[Civil Law Review] Article 1162: Provisions Governing Quasi-Delict - 08

JO SANTOS
Cerezo v. Tuazon Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his
G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004 | Carpio, J.: evidence.

FACTS On 30 May 1995, after considering Tuazon’s testimonial and

documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor.
Country Bus Lines bus collided with a tricycle of Tuazon. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability
Tuazon sued for damages against owners and bus driver. because there was no service of summons on him. The trial court
Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs.
bus with plate number NYA 241 collided with a tricycle bearing Cerezo’s business benefited the family, pursuant to Article 121(3)
plate number TC RV 126 along Captain M. Palo Street, Sta. Ines, of the Family Code. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable
Mabalacat, Pampanga. for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence
of Mrs. Cerezo’s employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for Code.
damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her
husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver CA affirmed.
Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda").
Cerezo’s Arguments – Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of
Allegations of the Complaint the present petition for annulment is lack of jurisdiction. Mrs.
Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render
At the time of the incident, plaintiff [Tuazon] was in his judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs.
proper lane when the second-named defendant Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on
[Foronda], being then the driver and person in charge Foronda.
of the Country Bus with plate number NYA 241, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously operate Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a
the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and separate civil action for damages in the criminal action. Such
imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules contention betrays a faulty foundation. Mrs. Cerezo’s contention
and regulations, there being a "Slow Down" sign near proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not of civil
the scene of the incident, and without taking the law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict
necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries, under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted
to severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical ISSUE(S)
injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable to walk and
becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger IS Mrs. Cerezo liable? – YES.
on the left hand being cut[.]
RULING
Summons could not be served due to wrong residence. Alias
summons not served also due to threats made by Atty. Quasi-Delict v. Delict
Cerezo (the husband of the owner). The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a
On 1 October 1993, Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give
Subsequently, the trial court issued summons against Atty. rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil
Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo spouses") at the Makati Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies.
address stated in the complaint. However, the summons was An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently
returned unserved on 10 November 1993 as the Cerezo spouses from the criminal action.
no longer held office nor resided in Makati.
There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from
On 18 April 1994, the trial court issued alias summons against a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of
the Cerezo spouses at their address in Barangay Sta. Maria, remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the
Camiling, Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the complaint procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.
were finally served on 20 April 1994 at the office of Atty. Cerezo,
who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor. Atty. Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-
Cerezo reacted angrily on learning of the service of summons delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo,
upon his person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly told Sheriff William "without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and
Canlas: "Punyeta, ano ang gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong management of her employees and buses," hired Foronda as her
hindi ka makalabas ng buhay dito? Teritoryo ko ito. Wala ka sa driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s
teritoryo mo." "recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence," aggravated by
Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack of due care and diligence in the selection and
RTC granted Motion to Litigate as Pauper. supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda."
On 30 August 1994, the trial court issued an order resolving
Tuazon’s motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses’ Mrs. Cerezo was held liable under Article 2180.
urgent ex-parte motion. On 27 September 1994, the Cerezo “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration. The employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.”
RTC declared defendants in default. Granted relief to Tuazon
The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer. On 27 January 1995,
Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default.
On 6 February 1995, the trial court issued an order declaring the
 [Civil Law Review] Article 1162: Provisions Governing Quasi-Delict - 08
JO SANTOS
Foronda not indispensable. Cerezo’s liability is as an Hence, RTC had jurisdiction to hold them liable. Foronda is
employer which is solidary, primary, and direct. not an indispensable party.u
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction and was competent
indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo
whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s
and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present
case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a
However, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a separate civil action because he opted to file a civil action for
quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable
Foronda is not an indispensable party to the final resolution of for her own civil negligence.
Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
The words of Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia still hold
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for true today as much as it did in 1942:
a quasi-delict is solidary. Can sue one party
Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in x x x [T]o hold that there is only one way to make
this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, defendant’s liability effective, and that is, to sue the
each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There driver and exhaust his (the latter’s) property first, would
is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
representation. devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief.
True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there
Here the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party primary and direct responsibility of the defendant
because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, under article [2180] of the Civil Code. Our view of the
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs,
collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone. because the procedure indicated by the defendant is
wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
“Primary and Direct” refer to whom the suit should be common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis
enforced first. 2180 liability of employer is direct & primary. and other similar public conveyances do not have
Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then,
primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
delict is merely subsidiary. through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably
useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have
The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of
refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation right and justice.
rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although
liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of DISPOSITIVE PORTION
the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for review. The
that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in Resolution dated 21 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
not preventing or avoiding the damage. G.R. SP No. 53572, as well as its Resolution dated 20 January 2000
denying the motion for reconsideration, is AFFIRMED with the
While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the MODIFICATION that the amount due shall earn legal interest at
employee’s criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable 6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial
directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to court’s decision. Upon finality of this decision, the amount due
exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. shall earn interest at 12% per annum, in lieu of 6% per annum,
The idea that the employer’s liability is solely subsidiary is wrong. until full payment.

Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to SO ORDERED.
acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial court’s
acquisition of jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to
dispose of the present case on the merits.

No need to issue new summons as liability is direct.

The Cerezo spouses’ contention that summons be served anew
on them is untenable in light of their participation in the trial
court proceedings. To uphold the Cerezo spouses’ contention
would make a fetish of a technicality. Moreover, any irregularity
in the service of summons that might have vitiated the trial
court’s jurisdiction over the persons of the Cerezo spouses was
deemed waived when the Cerezo spouses filed a petition for
relief from judgment.