring all critical
infrastructure owners and operators (whether they contract with the federal
government or not) to submit reports of cybersecurity incidents and
ransomware payments to CISA. Also, many U.S. states have passed privacy
laws, and there is a possibility of a federal law on privacy being enacted.
While more organizations recognize cybersecurity’s strategic nature and
enabling characteristics, more security leaders are considered “real” C-level
executives. However, numerous organizations still consider cybersecurity as
nonstrategic and tactical. Security and privacy are often not a part of the
initial design of new products and services, because security is still seen not
as a business enabler but as an impediment. But cybersecurity is regarded as
unimportant, until it is. Often, only a serious security breach will change this
mindset among executives.
Outcomes
The primary outcome of a security program is the realization of its strategy,
goals, and objectives, as discussed in Chapter 2. When a strategy is aligned
with the business and its risk tolerance and operations, the organization’s
security program will act as a business enabler, allowing it to consider new
business ventures while being fully aware of associated risks that can be
mitigated or accepted. Like the brakes on a race car that enable it to
maneuver more quickly, an effective security program helps the organization
Charter
A charter is a formal, written definition of the objectives of a program, its
main timelines, the sources of funding, the names of its principal leaders and
managers, and the business executives sponsoring the program. In many
organizations, a program charter document is approved by the CEO or other
executive leader that gives authority to the person or group that runs the
program. The charter also demonstrates the support from the executive
leadership team.
An information security program charter gives authority to the security
leader to develop and/or perform several functions, including the following:
Scope
An early step in the creation of an information security program is the
definition of its scope. Management needs to define the departments,
business units, affiliates, and locations to be included in the organization’s
information security program. The scope of a program is essential, because it
defines the boundaries and what parts of the organization are to be included
and subject to information security governance and policy.
The discussion of scope is generally more relevant in larger organizations
with autonomous business units or affiliates. In larger organizations, business
units or affiliates may have programs of their own, which may be defined as
part of a larger security program or may be entirely autonomous. If the scope
of a security program is defined as “headquarters only” in an organization
with autonomous business units, this does not mean there is no interaction
between the headquarters security program and business unit security
programs. For instance, there may be a single set of policies for all entities,
but separate processes, personnel, and standards in each business unit.
There is no right or wrong way to define the relationship between two or
more security programs in an organization. Rather, management needs to be
aware of factors that represent similarities and differences between parts of
larger organizations that will help them define the scope to result in effective
security management throughout the organization. This is sometimes easier
said than done, particularly in cases where the scope of security programs and
IT departments differ.
• Foundation technologies
• TCP/IP internals
• Operating systems internals
The information security leader does not need to have expertise in all of
these technologies. Further, some of these technologies are managed outside
of information security, such as IT or product development. That said,
information security needs to employ risk management to identify whether
controls and technologies in these and other areas adequately reduce risk and
to ensure that there are staff members in the organization who understand
their architecture, implementation, and operation.
Indeed, there is only one valid reason for adopting new security
technology: risk analysis and risk treatment call for it, and the organization
is unwilling to accept a related risk. All other reasons are generally invalid
and the result of peer pressure, emotional decision-making, or the desire to
“get their hands dirty” in the latest security tooling fad.
Hardware Assets
Hardware assets may include server and network hardware, user
workstations, office equipment such as printers and scanners, and Wi-Fi
access points. Depending on the scope of the risk assessment, assets in
storage and replacement components may also be included.
Accurately identifying hardware assets can be challenging, and many
organizations do a subpar job of building and maintaining inventory
information. Accounting may have asset inventory in its accounting system,
but this would not account for assets not in use or retired assets reverted to
storage. Further, asset inventory in accounting often does not cite the
business applications they support. Tools used by IT for security scans or
patch management are another source of inventory information, although
these are often incomplete for many reasons. Even purpose-made asset
inventory systems are plagued with inaccuracies, because maintaining the
data is not always a high priority.
An organization responsible for managing information and information
systems must know what its assets are. More than that, IT needs to acquire
and track several characteristics of every asset, including the following:
Information Assets
Information assets are less tangible than hardware assets, because they are
not easily observed. Information assets take many forms:
Virtual Assets
Virtualization technology, which enables an organization to employ multiple,
Asset Classification
In asset classification, an organization assigns an asset to a category
representing usage or risk. In an information security program, the purpose of
asset classification is to determine, for each asset, its level of criticality to the
organization.
Criticality can be related to information sensitivity. For instance, a
customer information database that includes contact and payment information
would be considered highly sensitive and could significantly impact present
and future business operations in the event of compromise.
Criticality can also be related to operational dependency. For example, a
Information Classification
Information classification is a process whereby different sets and collections
of data in an organization are analyzed for various types of value, criticality,
integrity, and sensitivity. There are different ways to understand these
characteristics. These are some examples:
Most organizations store information that falls into all of these categories,
with degrees of importance within them. Though this may result in a complex
matrix of information types and degrees of importance or value, the most
successful organizations will build a fairly simple information classification
scheme. For instance, an organization may develop four levels of information
classification, such as the following:
• Secret
• Restricted
• Confidential
• Public
These levels of information, examples of the types of levels that fall into each
category, and instructions on handling information at each level form the
heart of a typical information classification program.
Most organizations depend on their personnel to understand the
information classification program, including correctly classifying
information and handling it properly. This is why better information
classification programs have only three or four classification levels. It may be
more desirable to have more classification levels, but this often results in
confusion and misclassification or mishandling of sensitive and critical data.
System Classification
Once an organization is satisfied that its information classification is in order,
it can embark on system classification. Like various information assets,
information systems can also be classified according to various security and
operational criteria. The purpose for system classification is similar to the
purpose for information criteria: to identify and categorize system assets
according to the classification of information stored, processed, or
transmitted by them, so that an appropriate level of protection can be
determined and implemented.
Once a system is classified according to the highest classification level of
information stored, processed, or transmitted through it, the measures used to
protect the information system may well play a role in protecting the
information—or, in some cases, it will protect only the system. Both means
are utilized, and both are essential.
A typical approach to system classification and protection is this: for each
level of classification and each type of system, a system-hardening standard
is developed that specifies the features and configuration settings to be
applied to the system. These settings help make the system resistant to attack,
and in some cases, the settings will help protect the information being stored,
processed, or transmitted by the systems.
Some examples will help illustrate these points:
Facilities Classification
Data, asset, and systems classification can often be extended to facilities
classification in larger organizations. Facilities classification is a method for
assigning classification or risk levels to work centers and processing centers,
based on their operational criticality or other risk factors. Facilities
classification aims to develop more consistent security controls for facilities
with similar risk levels. For instance, a processing center may have extensive
video surveillance and layers of multifactor physical access controls, whereas
a sales office may have minimal (if any) video surveillance and simpler
access controls.
Personnel Classification
In some organizations, additional requirements are imposed on persons who
Asset Valuation
A key part of a risk assessment is identifying the value of an asset. In the
absence of an asset’s value, it is more difficult to calculate risks associated
with an asset, even when qualitative risk valuation is employed. Without a
known valuation, the impact of loss can be more difficult to know.
Note that some of these standards appear in more than one category. Some
are multipurpose in nature. For instance, NIST CSF prescribes a risk
Control Frameworks
Although every organization may have its unique missions, objectives,
business models, risk tolerance, and so on, organizations need not invent
governance frameworks from scratch to manage their particular IT objectives.
In strategy development, some organizations may already have a suitable
control framework in place, while others may not. It is not always necessary
for an organization to select an industry-standard control framework, but it is
advantageous to do so. These frameworks have been used in thousands of
companies, and they are regularly updated to reflect changing business
practices, emerging threats, and new technologies.
It is often considered a mistake to select or refuse a control framework
because of the presence or absence of a small number of specific controls.
Usually, a selection is made assuming that control frameworks are rigid and
inflexible. Instead, the strategist should select a control framework based on
industry alignment and then institute a process for developing additional
controls based on the results of risk assessments. Indeed, this is exactly the
approach described in ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST CSF: start with a well-
known control framework and then create additional controls, if needed, to
address risks specific to the organization.
When assessing the use of a specific framework, the strategist may find
that a specific control area is not applicable. In such a case, rather than
ignoring the section, the strategist should document the business and
technical reasons why the organization chose not to use the control area. This
will assist if a question is raised in the future as to why the decision was
made not to implement the control area. The date and those involved in the
decision should also be documented.
Several standard control frameworks are discussed in the remainder of this
section:
• COBIT
• IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) / ISO/IEC 20000
• ISO/IEC 27002
• HIPAA
ISO/IEC 27002
ISO/IEC 27002, “Information technology — Security techniques — Code of
practice for information security controls,” is an international standard
controls framework. The controls in ISO/IEC 27002 are fully explained,
including implementation guidance. These controls are listed in the appendix
of ISO/IEC 27001 but lack any explanation or background.
ISO/IEC 27002 is available from www.iso.org/standard/54533.html
(registration and payment required).
HIPAA
The U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act established
requirements for protecting electronic protected health information (ePHI).
These requirements apply to virtually every corporate or government entity
(known as a covered entity) that stores or processes ePHI. HIPAA
requirements fall into three main categories:
• Administrative safeguards
• Physical safeguards
• Technical safeguards
Several controls reside within each of these three categories. Each control
is labeled as Required or Addressable. Every covered entity must implement
controls that are labeled as Required. Controls labeled as Addressable are
considered optional in each covered entity, meaning the organization does not
have to implement an Addressable control if it does not apply or if there is
negligible risk if the control is not implemented.
A copy of HIPAA is available to view from
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt736/pdf/CRPT-104hrpt736.pdf.
NIST SP 800-53
Developed by the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology,
NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, “Security and Privacy Controls for
Federal Information Systems and Organizations,” is one of the most well-
known and adopted security control frameworks. NIST SP 800-53 is required
for all U.S. government information systems and all information systems in
private industry that store or process information on behalf of the federal
government.
NIST SP 800-53 controls are organized into 18 categories:
Even though the NIST 800-53 control framework is required for federal
information systems, many organizations that are not required to employ the
framework have used it, primarily because it is a high-quality control
framework with in-depth implementation guidance and also because it is
available without cost.
NIST SP 800-53 is available from csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-
53/rev-5/final.
NIST SP 800-171
NIST SP 800-171, “Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in
Nonfederal Systems and Organizations,” is a framework of requirements for
the protection of controlled unclassified information (CUI). This framework
is required for all information systems in private industry that store or process
• Access control
• Awareness and training
• Audit and accountability
• Configuration management
• Identification and authentication
• Incident response
• Maintenance
• Media protection
• Personnel security
• Physical protection
• Risk assessment
• Security assessment
• System and communications protection
The NIST CSF can be used as the foundation for a controls framework.
Table 2 of Version 1.1 of the CSF maps its Framework Core to CIS CSC,
COBIT 2019, ISA 62443, ISO/IEC 27001, and NIST SP 800-53.
The NIST CSF is available from www.nist.gov/cyberframework.
PCI DSS
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard is a control framework
specifically for protecting credit card numbers and related information when
stored, processed, and transmitted on an organization’s networks. The PCI
DSS was developed in 2004 by the PCI Standards Council, a consortium of
the world’s dominant credit card brands—namely, Visa, MasterCard,
American Express, Discover, and JCB.
The PCI DSS has 12 control objectives:
Policy Development
Security policy development is foundational of any organization’s
information security program. Information security policy defines the
principles and required actions for the organization to protect its assets and
personnel properly.
The audience for security policy is the organization’s personnel—not only
its full-time and part-time employees, but also its temporary workers,
including contractors and consultants. Security policy must be easily
accessible by all personnel so that they can never offer ignorance as an
excuse for violating policy. To this point, many organizations require all
personnel to acknowledge the existence of, and their understanding of, the
organization’s security policy at the time of hire and periodically (usually
annually) thereafter.
Considerations
Security policy cannot be developed in a vacuum. Instead, it needs to align
with some internal and external factors. The development of policy needs to
incorporate several considerations, including the following:
Security managers can choose how to package these and other security
policies. For example, they may exist in separate documents or together in
one document. There is no right or wrong method; instead, a security
manager should determine what would work best in the organization by
observing how other policies are structured, published, and consumed.
Security policy statements should be general and not cite specific devices,
technologies, algorithms, or configurations. Policy statements should state
what is to be done (or not done) but not how. This way, security policies will
be durable and will need to be changed infrequently. On the other hand,
security standards and procedures may change more frequently as practices,
techniques, and technologies change.
Standards
It is said that policy states what to do, whereas standards describe how to do
it or what to do it with. Like policies, standards should be written down,
periodically examined and updated, approved by management, and published
so all personnel can find them.
The topic of standards development is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 2.
Guidelines
Guidelines are nonbinding statements or narratives that provide additional
direction to personnel regarding compliance with security policies, standards,
and controls. Information security departments often develop guidelines
when they receive numerous inquiries for help understanding certain policies
or have trouble understanding how to implement them.
Requirements
Requirements are formal statements that describe the characteristics of a
system that is to be changed, developed, or acquired. Requirements should
flow from, and align with, the structure and content of policies and standards.
Because of their use in systems and services development and acquisition,
requirements should be published in a format that can be easily extracted for
use in specific projects.
Organizations should have a standard set of general requirements that
apply to all technologies and environments. Then, additional specific
requirements should be developed that focus on each specific project or
initiative.
Requirements must be specific and verifiable. Any ambiguities should be
resolved, so that all parties involved have a clear understanding of each
requirement. Further, requirements should become the basis for a test plan, a
step-by-step procedure for verifying that a system, service, or process
complies with all applicable requirements.
It is unlikely that all requirements will be satisfied in large, complex
projects. Thus, project managers and subject matter experts should prioritize
requirements to distinguish those considered “must-have” versus those that
are “nice to have.” Further, each bespoke requirement that is not a part of the
organization’s standard requirements should be traceable to the person or
group that requested it be included. If there are questions later in the project
about a specific requirement, the project team can easily know who wrote and
included the requirement. Those individuals can answer any questions about
the requirement to help others better understand it.
Some organizations distinguish functional requirements from
nonfunctional requirements. Functional requirements describe the required
actions and functions of a system. Example functional requirements include
the following:
While useful, these metrics do not address the bigger picture of the
effectiveness or alignment of an organization’s overall security program.
They do not answer key questions that boards of directors and executive
management often ask, such as the following:
Monitoring
In the overall information security program, monitoring is the continuous or
regular evaluation of a system or control to determine its operation or
effectiveness. Monitoring generally includes two activities:
Effective Metrics
For metrics to be effective, they need to be measurable. A common way to
ensure the quality and effectiveness of a metric is to use the SMART method.
A SMART metric is
• Specific
• Measurable
• Attainable
• Relevant
You can find more information about the development of metrics in NIST
SP 800-55 Revision 1, “Performance Measurement Guide for Information
Security,” available from https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-
55/rev-1/final.
Strategic Alignment
For a security program to be successful, it must align with the organization’s
mission, strategy, goals, and objectives. A security program strategy and
objectives should contain statements that can be translated into key
measurements—the program’s key performance and risk metrics.
Consider an example. The fictitious organization CareerSearchCo, which
is in the online career search and recruiting business, has the following as its
mission statement:
Based on these criteria, these metrics are all measurable, all align with the
security strategy, and are all leading indicators. If the metrics trend in an
unfavorable direction, this could indicate that a breach is more likely to occur
that would damage CareerSearchCo’s reputation and ability to earn new
business contracts from large corporations.
Types of Metrics
Many activities and events in an information security program and its
controls can be measured. These measurements can be depicted in various
ways, depending upon the story being told. When building and improving an
information security program, security managers need to understand that no
single metrics framework will meet every identified goal.
Compliance
Compliance metrics are measures of key controls related to requirements in
regulations, legal contracts, or internal objectives. Compliance metrics depict
the level of conformance to these requirements. Organizations need to
understand the business context of compliance metrics, including the
consequences of noncompliance. Security managers need to consider the
tolerance for noncompliance with each metric, including the organization’s
willingness and ability to initiate corrective action when noncompliant
activities occur.
Convergence
Larger organizations with multiple business units, geographic locations, or
security functions (which can often result from mergers and acquisitions)
Value Delivery
Metrics on value delivery focus on the long-term reduction in costs, in
proportion to other measures. Examples of value delivery metrics include the
following:
Resource Management
Resource management metrics are similar to value delivery metrics; both
convey an efficient use of resources in an organization’s information security
program. But because the emphasis here is program efficiency, these are
Organizational Awareness
Organizational awareness metrics help management understand the number
of workers who understand security policies and requirements. Typical
metrics in organizational awareness include the following:
Operational Productivity
Operational productivity metrics show how efficiently internal staff is used to
perform essential functions. Productivity metrics can help build business
cases for the automation of routine tasks. Example productivity metrics
include the following:
Organizational Support
Organizational support metrics show the degree of support for organizational
objectives. Arguably, this is a subjective metric, because it can be difficult to
produce meaningful measurements. Though it is possible to show the
achievement of key objectives, measuring the degree of support that led to
their achievement may be difficult: Was an achievement the result of a
determined few or the whole organization?
Risk Management
Effective risk management is the culmination of the highest-order activities
in an information security program; these include risk analyses, a risk ledger,
formal risk treatment, and adjustments to the suite of security controls.
While it is difficult to measure the success of a risk management program
effectively and objectively, it is possible to take indirect measurements—
much like measuring the shadow of a tree to gauge its height. Thus, the best
indicators of a successful risk management program would be improving
trends in metrics involved with the following:
Operational Performance
Operational performance metrics generally show how well personnel are
performing critical security functions. Processes measured by these metrics
need to have sufficiently detailed business records so that metrics can be
objectively measured. These are some examples of operational performance
metrics:
Audiences
As mentioned, when building or improving a metrics program, security
managers need to consider the purpose of any particular metric and the
audience to whom it is sent. A common mistake made by security managers
is the publication of metrics to various audiences without first understanding
whether any individual metric will have meaning to any particular audience.
For example, a metric showing the number of packets dropped by a firewall
will probably have no meaning to a member of the organization’s board of
directors—nor would a trend of this metric have any meaning. Security
managers need to determine what metrics are important for various audiences
and purposes and then proceed to develop those metrics.
Some metrics will have only operational value, while others can be
successfully transformed into a management or strategic metric when
portrayed in context. For example, a metric on the number of malware attacks
has no business context; however, a metric showing successful malware
attacks that result in business disruptions have far more meaning to
management. A metric on patch management SLAs by itself has no business
context, but if that were transformed into a metric showing that critical
systems not patched within SLAs resulted in higher than desired business
risk, the metric would have meaning to executive audiences.
Chapter Review
An information security program is a collection of activities used to identify,
communicate, and address risks. The security program consists of controls,
processes, and practices to increase the resilience of the computing
environment and ensure that risks are known and handled effectively.
A charter is a formal, written definition of the objectives of a program, its
main timelines, the sources of funding, the names of its principal leaders and
managers, and the business executives sponsoring the program.
Information security programs include numerous business processes to
fulfill the overall mission of information and information systems protection.
These processes fall into three major categories: risk and compliance,
architecture, and operations.
Modern information security includes essential business processes such as
risk and policy management, but overall it is also heavily involved in IT.
Notes
• Whether or not it carries authority in an organization, a charter’s
usefulness is derived from its descriptions of an organization’s vision,
objectives, roles and responsibilities, and processes and procedures. A
charter can help personnel come to a common understanding of
security programs and other programs.
• The three lines of defense model, used often in banking, is a good
model for formally separating and defining roles related to control
development, operation, and assurance. A similar model can be used
for policy development.
Questions
Answers
1. D. The metric on time to patch critical servers will be the most
meaningful metric for the board of directors. While potentially
interesting at the operational level, the other metrics do not convey
business meaning to board members.
2. D. The metric of the percentage of critical servers being patched within
SLAs is the best leading indicator because it is a rough predictor of the
probability of a future security incident. The other metrics are trailing
indicators because they report on past incidents.
3. A. The most important factor influencing a decision to select a control
framework is the industry vertical. For example, a healthcare
organization would likely select HIPAA as its primary control
framework, whereas a retail organization may select PCI DSS.
4. D. The balanced scorecard is a tool used to quantify an organization’s
performance against strategic objectives. The focuses of a balanced
scorecard are financial, customer, internal processes, and
innovation/learning.
5. C. An organization that needs to implement new controls should do so
within its existing control framework. It is unnecessary to adopt an
entirely new control framework when a few controls need to be added.
6. A. A data classification policy is a statement that defines two or more
classification levels for data, together with procedures and standards for
Supporting Tasks in the CISM job practice that align with the Information
Security Program / Information Security Program Development domain
include:
Control Classification
Before exploring the steps used to create and manage a control, you should
understand the characteristics, or classifications, of controls. Several types,
classes, and categories of controls are discussed in this section. Figure 6-1
depicts this control classification.
Types of Controls
The three types of controls are physical, technical, and administrative:
EXAM TIP ISACA does not expressly use the terms “type,” “class,” or
“category” in its literature or on the exam to describe and distinguish the
variety of controls and their basic characteristics. These terms are used in this
book to highlight the multidimensional nature of controls and how they can
be understood and classified. Like other constructs, these are models that help
you better imagine how controls operate and are used.
Classes of Controls
There are six classes of controls, which speak to their relationship with
unwanted outcomes:
NOTE Many controls can fit into more than one class. For example, a video
surveillance camera can be both a detective control (because it is part of a
system that records events) and a deterrent control (because its visibility is
designed to discourage persons from committing unwanted acts). Also, an
audit log can be both a detective control and a compensating control—
detective because it records events, and compensating because it may
compensate for a lack of a stronger, preventive control, such as a user IDs
and password access control.
Categories of Controls
There are two categories of controls that relate to the nature of their
operation:
Control Objectives
Control objectives describe the desired states or outcomes of business
operations. When building a security program, and preferably prior to
selecting a control framework, security professionals must establish high-
level control objectives.
Examples of control objective subject matter include the following:
Control objectives are the foundation for controls. For each control
objective, one or more controls will exist to ensure the realization of the
control objective. For example, the “availability of IT systems” control
objective may be implemented via several controls, including the following:
Together, these five (or more) controls contribute to the overall control
objective on IT system availability. Similarly, the other control objectives
will have one or more controls that will ensure their realization.
After establishing control objectives, the next step is to design controls.
This can be a considerable undertaking. A better approach is the selection of
one of several high-quality control frameworks that are discussed later in this
section.
If an organization elects to adopt a standard control framework, the next
step is to perform a risk assessment to determine whether controls in the
control framework adequately meet each control objective. Where there are
gaps in control coverage, additional controls must be developed and put in
place.
If you are familiar with information systems technology, you will quickly
realize that these GCCs will be implemented differently across different types
of information systems. Specific capabilities and limitations, for example,
will result in somewhat different capabilities for password complexity and
data encryption. Unless an organization is using really old information
systems, the four GCCs shown here can probably be implemented
everywhere in an IS environment. How they are implemented is the subject of
the next section.
Control Frameworks
A control framework is a collection of controls, organized into logical
categories. Well-known control frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27002, NIST
SP 800-53, and CIS CSC are intended to address a broad set of information
risks common to most organizations. Such standard control frameworks have
been developed to streamline the process of control development and
adoption within organizations. If there were no standard control frameworks,
organizations would have to assemble their controls using other, inferior
methods, such as the following:
• Gut feeling
• Using another organization’s experience
• Using a security practitioner from another organization
EXAM TIP CISM candidates are not required to memorize the specifics of
COBIT or other frameworks, but a familiarity with them will help the
candidate better understand how they contribute to effective security
governance and control.
The control in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 is far more specific than the control
in ISO/IEC 27002:2022, making this a good example of an imperfect
mapping.
In another example, on the topic of audits and audit tools, NIST SP 800-53
Rev 5 AU-9 does not clearly map to any control in ISO/IEC 27002:2022. The
closest control in ISO is control 8.34. The text of each control reads as
follows:
These controls do not map together well at all. In the earlier version of
ISO/IEC 27002, control 15.3.2 reads, “Access to information systems audit
tools should be protected to prevent any possible misuse or compromise.”
Unfortunately, in the newer revisions of these standards, for this control, the
mapping has diverged and is less clear now. Thus, mapping controls requires
continual effort.
• Defense in depth
• Split custody
• Separation of duties
ISO/IEC 27002
ISO/IEC 27002, “Information technology—Security techniques—Code of
practice for information security controls,” is a world-renowned set of
controls. The ISO/IEC 27002 control framework consists of 4 control
categories and 93 control objectives. Table 6-3 describes these control
categories and control objectives for the 2022 version, known as ISO/IEC
27002:2022.
ISO/IEC 27002 is available from www.iso.org. This and most other ISO
standards are fee-based, meaning that they must be purchased and have
licensing and usage restrictions that govern their use in an organization.
Generally, these standards are purchased in single quantities and are “single
user” in nature, and they are not permitted to be stored on file servers for use
by multiple users.
NIST SP 800-53
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, “Security and Privacy Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations,” is published by the Computer
Security Division of the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST). A summary of controls in NIST SP 800-53 appears in Appendix D,
“Security Control Baselines,” and detailed descriptions of all controls are
found in Appendix F, “Security Control Catalog.” NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 is
available from http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html. The standard is
available without cost or registration.
Table 6-4 lists the categories of controls in NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5.
The CIS CSC framework is structured in a way that makes it easy for
security practitioners to understand and use. Within each control category is a
section entitled “Why Is This Control Critical?” followed by the individual
controls. This is followed by a section called “Procedures and Tools” that
provides additional guidance. Finally, each control category includes a
system entity relationship diagram that depicts the control’s implementation
in an environment. Many consider the CIS CSC a more pragmatic and less
academic framework than NIST SP 800-53 or PCI DSS.
The CIS CSC framework includes one or more controls within each
control category. Some controls are flagged as “foundational,” meaning they
are essential in any organization. The controls not marked as “foundational”
may be considered optional.
Some controls include advanced implementation guidelines. For instance,
control 8.3 (“Limit use of external devices to those with an approved,
documented business need. Monitor for use and attempted use of external
devices. Configure laptops, workstations, and servers so that they will not
auto-run content from removable media, like USB tokens [thumb drives],
USB hard drives, CDs/DVDs, FireWire devices, external serial advanced
technology attachment devices, and mounted network shares. Configure
systems so that they automatically conduct an anti-malware scan of
removable media when inserted….”) includes in its advanced guidance,
“Actively monitor the use of external devices (in addition to logging).”
The CIS CSC framework is available from www.cisecurity.org/critical-
controls.cfm without cost, although registration may be required.
The PCI Security Standards Council has also defined business rules
around the PCI DSS standard. There is a tier structure based on the number of
credit card transactions; organizations whose credit card volume exceeds set
limits are subject to onsite annual audits, while organizations with lower
volumes are permitted to complete annual self-assessments. There is also a
distinction between merchants (retail and wholesale establishments that
accept credit cards as a form of payment) and service providers (all other
organizations that store, process, or transmit credit card data); service
providers are required to comply with additional controls.
NOTE The PCI Security Standards Council release version 4.0 of the PCI
DSS standard takes effect in March 2024. The structure of the 4.0 standard is
nearly identical with the structure of the 3.2.1 standard.
COBIT 2019
To ensure that a security program is aligned with business objectives, the
COBIT 2019 control framework of 5 principles and 37 processes is an
industry-wide standard. The five principles are as follows:
COBIT 2019 includes more than 1100 control activities to support these
principles. Established in 1996 by ISACA and the IT Governance Institute,
COBIT is the result of industry-wide consensus by managers, auditors, and
IT users. Today, COBIT 2019 is accepted as a best-practices IT process and
control framework. COBIT has absorbed ISACA’s Risk IT Framework and
Val IT Framework.
COBIT 2019 is available from www.isaca.org/resources/cobit.
COSO
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO) is a private-sector organization that provides thought leadership
through the development of frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk
management, internal control, and fraud deterrence. Its control framework is
used by U.S. public companies for management of their financial accounting
and reporting systems.
COSO is a joint initiative of the following private-sector associations:
• Self-assessment
• Third-party Audit
Several controls are included within each trust principle. All controls
within each selected trust principle are included in a SOC 2 audit.
There are two basic types of SOC 2 audits:
Controls Development
The development of controls is a foundational part of any security program.
To develop controls, a security manager must have an intimate level of
knowledge of the organization’s mission, goals, and objectives, as well as a
good understanding of the organization’s degree of risk tolerance. Figure 6-3
illustrates the relationship between an organization and the fundamentals of a
security program.
Control Implementation
The implementation of a new control should be guided by formal processes,
not unlike those that guide systems development: a new control should have a
control objective, a design that is reviewed by stakeholders, a test plan that is
carried out with results reviewed, a formal authorization to implement the
control, and IT and business change management processes to plan its
implementation.
Controls must have control owners, who are responsible for proper
operation of each control. When an organization implements new controls,
control owners should be identified and trained on the operation of the
controls they are responsible for. Ideally, control ownership and training is
included in the control life cycle to ensure that control owners are identified
and trained prior to the control being placed into operation.
New controls should be audited or reviewed more frequently to ensure that
they are operating as expected. Measurements of control performance and
operation should be established so that management can review actual versus
expected performance. In some cases, an organization will also audit or
review controls to ensure that they are meeting objectives.
• Event monitoring
• Vulnerability management
• Secure engineering and development
• Network protection
• Endpoint protection and management
• Identity and access management
• Security incident management
• Security awareness training
• Managed security services providers
• Data security
• Business continuity planning
Event Monitoring
Event monitoring is the practice of examining the security events that occur
on information systems, including applications, operating systems, database
management systems, end-user devices, and every type and kind of network
device, and then providing information about those events to the appropriate
people or systems.
Prior to widespread business use of the Internet, most organizations found
it sufficient to review event logs on a daily basis. This comprised a review of
the previous day’s logged events (or the weekend’s events on a Monday) to
ensure that no security incidents warranted further investigation. Today,
Vulnerability Management
Vulnerability management is the practice of periodically examining
information systems (including but not limited to operating systems,
subsystems such as database management systems, applications, network
devices, and IoT devices) for the purpose of discovering exploitable
vulnerabilities, related analysis, and decisions about remediation.
Organizations employ vulnerability management as a primary activity to
reduce the likelihood of successful attacks on their IT environments.
Often, one or more scanning tools, such as the following, are used to scan
target systems in the search for vulnerabilities:
• Periodic scanning One or more tools are used to scan assets in the
organization to search for vulnerabilities and discover new devices.
• Analysis of scan results A security analyst examines the results of a
vulnerability scan, validating the results to make sure there are no false
positive results. This analysis often includes a risk analysis to help the
analyst understand an identified vulnerability in the context of the
asset, its role, and its criticality. Scanning tools generally include a
criticality level or criticality score for an identified vulnerability so that
personnel can begin to understand the severity of the vulnerability.
Most tools utilize the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
method for scoring a vulnerability.
After noting the CVSS score of a specific vulnerability, a security
manager analyzes the vulnerability to establish the contextual
criticality of the vulnerability. For example, a vulnerability in the
Server Message Block (SMB) service on Microsoft Windows servers
may be rated as critical. A security manager may downgrade the risk in
the organization if SMB services are not accessible over the Internet or
if robust safeguards are already in place. In another example, a security
manager may raise the severity of a vulnerability if the organization
lacks detective controls that would alert the organization that the
vulnerable component has been attacked and compromised.
• Delivery of scan results to asset owners The security manager
delivers the report to the owners or custodians of affected assets so that
those people can begin planning remediation activities.
• Remediation Asset owners make changes to affected assets, typically
through the installation of one or more security patches or through the
implementation of one or more security configuration changes. Often,
risk analysis is performed to determine the risks associated with
proposed remediation plans.
• Reconnaissance
• Resource development
• Initial access
• Execution
• Persistence
• Privilege escalation
Network Protection
Network protection is one of the more mature disciplines in IT and
information security. Usenet, the pre-Internet dial-up protocol for
transporting e-mail and other information, included user ID and password
authentication as early as 1980. The first firewall was developed in 1988 as
the primary means for protecting systems and data from attacks originating
outside the organization. Firewalls are still considered essential, and other
types of devices and design considerations are commonly used to protect
organizations’ internal networks from many types of unwanted activities.
Networks in organizations often grow organically, with incremental
changes over time designed by a succession of network engineers or
architects. In all but the most mature organizations, the details of network
architecture and the reasons for various architectural features are
undocumented and lost to the annals of time. This results in many
organizations’ networks today consisting of several characteristics and
features that are poorly understood, other than knowing that they are essential
to the networks’ ongoing functionality.
Firewalls Firewalls are network devices that are used to control the passage
of network traffic from one network to one or more other networks. Firewalls
are typically placed at the boundary of an organization’s network and other,
external networks. Organizations also use firewalls to logically separate
internal networks from each other; examples include the following:
Firewalls are managed through a user interface of some kind. At the heart
of a firewall’s configuration are its rules, a series of statements that define
specific network traffic that is to be permitted or blocked. Table 6-13 shows a
set of sample firewall rules.
• Permit e-mail from the entire Internet to reach the e-mail server at
141.204.10.22 only.
• Permit DNS from the entire Internet to reach the DNS server at
141.204.10.24 only.
• Permit NNTP traffic from the entire Internet to reach time server at
141.204.10.22 only.
• Permit all users to access the entire Internet on ports 80 and 443
(HTTP and HTTPS protocols) only.
• Deny all other traffic from the Internet on all ports from reaching any
internal system.
Figure 6-6 NTA systems collect data from several sources for analysis
There are two main types of NTA systems. The first is a dedicated system
(an appliance or virtual machine) that collects network traffic data from
various points in the network, as depicted in Figure 6-6. The second method
is the use of detailed event logging in core routers and firewalls that are sent
to a SIEM, where NTA detection rules are established. These two methods
can achieve the same goal: detection of unusual network traffic that may be
signs of an intrusion or other unwanted event in the network.
Three standards are used for network behavior anomaly detection:
Web content filters closely monitor the network traffic flowing to and
from users’ browsers and block traffic containing malicious content as a
means for protecting the organization from malware attacks. Being centrally
administered by a network engineer or security engineer, web content filters
are typically used to block categories of content, making web sites associated
with those categories unreachable by the organization’s users. For instance,
E-mail Protection: Spam and Phishing Filters E-mail has been a preferred
method for propagating malware for decades. More than 90 percent of
successful network intrusions begin with phishing messages sent to scores of
targeted users in the hopes that one or more of them will open a malicious
document or visit a compromised web site. The “trendy” schemes include
business e-mail compromise (where a fraudster sends e-mails to company
executives requesting them to wire large amounts of money in support of a
secret merger or acquisition) and ransomware (malware that encrypts users’
files and then demands a ransom in exchange for file recovery). To avoid
compromise, many organizations employ e-mail protection in the form of
spam and phishing filters to keep those unwanted messages from ever
reaching end users.
Spam and phishing e-mail filters generally have the following
characteristics:
• End users were able to install programs, install drivers, and change
system configuration at will, thereby relieving the IT service desk of
having to do these actions themselves. While this practice relieving
• Managed SIEM
• Managed vulnerability scanning
• Managed data loss prevention
• Managed endpoint security monitoring
• Managed detection and response (MDR)
• Security incident response and forensics
• Access management
• Backup and recovery
• Data classification
• Data loss prevention
• Cloud access security brokers
Backup and Recovery Many types of events can damage information, and
some circumstances compel an organization to revert to earlier versions of
information. It’s essential that copies of stored information exist elsewhere
and in a form that enables IT personnel to load this information easily into
systems so that processing can resume as quickly as possible.
Backup to Tape and Other Media In organizations still utilizing their own
IT infrastructure, tape backup is just about as ubiquitous as power cords.
From a disaster recovery perspective, however, the issue probably is not
whether the organization has tape backup but whether its current backup
capabilities are adequate in the context of disaster recovery. There are times
when an organization’s backup capability may need to be upgraded:
NOTE Backups have always been a critical activity in IT. Ransomware has
served to highlight its importance still further.
Backup Schemes Three main schemes are used for backing up data:
• A small data set could be backed up more than once a week, while an
• First in, first out In this scheme, there is no specific requirement for
retaining any backup media for long periods (such as one year or
more). The method in the first in, first out (FIFO) rotation scheme
specifies that the oldest available backup tape is the next one to be
used. The advantage of this scheme is its simplicity. However, there is
a significant disadvantage: any corruption of backed-up data needs to
be discovered quickly (within the period of media rotation), or else no
valid set of data can be recovered. Hence, only low-criticality data
without any lengthy retention requirements should be backed up using
this scheme.
• Grandfather-father-son The most common backup media rotation
scheme, grandfather-father-son creates a hierarchical set of backup
media that provides for greater retention of backed-up data that is still
economically feasible. In the most common form of this scheme, full
backups are performed once per week, and incremental or differential
backups are performed daily. Daily backup tapes used on Monday are
not used again until the following Monday. Backup tapes used on
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday are handled in
the same way. Full backup tapes created on Sunday are kept longer.
Tapes used on the first Sunday of the month are not used again until
the first Sunday of the following month. Similarly, tapes used on the
Backup Media Storage Backup media that remains in the same location as
backed-up systems is adequate for data recovery purposes but completely
inadequate for disaster recovery purposes: any event that physically damages
information systems (such as fire, smoke, flood, hazardous chemical spill,
and so on) is also likely to damage backup media that is stored nearby. To
provide disaster recovery protection, backup media must be stored off site in
a secure location. Selection of this storage location is as important as the
selection of a primary business location: in the event of a disaster, the
survival of the organization may depend upon the protection measures in
place at the offsite storage location.
The criteria for selection of an offsite media storage facility are similar to
the criteria for selection of a hot/warm/cold recovery site, discussed in
Chapter 7. If a media storage location is too close to the primary processing
site, it is more likely to be involved in the same regional disaster, which
could result in damage to backup media. However, if the media storage
location is too far away, it may take too long for a delivery of backup media,
which would result in an unacceptably long recovery operation.
Another location consideration is the proximity of the media storage
location and the hot/warm/cold recovery site. If a hot site is being used,
chances are there is some other near real-time means (such as replication) for
data to get to the hot site. But a warm or cold site may be relying on the
arrival of backup media from the offsite media storage facility, so it may
make sense for the offsite facility to be near the recovery site.
An important factor when considering offsite media storage is the method
of delivery to and from the storage location. Chances are that the backup
media is being transported by a courier or a shipping company. It is vital that
the backup media arrive safely and intact and that the opportunities for
interception or loss are reduced as much as possible. Not only can a lost
backup tape make recovery more difficult, but it can also cause an
embarrassing security incident if knowledge of the loss becomes public.
From a confidentiality/integrity perspective, encryption of backup tapes is a
good idea, although this digresses somewhat from disaster recovery
(concerned primarily with availability).
Backup media that must be kept on site should be stored in locked
cabinets or storerooms that are separate from the rooms where backups are
Backup Media Records and Destruction To ensure the ability to restore data
from backup media, organizations need to have meticulous records that list
all backup volumes in place, where they are located, and which data elements
are backed up on them. Without these records, it may prove impossible for an
organization to recover data from its backup media library. Laws and
regulations may specify minimum and/or maximum periods that specific
information may be retained. Organizations need to have good records
management that helps them track which business records are on which
backup media volumes. When it is time for an organization to stop retaining a
specific set of data, those responsible for the backup media library need to
identify the backup volumes that can be recycled. If the data on the backup
media is sensitive, the backup volume may need to be erased prior to reuse.
Any backup media that is being discarded needs to be destroyed so that no
other party can possibly recover data on the volume, and records of this
destruction should be retained.
• Static DLP These tools are used to scan unstructured data storage
systems for sensitive information. They can be effective at discovering
sensitive data that personnel copy to file servers. Often, users will
export sensitive data out of a business application to a spreadsheet and
store that data on a file server or cloud-based file storage service.
These uses are proprietary and exist as islands of control, as there are no
standards that work across multiple technologies or uses.
Cryptography
Cryptography is the practice of hiding information in plain sight, and
encryption is the application of cryptography that converts data into a code in
an attempt to hide the information from unintended viewers. The purpose of
encryption is to make it difficult (“impossible” is a word to be avoided here)
for someone other than the intended receiver to be able to access the
information. Encryption works by scrambling the characters in a message
using a method known only to the sender and receiver, which makes the
Secure Key Exchange Secure key exchange refers to methods used by two
parties to establish a symmetric encryption key securely without actually
transmitting the key over a channel. Secure key exchange is needed when two
parties, previously unknown to each other, need to establish encrypted
communications where no out-of-band channel is available. Two parties can
perform a secure key exchange if a third party intercepts their entire
conversation. This is because algorithms used for secure key exchange utilize
information known by each party but not transmitted between them. The
most popular algorithm is the Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol.
Key Pair The encryption keys used in public key cryptography are called the
public key and the private key. Each user of public key cryptosystems
possesses this key pair. The two keys require different handling and are used
together but for different purposes, as explained in the following paragraphs.
When a user generates a key pair, the key pair will physically exist as two
separate files. The user is free to publish or distribute the public key openly;
it could even be posted on a public web site. This is in contrast to the private
key, which must be well protected and never published or sent to any other
party. Most public key cryptosystems utilize a password mechanism to
further protect the private key; without its password, the private key is
inaccessible and cannot be used.
Note that only User B’s encryption key is used in this example. This
method protects the message from eavesdroppers, but it is not used to verify
the authenticity of the message.
Public key cryptography can also be used to verify the authenticity and
integrity of a message—to verify that a specific party did, in fact, create the
message. The procedure is as follows:
• Certificate authority (CA) A public key that has been obtained from
a trusted, reputable CA can be considered genuine.
• E-mail address Public keys used for e-mail will include the user’s e-
mail address. If the e-mail address is part of a corporate or government
domain (for example, apple.com or seattle.gov), then some level of
credence can be attributed to the successful exchange of messages with
that e-mail address. However, since e-mail addresses can be spoofed,
this should be considered a weak method at best.
• Directory infrastructure A directory services infrastructure such as
Microsoft Active Directory, Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP), or a commercial product can be used to verify a user’s public
key.
• Key fingerprint Many public key cryptosystems employ a method
for verifying a key’s identity, known as the key’s fingerprint. If a user
wants to verify a public key, the user retrieves the public key and
calculates the key’s fingerprint. The user then contacts the claimed
owner of the public key, who runs a function against his private key
that returns a string of numbers. The user also runs a function against
the owner’s public key, also returning a string of numbers. If both
numbers match, the public key is genuine.
NOTE When issuing a public key, it is essential that the requestor of the
new public key be authenticated, such as by viewing a government-issued ID
or by contacting the owner at a publicly listed telephone number.
1. The sender publishes his public key to the Internet at a location that is
easily accessible to recipients.
2. The recipient retrieves the sender’s public key and saves it for later
use.
3. The sender creates a message (or file) and computes a message digest
(hash) of the message and then encrypts the hash with his private key.
4. The sender sends the original file plus the encrypted hash to the
The use of digital signatures was depicted earlier in this chapter in Figure
6-11.
1. The sender and recipient agree that the sender will transmit a large
message to the recipient.
2. The sender selects or creates a symmetric encryption key, known as
the session key, and encrypts the session key with the recipient’s
public key.
3. The sender encrypts the message with the session key.
4. The sender sends the encrypted message (encrypted with the session
key) and the encrypted session key (encrypted with the recipient’s
public key) to the recipient.
Key Generation An encryption key life cycle starts with its generation.
While at first glance it would appear that this process should require little
scrutiny, further study shows that this is a critical process that requires
safeguards. The system on which key generation takes place must be highly
protected. If keys are generated on a system that has been compromised or is
of questionable integrity, it would be difficult to determine whether a
bystander could have electronically observed key generation. For instance, if
a keylogger or other process spying tool were active in the system when keys
were generated, key generation may have been observable and details about
keys captured. This would mean that newly minted keys have already been
compromised if an outsider knows their identities.
In many situations, it would be reasonable to require that systems used for
key generation be highly protected, isolated, and used by as few people as
possible. Regular integrity checks would need to take place to make sure the
system continues to be free of any problems. Furthermore, the key generation
process needs to include some randomness (or, as some put it, entropy) so
Key Protection Private keys used in public key cryptosystems and keys used
in symmetric cryptosystems must be continuously and vigorously protected.
At all times, they must be accessible only to the parties that are authorized to
use them. If protection measures for private encryption keys are
compromised (or suspected to be), it will be possible for a key compromise to
take place, enabling the attacker to view messages encrypted with these keys
and create new encrypted messages in the name of the key’s owner. A key
compromise is any event whereby a private encryption key or symmetric
encryption key has been disclosed to any unauthorized third party. When a
key compromise occurs, it will be necessary to re-encrypt all materials
encrypted by the compromised key with a new encryption key.
Key Rotation Key rotation is the process of issuing a new encryption key
and re-encrypting data protected with the new key. Key rotation may occur
when any of the following occurs:
Secure Sockets Layer and Transport Layer Security Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) are the encryption protocols used
to encrypt web pages requested with the Hypertext Transfer Protocol/Secure
(HTTPS) protocol. Introduced by Netscape Communications for use in its
own browser, SSL and its successor, TLS, have become de facto standards
for the encryption of web pages.
SSL and TLS provide several cryptographic functions, including public
key encryption, private key encryption, and hash functions. These are used
for server and client authentication (although in practice, client authentication
EXAM TIP Test-takers need to understand that all versions of SSL and the
early version of TLS are now considered deprecated and should no longer be
used. The term SSL is still commonly used, however, and it refers to the
context but not the algorithm.
Control Monitoring
A control needs to have been designed so that monitoring can take place. In
the absence of monitoring, the organization will lack methodical means for
observing the control to determine whether it is effective. For example,
suppose an organization identified a risk during a risk assessment that
indicated that its user accounts were vulnerable to brute-force password
guessing. The organization decided to change the login process on affected
systems so that incorrect passwords would result in a small delay before the
user could re-attempt to log on (to counter machine-driven password
guessing) and that user accounts would be temporarily locked out after five
unsuccessful attempts within a five-minute period. To facilitate monitoring,
the organization also changed the login process to create audit log entries
each time a user attempted to log in, regardless of the outcome. This provided
the organization with event data that could be examined from time to time to
determine whether the control was performing as intended.
Some controls are not so easily monitored. For instance, a control
addressing abuse of intellectual property rights includes the enactment of new
acceptable use policies (AUPs) that forbid employees from violating
intellectual property laws such as copyrights. Many forms of abuse cannot be
easily monitored.
Security Reviews
Sometimes known as a control review, this examination of a process,
procedure, system, program, or other object determines the state of security.
A security review may be part of an ad hoc request, or it may be part of a
repeatable business process. These are some examples of security reviews:
Audits
An audit is a systematic and repeatable process whereby a competent and
independent professional evaluates one or more controls, interviews
personnel, obtains and analyzes evidence, and develops a written opinion on
the effectiveness of a control. In an audit of information systems and the
processes that support them, an information systems auditor interviews
personnel, gathers and analyzes evidence, and delivers a written opinion on
the effectiveness of controls implemented in information systems.
There are generally two parties in an audit: the auditor and the auditee.
This is true whether the audit is formal or informal and whether it’s internal
or external. In terms of the context of an audit, there are two types: internal
audit and external audit. These have to do with who performs the audit and
why. Otherwise, the methodologies and techniques used in auditing are the
same.
• Purpose The auditor and the auditee must establish why an audit is to
be performed. The purpose for a particular audit could be to determine
the level of compliance to a particular law, regulation, standard, or
contract. Another reason could be to determine whether specific
control deficiencies identified in past audits have been remediated. Still
another reason is to determine the level of compliance to a new law,
standard, or contract that the organization may be subject to in the
future.
• Scope The auditor and the auditee must also establish the scope of the
audit. Often, the audit’s purpose will make the scope evident, but not
always. Scope may be multidimensional: it could involve a given
period in which the body of evidence includes records spanning from a
start date to an end date, or it could involve geography (systems in a
particular region or locale), a technology (systems using a specific
operating system, a database, application, or other aspect), a business
process (systems that support specific processes such as accounting,
order entry, or customer support), or a segment of the organization.
• Risk analysis To know which areas require the greatest amount of
attention, the auditor needs to be familiar with the levels of risk
associated with the domain being audited. Two different perspectives
of risk may be needed. First, the auditor needs to know the relative
levels of risk among the different aspects of the domain being audited
so that audit resources can be allocated accordingly. For example, if
the subject of an audit is an enterprise resource planning (ERP) system
and the auditor knows that the accounts receivable function has been
problematic in the past, the auditor will probably want to devote more
resources and time on the accounts receivable function than on others.
Second, the auditor needs to know about the absolute level of risk
Audit Objectives The audit objectives are the specific goals for an audit.
Generally, the objective of an audit is to determine whether controls exist and
whether they are effective in some specific aspect of business operations in
an organization. An audit is often performed as a requirement of regulations,
This and other information will enable the auditor to determine the skills
required to examine and evaluate processes and information systems. The
auditor will be able to establish an audit schedule and will have a good idea
of the types of evidence that are needed. The IS audit may be able to make
advance requests for certain other types of evidence even before the onsite
phase of the audit begins.
For an audit with a risk-based approach, the auditor has a couple of
options:
Audit Statement of Work For an external audit, the auditor may need to
develop a statement of work or engagement letter that describes the audit
purpose, scope, duration, and costs. The auditor may require a written
approval from the client before audit work can officially begin.
Report Preparation The auditor needs to develop a plan that describes how
the audit report will be prepared. This will include the format and the content
of the report, as well as the manner in which findings will be established and
documented. The auditor must ensure that the audit report complies with all
applicable audit standards, including ISACA IS audit standards. If the audit
report requires internal review, the auditor should identify the parties that will
perform the review and make sure they will be available at the time when the
auditor expects to complete the final draft of the audit report.
Post-audit Follow-up
After a given period (which could range from days to months), the auditor
should contact the auditee to determine what progress the auditee has made
on the remediation of any audit findings. There are several good reasons for
doing this:
• Real tasks The auditor should request to see some functions actually
being carried out.
• Skills and experience The auditor should ask each interviewee about
his or her career background to determine the interviewee’s level of
experience and career maturity.
• Security awareness The auditor should observe personnel to
determine whether they are following security policies and procedures.
• Segregation of duties The auditor should observe personnel to
determine whether adequate segregation of duties is in place.
Reporting Audit Results The work product of an audit project is the audit
report, which describes the entire audit project, including audit objectives,
scope, controls evaluated, opinions on the effectiveness and integrity of those
controls, and recommendations for improvement. While an auditor or audit
firm will generally use a standard format for an audit report, some laws and
standards require that an audit report regarding those laws or standards
contain specific information or be presented in a particular format. Still, there
will be some variance in the structure and appearance of audit reports created
by different audit organizations. The auditor is typically asked to present
findings in a closing meeting, where he can explain the audit and its results
and be available to answer questions about the audit. The auditor may include
an electronic presentation to guide discussion of the audit.
Structure and Contents While there are often different styles for presenting
audit findings, as well as regulations and standards that require specific
content, an audit report will generally include several elements:
• Cover letter
When the auditor is creating the report, she must make sure that it is
balanced, reasonable, and fair. The report should not just be a list of
everything that was wrong; it should also include a list of controls that were
found to be operating effectively. The auditor also needs to take care when
describing recommendations, realizing that any organization is capable of
only so much change in a given period. If the audit report contains many
findings, the auditor should realize that the organization may not be able to
remediate all of them in an elegant manner. Instead, the organization will
need to understand which findings should be remediated first—the audit
report should provide this guidance.
NOTE It is typically not the auditor’s role to describe how an audit finding
should be remediated. Deciding the methods used to apply remediation is the
role of auditee management.
TIP The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) has excellent guidance for audit
planning at www.theiia.org.
Organizations undergoing any particular audit for the first time generally
plan much further ahead. In many cases, a pre-audit will get a preliminary
idea of the results that will be achieved in the actual audit. Organizations
planning a pre-audit need to ensure that the same techniques used in the pre-
audit will be used in the audit. This is a common mistake in a pre-audit. If the
pre-audit is less rigorous and thorough than the audit, the organization may
have a false sense of confidence in a favorable audit outcome; they will be
surprised that the audit went poorly while the pre-audit was seemingly
successful.
Organizations should ensure that personnel are ready for the audit. In
particular, personnel who have never worked with external auditors need to
be coached as follows:
Control Self-Assessment
The control self-assessment (CSA) is a methodology used by an organization
to review key business objectives, risks related to achieving these objectives,
and the key controls designed to manage those risks. The primary
characteristic of a CSA is that the organization takes initiative to self-regulate
rather than engage outsiders, who may be experts in auditing but not in the
organization’s mission, goals, objectives, and culture.
• Corporate workers All use computers, and most use mobile devices
for e-mail and other functions.
• Retail floor managers These people work in retail store locations
and use computers daily in their jobs.
• Retail floor cashiers All work in retail store locations and do not use
computers, but they do collect payments by cash, check, and credit
card.
• Retail floor workers All work in retail store and warehouse locations
and do not use computers.
• Third-party personnel Any persons from outside companies that
regularly access the organization’s networks, systems, or data should
be included in portions of security awareness training that are relevant
to their tasks and duties.
Technical Workers
Technical workers in an organization, typically IT personnel, should be
trained in security techniques that are relevant to their positions. Technical
workers are responsible for architecture, system and network design,
implementation, and administration. Without security training, these workers’
lapses in judgment may result in significant vulnerabilities that could lead to
Software Developers
Software developers typically receive little or no education on secure
software development in colleges, universities, and tech schools. The art of
secure coding is new to many software developers. Security training for
software developers helps them to be more aware of common mistakes,
including the following:
This list is adapted from the “Top 10 Web Application Security Risks,”
published by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), at
https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/. This organization is dedicated to
helping software developers better understand the techniques needed for
secure application development and deployment.
Security training for software developers should also include protection of
the software development process itself. Topics in secure software
development generally include the following:
Third Parties
Security awareness training needs to be administered to all personnel who
have access to an organization’s data through any means. Often this includes
personnel who are employees of other organizations, so this means that some
of those workers need to participate in the organization’s security awareness
training. In larger organizations, the curriculum for third-party personnel may
need to be altered somewhat because portions of the security awareness
training content may not be applicable to outsiders.
New Hires
New employees, as well as consultants and contractors, should be required to
attend security awareness training as soon as possible. There is a risk that
new employees could make mistakes early in their employment and prior to
their training, as they would not be familiar with all the security practices in
the organization. Better organizations link access control with security
awareness training: New employees are not given access to systems until
after they have successfully completed their security awareness training. This
gives new workers added incentive to complete their training quickly, since
they want to be able to access corporate applications and get to work.
Benefits of Outsourcing
Organizations that are considering outsourcing operations to third parties
need to weigh the benefits and costs carefully to determine whether the effort
to outsource will result in measurable improvement in their processing,
service delivery, and/or finances.
Outsourcing can offer an organization many benefits:
Risks of Outsourcing
In the 1990s, when many organizations rushed to outsource development and
support functions to organizations located in other countries, they did so with
unrealistic short-term gains in mind and without adequately considering all
the real costs and risks of outsourcing. This is not to say that outsourcing to
third parties is bad, but many organizations made outsourcing decisions
without fully understanding them.
While outsourcing to third parties can bring many tangible and intangible
benefits to an organization, it is not without certain risks and disadvantages.
Naturally, when an organization employs third parties to perform some of its
functions, it relinquishes some control to those third parties.
The risks of outsourcing to third parties include the following:
• Higher than expected costs Reduced costs were the main driver for
offshore outsourcing that began in the 1990s. However, many
organizations failed to anticipate the actual operational realities and/or
the cost savings. For instance, after U.S.-based organizations
outsourced to overseas operations, IT personnel had to make many
more expensive trips than expected. Also, changes in international
• Legal One of the most important allies to the security manager, the
organization’s legal department negotiates purchase and service
contracts with third parties. Thus, legal will have a collection of
contracts that can identify third parties. Security managers need to
understand, however, that legal does not handle contracts for every
third party, because some suppliers and vendors do not use contracts.
Many online service providers, for example, use simple “click-
through” agreements that do not go through the organization’s legal
department.
• Allgress
• CyberGRX
• Diligent (formerly Galvanize)
• KY3P
• Lockpath
• Prevalent
• RSA Archer
• ServiceNow
NOTE Because TPRM is a rapidly growing and changing field, the number
and types of service vendors providing products that help manage third
parties will frequently change.
Note that the values in Tables 6-14 and 6-15 are not absolutely consistent
across different service providers. Instead, these tables serve to illustrate the
nature of shared responsibilities between a service organization and its
customers. The specific responsibilities for operations and security between
an organization and any specific service provider can vary somewhat. It is
vital that an organization clearly understand its precise responsibilities for
each third-party relationship so that no responsibilities are overlooked or
neglected; otherwise, risks may be introduced to the organization’s
operations and/or security. The organization is ultimately responsible for
ensuring that specific areas are addressed, because if a breach occurs, the
organization will be held responsible in the eye of shareholders, board of
directors, and customers.
TPRM has been the subject of many standards and regulations that compel
organizations to be proactive in discovering risks present in the operations of
their critical third-party relationships. Historically, many organizations were
not voluntarily assessing their critical third parties. Statistical data about
breaches over several years has revealed that more than half of all breaches
are caused by inappropriately managed third parties. This statistic illuminates
Initial Assessment
Prior to the establishment of a business relationship, an organization will
assess and evaluate the third party for suitability. Often this evaluation is
competitive, involving two or more third parties vying for the formal
relationship. The organization will require that each third party provide
information describing its services, generally in a structured manner through
a request for information (RFI) or a request for proposal (RFP).
In the RFI and RFP, an organization often includes sections on security
and privacy to solicit information about how each third party will protect the
organization’s information. This, together with information about the services
themselves, pricing, and other information, reveals details that the
organization uses to select the third party that will provide services.
Onboarding
Onboarding is the process by which an organization begins a business
relationship with a third party. Before utilizing the products or services from
a third party, the organization should perform up-front due diligence to
understand the level of risk involved in the relationship. Often, an
organization will establish a risk level using criteria discussed earlier in this
section and will then perform an assessment utilizing questionnaires and
other methods according to the scheme shown in Tables 6-17 and 6-18. These
activities will uncover issues that may require remediation and/or specific
Legal Agreement
Before services can commence, the organization and the third party will
negotiate a legal agreement that describes the services provided, service
levels, quality, pricing, and other terms. Based on the details discovered in
the assessment phase, the organization can develop a section in the legal
agreement that addresses security and privacy, which will typically cover
these subjects:
As stated earlier, not all third parties are assessed in the same way.
Instead, organizations can establish schemes for assessing vendors according
to their risk levels. Table 6-17 depicts such a scheme.
• Security policy
• Security controls
• Security awareness training records
• New-hire checklists
• Details on employee background checks (not necessarily actual records
but a description of the checks performed)
Risk Treatment
Organizations that carefully examine the information provided from the third
parties may discover some unacceptable practices or situations. In these
cases, the organization can analyze the matter and decide on a course of
action. For instance, suppose a highly critical third party indicates that it does
not perform annual security awareness training for its employees, and the
organization finds this unacceptable. To remedy this, the organization
analyzes the risk (in a manner not unlike any risk found internally) and
decides on a course of action: it contacts the third party in an attempt to
compel them to institute annual training.
Security Incidents
If a security incident occurs in a third-party organization, responding to the
incident is more complex, mainly because two or more organizations and
their respective security teams are involved. A security incident at a third-
party organization is also an incident in its customers’ organizations, and
each needs to respond to it. If a third-party organization’s systems are
breached, the third-party must respond and perform all of the steps of
incident response, such as notifying affecting parties, including its customers.
Customers of third-parties have their own incident response to perform.
However, customers are usually not permitted to access detailed event logs or
perform forensic analysis on the third-party provider. Often, customers have
Security Operations
Security operations are associated with much of the action-oriented activities
in an information security program, through its monitoring and response
processes. Communications and reporting from security operations may
include the following:
Risk Management
Risk management, the risk analysis and risk treatment function that deals
with emerging risk, should periodically produce management reports so that
executive leaders can stay informed on many aspects of cyber risk in the
organization. Risk management reporting consists of a periodic snapshot of
the risk register, including changes in overall security posture, new risks,
changes in existing risks, and those risks that have been treated. Reporting
would also include tracking of risk remediation and whether it is being
performed on schedule and within budget.
Trends in risk management reporting could include risk treatment
decisions by risk magnitude, indicating whether an organization’s risk
appetite is increasing, decreasing, or staying the same, and the time taken to
complete remediation. Reporting may be misleading if it includes only the
numbers of items in the risk register and the number of items being selected
for risk treatment.
Internal Partnerships
No security manager can hope to accomplish much if they work alone.
Effective information security and information risk is a team sport, and each
player on the team can help the security manager in different ways. Further,
communication with other corporate departments and business units helps to
keep the security manager informed on matters of importance.
An effective way to build those partnerships while increasing the
Legal
In most organizations, the legal department functions as the organization’s de
facto business risk office, through the negotiation of contract terms with
service providers, customers, and other parties. Legal generally always
attempts to tip risk in favor of the organization.
Legal and information security can collaborate on the security clauses in
almost any contract with customers, suppliers, service providers, and other
parties. When other parties send contracts that contain security clauses, the
security manager should examine those clauses to ensure that the
organization is able to meet all requirements. Similarly, when the
organization is considering doing business with another party, the security
manager can work with the legal department to make sure that the
organization is adequately protected by requiring the other party to take
certain steps to protect the organization’s information.
Sometimes an organization will enter into a business relationship without
informing or consulting with the security manager, who often would want to
perform a risk assessment to identify any important risks that should be
known. The best arrangement is for legal to inform the security manager of
every new contract it receives so that the security manager can attempt to
identify risks at this late stage.
Human Resources
As the steward for information and many activities regarding employees and
other workers, human resources (HR) is another important ally of information
security. HR can bolster the organization’s security in many ways, including
the following:
Facilities
The facilities function provides stewardship of the workplace to ensure that
there is adequate space and support for workers in all office locations. The
communication between facilities and information security includes the
following subject matter:
NOTE Although personnel security is cited last in this list, the safety of
Information Technology
Information technology and information security represents perhaps the most
strategic partnership that the security manager will establish and develop.
Many key functions are performed by IT that have security ramifications,
requiring effective collaboration and communication between these two
teams. These functions include the following:
Systems Development
Systems development includes software development, systems development,
integration, and other activities concerned with the development or
acquisition of information systems for use internally or by customers or
partners.
Under guidance from the security manager, systems development will
manage the entire product development life cycle, with security as an integral
part at each stage in the process. Communications and collaboration between
systems development and information security include the following topics:
• Security and privacy by design Several activities ensure that all new
offerings, components, features, and improvements incorporate
security and privacy as part of the design process. This can help the
organization avoid issues later in the development process that may be
Procurement
Larger organizations have procurement or purchasing departments that
negotiate prices and business terms for new purchases of hardware, software,
and services, as well as renewals for subscriptions and services. The security
Internal Audit
Virtually all U.S. public companies, and many private companies, have an
internal audit (IA) function whose main mission is assurance through
independent audits of policies and controls. Although IA departments cannot
stipulate how controls, policies, and processes should be designed and
operated, IA can still be a collaborative partner on controls, policies, and
processes by telling IT, information security, and others whether those
controls, policies, and processes can be audited as designed.
External Partnerships
Successful information security is possible only when the security manager
communicates and has established relationships with key external
organizations. Those key organizations can be identified according to the
organization’s industry sector, relevant regulations, information systems in
use, geographic locations, and similar considerations.
Law Enforcement
A roof is best repaired on a sunny day. Similarly, security managers should
communicate and cultivate relationships with key law enforcement agencies
and relevant personnel in those agencies before there is an urgent matter at
hand. Organizations and law enforcement can develop a relationship in which
trusted information sharing can take place; then, when an emergency such as
a security breach occurs, law enforcement will be familiar with the
organization and its key personnel and will be able to respond appropriately.
Organizations may benefit by developing relationships with the following
agencies:
Standards Organizations
Numerous standards organizations exist in the information security industry,
and a multitude of others exist in all other industry sectors. In the information
security industry itself, being involved in standards organizations avails the
security manager of “insider” information such as “sneak previews” of
emerging and updated standards, as well as learning opportunities and even
conferences and conventions. These organizations include the following:
Professional Organizations
The information security profession is challenging, not only because of the
consequences of ineffective security programs but also because of the high
rate of innovation that takes place. Professional organizations such as the
following help to fill the need for valuable information through training,
professional certifications, local chapter organizations, and conferences:
Compliance Management
Compliance is the state of conformance to applicable policies, standards,
regulations, and other requirements. It is the process by which the security
manager determines whether the organization’s information systems,
processes, and personnel conform to those things. When a security manager
develops or adopts a control framework and identifies applicable regulations
and legal requirements, he then sees to it that controls and other measures are
implemented. Then, as part of the risk management life cycle, he examines
those controls, processes, and systems to determine whether they are in
compliance with internal and external requirements. As discussed throughout
this book, these activities include external audits, internal audits, reviews, and
control self-assessments.
As they do with other life cycle processes, security managers need to
report on the organization’s compliance with policies, standards, regulations,
and other cybersecurity related legal obligations. Only then can management
understand the organization’s compliance posture and be aware of any
compliance issues that warrant attention.
Compliance or Security
Security consultants who work with numerous client organizations often
observe the ways that organizations treat asset protection. Organizations
seem to fall into one of two categories:
Applicability
Security managers often find that compliance is complicated by multiple,
overlapping standards, regulations, and other legal requirements, each of
which may be applicable to various portions of the organization. To
understand the coverage of these requirements, the security manager can
develop a compliance matrix such as the one shown in Table 6-19.
Compliance Risk
As the security manager performs risk assessments and populates the risk
register with risk matters requiring discussion and treatment, the security
manager should not overlook compliance risk. Compliance risk is associated
with any general or specific consequences of the failure to be compliant with
an applicable law or other legal obligation.
Suppose, for example, that during a risk assessment, a security manager
observes that the organization stores credit card information in plaintext
spreadsheets on internal file servers. The security manager can identify at
least two risks in this situation:
Compliance Enforcement
As the security manager reviews the results of internal and external audits,
control self-assessments, and other examinations of systems and processes,
she will need to weigh not only the direct risks associated with any negative
findings but also the compliance risk. The security manager can apply both of
these considerations in any discussions and proceedings during which others
in the organizations are contemplating their response to these compliance
Compliance Monitoring
Rules, regulations, and standards are ever-changing. Information security
organizations must find a way to stay current with regard to these changes, so
that the organization can proactively plan and anticipate changes that must be
made to maintain an acceptable compliance posture. Information security
departments often collaborate with corporate legal departments that consume
subscription services that inform the organization of changes in laws and
regulations. Otherwise, organizations would need to spend considerable time
researching applicable laws to be aware of important changes.
Personnel Management
In all but the smallest organizations where the security manager acts alone,
personnel management is an important aspect of information security
management. In many organizations, information security is staffed with a
team ranging from two to dozens of people. The security manager is
responsible for all aspects of the security team, starting with identifying and
hiring candidates, assigning and supervising work, developing new skills, and
developing the security team’s “culture within a culture.” All of this requires
intentional communication and monitoring.
Job Descriptions
A job description is a formal description of a position in an organization and
usually contains a job title, work experience requirements, knowledge
requirements, and responsibilities. Job descriptions are used when an
organization is seeking to fill a new or vacant position. The job description
will be included in online advertisements to attract potential candidates. In
most organizations, HR is the steward of job descriptions. However, when
positions become vacant or new positions are opened, HR often will consult
with the hiring manager to ensure that the contents of a job description are
still accurate and up-to-date.
Job descriptions are also a tool used in professional development.
Managers and leadership can develop career paths that represent a person’s
professional growth through a progression of promotions or transfers into
other positions. Job descriptions are a primary means for a worker to
understand what another position is like; interviewing people who are already
in a desired position is another means for gaining insight into a position that
someone aspires to. A small but effective way to drive a culture of security is
to add in specific language regarding the responsibilities that each role plays
in protecting the organization’s data and systems used in storing, processing,
and transmitting that data.
Culture
As discussed in Chapter 1, culture is the collective set of attitudes, practices,
communication, communication styles, ethics, and other behavior in an
organization. Culture can be thought of as the collective consciousness of the
workers in an organization. It’s hard to describe an organization’s culture
because it has to be experienced to be understood.
Security managers seek to understand an organization’s culture so that
they may be better and more effective change agents. In organizations that do
not regard information security as an important activity, security managers
must work to understand the culture and make subtle changes to improve
awareness of information security in a form that most workers can
understand. Security awareness training, with its attendant messaging from
NOTE With our codes of ethics from ISACA and other security
professional organizations, we are obligated to conduct ourselves according
to a higher standard, which is a part of the reason for the culture within a
culture.
Professional Development
Dedicated and committed technologists have a built-in thirst for knowledge
and for expanding their boundaries. Information security professionals should
have this thirst “on steroids,” because the velocity of change is higher than
that in other aspects of information technology. Cyber-criminal organizations
are innovating their malware and other attack techniques, manifested through
breaches using increasingly novel methods; security tools vendors are
innovating their detective and protective wares; security organizations are
continually improving many aspects of security management, including
control frameworks, auditing techniques, and security awareness messaging.
It’s been said that information security professionals must spend four hours
each week reading up on these and other new developments just to keep from
falling behind. Security managers need to be aware of the present knowledge
and skills that each security team member possesses today, what skills are
needed in the team in the future, and the professional growth aspirations that
drive each team member. Several avenues for professional development are
discussed here.
• Risk management
• Risk analysis
• Information systems auditing
• Penetration testing
• Red / blue / purple team
• Malware analysis
• Security engineering
• Security architecture
• Secure development
• Mobile device security
• Telecommunications and network security
• Social engineering
• Security awareness training
• Forensics
• Cryptography
• Business continuity planning and disaster recovery planning
• Identity and access management
• Identity and access governance
• Data governance and classification
Personnel-Related Reporting
Reporting that is related to personnel management and development may
include the following:
Budget
Budgeting is an essential part of long-term planning for information security
and arguably a more difficult undertaking than it is for many other
departments. Although the development of an information security strategy
(in terms of the capabilities needed) is somewhat more straightforward,
obtaining management support for the funding required to realize the strategy
can be quite difficult. When executive management does not understand the
strategic value of information security, the prospect of funding activities that
result in existing business capabilities or capacity seems far different from
funding information security, which results in no changes in business
capabilities or capacity.
The activities that the security manager needs to include in budgets
include the following:
IT Service Management
IT service management (ITSM) is the set of activities that occur to ensure that
the delivery of IT services is efficient and effective, through active
management and the continuous improvement of processes. ITSM consists of
several distinct activities:
• Service desk
• Incident management
• Problem management
• Change management
• Configuration management
• Release management
• Service-level management
• Financial management
• Capacity management
• Service continuity management
• Availability management
Service Desk
Often known as the help desk, the IT service desk handles incidents and
service requests on behalf of customers by acting as a single point of contact.
The service desk performs end-to-end management of incidents and service
requests (at least from the perspective of the customer) and is also
responsible for communicating status reports to the customer.
The service desk can also serve as a collection point for other ITSM
processes, such as change management, configuration management, service-
level management, availability management, and other ITSM functions. A
typical service desk function consists of frontline analysts who take calls
from users. These analysts perform basic triage and are often trained to
perform routine tasks such as password resets, troubleshoot hardware and
software issues, and assist users with questions and problems with software
programs. When analysts are unable to assist a user, the matter is typically
escalated to a subject-matter expert who can provide assistance.
• Service outage
• Service slowdown
• Software bug
Problem Management
When several incidents have occurred that appear to have the same or a
similar root cause, a problem is occurring. ITIL defines a problem as “a cause
of one or more incidents.” ISO/IEC 20000-1:2011 defines a problem as the
“root cause of one or more incidents” and continues by stating, “The root
cause is not usually known at the time a problem record is created and the
problem management process is responsible for further investigation.”
The overall objective of problem management is a reduction in the number
and severity of such incidents. Problem management can also include some
proactive measures, including system monitoring to measure system health
and capacity management, which will help management forestall capacity-
related incidents.
Examples of problems include the following:
Similar to incidents, when the root cause of a problem has been identified,
the change management and configuration management processes will be
enacted to make temporary and permanent fixes.
Change Management
Change management involves using a set of processes to ensure that all
changes performed in an IT environment are controlled and performed
consistently. ITIL defines change management as follows: “The goal of the
change management process is to ensure that standardized methods and
procedures are used for efficient and prompt handling of all changes, in order
to minimize the impact of change-related incidents upon service quality, and
consequently improve the day-to-day operations of the organization.”
The main purpose of change management is to ensure that all proposed
Emergency Changes
Although most changes can be planned in advance using the change
Configuration Management
Configuration management (CM) is the process of recording and maintaining
the configuration of IT systems. Each configuration setting is known in ITSM
parlance as a configuration item (CI). CIs usually include the following:
Service-Level Management
Service-level management is composed of the set of activities that confirms
whether the IT department is providing adequate service to customers. This is
achieved through continuous monitoring and periodic review of IT service
delivery.
An IT department often plays two different roles in service-level
management: As a provider of service to its own customers, the department
will measure and manage the services that it provides directly. Also, many IT
departments directly or indirectly manage services that are provided by
external service providers. Thus, many IT departments are both service
provider and customer, and often the two are interrelated, as depicted in
Figure 6-15.
Financial Management
Financial management for IT services consists of several activities, including
the following:
• Budgeting
• Capital investment
• Expense management
• Project accounting and project ROI
Availability Management
The goal of availability management is the sustainment of IT service
availability in support of organizational objectives and processes. The
availability of IT systems is governed by the following:
Asset Management
Asset management is the collection of activities used to manage the
inventory, classification, use, and disposal of assets. It is a foundational
activity, without which several other activities could not be effectively
managed, including vulnerability management, device hardening, incident
management, data security, and some aspects of financial management. Asset
management is discussed fully in Chapter 5.
Continuous Improvement
Continuous improvement represents the desire to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of processes and controls over time. It could be said that
continuous improvement is a characteristic of an organization’s culture. The
pursuit of continuous improvement is a roundabout way of pursuing quality.
A requirement in ISO/IEC 27001 certification requires that management
promote continual improvement and that security policy include a
commitment to the continual improvement of the information security
management system (ISMS). ISO/IEC 27001 also requires that management
review the ISMS to identify opportunities for continual improvement. The
standard also explicitly requires organizations to “continually improve the
suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness of its information security
management system.”
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5, “Security and Privacy Controls for Federal
Information Systems and Organizations,” similarly requires that an
organization’s risk management program incorporate a feedback loop for
continuous improvement. Control SA-15 (6) states that the organization must
“require the developer of the system, system component, or system service to
implement an explicit process to continuously improve the development
process.”
Chapter Review
Controls are the procedures, mechanisms, systems, and other measures
designed to reduce risk through compliance to policies. An organization
develops controls to ensure that its business objectives will be met, risks will
be reduced, and errors will be prevented or corrected.
Controls and control frameworks are used to enforce desired outcomes.
Controls need to be carefully considered, as each consumes resources.
Security managers need to understand the various types of controls (such as
preventive, detective, deterrent, manual, automatic, and so on) so that the
correct types of controls can be implemented.
Controls are classified in multiple dimensions so that security
professionals can better understand and work with them. Control type
descriptors include physical, technical, administrative, preventive, detective,
manual, automatic, compensating, and recovery.
An organization’s general computing controls (GCCs) are general in
nature and often implemented in different ways on different information
systems, based upon their individual capabilities and limitations, as well as
applicability.
A control framework is a collection of controls that is organized into
logical categories. Well-known control frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27002,
NIST SP 800-53, and CIS CSC are intended to address a broad set of
information risks common to most organizations. A crosswalk maps two or
more control frameworks together.
Before a control can be designed, the security manager needs to have
some idea of the nature of risks that a control is intended to address. In a
running risk management program, a new risk may have been identified
during a risk assessment that led to the creation of an additional control.
After a control has been designed, it should be put into service and then
managed throughout its life. Depending upon the nature of the control, this
Notes
• The most common approach to controls development is the selection of
an already-established control framework, such as those discussed in
this chapter. However, an organization is also free to develop a control
framework from scratch.
• In a typical security program, the security manager will select a control
framework as a starting point and then add, change, or remove controls
over time as a result of the risk management process. The initial
control framework should be considered only a starting point and not
the set of controls that the organization is required to manage
permanently.
• Security managers prefer preventive controls but will sometimes need
to settle on detective controls.
• The selection of a control framework is less important than the risk
management process that will, over time, mold it into the controls that
need to exist.
• Many organizations ruminate over the selection of a control
framework. Instead, each organization should select a framework and
then make adjustments to its controls to suit the business needs. A
control framework should generally be considered a starting point, not
a rigid and unchanging list of controls—except in cases where
regulations stipulate that controls may not be changed.
• Many organizations need to implement multiple control frameworks in
response to applicable regulations and other obligations. In such cases,
security managers should consider mapping them into a single control
framework.
• To the extent than an organization is dependent upon IT for its
operations, the organization is equally dependent upon effective
cybersecurity to protect its IT.
• Data backup has always been critical, but the rise in ransomware
attacks is highlighting the value of backups for business owners.
Questions
1. The most important factor in the selection of a control framework is:
A. Organization maturity
B. Industry relevance
C. Risk tolerance
D. Risk appetite
2. The life-cycle process that influences controls over time is known as:
A. Third-party risk management
B. External audit
C. Risk management
D. Internal audit
3. The main reason that preventive controls are preferred over detective
controls is:
Answers
1. B. Organizations looking to select a control framework as a starting
point for controls should select a framework that aligns with the
organization’s industry. For instance, a healthcare organization may start
with HIPAA, while a global manufacturer would likely select ISO/IEC
27002.
2. C. The risk management life cycle, over time, will have the greatest
influence on an organization’s controls. Newly discovered risks can be
managed through the enactment of new controls, for example.
3. A. Preventive controls, when available and feasible, are preferred over
detective controls, because they prevent unwanted events from
Supporting Tasks in the CISM job practice that align with the Incident
Management / Incident Management Readiness domain include:
Our world is full of surprises, including events that disrupt our plans and
activities. In the context of IT and business, several unexpected events can
cause significant disruption to business operations, even to the point of
threatening the ongoing viability of the organization itself. These events
include:
• Natural disasters
• Human-made disasters
• Malicious acts
• Cyberattacks
• Changes with unintended consequences
These examples should give you an idea of the nature of a security incident.
Not all represent cataclysmic events. Other types of incidents may also be
considered security incidents in some organizations.
Objectives
Similar to any intentional activity, organizations need to establish their
objectives prior to undertaking an effort to develop security incident response
plans. Otherwise, it may not be clear whether business needs are being met.
Following are some objectives that may be applicable to many organizations:
Maturity
When undertaking any effort to develop or improve business processes, an
organization should consider its current and desired levels of maturity. As a
quick reminder, the levels of maturity according to the Capability Maturity
Model Integration for Development (CMMi-DEV) are as follows:
Plan Development
A security incident response plan is a document that defines policies, roles,
responsibilities, and actions to be taken in the event of a security incident.
Often, a response plan also defines and describes roles, responsibilities, and
actions that are related to the detection of a security incident. This portion of
an incident response plan is vital, considering the high velocity and high
impact of certain types of security incidents.
A security incident response plan typically includes these sections:
• Policy
• Roles and responsibilities
• Incident detection capabilities
• Playbooks
• Communications
• Recordkeeping
Playbooks Recognizing that there are many types of security incidents, each
with its own impacts and issues, many organizations develop a collection of
incident response playbooks that provide step-by-step instructions for
incidents likely to occur in the organization. A set of playbooks may include
procedures for the following incidents:
During a serious incident, emotions can run high, and personnel under
stress may not be able to remember all of the steps required to handle an
incident properly. Playbooks help guide experienced and trained personnel in
the steps required to examine, contain, and recover from an incident. They
are commonplace in other industries: pilots and astronauts use playbooks to
handle various emergency situations, for example, and they practice the steps
to help them prepare to respond effectively when needed.
• Service outage
• Service slowdown
TIP Use of an intake form is not the only accepted approach when gathering
information about critical processes, dependencies, and systems. It’s also
acceptable to conduct one-on-one interviews or group interviews with key
users and IT personnel to identify critical processes, dependencies, and
systems. I recommend the use of an intake form (whether paper-based or
electronic), even if the interviewer uses it herself as a framework for note-
taking.
Statements of Impact
When processes and systems are being inventoried and cataloged, it is also
vitally important to obtain one or more statements of impact for each process
and system. A statement of impact is a qualitative or quantitative description
of the impact on the business if the process or system were incapacitated for a
time.
For IT systems, you might capture the number of users and the
departments or functions that are affected by the unavailability of a specific
IT system. Include the geography of affected users and functions if that is
appropriate. Here are example statements of impact on IT systems:
• Inability to place orders for appliances will cost the rate of $12,000
per hour.
• Delays in payments will cost $1,875 per hour in interest charges.
Criticality Analysis
When all of the BIA information has been collected and charted, a criticality
analysis can be performed. Criticality analysis is a study of each system and
process, a consideration of the impact on the organization if it is
incapacitated, the likelihood of incapacitation, and the estimated cost of
mitigating the risk or impact of incapacitation. In other words, it’s a
somewhat special type of a risk analysis that focuses on key processes and
systems. The criticality analysis should also include a vulnerability analysis
(aka vulnerability assessment), an examination of a process or system to
identify vulnerabilities that, if exploited, could incapacitate or harm the
process or system.
In the context of a BIA, a vulnerability analysis need not be at the level of
detail of a security scan to find missing patches or security misconfiguration.
Instead, this type of a vulnerability analysis seeks to find characteristics in a
process or system, such as the following:
• Single points of failure, such as only one staff member who knows
how to perform a key procedure.
• System not backed up.
• System lacks resilient architecture features, such as dual power
supplies.
• Procedure uses hard copy records and cannot be performed remotely.
• No training material is available for workers.
Table 7-2 Example Threat Analysis Identifying Threats and Controls for
Critical Systems and Processes
• Multiple threats are listed for a single asset. Only nine threats are
included, and for all the threats but one, only a single mitigating
control is listed. For the extended power outage threat, two mitigating
controls are included.
• Cost of downtime wasn’t listed. For systems or processes with a cost
per unit of time for downtime, this should be included, along with
some calculations to show the payback for each control.
EXAM TIP Test-takers should ensure that any question dealing with BIA
and criticality analysis places the business impact analysis first. Without this
analysis, criticality analysis is impossible to evaluate in terms of likelihood or
cost-effectiveness in mitigation strategies. The BIA identifies strategic
resources and provides a value to their recovery and operation, which is, in
turn, consumed in the criticality analysis phase. If presented with a question
NOTE Like MTD, MTO is not a target, but when MTO is set, recovery
targets such as recovery time objective (RTO), recovery point objective
(RPO), service delivery objective (SDO), recovery consistency objective
(RCO), and recovery capacity objective (RCapO) can be established.
Once these objectives are known, the business continuity team can
develop contingency plans to be followed when a disaster occurs, and the
disaster recovery team can begin to build system recovery capabilities and
procedures that will help the organization to realize these recovery targets
economically.
NOTE For a given organization, it’s probably best to use one unit of
measure for recovery objectives for all systems. This will help you avoid any
errors that would occur during a rank-ordering of systems, so that two days
do not appear to be a shorter period than four hours.
NOTE SDO, RTO, RPO, and RCapO are related to one another.
Organizations are free to construct recovery target models in ways that work
for them. One organization may start with SDOs and derive appropriate RTO,
RPO, and RCapO targets, while others may start with RTO and RPO and
figure out their SDOs.
NOTE Although CISM candidates are not required to understand the details
of BCP and DRP, they are required to understand the relationship between
incident response and BCP and DRP. The principles, methodologies,
recovery procedures, and testing techniques are so similar between the two
disciplines that it is important for information security managers to
understand these disciplines and how they relate to each other.
Disasters
In a business context, disasters are unexpected and unplanned events that
result in the disruption of business operations. A disaster could be a regional
Natural Disasters Natural disasters occur in the natural world with little or
no assistance from humans. They are a result of the natural processes that
occur in, on, and above the earth. Here are examples of natural disasters:
• Tropical cyclones The largest and most violent storms are known in
various parts of the world as hurricanes, typhoons, tropical cyclones,
tropical storms, and cyclones. Tropical cyclones, such as Hurricane
Figure 7-6 A field hospital in Brazil during the 2019 COVID pandemic
(Image courtesy of Gustavo Basso)
How Disasters Affect Organizations Many disasters have direct effects, but
sometimes the secondary effects of a disaster event are most significant, from
the perspective of ongoing business operations. A risk analysis, which is a
part of the BCP process (discussed in the next section in this chapter), will
identify the ways in which disasters are likely to affect an organization.
During the risk analysis, the primary, secondary, upstream, and downstream
effects of likely disaster scenarios are identified and considered. Whoever is
performing this analysis will need to have a broad understanding of the
interdependencies of business processes and IT systems, as well as the ways
in which a disaster will affect ongoing business operations. Similarly,
personnel who are developing contingency and recovery plans also need to be
familiar with these effects so that those plans will adequately serve the
organization’s needs.
Disasters, by our definition, interrupt business operations in some
measurable way. An event that may be a disaster for one organization would
not necessarily be a disaster for another, particularly if it doesn’t affect the
latter. It would be shortsighted to say that a disaster affects only operations;
instead, the longer-term effects created by a disaster can impact the
The following are the elements of the BCP process life cycle:
BCP Policy A formal BCP effort must, like any strategic activity, flow from
the existence of a formal policy and be included in the overall governance
model discussed throughout this chapter. BCP should be an integral part of
the IT control framework, not lie outside of it. Therefore, BCP policy should
include or cite specific controls that ensure that key activities in the BCP life
cycle are performed appropriately. BCP policy should also define the scope
of the BCP strategy, so the specific business processes (or departments or
divisions within an organization) that are included in the BCP effort must be
defined. Sometimes the scope will include a geographic boundary. In larger
organizations, it is possible to “bite off more than you can chew” and define
too large a scope for a BCP project, so limiting the scope to a smaller, more
manageable portion of the organization can be a good approach.
These controls are discussed in this chapter and also appear in COBIT
2019.
Pulling the Trigger When disaster declaration criteria are met, the disaster
should be declared. The procedure for disaster declaration could permit any
single core team member to declare the disaster, but it may be better in some
organizations to have two or more core team members agree on whether a
disaster should be declared. All core team members empowered to declare a
disaster should have the procedure on hand at all times. In most cases, the
criteria should fit on a small, laminated wallet card that each team member
can carry with him or have nearby at all times. For organizations that use the
consensus method for declaring a disaster, the wallet card should include the
names and contact numbers of other core team members so that each will
have a way of contacting others.
Next Steps Declaring a disaster will trigger the start of one or more other
response procedures, but not necessarily all of them. For instance, if a
disaster is declared because of a serious computer or software malfunction,
there is no need to evacuate the building. While this example may be
obvious, not all instances will be this clear. Either the disaster declaration
procedure itself or each of the subsequent response procedures should contain
criteria that will help determine which response procedures should be
enacted.
False Alarms Probably the most common cause of personnel not declaring a
disaster is the fear that an event is not an actual disaster. Core team members
empowered with declaring a disaster should not necessarily hesitate,
however. Instead, core team members could convene with additional team
members to reach a firm decision, provided this can be done quickly. If a
disaster has been declared and it later becomes clear that a disaster has been
averted (or did not exist in the first place), the disaster can simply be called
off and declared to be over. Response personnel can be contacted and told to
TIP Depending on the level of effort that takes place in the opening minutes
and hours of disaster response, the consequences of declaring a disaster when
none exists may or may not be significant. In the spirit of continuous
improvement, any organization that has had a few false alarms should seek to
improve its disaster declaration criteria. Well-trained and experienced
personnel can usually avoid frequent false alarms.
TIP Although the first person on the scene may be the person in charge
initially, as more personnel show up and the nature of the disaster and
response solidifies, qualified assigned personnel will take charge and
Scribe It’s vital that one or more people document the important events
continually during disaster response operations. From decisions, to
discussions, to status, to roll call, these events must be recorded so that the
details of disaster response can be pieced together afterward. This will help
the organization better understand how disaster response unfolded, how
decisions were made, and who performed which actions—all of which will
help the organization be better prepared for future events.
• Broadcast alerts Sent via text, voice, or mobile app, these help
inform large numbers of personnel about events affecting the
organization.
• Emergency radio communications When wireless and wireline
communications are not functioning, emergency communication via
radio enables personnel in different locations to pass along important
information.
• Customers
• Suppliers
• Partners
• Law enforcement and public safety authorities (including first
responders)
Legal and Compliance Several needs may arise during a disaster that require
the attention of inside or outside legal counsel. Disasters present unique
situations, such as the following, that may require legal assistance:
• Interpretation of regulations
• Interpretation of contracts with suppliers and customers
• Management of matters of liability to other parties
TIP Typical legal matters need to be resolved before the onset of a disaster,
and this information should be included in disaster response procedures.
Remember that legal staff members may be unavailable during the disaster.
Salvage Disasters destroy assets that the organization uses to create products
or perform services. When a disaster occurs, someone (either a qualified
employee or an outside expert) needs to examine assets to determine which
are salvageable; then, a salvage team needs to perform the actual salvage
operation at a pace that meets the organization’s needs. In some cases,
salvage may be a critical-path activity, where critical processes are paralyzed
until salvage and repairs to critically needed machinery can be performed. Or
the salvage operation may be performed on the inventory of finished goods,
raw materials, and other items so that business operations can be resumed.
Occasionally, when it is obvious that damaged equipment or materials are a
total loss, the salvage effort involves selling the damaged items or materials
to another organization. Assessment of damage to assets may be a high
priority when an organization is filing an insurance claim. Insurance may be a
primary source of funding for the organization’s recovery effort.
Data and Records This function is responsible for access to and re-creation
of electronic and paper business records. This business function supports
critical business processes, works with database management personnel, and,
if necessary, works with data-entry personnel to rekey lost data.
• Drinking water
• Food rations
• First-aid supplies
• Blankets
• Flashlights
• Battery- or crank-powered radio
• Out-of-band communications with internal and external parties
(beepers, walkie-talkies, line-of-sight systems, and so on)
• Key suppliers This may include electric and gas utilities, fuel
delivery, and materials delivery. In a disaster, an organization will
often need to impart special instructions to one or more suppliers,
requesting delivery of extra supplies or requesting temporary cessation
of deliveries.
• Key customers In many organizations, key customer relationships
are valued above most others. These customers may depend on a
steady delivery of products and services that are critical to their own
operations; in a disaster, they may have a dire need to know whether
such deliveries will be able to continue or not and under what
circumstances.
• Public safety Police, fire, and other public safety authorities may
need to be contacted, not only for emergency operations such as
firefighting but also for any required inspections or other services. It is
important that “business office” telephone numbers for these agencies
be included on contact lists, as 911 and other emergency lines may be
flooded by calls from others.
• Insurance adjusters Most organizations rely on insurance companies
to protect their assets in case of damage or loss in a disaster. Because
NOTE A wallet card has no reliance on energy or technology and may still
be valuable in extreme disaster scenarios.
Figure 7-11 shows an example wallet card. Organizations may also issue
digital versions of wallet cards for people to store on mobile devices.
Figure 7-11 Example of a wallet card for core team participants with
emergency contact information and disaster declaration criteria
The relationships between BCP and DCP were discussed in detail earlier
in this chapter and depicted in Figure 7-3.
Recovery Objectives
During the BIA and criticality analysis phases of a business continuity and
disaster recovery project, the speed with which each business activity (with
its underlying IT systems) needs to be restored after a disaster is determined.
The primary recovery objectives, as discussed in detail earlier in this chapter,
are as follows:
• RTO
• RPO
• RCO
• RCapO
TIP When publishing RTO and RPO figures to customers, it’s best to
publish the worst-case figures: “If our data center burns to the ground, our
RTO is X hours and the RPO is Y hours.” Saying it that way would be simpler
than publishing a chart that shows RPO and RTO figures for various types of
disasters.
Organizations that publish RCO and RCapO targets will need to include
the practical meaning of these targets, whether they represent an exact match
of capacity and integrity or some reduction. For example, if an organization’s
recovery site is engineered to process 80 percent of the transaction volume of
the primary site, an organization should consider stating that processing
capacity at a recovery site may be reduced.
The BCP project team needs to understand the relationship between the
time required to recover an application and the cost required to recover the
application within that time. A shorter recovery time is more expensive, and
this relationship is not linear. This means that reducing RPO from three days
to six hours may mean that the equipment and software investment could
double, or it may increase eightfold. So many factors are involved in the
supporting infrastructure for a given application that a BCP project team must
knuckle down and develop the cost for a few different RTO and RPO figures.
The business value of the application itself is the primary driver in
determining the amount of investment that senior management is willing to
make to reach any arbitrary RTO and RPO figures. This business value may
be measured in local currency if the application supports revenue, but the loss
of an application during a disaster may harm the organization’s reputation,
which is difficult to monetize. Management must decide how much it is
willing to invest in disaster recovery capabilities that bring RTO and RPO
figures down to an acceptable level. Figure 7-12 illustrates these
relationships.
Hot Sites A hot site is an alternate processing center where backup systems
are already running and in some state of near-readiness to assume production
workload. The systems at a hot site most likely have application software and
database management software already loaded and running, perhaps even at
the same patch levels as the systems in the primary processing center. A hot
site is the best choice for systems whose RTO targets range from zero to
several hours, perhaps as long as 24 hours.
A hot site may consist of leased rack space (or even a cage for larger
installations) at a co-location center. If the organization has its own
processing centers, a hot site for a given system would consist of the required
rack space to house the recovery systems. Recovery servers will be installed
and running, with the same version and patch level for the operating system,
DBMS (if used), and application software.
Systems at a hot site require the same level of administration and
maintenance as the primary systems. When patches or configuration changes
are made to primary systems, they should be made to hot-site systems at the
same time or very shortly afterward. Because systems at a hot site need to be
at or very near a state of readiness, a strategy needs to be developed regarding
a method for keeping the data on hot standby systems current. Systems at a
hot site should also have full network connectivity. A method for quickly
directing network traffic toward the recovery servers needs to be worked out
in advance so that a switchover can be accomplished. All this is discussed in
the “Recovery and Resilience Technologies” section later in this chapter.
The organization sends one or more technical staff members to the hot site
to set up systems; once the systems are operating, much or all of the system-
and database-level administration can be performed remotely. In a disaster
scenario, however, the organization may need to send the administrative staff
to the site for day-to-day management of the systems. This means that
workspace for these personnel needs to be identified so that they can perform
their duties during the recovery operation.
Cold Sites A cold site is an alternate processing center where the degree of
readiness for recovery systems is low. At the least, a cold site is nothing more
than an empty rack or allocated space on a computer room floor. It’s just an
address in someone’s data center or co-location site where computers can be
set up and used at some future date. Often, cold sites contain little or no
equipment. When a disaster or other highly disruptive event occurs in which
the outage is expected to exceed 7 to 14 days, the organization will order
computers from a manufacturer or perhaps have computers shipped from
some other business location to arrive at the cold site soon after the disaster
event has begun. Then personnel would travel to the site and set up the
computers, operating systems, databases, network equipment, and so on, and
Table 7-6 Detailed Comparison of Cold, Warm, Hot, and Cloud Sites
Mobile Site A mobile site is a portable recovery center that can be delivered
to almost any location in the world. A viable alternative to a fixed-location
recovery site, a mobile site can be transported by semitrailer truck and may
even have its own generator, communications, and cooling capabilities. APC
and SunGuard provide mobile sites installed in semis. Oracle can provide
mobile sites that include a configurable selection of servers and workstations,
all housed in shipping containers that can be shipped by truck, rail, ship, or
air to any location in the world.
NOTE With the wide use of Internet co-location centers, reciprocal sites
have fallen out of favor. Still, they may be ideal for organizations with
mainframe computers that are otherwise too expensive to deploy to a cold or
warm site.
Figure 7-14 Direct connectivity scenarios for disaster recovery with SaaS
providers (Source: Peter Gregory)
Table 7-7 lists the pros and cons of these strategies. Warm-site strategy is
not listed because an organization could purchase hardware either in advance
of the disaster or when it occurs. Because cold, hot, and cloud sites are
deterministic, they are included in the table.
• Does the technology help the information system achieve the RTO,
RPO, and RCapO targets?
• Does the cost of the technology meet or exceed budget constraints?
• Can the technology be used to benefit other information systems
(thereby lowering the cost for each system)?
• Does the technology fit well into the organization’s current IT
operations?
• Will operations staff require specialized training to use the technology
for recovery?
• Does the technology contribute to the simplicity of the overall IT
architecture, or does it complicate it unnecessarily?
Storage systems are hardware devices that are entirely separate from
servers—their only purpose is to store a large amount of data. They are
highly reliable through the use of redundant components and the use of one
or more RAID levels. Storage systems generally come in two forms:
Replication can take place from one system to another system, called
primary-backup replication, and this is the typical setup when data on an
application server is sent to a distant storage system for data recovery or
disaster recovery purposes. Replication can also be bidirectional between two
active servers; this is known as multiprimary or multimaster replication. This
method is more complicated, because simultaneous transactions on different
servers could conflict with one another (such as two reservation agents trying
NOTE Replication is often used for applications where the RTO is smaller
than the time necessary to recover data from backup media. For example, if a
critical application’s RTO is established to be two hours, recovery from
backup tape is probably not a viable option unless backups are performed
every two hours. While more expensive than recovery from backup media,
replication ensures that up-to-date information is present on a remote storage
system that can be put online in a short period.
NOTE Business continuity and disaster recovery plans work together to get
critical business functions operating again after a disaster. Because of this,
business continuity and disaster recovery teams need to work closely when
developing their respective response procedures to ensure that all activities
are covered, but without unnecessary overlap.
Disaster recovery plans should consider all the likely disaster scenarios
that may occur to an organization. Understanding these scenarios can help the
team take a more pragmatic approach when creating response procedures.
The added benefit is that not all disasters result in the entire loss of a
computing facility. Most are more limited in their scope, although all of them
can still result in a complete inability to continue operations. Some of these
scenarios are as follows:
These scenarios are probably more likely to occur than a catastrophe such as
a major earthquake or hurricane (depending on where a data center is
located).
Backup to Tape and Other Media In organizations still utilizing their own
IT infrastructure, tape backup is just about as ubiquitous as power cords.
From a disaster recovery perspective, however, the issue probably is not
whether the organization has tape backup, but whether its current backup
capabilities are adequate in the context of disaster recovery. An
organization’s backup capability may need to be upgraded if:
Incident Classification/Categorization
No two security incidents or disasters are alike: some may threaten the very
survival of an organization, while others are minor, bordering on
insignificant. The degree and type of response must be appropriate for the
severity of the incident in terms of mobilization, speed, and communications.
Further, an incident may or may not have an impact on sensitive information,
including intellectual property and personally identifiable information (PII).
Organizations generally classify incidents according to severity, typically
on a 3-, 4-, or 5-point scale. Organizations that store or process intellectual
property, confidential data about their employees, or sensitive information
about clients or customers often assign incident severity levels according to
the level of impact on this information. Tables 7-8 and 7-9 depict two such
schemes for classifying security incidents.
In Table 7-8, incidents are assigned a single numeric value of 1 to 5 based
upon the impact as described. In Table 7-9, incidents are assigned a numeric
value and an alphabetic value, based on impact on operations and impact on
information. For example, an incident involving the loss of an encrypted
laptop computer would be classified as 1A, whereas a ransomware incident
where some production information has been lost would be classified as 4E
or 5E.
All of the test levels that need to be performed to verify the quality of
response plans are also training opportunities for personnel. The development
and testing of disaster-related plans and procedures provide a continuous
learning experience for all of the personnel involved.
These tests should be performed once each year or even more often. In the
walk-through and simulation tests, someone should be appointed as a note-
taker so that any improvements will be recorded and the plan can be updated.
Tests should include incidents addressed in each playbook and at each
classification level so that all procedures will be tested. Regardless of the
type of test conducted, an after-action or lessons-learned session should be
conducted. Any identified recommendations or remedial actions should be
incorporated into incident response plans and supporting documentation.
If the incident response plan contains the names and contact information
of response personnel, the plan should be reviewed more frequently to ensure
that all contact information is up to date.
• Walk-through
• Simulation
• Parallel test
• Cutover test
TIP Usually, an organization should perform the less intensive tests first to
identify the most obvious flaws, followed by tests that require more effort.
Test Preparation
Each type of test requires advance preparation and recordkeeping.
Preparation will consist of several items:
Cutover Test A cutover test, the most intrusive type of disaster recovery
test, also provides the most reliable results in terms of answering the question
of whether backup systems have the capacity and correct functionality to
shoulder the real workload. The consequences of a failed cutover test,
however, may resemble an actual disaster: if any part of the cutover test fails,
real, live business processes will be proceeding without the support of IT
applications, as though a real outage or disaster were in progress. But even a
failure like this would reveal whether the backup systems will or won’t work
if an actual disaster were to happen.
In some respects, a cutover test is easier to perform than a parallel test. A
parallel test is a little trickier, because business information is required to
flow to the production system and to the backup system, which means that
some artificial component has been somehow inserted into the environment.
With a cutover test, business processing takes place on the backup systems
only, which can often be achieved through a simple configuration someplace
in the network or the systems layer of the environment.
When conducting a cutover test, you should determine ahead of time how
long the backup platform will be running. Additionally, a cutover test may be
a good time to check the security controls of the backup platform.
Recording and comparing detailed test results from one test to the next
will also help the organization measure progress. By this, I mean that the
quality of disaster response plans should steadily improve from year to year.
Simple mistakes of the past will not be repeated, and the only failures in
future tests should be in new and novel parts of the environment that weren’t
well thought out to begin with. And even these should diminish over time.
Chapter Review
Security incident management, disaster recovery planning, and business
continuity planning all support a central objective: resilience and rapid
recovery when disruptive events occur.
A security incident occurs when the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of information or information systems has been or is in danger of
being compromised. The proliferation of connected devices makes life safety
an additional consideration in many organizations.
An organization that is developing security incident response plans needs
to determine high-level objectives so that response plans will meet these
objectives.
With the proliferation of outsourcing to cloud-based service providers,
many security incidents now take place in third-party organizations, which
requires additional planning and coordination so that any incident response
involving a third party is effective.
BCP and DCP work together to ensure the survival of an organization
during and after a cyberattack, natural disaster, or human-made disaster.
The business impact analysis identifies the impact of various disaster
scenarios and determines the most critical processes and systems in an
organization. The BIA helps an organization focus its BCP and DRP on the
Notes
• Understanding the computer intrusion kill chain model can help an
organization identify opportunities to make their systems more resilient
to intruders.
Questions
1. Which of the following recovery objectives is associated with the
longest allowable period for a service outage?
A. Recovery tolerance objective (RTO)
B. Recovery point objective (RPO)
C. Recovery capacity objective (RCapO)
D. Recovery time objective (RTO)
2. A security manager is developing a strategy for making improvements
to the organization’s incident management process. The security
manager has defined the desired future state. Before specific plans can
be made to improve the process, the security manager should perform a:
A. Training session
B. Penetration test
C. Vulnerability assessment
D. Gap analysis
Answers
One Supporting Task in the CISM job practice aligns with the Incident
Management / Incident Management Operations domain:
Planning
This step involves the development of written response plans, guidelines, and
procedures to be followed when an incident occurs. These procedures are
created after the organization’s practices, processes, and technologies are
well understood. This helps to ensure that incident response procedures align
with security policy, business operations, the technologies in use, as well as
practices regarding organizational architecture, development, management,
and operations. The plans, guidelines, and procedures should identify and
include key external partners. The planning cannot be conducted in a
vacuum, because many organizations rely on partners for key business
functions.
Detection
Detection represents the moment in which an organization is initially aware
that a security incident is taking place or has taken place. Because a variety of
events can characterize a security incident, an organization can become aware
of an incident in several ways, including the following:
Initiation
This is the phase in which response to the incident begins. Typically, it
includes declaration of an incident, followed by notifications sent to response
team members so that response operations may begin. Depending upon the
severity of the incident, notifications may be sent to business executives.
Analysis
In this phase, response team members collect and analyze available data to
understand the incident’s cause, scope, and impact. This may involve the use
of forensic analysis tools to understand activities on individual systems.
During this phase, partners or vendors may be engaged to collect information
from their systems to determine the extent of the compromise.
Containment
Incident responders perform or direct actions that halt, or contain, the
progress or advancement of an incident. The steps required to contain an
incident will vary according to the means used by the attacker. Techniques
include blocking command and control traffic or taking storage systems
offline. Senior leadership is usually involved in approving the containment
actions of the team. In some cases, a mature incident response program will
already have rules of engagement so the technical teams know which actions
are approved and which need input from senior leadership.
Eradication
In this phase of incident response, responders take steps to remove the source
Recovery
When the incident has been evaluated and eradicated, there is often a need to
recover systems or components to their pre-incident state. This can include
restoring data or configurations or replacing damaged or stolen equipment.
Remediation
This activity involves any necessary changes that will reduce or eliminate the
possibility of a similar incident occurring in the future. This may take the
form of process or technology changes.
Closure
Closure occurs when eradication, recovery, and remediation have been
completed. Incident response operations are officially closed.
Post-incident Review
Shortly after the incident closes, incident responders and other personnel
meet to discuss the incident: its cause, impact, and the organization’s
response. Discussion can range from lessons learned to possible
improvements in technologies and processes to improve defense and response
further.
Retention of Evidence
Incident responders and other personnel direct the retention of evidence and
other materials used or collected during the incident. This may include
information used in legal proceedings such as prosecution, civil lawsuits, and
internal investigations. A chain of custody may be required to ensure the
integrity of evidence.
NOTE Remember that, despite the noise and disruption caused by a serious
incident, normal business operations need to continue uninterrupted in the
organization.
Threat Hunting
The practice of threat hunting is used proactively to look for signs of
intrusions. Rather than passively monitoring systems, threat hunters use tools
to hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs). The objective of threat hunting
is the earliest possible detection of intrusions. When an intrusion is detected
early, its impact on the organization may be low, particularly if an attack is
detected prior to the intruder achieving her attack objective. Threat hunting is
often carried out by organizations with mature event monitoring programs. In
other words, organizations considering threat hunting should do so only after
achieving a moderate to high level of maturity in their monitoring tools and
practices.
Incident Detection
The detection phase marks the start of an organization’s awareness of a
security incident. In many cases, some time elapses between the beginning of
an actual incident and the moment that the organization is aware of it; this
period is known as dwell time. The ability to detect an intrusion or incident
requires event visibility, which is typically achieved through event log
Incident Initiation
When an organization realizes that a security incident has occurred or is
occurring, an incident responder will make an incident declaration, signaling
the initiation phase. An organization’s security incident response plan should
include a procedure for initiating an incident. This generally consists of
notifying key personnel, including the security manager and the IT manager
(whose actual titles may vary), and personnel on the incident response team.
Incident response personnel may then initiate and join an emergency
communications conference bridge or assemble in a war room. The group
will select an incident commander, who will coordinate the use of resources
and internal communications to enable the team to work effectively to
manage the incident.
False Alarms
Some people are concerned with the prospect of declaring an incident
when no incident is taking place—in other words, a false alarm.
Organizations need to understand that a false alarm from time to time may
be acceptable, especially considering that the opposite problem of not
recognizing and declaring an incident may be far more harmful to the
organization. It’s better to roll the fire trucks and later discover that the
alarm was caused by a faulty smoke detector than to use valuable time
confirming the presence of a fire, which could result in more property
damage and threat to human life.
Forensic Investigations
After a security incident has occurred, the organization may determine that an
investigation is needed to determine the incident’s cause and effects. A
forensic investigator gathers, studies, and retains information that may be
needed in a court of law should the incident result in legal proceedings.
Because the information collected in an investigation may later be used in a
legal proceeding, a forensic investigator must understand the requirements
regarding the chain of custody and other evidence protection activities that
ensure that evidence can be used in court.
Forensics Certifications
Organizations considering hiring, training, or retaining forensics experts
should look for one or more of the following nonvendor forensics
certifications:
Privacy Breaches
A breach of privacy is a unique type of security incident. In a privacy breach,
an attacker may steal or compromise sensitive or private data about
employees, customers, or other persons. The steps taken during incident
response will be largely the same as those for breaches of other types of
information. There are, however, two differences to keep in mind:
Attorney–Client Privilege
Some organizations utilize their legal counsel as a central point of
communications during a security incident. When done properly, this may
permit an organization to shield communications and other proceedings
from discovery in the event of a lawsuit. This practice is known as
attorney–client privilege. Consult with legal counsel to understand the
applicability and procedures for this approach.
Regulatory Requirements
Recordkeeping
Typical incident response plans often direct that all proceedings of incident
response be recorded, so that post-incident activities can be informed by the
steps taken during the incident. This recordkeeping should include e-mails,
notifications, decisions, artifacts, reports, and virtually everything connected
with the incident.
A standard, consistent methodology for recording incidents facilitates
future research by making specific types of information easier to find. For
• Incident number
• Incident date
• Incident name
• Short description
• Incident context and severity
• URL or other pointer to the repository containing incident details
Metrics
An organization’s security incident response program can be managed and
improved only to the extent that key metrics are established to measure the
Reporting
Like any management report, the information security manager must identify
target audiences and tailor reporting for those audiences based on the types of
information of interest to them. Reports may include metrics, key risk
indicators (KRIs), and key performance indicators (KPIs) that help
management better understand whether the incident response program is
effective at detecting and responding to incidents.
For instance, security incident reporting for a board of directors may
contain a list of significant incidents (if any), as well as metrics showing the
trends of incidents over time. This reporting should inform the audience of
basic facts, including:
Incident Eradication
Eradication is the complete removal of the agent(s) that caused harm in an
incident. To remove threat agents successfully, the security incident response
team must be confident in the containment steps performed earlier.
Depending on the nature of the incident, this may involve the removal of
physical subjects from a work center or information processing center or the
removal of malware from one or more affected systems.
Modern malware and intrusion techniques can be difficult to identify and
even more difficult to remove. Malware can have characteristics or employ
techniques that make it more resilient, including the following:
The personnel who examine infected systems must have up-to-date skills
and experience to identify and remove malware and other attack artifacts.
Incident Recovery
The recovery phase of security incident response focuses on restoring
affected systems and assets to their pre-incident state. Recovery is performed
after eradication is completed; this means that any malware or other tools
used by the intruder have been removed. The state of a system entering the
recovery phase is described as free of all tools, files, and agents used by the
intruder. There are two basic approaches to recovery:
Incident Remediation
I stated that recovery is the action of returning a system or asset to its pre-
incident state, but you must understand a slight, but critical, nuance: we don’t
want to restore the system to its exact pre-incident state, but to a state where
the system functions as before the incident, but with one or more immediate
safeguards to prevent recurrence of the same or similar attack. This is where
recovery leads to remediation. Incident responders understand that the
intruder may not be satisfied that he was eradicated from target systems. If
any of the same vulnerabilities still exist, the intruder may attempt to re-
establish a foothold to resume the intrusion in support of its original
objective.
A critical step in incident response is remediation of any vulnerabilities
exploited during the incident. This includes but is not limited to technical
vulnerabilities that may have permitted malware exploits to work; it also
includes any supporting technologies, business processes, or personnel
training that may have helped to prevent the incident from occurring if they
had been in place before the incident. For instance, if an end user’s system
was successfully attacked with ransomware because that system’s endpoint
detection and response (EDR) solution was not installed or functioning
Closure
After an incident has been identified, its causes eradicated, and any affected
systems remediated and recovered, the incident can be closed. Mainly this is
a “back to business as usual” declaration. Some activities are necessary for
full closure:
Post-incident Review
When all incident response proceedings have concluded, the organization
should consider reviewing the incident that has taken place. A post-incident
review should include a frank, open discussion that identifies what went well
during the incident response and what could have been handled or performed
better. A typical post-incident review should cover the following:
Chapter Review
Security incident management, disaster recovery planning, and business
continuity planning all support a central objective: resilience and rapid
recovery when disruptive events occur.
As a result of a security incident event, the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of information or information systems has been or is in danger of
being compromised. Although important, the condition of information
systems is a secondary concern. Human safety is always the top priority when
any disaster event has occurred.
The phases of incident response are planning, detection, initiation,
analysis, containment, eradication, recovery, remediation, closure, and post-
incident review. Planning consists of the development of incident response
policies, roles and responsibilities, procedures, as well as testing and training.
Security incident response requires incident detection capabilities that
enable an organization to be aware of an incident as it occurs. Without
incident detection capabilities, an organization may not know about an
intrusion for many weeks or months, if ever. A primary capability in incident
response is event visibility, which is usually provided through a security
information and event management (SIEM) system.
Many organizations outsource security event monitoring to a third-party
managed security services provider. Organizations also often outsource
Notes
• Developing custom playbooks that address specific types of security
incidents will ensure a more rapid and effective response to a security
incident. High-velocity incidents such as data wipers and ransomware
require a rapid, almost automatic response.
• Organizations must be careful to understand all of the terms and
exclusions in any cyber-incident insurance policy to ensure that no
exclusions would result in denial of benefits after an incident.
• With so many organizations using cloud-based services, organizations
must understand, in detail, their roles and responsibilities and that of
each cloud service provider. This is necessary for the organization to
build effective incident response should an incident occur at a cloud-
based service provider.
• Threat hunting and cyber-threat intelligence can help an organization
more effectively anticipate and detect an incident as it unfolds. This
helps reduce potentially damaging effects through prevention.
• Many organizations outsource the forensic examination and analysis
portion of security incident response, because personnel with these
skills are difficult to find and the tools required are expensive.
• When responding to a security incident, organizations should consider
Questions
1. The types of incident response plan testing are:
A. Document review, walk-through, and simulation
B. Document review and simulation
C. Document review, walk-through, simulation, parallel test, and
cutover test
D. Document review, walk-through, and cutover test
2. The length of time between incident occurrence and incident detection is
known as:
A. Dwell time
B. Lag time
C. Lead time
D. Propagation
3. The purpose of attorney–client privilege during an investigation is:
A. To improve the results of the investigation
B. To obtain better forensic examination services
C. To protect investigation proceedings from a discovery order
D. To improve the integrity of investigation proceedings
4. The purpose of chain of custody procedures is:
A. To prove the ownership of investigation data
B. To determine the cause of an incident
C. To prove the integrity of investigation data
D. To determine who is responsible for an incident
5. An organization has developed its first-ever business continuity plan.
Which of the following is the best first choice to test of the continuity
plan that the business should perform?
A. Walk-through
Answers
1. A. The types of security incident response plan testing are document
review, walk-through, and simulation. Parallel and cutover tests are not
part of security incident response planning or testing and are used for
disaster recovery planning.
2. A. Dwell time refers to the period between the occurrence of a security
incident and the organization’s awareness of the incident.
3. C. The purpose of attorney–client privilege is the protection of
correspondence and exhibits, including those in an investigation. If an
organization that has experienced a security incident believes it may be
defending itself in a lawsuit, the organization can choose to protect its
Glossary
acceptable use policy (AUP) A security policy that defines the types of
activities that are acceptable and those that are unacceptable in an
organization, written for general audiences and applying to all personnel.
access control Any means that detects or prevents unauthorized access and
that permits authorized access.
access control policy A statement that defines the policy for granting,
reviewing, and revoking access to systems and work areas.
advanced persistent threat (APT) A class of threat actor that uses an array
of reconnaissance and attack techniques to establish a long-term presence
within a target organization.
asset value (AV) The value of an IT asset, which is usually (but not
necessarily) the asset’s replacement value.
audit program The formalized and approved plan for conducting audits
over a long period.
backup media rotation Any scheme used to determine how backup media
is to be reused.
botnet A collection of bots that are under the control of an individual. See
also bot.
bring your own app (BYOA) A practice whereby workers use personally
bring your own device (BYOD) A practice whereby workers use personally
owned devices (typically laptop computers and mobile devices) to conduct
company business.
bring your own software (BYOS) See bring your own app (BYOA).
call tree A method for ensuring the timely notification of key personnel,
such as after a disaster.
career path The progression of responsibilities and job titles that a worker
will attain over time.
certificate authority (CA) A trusted party that stores digital certificates and
public encryption keys.
chief information risk officer (CIRO) The typical job title for the topmost
information security executive in an organization. Generally, this represents a
change of approach to the CISO position, from protection-based to risk-
based. See also chief information security officer (CISO).
chief risk officer (CRO) The typical job title for the topmost risk executive
in an organization.
chief security officer (CSO) The typical job title for the topmost security
executive in an organization.
cold site An alternate processing center where the degree of readiness for
recovery systems is low. At the least, a cold site is nothing more than an
empty rack or allocated space on a computer room floor.
contact list A list of key personnel and various methods for contacting them,
often used in a response document. See also response document.
contract A binding legal agreement between two or more parties that may
be enforceable in a court of law.
control risk The risk that a significant or material error exists that will not
be prevented or detected by a control.
data acquisition The act of obtaining data for later use in a forensic
investigation.
data debt The state of being hampered by data models of older vintages that
are no longer business aligned, often resulting in the fracturing of data into an
increasing number of silos. See also technical debt.
data restore The process of copying data from backup media to a target
system for the purpose of restoring lost or damaged data.
digital signature The result of encrypting the hash of a message with the
originator’s private encryption key; used to prove the authenticity and
integrity of a message.
disk array A chassis in which several hard disks can be installed and
connected to a server.
dwell time The period of time that elapses from the start of a security
incident to the organization’s awareness of the incident.
elliptic curve A public key cryptography algorithm used for encrypting and
decrypting information.
endpoint A general term used to describe any of the types of devices used
exposure factor (EF) The financial loss that results from the realization of a
threat, expressed as a percentage of the asset’s total value.
fiduciary A person who has a legal trust relationship with another party.
file activity monitoring (FAM) A program that monitors the use of files on
a server or an endpoint as a means for detecting indicators of compromise.
file server A server used to store files in a central location, usually to make
them readily available to many users.
file system A logical structure that facilitates the storage of data on a digital
storage medium such as a hard disk drive (HDD), solid-state drive (SSD),
CD/DVD-ROM, or flash memory device.
first in, first out (FIFO) A backup media rotation scheme by which the
oldest backup volumes are used next. See also backup media rotation.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) A U.S. law that forbids
persons and organizations from bribing foreign government officials.
general computing controls (GCCs) Controls that are general in nature and
implemented across most or all information systems and applications.
general data protection regulation (GDPR) The European law that took
effect in 2018 that protects the privacy of European Union residents.
hard disk drive (HDD) A storage device using magnetic storage on rapidly
rotating disks. See also solid-state drive (SSD).
hot site An alternate processing center where backup systems are already
running and in some state of near-readiness to assume production workload.
The systems at a hot site most likely have application software and database
management software already loaded and running, perhaps even at the same
patch levels as the systems in the primary processing center. See also cold
site, warm site.
impact The actual or expected result from some action such as a threat or
disaster.
impact analysis The analysis of a threat and the impact it would have if it
were realized.
incident Any event that is not part of the standard operation of a service and
that causes, or may cause, interruption to or a reduction in the quality of that
service.
inherent risk The risk that material weaknesses are present in existing
business processes with no compensating controls to detect or prevent them.
key disposal The process of decommissioning encryption keys. See also key
management.
key generation The initial generation of an encryption key. See also key
management.
key protection All means used to protect encryption keys from unauthorized
disclosure and harm. See also key management.
key rotation The process of issuing a new encryption key and reencrypting
data protected with the new key. See also key management.
log correlation The process of combining log data from many devices to
discern patterns that may be indicators of operational problems or
compromise.
log server A system or device to which event logs from other systems are
sent for processing and storage. See also centralized log management,
security information and event management (SIEM).
macro virus Malicious software that is embedded within another file, such
as a document or spreadsheet.
mobile site A portable recovery center that can be delivered to almost any
location in the world.
natural disaster A disaster that occurs in the natural world with little or no
offsite media storage The practice of storing media such as backup tapes at
an offsite facility located away from the primary computing facility.
operational risk The risk of loss resulting from failed controls, processes,
and systems; internal and external events; and other occurrences that impact
business operations and threaten an organization’s survival.
out of band Communications that take place separately from the main
communications channel.
password reuse The act of reusing a prior password for a user account.
Some information systems can prevent password reuse in case any prior
passwords were compromised with or without the user’s knowledge.
policy A statement that specifies what must be done (or not done) in an
organization. A policy usually defines who is responsible for monitoring and
enforcing it.
project plan The collection of documents that describe the stages and
oversight of a project. A project plan outlines the sponsor, stakeholders,
goals, milestones, tasks, resources, risks, constraints, and timelines needed to
accomplish the stated objective(s).
quarantine A holding place for e-mail messages that have been blocked by
a spam or phishing filter.
recovery time objective (RTO) The period from the onset of an outage until
the resumption of service, usually measured in hours or days.
remote access Trojan (RAT) Malware that permits the attacker to access
and control a target system remotely.
residual risk The risk that remains after being reduced through risk
treatment options.
right to audit A clause in a contract that grants one party the right to
conduct an audit of the other party’s operations.
risk Generally, the fact that undesired events can happen that may damage
property or disrupt operations; specifically, an event scenario that can result
in property damage or disruption.
risk appetite The organization’s overall acceptable level of risk for a given
business venture.
risk tolerance The organization’s level of acceptable variation from the risk
appetite.
risk transfer The risk treatment option involving the act of transferring risk
to another party, such as an insurance company or service provider.
risk treatment The decision to manage an identified risk: mitigate the risk,
avoid the risk, transfer the risk, or accept the risk.
salvage The process of recovering components or assets that still have value
after a disaster.
SANS 20 Critical Security Controls, aka SANS Top 20 Controls See CIS
Controls.
secure coding The practice of developing program source code that is free
of security defects. See also secure development training.
security architecture The overall strategy as well as the details that define
the role of technology and asset protection in an organization. See also The
Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF), Zachman Framework.
service desk The IT function that handles incidents and service requests on
behalf of customers by acting as a single point of contact. See also IT service
management (ITSM).
single loss expectancy (SLE) The financial loss that results from the
realization of a threat. SLE is defined as asset value (AV) × exposure factor
(EF). See also asset value (AV), exposure factor (EF).
skills matrix A chart that includes names of staff members and their relevant
skills as axes, with indicators on which staff members have which skills, and
with what levels of proficiency.
solid-state drive (SSD) A solid-state device used for persistent data storage,
generally a replacement for a hard-disk drive. See also hard disk drive
(HDD).
spam filter A central program or device that examines incoming e-mail and
removes all messages identified as spam.
steganography Any technique that hides data within another data file.
strategic planning Activities used to develop and refine long-term plans and
objectives.
tablet A mobile device with a touchscreen interface. See also mobile device.
threat hunting The proactive search for intrusions, intruders, and indicators
of compromise.
three lines of defense A functional model that defines roles related to the
development, operation, and assurance of controls and policies.
user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA) See user behavior analytics
(UBA).
vendor standard A standard that specifies which suppliers and vendors are
war room A meeting room or other place where incident responders gather
to coordinate incident response activities.
web server A server that runs specialized software that makes static and
dynamic HTML pages available to users.
whaling Spear phishing that targets executives and other high-value and
high-privilege individuals in an organization. See also business e-mail
compromise, phishing, spear phishing.
zero trust (ZT) security model A network architecture model in which user
and device access must be verified and validated continually.