Transparency International Slovakia

Obstacles to Open and Honest Government: An Overview

of Corruption:

Corruption as a Problem (ethical, moral, economic and

political) Affecting the Whole Society
Daniela Zemanovičová1
Emília Sičáková2
Miroslav Beblavý3

1. DEFINITION
Defined simply, corruption is the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit4. Yet it is
not so long ago that the word itself was completely taboo in professional and political
environments. The word seldom appeared in newspapers and economists rarely mentioned it,
although political scientists had begun to take an academic interest in it. Normative
statements about corruption require a point of view, a standard of "goodness" and a model of
how corruption works in particular instances.

While corruption is defined as "the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit", it can also
be described as representing non-compliance with the "arm's-length" principle, under
which no personal or family relationship should play any role in economic decision-
making, be it by private economic agents or by government officials.

Once the arm's-length principle has been breached and a distinction made based on
relationships, corruption will often follow. Conflict of interest situations and nepotism are
examples. The arm's-length principle is seen as fundamental to the efficient functioning of
any organisation.

A core, but unstated assumption underlying theoretical work on the role of the public sector is
that public sector officials (both policy-makers and civil servants) are knowledgeable, neutral
and impersonal in their pursuit of the social welfare. But are they? What do officials see as
the pursuit of the social welfare and what do they, themselves, consider to be "corruption"?
And what of their willingness--or otherwise--to take action against it? These questions are all
too seldom asked.

1
CPHR – Transparency International Slovakia, Bajkalská 25, 82718 Bratislava 212, Slovakia
danielaz@transparency.sk, ema@transparency.sk
2
CPHR – Transparency International Slovakia, Bajkalská 25, 82718 Bratislava 212, Slovakia,
ema@transparency.sk
3
SGI – Slovak Governance Institute, Bajkalská 25, 82718 Bratislava 212, Slovakia, beblavy@governance.sk
4
Transparency International Source Book, Berlin 2000

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Corruption has been defined in lots of ways in the literature.5 The basic distinction is
between normative and positive definitions, summarised in Table 1. Two variants of
normative are provided in definitions 1 and 2 in Table 1. The first looks at acts and is clearly
normative while second looks at the consequences of acts. The second remains normative
definition because the definition of the public interest may differ across observers. It is also
problematic to define corruption in terms of its consequences because this defines out of
existence cases of beneficial corruption. Economic and sociological comparisons most often
use the third, positive definition using the standard of legal norms to identify the deviations.
Thus corruption is defined as deviation from the formal rules governing the allocative
decisions of public officials in response to offers to them of financial gain or political
support. (based on Nye, 1967)

Table 1 Definitions of corruption

Normative definitions Positive definitions
1. Deviations from Ethical Norms 1. Deviations from Legal Norms
2. Actions which Harm the Public Interest

The stipulation that corrupt transactions should violate formal rules rather than simply ethical
norms rules out any disagreements about the appropriate ethical standards. The additional
stipulation that public officials are involved in distinguishes corruption from theft which is
illegal but which exclusively involves decisions by private individuals. The definition is still
open to the problem that formal rules can vary across countries. A strict application of the
definition could lead to different sets of practices being identified as corrupt. Fortunately, the
corrupt practices which economists have wished to analyse would in fact violate formal rules
in most countries.

Corruption can be also divided to active and passive. Active corruption refers to accepting
bribes6 and passive corruption refers to offering bribes.

2. WHY IS CORRUPTION HARMFUL?7

Apart from the negative impacts on ethics and moral of the society, harmfulness of corruption
rests upon the fact that due to it important decisions (in public interest) are made on the basis
of private motives, not taking into consideration the impacts on the society and on the
citizens. The decisions made are motivated by personal advantages (including financial
advantages), and not by the needs of people. Thus:

o There is an interest to preserve the extent of activities where “non-private money”

is decided on, and there is a pressure on the growth of re-distribution, centralised
funds, subsidies, etc.

Internalities (private motives of people making decisions in public interest) cause that
unnecessary projects are implemented (the construction of “palaces” for banks, boards of
5
Explaining corruption edited by Robert Williams, The Politics of Corruption, Cheltenham, Uk. Northampton,
MA, USA,2000.
6
Transparency International developed indexes that try to show the extent of these phenomenon:
- Corruption Perception Index (please see Attachment 1)
- Bribe Payers Index (please see Attachment 2).
7
For more detail see Zemanovičová, Sičáková (2001)

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inland revenue or other institutions, funded wholly or in part from public funds, may serve as
an example), as well as business trips of employees of these institutions to exotic countries,
covered from public funds (e.g. business trips to crocodile farms).

It is apparent that internalities are related to corruption. On the other hand, resources are
missing in other areas, e.g. in the education and health care sector. Preservation of the range
of activities paid from public funds exerts pressure on the increase of taxes and charges,
which does not motivate business and hinders economic development, resulting in negative
social impacts following from unemployment. It is known that a portion of funds is simply
“lost” in the re-distribution process.

o If private motives influence the decision making on public funds, then the resources
(financial, material, human) do not get where their valuation is best.

Ineffective transfers are performed, resources are withdrawn from the efficient in favour of
the inefficient subjects and activities. Thus, the allocation efficiency of the economy is
worsened as well as its competitiveness. This means that the best ones are not supported,
their competition is not supported, conditions for their development are not supported, but
advantages are granted to those with the most powerful lobby. Thus, not creation of wealth is
supported, but its distribution. Businesspeople focus on “rent seeking” rather than on “profit
seeking”. Thus, they are not motivated to create wealth, but to re-distribute it in their favour.
As a consequence, the general wealth of the country is diminishing.

o Corruption and non-transparent rules mean high administrative demandingness

and high transaction costs.

The great number of permits, licenses, authorisations, and complicated procedures in order to
be granted those, present obstacles to business on the one hand, and open up space for
corruption on the other hand. It is the transaction costs (costs of contact with the
surroundings, paid by businesspeople, but also by citizens,) that to an ever-increasing extent
determine the prosperousness of economies. This, on the one hand, gives the civil servants
freedom in their decision-making, and on the other hand, poses uncertainty for
businesspeople, impairing quality of the business environment, and demotivating business.

Moreover, if the rules are ambiguous, uncertainty leads the businesspeople and the citizens
towards ensuring their certainty by bribery.

o Uncertainty about whether the rules are valid, and how they will be applied, also
increases the investment risk.

If businesspeople are not certain whether the rules and laws will be observed and enforced, or
if they enter an environment, in which establishment and operation of the business are to be
secured by giving bribes, the investment risk in the respective country is increased for them.
Thus, corrupt climate results in reduction of foreign investments. It is the foreign investments
that are for several reasons a very important factor for transition economies. Mass need of re-
structuring in the transition economies hits against the problem of limited internal resources –
foreign investments facilitate the currency exchange rate stabilisation, enable integration into
global economic relations, entry to foreign markets, they bring along know-how in the areas

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of management and marketing, as well as a new business culture, they create a natural foreign
lobby for our integration ambitions, etc. Thus, the economies that have succeeded in
attracting more foreign investments are more successful in their transition, as a rule. Several
voices from the business circles abroad and from international institutions are warning that
corruption is the obstacle to business in Slovakia.

o Corruption causes that the citizens receive less than they could receive at the
respective level of resources at the disposal of the economy.

A corrupt environment causes prices to increase, and on the other hand, the quality and
accessibility of goods and services decreases. For example, a businessperson having been
awarded a public contract via a bribe will include this bribe into the price paid by us for
his/her services, or the public funds for funding of other services will be reduced. The fact
that the amounts involved are not minor is evidenced by estimations, according to which a
corrupt environment may cause the public contracts to be overcharged by 30 to 50%.
However, also non-transparency in other areas means losses for the citizen. For example, if
the funding of political parties is not transparent, if the offices in state-owned monopolies are
held by persons on the basis of a political key, without any possibility of public control, it
may result in pouring of the funds from one place to another, in inefficiency, and in the
increase of prices for services paid by the citizen.

Economic impact in particular countries differ and there are differences between strong and
weak kleptocrats. As Ackeman (1999) states, a strong kleptocrat operating with impunity
would not have to worry about “cover story”. He can just take public funds or aid monies,
send them to his off-shore bank account, and earn international rates of return. This contrast
between strong and weak kleptocrats recalls a familiar joke, repeated in various versions in
the development community.

Ruler A shows off his new mansion to ruler B. Pointing out a new highway, A explains his
new house by saying, “Thirty percent”. Later A visit B at his even more lavish mansion.
Asked how it was financed, B says , : “See the highway out there?” A looks puzzled because
no highway can be seen. “That is just the point,” says B, “one hundred percent. “

Apart from the economic and social consequences, it is necessary to realise the broader
political impacts as well. In a corrupt environment, the citizens loose their confidence in the
country and in the rules. Not only the rule of law is put in question, but also equality in front
of the law, and democracy as such. The moral declines, and on the other hand, criminality
grows.

There is a strong indirect relation between corruption and democracy (the less corruption, the
more democracy). If we base our statements on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), we
can conclude that corruption is least widespread in the countries with stable democracies, and
on the other hand, countries with non-democratic, often dictatorial regimes are usually on the
opposite side of the scale.

In many countries we may speak about institutionalisation of corruption, i.e. that it is

considered as a common phenomenon, and it is becoming beneficial not only to individuals,
but also to certain groups, e.g. political parties or some professions. “The expected profit

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from participation in a corrupt transaction compared to non-participation therein depends on

the number of other people engaged therein.”8 For example, if the rules for funding of
political parties are of little transparency, then the fundraising to cover their activities may be
related to corruption. If one political party engages therein, the remaining political parties
tend to behave in a similar way. Scandals related to funding of political campaigns did not
become a subject of political fight (for example in Slovakia), whereupon it may be concluded
that other parties proceed in much the same way. The higher the number of parties with
similar behaviour, the higher the costs for the party, which does not want to use such money.
The problem may only be dealt with by means of changing rules and exerting pressure to
provide information on the funding.

o Corruption also causes inequality of citizens according to whether they dispose of

funds for the bribe or not, which divides them into those who have access to e.g.
education, or to quality health care services, and those without such access. The
division is also into prosecutable and non-prosecutable citizens according to
whether they are able to ensure a “favourable” settlement of the legal dispute by
means of a bribe.

Corruption is also dangerous due to the fact that it has broader social relations, deeper roots.
It works as a system, having its own playing rules, internal mechanisms. It works on the
principle of a perpetuum mobile, thus, once it had originated and got spread to certain
dimensions it is being spread further by its own mechanisms. The larger its extent, the higher
the increase in its potential to be spread further. Thus, the present extent of corruption to a
certain degree determines spreading of corruption in the future, unless radical steps are
implemented in the system.

Corruption undermines democratic development, inhibiting the performance of public

institutions and the optimal use of resources. It feeds secrecy and suppression. Ultimately, it
denies development and an increased quality of life to the most vulnerable members of
society. While corruption might, at least in theory, be tamed in an autocratic and dictatorial
manner using a "big stick", the inexorable decline into corruption and other abuses of power
on the part of totalitarian administrations suggests that this can only be temporary. The
promotion of national integrity across the board is crucial to any process of sustainable
reform. By raising levels of national integrity, corruption can be reduced; and this approach is
vital if other efforts to promote sustainable and equitable development are not to be
undermined.

As is well known, corruption engenders wrong choices9. It encourages competition in

bribery, rather than competition in quality and in the price of goods and services. It inhibits
the development of a healthy marketplace. Above all, it distorts economic and social
development, particularly damaging in developing countries. Too often, corruption means
that the world's poorest, who are least able to bear the costs, must pay not only for the
corruption of their own officials, but also for that of companies from developed countries.
Moreover, evidence shows that if corruption is not contained, it will grow, and grow
exponentially. Once a pattern of successful bribes is institutionalised, corrupt officials have
an incentive to demand larger bribes, engendering a "culture" of illegality that in turn breeds

8
For more detail see Andvig, 1991.
9
TI Source Book 2000.

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market inefficiency. Once the moral authority of managers is lost, through corruption at
higher levels, their ability to control their subordinates evaporates.

At the conceptual level, there are many costs associated with corruption. However, it is
hardly surprising that there is little hard evidence on the incidence and magnitude of
corruption. Surveys of business people indicate that the problem varies widely across
countries and that even within countries, some public agencies (for example, customs and tax
collection) are more prone to corruption than others. Surveys also indicate that, where
corruption is endemic, it imposes a disproportionately high cost on small businesses. Most
importantly, the heaviest cost is typically not so much in the bribes themselves, but rather in
the underlying economic distortions they trigger and in the undermining of institutions of
administration and governance.

Emerging democracies, in particular, brave considerable political risks if corruption is not

contained, as the corrupt can greatly weaken the authority and capacity of the fledgling state.

3. REASONS FOR CORRUPTION

Corruption flourishes in areas where the profit from corruption is high and the risk of
detection low. It is related to the level of formal and informal rules.10

3.1. FORMAL RULES

Corruption potential is formed, if rules:

o do not exist,
o if there are loopholes and drawbacks therein, or
o if they are not clearly-defined, unpredictable, which discretion power in decision making,
if the conflict of interests is not efficiently countered at all levels (public officials, state
administration, public administration, self-administration).
o if the valid legislation and enforceability of law cause that the risk of detection and
bearing of consequences is of minor, or low value, compared to the profit. It depends on
the control and sanctioning mechanisms

Corruption potential is formed in certain economic situations (which at the same time
indicates answer to the question of how it may be restricted):

o If the demand is higher than supply (from the point of view of amount, or quality)
there arises an attempt to obtain the shortage goods via a bribe. Some services in health
care, education, or in granting of social flats may be used as examples.

o If there is a high engagement of public administration in economy, i.e. too much

regulation, or re-distributing processes, potential space for corruption is formed. The
surveys clearly demonstrate that corruption is related to bureaucracy, as it forces citizens
as well as businesspeople to buy speedy or favourable settlements of the required
formalities or advantages via bribery.

10
The formal rules pursuant to the new institutional economy shall be understood as rules, laws, standards and
institutions. The informal rules shall be understood as behaviour models, habits, unwritten rules, values.

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o If there is a low degree of political life transparency and its low controllability.
Despite several scandals, the issues of funding of political parties did not become a
subject of political fight, signalling that other political parties are applying similar
methods as well. This situation is accurately characterised by a quotation of the US
President R. Nixon regarding the Watergate scandal: “There is no tree in the forest,
which does not have to fear the storm.”

o If imperfection of the legislative, regulatory and control systems enables private

companies to turn politicians and civil servants to their vassals in the sense that they
approve legislation and regulations “a la carte” – suiting the particular companies. This
phenomenon (capture economy) is especially known in the transition economies.

Table 2
State capture and administrative corruption according to countries
(selected countries 1999)

Country Index of state capture by companies Corruption in

administration
PL PR CB PC CC FPP MCI C R
Albania 12 7 8 22 20 25 16 M 4,0
Azerbaidzhan 41 48 39 44 40 35 41 H 5,7
Bulgaria 28 26 28 28 19 42 28 H 2,1
Croatia 18 24 30 29 29 30 27 H 1,1
Czech Republic 18 11 12 9 9 6 11 M 2,5
Estonia 14 7 8 8 8 17 10 M 1,6
Georgia 29 24 32 18 20 21 24 H 4,3
Hungary 12 7 8 5 5 4 7 M 1,7
Kyrgyzstan 18 16 59 26 30 27 29 H 5,3
Latvia 40 49 8 21 26 35 30 H 1,4
Lithuania 15 7 9 11 14 13 11 M 2,8
Moldavia 43 30 40 33 34 42 37 H 4,0
Poland 13 10 6 12 18 10 12 M 1,6
Romania 22 20 26 14 17 27 21 H 3,2
Russia 35 32 47 24 27 24 32 H 2,8
Slovakia 20 12 37 29 25 20 24 H 2,5
Slovenia 8 5 4 6 6 11 7 M 1,4
Ukraine 44 37 37 21 26 29 32 H 4,4
Mean 3,0
Note:
PL – parliamentary legislation
PR – presidential regulations
CB – central bank
PC – penal courts
CC – commercial courts
FPP – funding of political parties
MCI – mean capture index
C – capture, M – medium, H – high

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R – ratio of the amount of bribes to income in the company

Source: Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000; see also http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance

The above-mentioned problem is also related to non-existence of lobbying rules. Lobbying

may be characterised as direct influence of an individual or an interest group, or its
representative, on an elected public administration representative or employee, with the aim
to influence the result of a legislative or regulatory process. It does not present conflict of
interests or corruption. A necessary feature of lobbying is that it is a public activity, or
publicly controllable. As far as lobbying is performed on a public basis and as far as the
possibility of more or less equal access to the elected representatives and to public
administration is provided to all interest groups, then lobbying contributes to mediation of
information on the legislative and political market and supports the quality of the legislative
process. Too often, however, the content of the word lobbying is confused with the content of
the word corruption. Compared to the above-mentioned definition of lobbying, there is a
difference in that corruption involves a direct impact of an individual or an interest group, or
its representative, on the elected representative or government official, with the aim to
influence the result of a legislative, regulatory or executive process via exchange for financial
or other reward in favour of the elected representative or government official, or a political
subject represented by them. As a rule, corruption is non-public.

International comparisons11 show that corruption in the public sector is manifested in the
same areas, regardless of the fact whether the country in question is an industrial or a
developing one. The following public sector areas tend to corruption:
o public procurement,
o allocation of land,
o levying of taxes,
o appointment to governmental functions,
o local self-administration.

The methods used in corruption were also very similar:

o nepotism, connexions, preference of relatives and family members,
o political corruption by means of pre-election campaign support,
o commissions for being awarded public contracts (including consultations at the
conclusion of contracts),
o fraud of all kinds.

It is therefore possible to know the corruption-sensitive areas, and on the other hand, it is
possible to use the international know-how in the area of anti-corruption tools.

3.2. INFORMAL RULES12

Behaviour is also regulated by more subtle rules, by the moral system and by acceptance of
ethical and moral values.

11
Pope, 2000.
12
Fore more detail see Zemanovičová (2000).

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If the citizens´ tolerance towards corruption is high, there exists no efficient pressure towards
change. The power of public opinion exerts pressure on the politicians, and the political will
may result in system changes restricting the space for corruption. Much experience from
abroad shows that corruption is less thriving in societies with sound and active civil society13.

Formation of the society’s value orientation is a long-term process influenced by historical,

cultural and economic conditions. Informal rules, unlike the formal, cannot be quickly
changed, they have their natural inertia.

If we want to understand the informal rules, it is necessary to see our near as well as more
distant past. Already the pagan habits of reconciliation of divinities, or buying of indulgences
include inherent germs of corrupt behaviour.

Fore many countries there was political corruption in the conditions of the past regime, when
citizens paid for their relatively high standard of living by loyalty towards the regime,
although provision of this standard still more and more collided with the limited possibilities
of the unsound economic system. In the period of centrally planned and administered
economy and society, the relationship citizen – public administration was being deformed in
two directions. On the one hand, there was paternalism, when the state assumed responsibility
for everything and the citizens got the feeling that someone is here to care for them. On the
other hand, the citizen’s rights were suppressed, administration of public affairs got alienated
to the citizen, public administration was a suppression tool of civil rights and liberties. The
citizens´ passivity formed part of the system. The citizen’s initiative was being suppressed. A
double-moral environment was formed within the society (outwardly, compulsory acceptance
of the “values of socialism” was expressed, whereas in private, “pragmatic” behaviour
models were being formed)14. Behaviour norms and ethical values (e.g. of the builders of
communism, norms for children in the pre-pioneer organisation and for the pioneers) were
downgraded in the past. Not only that they were not complied with, but also efforts to
implement them by force elicited dislike in the citizens.

According to several authors15, the elites of that regime exchanged their political capital for
the economic one. “Social capital is of disadvantage compared to the economic one due to the
fact that it is contextually bound, whereas money has the most beautiful quality that it is
contextually absolutely neutral… Dirty connexions may not be deposited in a bank and then
used in a different context, whereby with dirty money this is possible.”16 This is one of the
reasons why the change of the system was relatively easy to bring about. It, however, at the
same time indicated the risk that relations of clientelism have been preserved, and the more
difficult it will be to combat them.

The actual transition process provides further corruption opportunities. Absence of rules,
their non-functioning and very restricted enforceability of law enabled limited interest groups
to profit from this situation.

13
See e.g. Putman, 1993.
14
E.g. the motto “who does not rob, robs his family” or “who greases moves better (“to grease” – in literally
translation it is the Slovak idiom for “to give bribes”)
15
See e.g. Frič, 1999.
16
Možný, 1991.

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Corruption is flourishing in the conditions of the so-called unrepeated game, and on the
contrary, the more the conditions approach the rules of repeated game, the smaller the
corruption space becomes, and there is an interest to establish correct playing rules.

Deformation took place in the areas of successful behaviour models, values and ethics. The
citizens have to come to terms with the fact that even the biggest cases related to privatisation
and tunnelling, the investigation of which was the subject of pre-election promises of the
present coalition, remain unpunished. Underrating, or conscious imperfection of the
institutional framework, provided considerable space for corrupt behaviour. After more then
ten years of transition in many transition countries the state is strong and weak at the same
time. For example, its engagement in the economy is still high, implementation of the public
administration reform as well as its decentralisation have not taken place, the extent of re-
distributing processes is also high. On the other hand, the state’s weakness is manifested in its
inability to guarantee the observation of rules17.

This elicits pessimism and scepticism in the citizens, they get the feeling of impossibility to
influence the administration of public affairs, and they also perceive corruption to be
inherent, whereby they expect that the state, or someone else, will liberate them from this
phenomenon.

Such environment only enables to implement changes by radical intervention into the
prevention and repression system. Moreover, activities of the government and the parliament,
but also of the civil society are required. Some surveys show18 that the citizens perceive the
problems of corruption rather at the level of individuals and their immoral attitudes. There is
less perception that it is not enough to throw the “rotten apples” out of the basket, because if
the basket remains clammy, i.e. if the environment is not changed, then also the new apples
will become rotten. This requires enlightenment, and it is necessary to cultivate the active
attitude of citizens by means of informing on the particular tools that may be applied in the
fight against corruption. Although no quick results may be expected due to the already
mentioned conservativeness of the informal rules. It is also very important to exert influence
in the area of information and education, and to provide information to citizens, which is not
only related to corruption and its harmfulness, but also informs about the possibilities of how
to restrict the space for its existence, and what the citizens can do if they encounter it.

Also the foreign countries provide several examples supporting the statement that corruption
has long-term bonds to the historical and cultural context, however, it also was often
imported, e.g. during colonial domination.

Homework exercise:
1) according to the text above analyse situation in your country, define the main reasons
why corruption has become that widespread, identify common marks as well as the
specifics of each transition country

17
E.g. the degree of central re-distribution of funds and audit of licences, permits and subsidies at the particular
ministries showed its considerable extent and unclear decision-making criteria.
18
See Zemanovičová – Gyárfášová, 2000.

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2) identify key players - groups that could have interest and yield from corruptive
environment and similarly groups, which regularly loose from corruption and could form
an anti-corruption alliance and enforce necessary reforms.

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References

1. Ackerman, S.R.: Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform, Cambridge University
Press, 1999.
2. Aderivwale, A.: Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in West Africa. Ibadan, ALF Publications 1995.
3. Andvig J. C.: The economics of corruption: a survey. Study economici, No. 43/1, 1991.
4. Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in Africa. Benin, Cotonou 9.-21. 9. 1994. Frič, P. et al.:
Korupce na český způsob (Corruption in the Czech Way). Praha, Nakladateľstvo G plus G 1999.
5. Explaining corruption edited by Robert Williams, The Politics of Corruption, Cheltenham, UK.
Northampton, MA, USA,2000.
6. Friedrich, C. J.: Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective. In: Heidenheimer A. J., – Johnson M. –
Levine S.: Political Corruption: A Handbook. New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transition Publishers 1990.
7. Hellman, J. S. – Jones, G. – Kaufmann, D.: Seize the State, Seize the Day (State Capture, Corruption and
Influence in Transition). Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank Institute 2000.
8. Integrity Pact – the concept, the model and the present applications. A Status report. Berlin, TI Berlin 2000.
9. Korupcia na Slovensku (Corruption in Slovakia). Diagnostic survey. The World Bank 2000.
10. Krivý, V. – Feglová, V. – Balko, D.: Slovensko a jeho regióny. Sociokultúrne súvislosti volebného
správania (Slovakia and its regions. Socio-cultural contexts of election behaviour.). Bratislava, Nadácia
Média 1996.
11. Lízal, L. – Kočenda, E.: Corruption and Anticorruption in the Czech Republic. Working Paper N. 345,
Wiliam Davidson Institute 2000.
12. Možný, I.: Proč tak snadno (Why in a such easy way). Praha, Sociologické nakladatelství 1991.
13. Noonan, J. T.: Bribes. Los Angeles, University of California Press, Berkeley 1984.
14. Pope, J.: National Integrity System. Berlin, Transparency International, Berlin 1998.
15. Pope, J.: Source Book. Berlin, Transparency International 2000.
16. Putman R. D.: Making Democracy Work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press 1993.
17. Quah, Jon S. T.: Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN countries. In: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,
Vol. 13., 1982.
18. Sičáková, E. et al.:Corruption Forms in Slovakia. Bratislava, CPHR – Transparency International
Slovensko 1999.
19. Zemanovičová, D. – Gyárfášová,O.: Korupcia na Slovensku z hľadiska spravovania vecí verejných
(Corruption in Slovakia from the Aspect of Public Affairs Administration). Bratislava, CPHR –
Transparency International Slovensko 2000.
20. Zemanovičová, D.: Relations between government and citizens, in Ethics in public administration,
Bratislava, 2000a
21. Zemanovičová, D. – Sičáková, E.: Corruption in the Slovak republic as a problem affecting the whole
society, CPHR – Transparency International Slovakia, 2001

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Attachment 1:

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2001

Country Country 2001 CPI Score Surv Standard High-Low

Rank eys Deviation Range
Used
1 Finland 9.9 7 0.6 9.2 - 10.6
2 Denmark 9.5 7 0.7 8.8 - 10.6
3 New Zealand 9.4 7 0.6 8.6 - 10.2
4 Iceland 9.2 6 1.1 7.4 - 10.1
Singapore 9.2 12 0.5 8.5 - 9.9
6 Sweden 9.0 8 0.5 8.2 - 9.7
7 Canada 8.9 8 0.5 8.2 - 9.7
8 Netherlands 8.8 7 0.3 8.4 - 9.2
9 Luxembourg 8.7 6 0.5 8.1 - 9.5
10 Norway 8.6 7 0.8 7.4 - 9.6
11 Australia 8.5 9 0.9 6.8 - 9.4
12 Switzerland 8.4 7 0.5 7.4 - 9.2
13 United Kingdom 8.3 9 0.5 7.4 - 8.8
14 Hong Kong 7.9 11 0.5 7.2 - 8.7
15 Austria 7.8 7 0.5 7.2 - 8.7
16 Israel 7.6 8 0.3 7.3 - 8.1
USA 7.6 11 0.7 6.1 - 9.0
18 Chile 7.5 9 0.6 6.5 - 8.5
Ireland 7.5 7 0.3 6.8 - 7.9
20 Germany 7.4 8 0.8 5.8 - 8.6
21 Japan 7.1 11 0.9 5.6 - 8.4
22 Spain 7.0 8 0.7 5.8 - 8.1
23 France 6.7 8 0.8 5.6 - 7.8
24 Belgium 6.6 7 0.7 5.7 - 7.6
25 Portugal 6.3 8 0.8 5.3 - 7.4
26 Botswana 6.0 3 0.5 5.6 - 6.6
27 Taiwan 5.9 11 1.0 4.6 - 7.3
28 Estonia 5.6 5 0.3 5.0 - 6.0
29 Italy 5.5 9 1.0 4.0 - 6.9
30 Namibia 5.4 3 1.4 3.8 - 6.7
31 Hungary 5.3 10 0.8 4.0 - 6.2
Trinidad & Tobago 5.3 3 1.5 3.8 - 6.9
Tunisia 5.3 3 1.3 3.8 - 6.5
34 Slovenia 5.2 7 1.0 4.1 - 7.1
35 Uruguay 5.1 4 0.7 4.4 - 5.8
36 Malaysia 5.0 11 0.7 3.8 - 5.9
37 Jordan 4.9 4 0.8 3.8 - 5.7
38 Lithuania 4.8 5 1.5 3.8 - 7.5
South Africa 4.8 10 0.7 3.8 - 5.6
40 Costa Rica 4.5 5 0.7 3.7 - 5.6
Mauritius 4.5 5 0.7 3.9 - 5.6
42 Greece 4.2 8 0.6 3.6 - 5.6
South Korea 4.2 11 0.7 3.4 - 5.6
44 Peru 4.1 6 1.1 2.0 - 5.3
Poland 4.1 10 0.9 2.9 - 5.6
46 Brazil 4.0 9 0.3 3.5 - 4.5
47 Bulgaria 3.9 6 0.6 3.2 - 5.0
Croatia 3.9 3 0.6 3.4 - 4.6

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Czech Republic 3.9 10 0.9 2.6 - 5.6

50 Colombia 3.8 9 0.6 3.0 - 4.5
51 Mexico 3.7 9 0.6 2.5 - 5.0
Panama 3.7 3 0.4 3.1 - 4.0
Slovak Republic 3.7 7 0.9 2.1 - 4.9
54 Egypt 3.6 7 1.5 1.2 - 6.2
El Salvador 3.6 5 0.9 2.0 - 4.3
Turkey 3.6 9 0.8 2.0 - 4.5
57 Argentina 3.5 9 0.6 2.9 - 4.4
China 3.5 10 0.4 2.7 - 3.9
59 Ghana 3.4 3 0.5 2.9 - 3.8
Latvia 3.4 3 1.2 2.0 - 4.3
61 Malawi 3.2 3 1.0 2.0 - 3.9
Thailand 3.2 12 0.9 0.6 - 4.0
63 Dominican Rep 3.1 3 0.9 2.0 - 3.9
Moldova 3.1 3 0.9 2.1 - 3.8
65 Guatemala 2.9 4 0.9 2.0 - 4.2
Philippines 2.9 11 0.9 1.6 - 4.8
Senegal 2.9 3 0.8 2.2 - 3.8
Zimbabwe 2.9 6 1.1 1.6 - 4.7
69 Romania 2.8 5 0.5 2.0 - 3.4
Venezuela 2.8 9 0.4 2.0 - 3.6
71 Honduras 2.7 3 1.1 2.0 - 4.0
India 2.7 12 0.5 2.1 - 3.8
Kazakhstan 2.7 3 1.3 1.8 - 4.3
Uzbekistan 2.7 3 1.1 2.0 - 4.0
75 Vietnam 2.6 7 0.7 1.5 - 3.8
Zambia 2.6 3 0.5 2.0 - 3.0
77 Cote d´Ivoire 2.4 3 1.0 1.5 - 3.6
Nicaragua 2.4 3 0.8 1.9 - 3.4
79 Ecuador 2.3 6 0.3 1.8 - 2.6
Pakistan 2.3 3 1.7 0.8 - 4.2
Russia 2.3 10 1.2 0.3 - 4.2
82 Tanzania 2.2 3 0.6 1.6 - 2.9
83 Ukraine 2.1 6 1.1 1.0 - 4.3
84 Azerbaijan 2.0 3 0.2 1.8 - 2.2
Bolivia 2.0 5 0.6 1.5 - 3.0
Cameroon 2.0 3 0.8 1.2 - 2.9
Kenya 2.0 4 0.7 0.9 - 2.6
88 Indonesia 1.9 12 0.8 0.2 - 3.1
Uganda 1.9 3 0.6 1.3 - 2.4
90 Nigeria 1.0 4 0.9 -0.1 - 2.0
91 Bangladesh 0.4 3 2.9 -1.7 - 3.8
Source: Transparency International, www.trasparency.org

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Attachment 2:

Bribe Payers Index (BPI)

The BPI ranking is based on scores that derive from

responses to the following exact question:

1999 Transparency International

Bribe Payers Index (BPI)
Ranking 19 Leading Exporters

Gallup International asked: “In the business sectors with

which you are familiar, please indicate whether companies
from the following countries are very likely, quite likely or
unlikely to pay bribes to win or retain business in this
country.”
Rank Country Score Rank Country Score
1 Sweden R 8.3 11 Singapore n.s. 5.7
2 Australia R 8.1 12 Spain S 5.3
2 Canada R 8.1 13 France S 5.2
4 Austria R 7.8 14 Japan R 5.1
5 Switzerland S 7.7 15 Malaysia n.s. 3.9
6 Netherlands S 7.4 16 Italy S 3.7
7 United Kingdom 7.2 17 Taiwan n.s. 3.5
R
8 Belgium R 6.8 18 South Korea R 3.4
9 Germany R 6.2 19 China n.s. 3.1
9 United States 6.2
Source: Transparency International

Notes: the questions related to leading exporters paying bribes to senior public
officials. The standard error in the results was 0.2 or less. In the scoring: 10 represents
a perceived level of negligible bribery, while 0 represents responses indicating very
high levels of bribery.
Questioning found that many respondents said it was difficult to distinguish between
mainland and Hong Kong companies since a growing number of mainland companies
now operate from Hong Kong. Accordingly, the survey used the term 'China
including Hong Kong.'
Status of OECD Convention: R = ratified, S = signed but not ratified, n.s. = not signed

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Bribery in business sectors

Business executives and business professionals in leading

emerging market countries see international bribe-paying to
be greatest in the public works and construction sectors,
followed by the arms industry.

Bribery in Business Sectors

Gallup International asked: Which are the sectors in

your country of residence where senior public officials
would be very likely, quite likely, unlikely to accept or
extort bribes?

The scores below are mean averages from all the responses on a 0 to 10 basis where 0
represents perceptions of very high levels of corruption, while 10 represents
perceptions of extremely low levels of corruption.

The standard error in the responses was small at 0.2 or less.

Public works contracts and construction 1.5

Arms and defence industry 2.0
Power (including petroleum and energy) 3.5
Industry (including mining) 4.2
Healthcare/social work 4.6
Telecommunications, post (equipment and services) 4.6
Civilian aerospace 5.0
Banking and finance 5.3
Agriculture 6.0
Source: Transparency International

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