TC - 34

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTARANCHAL UNIVERSITY

9th NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION - 2025

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

Writ Petition No. ………of 2025

Salim and others……………………………………………………Petitioners
Versus
State of UP…………………………………………………...……Respondents
Clubbed with
Writ Petition No. ………of 2025

40 MLAs of IPP……………………………………………………. Petitioners

Versus
Deputy Speaker of Uttam Pradesh Legislative Assembly……...Respondents
Clubbed with
Writ Petition No. ………of 2025

Ravi Ansari………………………………………………………….Petitioners
Versus
Union of Indica……………………………………………………Respondents

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

___________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT TC-34

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... 1

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.......................................................................................... 8

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................ 9

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ..................................................................................................... 10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. 11

ISSUE 1: Whether the practice of “bulldozer justice”, implemented by the state government of
Uttam Pradesh, violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Indica, and
whether such actions represent an unconstitutional exercise of executive power? ................. 13

1.1 The practice of bulldozer justice violates fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21
of the Constitution of Indica. ................................................................................................... 13

1.2 The action violates the right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of Indica.
.................................................................................................................................................. 15

1.3 This action represents an unconstitutional exercise of executive power. .......................... 16

1.4 The principles of natural justice are not absolute and can be restricted. ........................... 16

ISSUE 2: Whether Paragraph 2(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution violates the
constitutional right to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances, such as
widespread civil unrest and political instability? ..................................................................... 18

2.1 Para 2(1)(b) offers the necessary flexibility to address exceptional situations .................. 18

2.2 Recognition of the vital role played by the Party in representing the electorate, which is
essential for preserving democratic stability and ensuring party cohesion, particularly in
extraordinary circumstances. ................................................................................................... 19

2.3 The Constitution does not confer an inherent right to represent one’s constituency ......... 21

ISSUE 3: Whether the current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker
of the Legislative Assembly, is constitutionally valid or not? ................................................. 24

3.1 The current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly upholds the principles of parliamentary democracy. ........................... 24

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3.2 The current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly is governed by both constitutional mandates and assembly-specific
rules. ......................................................................................................................................... 26

Issue 4: Whether the broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial
detention without formal charges are consistent with the protection of fundamental rights? . 32

4.1 The definitions of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under UAPA are not vague. ...... 32

4.2 The denial of bail is consistent with the judicially devised tests. ...................................... 34

4.3 The prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges is consistent with the protection
afforded by fundamental rights. ............................................................................................... 37

PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 38

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

& And
AIR All India Reporter
All. Allahabad
Art. Article
etc. Et cetera (Latin)
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honorable
i.e. id est (Latin)
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly
J. Justice
Ltd. Limited
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
UOI Union of India
v. Versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Afjal Ansari v. State of U.P., (2024) 2 S.C.C. 187 .............................................................. 18,19

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, AIR 1997 SC 152. ........... 12
Almitra Patel vs. Union of Indica, AIR 2000 SC 1256. ........................................................... 12
Ashish Shelar v. Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, AIR 2022 SC 69. .................................. 19
Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of Indica, AIR 1990 SC 1480. ..................................................... 13
Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, AIR 2005 SC 69. 16
Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Assn. v. Union of Indica, (2016) 14 SCC 536. ..... 29
Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2025) 5 SCC 403. .................................. 31
Jawaharlal Nehru University vs. B. S. Narwal, AIR 1980 SC 1666. ....................................... 13
Kanhiyalal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, AIR 1986 SC 111 ............................................................... 17
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955. ..................................................................... 29
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. ................................................. 16
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651. ................................. 14, 15, 16, 17,21
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of Indica & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3127, para 284-85................. 16, 17,18
Mohammad Amin Sheikh Vs Divisional Commissioner Kashmir, Srinagar, 2025 LiveLaw
(JKL) 9.................................................................................................................................. 34
Ms. Sundaram Finance Ltd. v Regional Transport Officer, AIR 1993 SC 436 ....................... 15
N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem District
and Others, 1952 AIR 64, 1952 SCR 218............................................................................. 23
NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1............................................................... 32
Olga Tellis & Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180. ........................... 11
P Nalla Thampy v UOI, AIR 1985 SC 1133............................................................................. 17
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain & Anr., 1975 AIR 2299, 1975 SCC (2) 159 . .. 23
Social Action for People's Rights v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 All 250...................................... 20
Thwaha Fasal vs. Union of Indica, (2022) 14 SCC 766. ......................................................... 32

Statutes

Art. 105, the Constitution of Indica. ........................................................................................ 14

Art. 14, the Constitution of Indica. .................................................................................... 10, 11
Art. 19(1)(a), the Constitution of Indica. ........................................................................... 10, 11
Art. 19(1)(e), the Constitution of Indica. ........................................................................... 10, 11

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Art. 19(2), the Constitution of Indica. ................................................................................ 10, 11

Art. 19(5), the Constitution of Indica. ...................................................................................... 10
Art. 194, the Constitution of Indica. ........................................................................................ 14
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica. .............................................................................. 10, 12, 34
Art. 22, the Constitution of Indica. .......................................................................................... 34
Art. 300A, the Constitution of Indica. ...................................................................................... 12
Art.19(1), the Constitution of Indica. ....................................................................................... 10
Art. 13, Constitution of Indica. ................................................................................................ 26
Art. 178, Constitution of Indica. .............................................................................................. 24
Art. 208, Constitution of Indica. .............................................................................................. 24
Art. 32, Constitution of Indica ................................................................................................... 6
Para 2(1)(b), Schedule 10, the Constitution of Indica. ............................................................ 17
Schedule 10, the Constitution of Indica. ...................................................................... 14, 15, 16
Section 124A, the Indican Penal Code, 1860. ......................................................................... 29
Section 15, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. ............................................ 29, 30
Section 173, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. .................................................................. 31
Section 193, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. ................................................. 31
Section 2(k), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. ................................................. 28
Section 2(o). the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. ................................................. 28
Section 2. the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967....................................................... 28
Section 26C, the Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act. .............................. 12
Section 26C, Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. .......................... 12
Section 26C, Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973............................. 13
Section 439, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. .................................................................. 31
Section 485, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita. ........................................................... 31
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. ............................................................... 28, 29
Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. ................................................ 11

Other Authorities

Bag, P. K., Sabourian, H., & Winter, E. (2005). Sequential Elimination vs. Instantaneous
Voting. University of Rochester. .......................................................................................... 21
Bag, P. K., Sabourian, H., & Winter, E. (2008). Multi-Stage Voting, Sequential Elimination
and Condorcet Consistency. Journal of Economic Theory. ................................................. 21

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Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (2002). Voting Procedures. In K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, & K.
Suzumura (Eds.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare (Vol. 1, pp. 175-227). Elsevier
Science B.V. .......................................................................................................................... 21
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1958, p. 362 (Best Books of 1959)................................................................... 19
Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, 20th ed., 233 (1983). .................................................. 20
G.V. Mavalankar, Remarks on the Role of the Speaker, in Impartial Speaker For Thriving
Democracy, The Indican Express, Aug. 19, 2021. ............................................................... 21
Halsbury's Laws of England, 5th edn, 2008, vol. 2, para. 954. ............................................... 23
Jawaharlal Nehru, Remarks on the Role of the Speaker, in Nehru and Parliamentary
Democracy, The Tenth Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial Lecture, Jan. 18, 2014. .................. 21
Law Commission of Indica, 170th Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999). .............. 15
Srishti Ojha, Supreme Court Dismisses NIA's Plea Challenging Default Bail To Sudha
Bharadwaj In Bhima Koregaon Case, LiveLaw, https://www.livelaw.in/top-
stories/supreme-court-sudha-bharadwaj-default-bail-bhima-koregaon-nia-bombay-high-
court-
187093#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20on%20Tuesday,in%20the%20Bhima%20
Koregaon%20case., last seen on 25/1/25. ........................................................................... 33

Rules

Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, § 8 and § 9, published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
.............................................................................................................................................. 26
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, § 8(1), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat. . 24, 25
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, § 8(2), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat. . 24, 26
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, § 8(3), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat. . 25, 26
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, § 8(5), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat. ....... 25
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, § 8(6), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat. ....... 25

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Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, § 9(1), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat. . 25, 26
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, § 9(2), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat. . 25, 26
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as
amended up to 2021, published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat. ...... 20, 24, 27

Treatises

United Nations Security Council Resolutions (1373 of 2021). ................................................ 30

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The respondents have approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica under Article 321 of
the Constitution of Indica.

Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950

Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1)
and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local
limits of its jurisdiction ill or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court
under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.

1
Constitution of Indica, Art. 32

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Indica is a federal parliamentary republic with a bicameral legislature and strict separation of
powers between the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary. States have their own governance
authority in key sectors.

PART II: PROTEST & BULLDOZER JUSTICE

Salim, a student and opposition supporter, was charged with instigating communal hatred
during a January 5, 2024 protest. Based on the controversial "bulldozer justice" policy of CM
Rohit Kumar, his ancestral place was demolished without following due procedure on January
22, 2024. It is alleged to be political vendetta against Salim. Salim along with his father
challenged the demolition in the supreme court by raising the issues of the violation of
fundamental rights.

PART III: POLITICAL CRISIS & FLOOR TEST

Widespread riots and government bias allegations had heated up the issue between the majority
Tribe A and the minority Tribe B. During this, 40 ruling party MLAs ignored a party whip in
the floor test that made the government fall. The Deputy Speaker belonging to Tribe A
disqualified them under the Anti-Defection Law for which they appealed to the Supreme Court
citing no due process and political pressure.

PART IV: UAPA & FREE SPEECH

Tribe B's activist Ravi Ansari was arrested under UAPA for allegedly inciting violence, but he
claimed it was a political move to silence dissent. His long detention without charges led to a
legal challenge on the constitutionality of UAPA with regard to broad definitions of terrorism,
denial of bail, and due process violations.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF “BULLDOZER JUSTICE”, IMPLEMENTED BY THE

STATE GOVERNMENT OF UTTAM PRADESH, VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA, AND WHETHER SUCH
ACTIONS REPRESENT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE
POWER?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE TENTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION

VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REPRESENT ONE’S CONSTITUENCY
IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS WIDESPREAD CIVIL UNREST
AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTION OF THE SPEAKER

AND DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE BROAD DEFINITION OF “UNLAWFUL” AND “TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES” UNDER THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT (UAPA),
THE DENIAL OF BAIL, AND THE PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL DETENTION WITHOUT
FORMAL CHARGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Issue 1: Whether the practice of “bulldozer justice”, implemented by the state

government of Uttam Pradesh, violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the
constitution of indica, and whether such actions represent an unconstitutional exercise of
executive power?

First, there was no violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21. The
government claims the demolition was based on lacking legal documents and tax filings, not
political affiliation, making it non-discriminatory. They argue Salim's inflammatory speeches
justified restricting his free speech rights, and the demolition of illegal construction doesn't
violate right to life. Second, though Article 300A protects against property deprivation, the
action was authorized under Section 26C of the UPDA, 1973, making it legal. Third, the
government contends their actions were a constitutional exercise of executive power under
Sections 26C and 27 of UPDA, which allow demolition without prior notice for illegal
construction. Finally, that principles of natural justice aren't absolute and can be restricted when
legislation explicitly allows it, as in this case.

Issue 2: Whether paragraph 2(b) of the tenth schedule of the constitution violates the
constitutional right to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances, such
as widespread civil unrest and political instability?
Para 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule is constitutionally valid, balancing party discipline with
flexibility for exceptional cases. Kihoto Hollohan upheld its role in preventing unethical
defections without violating legislative freedoms. The provision allows for limited dissent with
prior approval or condonation. Political parties are vital to parliamentary democracy, ensuring
stability and public trust. Unchecked dissent could destabilize governance, while internal party
mechanisms allow for debate without undermining cohesion. Moreover, representation is a
statutory privilege, not an inherent right. Judicial rulings affirm that disqualification upholds
democratic integrity. Thus, Para 2(1)(b) aligns with constitutional principles, maintaining
accountability and electoral trust.

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ISSUE 3: Whether the current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, is constitutionally valid or not?
The election procedure for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Uttam Pradesh Legislative
Assembly, governed by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Procedure and Conduct of Operations
Rules, 1958, is constitutionally valid and upholds parliamentary democracy. The Speaker plays
a crucial role in maintaining order and impartiality, with elections conducted via a fair, multi-
stage voting system. Constitutional mandates (Articles 178, 208) and assembly-specific rules
ensure transparency and legitimacy. Executive oversight and judicial review safeguard the
process, ensuring compliance with democratic principles. This structured framework
guarantees fair representation, prevents strategic voting, and fosters legislative unity while
maintaining constitutional integrity.
Issue 4: Whether the broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-
trial detention without formal charges are consistent with the protection of fundamental
rights?
The UAPA’s broad definitions of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities,” denial of bail, and
prolonged pre-trial detention align with fundamental rights. The definitions are specific,
targeting threats to India’s sovereignty and integrity. The denial of bail follows judicially
established tests, ensuring a balance between security and individual rights. In Mr. Ansari’s
case, his speech incited violence, justifying detention. Prolonged pre-trial detention is
necessary due to the complexity of national security cases, preventing interference with
investigations. While fundamental rights are important, national security concerns justify
reasonable restrictions under Articles 21 and 22, making the UAPA’s provisions legally and
constitutionally valid.

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ARGUMENT ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: Whether the practice of “bulldozer justice”, implemented by the state

government of Uttam Pradesh, violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of Indica, and whether such actions represent an unconstitutional exercise
of executive power?

The action taken by the State Government, particularly the demolition of Mr. Salim’s home,
took place within the constitutional, statutory, and legal framework of Uttam Pradesh and
Indica. It is humbly submitted on behalf of the respondents that the practice of “bulldozer
justice,” implemented by the state government of Uttam Pradesh, firstly, violates fundamental
rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of Indica [1.1]; secondly, it also violates
the right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of Indica [1.2]; thirdly, this action
represents an unconstitutional exercise of executive power [1.3]; and fourthly, the principles
of natural justice are not absolute and can be restricted. [1.4]

1.1 The practice of bulldozer justice violates fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19,
and 21 of the Constitution of Indica.

Article 142 provides equality before law and equal protection of laws and states that there
should not be any arbitrary action on behalf of the state, dealing with reasonable classification.
Further, article 19(1)3 provides six freedoms which are provided to every citizen of Indica,
including the right to freedom of speech and expression u/a 19(1)(a)4 and right to reside and
settle throughout the territory of Indica u/a 19(1)(e)5 but this right is subject to certain
reasonable restrictions given under Articles 19(2)6 and 19(5)7 of the Indican Constitution.
Additionally, article 218 provides for the right to life and personal liberty but it does not provide
any absolute or unlimited safeguard against any legal action taken by a statutory authority.

2
Art. 14, the Constitution of Indica.
3
Art.19(1), the Constitution of Indica.
4
Art. 19(1)(a), the Constitution of Indica.
5
Art. 19(1)(e), the Constitution of Indica.
6
Art. 19(2), the Constitution of Indica.
7
Art. 19(5), the Constitution of Indica.
8
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica.

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1.1.1 Article 14 has not been violated.

P1. Article 149 deals with equality before law and equal protection of laws and opposes
arbitrary discrimination or actions. It also provides for a reasonable classification based on
intelligible differentia i.e. a rational nexus and intelligible differentia. The act makes an
intelligible differentiation between people who are anti-social elements, rioters, or anti-
communal elements and people who are not. This is done for the basic reason that they are
served with a form of punishment for violating the law(s) of the land.
P2. In the present case, Salim’s house is demolished by following due process of law, keeping
in mind the fact that there was absence of legal documents and tax filings of the house,
without his political affiliation playing any role. The government adhered to their zonal
development and master development plans as enshrined in the Uttam Pradesh Urban
Planning and Development Act10 without focusing or targeting any specific house or
property. The government had even notified the property owners about the demolition
beforehand when their plans were released. Since demolition did not occur due to an FIR
or political affiliation of Salim, there has been no violation of Article 1411 in the present
matter.

1.1.2 Article 19 has not been violated.

P1. Article 19(1)(a)12 guarantees free speech and expression, but this right is subject to certain
reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2),13 which includes public order and national
interest. In the present matter, since Mr. Salim’s inflammatory speeches were against
national integration, there was a need to curb his right to free speech and expression keeping
in mind the reasonable restrictions of public order and national interest and the same was
done by the government.
P2. Additionally, article 19(1)(e)14 grants the right to reside anywhere throughout the territory
of India. In the case of Olga Tellis & Ors v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,15 it was held

9
Art. 14, the Constitution of Indica.
10
Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973.
11
Art. 14, the Constitution of Indica.
12
Art. 19(1)(a), the Constitution of Indica.
13
Art. 19(2), the Constitution of Indica.
14
Art. 19(1)(e), the Constitution of Indica.
15
Olga Tellis & Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180.

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that the right to livelihood does not include occupying land in an illegal manner and the
freedom of residence cannot be read to mean protection of unlawful occupation. The
government acted keeping in mind the established principle therefore it has not infringed
upon or violated the right to reside and settle of Mr. Salim.

1.1.3 Article 21 has not been violated.

P1. Article 2116 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty but it does not offer unlimited
protection against lawful actions taken by a statutory authority. The demolition was carried
out under Section 26C of the UPDA, 1973,17 which states that the government can act
without prior notice while dealing with illegal encroachments. In Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan,18 the Supreme Court held that unauthorized
occupation vests unenforceable legal rights, and eviction does not infringe Article 21 if
backed by law.
P2. Similarly, it was held in the case of Almitra Patel v. Union of India19 that urban
encroachments have to be removed for sustainable city planning, even if it is done at the
cost of livelihoods. Given that Mr. Salim's house lacked tax filings and house papers, the
act is not violative of Article 21,20 since the process is proper in law. The government
ensured that procedures of the law were followed as far as the identification and targeting
of illegal construction was concerned. This is part of even broader efforts to achieve orderly
urban growth and development.

1.2 The action violates the right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of
Indica.

Article 300A of the Constitution21 holds that no person shall be deprived of property except by
authority of law. But in this case, it was done through Section 26C of the UPDA, 1973,22 which
states such authority. Thus, since the government acted under a specific statutory provision,
there was no violation of Article 300A.23

16
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica.
17
Section 26C, the Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act.
18
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, AIR 1997 SC 152.
19
Almitra Patel vs. Union of Indica, AIR 2000 SC 1256.
20
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica.
21
Art. 300A, the Constitution of Indica.
22
Section 26C, Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973.
23
Art. 300A, the Constitution of Indica.

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1.3 This action represents an unconstitutional exercise of executive power.

The government's acts were furthermore justified under Sections 26C and 27 of the UPDA,
1973. Section 26C explicitly empowers demolition notices without prior notice where illegal
construction is detected through the Urban Development Administration. Section 27 declares
that the implementation of urban planning regulations cannot be prejudiced by Section 26,
which implies that the said provisions are complementary to one another. Since the government
had relied on the express statutory power provided under Section 26C, there was no
requirement of prior notice before demolition, and the state's actions were legal.

1.4 The principles of natural justice are not absolute and can be restricted.

P1. The principles of natural justice are not absolute, and there are certain well-known
exceptions where compliance with such principles would defeat the very purpose of the
legislation for which it was created. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Jawaharlal Nehru University v. B.S. Narwal24 that “natural justice is not an absolute
principle; it must be applied with regard to the context and nature of the decision-making
process." Additionally, it was held in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India25 that "the
principles of natural justice are not an inflexible rule but must be applied in accordance
with the context and circumstances of each case."
P2. If a statute excludes, explicitly or by necessary implication, the application of principles of
natural justice then adherence to natural justice can be avoided as legislative actions can be
exempt from strict adherence to natural justice principles. Additionally, it was pointed out
in the case of Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India26 that legislative actions, especially
those affecting a large class of individuals, does not require individual hearings as it lays
down policies without reference to specific individuals. After placing reliance on these
well-settled principles, it is most humbly submitted that the principles of natural justice are
not absolute and can be avoided in cases of express legislative exclusion, as done in the
present case which is evident from Section 26C of Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973.27

24
Jawaharlal Nehru University vs. B. S. Narwal, AIR 1980 SC 1666.
25
Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of Indica, AIR 1990 SC 1480.
26
Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of Indica, AIR 1990 SC 1480.
27
Section 26C, Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973.

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P3. The demolition of Mr. Salim's house was thus not an unconstitutional exercise of executive
power but rather a legal action taken for ensuring compliance with regulations pertaining
to urban planning. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld state action relating to
implementation of urban planning laws, which affirms the legitimacy of removing or
evicting illegal constructions. As has been stated above, the principles of natural justice
cannot prevail over clear legal provisions. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the
principles of natural justice are not absolute and can be restricted in certain circumstances.
P4. Therefore, it is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica that
the practice of “bulldozer justice,” implemented by the state government of Uttam Pradesh,
does not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Indica, and
such actions do not represent an unconstitutional exercise of executive power.

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ISSUE 2: Whether Paragraph 2(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution violates the
constitutional right to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances, such
as widespread civil unrest and political instability?

It is humbly submitted that Para 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution28 does not
contravene any constitutional principles as this provision offers the necessary flexibility to
address exceptional situations [2.1], while recognizing the vital role of the Party in representing
the electorate, which is essential for preserving democratic stability and ensuring party
cohesion, particularly in extraordinary circumstances [2.2]. Moreover, the Constitution does
not confer an inherent right to represent one’s constituency [2.3].

2.1 Para 2(1)(b) offers the necessary flexibility to address exceptional situations

P1. The majority in Kihoto Hollohan case29 has “upheld the validity of Para 2 of the 52nd
Amendment. This provides for disqualification on defection of a member from one political
party to another. These provisions, the majority has ruled, do not violate any rights or
freedom guaranteed to the legislatures under Article 10530 and 19431 of the constitution.
The provisions are statutory and are intended to strengthen the fabric of Indican
parliamentary democracy by curbing unprincipled and unethical political defection.”32
P2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan case confined the scope of of this
provision by keeping in view “the object underlying the amendments contained in the Tenth
Schedule33 namely, to curb the evil or mischief of political defections motivated by the lure
of office or other similar considerations to make it in harmony with the constitution.” The
court stated that,
P3. “54. The said object would be achieved if the disqualification incurred on the ground of
voting or abstaining from voting by a member is confined to cases where a change of
Government is likely to be brought about or is prevented, as the case may be, as a result of
such voting or abstinence or when such voting or abstinence is on a matter which was a
major policy and programme on which the political party to which the member belongs
went to the polls……The voting or abstinence from voting by a member against the

28
Schedule 10, the Constitution of Indica.
29
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651.
30
Art. 105, the Constitution of Indica.
31
Art. 194, the Constitution of Indica.
32
Ms. Sundaram Finance Ltd. v Regional Transport Officer, AIR 1993 SC 436
33
Schedule 10, the Constitution of Indica.

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direction by the political party on such a motion would amount to disapproval of the
programme on the basis of which he went before the electorate and got himself elected and
such voting or abstinence would amount to a breach of the trust reposed in him by the
electorate.”34
P4. The same was stated by the Law Commission of Indica in “170th Report on Reform of
the Electoral Laws.”35
P5. Furthermore, in the same case, it was also stated that “the provision recognises two
exceptions: one when the Member obtains from the political party prior permission to vote
or abstain from voting and the other when the Member has voted without obtaining such
permission but his action has been condoned by the political party. This provision itself
accommodates the possibility that there may be occasions when a Member may vote or
abstain from voting contrary to the direction of the party to which he belongs.”
P6. Thus, these exceptions recognize that there may be extraordinary circumstances that justify
divergence from party directives. By requiring either prior permission or post facto
condonation, the provision balances the need for discipline with the reality of exceptional
situations. This ensures that dissent does not destabilize the government or compromise the
party’s integrity.
P7. Additionally, if any inquiry is done under this provision it is more elaborate involving
several factual aspects. This was reaffirmed by the supreme court in the case of
Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council.36
P8. Therefore, “the main principle of this disqualification is that for something which a
Member does in this House in the presence of the Presiding Officer such as voting against
the Party or abstaining from voting against the direction of the Party. Now this is something
which is proved beyond doubt.” So there is no chance or any injustice being done.

2.2 Recognition of the vital role played by the Party in representing the electorate, which
is essential for preserving democratic stability and ensuring party cohesion, particularly
in extraordinary circumstances.

P1. This Court, while dealing with the question of political party system vis-à-vis democracy
observed that "parliamentary democracy and multi-party system are an inherent part of the

34
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651.
35
Law Commission of Indica, 170th Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws (1999).
36
Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, AIR 2005 SC 69.

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basic structure of Indican Constitution. It is the political parties that set up candidates at
an election who are predominantly elected as Members of the State Legislatures." Further,
the Court, placing reliance on Kesavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala37 observed that
"....a Parliamentary Democracy like ours functions on the basis of the party system. The
mechanics of operation of the party system as well as the system of Cabinet Government
are such that the people as a whole can have little control in the matter of detailed law-
making."38
P2. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu,39 the Court felt that “the existence of the Tenth Schedule
of the Constitution40 further strengthens the importance of the political parties in our
democratic set-up. Rejecting the argument that the political party is not a democratic
entirety, and that Whip issued under the Tenth Schedule is unconstitutional, the Court
reiterated that the Parliament was empowered to provide that the Members are expected
to act in accordance with the ideologies of their respective political parties and not against
it.”41
P3. The insertion of the Tenth Schedule presupposes the existence of the party system in the
parliamentary form of Government in Indica.42 Explaining the rationale underlying
Schedule Ten, the Supreme Court has stated that “the provisions of Schedule X give
recognition to the role of the political parties in the political process. A political party goes
before the electorate with a particular programme; it sets up candidates at the election on
the basis of such programme; a candidate is therefore elected on the basis of the party
programme.”43 Also, a political party functions on the strength of shared beliefs. “Its own
political stability and social utility depend on such shared beliefs and concerted action of
its members in furtherance of those commonly held principles. Any freedom of its members
to vote as they please independently of the political party's declared policies will not only
embarrass its public image and popularity, but also undermine public confidence in it
which, in the ultimate analysis, is its source of sustenance - nay, indeed its very survival. A

37
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
38
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of Indica & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3127, para 284-85
39
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651.
40
Schedule 10, the Constitution of Indica.
41
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of Indica & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3127, para 284-85
42
Kanhiyalal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi, AIR 1986 SC 111
43
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 651.

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public image of disparate stands of members of the same political party is not looked upon,
in political tradition, as a desirable state of things.”44
P4. This demonstrates that political parties, as collective entities, are the cornerstone of Indica’s
parliamentary system. Allowing members to act independently in the name of extraordinary
circumstances could lead to chaos, weaken the government’s stability, and undermine
democratic governance. Moreover, the provision acknowledges intra-party debates and
discussions as legitimate avenues for dissent, while curbing open defections that could
damage the party’s public image and electoral mandate. This balance ensures that members
can voice concerns internally without compromising the collective governance mandate.
P5. Thus, “in any democratic system of government, political parties occupy a distinct and
unique place. It is through them that the generality of people attempt to voice and ventilate
their grievances;”45 and therefore, para 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution46
underscores the importance of party discipline in maintaining the integrity of the
parliamentary system.

2.3 The Constitution does not confer an inherent right to represent one’s constituency

P1. The concept of democratic representation is inherently tied to the principles of legal
accountability and adherence to the rule of law. While democracy enshrines the right to
vote and participate in governance, this right does not inherently or unconditionally extend
to the right to represent a constituency. The Indican Constitution, through its framework
and jurisprudence, makes it clear that representation is subject to statutory and
constitutional limitations, thereby emphasizing that the right to represent is not an absolute
or inherent entitlement.
P2. In Kuldip Nayar v. Union of Indica,47 the Supreme Court underscored the dual elements
of representation: capacity and authority. It highlighted that only a qualified individual
could legitimately claim to represent a class or constituency, underscoring the necessity of
adherence to constitutional and legal standards.
P3. Furthermore, in Afjal Ansari v. State of U.P.,48 The Supreme Court held that
“representation by disqualified parliamentarians could breach the trust and confidence

44
Ibid.
45
P Nalla Thampy v UOI, AIR 1985 SC 1133
46
Para 2(1)(b), Schedule 10, the Constitution of Indica.
47
Kuldip Nayar v. Union of Indica, (2006) 7 SCC 1
48
Afjal Ansari v. State of U.P., (2024) 2 S.C.C. 187

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that was repossessed by those who voted him to power. The trust placed on elected
representatives is conditional on their continued adherence to the principles and laws
governing their role. Disqualification mechanisms serve as a crucial safeguard to rectify
any breach of such adherence. By promptly addressing instances such as the one under
consideration, the democratic system aims to maintain the credibility and legitimacy of the
elected bodies. This process is fundamental to ensure that the will of the people, expressed
through their votes, remains untainted and reflects a genuine mandate.”49 This principle
reinforces the conditional nature of representation, which is subject to compliance with
legal and constitutional norms.
P4. Additionally, “the law is crystal clear that the right to represent a constituency cannot be
construed as a fundamental or an absolute right.” In Ashish Shelar v Maharashtra
Legislative Assembly,50
P5. "60. ... It is true that the right to vote and be represented is integral to our democratic
process and it is not an absolute right.”51
P6. Also, in the same case, the Supreme Court further stated that “the right of the appellant to
represent a constituency or that of a constituency to be represented by the appellant is not
a constitutional right under Article 326 of the Constitution.”52 Thus, the right to represent
a constituency is a statutory privilege subject to prescribed qualifications and
disqualifications, rather than a constitutional guarantee. Representation, therefore, is not an
inherent right but a conditional role granted under the law.
P7. The contention that disqualification results in "irreversible consequences" is unfounded in
light of the overarching democratic framework. As Dwight D. Eisenhower, the 34th US
President, perhaps in times when democracy faced its toughest test; he rightly
remarked,"the clearest way to show what the rule of law means to us in everyday life is to
recall what has happened when there is no rule of law".53 The balance between
representation and legal accountability must be maintained to preserve the integrity of
democratic institutions. Allowing disqualified representatives to claim an automatic or

49
Supra.
50
Ashish Shelar v. Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, AIR 2022 SC 69.
51
Afjal Ansari v. State of U.P., (2024) 2 S.C.C. 187.
52
Ibid.
53
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, p.
362 (Best Books of 1959).

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inherent right to representation would lead to arbitrariness and undermine the electorate's
trust in the system.
P8. Hence, the Constitution does not confer an inherent right to represent one’s constituency.
Representation is a privilege governed by statutory and constitutional frameworks, subject
to the principles of accountability and adherence to the rule of law. Therefore, the para
2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the constitution operates well within the constitutional
framework while also providing the necessary flexibility to address exceptional situations
and recognizes the vital role played by the Party in representing the electorate. Additionally
the Constitution does not confer an inherent right to represent one’s constituency, the
conditional nature of representation is essential to uphold the sanctity of democratic
institutions and ensure that the electorate’s will remains untainted and genuinely reflected.

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ISSUE 3: Whether the current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, is constitutionally valid or not?

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the current procedure for the election of
the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative assembly of Uttam Pradesh which is
governed by U.P. Legislative Assembly Procedure and Conduct of Operations Rules,
195854 is election process is constitutionally validated, as it upholds the principles of
parliamentary democracy [3.1] and is governed by both constitutional mandates and assembly-
specific rules [3.2].

3.1 The current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly upholds the principles of parliamentary democracy.

P1. “The member chosen for the high and honourable office is styled "Speaker" because it is
his business to speak to or address the Sovereign in the name of the House, when occasion
requires; during his absence, no business can be transacted by the House nor any question
moved, but that of adjournment. He is the representative of the House itself in its powers,
proceedings and dignity. On the one hand, he is the spokesman or representative of the
House. On the other hand, he presides over the debate of the House and enforces the
observance of all rules for preserving order in its proceedings.”55The legislature cannot be
said to have commenced until a speaker is elected.56
P2. Furthermore, “the speaker is much more than merely a presiding officer, he is the
representative and the Speaker is the house in its collective capacity is the chief custodian
of its powers and privileges of the house.” According to the majority opinion in Kihoto
case: “The office of the Speaker is held in the highest esteem and respect in Parliamentary
traditions. The evolution of the institution of parliamentary democracy has as its pivot the
institution of the speaker. The speaker holds a high, important and ceremonial office… The
Speaker is said to be the very embodiment of propriety and impartiality.”57

54
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
55
Erskine May, Parliamentary Practice, 20th ed., 233 (1983).
56
Social Action for People's Rights v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 All 250
57
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 SCR (1) 686, 1992 SCC Supl. (2) 651

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P3. As Mavalankar58, who was himself a distinguished occupant of that high office, remarked,
the Speaker belongs to all members and none, holding the scales of justice evenly without
intentional partiality. Pandit Nehru59 emphasized that the Speaker represents the dignity
and freedom of the House and must be a person of outstanding ability and impartiality. He
further highlighted the Speaker's critical role in safeguarding the liberties of the House from
executive intrusion and protecting minority opinions from the dominance of the majority.
This esteemed position demands respect and trust from all.
P4. Given the significance of the Speaker's and Deputy Speaker’s office, the Assembly
employs non-ranked multistage voting i.e. successive elimination method. According to the
research conducted across institutions such as Harvard University60, the University of
Cambridge,61 and the University of Rochester62 converges on the advantages of sequential
elimination voting as a robust mechanism for achieving fair and representative outcomes,
it was confirmed that nonranked multistage voting with successive elimination, provides
significant advantages over traditional voting methods. This method is particularly lauded
for its Condorcet consistency, a property where, if a Condorcet winner exists (a candidate
who can beat every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons), that candidate is
guaranteed to be elected. This makes it a highly democratic process compared to many
single-round voting systems, which often fail to select the Condorcet winner when voters
act strategically . Even in scenarios where no Condorcet winner exists, sequential
elimination ensures that the final outcome belongs to the "top cycle". This means the winner
is either directly or indirectly majority-preferred to every other candidate, ensuring a high
level of representativeness in the outcome .
P5. Another key advantage is its ability to reduce miscoordination. In single-round voting,
voters often face significant challenges in coordinating their preferences, leading to
suboptimal outcomes. Sequential elimination addresses this by allowing the voting process
to unfold in stages, giving voters multiple opportunities to influence the outcome as

58
G.V. Mavalankar, Remarks on the Role of the Speaker, in Impartial Speaker For Thriving Democracy, The
Indican Express, Aug. 19, 2021.
59
Jawaharlal Nehru, Remarks on the Role of the Speaker, in Nehru and Parliamentary Democracy, The Tenth
Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial Lecture, Jan. 18, 2014.
60
Brams, S. J., & Fishburn, P. C. (2002). Voting Procedures. In K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, & K. Suzumura (Eds.),
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare (Vol. 1, pp. 175-227). Elsevier Science B.V.
61
Bag, P. K., Sabourian, H., & Winter, E. (2008). Multi-Stage Voting, Sequential Elimination and Condorcet
Consistency. Journal of Economic Theory.
62
Bag, P. K., Sabourian, H., & Winter, E. (2005). Sequential Elimination vs. Instantaneous Voting. University
of Rochester.

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candidates are eliminated one by one. This gradual approach prevents voters from being
locked into "bad" equilibria, where their preferred outcomes are unattainable due to early
misalignment in strategies .
P6. Furthermore, this voting method is incredibly flexible and dynamic. It allows various
single-round voting rules, such as plurality or Borda voting, to be adapted into sequential
formats. These adaptations retain desirable properties, including Condorcet consistency,
while offering a stepwise decision-making process that evolves based on voter behavior at
each stage . Additionally, the process is designed to be Pareto efficient when there are three
candidates, ensuring that no voter can be made better off without making another worse off
.
P7. The structure of sequential elimination voting enhances voter influence and adaptability.
As rounds progress, voters can adjust their strategies based on the results of previous
rounds, allowing for more informed and representative decision-making. Unlike single-
round methods that often rely on fixed agendas or one-time submissions of preferences,
this process enables the pool of candidates to evolve dynamically through strategic voter
behavior, fostering a fairer and more representative outcome.
P8. Therefore the current procedure makes it possible that whoever is selected is actually the
true representative as elected individual has broad support within the Assembly, reflects
the true will of the majority, and minimizes the risk of strategic voting. By encouraging
candidates to appeal to a wide range of members, it upholds democratic principles and
ensures the election of a representative capable of uniting the House.

3.2 The current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly is governed by both constitutional mandates and assembly-specific
rules.
P1. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N.P. Ponnuswami vs. The Returning Officer,
Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem District and Others63 established the
interpretation of the term "election". The Court recognized that the word "election" has
both a narrow and a broad meaning. In its narrow sense, it refers to the final selection of a
candidate, either through polling or an uncontested return. In its broader sense, it
encompasses the entire electoral process, culminating in a candidate being declared elected.

63
N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, Namakkal, Salem District and Others, 1952
AIR 64, 1952 SCR 218.

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This comprehensive view aligns with Halsbury’s Laws of England,64 which describes an
election as a multi-stage process involving numerous steps, each potentially affecting the
outcome. The case also outlined three essential requisites for an election system: (1) a set
of laws and rules governing all aspects of elections, (2) an executive body responsible for
conducting elections, and (3) a judicial tribunal to resolve election-related disputes. These
elements together ensure the smooth and fair functioning of the electoral process.
P2. Furthermore, in the case of Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Shri Raj Narain & Anr65., the
Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of election-related laws. It held that the
validity of a statute depends on legislative competence and the limitations imposed by
Article 13 of the Constitution.
P3. Therefore, the procedure for elections is governed by both constitutional mandates and
assembly-specific rules, ensuring a structured and legally sound process. Elections are not
just limited to the final selection of a candidate but encompass multiple stages, including
nomination, voting, and declaration of results. A well-defined legal framework, along with
executive oversight and judicial review, is essential for maintaining the integrity of the
electoral process. Additionally, any law governing elections must conform to constitutional
principles, legislative competence, and the limitations imposed to uphold democratic
values. This ensures that the election process remains fair, transparent, and in line with the
foundational principles of governance.
P4. In the present case, Article 17866 of the Indian Constitution mandates that every Legislative
Assembly, including the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly, elect a Speaker and Deputy
Speaker "as soon as may be" after a general election and whenever necessary. This election
process is conducted in accordance with the Assembly’s rules of procedure.
Complementing this, Article 20867 empowers state legislatures to regulate their own
procedures through established Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, provided they
do not contravene constitutional provisions. Together, these articles ensure a structured and
legally compliant framework for the election of these key legislative officers, which the
Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly follows through its well-defined procedural rules.

64
Halsbury's Laws of England, 5th edn, 2008, vol. 2, para. 954.
65
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain & Anr., 1975 AIR 2299, 1975 SCC (2) 159 .
66
Constitution of Indica, art. 178.
67
Constitution of Indica, art. 208.

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P5. Furthermore, The election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker in the U.P. Legislative
Assembly is governed by a well-structured legal framework, specifically outlined in the
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958.
68
These rules ensure the election process is conducted in a manner that upholds the
principles of fairness, transparency, and constitutional compliance. Also, it adheres to the
three essential requisites i.e. legal framework, executive oversight, and judicial review.
P6. According to Section 8(1)69 of these rules, the Governor is responsible for fixing the
election date for the Speaker, which must occur within 15 days of the vacancy, whether the
Assembly is sitting or when it reconvenes. This time frame is crucial for maintaining the
continuity of leadership within the Assembly. In Section 8(2),70 the nomination process is
outlined. A member can propose another member for election, with the nominee agreeing
to serve if elected. This ensures that only those genuinely willing to undertake the
responsibilities of the Speaker are nominated. The procedure also involves a proposer and
a seconder, ensuring that nominations have sufficient support from the members, reflecting
the democratic nature of the process.
P7. And, Section 8(3)71 provides for the withdrawal of nominations before the election. This
allows for flexibility, ensuring that candidates who no longer wish to contest can step down,
and if only one candidate remains after withdrawals, they are automatically declared
elected. The ballot system, as described in Section 8(5),72 ensures that voting is fair and
transparent, and if more than two candidates are nominated, elimination rounds are held to
determine the winner. The principle of successive elimination through ballots, where the
candidate with the fewest votes is excluded, ensures a fair outcome. Additionally, Section
8(6)73 provides that if there is a tie, the decision will be made by drawing lots, which ensures
impartiality.

68
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
69
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8(1), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
70
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8(2), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
71
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8(3), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
72
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8(5), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
73
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8(6), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.

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P8. The procedure for electing the Deputy Speaker is outlined in Section 9(1),74 which
mandates the Speaker to fix the election date. Similar to the Speaker’s election, Section
9(2)75 requires a member to submit a nomination paper, signed by the proposer and
seconder, ensuring that the nomination is supported by at least two other members. The
election procedure for the Deputy Speaker mirrors the Speaker’s election, which guarantees
fairness and consistency. The ballot system and elimination procedure in the case of
multiple candidates are similarly applied here.
P9. Thus, this detailed election procedure which upholds the constitutional principles of
democracy, free and fair participation and transparency qualifies as a legal frame work.
P10. Additionally, the Executive oversight plays a critical role in ensuring the integrity and
efficiency of the election process. The Governor, Speaker, and other administrative bodies
are entrusted with key responsibilities, ensuring that the election process is carried out
according to the rules and in a transparent manner. The Governor’s role, as stipulated in
Section 8(1),76 is to fix the election date for the Speaker, ensuring that the election is held
within the required timeframe. The Speaker, as outlined in Section 9(1),77 is responsible
for fixing the date for the election of the Deputy Speaker. The timely fixing of these dates
is critical to maintaining the smooth functioning of the Assembly. The Governor and
Speaker’s roles are designed to ensure that the leadership within the Assembly remains in
place without undue delay.
P11. The Secretary for the Speaker’s election (Section 8(2))78 and the Principal Secretary for
the Deputy Speaker’s election (Section 9(2))79 are responsible for administrative tasks,
such as sending notices to the members and managing the nominations. These officers
ensure that the election is conducted efficiently and according to the rules. The Presiding
Officer, as mentioned in Section 8(3)80, oversees the election proceedings, maintaining

74
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 9(1), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
75
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 9(2), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
76
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8(1), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
77
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 9(1), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
78
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8(2), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
79
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 9(2), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
80
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8(3), published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.

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order during the election and ensuring that the rules are followed. Hence, this executive
oversight ensures that the election process is conducted fairly, without interference or
malpractices.
P12. For the election process to be valid, it must comply with constitutional principles,
specifically the Constitution of India. Judicial review serves as a safeguard, ensuring that
the election process is both lawful and constitutional. The Constitution of India mandates
that all laws and procedures must conform to constitutional principles. Under Article 13,81
any law or provision that violates fundamental rights is deemed void. This ensures that the
election process adheres to democratic values and does not infringe upon the rights of the
members of the Assembly. The nomination and voting processes as outlined in Sections 8
and 982 must be conducted in a manner that upholds these rights, ensuring that all members
have an equal opportunity to participate in the election.
P13. Judicial oversight ensures that the election process remains within constitutional limits.
If any dispute arises regarding the election, it can be challenged in court. The judiciary’s
role is to interpret the legal framework and ensure that the process follows constitutional
provisions and principles of natural justice.
P14. Hence, the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker in the U.P. Legislative
Assembly is governed by a comprehensive legal framework that ensures fairness,
transparency, and adherence to constitutional principles. Executive oversight ensures the
election is carried out efficiently and according to the established rules, while judicial
review guarantees that the process remains lawful and constitutionally valid. Through these
mechanisms, the election process is safeguarded, upholding democratic values and
ensuring the credibility of the elected representatives.
P15. In conclusion, it is humbly submitted that the election procedure for the Speaker and
Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Uttam Pradesh, as governed by the U.P.
Legislative Assembly Procedure and Conduct of Operations Rules, 1958,83 is
constitutionally sound and aligned with the principles of parliamentary democracy. The
process ensures that the elected individuals truly represent the majority will within the

81
Constitution of Indica, art. 13.
82
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
§ 8 and § 9, published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.
83
Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, as amended up to 2021,
published by the U.P. Legislative Assembly Secretariat.

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Assembly, promoting inclusivity and minimizing the potential for strategic voting. The
comprehensive legal framework, coupled with executive oversight and judicial review,
safeguards the fairness, transparency, and legitimacy of the election. These mechanisms
ensure that the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker is conducted in a manner that
upholds democratic values, guarantees compliance with constitutional mandates, and
ensures the selection of leaders who possess broad support, fostering unity within the
legislative body.

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Issue 4: Whether the broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-
trial detention without formal charges are consistent with the protection of fundamental
rights?

It is most humbly submitted that the broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities”
under the UAPA, the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial detention without formal
charges are consistent with the protection of fundamental rights as firstly, the definitions of
“unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under UAPA are not vague [4.1]; secondly, the denial of
bail is consistent with the judicially devised tests [4.2]; and thirdly, the prolonged pre-trial
detention without formal charges is consistent with the protection afforded by fundamental
rights [4.3].

4.1 The definitions of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under UAPA are not vague.

It is humbly submitted that the Unlawful Activities and Prevention Act of 196784 (or UAPA0
was enacted with the view to prevent unlawful activities which threaten the sovereignty and
integrity of India. Section 2 of the Act85 deals with the definitions used in the act and unlawful
activities has been defined u/s 2(o)86 of the Act. The definition of terrorist activities has been
given u/s 2(k)87 which mandates us to adhere to the definition of the term u/s 15 of the Act as
the chapter on Punishment for Terrorist Activities (Chapter IV) was inserted by Unlawful
Activities Prevention (Amendment) Act of 2004. The definition of unlawful and terrorist
activities is not broad and vague, since it is aimed to protect the sovereignty, integrity, security,
and unity of India.

(i) Definition of unlawful is not vague.

P1. According to Section 2(o) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,88 "unlawful
activity" is a definition that is broadly wide-ranging. It encompasses everything that an
individual or association has done, written, spoken, signs, or even visible representations.
It includes activities which; (a) tends to bring about or support demands for the cession or

84
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
85
Section 2. the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
86
Section 2(o). the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
87
Section 2(k), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
88
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

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secession of any portion of Indian territory; (b) disclaims, questions, or disrupts India's
sovereignty and territorial integrity, or intends to do so; or (c) causes or intends to cause
disaffection towards India.89
P2. In addition, because the word "disaffection" has not been statutorily defined, the courts
have sought recourse in the interpretation of the word "sedition" in Section 124A of the
IPC,90 as laid down in Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar.91 The Court held that:
"….law frowns upon any act which has a tendency to create disorder or disturbance of law
and order or incitement to violence." “Therefore, mere violence cannot be the gravamen
of charge u/s 2(o) of the UAPA. Any activity which has a tendency to create a disorder or
disturbance of law and order to such an extent that the entire city is brought to its knees
and the entire government machinery is brought to a grinding halt, such an activity would
obviously be treated as an unlawful activity within the meaning of Section 2(o) of UAPA.”
P3. Therefore, it is submitted that the definition of unlawful activities is neither broad nor
vague.

(ii) Definition of terrorist activities is not broad.

P1. Section 15 of the UAPA92 defines a "terrorist act" as any act that either threatens or is
likely to threaten, inter alia, the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or which
is intended to intimidate or coerce or overawe the government as well as strike terror into
the people or any section of the people by doing, or threatening to do, any one of the
activities listed in the section, which may include use of bombs or firearms or other lethal
weapons capable of causing or which may cause the death or injury of a person.93
P2. In the modern times, terrorism has evolved into a global menace, and India is not immune
to its impact. It threatens not only the life, liberty, and property of individuals but also
endangers the social order, disrupts the economic framework of the State, and undermines
the ideals and values that define its liberal character.
P3. Besides, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Pathankot attack, and the Pulwama attack
in 2019 are examples of real-life incidents that prove the necessity of broad definitions
under UAPA. The terrorist organizations use legal loopholes to carry out mass violence, as

89
Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Assn. v. Union of Indica, (2016) 14 SCC 536.
90
Section 124A, the Indican Penal Code, 1860.
91
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
92
Section 15, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
93
Ibid.

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seen in these attacks. The definition of "terrorist activities" under Section 15,94 is broad
enough to include preparatory and supporting acts, such as financing terror or inciting
violence, so that people cannot escape liability on technical grounds.
P4. This is further compounded by the fact that the international standards on counterterrorism-
even as defined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR 1373) 95
recognize the role of law defining and criminalizing not only direct acts of terror but
financing, aiding, and incitement to terrorism. Definition under UAPA is therefore in step
with global best practices that India's laws in this regard are up to international par.
P5. Therefore, the definitions under UAPA are neither vague nor overbroad; they are necessary
tools to protect the sovereignty of the nation while maintaining judicial safeguards to
prevent misuse.

4.2 The denial of bail is consistent with the judicially devised tests.

P1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the judiciary has devised a twin prong
test, which makes the inquiry of a bail court u/s 43-D(5) of UAPA, which helps in deciding
applications of bail, easier and flexible by the test.

1. “Whether the test for rejection of bail is satisfied?

a. Examine if, prima facie, the alleged "accusations" make out an offence under
Chapter IV or VI, UAPA;

b. Such investigation should be confined to case diary and final report filed u/s
173 CrPC96 (now Section 193 of BNSS97);

2. Whether the accused is liable to be granted bail in the wake of general principles
governing grant of bail u/s 439 CrPC,98 now, Section 485 of BNSS99 ("tripod test")?

94
Section 15, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
95
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (1373 of 2021).
96
Section 173, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
97
Section 193, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
98
Section 439, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
99
Section 485, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.

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P2. On a consideration of various factors such as nature of offence, length of punishment (if
convicted), age, character, status of the accused, etc.,” the court must ask itself the following
questions:

1. “Is the accused likely to abscond?

2. Are there apprehensions that the accused will tamper with the evidence?

3. Are there apprehensions that the accused will intimidate witnesses?”

P3. “The question of entering the second test of the inquiry will not arise if the first test is
satisfied. And merely because the first test is satisfied, that does not mean however that the
accused is automatically entitled to bail. The accused will have to show that he successfully
passes the tripod test.”100 That is to say, that if the first test is not passed then the question of
going through the second test does not arise.

P4. In the present case, the test for denial of bail has been satisfied as it has been held by the
court that there exists prima facie evidence101 for Mr. Ansari’s detention as his speech
threatened and aimed to harm the sovereignty, unity, integrity, and security of India. This is so
because his speech was given at such a time when India was already going through a crisis and
was facing a political and social turmoil in the state of Uttam Pradesh, wherein the government
was alleged for doing systematic discrimination by favoring one tribe over the other. The
speech of Mr. Ansari just acted as fuel to the fire, which led to violence and protests and
contributed to ongoing instability. The bail provisions under UAPA were rightly invoked due
to the severity of the situation.

P5. Moreover, if we look at the tripod test then keeping in mind the fact that Mr. Ansari is a
political activist and leader of Tribe B, he has the power and influence to intimidate the
witnesses and tamper with evidence by his speeches. He can seek support of the members of
his community by his speech thereby tampering with the present evidence, making it difficult
for the investigating agency to complete their work.

100
Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2025) 5 SCC 403.
101
Para 35, moot proposition.

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P6. It was held in the case of Thwaha Fasal vs. Union of India102 that “while deciding a bail
petition filed by an accused against whom offences under Chapters IV or VI of the 1967 Act
have been alleged, the court has to consider whether there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true. Thus, the scope of inquiry
is to decide whether prima facie material is available against the accused of commission of the
offences alleged under Chapter IV or VI.” So applying this principle in the present case, it has
already been held by the lower court that there exist prima facie material and grounds for
detention of Mr. Ansari as his speech incited violence and led to public disorder.

P7. Additionally, it was held by the court in NIA vs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali103 that “the
matters to be considered while deciding a bail application are as follows:

a. whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
committed the offence;

b. nature and gravity of the charge;

c. severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;

d. danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;

e. character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused;

f. likelihood of the offence being repeated;

g. reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and

h. danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”

P8. It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that upon applying and analysing these
factors in the present case, the rejection of application for bail is satisfied. This is so because
there are prima facie reasonable grounds that the offence has been committed by the accused
i.e. Mr. Ravi Ansari. Additionally, the nature and gravity of offence committed by the accused
is serious as it led to violent protests and led to unlawful activities. The accused has high
character, position, and standing in the society as he is the representative and prominent activist

102
Thwaha Fasal vs. Union of Indica, (2022) 14 SCC 766.
103
NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1.

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of Tribe B. There is also a huge likelihood of the offence being repeated considering the fact
that he is a prominent activist and the public has been influenced by his speech.

P9. Since he is a prominent activist, there is the reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
tampered with as the warnings or threats of being ousted from the tribe or community can be
given. Lastly, there will be danger to justice if the accused is granted bail since it will lead to
further political instability and violence. The Supreme Court's stance in the Bhima Koregaon
case wherein bail was rejected because of serious charges and threat posed by an accused is a
clear parallel to the case of Mr. Ansari. The state is well within its rights when it invokes UAPA
to thwart activities that are likely to bring about unrest even if they started under the garb of
political activity.104

4.3 The prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges is consistent with the
protection afforded by fundamental rights.

P1. It is submitted that prolonged pre-trial detention under UAPA is warranted by national
security concerns, complexity of investigation and the risks likely to be incurred if the
persons are released. UAPA offences are of such character that they mandate proper
investigation comprising collection of intelligence, forensic examinations, and checks for
international connections. All of these are time-consuming processes and only a prolonged
period of detention could avoid evidence contamination or interference with the
investigation process.
P2. The delay in charging Mr. Ansari is because evidence in national security cases takes time
to collect and not because of negligence. Charges include incitement of communal
disharmony and disruption of sovereignty, which require a careful review of digital records,
witness statements, and links to extremists.
P3. Pre-trial detention for long periods deters the accused from tampering with the evidence or
inciting riots within the community. The courts have held that free influential detainees
pose public order risks. In Mohammad Amin Sheikh Vs Divisional Commissioner
Kashmir, Srinagar,105 the Supreme Court held that minor procedural lapses in

104
Srishti Ojha, Supreme Court Dismisses NIA's Plea Challenging Default Bail To Sudha Bharadwaj In Bhima
Koregaon Case, LiveLaw, https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-sudha-bharadwaj-default-bail-
bhima-koregaon-nia-bombay-high-court-
187093#:~:text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20on%20Tuesday,in%20the%20Bhima%20Koregaon%20case.,
last seen on 25/1/25.
105
Mohammad Amin Sheikh Vs Divisional Commissioner Kashmir, Srinagar, 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 9.

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counterterrorism investigations do not invalidate UAPA proceedings to prevent

technicalities from frustrating national security efforts.
P4. Fundamental rights, especially Articles 21106 and 22,107 must be observed in the light of
national security. Mr. Ansari has not been detained violating his fundamental rights but has
to be detained as due process sanctions it. As for the case under Article 21 in relation to
personal liberty, the same can be reasonably restricted where such activities are done by a
person who may be threatening national security. Article 22 allows for preventive
detentions based on national security and safeguards through UAPA provide for due
process.
P5. Considering the above facts, the prolonged pre-trial detention of Mr. Ansari is neither
arbitrary nor unconstitutional but a necessary step for safeguarding national security and
ensuring protection of fundamental rights. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the
prolonged pre-trial detention is consistent with the protection of fundamental rights.
P6. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the broad definition of
“unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
(UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges
are inconsistent with the protection of fundamental rights, particularly Articles 19(1)(a),
21, and 22.

PRAYER

106
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica.
107
Art. 22, the Constitution of Indica.

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Wherefore in light of the fact stated issues raised arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble court that, It may be graciously pleased to adjudge
and declare that

1. The practice of “Bulldozer Justice” implemented by the stated govt. of Uttam Pradesh
Violated Fundamental Rights, guaranteed under the constitution of Indica, and that such
actions doesn’t represent unconstitutional exercise of executive power

2. Paragraph 2(1)(b) of 10th Schedule of the constitution doesn’t violates the

constitutional right to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances and
further doesn’t violate the basic structure of the Constitution of Indica.

3. The current procedure for the election of Speaker and Deputy-Speaker of Legislative
assembly is constitutionally valid.

4. The broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial
detention without formal charges are consistent with the protection of fundamental
rights.

And/Or

Pass any other order, writ or direct as this Hon’ble court deems fit in the interest of

Justice, Equity and good conscious.

For such an act of kindness, the petitioners shall duty bound forever pray

Sd/-

Counsel on behalf of Respondents

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