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Chapter 8

The document discusses reliability concepts like hazard rate, mean time to failure, and the bathtub curve. It then covers reliability networks including series, parallel, and standby configurations. Finally, it summarizes reliability analysis methods such as Markov analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis.

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kirubel Alemu
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265 views49 pages

Chapter 8

The document discusses reliability concepts like hazard rate, mean time to failure, and the bathtub curve. It then covers reliability networks including series, parallel, and standby configurations. Finally, it summarizes reliability analysis methods such as Markov analysis, fault tree analysis, and failure modes and effects analysis.

Uploaded by

kirubel Alemu
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Reliability

Content:
Root Cause of Equipment Reliability Problems and Bathtub Hazard
 Rate Concept
 Reliability Measures
 Reliability Function
 Hazard Rate
 Mean Time to Failure (MTTF)
Reliability Networks
 Series Network
 Parallel Network
 Standby System
 Reliability Analysis Methods
INTRODUCTION
• Reliability is the probability that an item will
perform its stated mission satisfactorily for
the given time period when used under the
specified conditions.
• It is an important factor in equipment
maintenance because lower equipment
reliability means higher need for
maintenance.
ROOT CAUSE OF EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY
PROBLEMS AND BATHTUB HAZARD RATE
CONCEPT
• The basic requirement of plant performance is
equipment reliability because factors such as
product quality, profitability, and production
capacity hinge on this crucial factor alone.
• Over the years various studies have been
conducted to determine the root cause of poor
equipment reliability.
• One study based on data collected over a 30-year
period categorized the root cause of equipment
reliability problems into the following six groups:
1. Sales and marketing: 28%
2. Production scheduling: 20%
3. Maintenance: 17%
4. Production practices: 17%
5. Purchasing: 10%
6. Plant engineering: 8%
• In reliability analysis of engineering
systems it is often assumed that the
hazard or time-dependent failure rate of
items follows the shape of a bathtub as
shown in Fig. 12.1.
FIGURE 12.1 Bathtub hazard rate curve.
• The curve shown in Fig. 12.1 has three distinct regions:
burn-in period, useful life period, and wear-out period.
The burn-in period is also known as “infant mortality
period,” “break-in period,” or “debugging period.”
• During this time frame the hazard rate decreases and
the failures occur due to causes such as presented in
Table 12.1.
• In the useful life period the hazard rate is constant and
the failures occur randomly or unpredictably.
• Some of the causes of failures in this region include
insufficient design margins, incorrect use environments,
undetectable defects, human error and abuse and
unavoidable failures (i.e., ones that cannot be avoided
by even the most effective preventive maintenance
practices).
• The wear-out period begins when the item passes
its useful life period. During the wear-out period the
hazard rate increases.
• Some causes for the occurrence of wear-out region
failures are: wear due to aging, inadequate or
improper preventive maintenance, limited-life
components, wear due to friction, misalignments,
corrosion and creep, and incorrect overhaul
practices.
• Wear out period failures can be reduced
significantly by executing effective replacement and
preventive maintenance policies and procedures.
RELIABILITY MEASURES
This section presents formulas to obtain item
reliability hazard rate and mean time to
failure.

RELIABILITY F UNCTION
• The reliability of an item can be obtained by
using any of the following three equations:
RELIABILITY NETWORKS
• This section is concerned with the reliability
evaluation of most standard networks occurring
in engineering systems.
The networks covered in this section are series,
parallel and standby.
SERIES NETWORK
• In this case n number of units forms a series
system, as shown in Fig. 12.2. If any one of the
units fails, the system fails. All system units
must work normally for successful operation of
the system.
• A typical example of a series system is four wheels of a
car. If any one of the tires punctures, the car for practical
purposes cannot be driven. Thus, these four tires form a
series system. For independent and non-identical units,
the series system, shown in Fig. 12.2, reliability is
PARALLEL NETWORK
Example 12.5
An aircraft has two independent and active
engines. At least one engine must operate
normally for the aircraft to fly. Engines 1 and
2 reliabilities are 0.99 and 0.97, respectively.
Calculate the probability of the aircraft flying
successfully with respect to engines.
STANDBY SYSTEM
• In this case one unit is operating and k units are in
standby mode. As soon as the operating unit fails, it is
immediately replaced with one of the standby units. The
system has a total of (k + 1) units. Figure 12.4 shows a
block diagram of a standby system with (k + 1) units.
Each block in the figure denotes a unit.
FIGURE 12.4 An (k + 1)-unit standby system.
Equation (12.25) is subject to the following
assumptions:
• The switching mechanism is perfect.
• All system units are independent and
identical.
• The standby units remain as good as new in
their standby mode.
• The unit failure rate is non-constant. Times
to failure can be represented by any
statistical distribution (e.g., Weibull, gamma,
or exponential).
Example 12.7
• A system is composed of two independent
and identical units - one working, one on
standby. The standby switching
mechanism is perfect and the unit failure
rate is 0.0005 failures per hour. Calculate
the system mean time to failure and
reliability for a l00h mission. Assume the
standby unit remains as good as new in its
standby mode.
Table 12.3 presents mean time to failure
formulas for some independent unit
standard reliability networks.
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS
Over the years many reliability analysis methods have been
developed. The three such commonly used methods in the
industrial sector: Markov, fault tree analysis (FTA), and failure
modes and effect analysis.

MARKOV METHOD

• The Markov method is a powerful reliability analysis method


named for a Russian mathematician (1856–1922).
• The Markov method is a useful tool to model systems with
dependent failure and repair modes and constant failure and
repair rates.
• It can also handle some systems having time-dependent failure
and repair rates
The Markov method is based on the following
assumptions:
• The transitional probability from one system
state to another in the time Δt is given by λΔt .
The parameter λ is a constant and its dimensions
are occurrences per unit time. In reliability work,
this constant could be a failure or repair rate.
• The occurrences are independent of all other
occurrences.
• The transition probability of two or more
occurrences in time interval Δt from one system
state to another is negligible (e.g.,(λΔt)(λΔ t)→0).
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
• Fault tree analysis (FTA) is one of the most widely
used methods in the industrial sector to perform
reliability analysis of complex engineering systems.
• A fault tree is a logical representation of the
relationship of primary/basic events that lead to a
given undesirable event (i.e., top event). It is
depicted using a tree structure with logic gates such
as OR and AND.
• FTA begins with identification of an undesirable event
called the top event of a given system. Fault events
which could make the top event occur are generated
and connected by logic gates such as OR and AND.
FIGURE 12.7 Basic fault tree symbols: (a) basic fault event,
(b) OR gate, (c) AND gate, (d) resultant fault event.
• The OR gate provides a TRUE (failure) output if one or more
of its input faults are present.
• In contrast, the AND gate provides a TRUE (failure) output if all
of its input faults are present.
• Symbols for both OR and AND gates are shown in Fig. 12.7.
• The fault tree construction proceeds by generation of fault
events successively until the fault events need not be
developed further.
• These fault events are known as basic fault events and the
fault tree itself is the logic structure relating the top fault event
to the basic fault events.
• Four basic symbols used in fault tree construction are shown
in Fig. 12.7. The meanings of both OR and AND gate symbols.
• Circle and rectangle symbols denote a basic fault event and
the resultant fault event which occur from the combination of
fault events through the input of a gate, respectively.
• The development or construction of a fault tree is a top-down process (i.e.,
starting from the top event moving downward). It consists of successively
asking the question, “How could this event occur?”

The following basic steps are involved in performing FTA:

• Define factors such as system assumptions and what constitutes a failure.


• Develop system a block diagram showing items such as interfaces, inputs and
outputs.
• Identify undesirable or top fault event.
• Using fault tree symbols, highlight all causes that can make the top event
occur.
• Construct the fault tree to the lowest level required.
• Analyze the fault tree as per the requirements.
• Identify necessary corrective measures.
• Document and follow up on highlighted corrective measures.
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECT
ANALYSIS (FMEA)
• Failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) is one of the
most widely used methods to evaluate design at the initial
stage from the reliability aspect.
• The technique helps identify requirements for and the
effects of design change. This method was developed in
the early 1950s to evaluate the design of flight control
systems from the reliability aspect.
• FMEA demands listing potential failure modes of each
system /equipment /device /part on paper and its effects on
the listed subsystems/systems/parts/etc.
• The fundamental difference between FMEA and FTA is that
the former is failure-oriented and the latter event-oriented.
The basic steps used in performing FMEA are as follows:

1. Define system/equipment/item boundaries and associated


detailed requirements.
2. List all system/item components and subsystems.
3. Identify each component, its associated failure modes and
their descriptions.
4. Assign failure rate/probability to each identified
component failure mode.
5. List effect or effects of each failure mode on subsystem/
plant.
6. Enter remarks for each failure mode.
7. Review each critical failure mode and initiate appropriate
measures.

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