TC -34

LAW COLLEGE DEHRADUN, FACULTY OF UTTAMANCHAL UNIVERSITY

9th NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION – 2025

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

In the matter of
Petition No. ………of 2025
Salim and Anr....……………………………………………………Petitioners
Versus
State of Uttam Pradesh…………………………………...……Respondents
Clubbed with
Writ Petition No. ………of 2025

40 MLAs of IPP…………………………………………………. Petitioners

Versus
Deputy Speaker, Uttam Pradesh Legislative Assembly…….....Respondents
Clubbed with
Petition No. ………of 2025

Ravi Ansari……………………...........…………………………….Petitioners
Versus
Union of Indica…………………………………………………Respondents

PETITION INVOKED UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA

__________________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS TC-34

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.......................................................................................... 8

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................ 9

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ..................................................................................................... 10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. 11

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................. 13

ISSUE 1: Whether the practice of “bulldozer justice”, implemented by the state government
of Uttam Pradesh, violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Indica,
and whether such actions represent an unconstitutional exercise of executive power? ....... 13

1.1 The practice of bulldozer justice violates fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and
21 of the Constitution of Indica. ....................................................................................... 13

1.2 The action violates the right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of
Indica. ............................................................................................................................... 21

1.3 This action represents an unconstitutional exercise of executive power. ................... 23

ISSUE 2: Whether Paragraph 2(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution violates the
constitutional right to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances, such as
widespread civil unrest and political instability? ................................................................. 26

2.1 Lack of Specificity in sub-clause (b) of para 2(1) subverts the democratic rights of
elected members ............................................................................................................... 26

2.2. Violation of the basic structure of the constitution of Indica .................................... 28

ISSUE 3: Whether the current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker
of the Legislative Assembly, is constitutionally valid or not? ............................................. 33

Issue 4: Whether the broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial
detention without formal charges are consistent with the protection of fundamental rights?
.............................................................................................................................................. 36

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4.1 The definitions of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under UAPA are vague and
overreaching. .................................................................................................................... 36

4.2 The denial of bail and prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges is
inconsistent with judicially devised tests.......................................................................... 38

4.3 There has been a violation of fundamental rights of the accused. .............................. 42

PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 45

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

& And
AIR All India Reporter
All. Allahabad
Art. Article
etc. Et cetera (Latin)
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honorable
i.e. id est (Latin)
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly
J. Justice
Ltd. Limited
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
UOI Union of India
v. Versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne, [1910] AC 87 (HL). ......................... 27

AP Aggarwal v. Government of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2000 SC 205 . ......................................... 17
Asif Iqbal Tanha vs State (NCT of Delhi), (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 106 ....................................... 36
Bal Kishan Das v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (2010) RSA No. 76/1991. ....................... 20
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011, Supreme Court of the United States).................. 29
Chameli Singh vs. State of UP, AIR 1996 SC 1051 ................................................................. 11
Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India, W. P. (C) 456/2022. ........................................................ 21
E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC............................................................... 17
Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association. v. Union of Indica, (2016) 14 SCC 536.
........................................................................................................................................ 35, 36
Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2024) 5 SCC 403. .................................. 37
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602; ................................... 39
Hussainara Khatoon and Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, AIR 1979 SC 1369.
.............................................................................................................................................. 39
Hussainara Khatoon vs State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369..................................................... 42
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Kumar Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. .................................... 16
In Re Manoj Tibrewal 2024 INSC 863 .................................................................................... 20
Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, W.P. (C) 295/2022. ............... 20
Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 ........................................................... 38
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 4 SCC 225 (1973).............................................. 15,26
Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu AIR 1993 SC at 452: 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651. .......... 24,27,29,31
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 SCR (2) 621.................................................... 11,17,22
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 2432.
.............................................................................................................................................. 15
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, (2016) 11 SCC 1. ............................................................... 33
Narender Kumar, Constitutional Law of India, Allahabad Law Agency, 10th edition, 2021. 16
Naryanappa HC v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 1073, p 1078 ........................................... 15
Natasha Narwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2021) 2 HCC (Del) 681. ..................................... 36
NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1......................................................... 38, 40
Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 ........... 39
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 .......................................... 22

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Om Kumar v UOI, AIR 2000 SC 3689. .................................................................................... 17

People’s Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of Indica, (2004) 9 SCC 580 ............................ 36
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549. ..................................... 21
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600. .................................................................... 42
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574. ........................................................... 41
Shreya Singhal v. Union of Indica, (2015) 5 SCC 1. ............................................................... 41
Shreya Singhal vs. Union of Indica, AIR 2015 SC 1523. ......................................................... 36
Social Action for People's Rights v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 All 250...................................... 31
SR Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918................................................................... 18
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) 1 SCR 284................................................. 17
Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India 2024 INSC 753 ................................................................ 13
Thwaha Fasal vs. Union of Indica, (2022) 14 SCC 766 ................................................ 36,38,40
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Freinds Co-op Housing Society Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 114 .. 14
Union of Indica vs. K. A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713. ........................................................ 39,42
Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 2 SCC 271 ............................... 39
Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 15 SCC 56. ......................................................... 38, 39
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1; .............................. 36

Statutes

Art. 19(1)(a), the Constitution of Indica. ........................................................................... 35, 41

Art. 19(2), the Constitution of Indica. ...................................................................................... 41
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica. .............................................................................. 39, 41, 42
Art. 22, the Constitution of Indica. .................................................................................... 41, 42
Art. 105(1), The Constitution of Indica. ................................................................................... 27
Art. 19(1)(a), Constitution of Indica. ....................................................................................... 27
Art. 32, Constitution of Indica ................................................................................................... 6
Art. 300A., Constitution of Indica ............................................................................................ 19
Art. 19, cl. (a), Constitution of Indica. ..................................................................................... 14
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica. .................................................... passim
Schedule 10, para. 2, the Constitution of Indica...................................................................... 24
Sec. 43D(5), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. ................................................. 40
Section 15, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. .................................................. 35
Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. ........................................................................ 37
Section 193, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. ................................................. 37

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Section 2(k), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. ....................................................... 34

Section 2(o), The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. .......................................... 34, 35
Section 2, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. .................................................... 34
Section 439, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. .................................................................. 37
Section 43D(5), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. ............................................ 37
Section 485, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. ................................................. 37
The Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. ............................................ 39
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. ..................................................................... 34

Other Authorities

B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, 38 (1948). ..................................... 30

Balveer Arora, Can Democracy Flourish with Undemocratic Parties?, The Tribune (15 August
2007), available at www.tribuneIndica.com/2007/20070815/independence/main3.htm (last
seen on 28/01/2025). ............................................................................................................ 26
Barun Mitra, Anti-Defection: A Law Endangering Democracy, Mint (21 August 2008),
available at www.miracleofdemocracy.org/story.aspx?id=1890&pubid=2038 (last seen on
28/01/2025). ......................................................................................................................... 26
Bedner, Adriaan. “An elementary approach to the rule of law.” Hague Journal on the rule of
law 2.1 (2010): 48-74. .......................................................................................................... 17
Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 205 (Library of Alexandria
2015)..................................................................................................................................... 32
E. Sridharan, Party System Fragmentation, Intra Party Democracy, and Opaque Political
Finance, Indica in Transition (4 May 2009), available at
www.asi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/esridharan (last seen on 28/01/2025). ....................................... 27
Joy Makhal, Bulldozer Justice: An Analysis into the Rule of Law in India, Indican Journal of
Law and Legal Research, Volume V Issue 1, 1 - 16. ............................................................ 21
Krishnadas Rajagopal, ‘Demolition drives may challenge the rule of law’ (The Hindu, 15 June,
2022) accessed 30 November, 2024. .................................................................................... 20
Law Commission of Indica, 170th Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws (May 1999). ...... 27
MAY ON PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, 20th Edn., p. 233. 48 ............................................ 33
N.A. Palkhivala, Our Constitution Defaced and Defiled 175 (Macmillan Co. of Indica 1974).
.............................................................................................................................................. 30
Raitio, Juha. “The Concept of the Rule of Law - Just a Political Ideal, or a Binding Principle?.”
Giornale di Storia Costituzionale, 45, 2023, pp. 37-46. HeinOnline. ................................. 17

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Report of the Committee on Defections, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Indica

(1969). .................................................................................................................................. 26

Treatises

Art. 9, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ................................................. 40

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioners have approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica under Article 321 of
the Constitution of Indica.

Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950

Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits
of its jurisdiction ill or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under
clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.

1
Art. 32, Constitution of Indica.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

PART I: CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Indica is a federal parliamentary republic with a bicameral legislature and strict separation of
powers between the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary. States have their own governance
authority in key sectors.

PART II: PROTEST & BULLDOZER JUSTICE

Salim, a student and opposition supporter, was charged with instigating communal hatred
during a January 5, 2024 protest. Based on the controversial "bulldozer justice" policy of CM
Rohit Kumar, his ancestral place was demolished without following due procedure on January
22, 2024. It is alleged to be political vendetta against Salim.

Salim along with his father challenged the demolition in the supreme court by raising the issues
of the violation of fundamental rights.

PART III: POLITICAL CRISIS & FLOOR TEST

Widespread riots and government bias allegations had heated up the issue between the majority
Tribe A and the minority Tribe B. During this, 40 ruling party MLAs ignored a party whip in
the floor test that made the government fall. The Deputy Speaker belonging to Tribe A
disqualified them under the Anti-Defection Law for which they appealed to the Supreme Court
citing no due process and political pressure.

PART IV: UAPA & FREE SPEECH

Tribe B's activist Ravi Ansari was arrested under UAPA for allegedly inciting violence, but he
claimed it was a political move to silence dissent. His long detention without charges led to a
legal challenge on the constitutionality of UAPA with regard to broad definitions of terrorism,
denial of bail, and due process violations.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE PRACTICE OF “BULLDOZER JUSTICE”, IMPLEMENTED BY THE

STATE GOVERNMENT OF UTTAM PRADESH, VIOLATES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
GUARANTEED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA, AND WHETHER SUCH
ACTIONS REPRESENT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE
POWER?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER PARAGRAPH 2(B) OF THE TENTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION

VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO REPRESENT ONE’S CONSTITUENCY
IN EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS WIDESPREAD CIVIL UNREST
AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE CURRENT PROCEDURE FOR THE ELECTION OF THE SPEAKER

AND DEPUTY SPEAKER OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?

ISSUE 4

WHETHER THE BROAD DEFINITION OF “UNLAWFUL” AND “TERRORIST

ACTIVITIES” UNDER THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT (UAPA),
THE DENIAL OF BAIL, AND THE PROLONGED PRE-TRIAL DETENTION WITHOUT
FORMAL CHARGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Issue 1: Whether the practice of “bulldozer justice”, implemented by the state

government of Uttam Pradesh, violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the
constitution of indica, and whether such actions represent an unconstitutional exercise of
executive power?
The practice of "bulldozer justice" implemented by the Uttam Pradesh government, which
allegedly violates fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21. The petitioner, Mr. Salim,
claims his ancestral home was demolished without due process following an FIR against him,
infringing upon his right to shelter and livelihood. The petition argues that this action represents
an unconstitutional exercise of executive power, as it disregards principles of natural justice
and fails to provide a fair hearing. The petition highlights that such arbitrary actions undermine
the rule of law and violate the right to equality, free speech, and the right to reside anywhere
in the territory, emphasizing the need for judicial intervention to uphold constitutional
protections.
Issue 2: Whether paragraph 2(b) of the tenth schedule of the constitution violates the
constitutional right to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances, such
as widespread civil unrest and political instability?
Paragraph 2(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution undermines representative democracy
by allowing the disqualification of legislators who deviate from party lines. The provision's
broad interpretation of "voluntarily giving up membership" transforms elected representatives
into rubber stamps, restricting their ability to dissent or respond to constituents' urgent needs,
especially during extraordinary circumstances. By prioritizing party discipline over individual
conscience, the law prevents legislators from exercising their constitutional right to freely
represent their constituencies, effectively stifling democratic deliberation and legislative
autonomy.
ISSUE 3: Whether the current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, is constitutionally valid or not?
The Speaker's crucial role as an impartial representative of the House, citing historical
perspectives from leaders like Mavalankar and Nehru who stressed the importance of the
Speaker's neutrality and ability to protect minority opinions. While seemingly comprehensive,
the process fails to ensure true constitutional compliance in several ways: it allows the majority
party to dominate the selection process, lacks mechanisms for building consensus across party

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lines, and doesn't include safeguards against political manipulation. The nomination process,
while appearing democratic, holds little practical value for opposition members in a
majoritarian system. These procedural shortcomings ultimately undermine the Speaker's
constitutional role as an impartial authority and violate the principles of fair representation and
democratic equity.
Issue 4: Whether the broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-
trial detention without formal charges are consistent with the protection of fundamental
rights?
The UAPA's definitions of "unlawful" and "terrorist activities" are unconstitutionally vague
and broad, potentially criminalizing legitimate political dissent rather than actual threats to
national security. Additionally, Mr. Ansari's detention fails to meet established legal standards
for bail denial under UAPA - there is neither prima facie evidence of terrorist activities (failing
the twin-prong test) nor any indication that he would abscond, tamper with evidence, or
intimidate witnesses (failing the tripod test).Finally, that the UAPA's application in this case
violates three fundamental rights: freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)), as it
criminalizes legitimate political dissent; right to life and personal liberty (Article 21), due to
prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges; and protection against arbitrary arrest
(Article 22), as the prosecution relies on vague allegations without specific grounds for
detention.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: Whether the practice of “bulldozer justice”, implemented by the state

government of Uttam Pradesh, violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of Indica, and whether such actions represent an unconstitutional exercise
of executive power?

This Writ Petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indica seeks to raise the
grievance on behalf of a citizen whose residential property has been demolished by the state
machinery, without following the due process of law, on the ground of him being involved as
an accused in criminal offences. It is humbly submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the
practice of “bulldozer justice,” implemented by the state government of Uttam Pradesh, firstly,
violates fundamental rights enshrined under Articles 14, 19, and 21 guaranteed under the
Constitution of Indica [1.1]; secondly, the action violates the right to property under Article
300 of the Constitution of Indica [1.2]; and thirdly, this action represents an unconstitutional
exercise of executive power. [1.3]

1.1 The practice of bulldozer justice violates fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19,
and 21 of the Constitution of Indica.

It is humbly submitted that articles 14, 19, and 21 form the golden triangle of the Indican
Constitution.2 Article 21 provides for the right to life and personal liberty, including within its
ambit the right to shelter and livelihood as held in the cases of Chameli Singh vs. State of
Uttam Pradesh.3 Additionally, Article 19(1)(e) provides for all citizens to have the right to
reside and settle in any part of the territory of India, which has been violated in the present
matter. Moreover, since the principles of natural justice were not observed in the present case,
it led to breach of rule and therefore negation of equality under Article 14. Moreover, the rights
enjoyed by prisoners under Articles 14, 19 and 21, though limited, are not static and will rise
to human heights when challenging situations arise.

2
Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of Indica, AIR 1978 SC 597.
3
Chameli Singh vs. State of UP, AIR 1996 SC 1051; See also, Shantistar Buiders v. N.K. Toitame, 1990 (1)
SCC 520; Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan, 1997 (11) SCC 123; and Ajay
Maken v. Union of Indica, W.P. (C) 11616/2015 (DHC Mar 18, 2015).

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1.1.1 Right to shelter and livelihood under Article 21 has been violated by this practice.

P1. It is submitted that the right to shelter is one of the facets of Article 21 of the Constitution.
The sight of a bulldozer demolishing a home, particularly when authorities have failed to
adhere to the basic principles of natural justice and due process, reminds one of a lawless
state of affairs, where “might makes right.” In the present case, an FIR was filed against
Mr. Salim by Mr. Xang, who alleged him of inciting communal enmity and making
statements harmful to national integration as Mr. Salim was a critical supporter of the
opposition party and he made some statements opposing the government’s actions. The FIR
was filed on January 6, 2024. Due to this FIR, the authorities acted under the directions of
the Chief Minister Rohit Kumar and demolished the ancestral house of Mr. Salim.
P2. Salim’s house was demolished without a prior notice, legal hearing, or an opportunity for
Mr. Salim and his father, Mr. Sheik. This is also in contravention to proviso of Section
27(1) of Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 which states that
“Provided that no such order shall be made unless the owner or the person
concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order
should not be made.”
P3. The principle of natural justice particularly audi alteram partem or “hear the other side” or
“no one should be condemned unheard.” This principle states that before an order is passed
or any action is taken against any person, a reasonable opportunity of being heard is to be
given to him. This principle involves two essential elements: notice and hearing. In the
present case, no notice was given to Mr. Salim and he was denied a fair chance of hearing
or legal representation.4 The failure to observe these principles constitutes a violation of
due process and strikes at the core of constitutional protections afforded under Article 21.
P4. In a constitutional democracy founded on the rule of law, arbitrary and high-handed
executive actions that ignore natural justice have no place. Such excesses at the hands of
the executive will have to be dealt with by the heavy hand of the law. Our constitutional
ethos and values would not permit any such abuse of power and such misadventures cannot
be tolerated by the court of law. Such an action also cannot be done in respect of a person

4
Moot prop, para 14.

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against whom a FIR has been filed in the court of law, where no charge sheet has been filed
yet and no legal proceedings have been initiated.
P5. This Court recently in the case of Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India,5 reiterated the
constitutional rights of the accused in the following words:
“The right to live with dignity extends even to the incarcerated. Not providing
dignity to prisoners is a relic of the colonizers and pre-colonial mechanisms, where
oppressive systems were designed to dehumanize and degrade those under the
control of the State. Authoritarian regimes of the pre-constitutional era saw prisons
not only as places of confinement but as tools of domination. This Court, focusing
on the changed legal framework brought out by the Constitution, has recognized
that even prisoners are entitled to the right to dignity.Thus, the jurisprudence which
emerges on the rights of prisoners under Article 21 is that even the incarcerated
have inherent dignity. They are to be treated humanely and without cruelty. Police
officers and prison officials cannot take any disproportionate measures against
prisoners. The prison system must be considerate of the physical and mental health
of prisoners. For instance, if a prisoner suffers from a disability, adequate steps
have to be taken to ensure their dignity and to offer support.”

P6. Therefore, the right to shelter enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution has been
violated.

1.1.2 The freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to reside in any part of the
territory has been violated.

Article 19 enshrines six freedoms which are available to the citizens, including the right of
speech and expression, right to assemble peacefully without arms, right to form associations or
unions. “Right to move in any part of the territory, right to reside and settle in any part of the
territory, and right to practise any occupation, trade, or business.” All of these rights are
fundamental for the very existence of the citizens of Indica. Right to freedom of speech and
expression enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to reside anywhere in any part of the
territory enshrined under Article 19(1)(e) have been violated in the present case.

5
Sukanya Shantha v. Union of Indica 2024 INSC 753

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a. Article 19(1)(a) of Indican Constitution is being violated.

P1. Art. 19 of the Indican Constitution recognizes the fundamental right to freedom of speech
and expression under Article 19(1)(a),6 which is essential for human beings and is the
cornerstone of free and democratic societies. This right, essential for human dignity, includes
the freedom to voice dissent and critique the government. It is contended that the provision of
bulldozer justice mentioned u/s 27 of Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act,
1973 exceeds the permissible limitations on this right under Article 19(2), which allows
restrictions only on specific grounds like public order or morality.

P2. Since Mr. Salim was a supporter of the opposition party and opposed the government’s
action, an FIR was filed against him for the mere fact of criticizing the government, thereby
violating his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. He was accused of
inciting communal enmity - a claim that appears politically motivated and unsupported by
evidence. The subsequent demolition of his ancestral home represents a chilling retaliation
against his exercise of free speech. Targeting him merely for his political stance constitutes an
unconstitutional restriction on his freedom of expression.

b. Article 19(1)(e) is being violated.

Article 19(1)(e) states that it is the fundamental right of every citizen of Indica to reside and
settle in any part of the country. In the case of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Freinds Co-
op Housing Society Ltd.,7 it was held that Article 19(1)(e) includes the right to shelter and to
construct houses for that purpose. In the present case, Mr. Salim and his father, Mr. Sheik were
not given time to present their property papers and filed tax papers as no legal claim was
substantiated by the authorities. Instead, the authorities just supported this act of demolition by
stating that the house was built illegally, violating their right to shelter.

c. The requirements for a valid limitation under Articles 19(2) and 19(5) are not being
fulfilled.

P1. “In order to be valid, a limitation or restriction under Article 19 must comply with following
conditions-

6
Art. 19, cl. (a), Constitution of Indica
7
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Freinds Co-op Housing Society Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 114

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1. It must be imposed by law.

2. Such a law must be valid.

3. The restriction imposed by the law must be “reasonable” except in cases falling under
subclauses (i)-(ii) of clause (6).8

4. The restriction must be proximately related to any of the grounds specified in the
limitation clauses, which may be relevant to the fundamental right in question.

5. Restrictions on fundamental rights must be based on the principle of least

invasiveness.”9

P2. Additionally, in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,10 it was ruled that restrictions
on fundamental rights must be legitimate, within the legislative purview, and should not
contravene the Constitution's core framework.

P3. Section 27 of the Act violates the constitutional rights to dissent, free speech, individual
liberty, and residence. The restrictions imposed by the law are unreasonable, as they aim to
demolish the house of the people, even if they are criminally accused. There is no proximate
relation between the legislation and the specified grounds for restriction, as the broad
demolition powers can be used to curb dissent and voices from the opposition party, which
holds true in the present case with Mr. Salim.

P4. The restrictions on fundamental rights must be proportional, narrowly tailored, and use the
least restrictive means available.11 However, the Act violates this principle of least invasiveness
by unduly burdening accused(s) and convict(s) rights to free speech, dissent, residence, and
personal liberty. The principle of least restrictive means, a cornerstone of reasonable
restrictions, has also been violated. The authorities opted for an extreme measure—
demolishing Mr. Salim’s house - without exhausting less invasive means to address the alleged
illegality. This failure to follow a proportional approach amounts to an overreach of power.

8
Naryanappa HC v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 SC 1073, p 1078 : (1960) 3 SCR 742; Kondala v APSRTC, AIR
1961 SC 82 : (1961) 1 SCR 642
9
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196
10
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
11
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 2432.

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P5. The demolition of Mr. Salim’s home represents an unconstitutional infringement on his
fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(e). By targeting his freedom of speech and
expression and his right to reside and settle, the authorities acted beyond the permissible scope
of Article 19’s limitations. Such actions, which lack proportionality and reasonable
justification, erode the constitutional protections afforded to all citizens. Section 27, as applied,
becomes a tool for stifling dissent and punishing opposition voices, violating both the letter
and spirit of the Constitution. This warrants judicial scrutiny and correction to uphold the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19.

1.1.3 There has been negation of equality, thus leading to violation of Article 14.

P1. It is humbly submitted that article 14 encompasses equality before law and equal protection
of laws. This article states that every person, regardless of their religious or political
affiliation, should be treated in the same manner and be subjected to equal treatment under
the law. The demolition of Mr. Salim’s ancestral home, without following the due process
of law and without giving notice, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and of the
principles of natural justice, also pointing to discriminatory actions.
P2. The Indican concept of equality before law is English in origin and is a familiar feature of
AV Dicey’s concept of rule of law.12 AV Dicey's rule of law principle comprises three key
elements: first, punishments must only arise from clear legal breaches proven in ordinary
courts; second, no individual is above the law, with everyone subject to standard legal
jurisdiction regardless of status; and third, constitutional principles are fundamentally
shaped by judicial decisions determining individual rights, emphasizing the primacy of
legal reasoning and consistent judicial interpretation in maintaining social order and
protecting citizens from arbitrary state power. “The rule of law is an umbrella concept to
protect citizens against the power of the State.”13 It is integral to and necessary for
democracy and good governance. Rule of law is also considered to be a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution of Indica.14
P3. Additionally, the phrase “equal protection of laws” means ‘subjection of equal laws
applying to all in the same circumstances.’ "Everyone is entitled to equal treatment under

12
Narender Kumar, Constitutional Law of Indica, Allahabad Law Agency, 10th edition, 2021.
13
Bedner, Adriaan. “An elementary approach to the rule of law.” Hague Journal on the rule of law 2.1 (2010):
48-74.
14
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Kumar Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299.

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similar circumstances, both in the benefits granted and in the responsibilities imposed by
law." This phrase lays down the rule that like should be treated alike and not that unlike
should be treated alike. “The law must be just and fair and protect the human rights and
dignity of all members of society.”15 “Above all, the essential purpose of the rule of law is
to prevent the abuse of power.”16
P4. However, Article 14 does permit reasonable classification and looking at the Uttam
Pradesh UPDA, 1973, there has been a reasonable classification with intelligible
differentia. Article 14 allows for reasonable classification but it does not grant carte blanche
for arbitrary decisions.17 Any classification or differentiation must be based on an
intelligible differentia, and it must not be discriminatory in nature. In cases of demolitions,
the government must apply the law equally to all individuals in similar circumstances.
Selective demolitions of specific structures, while leaving similar ones untouched, are
discriminatory and fail to meet the constitutional standard of equal protection of the law.
But in the present case, the authorities failed to abide by guidelines under this Article,
specially of the right of being heard.18
P5. Article 14 outlaws arbitrary administrative action. Arbitrary action is described as one that
is irrational and not based on sound reason or as one that is unreasonable.19 Furthermore, it
is arbitrary to refer to the freedom to oppose the government as "communal enmity."
Arbitrary action, within the context of Article 14, refers to decisions or actions that are
taken without a rational basis, a legal framework, or without applying the law in a fair and
just manner. Such actions lack any reasoned justification and fail to establish a reasonable
connection between the action taken and its intended legal outcome.
P6. When there is arbitrariness in state action, Art. 14 springs into action and the court strikes
down such action.20 As observed in the landmark case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
Nadu,21 the Supreme Court held that arbitrariness is antithetical to equality and strikes at
the heart of Article 14. 'Bulldozer justice', in this sense, reflects a disproportionate and

15
Stein, Robert. “Rule of law : what does it mean.” Minn. J. Int'l L. 18 (2009) : 293.
16
Raitio, Juha. “The Concept of the Rule of Law - Just a Political Ideal, or a Binding Principle?.” Giornale di
Storia Costituzionale, 45, 2023, pp. 37-46. HeinOnline.
17
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, (1952) 1 SCR 284.
18
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI AIR 1978 SC 597
19
Om Kumar v UOI, AIR 2000 SC 3689.
20
AP Aggarwal v. Government of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2000 SC 205 .
21
E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC

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unjustified application of power, disconnected from the principles of fairness and equality
required by Article 14.
P7. The arbitrariness of this action is further underscored by the fact that there was no uniform
application of the law. Mr. Salim's house was singled out, while other properties similarly
situated within the same zone were left untouched, violating the principle of equal
protection of laws. The Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu22 held that
arbitrariness is the very antithesis of equality. This is a form of abuse of state power and
violation of Article 14 in that demolition actions are selectively enforced depending on the
political affiliations of an individual.
P8. Moreover, the demolition of Mr. Salim's house without any investigation or trial was a form
of extrajudicial punishment. Such acts have been observed by Justice B.R. Gavai as
violative of the rule of law and leading to a state of anarchy wherein the executive assumes
judicial functions. The same was repeated in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal
Corporation, wherein the Court directed that even unauthorized occupants cannot be
evicted without due notice and an opportunity to be heard.
P9. The political motives in taking this action raise more profound questions of mala fide
intentions. Mr. Salim, an active worker in an opposition party and the open critic of the
reigning power, was selected under law and order for taking punishment. The lack of notice
and discriminatory selection in regard to his property shows the retaliatory intent of the
state. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India,23 the Supreme Court highlighted that political
actions, under the garb of lawfully taken measures, offend constitutional guarantees and
the federal democratic principle.
P10. The demolition has caused irreparable damage to Mr. Salim and his family by depriving
them of their home and livelihood without any legal justification or remedy. This reflects a
gross abuse of administrative power, in violation of Article 14, 19, and 21 of the
Constitution. The razing of homes as an act of deterrence is anti-thought to the tenets of
democracy and rule of law. It violates the will of the constitution by being executive
expediency instead of constitutional compliance, risking public confidence in the
administration.

22
Ibid.
23
SR Bommai v. Union of Indica, AIR 1994 SC 1918.

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P11. The destruction of Mr. Salim's ancestral house, in the name of checking illegal
constructions, is a grave violation of Article 14. It is a paradigm of arbitrary state action,
discriminatory enforcement of laws, and the usurpation of judicial functions by the
executive. Preserving constitutional values calls for upholding the rule of law and ensuring
procedural fairness. The judiciary must intervene to declare such actions unconstitutional,
reaffirming the primacy of equality, justice, and the protection of individual rights against
the abuse of state power.

1.2 The action violates the right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of
Indica.

P1. The right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution of India is not only
constitutional or legal but also an essential human right. Article 300A24 stipulated that “No
person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of the law.” Even Justice K.
Chandru, the former Madras High Court judge, came forward to respond to the demolition
of houses. He said, “Article 300A is a potent right. He said demolitions were a product of
the politicisation of the bureaucracy.” Justice Chandru said “acts like demolition were a
nuclear button held against problem creators. It is like cause and effect. If these people
have violated building laws, give them a chance to be heard, and give them notice…
Immediate demolitions without court orders hark back to the Emergency days.”25
P2. Section 27 of the Uttam Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, the
authority of law has set a procedure for demolition for the house, which is arbitrary, as
discussed under 1.1.3. This is so because bulldozer justice is simply unacceptable under the
rule of law. If it were to be permitted, the constitutional recognition of the right to property
under Article 300A would be reduced to a dead letter. Section 27 of the Act has been used
by the State Government of Uttam Pradesh in contravention of Article 14 as they only focus
on the demolition of the houses of people who are either accused or convict or involved in
a criminal proceeding, which points towards discriminatory action. The demolition of Mr.
Salim’s ancestral home without issuing a notice or providing him a reasonable opportunity
to be heard is a blatant violation of procedural safeguards and natural justice.

24
Indica Const., art. 300A.
25
Krishnadas Rajagopal, ‘Demolition drives may challenge the rule of law’ (The Hindu, 15 June, 2022)
accessed 30 November, 2024.

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P3. “Justice through bulldozers is unknown to any civilised system of jurisprudence. There is
a grave danger that if high handed and unlawful behaviour is permitted by any wing or
officer of the state, demolition of citizens’ properties will take place as a selective reprisal
for extraneous reasons. Citizens’ voices cannot be throttled by a threat of destroying their
properties and homesteads. The ultimate security which a human being possesses is to the
homestead.”26 Additionally, the alleged involvement of a person in a crime was not a
ground for the demolition of his or her property,27 which has been done in the present case.
P4. During the demolition, written notice should have been issued giving sufficient time in
connection with the removal of the affected houses and other establishments/shops. In a
2010 judgment, the Delhi High Court explained the serving of a show-cause notice to the
concerned party as a “mandatory requirement.”28 Whereas in this case a notice, regarding
the removal of the alleged encroachment was not issued. Rather, on 22 January 2024, Mr.
Salim was informed about the demolition on the spot and he saw his home being
demolished in front of his eyes, for the mere fact of not supporting the ruling government
of Chief Minister Rohit Kumar.
P5. Additionally, another issue that arises is that it is not only the accused who lives in such
property or owns such property. Can family members or co-owners of a property, who are
uninvolved in any alleged crime, be penalized merely by their association with an accused?
In the present case, the same has been witnessed by Mr. Salim’s father Mr. Sheik, whose
son was falsely accused of inciting communal enmity while opposing the government’s
actions.
P6. The basis of demolishing the house, as claimed by the authorities acting under the direct
instructions of Chief Minister Rohit Kumar, is that the residents were involved in crimes,
but this demolition had no legal backing. Furthermore, if the houses were indeed illegal,
the demolitions should have been carried out earlier and across all areas with illegal
constructions. The timing and location of these demolitions certainly raise concerns, as they
seem to be selective and potentially insidious.
P7. Even if one were to accept that these demolitions were lawful, the selective application of
the law undermines the fundamental principles of Article 13, 14, 21 and 300A of Indica’s
Constitution. The unilateral demolition of residential properties without prior judicial

26
In Re Manoj Tibrewal, 2024 INSC 863
27
Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation, W.P. (C) 295/2022.
28
Bal Kishan Das v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (2010) RSA No. 76/1991.

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adjudication fundamentally transgresses cardinal principles of natural justice, violating the

presumption of innocence and the right to be heard. Such extrajudicial actions contravene
internationally recognized human rights norms, specifically Articles 25(1) of the UDHR
and Article 11 of the ICESCR, which guarantee the right to adequate housing. These
demolitions represent not merely a legal impropriety, but a fundamental assault on
constitutional principles of procedural fairness and human dignity, undermining the
foundational tenets of a democratic legal system.29
P8. In the present case, the demolition was carried out on January 22, 2024 under Section 27(1)
of UP Town Planning and Development Act, 1973. The section provides for a notice to be
sent to the owner of the illegal building at least 15 days prior to the demolition. However,
in the present case, the principles of natural justice were completely overlooked and direct
demolition of Mr. Salim’s ancestral home was done. Therefore, this demolition raises
serious questions whether the due process of law was followed in the demolition or not.

1.3 This action represents an unconstitutional exercise of executive power.

P1. In the case of Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India,30 it was underscored by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Indica that the “strength of democracy depends on three critical pillars:
the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The first two organs derive their authority
from the will of the people while the third organ acts as the sentinel of democracy by
ensuring that the other two organs function within their constitutional limits. The Court
emphasized that judicial review is a powerful weapon to curb unconstitutional exercises of
power by the legislature and executive. However, the judiciary itself operates under the
self-imposed discipline of judicial restraint, reviewing only whether the legislature or
executive has acted within their constitutional mandate.”
P2. Similarly, in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab,31 a Constitution Bench of
this Hon’ble Court observed thus:
“It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means
and implies. Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental
functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away. The

29
Joy Makhal, Bulldozer Justice: An Analysis into the Rule of Law in Indica, Indican Journal of Law and Legal
Research, Volume V Issue 1, 1 - 16.
30
Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of Indica, W. P. (C) 456/2022.
31
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549.

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Constitution has not indeed recognised the doctrine of separation of powers in its absolute
rigidity but the functions of the different parts or branches of the Government have been
sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution
does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of functions that
essentially belong to another.”
P3. In the present case, the demolition of Mr. Salim’s ancestral home, carried out without
judicial determination of guilt or adherence to due process, represents a blatant
transgression of executive powers. The executive, acting as a judge and executioner,
assumed the role of deciding Mr. Salim’s guilt based solely on an unsubstantiated FIR
accusing him of inciting communal enmity. This action not only violated the principle of
separation of powers but also undermined the rule of law, a fundamental feature of the basic
structure doctrine as established in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala.
P4. The doctrine of public trust, though commonly invoked in environmental matters, equally
applies to the exercise of executive powers. The executive acts as a trustee of the citizens
and must ensure its actions are consistent with maintaining public trust. Arbitrary
demolitions, particularly those targeting political dissenters like Mr. Salim, erode this trust
and violate principles of accountability. If the executive breaches the rule of law or acts
beyond its constitutional authority, the judiciary must intervene to uphold constitutional
values.
P5. The rule of law requires that all actions of the State must be just, fair, and reasonable, as
held in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.32 The principle of natural justice, particularly
audi alteram partem (the right to be heard), was completely disregarded in Mr. Salim’s
case. No notice was served, and no opportunity to defend was granted. Punishing an
individual and his family by demolishing their home based solely on accusations without
legal adjudication strikes at the core of constitutional safeguards.
P6. Even if Mr. Salim were guilty of the allegations, demolishing his home as a punitive
measure without judicial authorization would be disproportionate and unconstitutional. As
the Court noted in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,33 the right to shelter is
an integral part of the right to life under Article 21, and no person can be evicted or deprived
of their property without due process.

32
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of Indica 1978 SCR (2) 621
33
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180

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P7. The selective enforcement of demolition laws raises further constitutional concerns. If the
authorities genuinely aimed to address illegal constructions, they would have applied the
law uniformly across all similarly situated properties. However, the focus on Mr. Salim’s
home—a vocal critic of the ruling party—suggests political vendetta rather than lawful
enforcement. The timing and targeted nature of the demolition demonstrate discriminatory
action, violating Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law.
P8. Moreover, demolishing the property also affected Mr. Salim’s father and other family
members, who had no involvement in the alleged accusations. This collective punishment
is unjustifiable and contrary to constitutional principles.
P9. The demolition of Mr. Salim’s home is a textbook case of the unconstitutional exercise of
executive power. The actions of the executive not only violated the principles of separation
of powers and rule of law but also disregarded constitutional safeguards under Articles 14,
19, 21, and 300A. The judiciary’s role as a sentinel of democracy is essential to curb such
transgressions, ensuring that executive actions remain within constitutional boundaries and
do not become instruments of oppression. Judicial intervention is imperative to restore
public trust and reaffirm the rule of law.
P10. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indica that the
practice of “bulldozer justice,” implemented by the state government of Uttam Pradesh,
violates fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Indica, and that such
actions represent an unconstitutional exercise of executive power.

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ISSUE 2: Whether Paragraph 2(b) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution violates the
constitutional right to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances, such
as widespread civil unrest and political instability?

It is humbly submitted that Para 2 of the Tenth Schedule34 provides the grounds for defection
due to which a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified. But
sub-clause (b) of para 2(1) of this schedule suffers from the vice of lack of specificity, subverts
the democratic rights of elected members [2.1], and further violates the basic structure of the
constitution of Indica i.e. Parliamentary democracy and separation of power [2.2].

2.1 Lack of Specificity in sub-clause (b) of para 2(1) subverts the democratic rights of
elected members

P1. According to para 2(1)(b),35 “if a member while remaining a member of the political party
which had set him up as a candidate at the election, votes or abstains from voting contrary
to "any direction" issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or
authority authorised by it in this behalf he incurs the disqualification. In other words, it
deals with a member who expresses his dissent from the stand of the political party to which
he belongs by voting or abstaining from voting in the House contrary to the direction issued
by the political party. The said object of the schedule would be achieved if the
disqualification incurred on the ground of voting or abstaining from voting by a member
is confined to cases where a change of Government is likely to be brought about or is
prevented, as the case may be, as a result of such voting or abstinence or when such voting
or abstinence is on a matter which was a major policy and programme on which the
political party to which the member belongs went to the polls.”36
P2. However, the provision does not differentiate between dissent motivated by genuine
disagreement and defection driven by malafide intentions, treating both grounds for
disqualification. As stated by Bhupesh Gupta one of the nominees in the Committee on
Defection that “Defection in the sense of the crossing of the floor of the House is no new
occurrence in bourgeois parliamentary democracy, especially under a multi-party system.
This essentially reflects the fluidity of a country's political life and often the polarisation of

34
Schedule 10, para. 2, the Constitution of Indica.
35
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.
36
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors., 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651, para. 54 (Indica).

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its political forces. More fundamental contradictions and conflicts in society including
those within the ruling class itself lie at the root of political fluctuations at the
parliamentary level.
P3. The process is liable to become all the more pronounced when the ruling class and the
parties variously representing it are in crisis and disintegrating. We are passing precisely
through such a phase of the crisis of bourgeois rule as well as of the rapid disintegration
of its principal party....Here it is perhaps necessary to make one observation. Having
regard to the realities of our political life, all defections cannot be tarred with the same
brush. It is true that large number of defections have taken place for dishonourable
considerations including personal gains, such as ministerial Office. But at the same time
there have also been defections notably from Congress which were not motivated by such
unethical or improper considerations. Important Congress leaders have left the Party in a
protest against what they consider to be betrayals and unwholesome practices. We need
not go into this is encouragement for defections.”.37
P4. Thus, even though the scope of the provision is narrowed down by the Supreme Court but
the application, purpose, and objective are yet not clarified, it's still in grey, resulting in
intermixing of dissent motivated by genuine disagreement and defection driven by
malafide intentions, treating both as grounds for disqualification; this becomes a huge
problem in cases like one at hand where the dissent done by the 40 MLAs was motivated
by the needs of their constituency and the extraordinary circumstances at the ground level.
P5. Furthermore, In India, “the party and not the individual legislator have become the central
organisational pillar.”38 “The practice of democratic elections has not been accompanied
by the development of democratic practices within political parties.”39 “The Anti Defection
Act entrusted the enforcement of discipline to party command structures. But the question
of whether party organizations were rooted in democratic legitimacy was left in the
unregulated sphere, as it was difficult to monitor it beyond procedural propriety.”40 “Party
leadership across the spectrum of Indican politics tend to be self-perpetuating

37
Report of the Committee on Defections, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Indica (1969).
38
Barun Mitra, Anti-Defection: A Law Endangering Democracy, Mint (21 August 2008), available at
www.miracleofdemocracy.org/story.aspx?id=1890&pubid=2038 (last seen on 28/01/2025).
39
Balveer Arora, Can Democracy Flourish with Undemocratic Parties?, The Tribune (15 August 2007),
available at www.tribuneIndica.com/2007/20070815/independence/main3.htm (last seen on 28/01/2025).
40
Ibid.

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oligarchies”.41 Similar problem was highlighted by the Law Commission”42, where it noted
that whips, which enforce party discipline, are unregulated and often overused. It
recommended limiting whips to votes on motions of confidence, no-confidence, or party-
core policies. Overuse of whips on every issue suppresses members' autonomy and stifles
parliamentary debate. This creates a scenario where Members prioritize party loyalty over
the democratic mandate of their electorate.
P6. Therefore, paragraph 2(1)(b)43 in a way, this undermines the democratic spirit within
Parliament, which is fundamentally a democratic institution. The principle of parliamentary
representation should not be sacrificed in favour of mere solidarity among party members.

2.2. Violation of the basic structure of the constitution of Indica

2.2.1 Representative Democracy and Accountability

P1. Trust in elected representatives is the foundation of a democracy. When that trust is broken,
everything collapses. Democracy is considered an integral part of the Constitution's basic
structure by the Supreme Court in Kesvananda Bharti v. State of Kerala44, it further
observed,
P2. “Democracy proceeds on the faith in the capacity to elect their representatives, and faith
In the representatives to represent the people….The two basic postulates in democracy are
faith in human reason and faith in human nature. There is no higher faith than faith in
democratic process. Democracy on adult suffrage is a great experiment in our country. The
roots of our democracy are in the country and faith in the common man….”
P3. Thus, it is a widely known fact that the people of a country would act through the people
who they have elected, and the people who they have elected shall make such decisions for
them.
P4. However, subclause (b) of para 2(1)45, this places party members in a position of
submissiveness to the party's rules and policies, limiting their ability to oppose the party's
wrongdoings, poor policies, leaders, and bills. A political party acts as a dictator for its

41
E. Sridharan, Party System Fragmentation, Intra Party Democracy, and Opaque Political Finance, Indica in
Transition (4 May 2009), available at www.asi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/esridharan (last seen on 28/01/2025).
42
Law Commission of Indica, 170th Report on Reform of the Electoral Laws (May 1999).
43
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.
44
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, 4 SCC 225 (1973).
45
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.

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members who are not allowed to dissent. This violates the principle of representative
democracy, wherein the members are forced to obey the high command.
P5. Further, it was rightly observed by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in Servants v. Osborne,46
which was also referred in Kihoto Hollohan47 case, that
P6. “Take the testing instance : should his view as to right ' and wrong on a public issue as to
the true line of service to the realm, as to, the real interests of the constituency which has
elected him, or even of the society which pays him, differ from the decision of the
parliamentary party and the maintenance by it of its policy, he has come under a contract
to place his vote and action into subjection not to his own convictions, but to their decisions.
My Lords, I do not think that such a subjection is compatible either with the spirit of our
parliamentary constitution or with that independence and freedom which have hitherto
been held to lie at the basis of representative Government in the United Kingdom.”
P7. Thus, subordinating a legislator's conscience to party commands contradicts the spirit of
parliamentary democracy and undermines their accountability to their constituency. And
an essential characteristic of democracy is that an elected official remains accountable to
their constituents even after being elected for office. His constituents keep him accountable
for their votes and actions during his next term re-election campaign. But, Paragraph
2(1)(b)48 only adds fuel to the contrary.

2.2.2 Right of Representation and Freedom of Speech

P1. The right to vote for a candidate of one's choice is a fundamental aspect of democracy.
Although the right to vote is a statutory right, the freedom to vote has been acknowledged
as an element of Article 19(1)(a).49 By extension, voting develops as an indispensable
constituent of freedom under article 105(1).50 Thus, it must not be restricted. And Paragraph
2(1)(b)51 stifles honest dissent based on fundamental reasons regarding what may be best
for the nation, according to the perspective of a particular candidate, thereby undermining
the core purpose of Parliament's free will.

46
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v. Osborne, [1910] AC 87 (HL).
47
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors., 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651.
48
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.
49
Art. 19(1)(a), the Constitution of Indica
50
Art. 105(1), the Constitution of Indica
51
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.

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P2. In a well-settled representative democratic environment, people wish for the electorate to
take care of their acts rather than working on the instructions and wishes of the party leaders
and their policies. As party members are granted increasing powers, they are constrained
from voting independently on any issue, whether being part of the party manifesto or not.
The anti-defection law exacerbates this by conflating defiance with defection, as
demonstrated in the present case. Here, 40 MLAs, responding to extraordinary
circumstances of civil unrest and intense pressure from their constituencies, chose to
prioritize the will of the people they represent over a party whip.
P3. Their actions were not acts of defection but a conscientious effort to uphold their
democratic responsibilities during a socio-political crisis. Despite this, the Deputy Speaker
hastily disqualified these MLAs without granting them a fair hearing or adhering to the
principles of natural justice.
P4. The same view was expressed by Dr B.R. Ambedkar, who highlighted in the Constituent
Assembly that the framers of the Indican Constitution deliberately chose the parliamentary
system, prioritizing accountability over stability. The government in this system is
accountable to Parliament daily through questions, debates, and motions and can even be
removed via a no-confidence motion. However, the anti-defection law undermines this
intent by curbing legislators' freedom to scrutinize the government or vote independently
due to the constraints of the party whip.52
P5. Additionally, Mr. N.A. Palkhivala, the noted jurist, who in his Book 'Our Constitution
Defaced and Defiled'canvassed:-
P6. “No greater insult can be imagined to members of Parliament and the State Legislatures
than to tell them that once they become members of a political party, apart from any
question of the party, apart from any question of the party may choose to take, the
Constitution of India itself expects them to have no right to form a judgement and no liberty
to think for themselves, but they must become soulless and conscienceless entities who
would be driven by their political party in whichever direction the party chooses to push
them.”53

52
B.R. Ambedkar, Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, 38 (1948).
53
N.A. Palkhivala, Our Constitution Defaced and Defiled 175 (Macmillan Co. of Indica 1974).

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P7. Thus, the provision effectively forces legislators to vote in alignment with party mandates,
curtailing their ability to fulfil this obligation. This provision stifles debate and discourages
individual perspectives, ultimately eroding public confidence in the legislature.

2.2.3 Dissent, Defection, and Deliberative Democracy

P1. A member of parliament is loyal to both his political party and his constituents. The fact
that the Member is subject to the Whip's instructions is a strong indication of party loyalty.
He must, however, take into account the interests of his constituents as necessary in order
to balance his own. It is incorrect to view such behaviour as betraying the party or as having
a negative impact on the party's unity. It is common for members of the same political party
to hold divergent views on a given issue, and when these differences are expressed, the
ideas being considered may be changed or withdrawn. This result could only be possible if
the members express dissent. Intra-party dissent or intra-party debates, both a foundational
and fundamental element of intra-party democracy, are dependent upon the willingness of
the leaders to allow members to vote against party lines. However, Paragraph 2(1)(b) 54
conflates dissent with defection.
P2. Further, the US Supreme Court in Bond and Gewertz 55 noted that “dissent from party view
is within the realm of affairs of a private association. Thus, a legislator is protected from
disqualification in case he opts to oppose his political party on a particular matter. He can
be excluded from a party but not the House itself.”
P3. Furthermore, the Kihoto Hollohan56 judgment inaccurately cited dissent as a potential
threat to party cohesion and stability. This perspective negates the role of dissent in
fostering accountability and advancing democratic values within the legislature. This
severely limits their ability to make their own decisions. This clause essentially negates the
goal of debate in the house by restricting the options available to lawmakers for voting. As
a result, the House now has less room for disagreement, another kind of free speech.

2.2.4 Separation of Powers and Legislative Autonomy

P1. The basic structure doctrine also encompasses the principle of separation of powers, which
is essential to prevent the concentration of authority in any one branch of government. The

54
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.
55
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211 (2011, Supreme Court of the United States).
56
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors., 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651 (Indica).

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Parliament's role utterly diminishes if it is denied the authority to seek the executive's
responsibility. This contributes even more to the government's diminished accountability
to Parliament.
Because the executive's existence depends on the party rather than the Parliament,
paragraph 2(1)(b)57 allows a constitutionally elected government to transform into an
autocratic dictatorship that is answerable to no one for a period of five years. This can also
be seen in the present case where the MLAs who dissented from the autocratic rule of the
government were disqualified in lieu of para 2(1)(b).58
P2. The provision blurs the line between the executive and the legislature, as noted by
Montesquieu ,“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person...
there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner."59
P3. Thus, provision transforms the legislature into a mere extension of the executive, reducing
its ability to act as an independent check. The legislature’s role to oversee the executive
and ensure its accountability diminishes, further eroding the democratic framework.
P4. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to argue that the Constitution does not recognize the
existence and role of political parties in the governance of the country. Therefore, it cannot
be argued that elected officials are completely immune from the influence or control of the
political parties they represent when performing their duties. But it's just as important to
make sure that this kind of control doesn't make elected officials nothing more than rubber
stamps for their parties. Such an outcome would strip them of their representative character,
thereby undermining parliamentary democracy and separation of power which itself—are
the Constitution’s basic features and an integral part of its basic structure. And in the present
case para 2(1)(b) of the 10th schedule60 not only violates the right to represent but also the
constitution’s basic structure.

57
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.
58
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.
59
Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 205 (Library of Alexandria 2015).
60
Schedule 10, para. 2(1)(b), the Constitution of Indica.

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ISSUE 3: Whether the current procedure for the election of the Speaker and Deputy
Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, is constitutionally valid or not?

P1. “The member chosen for the high and honourable office is styled "Speaker" because it is
his business to speak to or address the Sovereign in the name of the House, when occasion
requires; during his absence, no business can be transacted by the House nor any question
moved, but that of adjournment. He is the representative of the House itself in its powers,
proceedings and dignity. On the one hand, he is the spokesman or representative of the
House. On the other hand, he presides over the debate of the House and enforces the
observance of all rules for preserving order in its proceedings.61The legislature cannot be
said to have commenced until a speaker is elected.”62
P2. Furthermore, the Speaker serves as the representative of the House and, in its collective
capacity, is the primary steward of its privileges and powers. He is much more than just the
chairman. According to the majority opinion in Kihoto case:63“The office of the Speaker is
held in the highest esteem and respect in Parliamentary traditions. The evolution of the
institution of parliamentary democracy has as its pivot the institution of the speaker. The
speaker holds a high, important and ceremonial office… The Speaker is said to be the very
embodiment of propriety and impartiality.”
P3. As Mavalankar, who was himself a distinguished occupant of that high office, remarked,
the Speaker belongs to all members and none, holding the scales of justice evenly without
intentional partiality.64 Pandit Nehru emphasized that the Speaker represents the dignity
and freedom of the House and must be a person of outstanding ability and impartiality. He
further highlighted the Speaker's critical role in safeguarding the liberties of the House from
executive intrusion and protecting minority opinions from the dominance of the majority.
This esteemed position demands respect and trust from all.65
P4. But when individuals ascend to the esteemed offices of Speaker and Deputy Speaker
through manipulation or strategic voting and act as mere puppets of their parties, it
undermines the spirit of the Constitution and the purpose of these roles. In the present case,

61
MAY ON PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, 20th Edn., p. 233. 48
62
Social Action for People's Rights v. State of U.P., AIR 2003 All 250
63
Kihoto Hollohan v Zachillhu AIR 1993 SC at 452: 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651.
64
G.V. Mavalankar, Remarks on the Role of the Speaker, in Impartial Speaker For Thriving Democracy, The
Indican Express, Aug. 19, 2021.
65
Jawaharlal Nehru, Remarks on the Role of the Speaker, in Nehru and Parliamentary Democracy, The Tenth
Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial Lecture, Jan. 18, 2014.

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the state of Uttam Pradesh exemplifies this deviation, which is rooted in problems within
the election procedure. The Speaker, from the Samast Political Party (SPP), and the Deputy
Speaker, from the Indican Progressive Party (IPP), have acted contrary to the impartiality
expected of their positions. The Deputy Speaker’s controversial decision to disqualify
dissenting MLAs, during the Speaker’s absence, lacked procedural fairness and fuelled
political instability. While the Speaker expressed displeasure at the decision, he refused to
overturn it, further compromising the integrity of the office. Such conduct highlights the
consequences of flawed electoral processes, standing in stark contrast to the constitutional
ethos and betraying the office’s intended neutrality and democratic purpose.
P5. The election process for the Speaker, as outlined in Chapter III of Rule of Procedure and
Conduct of business of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, 1958, section 8 of the relevant
legislation, is procedurally comprehensive but fails to ensure constitutional compliance in
critical areas. Specifically, the process compromises the principles of impartiality, fair
representation, and democratic equity, which are fundamental to the Speaker's role as the
neutral arbiter of the legislative assembly. This failure undermines its validity under the
Constitution, as the rules do not adequately safeguard against the structural dominance of
the majority party, procedural bias, and political manipulation. Sub-rule 8(2) permits any
member to nominate another member for the position of Speaker. While this appears to
provide equal opportunity, the practical implications of this provision are limited. In a
majoritarian system, the opposition or minority members' nominations hold no practical
weight unless there is an even balance of power, which is rarely the case. Moreover, the
nomination process lacks additional safeguards to protect opposition-nominated candidates
from being excluded in successive rounds of balloting due to strategic voting by the ruling
party. In assemblies where the ruling party holds a clear majority, this system ensures the
ruling party's nominee will always be elected. The process, therefore, creates an inherent
bias favouring the majority party, undermining the Speaker's constitutional role as an
impartial authority.
P6. Furthermore, the rules do not include any mechanism for building consensus around the
Speaker's election. Sub-rule 8(5) relies entirely on successive ballots to determine the
winner, where candidates are eliminated until one achieves a simple majority. This
eliminates the possibility of requiring broader Assembly support, such as a two-thirds
majority, which would necessitate collaboration across party lines. As a result, the Speaker
is often perceived as a representative of the ruling party rather than a neutral authority with
the confidence of the entire Assembly.

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P7. “All these procedural voids, prevent free and fair election, which is essential for
democratic nation, as the office of speaker is vital for its role as guardians of the rights and
privileges of the House, hence, playing a pivotal role in maintaining the democratic
structure of the country. And the mechanism for determining the real representatives of the
people in an election as contemplated by the Constitution. Democracy could function only
when there are free and fair elections.”66
P8. The judiciary has consistently underscored the need for impartiality in the role of the
Speaker. In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker,67 the Supreme Court emphasized that “the
Speaker must remain neutral and uphold constitutional values.” However, the current
election process does not include safeguards to ensure that the elected Speaker is free from
political or party influence. This disconnects between the procedural framework and the
constitutional mandate makes the process vulnerable to legal challenges.
P9. Therefore, the procedural dominance of the majority party erodes the principle of fairness
and alienates the opposition from meaningful participation in the process. The election
process does not ensure that the Speaker represents the interests of all Assembly members.
This undermines the Speaker’s ability to serve as a custodian of the legislative institution,
which requires broad-based support across party lines, this is against the constitutional
values of this office, thus, the current procedure of the election for speaker and deputy
speaker is not constitutionally valid.

66
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, (2016) 11 SCC 1.
67
Supra

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Issue 4: Whether the broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged
pre-trial detention without formal charges are consistent with the protection of
fundamental rights?

It is most humbly submitted that the broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities”
under the UAPA, the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial detention without formal
charges are inconsistent with the protection of fundamental rights.

4.1 The definitions of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under UAPA are vague and
overreaching.

It is humbly submitted that the Unlawful Activities and Prevention Act of 196768 (or UAPA)
was enacted with the view to prevent unlawful activities which threaten the sovereignty and
integrity of India. Section 2 of the Act69 deals with the definitions used in the act and unlawful
activities has been defined u/s 2(o)70 of the Act. The definition of terrorist activities has been
given u/s 2(k)71 which mandates us to adhere to the definition of the term u/s 15 of the Act as
the chapter on Punishment for Terrorist Activities (Chapter IV) was inserted by Unlawful
Activities Prevention (Amendment) Act of 2004. The definition of unlawful and terrorist
activities is excessively broad and vague, since it has led to potential misuse and arbitrary
application.

(i) Definition of unlawful is vague and has far-reaching implications.

P1. According to Section 2(o) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967,72 "unlawful
activity" is a definition that is broadly wide-ranging. It encompasses everything that an
individual or association has done, written, spoken, signs, or even visible representations.
It includes activities which; (a) tends to bring about or support demands for the cession or
secession of any portion of Indican territory; (b) disclaims, questions, or disrupts India's

68
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
69
Section 2, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
70
Section 2(o), The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
71
Section 2(k), Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
72
Section 2(o), The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

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sovereignty and territorial integrity, or intends to do so; or (c) causes or intends to cause
disaffection towards India.73
P2. This definition is overly broad and subjective, and creates an opportunity for the misuse of
national sovereignty and unity as grounds for criminalizing dissenting opinion, peaceful
protests, or critique of governmental policy. This definition involves various indefinable
words like “questions,” “disrupts,” and “cause disaffection.” This allows the government
to target those individuals who express their dissatisfaction or criticize the government
policies.
P3. The usage of the words under this definition aims to curb and suppress political dissent by
terming it as unlawful activity, which is evident in the present case. Mr. Ansari, through
his speech, merely criticised the policies of the government, which neglected minority tribe
B and he exercised his right to freedom of speech and expression enshrined under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution.74 He was charged and booked under UAPA for the mere fact
of expressing his dissent and for accusing the government of systematic discrimination.
This shows the misuse of the definition of UAPA as it is being used to curb political dissent
in the state of Uttam Pradesh.

(ii) Definition of terrorist activities is broad.

P1. Section 15 of the UAPA75 defines a "terrorist act" as any act that either threatens or is likely
to threaten, inter alia, the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or which is
intended to intimidate or coerce or overawe the government as well as strike terror into the
people or any section of the people by doing, or threatening to do, any one of the activities
listed in the section, which may include use of bombs or firearms or other lethal weapons
capable of causing or which may cause the death or injury of a person.76
P2. There is no threshold of harm or intent as specified in the section, which allows for
subjective interpretation. This absence of clarity was emphasised in the case of Thwaha
Fasal vs. Union of India,77 where the difference between actual acts of terror and mere
ideological or associative behaviour was emphasised by the Court. Moreover, “the court
must be careful in employing the definitional words and phrases used in Section 15 of

73
Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association. v. Union of Indica, (2016) 14 SCC 536.
74
Art. 19(1)(a), the Constitution of Indica.
75
Section 15, The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
76
Ibid.
77
Thwaha Fasal vs. Union of Indica, (2022) 14 SCC 766.

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UAPA78 in their absolute literal sense or use them lightly in a manner that would trivialise
the extremely heinous offence of terrorist act, without understanding how terrorism is
different even from conventional, heinous crime.”79 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India80 struck down Section 66A of the Information
Technology Act, holding that vague and overbroad laws can have a chilling effect on free
speech.
P3. In the present case, it is important to note that the state has failed to provide any substantial
evidence that connects him in any way to violent activities or to acts that can be classified
as terroristic in nature. His speech, which is critical of various government policies and
decisions, does not, in any way, pose a threat to national security, nor does it serve to incite
violence among the public or individuals. Regardless of this clear lack of evidence, he has
nonetheless been charged under the extensive and often ambiguous definition of “terrorist
activities” as outlined in the UAPA, which underscores the significant overreach associated
with this particular law. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the definitions of “unlawful”
and “terrorist activities” under UAPA are broad, vague, and overreaching.

4.2 The denial of bail and prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges is
inconsistent with judicially devised tests.

(A) The tests for denial of bail have not been satisfied.

P1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the judiciary has devised a twin prong
test, which makes the inquiry of a bail court u/s 43D(5) of UAPA,81 which helps in deciding
applications of bail, easier and flexible by the test.

1. “Whether the test for rejection of bail is satisfied?

a. “Examine if, prima facie, the alleged "accusations" make out an offence under
Chapter IV or VI, UAPA;

78
Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association. v. Union of Indica, (2016) 14 SCC 536.
79
Asif Iqbal Tanha vs State (NCT of Delhi), (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 106; People’s Union for Civil Liberties vs.
Union of Indica, (2004) 9 SCC 580; Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13 SCC 1;
Natasha Narwal vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2021) 2 HCC (Del) 681.
80
Shreya Singhal vs. Union of Indica, AIR 2015 SC 1523.
81
Section 43D(5), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

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b. Such investigation should be confined to case diary and final report filed u/s
173 CrPC82 (now Section 193 of BNSS83);

2. Whether the accused is liable to be granted bail in the wake of general principles
governing grant of bail u/s 439 CrPC,84 now, Section 485 of BNSS85 ("tripod test")?

P2. On a consideration of various factors such as nature of offence, length of punishment (if
convicted), age, character, status of the accused, etc., the court must ask itself the following
questions:

1. Is the accused likely to abscond?

2. Are there apprehensions that the accused will tamper with the evidence?

3. Are there apprehensions that the accused will intimidate witnesses?”

P3. “The question of entering the “second test" of the inquiry will not arise if the "first test" is
satisfied. And merely because the first test is satisfied, that does not mean however that the
accused is automatically entitled to bail. The accused will have to show that he successfully
passes the "tripod test."86 That is to say, that if the first test is not passed then the question of
going through the second test does not arise.”

P4. In the present case, if we apply the first test i.e. the twin pronged test for denial of bail then
it has not been satisfied because prima facie, the alleged accusations do not make any offence
under Chapters IV or VI of UAPA, 1967. Chapter IV and VI of UAPA deal with punishment
for terrorist activities and terrorist organisations respectively. Mr. Ansari has not threatened the
sovereignty, unity, integrity, or security of India in any manner, as his speech was not against
the country but against the government and the systematically applicable policies of
discrimination favoring tribe A. Political dissent, however strongly worded, does not attract
Chapter IV or falls within the definition of “terrorist activities” as defined u/s 15 of UAPA.87

82
Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
83
Section 193, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
84
Section 439, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
85
Section 485, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
86
Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2024) 5 SCC 403.
87
Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955; Thwaha Fasal vs. Union of Indica, (2022) 14 SCC 766.

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P4. In NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali,88 it has been held that the prima facie true standard
requires that evidence collected by the investigating agency in the charge sheet would show
the complicity of the accused on its face.89 No such evidence has been presented in the case of
Mr. Ansari. Instead, the prosecution has wholly relied on vague allegations springing from his
speech, which have no probative value to meet the prima facie standard. Further, while dealing
with the tripod test, the accused satisfies the tripod test for granting bail under UAPA as:

a. Firstly, he is not likely to abscond considering he is a political activist, who is the

representative for his tribe’s rights and his social and professional standing and deep
ties with the community negates his likelihood of absconding.

b. Secondly, the investigation in the present case is majorly complete and there has been
no material or evidence suggesting that he is likely to tamper with the evidence.

c. Lastly, he does not pose any risk of intimidating witnesses. Even though he is a public
figure and gives speeches, there is complete absence of evidence to suggest that he will
intimidate witnesses. Moreover, there is no coercion on the part of Mr. Ansari. If he is
denied bail on the ground that he might do something i.e. speculative bail, without filing
any formal charge sheet, it violates his right under Article 21.

P5. Additionally, in numerous cases,90 the Supreme Court has laid down the method of
interpretation in which stringent provisions of a statute should be construed. It has been noticed
that the court should cautiously consider each case, before assessing whether the Act would
come into operation or not. When the statutes have stringent provisions then it makes the task
of the court(s) even more arduous. The graver the offence, greater should be the care taken to
see that the offence would fall within the four corners of the Act. Though these judgments were
delivered while testing similar rigorous provisions under the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987,91 the same principle would apply in respect of the UAPA as
well.92 Data from the Union Home Ministry that was provided to Parliament in March of this

88
NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1.
89
Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 15 SCC 56.
90
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602; Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v.
Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76; Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. State of Gujarat, (1988) 2 SCC
271.
91
The Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
92
Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 15 SCC 56.

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year also depicts that 2.2% of cases filed under the UAPA between 2016 and 2019 ended in
court convictions. This inflicts a much greater and heavier responsibility on the courts to
differentiate between terrorist activities as given u/s 15 of the Act and political dissent or
government criticism, as the fundamental rights of a person are at stake.

(B) The prolonged pre-trial detention is unjustified and violates legal safeguards.

P1. The prolonged pre-trial detention of Mr. Ravi Ansari under UAPA is a clear violation of
the established legal principles. More than 180 days incarceration, no charge and no
material evidence of having committed terrorist acts - this shows arbitrary and oppressive
usage of UAPA's stringent provisions. Article 21 of the Constitution93 protects the right to
life and personal liberty, which includes a fair and speedy trial.94
P2. It has been held that detention for an unreasonably long period without trial violates the
fundamental rights. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,95 the Court held that even in cases
of stringent laws like UAPA, arbitrary detention infringes Article 21 and calls for judicial
intervention. The detention of Mr. Ansari has no justification, as it violates principles of
justice and due process of law. Prolonged detention tends to destroy the presumption of
innocence, which is an essential tenet of criminal law. This presumption is due to every
person until proven guilty, as per Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India.96
P3. Mr. Ansari is subjected to vague, unsubstantiated allegations for his provocative speech
regarding government policies. As an exercise of his rights of free speech mandated under
Article 19(1)(a), his articulating views under free speech are legitimate. There was no
evidence presented of incitement to violence or terrorism related to his detention. UAPA's
Section 43-D(5) allows detention up to 180 days, but extensions are permissible only on
compelling reasons supported by substantial evidence.
P4. In NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali,97 the Supreme Court held that prima facie evidence
must show complicity on the part of the accused. There is no evidence linking Mr. Ansari
to these alleged UAPA crimes. It has failed to link him to either terrorism or any
organization of terrorists. In addition, under the ICCPR, which he is bound by as an

93
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica.
94
Hussainara Khatoon and Others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, AIR 1979 SC 1369.
95
Union of Indica vs. K. A. Najeeb, AIR 2021 SC 712.
96
Thwaha Fasal vs. Union of Indica, (2022) 14 SCC 766.
97
NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1.

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international obligation of India, his detention is not fair. Article 9(3) of the ICCPR98
mandates that there should be no pre-trial detention and that individuals should be tried
within a reasonable time or released. In the present case, these international norms, along
with fundamental rights under Article 21, are being violated and infringed upon.
P5. The detention of Mr. Ansari has also brought grave social and economic consequences.
Being a prominent activist of Tribe B, his detention has hampered his work for the deprived
sections of society. This unjust imprisonment has not only stigmatized Mr. Ansari but also
deprived the community he represents of their leader. The prolonged pre-trial detention of
Mr. Ravi Ansari is arbitrary, punitive, and violative of constitutional and legal safeguards.
This indicates misappropriation of the UAPA provisions when the prosecution cannot
prove the charges on time, and also lacks credible evidence.
P6. The allegations against Mr. Ansari do not meet the twin-prong test for denial of bail under
Section 43-D(5) of UAPA.99 Prima facie, there is no case made out under Chapter IV or VI
of UAPA because his speech was against the government's policies, not the unity or security
of India. Moreover, in the tripod test, Mr. Ansari falls within the requirement of bail since
he does not pose any likelihood of absconding, tampering with the evidence, and
intimidating witnesses. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the denial of bail and
prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges is inconsistent with judicially devised
tests as it does not fulfil the two-pronged test and the tripod test.

4.3 There has been a violation of fundamental rights of the accused.

Mr. Ansari’s fundamental rights of Articles 19(1)(a),100 21,101 and 22102 of the Constitution of
India have been infringed upon due to the denial of bail and the prolonged pre-trial detention
as it shows the misuse of the powers granted by UAPA.

a. The freedom of speech and expression has been violated.

P1. Art. 19 of the Indican Constitution recognizes the fundamental right to freedom of speech
and expression. Such freedom is guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution103 and

98
Art. 9, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
99
Sec. 43D(5), the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
100
Art. 19(1)(a), the Constitution of Indica.
101
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica.
102
Art. 22, the Constitution of Indica.
103
Art. 19(1)(a), the Constitution of Indica.

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serves as the cornerstone of all free and democratic societies. The speech by Mr. Ansari
against the government policies towards Tribe B squarely falls under the category of
political dissent, which is constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court clarified that mere
advocacy or discussion, unless it incites violence, is covered under Article 19(1)(a).104 Even
while critical, his speech did not advocate violence or secession and no act threatening
sovereignty or integrity of India. Invocation of UAPA against him would mean the
conflation of valid dissent with crime, which silences his constitutional right to freedom of
speech.
P2. Freedom of speech and expression, under Article 19(2),105 is permitted to be reasonably
restricted on the grounds of the sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, and
incitement to an offense. Restrictions must be narrow and cannot serve as a pretext for
suppressing dissent. The speech of Mr. Ansari was only critical of the government and its
policies and in no way hampered the sovereignty, integrity, public order, or led to
incitement of an offence. In S Rangarajan v. P Jagjivan Ram,106 the Supreme Court noted
that under Article 19(2), restrictions must bear a proximate and direct nexus to the threat
sought to be addressed. However in the present case, there is no proximate and direct nexus
as the threat itself is absent. Likewise, the Court held that speculative or distant threats
cannot justify the curtailing of free speech.107 The invocation of UAPA on such speculative
interpretations of his speech amounts to the overreach and misuse of the reasonable
restrictions permitted by the Constitution under Article 19(2). Therefore, it is submitted
that his freedom of speech and expression has been violated.

b. The right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 has been infringed upon.

Article 21,108 which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, includes the right to a fair
and speedy trial.109 The prolonged pre-trial detention of Mr. Ansari without filing formal
charges for more than 180 days is a violation of this fundamental right. In Union of India v.
K.A. Najeeb,110 the Supreme Court held that indefinite incarceration even under stringent laws

104
Shreya Singhal v. Union of Indica, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
105
Art. 19(2), the Constitution of Indica.
106
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574.
107
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600.
108
Art. 21, the Constitution of Indica.
109
Hussainara Khatoon vs State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369.
110
Union of Indica vs. K. A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713.

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like UAPA infringes upon this article. The court further observed that prolonged detention
without trial turns the presumption of innocence on its head, effectively punishing individuals
before they are convicted. In the present case, the failure of the authorities to prove charges
against Mr. Ansari within the timeframe provided for will definitely prove arbitrary detention
and an infringement of the right to liberty. Therefore, his right under Art. 21 has been violated.

c. Article 22 was violated.

P1. Article 22111 provides the procedural safeguards that protect a person from arbitrary arrest
and detention. The safeguards involve the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest and
the right to consult a legal practitioner. Although UAPA allows long detention periods
under Section 43-D(2), the state must follow rigid procedural requirements lest it misuse
the provisions. In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,112 held that preventive detention
statutes must be narrowly construed and strictly applied to prevent abuse. In the case of Mr.
Ansari, the prosecution has placed reliance on nebulous and generalized allegations without
bringing any specific grounds for his detention. This lack of transparency and
accountability is, in itself, a clear breach of Article 22, leading to the infringement of rights
under Articles 19, 21, and 22.
P2. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the broad definition of
“unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act
(UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial detention without formal charges
are inconsistent with the protection of fundamental rights, particularly Articles 19(1)(a),
21, and 22.

111
Art. 22, the Constitution of Indica.
112
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.

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PRAYER

Wherefore in light of the fact stated issues raised arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble court that, It may be graciously pleased to adjudge
and declare that

1. The practice of “Bulldozer Justice” implemented by the stated govt. of Uttam Pradesh
Violated Fundamental Rights, guaranteed under the constitution of Indica, and that such
actions represent unconstitutional exercise of executive power

2. Paragraph 2(1)(b) of 10th Schedule of the constitution violates the constitutional right
to represent one’s constituency in extraordinary circumstances and further violates the
basic structure of the Constitution of Indica.

3. The current procedure for the election of Speaker and Deputy-Speaker of Legislative
assembly is not constitutionally valid.

4. The broad definition of “unlawful” and “terrorist activities” under the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the denial of bail, and the prolonged pre-trial
detention without formal charges are not consistent with the protection of fundamental
rights.

And/Or

Pass any other order, writ or direct as this Hon’ble court deems fit in the interest of

Justice, Equity and good conscious.

For such an act of kindness, the petitioners shall duty bound forever pray

Sd/-

Counsel on behalf of Petitioners

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