TC-NMCC 20

1st RABINDRANATH TAGORE UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LAW, BHOPAL

National Moot Court Competition, 2024

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution

Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Men…………………………………………Petitioner 1

Versus

Union of India……………………………………………………………………...Respondent

CLUBBED WITH

Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution r/w Section 528 of BNSS

Angrez………………………………………………………………………………Petitioner 2

Versus

Union of India & Anr. ……………...……………………………………………..Respondents

CLUBBED WITH

Bail petition under Section 483 BNSS

Jashn………………………………………………………………………………..Petitioner 3

Versus

State of U.P………………………………………………………………………...Respondent

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO THE HON’BLE JUDGES IN

JUDICATURE OF THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF PETITIONER

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................5

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION......................................................................................8

STATEMENT OF FACTS......................................................................................................9

STATEMENT OF ISSUES...................................................................................................11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...........................................................................................12

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED................................................................................................14

ISSUE 1: WHETHER SECTION 69 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.........................................................................................14

1.1 Whether Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is violative of fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India..................................................................16

1.2 Whether Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita is applicable in the present case....19

ISSUE 2: WHETHER GRANT OF POLICE CUSTODY BEYOND 15 DAYS IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID IN ABSENCE OF ANY SAFEGUARDS IN THE
SECTION.............................................................................................................................21

2.1 Whether the extension of police custody beyond the 15-day limit, violates the
fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution of India...................22

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE FIR SHOULD BE QUASHED...............................................24

3.1. Whether the FIR discloses a cognizable offence.......................................................24

3.2. Whether the FIR is a result of mala fide intent and constitutes an abuse of process.26

3.3. Whether the FIR Violates the Petitioner’s Fundamental Rights................................28

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES SHOULD BE GRANTED

BAIL.....................................................................................................................................29

4.1. Whether the Nature of the Offences Justifies Bail for the Accused in Both Cases.. .30

4.2. Whether the Accused Pose a Risk of Flight or Tampering with Evidence in Both
Cases.................................................................................................................................32

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4.3. Whether the Accused’s Continued Detention is Necessary for the Interests of
Justice................................................................................................................................33

PRAYER.................................................................................................................................35

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORM

@ Alias
& And
§ Section
AIR All India Reporter
Anr Another
Art. Article
BNS Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
BNSS Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
BSA Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam
CBI Central Bureau of Investigation
Const. Constitution
Crj Criminal Journal
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure
Etc. Et cetera
FIR First Information Report
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
Iss. Issue
i.e. That is
IPC Indian Penal Code
LRS Legal Representatives
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
Ors Others
Pvt. Private
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Sec Section
UOI Union of India

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U.P. Uttar Pradesh
u/A Under Article
u/s Under Section
v. Versus
W. P Writ Petition
Vol. Volume

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTION

Constitution Of India, 1950.

STATUTES

1. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.

2. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.
3. Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860.
4. Information Technology Act, 2000.
5. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
6. Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
7. Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023.

CASES

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 1 SCC 228..............................................................16

Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273................................................................31
Babu v. State of Kerala, 2013 (4) KHC 195............................................................................20
Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1992) 1 SCC 249............................................................23
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141..........................21
Data Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 3 SCC 22............................................................33
Delhi Administration v. Ravinder Kumar Bhatnagar, 1982 Cri LJ 989 (Del).........................22
Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2010) 6 SCC 343................................................................22
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3...........................................................28
Frances Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608.................................28
Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, (2021) SCC Online SC 382.................23
Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 1 SCC 228.......................................................................16
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343....................22
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98.............................33
Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260...............................................................29
Jose Thettayil v. Station House Officer, Aluva East Police Station, (2013) 4 KLT 854.........21
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39...................................................................15

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Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1............17
Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala, (2013) 1 SCC 200..................................................................20
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2005) 2 SCC 42...................................................34
Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1.......................................................31
Mahender Chawla & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 16 SCC 1...................................18
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248................................................17, 22, 28
Mansab Ali v. Irsan, (2003) 8 SCC 707...................................................................................30
Mohd. Muslim alias Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 1648............................31
Mukesh @ Bhola v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2021) SCC Online SC 1130...............................23
N.P.S. Sisodia v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) SCC Online MP 13347...........................16
National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438..............14
Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417...................................................................31
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24.........................................34
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1380.......................29
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749.......................................27
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608...................................19
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496............................................30
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866....................................................................25
Raj Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (1983) Crl. L.J. 109.................................................................23
Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40....................................34
Sharad Shankar Puranik v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 379......................................22
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1..................................................................17
Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694..........................32
Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 2 SCC 1.......................................19
Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021) SCC SC 181..............................................................................21
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, (1991) 2 SCC 1........................................................................27
State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, (1992) 1 SCC 335..................................................................25
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mange Ram, (2007) 9 SCC 540...............................................20
State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699.......................................................27
State of Kerala v. Sadanandan, (1966) 2 SCC 26....................................................................21
State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vetal, (2004) 7 SCC 521............................................33
State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308.................................................................34
Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation, AIR 2001 SC 3887................................28

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Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University, (1996) 3 SCC 545.......................................................14
Vimal Vijay v. Union of India & Anr., (2024) SCC OnLine Del 31598.................................15
Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122..................27

BOOKS

1. D.D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis, (2010).

2. Dr. Ramaswamy, New Criminal Manual, (2024).
3. Summit Sarkar, The Code of Criminal Procedure - An Encyclopedic Commentary on
the Code of Criminal Procedure, (1973).
4. Ml Bhargava, Digest On Bails, (1950-2022).

LEGAL DATABASES

1. Manupatra
2. SCC Online
3. West Law
4. Hein Online
5. Bar And Bench
6. Live Law

ARTICLES

 National Commission for Women, Annual Report 2014-15(2015).

http://ncw.nic.in/sites/default/files/Annual_Report_2014-15_English_Full.pdf.
 Anisha Sareen, Judicial Approach and Reformation in the Law Regarding Custodial
Violence in India (2022).
https://ijirl.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/judicial-approach-and-reformation-in-
the-law-regarding-custodial-violence-in-india-.pdf.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court that Petitioner 1 has filed a
writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India 1, Petitioner 2 has filed a writ
petition under Article 226 read with Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
20232 and Petitioner 3 has filed a bail application under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 20233; the counsel of the Petitioners submits to the jurisdiction of the
Hon’ble Allahabad High Court. The High Court has clubbed all the matters in the
present case.

1
Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories
in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate
cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature
of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantor and certiorari, or any of them, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or
person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the scat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not
within those territories.
2
Saving of inherent powers of High Court.
Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
3
Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.
(1)A High Court or Court of Session may direct,-
(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the
nature specified in sub-Section (3) of Section 480, may impose any condition which it considers necessary
for the purposes mentioned in that sub-Section

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

Background of the Relationship

Lalita and Angrez, both from Uttar Pradesh, met in March 2020 while studying Computer
Applications in Delhi. Their friendship turned romantic, and they got engaged on December
31, 2022. After completing their degrees in June 2023, Lalita returned to Lucknow, while
Angrez took a job in Bengaluru. They maintained a long-distance relationship, discussing
marriage.

In September 2023, Lalita visited Bengaluru for a cousin’s wedding, staying at Angrez’s
place for a night. Upon returning to Lucknow, her father, a Personal Secretary to the Home
Minister of Uttar Pradesh, began seeking matrimonial alliances for her. Lalita discovered that
Angrez had converted to Christianity when she asked him to approach her father for
marriage. Despite her initial distress, Lalita decided to proceed with the relationship but
encountered disapproval from her father, leading to no date being set for the marriage.

Engagement and Conflict

Tensions escalated when Lalita, frustrated by the lack of commitment from Angrez,
threatened to file a rape complaint against him if he did not marry her. This led to their
engagement on 15th June 2024, a ceremony overshadowed by the visible discontent of
Lalita’s father, who taunted Angrez for his relationship with Lalita. On 30th June 2024,
Angrez visited Lalita’s house, during which Lalita discovered photographs on his phone
showing Angrez engaged to another woman, Ruby, just three days earlier, on 27th June 2024.
Confronted, Angrez admitted to the engagement but claimed he was planning to inform Lalita
that he had called off the engagement with her due to disagreements with her father. Lalita,
however, alleged that Angrez had never intended to disclose this information.

Fir and Arrest

On 1st July 2024, Lalita lodged an FIR against Angrez at, Lucknow, under Sections 64, 69,
64(2) (m), 87, and 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The complaint alleged that
Angrez had deceived her into having sexual relations by falsely promising marriage. Angrez
was arrested the following day, 2nd July 2024, and remanded to police custody for two days
by the Magistrate.

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Bail Proceedings and Subsequent Arrest

On 4th July 2024, Angrez applied for bail before the Court of Sessions. Although initially
granted bail, the Sessions Court revoked it on 10th July 2024, citing new allegations of
criminal intimidation. Angrez was rearrested on 11th July 2024 and remanded to judicial
custody. On 18th July 2024, the police requested additional police custody, citing the
recovery of objectionable photos from Angrez’s computer and the need for further
investigation into his alleged modus operandi. The Sessions Court granted three days of
police remand.

Challenges and Subsequent Petitions

Angrez challenged the grant of police remand beyond 15 days before the High Court, arguing
that such custody violated Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which
limits police custody to 15 days. He further alleged that the police remand was being used to
harass him at the behest of Lalita’s influential father. The High Court granted a stay on 19th
July 2024 and scheduled the next hearing for 25th July 2024. Separately, a Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Men filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 69
of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, contending that it was biased and susceptible to misuse
by women, thereby violating the right to equality before the law.

Connected Case and Clubbing of Matters

In a separate but related case, Jashn, a Class I officer, was arrested and remanded to police
custody after his wife filed an FIR for cruelty. He challenged the police remand and sought
bail, alleging that his wife’s influential family had orchestrated his detention to further their
divorce proceedings and tarnish his professional reputation. The High Court has clubbed all
the matters present in this proposition.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER SECTION 69 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.

ISSUE 2

WHETHER GRANT OF POLICE CUSTODY BEYOND 15 DAYS IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID IN ABSENCE OF ANY SAFEGUARDS IN THE
SECTION.

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE FIR SHOULD BE QUASHED.

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IN BOTH THE CASES BE RELEASED ON BAIL.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: WHETHER SECTION 69 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.

It is most respectfully submitted that Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, is
constitutionally invalid as it breaches Articles 14 and therefore subsequently Article 19, and
21 of the Constitution of India. The provision is challenged for its discriminatory nature, as it
disproportionately targets men and imposes an unfair burden of proof on them, contravening
the principle of “innocent until proven guilty.” This Section is argued to lack the necessary
reasonableness, arbitrariness under Article 14 and proportionality required under Article 19
and 21, as it introduces gender bias and perpetuates stereotypes that undermine the principle
of equality before the law. Additionally, the provision’s application in the current case is
contested due to its failure to accurately address the nuances of consent and deceit. Therefore,
the provision is urged to be reviewed for its alignment with constitutional guarantees of
fairness, equality, and justice.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER GRANT OF POLICE CUSTODY BEYOND 15 DAYS IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID IN ABSENCE OF ANY SAFEGUARDS IN THE
SECTION.

It is most respectfully submitted that the extension of police custody beyond the 15-day limit,
as prescribed by Section 167 of the CrPC, is constitutionally questionable in the absence of
safeguards. The Supreme Court has held that the maximum period for police custody is 15
days, and any further detention must be judicial. This limitation is grounded in protecting
fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution, which guarantee personal
liberty and procedural fairness. Allowing extended police custody without adequate checks
may violate these rights by potentially leading to abusive practices and arbitrary detention.
Thus, adherence to the 15-day limit is crucial for ensuring the balance between effective law
enforcement and the protection of individual liberties.

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ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE FIR SHOULD BE QUASHED.

It is submitted that the FIR in the case is malicious and filed with ulterior motives, lacking
any substantive basis. It pertains to an alleged sexual relationship based on false promises of
marriage, but the facts indicate a consensual relationship with no evidence to support the
claims of deception. The FIR, thus, serves as a tool of harassment, infringing upon the
accused's fundamental rights under Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution, specifically
the right to life and personal liberty. Its continuation would result in a grave miscarriage of
justice, hence it must be quashed to meet the ends of justice.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IN BOTH THE CASES BE RELEASED ON

BAIL.

The accused in both cases should be granted bail under Section 483(1) of BNSS. The
presumption of innocence, coupled with the lack of compelling evidence, supports the
granting of bail. Although non-bailable and cognizable, the offences have been alleged with
mala fide intent, primarily to harass the accused. Both individuals pose no risk of flight or
tampering with evidence, and their continued detention serves no legitimate legal purpose.
Thus, bail should be granted to prevent the violation of their constitutional rights.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER SECTION 69 OF THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.

1. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that petitioner 1, The Society
for Prevention of Cruelty to Men, is hereby challenging the constitutional validity of
Section 69 of the BNS, 20234, on the grounds of violation of the right to equality
under Article 14.
2. The Section further criminalises consensual sexual relations outside of marriage, thus
infringing on individuals’ right to privacy and sexual autonomy as protected under
Articles 19(1)(a) and 21. The relationship between individuals is complex and cannot
be reduced to legislative prescriptions that penalise consensual acts that do not result
in marriage. The Section fails to uphold the constitutional standards of fairness,
inclusivity, and non-arbitrariness, rendering it invalid for breaching these essential
rights. Emphasizing the need for laws to be inclusive, non-discriminatory, and
protective of fundamental rights as held in NALSA vs Union of India5.
3. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that through the protection
guaranteed by

“The Constitution through its Preamble, fundamental rights and

directive principles created a secular State based on the principle of
equality and non-discrimination, striking a balance between the
rights of the individuals and the duty and commitment of the State to
establish an egalitarian social order”
As held in Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University6 is violated by Section 69 on the
face of its implementation.
4. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that there must be equal
protection of all, as well as equality before law that must be exercised regardless of
any sex as provided in Article 14 of the constitution of India. The provision’s
classification of men as the only perpetrators of deceit in sexual relationships is
inherently discriminatory and violates the principle of reasonable classification under
4
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 69, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
5
National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
6
Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University, (1996) 3 SCC 545.

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Article 14. Furthermore, the provision cannot be justified as a special protective
measure for women under Article 15(3) because it neither uplifts nor empowers
women but instead reinforces misogynistic stereotypes as emphasized in Joseph
Shine v. Union of India.7
5. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the term victim in these
laws should describe both men and women and not just women, as is the case now.
The petitioner is further drawing parallel line between Section 69 and the now-
struck-down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalised adultery
based on similar patriarchal presumptions. In addition, the exclusion of live-in
relationships and LGBTQIA+ individuals from the protection of the law, indicates
that the provision fails to account for diverse relationship dynamics and sexual
orientations.
6. According to Delhi Commission of Women (DCW) Report (2014-2015) 8, 53% of
the rape cases filed in Delhi during this period were false, often due to reasons such
as personal grudges, family disputes, or consensual relationships that turned sour.
Therefore, Women must be subjected to the equal term of imprisonment without
mercy if she is found guilty of filing a fake case. But with the introduction of such
non reasonably classified provisions for women , it will certainly be aided by the
vagueness of the provision, particularly its reference to “identity suppression,” which
is not clearly defined. The ambiguity surrounding what constitutes "identity" could
lead to arbitrary and broad interpretations, potentially criminalising acts based on
factors such as marital status, caste, religion, or profession 9 as in the present case
before the Court. Therefore, promotion of gender-neutral laws in India is the need of
the hour for the Indian society to be just and unbiased.10
7. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the contention of
unconstitutionality of Section 69 of BNS is therefore argued as violative of
fundamental rights stated above since it lacks reasonableness of creating a line of
distinction between a false promise or a mere breach of promise, since “only a false
promise to marry made with an intention to deceive a woman would vitiate the

7
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39.
8
National Commission for Women, Annual Report 2014-15 (2015)
http://ncw.nic.in/sites/default/files/Annual_Report_2014-15_English_Full.pdf.
9
Vimal Vijay v. Union of India & Anr., (2024) SCC OnLine Del 31598.
10
Nishant Kumar, Misuse of Anti-Dowry Laws to Blackmail Husband, Independent Media Centre India (2006),
p. 6.

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woman’s consent being obtained under misconception of fact. But a mere breach of
promise cannot be said to be a false promise”11
8. Further the validity of Section 69 of BNS stands disproportionate since it is
interpreted as arbitrary because it is biased against men as it disproportionately
targets them without considering the complexities of consensual relationships and
since the language of the Section is not clear and precise, it leads to arbitrary
enforcement, where men are being unfairly accused and prosecuted based on
subjective interpretations of what constitutes a “false promise of marriage.”, it further
creates a presumption of guilt against men, requiring them to prove their innocence
which goes against the principle of “innocent until proven guilty”.

1.1 Whether Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is violative of

fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India.

9. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, “the fundamental rights
are not distinct and mutually exclusive rights- each freedom has different dimensions
and merely because the limits of interference with one freedom are satisfied, the law
is not freed from the necessity to meet the challenge of another guaranteed freedom-
law affecting personal liberty under Article 21 will also have to satisfy the tests under
Article 19 and 14”. Running right through Articles 14 and 19 presents the principle
of reasonable procedure in different shades. A certain normative harmony among the
Articles is thus attained and Article 21 bears in its bosom the construction of fair
procedure legislatively sanctioned as stated in the case of AK Gopalan vs State of
Madras12.
10. Moreover the Hon’ble Court has time and again taken action as it deems fit in the
interest of substantive equality, for instance decriminalising adultery. The contention
is that the legislature has capriciously and irrationally made this particular
amendment without determining the equality principle. Such enactment is
excessively impinging upon and is disproportionate to male interest, who can be
subjected to cruelty for meeting unlawful demand or failing to meet such unlawful
demand for property or any valuable security. Hence it manifests arbitrariness in the

11
N.P.S. Sisodia v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) SCC Online MP 13347.
12
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 1 SCC 228.

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amendment which negates it in accordance with Article 14 and hence void under
Article 13 as it is in derogation of fundamental rights.
11. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in Maneka Gandhi vs Union
of India13, it was held that Article 14 has a persuasive processual potency and
versatile quality, egalitarian in its soul and allergic to discriminatory diktats. And
subsequently Article 19 can’t be disabled from functioning and applying to executive
and legislative actions even when there is no emergency to shield actions of doubtful
legality. In the unoccupied portions of the vast sphere of personal liberty the
substantive as well as procedural law made to cover them must satisfy the
requirements of both the said Articles to determine the test of constitutional validity
which makes the constitutionality of Section 69 of BNS doubtful being it a gender-
biased provision.
12. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the context of Article
21, an invasion of privacy by the State must be justified on the basis of a law that is
reasonable and valid. Such an invasion must meet a three-fold requirement as set held
in Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. UOI & Anr.14 (i) Legality, which
postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate State
interest, and (iii) proportionality, which ensures a rational nexus between the object
and the means adopted. The proof of which is given by test of reason and justice held
in the case of Shreya Singhal Vs Union of India15. Therefore Articles 14, 19, 20 and
21 are read together contending that “no Article in part III is an island but part of a
continent”, protecting the biased gender.
13. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the time when women
were invisible to the law, and lived in the shadows of the dominating man, has long
since gone by. A legislation here Section 69 of BNS, that perpetuates such stereo-
types in relationships, and institutionalised discrimination is a clear violation of the
fundamental rights. There is therefore, no justification for continuance of Section 69
of the BNS. As framed in 2023, to remain on the statute book. The contention is that
the particular provision is averse to Article 21, since males are not treated with
dignity to seek right remedy which for the same cause is entitled to women i.e. penal
in nature against men in the society. While upholding the conceptions of gender
13
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
14
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1.
15
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.

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equity, calibrated neutrality and justice by incorporating this statute for women
subjected to sexual intercourse not amounting to rape by deceitful means as in the
fake promise to marry in the present case, the statute is diluting the object of a special
amendment i.e. sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means.
14. The Indian parliament enacted Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 where it is
realised that “Human Rights is a broad concept and cannot be straitjacketed within
narrow confines. Any attempt to do so would truncate its all-embracing scope and
reach, and denude it of its vigour and vitality. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in
Beenu Rawat v. Union of India 16 that the Definition of “Human Rights” is large
enough to include fundamental rights to life, liberty, equality and dignity of an
individual. Therefore such provision is encroachment on one's right to life, liberty,
equality and dignity which in the present case is an encroachment upon men’s rights.
15. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the case of Rahul Gandhi
vs State17, states that ‘while dealing with such cases, the Courts had a two-fold duty –
firstly to see that women are not misused and secondly and equally that the law is not
misused against the male folk.
16. The same is contended here by the Periodic Labour Force Survey (July 2021-July
2022)18 released by National Sample Survey Organisation, female labour force
participation is 29.4% and in the agriculture sector, it accounts for 57% of the total
women in the age group of 15-59. The increasing number of employment and women
participation in India’s Labour Force is indicative that society is evolving. With this
change in society, women have become empowered to stand upright for their rights,
against unjust and to an extent of misusing the laws made for their benefit. The
antidote to bring about equality is to undo the provision that gives immense power to
women to disable and destroy the rights of man, which in the present case is clearly
evident.
17. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Sexual Abuse affects
every demographic and every community whether it was men, women, or an LGBTQ
Community. According to the report of the Centre’s for Disease Control and
Prevention. Men experience Sexual Abuse at a similar rate, similarly in a Victim

16
Mahender Chawla & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 16 SCC 1.
17
Rahul Gandhi v. State, (2024) SCC OnLine Mad 548.
18
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) Annual Report
2022-2023 Released (2023) https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1966154.

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survey of British and American males have shown that 3 to 8 percent of males
reported at least one sexual abuse in their lifetimes with at least 5 to 10 percent of all
victims being male in lieu of the same it was recommended by The 172 nd report of
the Law Commission of India that Sexual abuse law must be neutral and similar was
held in the case of Sudesh Jhaku V. K.C. Jhaku19 where it was observed by the
Hon’ble court that sexually assaulted men should be given the same protection as
women victims applying the principles of equality before the law and equal
protection of the law.

1.2 Whether Section-69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita is applicable in the present case.

18. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the petitioner is alleging
the application of Section 69 of BNS 2023, Now this provision is bias on prima facie
as even men could be induced in a sexual relationship with a woman who on the
pretext of marrying him made him agree to the condition. There can be evidences as
to false victimization of woman over man in a relationship. In order to understand the
concept of deceitful means in terms of making a false promise of marriage to induce
the women in sexual relationship, it is to be observed that there is a distinction
between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be
broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not
fulfilled20, similar judgement was held in the case of Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v.
State of Uttar Pradesh.21
19. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that subsequently in the case
of Lalita and Angrez, the petitioner is accused under Sections 64/69/64(2)(m)/87/351
of the BNS 2023, alleging that Angrez had deployed deceitful means to have sexual
relations with Lalita and he had no intention of marrying her therefore to draw a line
between consensual sex and rape, And in the pretext, Section 69, 64 (m) will be read
together with Section 375 of IPC22 and Section 90 of IPC.23
20. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, while in a relationship
based on “the consent given by the victim to sexual intercourse with a person whom

19
Sudesh Jhaku v. K.C. Jhaku, (1998) Cri LJ 2428.
20
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608.
21
Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 2 SCC 1.
22
Indian Penal Code, § 375, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
23
Indian Penal Code, § 90, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

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she is deeply in love on a promise to marry her in future, cannot be said to be a
misconception of fact” under Section 90 of IPC 24 and hence, the accused will not be
convicted for rape within the meaning of Section 37525.
21. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the key allegation that
Angrez later got engaged to another woman (Ruby), which made Lalita believe that
his intentions were not genuine. The said allegations don’t stand valid as it primarily
based on an apprehension of deception since the complainant has not been able to
establish the intention to deceive from the beginning therefore the entire criminal
proceedings initiated against the appellants is nothing but an abuse of the process and
consequently, they had invoked the extraordinary powers of the High Court under
Section 226 of Constitution of India.
22. Furthermore, since Angrez and Lalita had a long-term relationship since March 2020
and even got engaged, it would be challenging to argue that Angrez always intended
to deceive Lalita, and since Angrez genuinely proposed marriage to Lalita but later
decides not to marry due to unforeseen reasons (coercion by her father), therefore it
does not amount to deception. This view was considered in Kaini Rajan Vs State of
Kerala26 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained the essentials and
parameters that constitute such alleged crime stating that “The deception must be
present at the inception of the relationship”.
23. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that consent for the purpose of
Section 69 of BNS requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of
intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act
but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent, whether
there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant
circumstances27, which in the present case are indicated by the length of the
relationship of Angrez and Lalita and even her agreeing to his conversion in
Christianity which is violative of Hindu Marriage Act.
24. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that to allege Angrez of
Section 351 of BNS28, it must be proved that he deployed deceit to induce her into a
sexual relationship. From the facts, Angrez’s religious conversion and engagement
24
Indian Penal Code, § 90, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
25
Babu v. State of Kerala, 2013 (4) KHC 195.
26
Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala, (2013) 1 SCC 200.
27
State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mange Ram, (2007) 9 SCC 540.
28
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 351, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).

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with Ruby seem to have occurred later in the relationship. There is no indication that
these factors existed when the relationship began, which means the initial consent
given by Lalita was not induced by deceit under the legal maxim of vitiated consent
which is interpreted as the voluntary submission by a woman while she has the power
to resist, no matter how reluctantly yielded, amounts to consent and that removes an
essential element for the offence alleged 29. Additionally, she being an educated
woman in a premarital relationship cannot claim rape or related offence after the
relationship ends, as she is considered mature enough to understand the
consequences30.
25. Therefore, Section 69 of BNS, is thus unconstitutional on the above arguments.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER GRANT OF POLICE CUSTODY BEYOND 15 DAYS IS

CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID IN ABSENCE OF ANY SAFEGUARDS IN THE
SECTION.

26. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the initial detention of the
accused by the magistrate can be only for fifteen days in the whole and it may be
either police custody or judicial custody and during the period the magistrate has
jurisdiction to convert judicial custody to police custody and vice-versa and the
maximum period under which the accused can be so detained is only fifteen days, as
held in the case of State of Kerala vs. Sadanandan31contending that the extension of
the said period would lead to the violation of absent safeguards of the fundamental
rights of the accused.
27. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Supreme Court
interpreted the provision of Section 167(2) of CrPC 32 in such a way as to mean that if
the accused was detained in police custody, the maximum period for which he could
be kept in such custody is only 15 days, either pursuant to a single order or more than
one orders by the magistrate. But, on a whole, it could not be more than 15 days and
any further remand of the accused could only be to judicial custody as held in CBI vs
Anupam J Kulkarni33, a similar judgement was followed in Budh Singh versus

29
Jose Thettayil v. Station House Officer, Aluva East Police Station, (2013) 4 KLT 854.
30
Sonu v. State of U.P., (2021) SCC SC 181.
31
State of Kerala v. Sadanandan, (1966) 2 SCC 26.
32
Code of Criminal Procedure, §167(2), No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India).
33
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141.

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State of Punjab34, further the language of Section 167(2) is plain and that words “for
a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole” would clearly indicate that those
fifteen days begin to run immediately after the accused is produced before the
magistrate in accordance with the sub Section (1) and the police custody cannot be
granted after the lapse of the “first fifteen days”35.
28. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that “while dealing with
circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus is on the prosecution to prove
that the chain of evidence is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in the prosecution
can’t be cured by a false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of
this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence must be fully
established36, there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, the
facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused, that is to say that they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty37 further contending that Section 167 (2) of CrPC
should be taken into cognizance while dealing with such cases to provide for valid
safeguards and limited restrictions on the rights of the accused.

2.1 Whether the extension of police custody beyond the 15-day limit, violates the
fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution of India.

29. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that since Article 21 of the
Constitution guarantees the protection of life and personal liberty. This includes the
right to a hassle-fair, non-abusive investigation process under the criminal justice
system. Although not explicitly mentioned under this Article is the duty of the
criminal justice system to make sure the processes entailing the criminal trial are
right, just, and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive38. The accused cannot be
heckled back and forth by the Courts of law in the name of justice. A fundamental,
principal aim of the criminal justice system is to balance the rights of the accused
with the quest for truth and justice.

34
Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, (2010) 6 SCC 343.
35
Delhi Administration v. Ravinder Kumar Bhatnagar, 1982 Cri LJ 989 (Del).
36
Sharad Shankar Puranik v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 379.
37
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343.
38
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

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30. Custody is the apprehension of an individual to be kept under protective care. Section
167 of CrPC, concern themselves with the procedure to be followed while placing a
person under custody, and also differentiates between the types of custody. Under
Section 167, CrPC, who determines whether there are sufficient grounds to order a
remand of the suspect, either into judicial or police custody as held in Raj Pal Singh
v. State of U.P.39. It is the legitimate right of any police officer to interrogate or arrest
any suspect on some credible material, but it is their duty that such an arrest must be
in accordance with the law i.e. here in this case the accused was firstly taken to a
police custody and then to a judicial custody and then transferred back to the police
custody clearly indicating the abuse of law.40
31. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the procedural and
substantive protections provided by Section 167 CrPC are central to ensuring that the
fundamental right of personal liberty of an accused is upheld subsequently in
Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency41, the Court, has explained that
the expanded traditional concept of “custody” under Section 167, is consequently a
landmark judgment that has the potential to significantly affect the rights of accused
in criminal cases.
32. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the police cant question
the modus operandi of the accused in the present case owing to since there is no
habitual crime pattern of the accused as stated in the case of Mukesh @ Bhola vs
State of Chhattisgarh42, also the in charge police has no further right to question the
accused after 24 hours of the arrest and no further investigation could be conducted
as laid in the Section 187(1) of BNSS43.
33. Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the
investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by
Section 58 of BNSS44, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or
information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police
officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall
forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary
39
Raj Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (1983) Crl. L.J. 109.
40
Bhagwan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1992) 1 SCC 249.
41
Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, (2021) SCC Online SC 382
42
Mukesh @ Bhola v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2021) SCC Online SC 1130.
43
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, § 187(1) (India).
44
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, § 58, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).

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hereinafter specified relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the
accused to such Magistrate.
34. It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the judiciary plays a
major role in the provision of justice, as an interpreter of the law. Custodial violence
(extension of custody in this case) is a manifestation of the imbalance between the
liberty of an individual and the power of the state, and the judiciary acts as an
equaliser between the two45. The vulnerability of human rights assumes a traumatic
poignancy when the violation is perpetrated by the police arm of the State whose
function is to protect the citizens and not to commit gruesome offences against them.
35. Thereby, such extension as in the present case is a sheer violation of the safeguards
provided by the legislature and nullifies the contention of enactment of such
provision which is here Section 69, violating rights of one and safeguarding the rights
of other.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE FIR SHOULD BE QUASHED.

36. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the FIR registered against the
petitioner, alleging deceitful conduct in engaging in sexual relations with the Lalita
without the intent to marry her has been filed with a malicious intent to harass the
petitioner. The circumstances surrounding the FIR in our case reveal that it is
motivated by mala fide intentions, hence leading to the violation of fundamental
rights and therefore, this Court should exercise its inherent powers under Section 528
of BNSS, to quash the FIR and secure the ends of justice.

3.1. Whether the FIR discloses a cognizable offence.

37. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the FIR alleges that the
Petitioner engaged in a sexual relationship with Lalita by falsely promising marriage.
However, the FIR fails to disclose a prima facie case against him because it lacks
specific allegations that would constitute a cognizable offence, which means a crime
for which the police have the authority to arrest a person without a warrant and start
an investigation without the permission of a magistrate. These offences are typically

45
Anisha Sareen, Judicial Approach and Reformation in the Law Regarding Custodial Violence in India (2022)
Vol 2 https://ijirl.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/JUDICIAL-APPROACH-AND-REFORMATION-IN-THE-
LAW-REGARDING-CUSTODIAL-VIOLENCE-IN-INDIA-.pdf.

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serious, such as rape, murder, robbery, or kidnapping, and are defined under the First
Schedule of the CrPC or now the BNSS, and to support this contention, the Supreme
Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab46 articulated that if the FIR does not disclose
a prima facie case or if it is found to be inherently improbable, it is liable to be
quashed.

38. It is also humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Petitioner’s actions
were neither intended to deceive Lalita nor that they were criminal in nature because
later on in the facts of the case it was revealed that his second engagement
photographs were a hoax, as testified by the witness, and the petitioner was just
trying to call off the marriage as it was based on coercion.
39. The FIR is vague because it does not detail how Petitioner’s interactions with Lalita
amount to criminal behaviour. The entire relationship between the petitioner and the
Lalita, including their engagement, was under duress, as the Lalita had previously
threatened to commit suicide if the petitioner did not agree to marry her. This context
is crucial, as it shows that the relationship was not built on deceit by the petitioner
but rather on coercion by Lalita.
40. The Supreme Court in Salib v. State of U.P.47 observed that when a complainant files
an FIR with an ulterior motive for personal revenge, they will ensure it is well-
drafted to appear legitimate. In such frivolous or vexatious cases, the Court has a
duty to carefully examine not just the complaint but also other relevant circumstances
in the record. The Court must read between the lines with caution to identify any
hidden motives.

41. The Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal48 laid down several categories
under which an FIR can be quashed. Among these, the Court emphasized that when
the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence or when the FIR is
manifestly attended with mala fide intention, the Court should exercise its inherent
powers to quash the FIR.
42. In this case, the FIR lacks concrete evidence linking the Petitioner to any criminal
act, as the alleged promise of marriage was not made with fraudulent intent but under

46
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866.
47
Salib v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 947.
48
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) 1 SCC 335.

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coercion. Consequently, the FIR does not fulfil the criteria outlined in Bhajan Lal
case and hence should be quashed.
43. Furthermore, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao
Angre49 the Supreme Court held that when the allegations in the FIR do not disclose
the commission of any offence and only result in harassment of the accused, the FIR
should be quashed. The Hon’ble Court in its judgement observed that the legal
position is that at the initial stage, the Court must determine if the allegations
establish the prima facie offence. It should consider any special features and assess
whether it is in the interest of justice to continue the prosecution. If the chances of
conviction are bleak then allowing the prosecution to continue would serve no useful
purpose hence the Court may quash the proceedings even at a preliminary stage. The
FIR in the present case fails to meet these criteria as it does not provide any credible
evidence or material that could lead to a legitimate suspicion of the petitioner’s
involvement in the crime.

3.2. Whether the FIR is a result of mala fide intent and constitutes an abuse of process.

44. The petitioner humbly submits that the FIR is filed with mala fide intent and
constitutes an abuse of legal process. After the Petitioner decided to back out of the
marriage due to the coercive circumstances under which it was arranged, Lalita
retaliated by filing the FIR. This FIR is not a genuine attempt to seek justice but
rather a means to force the Petitioner back into the marriage or to exact revenge for
his decision to withdraw.
45. The sequence of events, where Lalita initially coerced the Petitioner into an
engagement and then used the legal system to harass him, clearly indicates malicious
intent. The circumstances suggest that the FIR is a tactic to harass the Petitioner
rather than a legitimate complaint of wrongdoing. The timing of the FIR i.e.
immediately after the Petitioner expressed his unwillingness to continue with the
marriage supports the inference that it was filed out of spite.
46. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the FIR lodged by Lalita is
internally inconsistent and contradicts the facts of the case. While Lalita claims that
she was deceived into a sexual relationship by Petitioner’s false promise of marriage,

49
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692.

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the facts of the case reveal that Lalita coerced the Petitioner into the engagement by
threatening to commit suicide. This act of coercion indicates that she was aware of
Petitioner’s reluctance or lack of commitment, this contradicts her claim of Section
69 and 87 of the BNS50 i.e. sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means and
Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage.
47. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 51 has emphasized that when an
FIR is based on allegations that are contradicted by the complainant’s statements or
actions, it raises serious doubts about the genuineness of the complaint. In this case,
Lalita’s contradictory action i.e. pressuring the petitioner into the engagement while
later claiming deceit, undermines the credibility of her FIR.
48. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy52, the Supreme Court emphasized the need
to quash FIRs that are frivolous or vexatious, the same precedent was reiterated in a
case by the apex Court.53 Given the lack of substantive evidence and the clear
retaliatory motive, this FIR falls within the category of cases that should be quashed
to prevent an abuse of process of law.
49. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate54
underscored that the criminal law should not be used as a weapon for personal
vendetta, where the Court’s observations were that summoning an accused in a
criminal case is a serious matter that requires the magistrate to apply their mind to the
facts and relevant law. The magistrate must examine the allegations and supporting
evidence to determine if there is sufficient basis to proceed, rather than merely
relying on the complainant's witnesses.
50. The doctrine of ex debito justitiae mandates that the Court must intervene to quash
proceedings that are manifestly unjust or are an abuse of the legal process. The FIR
in question is a clear example of such abuse, as it lacks any credible basis and is
motivated by malice. The FIR in this case is a result of malicious prosecution as
Lalita is using the legal system not to address a legitimate grievance but to punish the
Petitioner for his decision to withdraw from the engagement hence, hence such FIR
filed without reasonable cause and with malice is an abuse of the legal process,
warranting quashing by this Hon’ble Court. .
50
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, § 87, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
51
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, (1991) 2 SCC 1.
52
State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699.
53
Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122.
54
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749.

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3.3. Whether the FIR Violates the Petitioner’s Fundamental Rights.

51. The petitioner, Angrez, submits that the FIR infringes upon his fundamental rights
under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and personal
liberty. The baseless allegations in the FIR have caused the Petitioner mental distress
and harassment, violating his right to live with dignity. The coercive nature of his
relationship with Lalita, where he was threatened into an engagement, further
exacerbates this violation.
52. The Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 55 recognized that the right
to life includes the right to live without undue harassment as a part of right to live
with human dignity56 which has been compromised in this case. Article 21 in this
view of its expansive meaning not only protects life and liberty but also envisages a
fair procedure 57 which completely seems to be lacking here.
53. The FIR also violates Article 14, which ensures equality before the law. Lalita’s
arbitrary and vindictive use of the legal system to target the Petitioner despite the
absence of any criminal intent or action on his part, is a clear violation of this
principle.

“Any decision if taken without considering the relevant facts, can

only be termed as an arbitrary decision and violative of mandate of
Article 14 of the Indian constitution.”58

54. The Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 59 held that arbitrariness
is antithetical to equality, and this FIR represents an arbitrary and unfair application
of the law. The Hon’ble apex Court observed that:

“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions

and it cannot be ‘cribbed, cabined and confined’ within traditional
and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is
antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are
sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the
other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.”

55
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
56
Frances Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608.
57
D.D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis, (2010).
58
Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation, AIR 2001 SC 3887.
59
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3.

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55. The filing of the FIR appears to be a strategy to coerce the petitioner into marriage or
to exact revenge for his decision to withdraw. This misuse of criminal law not only
infringes on Petitioner’s constitutional rights but also undermines the integrity of the
legal system. The Supreme Court’s decision in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.60
underscores the need to protect individuals from arbitrary and unjust prosecution in a
sentence that “The existence of the power to arrest is one thing. The justification for
the exercise of it is quite another” which is precisely what the Petitioner’s contention
is in this case.
56. Given the clear violations of Petitioner’s fundamental rights under Articles 14 and
21, this Hon’ble Court is urged to quash the FIR. The legal process must not be
allowed to be misused for personal vendettas, and the petitioner’s right to personal
liberty and equality before the law must be protected.
57. After a thorough examination of the sub-issues, it is evident that proceeding with the
case based on the FIR would result in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, based on
the arguments and legal precedents presented, it is humbly urged before this Hon’ble
Court that the FIR be quashed and the ends of justice be met.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE ACCUSED IN BOTH CASES SHOULD BE GRANTED

BAIL.

58. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the accused in both cases
should be granted bail by virtue of Section 483(1) of BNSS 61 and the Court must
consider factors such as the nature of the accusation, risk of tampering with evidence,
likelihood of absconding, and public safety. As is no rigid rule for granting bail, and
each case should be judged on its individual merits and circumstances.62 When
granting bail, the Court must ensure that no condition is put on the accused that
contradicts the premise of presumption of innocence in favour of the accused 63. In
light of the specific circumstances surrounding each accused individual in our case, it
is respectfully submitted that they are entitled to bail. This issue examines whether
the continued detention of the accused serves any legitimate purpose or if it
represents an abuse of the legal process.
60
Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260.
61
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, § 483(1), No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
62
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1380.
63
Aditya Mehrotra, The Anomaly of Judicial Discretion in Grant of Bail: A Critical Analysis, Manupatra (2022).

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4.1. Whether the Nature of the Offences Justifies Bail for the Accused in Both Cases.

59. Under Section 478 of the BNSS, 2023 64, bail is a legal right for most offences, except
where the law explicitly states otherwise. The legal principle and its accompanying
rules derived from Section 478 and Section 479 of BNSS 65 must be applied while
determining whether the nature of the offence justifies detention. Although in our
cases the charges are of non bailable and cognizable offence but the intention behind
those is mala fide which has nothing more than motive of undue harassment of the
accused.
60. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down several factors to be considered while
considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature
and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail, (v)
character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of
the offence being repeated: (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced, and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.66
61. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the accused is clear from the
ambit of all these factors as can be clearly inferred from the facts of our case as the
nature of crime is although cognizable but there is an ulterior motive in the
allegations to harass the accused.
62. When deciding on the cases pertaining to Section 437 of CrPC 67 which is now 480 of
BNSS68, i.e. bail in the case on non-bailable offence it is pertinent to note that Courts
have been exercising due caution and great care in deciding the cases as the
jurisdiction is discretionary, which is ensured by balancing the rights and
consideration of liberty of the individual and the interest of the society.69.
63. The Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar70 emphasized that arrests
should not be made routinely, particularly in cases where the alleged offence is not of
serious magnitude. The Court also noted that the power of arrest is “largely
64
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, § 478, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
65
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, § 479, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
66
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496.
67
Code of Criminal Procedure, § 437, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).
68
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, § 480, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
69
Mansab Ali v. Irsan, (2003) 8 SCC 707.
70
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273.

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considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of
the public.” It is also necessary to bear in mind that superficially a case may have an
ugly look and thereby, prima facie, shaking the conscience of any Court but it is well
settled that suspicion, however high it may be, can under no circumstances, be held
to be a substitute for legal evidence.71
64. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the first case, the petitioner
is accused of deceitfully obtaining Lalita’s consent to a relationship by promising
marriage. Given the underlying facts, where Lalita's conduct appears dubious during
the engagement process, the accusations lack the gravity required to justify continued
detention. The Court has warned against the filing of such frivolous FIRs where there
is a misuse of the criminal justice system.72
65. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the second case the accused
is charged with a separate offence; however, similar to Case 1, the FIR lacks
substantial prima facie evidence linking the accused to the alleged crime. Hence what
is meant by not guilty when all the evidence is not present before the Court, it can
only be prima facie determination.73 The cruelty charges under Section 86 of BNS,
202374, and other ancillary accusations of corruption are serious but are clouded by
personal vendettas, particularly given the timing of Veni’s complaints and her
influence through her father.
66. The Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of UP 75 held that the deprivation of
personal liberty is a matter of grave concern and must be carefully scrutinized. The
nature of the allegations, seen in light of the potential for abuse of the legal process,
makes continued detention unjustifiable.
67. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI76 held that the seriousness of the
charge is a relevant consideration in granting bail, but it should not override the
fundamental principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception. In both cases, the
nature of the offences does not justify the continued detention of the accused. The
charges in these cases are not severe enough to automatically deny bail, especially
given the questionable nature of the allegations. Although the charges in FIR would

71
Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417.
72
Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1.
73
Mohd. Muslim alias Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 1648.
74
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, § 86, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
75
Joginder Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1994) 4 SCC 260.
76
Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40.

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constitute the cognizable and non bailable offence but the ulterior motive laden with
mala fide intention comes into play here, on pretext of which bail should be granted
by this Hon’ble Court.

4.2. Whether the Accused Pose a Risk of Flight or Tampering with Evidence in Both
Cases.

68. Section 482 of BNSS, 202377 states that bail should be refused if there is a credible
risk that the accused may flee or tamper with evidence. The Apex Court has observed
in the case of Guruchanran Singh vs. State78, that the likelihood of the accused
fleeing from justice and tampering with prosecution evidence should be considered
apart from considering the seriousness of offence while granting or refusing bail in
case of a non-bailable offence. This provision mirrors the principles laid out by the
Supreme Court in Gurubaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab 79.The prosecution
bears the burden of proof to demonstrate such risks exist, failing which, bail must be
granted.
69. Therefore, in light of the judgement in this case and acknowledging the principles
stated it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in both the cases the two
accused have no history of absconding and have cooperated with the investigation.
There is no indication that the accused poses any risk of flight or interference with
witnesses. The evidence in this case is primarily documentary, reducing the risk of
tampering in both the cases and as emphasized in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v.
State of Maharashtra 80, the likelihood of tampering with evidence or absconding
must be real and substantial.
70. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that similarly, in the second case
the accused, a government officer, holds a position of responsibility and respect. His
role in public service and the accusations of misuse of power by his wife suggest an
ulterior motive behind the allegations rather than a genuine fear of evidence
tampering.

77
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, § 482, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 2023 (India).
78
Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1978) 1 SCC 118.
79
Gurubaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565.
80
Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694.

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71. The principles laid out in State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vetal 81 support the
view that where the accused has a stable occupation and family life, the risk of
absconding or tampering with evidence is minimal.
72. It is humbly submitted that the grounds of other similar precedents as of P.
Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement82, where the Court underscored that
bail should be granted unless there is a substantial reason to believe that the accused
would abscond or tamper with evidence. It is humbly urged before this Court that the
facts of both cases align with this precedent, making a strong case for grant of bail.

4.3. Whether the Accused’s Continued Detention is Necessary for the Interests of
Justice.

73. Under the light of the constitution, people imprisoned as under trials under jails are
considered innocent i.e. innocent until proven guilty therefore pre-trial detention
should not be used as a form of punishment and must be justified by clear,
compelling reasons. This principle was reiterated in a case 83of where the Supreme
Court observed that if the State or prosecuting agency cannot ensure a speedy trial,
they should not oppose a bail plea solely because the crime is serious. Article 21
guarantees the right to a speedy trial regardless of the crime's severity, and the
presumption of innocence must be upheld, even if the penal law is stringent.
74. The Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar 84
warned against unnecessarily prolonged detention, which can amount to an abuse of
legal processes. It emphasized the right to a speedy trial and the need to avoid
unnecessary detention. Prolonged detention without strong justification is an affront
to justice, and in both cases, the interests of justice would be better served by
granting bail.
75. The notion of innocent till proven guilty governs bail. 85When discussing bail
modifications, it's important to remember that the accused is facing allegations and
has not been convicted. It is most humbly submitted that the seriousness of the crime

81
State of Maharashtra v. Sitaram Popat Vetal, (2004) 7 SCC 521.
82
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1380.
83
Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1693.
84
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98.
85
Data Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 3 SCC 22.

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shouldn't influence the respected judges; instead, the facts should be carefully
considered.
76. It is humbly submitted that in the first case, the allegations against the petitioner is
motivated by personal grievances rather than genuine criminal conduct. The FIR is
retaliatory, especially considering the coercive circumstances surrounding the
engagement. The questionable motivations behind Lalita’s FIR raise significant
concerns about whether the accused’s detention serves any legitimate legal purpose.
Continued detention under these circumstances would not serve justice but would
instead inflict undue harm on the accused.
77. The precedent in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand 86 supports the view that bail, not
jail, should be the norm, particularly in cases where the facts suggest that detention is
being used as a means of harassment.
78. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the second case, the absence
of compelling evidence and the nature of the charges similarly suggest that detention
is unwarranted as in the first one. The accused’s continued detention, especially in
light of the unsubstantiated allegations of corruption and cruelty, appears to be more
a tool of retribution than a necessity for justice. The police’s demand for repeated
remands without new evidence is indicative of an abuse of power, as outlined in P.
Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement87 where the Court highlighted the
misuse of legal provisions for extraneous purposes.
79. Even persons accused of non-bailable offences are entitled to bail if the Court
concerned comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima
facie case against him and/or if the Court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded that
in spite of the existence of prima facie case, there is a need to release such persons on
bail where fact situations require it to do so.88 Hence the apex Court has time and
again stated that jail is the exception and bail is the rule.89
80. Based on the reasons stated above, we respectfully request this Hon’ble Court to
grant bail to the accused in both cases. The legal framework, the facts of the cases,
and the precedents all point to the conclusion that further detention is unnecessary

86
State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308.
87
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24.
88
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2005) 2 SCC 42.
89
Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40.

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and unfair. We urge this Hon’ble Court to uphold the fundamental rights of the
accused and grant bail to ensure that justice is served.

PRAYER

Therefore, may it please the Hon’ble Court of Allahabad, in light of the facts and
circumstances of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
Counsel for the Petitioner prays that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and grant
the following prayers:

1. Hold and declare that Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 is
constitutionally invalid.
2. Hold and declare that police custody beyond 15 days is constitutionally invalid.
3. Hold and declare that the FIR should be quashed.
4. Hold and declare that both the accused i.e. Angrez and Jashn should be released on
bail.

AND PASS any such order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit the best interest of justice,
fairness, equity, and good conscience.

All of which is most respectfully prayed and humbly submitted

FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE PETITIONERS SHALL DUTY BOUND

FOREVER PRAY

-Sd-

Place:

Date: Counsel for the Petitioners.

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