January 24, 2020

Liability of Public Officers

Public officers are bestowed with authority consequently he has to be accountable on his
acts and performance of his duty that’s why it is only deemed proper to make it liable to
certain extent. This liability of Public officers has constitutional and statutory basis.
Article 11 sec. 1
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
In order to determine liability we have to know first its duty. There are 2 kinds of duty of
public officers
1. Duty to the public in general
2. Duty to the individual person
If the public officers fails to perform its duty to the public in general, do you have
recourse in law? The problem there is not legal, it is political this duty in public in
general cannot be enforce in law. On the other hand duty to a particular person, the
public officers may have liability for its failure to perform his duty because they are
directly affected by the nonfeasance.
Statutory Liability
Under sec. 38 of ADMIN CODE, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice
or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the
same book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence.
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Accountability of Public Officers; Rank may have
its privileges but certainly a blatant disregard of law and administrative rules is not one
of them—it must be etched in the minds of public officials that the underside of
privileges is responsibilities.—The fact that no conspiracy was established between
petitioners and the true embezzlers of the P55 million is likewise of no moment. The
crime of malversation, as defined under Article 217 of the Code, was consummated the
moment petitioners deliberately turned over and allowed the President’s private
secretary to take custody of public funds intended as payment of MIAA’s obligations to
the PNCC, if obligation there was at all. That petitioner Tabuena who was then General
Manager of MIAA personally and knowingly participated in the misfeasance compounds
the maleficence of it all. Rank may have its privileges but certainly a blatant disregard of
law and administrative rules is not one of them. It must be etched in the minds of public
officials that the underside of privileges is responsibilities.
Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of
its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact
committed in good faith. Such is the ruling in “Nassif v. People.” Tabuena vs.
Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, G.R. No. 103507 February 17,
1997
Firme: there can be no when the mind is not criminal.

HON. JAMES B. PAJARES, vs. DEPUTY SHERIFF ELIZER ALIPANTE

Administrative Law; Sheriff; Respondent who is completely unmindful of his duties, so

indifferent to his responsibilities and who utterly uncaring of the rights of the parties
has shown himself unfit for public service.—We find no cogent reason after reviewing
the record to disturb His Honor's findings. We agree that the respondent is guilty of
gross negligence and conduct seriously prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The evidence shows respondent to have been completely unmindful of his duties, so
indifferent to his responsibilities as to be scornful of them, and utterly uncaring of the
rights of the parties. He has by his conduct shown himself to be unfit for public service,
specially that connected with the administration of justice, which demands the highest
sense of dedication and zeal in the protection and conservation of the rights and
interests of litigants as well as in assuring the efficacy and integrity of the judicial
process.
OCA vs Judge Del Rosario (A.M. No. MTJ-94-949, December 13, 1994)

Courts; Clerks of Court; Commission on Audit; The wanton refusal of court personnel to comply with directives of
the Office of the Court Administrator and of the Commission on Audit shows defiance to superiors amounting to
gross misconduct and/or negligence which must be meted with sanction.—After a careful examination of the
records of this case we find no reason to depart from the conclusion reached by the Office of the Court
Administrator that respondent is indeed liable for gross misconduct and/or negligence. His wanton refusal to
comply with the directives of the Office of the Court Administrator and of the Commission on Audit shows his
defiance to superiors amounting to gross misconduct and/or negligence which must be meted with sanction if
only to remind him that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. As an accountable
officer, respondent cannot profess ignorance of the above-cited circular for it is required that he must update his
knowledge with whatever laws or any memorandum circular that may be issued by the Commission on Audit as
he has to deal from time to time with its auditors, especially in the audit of his cash and accounts. The purpose
of the aforesaid circular is to prevent the fraudulent use of the missing form.

Rama vs CA 148 SCRA 496 (1987)

Issue;
Whether or not Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo are personally liable for
damages for adopting a resolution which abolished positions to the detriment of the
occupants thereof?
Held:
A public officer by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his personal
capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith. A different rule would sanction the
use of public office as a tool of oppression.
Petitioners-public officers are personally liable for damages because of their precipitate
dismissal of provincial employees though on ostensibly legal means; Case at bar.—We
hold that the petitioners in the instant three cases are personally liable for damages
because of their precipitate dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly
legal means. The Court of Appeals, whose factual findings are binding on this Court,
found that the provincial employees concerned were "eased out because of their party
affiliation." i.e., they belonged to the Liberal Party whose presidential candidate then
was Sergio Osmeña, Jr. (CA Decision in G.R. No. 49328-R, p. 6, L-44591, Rollo, p. 38).
Such act of the petitioners reflected their malicious intent to do away with the followers
of the rival political party so as to accommodate their own proteges who, it turned out,
even outnumbered the dismissed employees.
Indeed, municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously or
wantonly, and if the work which they perform is done rather to injure an
individual than to discharge a public duty (56 Am. Jur. 2d 334, citing Yealy V.
Fink, 43 Pa 212). As we have held in Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, L-26882, April 5,
1978, 82 SCRA 294, 307-308, a public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe
honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as public officers or for
wilfully or negligently causing damage to another (Article 20, Civil Code) or for wilfully
causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
and/or public policy (Article 21, New Civil Code).
The dismissed employees are entitled to damages because they have suffered a special
and peculiar injury from the wrongful act of which they complain (Mechem, A Treatise
on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, p. 391). It is an undeniable fact that the
dismissed employees who were holding such positions as foremen, watchmen and
drivers, suffered the uncertainties of the unemployed when they were plucked out of
their positions. That not all of them testified as to the extent of damages they sustained
on account of their separation from their government jobs, cannot be used as a defense
by the petitioners. Suffice it to state that considering the positions they were holding,
the dismissed employees concerned belong to a lowsalaried group, who, if deprived of
wages would generally incur considerable economic hardships.

Spouses Julio V. Cui and Aresia Obsioma-Cui, vs. Judge Job B. Madayag

Administrative Law; Judges; The failure of respondent Judge to attach importance to

the standard and fundamental procedure mandated by the Rules of Court renders him
administratively liable.—While a trial judge may have discretion to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction ex-parte or only after notice and hearing, yet, he must first be
absolutely certain that the motion praying for the dissolution of the writ is in due form.
In this case, respondent Judge carelessly overlooked the basic procedural requirement
of proof of service of notice of the motion to the other party. The failure of respondent
Judge to attach importance to the standard and fundamental procedure mandated by
the Rules of Court renders him administratively liable.
Respondent Judge is required by Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.—The case of respondent
Judge should be no different. For judges are called to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They are not “common men and
women, whose errors men and women forgive and time forgets. Judges sit as the
embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, their last recourse where all other
institutions have failed.” Most importantly, respondent Judge is required by Canon 3,
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. As we held in one case, there will be faith in the
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of the litigant that the
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal
principles.
ELIZA RATILLA DE LA CRUZ vs JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION (A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062, August 25, 1994)

Administrative Law; Criminal Law; Judges; Judgment; As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous.—In Revita v. Rimando we said—x x x x (i)t may be argued that the respondent
committed an error of judgment in dismissing the complaint for grave slander and thus causing (at least in
complainant’s opinion) a miscarriage of justice. However, there is no proof that the error was attributable to a
conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, January 21, 1974,
55 SCRA 107, 119). ‘As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.’

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case before us, the
administrative complaint does not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. As a crime, it is
punished under Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he
renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and, (d) the judge knows
that his judgment is unjust. The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously
or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust.

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, or both. The source of
an unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well settled that a
judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which
he commits, provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability.

As interpreted by Spanish courts, the term “knowingly” means sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate
intention to do an injustice. Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not
constitute the crime.

“Mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance or bad faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and immaterial in
an administrative proceeding against him.”
Firme: the liability of the public officers happens when they acted with malice, or if
there is no malice their negligence is so gross.
TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS
Why there is a need for termination of official relations?
Firme: a public office is not supposed to be held in perpetuity. Public office cannot be
inherited to the heirs. Because somehow we have to make periodic renovation that’s why
it cannot be held in perpetuity.
Modes of termination of official relations
Expiration of term or tenure of office
Reaching the age limit (retirement)
Death or permanent disability
Resignation
Acceptance of an incompatible office
Abandonment of office
Prescription of right to office
Removal
Impeachment
Recall
By expiration of term of office
Upon expiration of the officer’s term, his rights, duties and authority must ipso facto
cease.“Term” ordinarily means a fixed and definite time prescribed by law or
Constitution by which an officer may hold an office. It does not apply to appointive
offices held at the pleasure of the appointing power.
Removal and expiration of term distinguished
To “remove” an officer is to oust him from office before the expiration of his term. When
the term is not fixed by law, and the incumbent is relieved by the appointing authority,
the legal effect is the same as if the term had been fixed by Congress itself. There is no
removal. When an appointment is for a definite and renewable period, non-renewal
thereof does not involve dismissal by an expiration of term.
Meaning of resignation
“Resignation” is the formal renunciation or relinquishment of a public office. It implies
an expression by the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to
surrender, renounce, and relinquish his right to the office and its acceptance by
competent and lawful authority.
Meaning of abandonment
“Abandonment” refers to the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder of all
right, title, or claim thereto with the intention of not reclaiming it, or terminating his
possession and control thereof.
By acceptance of an incompatible or prohibited office
If the office accepts another office incompatible with the first, he ipso facto vacates the
first office. The rule holds regardless whether the second office is inferior to the first;
even when title to the second office fails as where the election was void; nor when
another person has been appointed or elected.
When the law or Constitution prohibits the officer from accepting another office other
than that which he holds, he does not forfeit his original office. the second appointment
is void.
When offices incompatible with each other
There is conflict in the duties and functions of the offices;
One is subordinate to the other and is subject to its supervisory power; or The
Constitution or the law itself declares the incompatibility.
Exceptions to rule on holding incompatible offices
Where the officer cannot vacate the first office by his own act, upon the principle that he
will not be permitted to do indirectly what he could not do directly, as when the law
requires approval of the provincial board before a municipal officer can resign;
Where the first office is held under a different government from that which conferred
the second;
Where the officer is expressly authorized by law to accept another office; and
Where the second office is temporary.
By removal
Offices may also become vacant by the removal or dismissal of the incumbent from the
service under a variety of circumstances. Removal may be arbitrary or for cause.
Removal from office may be expressed or implied. Where it is expressly made, no
question can ordinarily arise either as to its purpose or effect.
Meaning of removal
“Removal” entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term. It
implies that the office exists after the ouster. Synonymous to “dismissal”.
What constitutes removal
Appointment of another officer. Where an officer may be removed at the superior
officer’s pleasure, the mere appointment of another in his place constitutes removal.
However, the incumbent must be notified of the action before the removal is considered
effective.
Meaning and purpose of impeachment
a. Definition: It is a method of national inquest into the conduct of public men.
b. Purpose: its purpose is to protect the people from official delinquencies or
malfeasances. It is primarily intended for the protection of the State and not for the
punishment of the offender. The penalties are incidental to the protection of the
people

By recall
a. It is the procedure by which an elective official may be removed at any time during
his term by the vote of the people at an election called for such purpose or at a
general election.

Purpose and nature of the power of recall

a. Effective speedy remedy for removal
1. The purpose of recall is to provide an effective and speedy remedy for the
removal of an official who is not giving satisfactory service to the public and
whom the electors do not want to remain in office, regardless of whether he is
discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates.
b. Political nature involving exercise of judicial functions
1. The power granted to electors to remove officers is political in nature and not
the exercise of a judicial function.
c. Essentially the power of removal exercised by the people themselves
1. Since the source of the power in a republic is the people, therefore, they have
the power to remove their officials.

Ambas vs Buenaseda 201 SCRA 308

Firme: The national center for mental health has the right to set standards for those physician
that possess these qualities and qualification for a certain specialization and this standard
cannot be question by the court. However the national center for mental health has no right to
terminate it’s only the DOH Sec.

GOVERNOR EMILIO M.R. OSMEÑA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Issue: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional

Held:

It thus becomes very evident that the Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior
to June 30, 1992 or more specifically, on the second Monday of May, 1992.

On this point, it has to be stressed that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials , is
fixed by the Constitution at three years (Sec. 8, Art. X). The incumbent local officials were elected in January 1988.
Therefore, their term would have expired on February 2, 1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of
June 30, 1992.
Upon the other hand, and contrary to the express mandate of the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act 7056 provides
for two (2) separate elections in 1992 as follows:

Sec. 2. Start of Synchronization — To start the process of synchronization of election in accordance with
the policy hereinbefore declared there shall be held:

(a) An election for President and Vice-President of the Philippines, twenty four (24) Senators and all
elective Members of the House of Representatives on the second Monday of May, 1992, and

(b) An election of all provincial, city and municipal elective officials on the second Monday of
November, 1992.

With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized (simultaneous) national and local
elections in the second Monday of May, 1992, the inevitable conclusion would be that Republic Act 7056 is
clearly violative of the Constitution because it provides for the holding of desynchronized election. Stated
differently, Republic Act 7056 particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the
1987 Constitution.

But this is not all. There are other provisions of the Constitution violated by RA 7056. For one, there is Section 2,
Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve
until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond
June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified.

Also, there is Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which provides that:

The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials which shall be determined by law
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. . . .

But if the local election will be held on the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be
elected will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995,
not three years as provided for by the Constitution.

Then also, Section 9, Article IX of the Constitution provides that:

Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety
days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.

Under this provision the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy and the ensuing campaign period must be embraced
or circumscribed within that election period of ninety days, except when in special cases, the Comelec (not
Congress) alters the period. But RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period.

All these — the postponement of the holding of a synchronized national and local election from 1992 to 1995; the
hold-over provision for incumbent local officials; the reduction of the term of office of local officials to be elected
on the second Monday of November 1992 and the change in the campaign periods, are violative of the 1987
Constitution.

ROSALINDA DE PERIO SANTOS vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG and SECRETARY RAUL
MANGLAPUS (G.R. No. 94070, April 10, 1992)
The petitioner’s designation as the permanent representative of the Philippine Government to the United Nations
and other International Organizations in Geneva, was one based on the special trust and confidence which the
appointing power, the President, had in the appointee. Once that trust and confidence ceased to exist, the
incumbent’s continuance in the position became untenable. When that confidence is lost and officer holding the
position is separated from the service, such cessation is not removal from office but merely an expiration of his/her
term.

Petitioner may not justifiably assail the appointment of Narcisa Escaler as her replacement in Geneva because the
power to appoint is essentially discretionary. The appointing power, the President, has the right of choice which
she may exercise freely, according to her best lights.

FIRME: Lost of confidence is a ground for Removal from the office.

Joson vs Nario 187 SCRA 453

Firme: Nario has to wait for the acceptance of his resignation because if not he would be liable for abandonment.
Nario should the Gov. In order for this resignation to be valid and effective it must be accepted if there is no
acceptance there is no resignation to speak off and therefore the official relation has not been terminated.

MARIO D. ORTIZ, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the
intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful
authority.

From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to surrender
his position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was
placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state therein that he was
unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said letter was actually a response to
Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25,1986 when she called on all appointive public
officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore confidence in public administration.

FIRME: In order for resignation to take effect there must be an intention to surrender his office accompanied by
the act of relinquishment. Since the resignation is not voluntary they are deemed to have completed that 16 years.

GUILLERMO GONZALES vs HON. JAIME HERNANDEZ, as Secretary of Finance (G.R. No. L-15482, May 30, 1961)

There is no resignation to speak of, because there was no intention on plaintiff’s part to relinquish his position as
attorney- agent in the Department of Finance. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the
officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position.

Plaintiff’s position in the GSIS was temporary in nature, during the period of an emergency only. He had the right
to live during the pendency of his appeal and naturally the right to accept any form of employment . In any case, as
the court below found, this temporary employment is not incompatible with his old position; he could resign
this temporary position any time as soon as his case has been definitely decided in his favor.

While thus deprived of his office and emoluments thereunto appertaining the petitioner had to find means to
support himself and his family. The fact that during the time his appeal was pending and was thus deprived of his
office and salary, he sought and found employment in another branch of the government does not constitute
abandonment of his former position.
Back salaries are ordered paid to an officer or an employee only if he is exonerated of the charge against him and
his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be illegal. In the case at bar, plaintiff was not completely
exonerated, because although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service was modified and the plaintiff was
allowed to be reinstated, the decision ordered him to forfeit two months’ pay and not to be given back salaries.

Firme: when the resignation is subject to condition, there is no intention to relinquish an office.

City of Manila vs Subido 17 SCRA 231 (1966)

Held:
1. It is seriously to be doubted whether the Commissioner has power or jurisdiction to indirectly oust an incumbent
official by refusing to approve any appointment extended by the latter. The law points out how an official actually
performing his duties may be ousted: quo warranto proceedings by the Solicitor General or by the party who
claims to be entitled to the office.

We do not believe that the Civil Service Law intended to empower the Commissioner to declare vacant the
position of any officer, Department Head, Director of Bureau, Chief of an office, etc., whose official act in extending
appointments is sent to the Commissioner under the Civil Service Law.
All he has to do is to see whether the said law has been observed. Should he have reasons to believe that an
appointing officer has committed an act that produced forfeiture of his office, he may inform the Solicitor General
so that the latter may take action to oust the incumbent by quo warranto proceedings.

Generally, he may not, in the guise of approving (or disapproving) appointments pass upon the qualification or
tenure of the person making the appointment; especially where — as in this case — such person is actually holding
the office of Mayor and discharging its functions.

The Commissioner is not to inquire into the right of the person (marking the appointment) to hold the office.

He may, however, inquire whether the office itself (or the officer as such) possesses the prerogative to issue the
appointment.

To that extent the respondent has the duty and power to determine "whether the appointments were extended
by the proper appointing authority".

There being no question that the 500 appointments had been extended by the Mayor of Manila, and that such
officer, as such, is empowered to make them, the Commissioner of Civil Service must be required to act on the
same and approve them if and when such appointments are found to be in accordance with the rules of the Civil
Service.

2. No. So with Mayor Villegas: he has not vacated his office as Mayor because he was merely designated as Acting
Director of the NAWASA.

We hereby render judgment holding that petitioner Antonio Villegas is still the Mayor of Manila, and commanding
the Civil Service Commissioner to recognize his signature in the said appointments as the signature of the Mayor of
Manila and to officially act on the same in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

RAUL R. INGLES, vs. AMELITO R. MUTUC

As regards the nature of the positions held by plaintiffs herein, the lower court would seem to have been
impressed by the fact that their items form part of the budget for 1961-1962 for "The President's Private Office,"
under subdivision (a) thereof entitled "Private Secretaries"; that they handled "confidential matters"; and that,
"while plaintiffs perform purely clerical work, the papers handled by them are highly confidential in nature."
The fact that they, at times, handle "confidential matters," does not suffice to characterize their " positions"
as  primarily confidential. Indeed, it is admitted that plaintiffs, likewise, handle "other routine matters," and it has
not even been shown that their work is, at least,  principally confidential.

Considering that plaintiffs herein are admittedly civil service eligibles, with several years of service in the
Government, and that positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential and highly technical in nature
are exceptions to the general rule governing Civil Service officers and employees, it was up to defendants-
appellees to establish that plaintiffs belong to one of these excepted classes. This, defendants-appellees have
failed, to accomplish.

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA vs MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget (G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982)

Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an
office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict
law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of
inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and
the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and
that its view be accorded the fullest consideration.

Firme: The constitutional right to security from tenure can only exist if there is an office. If there is no office
there can no be security of tenure to speak of. Abolition is valid so long as it is made in good faith.