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BACKGROUND GUIDE
The Disarmament and International Security Committee
UNSC BACKGROUND GUIDE

TABLE
OF CONTENTS

Key Terms 01
Introduction 02
Status Quo 03
Key Actors 04
Points of Consideration 05
Further Reading 06
Bibliography 07
 DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE

KEY TERMS
Non-Proliferation: The prevention of
the spread of nuclear weapons and
related technology.

Nuclear Disarmament: The process

of reducing or eliminating nuclear
weapons globally.

Peaceful Nuclear Energy: The use of

nuclear technology for non-military
purposes, such as energy generation
and medical applications.

Safeguards: Measures implemented

by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) to verify compliance
with the NPT.

Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS):

Countries recognized under the NPT
as possessing nuclear weapons (USA,
Russia, China, France, UK).

Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
(NNWS): Countries that do not
possess nuclear weapons under the
NPT framework.

Non-State Actors: Individuals or

groups, such as terrorist
organizations, that operate
independently of national
governments.
.
 DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE

INTRODUCTION
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), which came into force in 1970,
remains a cornerstone of global nuclear security. With
191 signatories, it is one of the most widely adhered-to
arms control agreements. The NPT is structured
around three key pillars: non-proliferation,
disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.
While it has played a crucial role in curbing nuclear
proliferation, challenges such as non-compliance, lack
of enforcement mechanisms, and the reluctance of
nuclear-armed states to disarm have hindered its
effectiveness. Recent geopolitical tensions and
advancements in nuclear technology have further
emphasised the need for strengthening the treaty.

The NPT's primary objective is to prevent

the spread of nuclear weapons by restricting
nuclear capabilities to the five recognised
nuclear-weapon states. However, concerns
over the treaty’s effectiveness have
persisted, especially as some nations have
pursued nuclear weapons outside of its
framework. The Cold War era saw a
buildup of nuclear arsenals, and while arms
control agreements have helped reduce
stockpiles, the threat of nuclear conflict
remains. The lack of a legally binding
commitment to disarmament from nuclear-
armed states has fueled criticism from non-
nuclear-weapon states, who argue that the
treaty disproportionately benefits the
existing nuclear powers.
DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE

INTRODUCTION
Additionally, the NPT permits non-nuclear weapon
states to develop nuclear energy programs for
peaceful purposes, provided they comply with IAEA
safeguards. However, this provision has raised
concerns over potential misuse, as seen in the cases of
Iran and North Korea. Iran’s nuclear program has
been subjected to intense scrutiny, with allegations
that it could be diverted toward weapons
development. North Korea’s withdrawal from the
treaty in 2003 and subsequent nuclear tests highlight
a major challenge in enforcing NPT obligations. The
treaty is reviewed every five years during the NPT
Review Conferences, where member states discuss
progress and challenges. However, divisions between
nuclear and non-nuclear states have made it difficult
to achieve consensus on necessary reforms. The most
recent review conferences have highlighted
disagreements over the pace of disarmament and the
role of nuclear deterrence in global security.

Moreover, technological advancements in nuclear

weaponry and delivery systems have further
complicated the non-proliferation landscape. Emerging
technologies such as hypersonic missiles and cyber
threats to nuclear infrastructure present new risks that
the treaty does not adequately address. As tensions
between major powers, such as the United States,
Russia, and China, continue to rise, the risk of nuclear
confrontation remains a serious concern.

Strengthening the NPT requires a multi-faceted

approach, including enhanced verification measures,
stricter enforcement mechanisms, and greater
commitment from nuclear-armed states to move toward
disarmament. Ensuring that the treaty remains relevant
in the face of modern challenges is crucial to
maintaining international security and preventing the
catastrophic consequences of nuclear proliferation.
 DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE

STATUS QUO
The Situation

Divide Between Nuclear and Non-

Civilian Nuclear Program Misuse
Nuclear States
A major concern is the potential misuse of
Despite its achievements, the NPT encounters civilian nuclear programs for military
substantial challenges. Countries like North purposes. Countries like Iran have been
Korea have exited the treaty to develop accused of using their nuclear energy
nuclear weapons, while Iran's compliance programs as a front for weapons
with safeguards has raised concerns. development, despite denials and
Meanwhile, nations like India and Pakistan, agreements like the Joint Comprehensive
not party to the treaty, maintain nuclear Plan of Action (JCPOA). Similarly, North
arsenals citing national security needs, Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty in
complicating global non-proliferation efforts. 2003 and subsequent nuclear tests have
Efforts to negotiate a binding disarmament demonstrated the difficulty in enforcing
agreement face resistance, particularly from NPT obligations and preventing
nuclear-weapon states viewing their arsenals proliferation.
as crucial for deterrence. This divide between
nuclear and non-nuclear states hinders
consensus on disarmament measures. Many
non-nuclear states argue that the slow
progress in disarmament violates the treaty's
principles, criticizing nuclear-weapon states New Technology
for insufficient steps towards eliminating their
Additionally, advancements in nuclear
arsenals.
technology and delivery systems, such as
hypersonic missiles and cyber threats to
nuclear infrastructure, pose new risks that
Conflicts the treaty does not adequately address. As
Furthermore, geopolitical tensions states continue to modernise their nuclear
between major powers have made arsenals, the risk of a renewed arms race
disarmament efforts more complicated. remains a significant challenge to global
The growing rivalry between the United security. The need for stronger verification
States, Russia, and China has led to an measures, more effective diplomatic
arms buildup, undermining global non- engagement, and a renewed commitment to
proliferation efforts. At the same time, disarmament is essential to ensuring the
regional conflicts in areas, such as South continued success of the NPT.
Asia, have raised concerns about potential
nuclear escalation, particularly given the
presence of nuclear-armed states in these
regions.
 DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE

KEY ACTORS

1. United Nations (UN) 2. International

Atomic Energy Agency
Plays a crucial role in
nuclear disarmament and (IAEA)
non-proliferation through
various resolutions and Oversees the
initiatives. implementation of NPT
safeguards and verifies
compliance.

3. Nuclear-Weapon
States (NWS) 4. Non-Signatory States
(India, Pakistan, North
Have a central role in
nuclear disarmament Korea):
and face criticism for Their nuclear
their slow progress programmes present
toward reducing challenges to the global
arsenals. non-proliferation regime.

3. Non-Nuclear
Weapon States 5. Civil Society Organizations
(NNWS)
Groups such as the
Advocate for stronger International Campaign
disarmament measures and to Abolish Nuclear
stricter enforcement of NPT Weapons (ICAN) push
provisions. for stronger disarmament
measures.
DISEC BACKGROUND GUIDE

POINTS OF CONSIDERATION

01 STRENGTHENING VERIFICATION
MECHANISMS

How can the IAEA’s role be expanded to ensure stricter compliance

with NPT safeguards?

02 ADDRESSING NON-COMPLIANCE

What measures can be taken to ensure states adhere to their NPT

commitments, and what penalties should be enforced for violations?

03 ENHANCING DISARMAMENT EFFORTS:

How can nuclear-armed states be incentivized to accelerate

disarmament in line with Article VI of the NPT?

04 DEALING WITH NON-SIGNATORIES

What diplomatic strategies can be employed to integrate non-

signatory nuclear-armed states into the non-proliferation
regime?

05 BALANCING CIVILIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY

AND SECURITY RISKS

How can states develop nuclear energy programs without

increasing the risk of proliferation?
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FURTHER READING

1. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) -

https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/

2. Arms Control Association - ACA's Factsheets | Arms Control Association

3. Council on Foreign Relations - Global Conflict Tracker l Council on Foreign

Relations

4. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Nuclear Policy | Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

United Nations. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022. Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – UNODA

Arms Control Association. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at a Glance.

Arms Control Association. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at a
Glance | Arms Control Association

Council on Foreign Relations. The Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation. CFR.

The Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament Is in Danger |
Council of Councils

International Atomic Energy Agency. IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread

of Nuclear Weapons. IAEA, 2023. infcirc140.pdf

pn
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