STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION whether the particular case or state of acts is

-Atty. Arsenik B. Pagaduan presented to the court comes with it.

I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS - Legislative purpose: reason why a particular

statute was enacted by the legislature.
A. Definition of Statutory Construction

- In the book of Black, titled “Construction and - Legislative meaning: what the law, by its
Interpretation of the Laws, statutory construction language, means.
was defined as the art or process of discovering
and expounding on the intended signification of D. Situs of Construction and Interpretation
the language used, that is, the meaning which the
authors of the law designed it to convey to others. - In the book of Diaz, “it simply stated that the situs
of construction and interpretation of written laws
- American jurisprudence defines it as that “branch belong to the judicial department. Thus, under the
of law dealing with the interpretation of laws principle of checks and balances, courts may
enacted by the legislature.” declare legislative measures or executive acts as
unconstitutional.
- Cornell Law School defines statutory construction
as the “process of determining what a particular - The judicial power is vested in one Supreme
statute means so that a court may apply it Court and in such lower courts as may be
accurately.” established by law. (Art. 8, Sec. 1 of the Philippine
1987 Constitution)
B. Statutory Construction distinguished from
Statutory Interpretation E. Requisites before the Courts can interpret
and/or construe the law
- In the book of Diaz, “construction is defined as the
drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects - Moot and academic case or question: its purpose
that are beyond the direct expression of the text has become stale or where no practical relief can
from elements known and given in the text, while be granted or which can have no practical effect.
interpretation is the process of discovering the
true meaning of the language used.” - Notwithstanding the mootness, the Court may
resolve the case and construe the applicable law,
- In the book of Agpalo, interpretation was defined “if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review,”
as the “art of finding the true meaning and sense specially where public interest requires its
of any form of words, while construction is the resolution or where rendering a decision on the
process of drawing warranted conclusions not merits would be of practical value.
always include in direct expressions, or
determining the application of words to facts in - The court does not interpret the law in vacuum. It
litigation.” construes or applies the law as it decides
concrete and controverted cases based on the
facts and the law involved. It does not give any
C. Object or Purpose of Statutory Construction legal opinion on hypothetical cases or in cases
and Interpretation which have become, as a rule, moot and
academic.
- In the book of Agpalo, “rules of statutory
construction are tools used to ascertain - Two (2) requisites must concur for the courts to
legislative intent.” [true intent and meaning]; As be duty bound to construe and interpret the laws:
instruments of construction, they may only be
used to clarify, not to defeat, legislative intent. 1. There must be an actual case or
controversy.
- In the book of Agpalo, “the cardinal rule in the
interpretation of all laws is to ascertain, and give ✓ A case brought to the court by party
effect to, the intent of the law.” The object of all litigants to hear and settle their
judicial interpretation of a statute is to determine disputes.
legislative intent, what intention is conveyed,
either expressly or impliedly, by the language ✓ If there is no case or controversy,
used, so far as it is necessary for ascertaining there is no way for the court to
construe or interpret a law.
 2. There is ambiguity in the law involved in the the Program, as long as such requirement can be
controversy. demonstrated when he actually testifies in court.
However, inasmuch as Roque has already been admitted
✓ The law involved is susceptible of into the Program and has actually finished testifying, the
two or more interpretations. issue presented by petitioners has become moot. Thus,
any judgment that this Court may render on the instant
petition would be merely an academic disquisition on a
- Verba legis: When the law is clear and
hypothetical problem. Until it can be shown that an actual
unequivocal, the Court has no other alternative
controversy exists, courts have no jurisdiction to render a
but to apply the law and not to interpret it. binding decision.

- Dura Lex Sed Lex: The Court cannot shy away The Case
from applying the law when no interpretation is
needed no matter how harsh the law may be.
This is a petition for review on certiorari to partially set
aside the June 28, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals,
- Art. 9, NCC: No judge or court shall decline to 1 which disposed as follows: 2
render judgement by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED for want of merit, and the injunction
• Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. issued against respondent judges from hearing the
125532; 10 July 1998 criminal actions against petitioner is hereby LIFTED.

Republic of the Philippines SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila The Court of Appeals upheld the justice secretary's denial
on January 11, 1996 of private respondent's "Petition for
FIRST DIVISION Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to
the Witness Protection Program."

Although Respondent Court ruled in favor of the

G.R. No. 125532 July 10, 1998 government, herein petitioners nonetheless assail the
following portion of the said Decision:
SECRETARY TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.; STATE
PROSECUTORS JUDE ROMANO, LEAH . . . From the explicit terms of the statute, it is at once
ARMAMENTO, MANUEL TORREVILLAS, JOAQUIN apparent that the presence of such corroborative
ESCOVAR, MENRADO CORPUS; the NATIONAL evidence is sine qua non to a witness' admission into the
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; and POTENCIANO Program. Being in the nature of a condition precedent [to]
ROQUE, petitioners, his admission into the Program, the existence of such
corroborative evidence must be shown at the time his
vs. application for admission is being evaluated.

COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO PINEDA, The Antecedent Facts

respondents.
Petitioners relate the antecedent facts of this case as
PANGANIBAN, J.: follows: 3

This case is an offshoot of the investigation conducted by Sometime in the last quarter of 1995, the National Bureau
the government in the last quarter of 1995, which delved of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation on the
into the alleged participation of national and local officials alleged participation and involvement of national and local
in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling. Although government officials in "jueteng" and other forms of illegal
the Court of Appeals upheld the admission into the gambling.
Witness Protection Program of Potenciano A. Roque, who
claimed personal knowledge of such gambling activities, The case was also the subject of a legislative
the secretary of justice nonetheless challenges the side inquiry/investigation by both the Senate and the House of
opinion of the appellate court that the testimony of the Representatives.
witness must, as a condition precedent to his admission
into said Program, be shown to be capable of substantial In November 1995, one Potenciano Roque, claiming to be
corroboration in its material points. The justice secretary an eyewitness to the networking of . . . national and local
claims that such corroboration need not be demonstrated politicians and gambling lords, sought admission into the
prior to or simultaneous with the witness' admission into Government's "Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program." Allegedly, he gained first-hand information in Preliminary Injunction with the respondent Court of
his capacity as Chairman of the Task Force Anti- Appeals.
Gambling (TFAG) during the term of former President
Corazon C. Aquino until his resignation in 1989. He also xxx xxx xxx
revealed that he and members of his family were in
danger of being liquidated, facing as he did the formidable In the meantime, petitioner-prosecutors proceeded with
world of corruption with a well-entrenched hold on
their preliminary investigation, and on February 2, 1996,
Philippine social, political and economic systems. they issued a resolution finding probable cause to charge
private respondent Pineda with several offenses (Annex
After a thorough evaluation of his qualifications, "K"). On February 5, 1996, three (3) Informations for
convinced of his compliance with the requirements of corruption of public officials were filed against him in the
Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as the "Witness Manila and Pasig City Trial Courts (Annexes "L," "M" and
Protection, Security and Benefit Act," the Department of "N"). He was subsequently arraigned on February 28,
Justice admitted Roque to the program, providing him a 1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7 of the City of
monthly allowance, temporary shelter and personal and Manila presided by Judge Enrico Lanzanes, and on
security protection during witness duty. March 14, 1996 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168,
of Pasig City, presided by Judge Benjamin Pelayo.
On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn
statement before NBI Agents Sixto M. Burgos, Jr. and On March 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals came up with a
Nelson M. Bartolome, alleging that during his stint as writ of preliminary injunction enjoining both trial courts
Chairman of the Task Force Anti-Gambling (TFAG), from hearing the criminal actions in the meantime.
several gambling lords, including private respondent
Rodolfo Pineda, and certain politicians offered him money The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
and other valuable considerations, which he accepted,
upon his agreement to cease conducting raids on their
respective gambling operations (Annex "B"). In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the
issue of whether the secretary of justice acted in excess
of his jurisdiction (a) in admitting Petitioner Roque into the
On the basis of Roque's sworn statement, the sworn Program and (b) in excluding him from the Informations
statement and supplemental affidavit of one Angelito H. filed against private respondent. Private respondent
Sanchez, and the sworn statement of Gen. Lorenzo contended that Roque's admission was illegal on two
Mateo (Annexes "C," "D" and "E"), then NBI Director grounds: first, his testimony could not be substantially
Mariano M. Mison forwarded the result of their corroborated in its material points; and second, he
investigation on the "jueteng" scam to the Department of appeared to be the most guilty or at least more guilty than
Justice (DOJ), recommending the filing of the following
private respondent, insofar as the crimes charged in the
charges against Pineda and other persons . . . . Informations were concerned.

xxx xxx xxx Respondent Court also ruled that RA 6981 contemplates
two kinds of witnesses: (a) a witness who has perceived
The DOJ Task Force on Illegal Gambling (composed of or has knowledge of, or information on, the commission of
the petitioner-prosecutors), created by petitioner a crime under Section 3; and (b) a particeps criminis or a
Secretary Teofisto Guingona on November 24, 1995 participant in the crime under Section 10.
(Annex "F"), conducted a preliminary investigation of the
case and subpoenaed all the respondents in I.S. No. 95- Based on his sworn statements, Roque participated in the
774, therein requiring them to submit their counter- commission of the crimes imputed to private respondent
affidavits by December 22, 1995. (corruption of public officials) by accepting bribe money.
Necessarily, his admission to the Program fell under
On December 21, 1995, Roque executed a supplemental Section 10, which requires that he should not appear to
sworn statement relative to I.S. No. 95-774, clarifying be the most guilty of the imputed crimes. Respondent
some of his statements in his first affidavit (Annex "G"). Court found that private respondent sought to bribe him
Consequently, the December 22, 1995 setting was several times to prevent him from conducting raids on
cancelled and reset to January 8, 1996 to give Pineda and private respondent's gambling operations. Such "passive
other respondents time to refute the charges contained in participation" in the crimes did not make him more guilty
the supplemental sworn statement. than private respondent.

On January 5, 1996, Pineda filed a "Petition for On the first issue, Respondent Court initially ruled that, by
Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to express provision of Sections 3 and 10, the requirement
the Witness Protection Program," which was denied by of corroboration is a condition precedent to admission into
petitioner Secretary in a letter-reply dated January 11, the Program. A contrary interpretation would only
1996 (Annexes "H" and "I"). On January 23, 1996, Pineda sanction the squandering of the various benefits of the
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus Program on one who might later be adjudged disqualified
with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
from admission for lack of evidence to corroborate his No Actual Controversy
testimony.
Without going into the merits of the case, the Court finds
However, in the same breath, Respondent Court upheld the petition fundamentally defective. The Constitution
herein petitioners' alternative position that substantial provides that judicial power "includes the duty of the
corroboration was nevertheless actually provided by courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
Angelito Sanchez' and retired Gen. Lorenzo M. Mateo's rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 6
testimonies. Hence, it disposed in favor of the According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist,
government. courts are mandated to settle disputes between real
conflicting parties through the application of the law. 7
Subsequently, this petition was filed. 4 Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial
power, demands the following: (1) there must be an actual
case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
The Issue
question must be ripe for adjudication; 8 and (3) the
person challenging must have "standing"; that is, he has
The lone issue raised by this petition is worded as follows: personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury. 9
Whether or not a witness' testimony requires prior or
simultaneous corroboration at the time he is admitted into The first requisite is that there must be before a court an
the witness protection, security and benefit program. 5 actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power.
Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through
As noted earlier, this petition is unusual and unique. advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned
Despite ruling in their favor, Respondent Court is assailed problems 10 or friendly suits collusively arranged between
by petitioners for opining that admission to the Program parties without real adverse interests. 11 Courts do not sit
requires prior or simultaneous corroboration of the to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
material points in the witness' testimony. scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. 12
As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power,
Respondent Court and private respondent are of the an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. 13
opinion that Sections 3 (b) & 10 (d) of RA 6981 expressly
require that corroboration must already exist at the time of An actual case or controversy exists when there is a
the witness' application as a prerequisite to admission into conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
the Program. RA 6981 pertinently provides: claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is
Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete
for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits
Program whenever the following are present: of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law
xxx xxx xxx would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 14

(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its Thus, no actual controversy was found in Abbas vs.
material points; Commission on Elections 15 regarding the provision in
the Organic Act, which mandates that should there be any
conflict between national law and Islamic Law, the
xxx xxx xxx
Shari'ah courts should apply the former. In that case, the
petitioner maintained that since the Islamic Law (Shari'ah)
On the other hand, petitioners contend that said was derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine
provisions merely require that the testimony of the state law, the Shari'ah may not be subjected to any "man-
witness seeking admission into the Program "can be made" national law. This Court dismissed petitioner's
substantially corroborated" or is "capable of argument because, as enshrined in the Constitution,
corroboration." So long as corroboration can be obtained judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
when he testifies in court, he satisfies the requirement that controversies involving rights which are legally
"his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its demandable and enforceable. No actual controversy
material points." between real litigants existed, because no conflicting
claims involving the application of national law were
The Court's Ruling presented. This being so, the Supreme Court refused to
rule on a merely perceived potential conflict between the
The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national
raised by petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial law.
power.
In contrast, the Court held in Sabello vs. Department of apprehension does not give rise to a justiciable
Education, Culture and Sports 16 that there was a controversy.
justiciable controversy where the issue involved was
whether petitioner — after he was given an absolute After finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
pardon — merited reappointment to the position he had the government prosecutors, Respondent Court allowed
held prior to his conviction, that of Elementary Principal I. the admission of Roque into the Program. In fact, Roque
The Court said that such dispute was not hypothetical or had already testified in court against the private
abstract, for there was a definite and concrete controversy respondent. Thus, the propriety of Roque's admission to
touching on the legal relations of parties and admitting of the Program is already a moot and academic issue that
specific relief through a court decree that was conclusive clearly does not warrant judicial review.
in character. That case did not call for mere opinion or
advice, but for affirmative relief. Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was
violated nor any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative
Closely related to the requirement of an "actual case," relief is being sought in this case. The Court concurs with
Bernas continues, is the second requirement that the the opinion of counsel for private respondent that this
question is "ripe" for adjudication. A question is ripe for action is a "purely academic exercise," which has no
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a relevance to the criminal cases against Respondent
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, Pineda. After the assailed Decision had been rendered,
in PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 17 the Court declined trial in those cases proceeded in earnest, and Roque
to pass judgment on the question of the validity of Section testified in all of them. Said counsel filed his Memorandum
3 of Act No. 2706, which provided that before a private only to satisfy his "academic interest on how the State
school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a machinery will deal with witnesses who are admittedly
permit from the secretary of education, because all the guilty of the crimes but are discharged to testify against
petitioning schools had permits to operate and were their co-accused." 21
actually operating, and none of them claimed that the
secretary had threatened to revoke their permit. Petitioners failed not only to present an actual
controversy, but also to show a case ripe for adjudication.
In Tan vs. Macapagal, 18 the Court said that Petitioner Hence, any resolution that this Court might make in this
Gonzales "had the good sense to wait" until after the case would constitute an attempt at abstraction that can
enactment of the statute [Rep. Act No. 4913 (1967)] only lead to barren legal dialectics and sterile conclusions
requiring the submission to the electorate of certain unrelated to actualities. 22
proposed amendments to the Constitution [Resolution
Nos. 1 and 3 of Congress as a constituent body (1967)] An Executive Function
before he could file his suit. It was only when this condition
was met that the matter became ripe for adjudication; prior
to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. In the present petition, the government is in effect asking
this Court to render an advisory opinion on what the
government prosecutors should do — when, how and
The doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch whom to grant or to deny admission into the Program. To
of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it accede to it is tantamount to an incursion into the
sees fit. Being one such branch, the judiciary, Justice functions of the executive department. From their
Laurel asserted, "will neither direct nor restrain executive
arguments stated above, both sides have obviously
[or legislative action] . . . ." 19 The legislative and the missed this crucial point, which is succinctly stated in
executive branches are not allowed to seek its advice on Webb vs. De Leon: 23
what to do or not to do; thus, judicial inquiry has to be
postponed in the meantime. Before a court may enter the
picture, a prerequisite is that something has been It is urged that they [the provisions of RA 6918] constitute
accomplished or performed by either branch. Then may it ". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the
pass on the validity of what has been done but, then court which has the power under the Rules on Criminal
again, only "when . . . properly challenged in an Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness."
appropriate legal proceeding." 20 The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 which
gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge
of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the
are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of prerogative of courts and beyond executive and
Respondent Roque's testimony, inasmuch as the legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
assailed Decision does not appear to be in conflict with
appertains to the executive department of government
any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our
fear that the assailed Decision would frustrate the laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of
purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute
come out and testify. But their apprehension is neither their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor
justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which Rewards and Incentives to Government Witnesses and
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best Informants and for Other Purposes" provides:
appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. Sec. 4. Any such informants or witnesses who shall
6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to testify, or provide vital information, regarding the
determine who can qualify as a witness in the program existence or activity of a group involved in the commission
and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. of crimes against national security or public order, or of an
Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition organized/syndicated crime or crime group, and/or the
that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is culpability of individual members thereof in accordance
an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the with this Decree shall, upon recommendation of the state
court is given the power to discharge a state witness only prosecutor, fiscal or military lawyer, as approved by the
because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime Secretary of National Defense or the Secretary of Justice,
and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of as the case may be, be immune from criminal prosecution
the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an for his participation or involvement in any such criminal
inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court activity which is the subject of the investigation or
have never been interpreted to be beyond change by prosecution, in addition to the benefits under Sec. 2
legislation designed to improve the administration of our hereof: Provided, that, immunity from criminal prosecution
justice system. [Emphasis ours] shall, in the case of a witness offering to testify, attach
only upon his actually testifying in court in accordance
Simply stated, the decision on whether to prosecute and with his undertaking as accepted by the state prosecutor,
whom to indict is executive in character. Only when an fiscal, or military lawyer: Provided, further, that the
information, charging two or more persons with a certain following conditions are complied with:
offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court, come into play, viz.: xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 9. Discharge of one of several defendants to be c. That such testimony or information can be substantially
witness for the prosecution. — When two or more persons corroborated in its material points;
are charged with the commission of a certain offense, the
competent court, at any time before they have entered xxx xxx xxx
upon their defense, may direct one or more of them to be
discharged with the latter's consent that he or they may
be witnesses for the government when in the judgment of The same tenor was adopted in National Emergency
the court: Memorandum Order No. 26 signed by former President
Corazon C. Aquino, Section 5 (c) of which provides:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
defendant whose discharge is requested; c. Immunity from Criminal Prosecution. — This applies to
the witness participation or involvement in the criminal
case in which his testimony is necessary and may be
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the availed of only upon his actually testifying in court in
proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the accordance with his undertaking, and provided that:
testimony of said defendant;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The testimony of said defendant can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(3) Such testimony or information can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty;
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Said defendant has not at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.
One may validly infer from the foregoing that the
government prosecutor is afforded much leeway in
In the present case, Roque was not one of those accused choosing whom to admit into the Program. Such inference
in the Informations filed by the government prosecutors. is in harmony with the basic principle that this is an
Rule 119, Section 9, is therefore clearly not applicable. executive function.

A resort to the progenitors of RA 6981 will yield the same RA 6981 is a much needed penal reform law that could
result. Although Presidential Decree 1731 and National help the government in curbing crime by providing an
Emergency Memorandum Order No. 26 state only when antidote, as it were, to the usual reluctance of witnesses
immunity from suit attaches to a witness, they do not to testify. The Department of Justice has clearly explained
specify who are qualified for admission into the Program. the rationale for said law: 24
PD 1731, otherwise known as a law "Providing for
Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation,
usually refuse to appear and testify in the
investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases.
Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have
been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence.
For a more effective administration of criminal justice,
there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses
and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure
their appearance in investigative bodies/courts.
FIRST DIVISION
This Court should then leave to the executive branch the
decision on how best to administer the Witness Protection G.R. No. 120721 February 23,
Program. Unless an actual controversy arises, we should 2005
not jump the gun and unnecessarily intervene in this
executive function.
MANUEL G. ABELLO, JOSE C.
CONCEPCION, TEODORO D. REGALA,
Closer Scrutiny of the Assailed Decision AVELINO V. CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
Finally, an accurate reading of the assailed Decision will COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
further enlighten petitioners as to its true message. REVENUE and COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondent Court did sustain Roque's admission into the respondents.
Program — even as it held that the first contention of
petitioners was untenable — based on the latter's DECISION
alternative argument that Roque's testimony was
sufficiently corroborated by that of General Mateo. While
AZCUNA, J.:
Respondent Court insisted that corroboration must exist
prior to or simultaneous with Roque's admission into the
Program, it sanctioned subsequent compliance to cure This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
this defect. The reason for this is found in the penultimate the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the
paragraph of the Decision, in which Respondent Court Court of Appeals in CA –G.R. SP No. 27134, entitled
categorically stated that it found no manifest abuse of "Comissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manuel G. Abello,
discretion in the petitioners' action. There is no quarrel Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Avelino V. Cruz
with this point. Until a more opportune occasion involving and Court of Tax Appeals," which reversed and set aside
a concrete violation of RA 6981 arises, the Court has no the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), ordering
jurisdiction to rule on the issue raised by petitioners. the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) to
withdraw his letters dated April 21, 1988 and August 4,
1988 assessing donor’s taxes and to desist from
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
collecting donor’s taxes from petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
During the 1987 national elections, petitioners, who are
partners in the Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and
Cruz (ACCRA) law firm, contributed ₱882,661.31 each to
F. Definition of Ambiguity the campaign funds of Senator Edgardo Angara, then
running for the Senate. In letters dated April 21, 1988, the
- Ambiguity: doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed each of the
duplicity, indistinctiveness, or uncertainty of petitioners ₱263,032.66 for their contributions. On August
meaning of an expression used in a written 2, 1988, petitioners questioned the assessment through a
instrument. letter to the BIR. They claimed that political or electoral
contributions are not considered gifts under the National
- RCBC vs. IAC and BF Homes: “Ambiguity is a Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), and that, therefore, they
are not liable for donor’s tax. The claim for exemption was
condition of admitting two or more meanings, of
denied by the Commissioner.1 1ªvvphi1.nét
being understood in more than one way, or
referring to two or more things at the same time.
On September 12, 1988, petitioners filed a petition for
review with the CTA, which was decided on October 7,
• Abello v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue – 1991 in favor of the petitioners. As aforestated, the CTA
G.R. No. 120721; ordered the Commissioner to desist from collecting
23 February 2005 donor’s taxes from the petitioners.2

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside

the CTA decision on April 20, 1994.3 The appellate Court
ordered the petitioners to pay donor’s tax amounting to not to employ or buy. On the other hand, the recipient-
₱263,032.66 each, reasoning as follows: donee does not regard himself as exchanging his services
or his product for the money contributed. But more
The National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, importantly he receives financial advantages gratuitously.
provides:
When the U.S. gift tax law was adopted in the Philippines
Sec. 91. Imposition of Tax. (a) There shall be levied, (before May 7, 1974), the taxability of political
assessed, collected, and paid upon the transfer by any contributions was, admittedly, an unsettled issue; hence,
person, resident, or non-resident, of the property by gift, a it cannot be presumed that the Philippine Congress then
tax, computed as provided in Section 92. (b) The tax shall had intended to consider or treat political contributions as
apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether non-taxable gifts when it adopted the said gift tax law.
the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is Moreover, well-settled is the rule that the Philippines need
real or personal, tangible or intangible. not necessarily adopt the present rule or construction in
the United States on the matter. Generally, statutes of
different states relating to the same class of persons or
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of law, the
things or having the same purposes are not considered to
transfer of property by gift, whether the transfer is in trust
be in pari materia because it cannot be justifiably
or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and
presumed that the legislature had them in mind when
whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
enacting the provision being construed. (5206,
intangible, is subject to donor’s or gift tax.
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 546.) Accordingly,
in the absence of an express exempting provision of law,
A gift is generally defined as a voluntary transfer of political contributions in the Philippines are subject to the
property by one to another without any consideration or donor’s gift tax. (cited in National Internal Revenue Code
compensation therefor (28 C.J. 620; Santos vs. Robledo, Annotated by Hector S. de Leon, 1991 ed., p. 290).
28 Phil. 250).
In the light of the above BIR Ruling, it is clear that the
In the instant case, the contributions are voluntary political contributions of the private respondents to Sen.
transfers of property in the form of money from private Edgardo Angara are taxable gifts. The vagueness of the
respondents to Sen. Angara, without considerations law as to what comprise the gift subject to tax was made
therefor. Hence, they squarely fall under the definition of concrete by the above-quoted BIR ruling. Hence, there is
donation or gift. no doubt that political contributions are taxable gifts.4

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General: Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in its resolution of June 16,
The fact that the contributions were given to be used as 1995.5
campaign funds of Sen. Angara does not affect the
character of the fund transfers as donation or gift. There Petitioners thereupon filed the instant petition on July 26,
was thereby no retention of control over the disposition of 1995. Raised are the following issues:
the contributions. There was simply an indication of the
purpose for which they were to be used. For as long as
1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR
the contributions were used for the purpose for which they
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER IN ITS DECISION THE
were intended, Sen. Angara had complete and absolute
PURPOSE BEHIND THE ENACTMENT OF OUR GIFT
power to dispose of the contributions. He was fully entitled
TAX LAW?
to the economic benefits of the contributions.

2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN

Section 91 of the Tax Code is very clear. A donor’s or gift
NOT CONSIDERING THE INTENTION OF THE GIVERS
tax is imposed on the transfer of property by
gift.1awphi1.nét IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE
PETITIONERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS WERE
GIFTS SUBJECT TO DONORS TAX?
The Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Ruling No. 344 on
July 20, 1988, which reads:
3. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DEFINITION OF
Political Contributions. – For internal revenue purposes, AN "ELECTORAL CONTRIBUTION" UNDER THE
political contributions in the Philippines are considered OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE IN DETERMINING
taxable gift rather than taxable income. This is so, WHETHER OR NOT POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE
because a political contribution is indubitably not intended TAXABLE?
by the giver or contributor as a return of value or made
because of any intent to repay another what is his due,
4. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN
but bestowed only because of motives of philanthropy or
NOT CONSIDERING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
charity. His purpose is to give and to bolster the morals,
PRACTICE OF CLOSE TO HALF A CENTURY OF NOT
the winning chance of the candidate and/or his party, and
SUBJECTING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO Donation has the following elements: (a) the reduction of
DONORS TAX? the patrimony of the donor; (b) the increase in the
patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of
5. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN liberality or animus donandi.7
NOT CONSIDERING THE AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE COURT OF The present case falls squarely within the definition of a
TAX APPEALS AND BY THE PETITIONERS TO THE donation. Petitioners, the late Manuel G. Abello8 , Jose C.
EFFECT THAT POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NOT Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala and Avelino V. Cruz,
TAXABLE GIFTS? each gave ₱882,661.31 to the campaign funds of Senator
Edgardo Angara, without any material consideration. All
6. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN three elements of a donation are present. The patrimony
NOT APPLYING AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE ON of the four petitioners were reduced by ₱882,661.31 each.
THE GROUND THAT THIS WAS NOT KNOWN AT THE Senator Edgardo Angara’s patrimony correspondingly
TIME THE PHILIPPINES GIFT TAX LAW WAS increased by ₱3,530,645.249 . There was intent to do an
ADOPTED IN 1939? act of liberality or animus donandi was present since each
of the petitioners gave their contributions without any
consideration.
7. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN
RESOLVING THE CASE MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF A
RULING ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT ONLY AFTER Taken together with the Civil Code definition of donation,
THE ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE? Section 91 of the NIRC is clear and unambiguous, thereby
leaving no room for construction. In Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court10 the
8. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERR
Court enunciated:
WHEN IT DID NOT CONSTRUE THE GIFT TAX LAW
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER AND
STRICLTY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF Court is to apply the law. When the law is clear and free
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION?6 from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent
ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical
First, Fifth and Sixth Issues
language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is
only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. v.
Section 91 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA 708 [1968])
reads:
Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken
(A) There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice
upon the transfer by any person, resident or nonresident, but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered Bank
of the property by gift, a tax, computed as provided in Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985];
Section 92 Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969];
Quijano v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 35
(B) The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or SCRA 270 [1970]).
otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and
whether the property is real or personal, tangible or Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning
intangible. may the court interpret or construe its true
intent.l^vvphi1.net Ambiguity is a condition of admitting
The NIRC does not define transfer of property by gift. two or more meanings, of being understood in more than
However, Article 18 of the Civil Code, states: one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same
time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or
In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce more possible meanings, in which case, the Court is
and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which
provisions of this Code. is to interpret the law according to its true intent.

Thus, reference may be made to the definition of a Second Issue

donation in the Civil Code. Article 725 of said Code
defines donation as: Since animus donandi or the intention to do an act of
liberality is an essential element of a donation, petitioners
. . . an act of liberality whereby a person disposes argue that it is important to look into the intention of the
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who giver to determine if a political contribution is a gift.
accepts it. Petitioners’ argument is not tenable. First of all, donative
intent is a creature of the mind. It cannot be perceived
except by the material and tangible acts which manifest
its presence. This being the case, donative intent is
presumed present when one gives a part of ones may even be called to enact laws that are contrary to the
patrimony to another without consideration. Second, interests of his benefactors, for the benefit of the greater
donative intent is not negated when the person donating good.
has other intentions, motives or purposes which do not
contradict donative intent. This Court is not convinced that In fine, the purpose for which the sums of money were
since the purpose of the contribution was to help elect a given, which was to fund the campaign of Senator Angara
candidate, there was no donative intent. Petitioners’ in his bid for a senatorial seat, cannot be considered as a
contribution of money without any material consideration material consideration so as to negate a donation.
evinces animus donandi. The fact that their purpose for
donating was to aid in the election of the donee does not Fourth Issue
negate the presence of donative intent.
Petitioners raise the fact that since 1939 when the first
Third Issue Tax Code was enacted, up to 1988 the BIR never
attempted to subject political contributions to donor’s tax.
Petitioners maintain that the definition of an "electoral They argue that:
contribution" under the Omnibus Election Code is
essential to appreciate how a political contribution differs . . . It is a familiar principle of law that prolonged practice
from a taxable gift.11 Section 94(a) of the said Code by the government agency charged with the execution of
defines electoral contribution as follows: a statute, acquiesced in and relied upon by all concerned
over an appreciable period of time, is an authoritative
The term "contribution" includes a gift, donation, interpretation thereof, entitled to great weight and the
subscription, loan, advance or deposit of money or highest respect. . . .12
anything of value, or a contract, promise or agreement to
contribute, whether or not legally enforceable, made for This Court holds that the BIR is not precluded from
the purpose of influencing the results of the elections but making a new interpretation of the law, especially when
shall not include services rendered without compensation the old interpretation was flawed. It is a well-entrenched
by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time in
rule that
behalf of a candidate or political party. It shall also include
the use of facilities voluntarily donated by other persons,
the money value of which can be assessed based on the . . . erroneous application and enforcement of the law by
rates prevailing in the area. public officers do not block subsequent correct application
of the statute (PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90
Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by
Since the purpose of an electoral contribution is to mistake or error on the part of its agents (Pineda v. Court
influence the results of the election, petitioners again
of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet
claim that donative intent is not present. Petitioners Consolidated Mining Co. v. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724).13
attempt to place the barrier of mutual exclusivity between
donative intent and the purpose of political contributions.
This Court reiterates that donative intent is not negated by Seventh Issue
the presence of other intentions, motives or purposes
which do not contradict donative intent. Petitioners question the fact that the Court of Appeals
decision is based on a BIR ruling, namely BIR Ruling No.
Petitioners would distinguish a gift from a political 88-344, which was issued after the petitioners were
donation by saying that the consideration for a gift is the assessed for donor’s tax. This Court does not need to
liberality of the donor, while the consideration for a delve into this issue. It is immaterial whether or not the
political contribution is the desire of the giver to influence Court of Appeals based its decision on the BIR ruling
the result of an election by supporting candidates who, in because it is not pivotal in deciding this case. As
the perception of the giver, would influence the shaping of discussed above, Section 91 (now Section 98) of the
government policies that would promote the general NIRC as supplemented by the definition of a donation
welfare and economic well-being of the electorate, found in Article 725 of the Civil Code, is clear and
including the giver himself. unambiguous, and needs no further elucidation.

Petitioners’ attempt is strained. The fact that petitioners Eighth Issue

will somehow in the future benefit from the election of the
candidate to whom they contribute, in no way amounts to Petitioners next contend that tax laws are construed
a valuable material consideration so as to remove political liberally in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against the
contributions from the purview of a donation. Senator government. This rule of construction, however, does not
Angara was under no obligation to benefit the petitioners. benefit petitioners because, as stated, there is here no
The proper performance of his duties as a legislator is his room for construction since the law is clear and
obligation as an elected public servant of the Filipino unambiguous.
people and not a consideration for the political
contributions he received. In fact, as a public servant, he
Finally, this Court takes note of the fact that subsequent - A concept, term, or phrase is ambiguous if it has
to the donations involved in this case, Congress approved more than one meaning. Take "cool" for
Republic Act No. 7166 on November 25, 1991, providing example. One meaning of "cool" has to do with
in Section 13 thereof that political/electoral contributions, temperature, and in this sense, "cool" contrasts
duly reported to the Commission on Elections, are not with "warm," "cold," and "hot." Another meaning
subject to the payment of any gift tax. This all the more of "cool" has to do with fashion and social
shows that the political contributions herein made are
attractiveness.
subject to the payment of gift taxes, since the same were
made prior to the exempting legislation, and Republic Act
No. 7166 provides no retroactive effect on this point. - Vagueness is ubiquitous in the law, and
frequently legal actors (courts and others who
apply the law) must resolve borderline cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are Ambiguity may be less common, because many
AFFIRMED. potentially ambiguous terms or phrases are
disambiguated by context.
No costs.
H. Analyzing Ambiguity and the Different Kinds of
SO ORDERED. Ambiguity

• Chapter 25, Legal Reasoning (2011), Christopher

G. Ambiguity distinguished from Vagueness Enright

- In the book of Diaz, it was said that “as a rule, a I. Void for Vagueness Doctrine
statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks a comprehensible standard of that men “of - The void for vagueness doctrine expresses the
common intelligence must necessarily guess as rule that for an act to constitute a crime, the law
its meaning and differ as to its application.” must expressly and clearly declare such act a
crime. A related doctrine is that penal statutes are
construed strictly against the state and liberally in
- It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: favor of the accused. (Sps. Romualdez vs.
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord COMELEC)
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves - The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out statute which either forbids or requires the doing
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of of an act in terms so vague that men of common
the Government muscle. intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates
- It must further be distinguished from statutes the first essential of due process of law." (Estrada
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to vs. Sandiganbayan)
certain types of activities. It that event, such
statutes may not be challenged whenever - Cornell Law School states that in, “In criminal law,
directed against such activities. a declaration that a law is invalid because it is not
sufficiently clear. Laws are usually found void for
- Legal Theory Lexicon entry focuses on vagueness if, after setting some requirement or
"ambiguity" and "vagueness"--two important punishment, the law does not specify what is
concepts for the theory of interpretation. Some required or what conduct is punishable.” And
legal texts are ambiguous--they contain words or “under vagueness doctrine, a statute is also void
phrases that can have two or more distinct for vagueness if a legislature's delegation of
meanings. authority to judges and/or administrators is so
extensive that it would lead to arbitrary
- "Tall" is a good example of a vague prosecutions.”
concept. Some humans are definitely not tall--
Danny DeVito, for example. Others definitely are
tall--Boban Marjanović, for one. A term is vague,
we might say, if and only if it has borderline
cases. A term is not vague just in case it has no
borderline cases.
 • Lagman v. Medialdea - G.R. No. 231658; 04 July NORKAYA S. MOHAMAD, SITTIE NUR DYHANNA S.
2017 MOHAMAD, NORAISAH S. SANI, ZAHRIA P. MUTI-
MAPANDI, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG) SECRETARY
(OFFICER-INCHARGE) CATALINO S. CUY, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHEF OF
STAFF GEN. EDUARDO M. AÑO, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP) CHIEF DIRECTOR
EN BANC GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON,
July 4, 2017 JR., Respondents.

G.R. No. 231658 DECISION

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO DEL CASTILLO, J.:

S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60
Petitioners days, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation
vs. No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, Mindanao.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR;
AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents The full text of Proclamation No. 216 reads as follows:

x-----------------------x WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016,

was issued on 04 September 2016 declaring a
state of national emergency on account of
G.R. No. 231771
lawless violence in Mindanao;
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, VIRGILIO T. LIN
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the
CUNA, ATELIANA U. HIJOS, ROLAND A. COBRADO,
Constitution provides that 'x x x In case of
CARL ANTHONY D. OLALO, ROY JIM BALANGIDG,
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
RENATO REYES, JR., CRISTIN A E. PALABAY,
requires it, he (the President) may, for a period
AMARYLLIS H. ENRIQUEZ, ACT TEACHERS'
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO L. TINIO, GABRIELA
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines
WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVE
or any part thereof under martial law x x x';
i\RLENED.BROSAS,KABATAAN PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO, MAE
PANER, GABRIELA KRISTA DALENA, ANNA WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal
ISABELLE ESTEIN, MARK VINCENT D. LIM, VENCER Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6968, provides
MARI CRISOSTOMO, JOVITA MONTES, Petitioners, that 'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is
vs. committed by rising and taking arms against the
PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE, EXECUTIVE Government for the purpose of removing from the
SECRETARY SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, ARMED territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF LT. part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
GENERAL EDUARDO ANO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or
POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL RONALD DELA the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
ROSA, Respondents powers or prerogatives';

x-----------------------x WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance

of Proclamation No. 55 was the series of violent
acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such
G.R. No. 231774
as the attack on the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur in February 2016, killing and authorities, i.e., the Zamboanga siege, the Davao
wounding several soldiers, and the mass bombing, the Mamasapano carnage, and the
jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016, freeing bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and
their arrested comrades and other detainees; Basilan, among others. Two armed groups have
figured prominently in all these, namely, the Abu
WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute Sayaff Group (ASG) and the ISIS-backed Maute
terrorist group has taken over a hospital in Marawi Group.1
City, Lanao del Sur, established several
checkpoints within the City, burned down certain The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a
government and private facilities and inflicted government operation to capture the high-ranking officers
casualties on the part of Government forces, and of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group was
started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing
and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government
attempting to remove from the allegiance to the operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence
Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and aimed not only against the government authorities and its
deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties.
prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and As narrated in the President's Report:
to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao,
constituting the crime of rebellion; and On 23 May 2017, a government operation to
capture Isnilon Hapilon, a senior leader of the
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the ASG, and Maute Group operational leaders,
capability of the Maute group and other rebel Abdullah and Omarkhayam Maute, was
groups to sow terror, and cause death and confronted with armed resistance which
damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur but escalated into open hostility against the
also in other parts of Mindanao. government. Through these groups' armed siege
and acts of violence directed towards civilians
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA and government authorities, institutions and
DUTERTE, President of the Republic of the establishments, they were able to take control of
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me major social, economic, and political foundations
by the Constitution and by law, do hereby of Marawi City which led to its paralysis. This
proclaim as follows: sudden taking of control was intended to lay the
groundwork for the eventual establishment of a
DAESH wilayat or province in Mindanao.
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of
martial law in the Mindanao group of islands for a
period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of Based on verified intelligence reports, the Maute
the date hereof. Group, as of the end of 2016, consisted of around
two hundred sixty-three (263) members, fully
armed and prepared to wage combat in
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas
furtherance of its aims. The group chiefly
corpus shall likewise be suspended in the
operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has
aforesaid area for the duration of the state of
extensive networks and linkages with foreign and
martial law.
local armed groups such as the Jemaah
Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of ASG. It adheres to the ideals being espoused by
May in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and the DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its
Seventeen. publication of a video footage declaring its
allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic
Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May State of Iraq and Syria) in particular, as well as
25, 2017, a written Report on the factual basis of illegal drug money, provide financial and logistical
Proclamation No. 216. support to the Maute Group.

The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on
been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which public display the groups' clear intention to
only escalated and worsened with the passing of time. establish an Islamic State and their capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities - the
Mindanao has been the hotbed of violent President, foremost - of their powers and
extremism and a brewing rebellion for decades. prerogatives.2
In more recent years, we have witnessed the
perpetration of numerous acts of violence In particular, the President chronicled in his Report the
challenging the authority of the duly constituted events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City
which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and • Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned
suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit: Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of Maria
Auxiliadora, the nun's quarters in the church, and
• At 1400H members of the Maute Group and the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony. Hostages were
ASG, along with their sympathizers, commenced taken from the church.
their attack on various facilities - government and
privately owned - in the City of Marawi. • About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan
College Foundation had been reportedly killed by
• At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals the lawless groups.
assaulted Marawi City Jail being manage by the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology • Other educational institutions were also burned,
(BJMP). namely, Senator Ninoy Aquino College
Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary
• The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail Pilot School.
facilities, destroyed its main gate, and assaulted
on-duty personnel. BJMP personnel were • The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak
disarmed, tied, and/or locked inside the cells. Hospital and hoisted the DAESH flag there,
among other several locations. As of 0600H of
• The group took cellphones, personnel-issued 24May 2017, members of the Maute Group were
firearms, and vehicles (i.e., two [2] prisoner vans seen guarding the entry gates of Amai Pakpak
and private vehicles). Hospital. They held hostage the employees of the
Hospital and took over the PhilHealth office
located thereat.
• By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City
had been interrupted, and sporadic gunfights
were heard and felt everywhere. By evening, the • The groups likewise laid siege to another
power outage had spread citywide. (As of 24 May hospital, Filipino-Libyan Friendship Hospital,
2017, Marawi City's electric supply was still cut which they later set ablaze.
off, plunging the city into total black-out.)
• Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the
• From 1800H to 1900H, the same members of Landbank of the Philippines and commandeered
the Maute Group ambushed and burned the one of its armored vehicles.
Marawi Police Station. A patrol car of the Police
Station was also taken. • Latest information indicates that about seventy-
five percent (75%) of Marawi City has been
• A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed of
Unit was killed during the takeover of the Marawi members of the Maute Group and the ASG. As of
City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escape the time of this Report, eleven (11) members of
of at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of the City Jail. the Armed Forces and the Philippine National
Police have been killed in action, while thirty-five
(35) others have been seriously wounded.
• The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi
City Jail and other affected areas to evacuate.
• There are reports that these lawless armed
groups are searching for Christian communities in
• By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3)
Marawi City to execute Christians. They are also
bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely, Lilod, Bangulo,
preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes
and Sauiaran, fell under the control of these
groups. They threatened to bomb the bridges to and forcing young male Muslims to join their
groups.
pre-empt military reinforcement.

• Based on various verified intelligence reports

• As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute
from the AFP and the PNP, there exists a
Group had occupied several areas in Marawi
strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in
City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street,
Marawi City, seizing public and private facilities,
Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well as the
perpetrating killings of government personnel,
following barangays: Basak Malutlot, Mapandi,
and committing armed uprising against and open
Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon, Saber, Bubong,
Marantao, Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga, and defiance of the government.3
Abubakar.
The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified
reports he received, led the President to conclude that -
• These lawless armed groups had likewise set
up road blockades and checkpoints at the Iligan
City-Marawi City junction.
These activities constitute not simply a display of The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi
force, but a clear attempt to establish the groups' City and the crucial and significant role it plays in
seat of power in Marawi City for their planned Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the
establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once
covering the entire Mindanao. Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.

The cutting of vital lines for transportation and The groups' occupation of Marawi City fulfills a
power; the recruitment of young Muslims to strategic objective because of its terrain and the
further expand their ranks and strengthen their easy access it provides to other parts of
force; the armed consolidation of their members Mindanao. Lawless armed groups have
throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a historically used provinces adjoining Marawi City
segment of the city population who resist; and the as escape routes, supply lines, and backdoor
brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, passages.
pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, Considering the network and alliance-building
from its allegiance to the Government. activities among terrorist groups, local criminals,
and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi City
There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal:
are attempting to deprive the President of his absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.
power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi These circumstances demand swift and decisive
City as a precedent to spreading their control over action to ensure the safety and security of the
the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine Filipino people and preserve our national
his control over executive departments, bureaus, integrity.6
and offices in said area; defeat his mandate to
ensure that all laws are faithfully executed; and The President ended his Report in this wise:
remove his supervisory powers over local
govemments.4 While the government is presently conducting
legitimate operations to address the on-going
According to the Report, the lawless activities of the ASG, rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public
Maute Group, and other criminals, brought about undue safety necessitates the continued implementation
constraints and difficulties to the military and government of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
personnel, particularly in the performance of their duties of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
and functions, and untold hardships to the civilians, viz.: Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is
completely quelled.7
Law enforcement and other government
agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending In addition to the Report, representatives from the
their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city- Executive Department, the military and police authorities
wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP conducted briefings with the Senate and the House of
have been prevented from performing their Representatives relative to the declaration of martial law.
functions. Through the attack and occupation of
several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the
have been adversely affected. The bridge and Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 3888 expressing full
road blockades set up by the groups effectively support to the martial law proclamation and finding
deprive the government of its ability to deliver Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional
basic services to its citizens. Troop and in accordance with the law". In the same Resolution,
reinforcements have been hampered, preventing
the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason
the government from restoring peace and order in
to revoke the same". The Senate thus resolved as follows:
the area. Movement by both civilians and
government personnel to and from the city is
likewise hindered. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is
hereby resolved, by way of the sense of the
Senate, that the Senate finds the issuance of
The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups Proclamation No. 216 to be satisfactory,
in the area, with support being provided by constitutional and in accordance with the law. The
foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, Senate hereby supports fully Proclamation No.
and their blatant acts of defiance which embolden
216 and finds no compelling reason to revoke the
other armed groups in Mindanao, have resulted
sarne.9
in the deterioration of public order and safety in
Marawi City; they have likewise compromised the
security of the entire Island of Mindanao.5 The Senate's counterpart in the lower house shared the
same sentiments. The House of Representatives likewise
issued House Resolution No. 105010 "EXPRESSING
THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF Citing online reports on the interview of Dr. Amer Saber
REPRESENTATIVES TO PRESIDENT RODRIGO (Dr. Saber), the hospital's Chief, the Lagman Petition
DUTERTE AS IT FINDS NO REASON TO REVOKE insists that the Maute Group merely brought an injured
PROCLAMATION NO. 216, ENTITLED 'DECLARING A member to the hospital for treatment but did not overrun
STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE the hospital or harass the hospital personnel. 22 The
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN Lagman Petition also refutes the claim in the President's
THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO"'. Report that a branch of the Landbank of the Philippines
was ransacked and its armored vehicle commandeered.
The Petitions It alleges that the bank employees themselves clarified
that the bank was not ransacked while the armored
vehicle was owned by a third party and was empty at the
A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)
time it was commandeered.23 It also labels as false the
report on the burning of the Senator Ninoy Aquino College
On June 5, 2017, Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Foundation and the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot
Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. School. It avers that the Senator Ninoy Aquino College
Billones, and Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed a Foundation is intact as of May 24, 2017 and that
Petition11 Under the Third Paragraph of Section 18 of according to Asst. Superintendent Ana Alonto, the Marawi
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Central Elementary Pilot School was not burned by the
terrorists.24 Lastly, it points out as false the report on the
First, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of beheading of the police chief of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
martial law has no sufficient factual basis because there and the occupation of the Marawi City Hall and part of the
is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao State University.25
Mindanao. It argues that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do
not constitute rebellion12 since there is no proof that its Third, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of
purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from martial law has no sufficient factual basis since the
allegiance to the Philippines, its laws, or its territory.13 It President's Report mistakenly included the attack on the
labels the flying of ISIS flag by the Maute Group in Marawi military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016,
City and other outlying areas as mere propaganda114 the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the
and not an open attempt to remove such areas from the Zamboanga siege, the Davao market bombing, the
allegiance to the Philippine Government and deprive the Mamasapano carnage and other bombing incidents in
Chief Executive of the assertion and exercise of his Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional
powers and prerogatives therein. It contends that the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law. It
Maute Group is a mere private army, citing as basis the contends that these events either took place long before
alleged interview of Vera Files with Joseph Franco the conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved,
wherein the latter allegedly mentioned that the Maute or with the culprits having already been arrested.26
Group is more of a "clan's private militia latching into the
IS brand theatrically to inflate perceived capability".15 The
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration of
Lagman Petition insists that during the briefing,
martial law has no sufficient factual basis considering that
representatives of the military and defense authorities did
the President acted alone and did not consult the military
not categorically admit nor deny the presence of an ISIS
establishment or any ranking official27 before making the
threat in the country but that they merely gave an evasive
proclamation.
answer16 that "there is ISIS in the Philippines".17 The
Lagman Petition also avers that Lt. Gen. Salvador Mison,
Jr. himself admitted that the current armed conflict in Finally, the Lagman Petition claims that the President's
Marawi City was precipitated or initiated by the proclamation of martial law lacks sufficient factual basis
government in its bid to capture Hapilon.18 Based on said owing to the fact that during the presentation before the
statement, it concludes that the objective of the Maute Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives,
Group's armed resistance was merely to shield Hapilon it was shown that the military was even successful in pre-
and the Maute brothers from the government forces, and empting the ASG and the Maute Group's plan to take over
not to lay siege on Marawi City and remove its allegiance Marawi City and other parts of Mindanao; there was
to the Philippine Republic.19 It then posits that if at all, absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation
there is only a threat of rebellion in Marawi City which is Front; and the number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS
akin to "imminent danger" of rebellion, which is no longer was "undetermined"28 which indicates that there are only
a valid ground for the declaration of martial law.20 a meager number of foreign fighters who can lend support
to the Maute Group.29
Second, the Lagman Petition claims that the declaration
of martial law has no sufficient factual basis because the Based on the foregoing argumentation, the Lagman
President's Report containef "false, inaccurate, contrived Petition asks the Court to: (1)"exercise its specific and
and hyperbolic accounts".21 special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of Proclamation No. 216"; and (2) render "a
Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216" for
It labels as false the claim in the President's Report that
lack of sufficient factual basis.30
the Maute Group attacked Amai Pakpak Medical Center.
In a Resolution31 dated June 6, 2017, the Court required The Mohamad Petition, denominated as a "Petition for
respondents to comment on the Lagman Petition and set Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual Basis of [the]
the case for oral argument on June 13, 14, and 15, 2017. Declaration of Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,"43 labels itself as
On June 9, 2017, two other similar petitions docketed as "a special proceeding"44 or an "appropriate proceeding
G.R. Nos. 231771 and 231774 were filed and eventually filed by any citizen"45 authorized under Section 18, Article
consolidated with G.R. No. 231658.32 VII of the Constitution.

B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition) The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a
measure of last resort46 and should be invoked by the
President only after exhaustion of less severe
The Cullamat Petition, "anchored on Section 18, Article
remedies.47 It contends that the extraordinary powers of
VII"33 of the Constitution, likewise seeks the nullification
the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first,
of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional
the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power
because it lacks sufficient factual basis that there is
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its
finally, the power to declare martial law.48 It maintains
declaration. 34
that the President has no discretion to choose which
extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be
In particular, it avers that the supposed rebellion dictated only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of
described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to events the situation.49
happening in Marawi City only an not in the entire region
of Mindanao. It concludes that Proclamation No 216
According to the Mohamad Petition, the factual situation
"failed to show any factual basis for the imposition of
in Marawi is not so grave as to require the imposition of
martial law in the entire Mindanao,"35 "failed to allege any
martial law.50 It asserts that the Marawi incidents "do not
act of rebellion outside Marawi City, much less x x x allege
equate to the existence of a public necessity brought
that public safety requires the imposition o martial law in
about by an actual rebellion, which would compel the
the whole of Mindanao".36
imposition of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus".51 It proposes that "[m]artial
The Cullamat Petition claims that the alleged "capability law can only be justified if the rebellion or invasion has
of the Maute Group and other rebel groups to sow terror reached such gravity that [its] imposition x x x is
and cause death and damage to property"37 does not rise compelled by the needs of public safety"52 which, it
to the level of rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in believes, is not yet present in Mindanao.
the whole of Mindanao.38 It also posits that there is no
lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that
Moreover, it alleges that the statements contained in the
in Marawi City.39
President's Report to the Congress, to wit: that the Maute
Group intended to establish an Islamic State; that they
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assails the inclusion of have the capability to deprive the duly constituted
the phrase "other rebel groups" in the last Whereas authorities of their powers and prerogatives; and that the
Clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it Marawi armed hostilities is merely a prelude to a grander
failed to identify these rebel groups and specify the acts plan of taking over the whole of Mindanao, are
of rebellion that they were supposedly waging.40 conclusions bereft of substantiation.53

In addition, the Cullamat Petition cites alleged The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the
inaccuracies, exaggerations, and falsities in the Report of declaration of martial law, and without waiting for a
the President to Congress, particularly the attack at the congressional action, a suit may already be brought
Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ambush and burning of the before the Court to assail the sufficiency of the factual
Marawi Police Station, the killing of five teachers of basis of Proclamation No. 216.
Dansalan College Foundation, and the attacks on various
government facilities.41
Finally, in invoking this Court's power to review the
sufficiency ofthe factual basis for the declaration of martial
In fine, the Cullamat Petition prays for the Court to declare law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
Proclamation No. 216 as unconstitutional or in the habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the
alternative, should the Court find justification for the Court may "look into the wisdom of the [President's]
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness".54
of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City, to declare the Further, it asserts that since it is making a negative
same as unconstitutional insofar as its inclusion of the assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the
other parts of Mindanao.42 factual basis is shifted to and lies on the respondents.55
It thus asks the Court "to compel the [r]espondents to
C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition) divulge relevant information"56 in order for it to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis.
In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to made his decision to declare martial law because to do so
exercise its power to review, "compel respondents to would subject the exercise of the President's discretion to
present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of an impossible standard.70 It reiterates that the
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ President's decision should be guided only by the
of habeas corpus in Mindanao"57 and declare as information and data available to him at the time he made
unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient the determination.71 The OSG thus asserts that facts that
factual basis. were established after the declaration of martial law
should not be considered in the review of the sufficiency
The Consolidated Comment of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law. The
OSG suggests that the assessment of after-proclamation
facts lies with the President and Congress for the purpose
The respondents' Consolidated Comment58 was filed on
of determining the propriety of revoking or extending the
June 12, 2017, as required by the Court. Noting that the
martial law. The OSG fears that if the Court considers
same coincided with the celebration of the 119th
after-proclamation-facts in its review of the sufficiency of
anniversary of the independence of this Republic, the
the factual basis for the proclamation, it would in effect
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) felt that "defending
usurp the powers of the Congress to determine whether
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216" should
martial law should be revoked or extended.72
serve as "a rallying call for every Filipino to unite behind
one true flag and defend it against all threats from within
and outside our shores".59 It is also the assertion of the OSG that the President could
validly rely on intelligence reports coming from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines;73 and that he could not be
The OSG acknowledges that Section 18, Article VII of the
expected to personally determine the veracity of
Constitution vests the Court with the authority or power to
thecontents of the reports.74 Also, since the power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
impose martial law is vested solely on the President as
declaration of martial law.60 The OSG, however, posits
Commander-in-Chief, the lack of recommendation from
that although Section 18, Article VII lays the basis for the
the Defense Secretary, or any official for that matter, will
exercise of such authority or power, the same
not nullify the said declaration, or affect its validity, or
constitutional provision failed to specify the vehicle, mode
compromise the sufficiency of the factual basis.
or remedy through which the "appropriate proceeding"
mentioned therein may be resorted to. The OSG suggests
that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Section Moreover, the OSG opines that the petitioners miserably
18, Article VII may be availed of using the vehicle, mode failed to validly refute the facts cited by the President in
or remedy of a certiorari petition, either under Section 1 or Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress
5, of Article VIII.61 Corollarily, the OSG maintains that the by merely citing news reports that supposedly contradict
review power is not mandatory, but discretionary only, on the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in piecemeal the
the part of the Court. 62 The Court has the discretion not happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news
to give due course to the petition.63 articles are "hearsay evidence, twice removed,"75 and
thus inadmissible and without probative value, and could
not overcome the "legal presumption bestowed on
Prescinding from the foregoing, the OSG contends that
governmental acts".76
the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No.
216 should be reviewed by the Court "under the lens of
grave abuse of discretion"64 and not the yardstick of Finally, the OSG points out that it has no duty or burden
correctness of the facts.65 Arbitrariness, not correctness, to prove that Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual
should be the standard in reviewing the sufficiency of basis. It maintains that the burden rests with the
factual basis. petitioners. However, the OSG still endeavors to lay out
the factual basis relied upon by the President "if only to
remove any doubt as to the constitutionality of
The OSG maintains that the burden lies not with the
Proclamation No. 216".77
respondents but with the petitioners to prove that
Proclamation No. 216 is bereft of factual basis.1âwphi1 It
thus takes issue with petitioners' attempt to shift the The facts laid out by the OSG in its Consolidated
burden of proof when they asked the Court "to compel Comment will be discussed in detail in the Court's Ruling.
[the] respondents to present proof on the factual basis"66
of Proclamation No. 216. For the OSG, "he who alleges ISSUES
must prove"67 and that governmental actions are
presumed to be valid and constitutional.68 The issues as contained in the revised Advisory78 are as
follows:
Likewise, the OSG posits that the sufficiency of the factual
basis must be assessed from the trajectory or point of 1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as G.R. Nos.
view of the President and base on the facts available to 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the "appropriate
him at the time the decision was made.69 It argues that proceeding" covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article
the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of
not based on the facts discovered after the President had review required of this Court when a declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas 8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism
corpus is promulgated; are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements of
public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23
a. is required to be factually correct or only not May 2017 will:
arbitrary in his appreciation of facts;
a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55
b. is required to obtain the favorable s. 2016; or
recommendation thereon of the Secretary of
National Defense; b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling
out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in
c. is required to take into account only the Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.
situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not After the oral argument, the parties submitted their
been accurately reported; respective memoranda and supplemental memoranda.

3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the OUR RULING
sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of I. Locus standi of petitioners.
habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that
have been taken by Congress jointly or separately; One of the requisites for judicial review is locus standi, i.e.,
"the constitutional question is brought before [the Court]
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for by a party having the requisite 'standing' to challenge
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the it."79 As a general rule, the challenger must have "a
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
a. What are the parameters for review? enforcement."80 Over the years, there has been a trend
towards relaxation of the rule on legal standing, a prime
b. Who has the burden of proof? example of which is found in Section 18 of Article VII
which provides that any citizen may file the appropriate
proceeding to assail the sufficiency of the factual basis of
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. "[T]he only requisite
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by for standing to challenge the validity of the suspension is
this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers that the challenger be a citizen. He need not even be a
granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely taxpayer."81
calling out powers, suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in
their capacities as citizens of the Republic;"82 similarly,
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be
may be considered, vague and thus null and void: "Filipino citizens, all women, all of legal [age], and
residents of Marawi City".83 In the Lagman Petition,
a. with its inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or however, petitioners therein did not categorically mention
that they are suing's citizens but merely referred to
b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual themselves as duly elected Representatives.84 That they
operational parameters within the entire are suing in their official capacities as Members of
Mindanao region; Congress couLd have elicited a vigorous discussion
considering the issuance by the House of
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Representatives of House Resolution No. 1050
Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President expressing full support to President Duterte and finding
to Congress are sufficient [bases]: no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216. By such
resolution, the House of Representatives is declaring that
it finds no reason to review the sufficiency of the factual
a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or
basis of the martial law declaration, which is in direct
contrast to the views and arguments being espoused by
b. for a declaration of martial law or the the petitioners in the Lagman Petition. Considering,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas however, the trend towards relaxation of the rules on legal
corpus in the entire Mindanao 1 region; standing, as well as the transcendental issues involved in
the present Petitions, the Court will exercise judicial self- proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
restraint85 and will not venture into this matter. After all, of the writ of habeas corpus.
"the Court is not entirely without discretion to accept a suit
which does not satisfy the requirements of a [bona fide] b) "In an appropriate
case or of standing. Considerations paramount to [the proceeding" does not refer to a
requirement of legal standing] could compel assumption petition for certiorari filed under
of jurisdiction."86 In any case, the Court can take judicial Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII
cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman
Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine It could not have been the intention of the framers of the
citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as Constitution that the phrase "in an appropriate
representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari
in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The
respondents did not question petitioners' legal standing. standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the
respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion
II. Whether or not the petitions are the amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
"appropriate proceeding" covered by paragraph performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the
3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required the proclamationor suspension. It must be emphasized
by the Court. that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court President's exercise of emergency powers. Put
based on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII differently, if this Court applies the standard of review
(Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution which used in a petition for certiorari, the same would
provides: emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18,
Article VII.
The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the c) Purpose/significance of
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation Section 18, Article VII is to
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of constitutionalize the pre-Marcos
the writ or the extension thereof, and must martial law ruling in In the Matter of
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.
from its filing.
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to constitutionalize
the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the
Section 18, Article VII is sui generis.87 It is a special and Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang,92 to
specific jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of martial law
those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.88 or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is not a political question but precisely within the
The Court agrees. ambit of judicial review.

a) Jurisdiction must be "In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law
specifically conferred by the or constitutional provision, the history of the times out of
Constitution or by law. which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed
to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be
remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
subjects of inquiry."93 Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (Fr.
conferred only by the Constitution or by the law.89 Unless
Bernas), a member of the Constitutional Commission that
jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the
drafted the 1987 Constitution, explained:
Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal
has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before
it for resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of The Commander-in-Chief provisions of the 1935
a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot be implied Constitution had enabled President Ferdinand
from the language of the Constitution or a statute.90 It Marcos to impose authoritarian rule on the
must appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to Philippines from 1972 to 1986. Supreme Court
exist.91 decisions during that period upholding the actions
taken by Mr. Marcos made authoritarian rule part
of Philippine constitutional jurisprudence. The
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII
members of the Constitutional Commission, very
reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to
much aware of these facts, went about
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
reformulating the Commander-in-Chief powers
with a view to dismantling what had been
constructed during the authoritarian years. The MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of
new formula included revised grounds for the invasion or rebellion. And in previous interpellations
activation of emergency powers, the manner of regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on
activating them, the scope of the powers, and the Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation
review of presidential action.94 (Emphasis is a situation of actual invasion or rebellion. In these
supplied) situations, the President has to act quickly. Secondly,
this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a
To recall, the Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it
v. Castaneda95 that the authority to decide whether there automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the
is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the factual
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is lodged with the basis of the proclamation always exists, even during
President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive those first 60 days.
upon the courts. This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case
of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of the MR. SUAREZ. Given our traumatic experience during
declaration of martial law and the suspension of the the past administration, if we give exclusive right to
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political the President to determine these factors, especially
question and is within the ambit of judicial review.96 the existence of an invasion or rebellion and the
However, in 1983, or after the declaration of martial law second factor of determining whether the public
by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in safety requires it or not, may I call the attention of the
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile,97 abandoned the ruling in Gentleman to what happened to us during the past
Lansang and reverted to Montenegro. According to the administration. Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by
Supreme Court, the constitutional power of the President Ferdinand E. Marcos in his capacity as President of
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon
subject to judicial inquiry.98 him purportedly under Article VII, Section 10 (2) of the
Constitution, wherein he made this predicate under
Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows the "Whereas" provision:
judicial review of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Whereas, the rebellion and armed action undertaken
the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect by these lawless elements of the Communists and
constitutionalized and reverted to the Lansang doctrine. other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the
Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and
d) Purpose of Section 18, force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state
Article VII is to provide additional of war against our people and the Republic of the
safeguard against possible abuse by Philippines.
the President on the exercise of the
extraordinary powers. And may I also call the attention of the Gentleman to
General Order No. 3, also promulgated by Ferdinand
Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional E. Marcos, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of
safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and pursuant
exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from wherein he said, among other things:
the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third Whereas, martial law having been declared because of
paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII.99 This is clear from wanton destruction of lives and properties, widespread
the records of the Constitutional Commission when its lawlessness and anarchy and chaos and disorder now
members were deliberating on whether the President prevailing throughout the country, which condition has
could proclaim martial law even without the concurrence been brought about by groups of men who are actively
of Congress. Thus: engaged in a criminal conspiracy to seize political and
state power in the Philippines in order to take over the
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. government by force and violence, the extent of which
has now assumed the proportion of an actual war against
our people and the legitimate government ...
The Commissioner is proposing a very
substantial amendment because this means that
he is vesting exclusively unto the President the And he gave all reasons in order to suspend the privilege
right to determine the factors which may lead to of the writ of habeas corpus and declare martial law in
the declaration of martial law and the suspension our country without justifiable reason. Would the
of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has Gentleman still insist on the deletion of the phrase 'and,
strong and compelling reasons in seeking to with the concurrence of at least a majority of all the
delete this particular, phrase. May we be members of the Congress'?
informed of his good and substantial reasons?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the case of significant is the power of the Chief Executive to suspend
Mr.Marcos, he is undoubtedly an aberration in our history the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim
and national consciousness. But given the possibility that martial law.
there would be another Marcos, our Constitution now has
sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not really true, as the The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-
Gentleman has mentioned, that there is an exclusive Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the imposition of martial law
right to determine the factual basis because the for more than eight years and the suspension of the
paragraph beginning on line 9 precisely tells us that the privilege of the writ even after the lifting of martial law in
Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate 1981. The new Constitution now provides that those
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the powers can be exercised only in two cases, invasion or
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the rebellion when public safety demands it, only for a period
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the
thereof and must promulgate its decision on the same power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of
within 30 days from its filing. martial law which congressional action may not be revoked
by the President. More importantly, the action of the
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The President is made subject to judicial review, thereby again
Constitution is supposed to balance the interests of the discarding jurisprudence which render[s] the executive
country. And here we are trying to balance the public action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of
interest in case of invasion or rebellion as against the the courts to adjudicate.
rights of citizens. And I am saying that there are enough
safeguards, unlike in 1972 when Mr. Marcos was able to For the first time, there is a provision that the state of
do all those things mentioned.100 martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution nor abolish civil courts or legislative
To give more teeth to this additional safeguard, the assemblies, or vest jurisdiction to military tribunals over
framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the civilians, or suspend the privilege of the writ. Please
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of forgive me if, at this point, I state that this constitutional
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the ambit provision vindicates the dissenting opinions I have written
of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by during my tenure in the Supreme Court in the martial law
allowing any citizen to question before this Court the cases.101
sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or
suspension. Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, f) To interpret "appropriate
Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a proceeding" as filed under Section 1
demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the of Article VIII would be contrary to
factual basis of said proclamation or suspension. It further the intent of the Constitution.
designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to
examine, in an appropriate proceeding, the sufficiency of To conclude that the "appropriate proceeding" refers to a
the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction
a limited period of 30 days from date of filing. of this Court would, therefore, contradict the clear
intention of the framers of the Constitution to place
e) Purpose of Section 18, additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse
Article VII is to curtail the extent of for, invariably, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
the powers of the President. VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In
other words, the framers of the Constitution added the
The most important objective, however, of Section 18, safeguard under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article
Article VII is the curtailment of the extent of the powers of VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
the Commander-in-Chief. This is the primary reason why
the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial g) Jurisdiction of the Court is
Department but remained under Article VII or the not restricted to those enumerated in
Executive Department. Sections I and 5 of Article VIII

During the closing session of the Constitutional The jurisdiction of this Court is not restricted to those
Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia Muñoz enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. For
Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 instance, its jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
Constitution. She said: relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President can be found in the last
The executive power is vested in the President of the paragraph of Section 4, Article VII.102 The power of the
Philippines elected by the people for a six-year term with Court to review on certiorari the decision, order, or ruling
no reelection for the duration of his/her life. While of the Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit
traditional powers inherent in the office of the President are can be found in Section 7, Article IX(A).103
granted, nonetheless for the first time, there are specific
provisions which curtail the extent of such powers. Most
h) Unique features of the third ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
make it sui generis. suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President.
The unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
generis separate and different from those enumerated in proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the
Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, information and data available to the President prior to or
Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed td
different rule on standing as any citizen may file it. Said "undertake an independent investigation beyond the
provision of the Constitution also limits the issue to the pleadings."106 On the other hand, Congress may take
sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief into consideration not only data available prior to, but
Executive of his emergency powers. The usual period for likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the
filing pleadings in Petition for Certiorari is likewise not Court I which does not look into the absolute correctness
applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress
VII considering the limited period within which this Court could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the
has to promulgate its decision. accuracy of the facts presented before it.

A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only
which actions are to be brought and defended, the initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate
manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress'
mode of deciding them, of opposing judgments, and of review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may
executing."104 In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section proclamation or suspension was made.
18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for
the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to
basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency revoke by Congress are not only totally different but
powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a likewise independent from each other although
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
Court. nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to
say, the power of the Court to review can be exercised
III. The power of the Court to review the independently from the power of revocation of Congress.
sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of b) The framers of the 1987
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Constitution intended the judicial
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is power to review to be exercised
independent of the actions taken by Congress. independently from the congressional
power to revoke.
During the oral argument,105 the OSG urged the Court to
give! deference to the actions of the two co-equal If only to show that the intent of the framers of the 1987
branches of the Government: on' the part of the President Constitution was to vest the Court and Congress with veto
as Commander-in-Chief, in resorting to his extraordinary powers independently from each other, we quote the
powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege following exchange:
of the writ of habeas corpus; and on the part of Congress,
in giving its imprimatur to Proclamation No. 216 and not MS. QUESADA. Yesterday, the understanding of
revoking the same.
many was that there would be safeguards that
Congress will be able to revoke such
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the proclamation.
scope of the extraordinary powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief and the review of the said MR. RAMA. Yes.
presidential action. In particular, the President's
extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and imposing martial law are MS. QUESADA. But now, if they cannot meet
subject to the veto powers of the Court and Congress. because they have been arrested or that the
Congress has been padlocked, then who is going
to declare that such a proclamation was not
a) The judicial power to review warranted?
versus the congressional power to
revoke.
xxxx
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the
MR. REGALADO. May I also inform of the President's decision of which among his
Commissioner Quesada that the judiciary is not graduated powers he will avail of in a given
exactly just standing by. A petition for a writ of situation.
habeas corpus, if the Members are detained, can
immediately be applied for, and the Supreme The President as the Commander-in-Chief wields the
Court shall also review the factual basis. x x x107 extraordinary powers of: a) calling out the armed forces;
b) suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
c) Re-examination of the and c) declaring martial law.112 These powers may be
Court's pronouncement in Fortun v. resorted to only under specified conditions.
President Macapagal-Arroyo
The framers of the 1987 Constitution reformulated the
Considering the above discussion, the Court finds it powers of the Commander-in-Chief by revising the
imperative to re-examine, reconsider, and set aside its "grounds for the activation of emergency powers, the
pronouncement in Fortun v. President Macapagal- manner of activating them, the scope of the powers, and
Arroyo108 to the effect that: review of presidential action."113

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves a) Extraordinary powers of the

to the Supreme Court the power to review the President distinguished.
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out
Court must allow Congress to exercise its own power is the most benign and involves ordinary police
review powers, which is automatic rather than action.114 The President may resort to this extraordinary
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or
express duty to defend the Constitution through suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he
such review should the Supreme Court step in as power to call is fully discretionary to the President;"115
its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the the only limitations being that he acts within permissible
President's proclamation of martial law or constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a grave abuse of discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to
political question in the hands of Congress before which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not
it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the subject to judicial review."117
Court.109
The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of
xxxx the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may
be exercised only when there is actual invasion or
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987
to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or Constitution imposed the following limits in the exercise of
suspension within the short time expected of it, these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and
then the Court can step in, hear the petitions possible revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and
challenging the President's action, and ascertain possible nullification by the Supreme Court."118
if it has a factual basis. x x x110
The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated
By the above pronouncement, the Court willingly but insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger thereof' as
unwittingly clipped its own power and surrendered the grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
same to Congress as well as: abdicated from its bounden habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.119 They
duty to review. Worse, the Court considered' itself just on perceived the phrase "imminent danger" to be "fraught
stand-by, waiting and willing to act as a substitute in case with possibilities of abuse;"120 besides, the calling out
Congress "defaults." It is an aberration, a stray power of the President "is sufficient for handling imminent
declaration, which must be rectified and set aside in this danger."121
proceeding.111
The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the
We, therefore, hold that the Court can simultaneously privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment
exercise its power of review with, and independently from, and suppression of civil rights and individual freedom.
the power to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning
perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does to citizens that the Executive Department has called upon
not deprive or deny the Court of its power to review. the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order,
and while the emergency remains, the citizens must,
IV. The judicial power to review the sufficiency under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner
of factual basis of the declaration of martial law that will render it more difficult to restore order and enforce
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of the law.122 As such, their exercise requires more
habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration stringent safeguards by the Congress, and review by the
Court.123
b) What really happens during martial law? jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a
theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are
During the oral argument, the following questions cropped unable to function.
up: What really happens during the imposition of martial
law? What powers could the President exercise during MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by
martial law that he could not exercise if there is no martial the realities of the situation in that specified
law? Interestingly, these questions were also discussed critical area.
by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
FR. BERNAS. That is correct.
FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked
during the meetings of the Committee: What MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought
precisely does martial law add to the power of the about by a declaration of the Commander-in-
President to call on the armed forces? The first Chief.
and second lines in this provision state:
FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a
A state of martial law does not suspend declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The
the operation of the Constitution, nor understanding here is that the phrase 'nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
or legislative assemblies... courts and agencies over civilians' has reference
to the practice under the Marcos regime where
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse military courts were given jurisdiction over
the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the civilians. We say here that we will never allow that
case of Aquino v. COMELEC where the Supreme except in areas where civil courts are, in fact,
Court said that in times of martial law, the unable to function and it becomes necessary for
President automatically has legislative power. So some kind of court to function.125
these two clauses denied that. A state of martial
law does not suspend the operation of the A state of martial law is peculiar because the President,
Constitution; therefore, it does not suspend the at such a time, exercises police power, which is normally
principle of separation of powers. a function of the Legislature. In particular, the President
exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to
The question now is: During martial law, can the ensure public safety and in place of government agencies
President issue decrees? The answer we gave to which for the time being are unable to cope with the
that question in the Committee was: During condition in a locality, which remains under the control of
martial law, the President may have the powers the State.126
of a commanding general in a theatre of war. In
actual war when there is fighting in an area, the In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court,
President as the commanding general has the quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza)
authority to issue orders which have the effect of Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on
law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of
situation we had during the period of martial law. martial law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may
In other words, there is an effort here to return to order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial
the traditional concept of martial law as it was warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of
developed especially in American jurisprudence, news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
where martial law has reference to the theater of issuance of Presidential Decrees x x x".128
war.124
Worthy to note, however, that the above cited acts that
xxxx the President may perform do not give him unbridled
discretion to infringe on the rights of civilians during
FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend
because we have clarified the meaning of martial the operation of the Constitution, neither does it supplant
law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies.
existed in the jurisprudence in international law, Moreover, the guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain
that it is a law for the theater of war. In a theater in place during its pendency. And in such instance where
of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also
actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are suspended, such suspension applies only to those
unable to function, then the military commander judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected
is authorized to give jurisdiction even over with invasion.129
civilians to military courts precisely because the
civil courts are closed in that area. But in the Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the
general area where the civil courts are open then most severe threat to civil liberties,130 the Constitution
in no case can the military courts be given
has safeguards against the President's prerogative to removed the requirement of congressional concurrence in
declare a state of martial law. the first imposition of martial law and suspension of the
privilege.133
c) "Graduation" of powers
refers to hierarchy based on scope MR. PADILLA.x x x
and effect; it does not refer to a
sequence, order, or arrangement by We all agree with the suspension of the writ or the
which the Commander-in-Chief must proclamation of martial law should not require
adhere to. beforehand the concurrence of the majority of the
Members of the Congress. However, as provided
Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as by the Committee, the Congress may revoke,
Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated amend, or shorten or even increase the period of
power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: such suspension.134
the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare xxxx
martial law."131 It must be stressed, however, that the
graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and MR. NATIVIDAD. First and foremost, we agree
effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, with the Commissioner's thesis that in the first
arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief imposition of martial law there is no need for
must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does concurrence of the Members of Congress
not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President because the provision says 'in case of actual
decides which power to choose. invasion or rebellion.' If there is actual invasion
and rebellion, as Commissioner Crispino de
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Castro said, there is a need for immediate
Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it response because there is an attack. Second, the
therefore necessarily follows that the power and fact of securing a concurrence may be impractical
prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a because the roads might be blocked or
mere exercise of the calling out power; or whether the barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial
situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ concurrence of the majority of all Members of the
of habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion might
martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. be impractical as I can see it.
The power to choose, initially, which among these
extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may
is a judgment call on the part of the President. As
revoke the declaration or lift the suspension.
Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to
include his prerogative to address exigencies or threats
that endanger the government, and the very integrity of And third, the matter of declaring martial law is
the State.132 already a justiciable question and no longer a
political one in that it is subject to judicial review
at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that
It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review there is no need for concurrence as a prerequisite
does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
to declare martial law or to suspend the privilege
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x135
set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount
to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive
and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least xxxx
initially, lies with the President.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
d) The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the Congress The Commissioner is suggesting that in
not to interfere a priori in the connection with Section 15, we delete the phrase
decision-making process of the 'and, with the concurrence of at least a majority of
President. all the Members of the Congress...'

The elimination by the framers of the 1987 Constitution of MR. PADILLA. That is correct especially for the
the requirement of prior concurrence of the Congress in initial suspension of the privilege of the writ of
the initial imposition of martial law or suspension of the habeas corpus or also the declaration of martial
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus further supports the law.
conclusion that judicial review does not include the
calibration of the President's decision of which of his MR. SUAREZ. So in both instances, the
graduated powers will be availed of in a given situation. Commissioner is suggesting that this would be an
Voting 28 to 12, the framers of the 1987 Constitution exclusive prerogative of the President?
MR. PADILLA. At least initially, for a period of 60 MR. SUAREZ. Will that prevent a future President
days. But even that period of 60 days may be from doing what Mr. Marcos had done?
shortened by the Congress or the Senate
because the next sentence says that the MR. MONSOD. There is nothing absolute in this
Congress or the Senate may even revoke the world, and there may be another Marcos. What
proclamation.136 we are looking for are safeguards that
arereasonable and, I believe, adequate at this
xxxx point. On the other hand, in case of invasion or
rebellion, even during the first 60 days when the
MR. SUAREZ. x x x intention here is to protect the country in that
situation, it would be unreasonable to ask that
there should be a concurrence on the part of the
The Commissioner is proposing a very
Congress, which situation is automatically
substantial amendment because this means that
terminated at the end of such 60 days.
he is vesting exclusively unto the President the
right to determine the factors which may lead to
the declaration of martial law and the suspension xxxx
of the writ of habeas corpus. I suppose he has
strong and compelling reasons in seeking to MR. SUAREZ. Would the Gentleman not feel
delete this particular phrase. May we be informed more comfortable if we provide for a legislative
of his good and substantial reasons? check on this awesome power of the Chief
Executive acting as Commander-in-Chief?
MR. MONSOD. This situation arises in cases of
invasion or rebellion. And in previous MR. MONSOD. I would be less comfortable if we
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during have a presidency that cannot act under those
the discussions on the Bill of Rights, as I conditions.
understand it, the interpretation is a situation of
actual invasion or rebellion. In these situations, MR. SUAREZ. But he can act with the
the President has to act quickly. Secondly, this concurrence of the proper or appropriate
declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a authority?
maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it
automatically terminates. Thirdly, the right of the MR. MONSOD. Yes. But when those situations
judiciary to inquire into the sufficiency of the arise, it is very unlikely that the concurrence of
factual basis of the proclamation always exists, Congress would be available; and, secondly, the
even during those first 60 days.
President will be able to act quickly in order to
deal with the circumstances.
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. So, we would be subordinating
MR. MONSOD. Yes, Madam President, in the actual circumstances to expediency?
case of Mr. Marcos[,] he is undoubtedly an
aberration in our history and national MR. MONSOD. I do not believe it is expediency
consciousness. But given the possibility that when one is trying to protect the country in the
there would be another Marcos, our Constitution event of an invasion or a rebellion.137
now has sufficient safeguards. As I said, it is not
really true, as the Gentleman mentioned, that
there is an exclusive right to determine the factual The foregoing exchange clearly manifests the intent of the
basis because the paragraph being on line 9 Constitution not to allow Congress to interfere a priori in
precisely tells us that the Supreme court may the President's choice of extraordinary powers.
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the e) The Court must similarly
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of and necessarily refrain from
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof calibrating the President's decision of
and must promulgate its decision on the same which among his extraordinary
within 30 days from its filing. powers to avail given a certain
situation or condition.
I believe that there are enough safeguards. The
Constitution is supposed to balance the interests It cannot be overemphasized that time is paramount in
of the country. And here we are trying to balance situations necessitating the proclamation of martial law or
the public interest in case of invasion or rebellion suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It
as against the rights of citizens. x x x was precisely this time element that prompted the
Constitutional Commission to eliminate the requirement of
1 concurrence of the Congress in the initial imposition by
the President of martial law or suspension of the privilege armed hostilities in Mindanao already amount to actual
of the writ of habeas corpus. rebellion and public safety requires it.

Considering that the proclamation of martial law or V. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 may
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is be considered vague and thus void because of (a)
now anchored on actual invasion or rebellion and when its inclusion of "other rebel groups"; and (b) the
public safety requires it, and is no longer under threat or absence of any guideline specifying its actual
in imminent danger thereof, there is a necessity and operational parameters within the entire
urgency for the President to act quickly to protect the Mindanao region.
country.138 The Court, as Congress does, must thus
accord the President the same leeway by not wading into Proclamation No. 216 is being facially challenged on the
the realm that is reserved exclusively by the Constitution ground of "vagueness" by the insertion of the phrase
to the Executive Department. "other rebel groups"139 in its Whereas Clause and for
lack of available guidelines specifying its actual
j) The recommendation of the operational parameters within the entire Mindanao region,
Defense Secretary is not a condition making the proclamation susceptible to broad
for the declaration of martial law or interpretation, misinterpretation, or confusion.
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. This argument lacks legal basis.

Even the recommendation of, or consultation with, the a) Void-for-vagueness doctrine.

Secretary of National Defense, or other high-ranking
military officials, is not a condition for the President to The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is
declare martial law. A plain reading of Section 18, Article facially invalid if "men of common intelligence must
VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
declare martial law is not subject to any condition except application."140 "[A] statute or act may be said to be
for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
that public safety requires it. Besides, it would be contrary of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
to common sense if the decision of the President is made meaning and differ in its application. [In such instance, the
dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. statute] is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
Rightly so, it is only on the President and no other that the (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief under especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is bestowed. conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
g) In any event, the President arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."141
initially employed the most benign
action - the calling out power - b) Vagueness doctrine applies
before he declared martial law and only in free speech cases.
suspended the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or,
At this juncture, it must be stressed that prior to as they are called in American law, First Amendment
Proclamation No. 216 or the declaration of martial law on cases.142 A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
May 23, 201 7, the President had already issued vague statute and also to one which is overbroad because
Proclamation No. 55 on September 4, 2016, declaring a of possible "'chilling effect' on protected speech that
state of national emergency on account of lawless
comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who
violence in Mindanao. This, in fact, is extant in the first does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime
Whereas Clause of Proclamation No. 216. Based on the under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain
foregoing presidential actions, it can be gleaned that himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of
although there is no obligation or requirement on his part a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
to use his extraordinary powers on a graduated or silence."143
sequential basis, still the President made the conscious
anddeliberate effort to first employ the most benign from
among his extraordinary powers. As the initial and It is best to stress that the vagueness doctrine has a
preliminary step towards suppressing and preventing the special application only to free-speech cases. They are
armed hostilities in Mindanao, the President decided to not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
use his calling out power first. Unfortunately, the situation statutes.144 Justice Mendoza explained the reason as
did not improve; on the contrary, it only worsened. Thus, follows:
exercising his sole and exclusive prerogative, the
President decided to impose martial law and suspend the A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the belief that the vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible 'chilling effect' upon c) Proclamation No. 216
protected speech. The theory is that ' [w]hen cannot be facially challenged using
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no the vagueness doctrine.
readily apparent construction suggests itself as a
vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single Clearly, facial review of Proclamation No. 216 on the
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society grounds of vagueness is unwarranted. Proclamation No.
of constitutionally protected expression is 216 does not regulate speech, religious freedom, and
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad other fundamental rights that may be facially
statutes with no requirement that the person challenged.148 What it seeks to penalize is conduct, not
making the attack demonstrate that his own speech.
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with narrow specificity.' The possible harm to As held by the Court in David v. President Macapagal-
society in permitting some unprotected speech to Arroyo,149 the facial review of Proclamation No. 1017,
go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
that the protected speech of others may be declaring a state of national emergency, on ground o
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester vagueness is uncalled for since a plain reading of
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly Proclamation No. 10171 shows that it is not primarily
broad statutes. directed at speech or even speech-related1 conduct. It is
actually a call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. (AFP) to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect Like Proclamation No. 1017, Proclamation No. 216
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the is manifestly subject to state regulation.
State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of d) Inclusion of "other rebel
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in groups " does not make Proclamation
the area of free speech. No.216 vague.

xxxx The contention that the phrase "other rebel groups"

leaves Proclamation No. 216 open to broad interpretation,
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, misinterpretation, and confusion, cannot be sustained.
overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing 'on their faces' statutes in In People v. Nazario,150 the Court enunciated
free speech cases or, as they are called in
that:
American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague
statute, the established rule is that'one to whom when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
application of a statute is constitutional will not be 'of common intelligence must necessarily guess
heard to attack the statute on the ground that at its meaning and differ as to its application.' It is
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1)
other persons or other situations in which its it violates due process for failure to accord
application might be unconstitutional.' As has persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair
been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
First Amendment context, like overbreadth law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
while statutes found vague as a matter of due the Government muscle.
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied'
to a particular defendant.' x x x145 But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that
is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving
Invalidation of statutes "on its face" should be used clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City
sparingly because it results in striking down statutes of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
entirely on the ground that they might beapplied to parties down an ordinance that had made it illegal for
not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally 'three or more persons to assemble on any
protected.146 "Such invalidation would constitute a sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a
departure from the usual requirement of 'actual case and manner annoying to persons passing by.' Clearly,
controversy' and permit decisions to be made in a sterile the ordinance imposed no standard at all
abstract context having no factual concreteness."147 'because one may never know in advance what
annoys some people but does not annoy others.'
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a The Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way,
'perfectly vague' act whose obscurity is evident on affect the President's declaration of a state of national
its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from emergency on account of lawless violence in Mindanao
legislation couched in imprecise language - but through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016,
which nonetheless specifies a standard though where he called upon the Armed Forces and the
defectively phrased - in which case, it may be Philippine National 1 Police (PNP) to undertake such
'saved' by proper construction.151 measures to suppress any and all forms of lawless
violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such
The term "other rebel groups" in Proclamation No. 216 is lawless violence from spreading and escalating
not at all vague when viewed in the context of the words elsewhere in the Philippines.
that accompany it. Verily, the text of Proclamation No. 216
refers to "other rebel groups" found in Proclamation No. In Kulayan v. Tan,152 the Court ruled that the President's
55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas calling out power is in a different category from the power
clauses. to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the power to declare martial law:
e) Lack of guidelines/
operational parameters does not x x x Congress may revoke such proclamation or
make Proclamation No. 216 vague. suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
Neither could Proclamation No. 216 be described as there is no such equivalent provision dealing with
vague, and thus void, on the ground that it has no the revocation or review of the President's action
guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters to call out the armed forces. The distinction
within the entire Mindanao region. Besides, operational places the calling out power in a different
guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the category from the power to declare martial law
implementation of the proclamation. In Part III, we and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
declared that judicial review covers only the sufficiency of of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
information or data available to or known to the President Constitution would have simply lumped together
prior to, or at the time of, the declaration or suspension. the three powers and provided for their revocation
And, as will be discussed exhaustively in Part VII, the and review without any qualification.153
review will be confined to the proclamation itself and the
Report submitted to Congress. In other words, the President may exercise the power to
call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to
Clearly, therefore, there is no need for the Court to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to
determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a
operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers,
other orders issued after the proclamation for being as in this case.
irrelevant to its review. Thus, any act committed under the
said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, Even so, the Court's review of the President's declaration
such as criminal acts or human rights violations, should of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces
be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a necessarily entails separate proceedings instituted for
risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it would be that particular purpose.
deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved
exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to As explained in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
revoke. Zamora,154 the President's exercise of his power to call
out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
VI. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. violence, invasion or rebellion may only be examined by
216 will (a) have the effect of recalling the Court as to whether such power was exercised within
Proclamation No. 55; or (b) also nullify the acts permissible constitutional limits or in a manner
of the President in calling out the armed forces to constituting grave abuse of discretion.155
quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts
of the Mindanao region. In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the
Integrated Bar of the ' Philippines had failed to sufficiently
a) The calling out power is in a comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not
different category from the power to able to show any specific injury which it had suffered or
declare martial law and the power to could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's order
suspend the privilege of the writ of deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in
habeas corpus; nullification of visibility patrols around the metropolis.156
Proclamation No. 216 will not affect
Proclamation No. 55. This locus standi requirement, however, need not be
complied with in so far as the Court's jurisdiction to review
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of nullity may have legal consequences which the
ofthe writ of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by more orthodox view would deny. That for a period
constitutional design, such review may be instituted by of time such a statute, treaty, executive order, or
any citizen before the Court,157 without the need to ordinance was in 'actual existence' appears to be
prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and indisputable. What is more appropriate and
personal injury as a consequence of the questioned logical then than to consider it as 'an operative
Presidential act/s. fact?' (Emphasis supplied)159

But, even assuming arguendo that the Court finds no However, it must also be stressed that this "operative fact
sufficient basis for the declaration of martial law in this doctrine" is not a fool-proof shield that would repulse any
case, such ruling could not affect the President's exercise challenge to acts performed during the effectivity of
of his calling out power through Proclamation No. 55. martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, purportedly in furtherance of quelling
b) The operative fact doctrine. rebellion or invasion, and promotion of public safety, when
evidence shows otherwise.
Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216
result in the nullification of the acts of the President done VII. The Scope of the Power to Review.
pursuant thereto. Under the "operative fact doctrine," the
unconstitutional statute is recognized as an "operative a) The scope of the power of
fact" before it is declared unconstitutional.158 review under the 1987 Constitution
refers only to the determination of the
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is sufficiency of the factual basis of the
found by the judiciary to be contrary to the declaration of martial law and
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil suspension of the privilege of habeas
Code puts it: 'When the courts declare a law to be corpus.
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative To recall, the Court, in the case of In the Matter of the
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang,160 which was
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws decided under the 1935 Constitution,161 held that it can
or the Constitution.' The above provision of the inquire into, within proper bounds, whether there has
Civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an been adherence to or compliance with the
unconstitutional act, whether legislative or constitutionally-imposed limitations on the Presidential
executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
no duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine corpus.162 "Lansang limited the review function of the
admits of qualifications, however. As the Court to a very prudentially narrow test of
American Supreme Court stated: 'The actual arbitrariness."163 Fr. Bernas described the "proper
existence of a statute prior to such a bounds" in Lansang as follows:
determination [of constitutionality], is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot What, however, are these 'proper bounds' on the
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. power of the courts? The Court first gave the
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to the general answer that its power was 'merely to
invalidity may have to be considered in various check - not to supplant - the Executive, or to
aspects, - with respect to particular regulations, ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
private and official. exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act. More specifically, the Court
The orthodox view finds support in the well- said that its power was not 'even comparable with
settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme its power over civil or criminal cases elevated
and provides the measure for the validity of thereto by appeal...in which cases the appellate
legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither court has all the powers of the courtof origin,' nor
the legislative nor the executive branch, and for to its power of quasi-judicial administrative
that matter much less, this Court, has power decisions where the Court is limited to asking
under the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. whether 'there is some evidentiary basis' for the
Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its administrative finding. Instead, the Court
provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null. accepted the Solicitor General's suggestion that
it 'go no further than to satisfy [itself] not that the
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary President's decision is correct and that public
as the governmental organ which has the final safety was endangered by the rebellion and
say on whether or not a legislative or executive justified the suspension of the writ, but that in
measure is valid leads to a more appreciative suspending the writ, the President did not act
attitude of theemerging concept that a declaration arbitrarily.'164
Lansang, however, was decided under the 1935 suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for since these happened after the President had already
judicial review based on the determination of the issued the proclamation. If at all, they may be used only
sufficiency of the factual bases, has in fact done away with as tools, guides or reference in the Court's determination
the test of arbitrariness as provided in Lansang. of the sufficiency of factual basis, but not as part or
component of the portfolio of the factual basis itself.
b) The "sufficiency of factual
basis test". In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look
Similarly, under the doctrine of contemporaneous into the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and
construction, the framers of the 1987 Constitution are not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court
presumed to know the prevailing jurisprudence at the time expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
they were drafting the Constitution. Thus, the phrase proclamation and in the written Report as the President
"sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity
the Constitution should be understood as the only test for of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the
judicial review of the President's power to declare martial situation. To require precision in the President's
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court therefore impede the process of his decision-making.
does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision Such a requirement will practically necessitate the
is correct, rather it only needs to determine whether the President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness
President's decision had sufficient factual bases. of the reports submitted to him within a period that only
the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.
Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the
We conclude, therefore, that Section 18, Article VII limits
President in peril but would also defeat the very purpose
the scope of judicial review by the introduction of the
of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to
"sufficiency of the factual basis" test.
borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun,
to "immediately put an end to the root cause of the
As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole emergency".166 Possibly, by the time the President is
discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend the satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the possession, it would be too late in the day as the invasion
revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since or rebellion could have already escalated to a level that is
the exercise of these powers is a judgment call of the hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
President, the determination of this Court as to whether
there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such,
Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered
must be based only on facts or information known by or
intelligence reports of military officers as credible
available to the President at the time he made the
evidence that the President ca appraise and to which he
declaration or suspension, which facts or information are
can anchor his judgment,167 as appears to be the case
found in the proclamation as well as the written Report
here.
submitted by him to Congress. These may be based on
the situation existing at the time the declaration was made
or past events. As to how far the past events should be At this point, it is wise to quote the pertinent portions of
from the present depends on the President. the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.
in Fortun:
Past events may be considered as justifications for the
declaration and/or suspension as long as these are President Arroyo cannot be blamed for relying
connected or related to the current situation existing at the upon the information given to her by the Armed
time of the declaration. Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, considering that the matter of the
supposed armed uprising was within their realm
As to what facts must be stated in the proclamation and
of competence, and that a state of emergency
the written Report is up to the President.165 As
has also been declared in Central Mindanao to
Commander-in-Chief, he has sole discretion to determine
prevent lawless violence similar to the
what to include and what not to include in the
'Maguindanao massacre,' which may be an
proclamation and the written Report taking into account
indication that there is a threat to the public safety
the urgency of the situation as well as national security.
warranting a declaration of martial law or
He cannot be forced to divulge intelligence reports and
suspension of the writ.
confidential information that may prejudice the operations
and the safety of the military.
Certainly, the President cannot be expected to
risk being too late before declaring martial law or
Similarly, events that happened after the issuance of the
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. The
proclamation, which are included in the written report,
Constitution, as couched, does not require
cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the
precision in establishing the fact of rebellion. The
factual basis of the declaration of martial law and/or the
President is called to act as public safety As a general rule, a word used in a statute which has a
requires.168 technical or legal meaning, is construed to have the same
technical or legal meaning.171 Since the Constitution did
Corollary, as the President is expected to decide quickly not define the term "rebellion," it must be understood to
on whether there is a need to proclaim martial law even have the same meaning as the crime of "rebellion" in the
only on the basis of intelligence reports, it is irrelevant, for Revised Penal Code (RPC).172
purposes of the Court's review, if subsequent events
prove that the situation had not been accurately reported During the July 29, 1986 deliberation of the Constitutional
to him. Commission of 1986, then Commissioner Florenz D.
Regalado alluded to actual rebellion as one defined under
After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, Article 134 of the RPC:
not accuracy, of the information at hand during the
declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not MR. DE LOS REYES. As I see it now, the
have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is Committee envisions actual rebellion and no
concerned. In any event, safeguards under Section 18, longer imminent rebellion. Does the Committee
Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a mean that there should be actual shooting or
situation, e.g., the martial law period is good only for 60 actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang,
days; Congress may choose to revoke it even for example? Let us take for example a
immediately after the proclamation is made; and, this contemporary event - this Manila Hotel incident,
Court may investigate the factual background of the everybody knows what happened. Would the
declaration.169 Committee consider that an actual act of
rebellion?
Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds
no application in this case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies MR. REGALADO. If we consider the definition of
in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the
written report are not enough reasons for the Court to Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual
invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as assemblage of men in an armed public uprising
there are other facts in the proclamation and the written for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by
Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual the means employed under Article 135. x x x173
invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the
declaration and/or suspension. Thus, rebellion as mentioned in the Constitution could
only refer to rebellion as defined under Article 134 of the
In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the RPC. To give it a different definition would not only create
determination of whether the President in declaring confusion but would also give the President wide latitude
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of of discretion, which may be abused - a situation that the
habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our Constitution see k s to prevent.174
review would be limited to an examination on whether the
President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, Article 134 of the RPC states:
i.e., whether the facts in his possession prior to and at the
time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How
to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
committed. - The crime of rebellion or insurrection
of habeas corpus. is committed by rising publicly and taking arms
against the Government for the purpose of
VIII. The parameters for determining the removing from the allegiance to said Government
sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands
of martial law and/or the suspension of the or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive
or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of
a) Actual invasion or rebellion, their powers or prerogatives.
and public safety requirement.
Thus, for rebellion to exist, the following elements must
Section 18, Article VII itself sets the parameters for be present, to wit: "(l) there is a (a) public uprising and (b)
determining the sufficiency of the factual basis for the taking arms against the Government; and (2) the purpose
declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove from
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the
invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any
exercise of such power."170 Without the concurrence of body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to
the two conditions, the President's declaration of martial deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives."175
habeas corpus must be struck down.
b) Probable cause is the declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the
allowable standard of proof for the writ of habeas corpus.
President.
We restate the elements of rebellion for
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President reference:
only needs to convince himself that there is probable
cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a 1. That there be (a) public uprising, and (b) taking
rebellion was committed or is being committed.176 To up arms against the Government; and
require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would
restrict the exercise of his emergency powers. Along this 2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement
line, Justice Carpio, in his Dissent in Fortun v. President is either: (a) to remove from the allegiance to said
Macapagal-Arroyo, concluded that the President needs Government or its laws the territory of the
only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of
determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion land, naval or other armed forces or (b) to deprive
for purposes of declaring martial law, and that probable the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most partially, of any of their powers or
expedient standard by which the President can fully prerogatives.178
ascertain the existence or non-existence of rebellion
necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension
of the writ. This is because unlike other standards of proof, Petitioners concede that there is an armed public uprising
which, in order to be met, would require much from the in Marawi City.179 However, they insist that the armed
President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of hostilities do not constitute rebellion in the absence of the
emergency powers, the requirement of probable cause is element of culpable political purpose, i.e., the removal
much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man [to from the allegiance to the Philippine Government or its
weigh] the facts and circumstances without resorting to laws: (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof;
the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he has no or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
sense [and] x x x needs only to rest on evidence showing partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed x
x x by the accused."177 The contention lacks merit.

To summarize, the parameters for determining the a) Facts, events and

sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual information upon which the President
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first anchored his decision to declare
two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable martial law and suspend the privilege
cause for the President to believe that there is actual of the writ of habeas corpus.
rebellion or invasion.
Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No.
Having laid down the parameters for review, the Court 216 on May 23, 2017 at 10:00 PM,180 the Court will
shall nowproceed to the core of the controversy - whether consider only those facts and/or events which were
Proclamation No. 216,Declaring a State of Martial Law known to or have transpired on or before that time,
and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas consistent with the scope of judicial review. Thus, the
Corpus in the whole of Mindanao, lacks sufficient factual following facts and/or events were deemed to have been
basis. considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No.
216, as plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216
IX. There is sufficient factual basis for the itself:
declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. 1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4,
2016, declaring a state of national emergency on
At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of account of lawless violence in Mindanao;181
judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or
veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored 2. Series of violent acts182 committed by the
his declaration of martial law or suspension of the Maute terrorist group including:
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the
sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao
President that there is probable cause that rebellion del Sur m February 2016, killing and wounding
exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a several soldiers;
matter ofurgency and much leeway and flexibility should
be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016
completely validate all the information he received before of the arrested comrades of the Maute Group and
other detainees;
3. On May 23, 2017:183 15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused
by ISIS;199
a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;
16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's
b) Establishment of several checkpoints declaration of allegiance to ISIS;200
within Marawi;
17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide financial and
c) Burning of certain government and logistical support to the Maute Group;201
private facilities;
18. Events on May 23, 2017 in
d) Mounting casualties on the part of the Marawi City, particularly:
government;
a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the Maute
e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and Group and ASG attacked various government and privately-
owned facilities;202
f) Capability of the Maute Group and
other rebel groups to sow terror, and b) at 4:00 PM, around fifty (50) armed criminals forcibly
cause death and damage to property not entered the Marawi City Jail; facilitated the escape of
only in Lanao del Sur but also in other inmates; killed a member of PDEA; assaulted and
parts of Mindanao; and the Report184 disarmed on-duty personnel and/or locked them inside the
submitted to Congress: cells; confiscated cellphones, personnel-issued firearms,
and vehicles;203
1. Zamboanga siege;185
c) by 4:30 PM, intem1ption of power supply; sporadic
gunfights; city-wide power outage by evening;204
2. Davao bombing;186

d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed and

3. Mamasapano carnage;187
burned the Marawi Police Station; commandeered a police
car;205
4. Cotabato bombings;188
e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and other
5. Sultan Kudarat bombings;189 affected areas;206

6. Sulu bombings;190 f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely,
Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, was taken by the
7. Basilan bombings;191 rebels;207

8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless
resistance by combined forces of ASG and the Maute armed groups at the Iligan-Marawi junction;208
Group;192
h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral of
9. Escalation of armed hostility against the Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in the church, and
government troops;193 the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony;209

10. Acts of violence directed not only against government i) taking of hostages from the church;210
authorities and establishments but civilians as well;194
j) killing of five faculty members of Dansalan College
11. Takeover of major social, economic and political foundation;211
foundations which paralyzed Marawi City;195
k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation and
12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School;212
groundwork for the establishment of a DAESH/ISIS
wilayat or province;196 1) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;213

13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;214
combat-ready;197
n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan Friendship
14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group Hospital;215
with foreign and local armed groups;198
o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the Philippines andforce; the armed consolidation of their members
commandeering an armored vehicle;216 throughout Marawi City; the decimation of a
segment of the city population who resist; and the
p) reports regarding Maute Group's plan to execute brazen display of DAESH flags constitute a clear,
Christians;217 pronounced, and unmistakable intent to remove
Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao,
from its allegiance to the Government."225
q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their
homes;218
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed
groups are attempting to deprive the President of
r) forcing young Muslims to join their group;219 and
his power, authority, and prerogatives within
Marawi City as a precedent to spreading their
s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of strategic control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to
mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi City, seizing undermine his control over executive
public and private facilities, perpetrating killings of departments, bureaus, and offices in said area;
government personnel1 , and committing armed uprising defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are
against and open defiance of the Government.220 faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory
powers over local governments."226
b) The President's Conclusion
7) "Law enforcement and other government
After the assessment by the President of the agencies now face pronounced difficulty sending
aforementioned facts, he arrived at the following their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-
conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP
the Report: have been prevented from performing their
functions. Through the attack and occupation of
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to several hospitals, medical services in Marawi City
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine have been adversely affected. The bridge and
Government this part of Mindanao and deprive road blockades set up by the groups effectively
the Chief Executive of his powers and deprive the government of its ability to deliver
prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land and basic services to its citizens. Troop
to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, reinforcements have been hampered, preventing
constituting the crime of rebellion."221 the government from restoring peace and order in
the area. Movement by both civilians and
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms government personnel to and from the city is
and committed public uprising against the duly likewise hindered."227
constituted government and against the people of
Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao 8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed
- starting with the City of Marawi, Lanao del Sur - groups in the area, with support being provided
from its allegiance to the Government and its laws by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug
and depriving the Chief Executive of his powers money, and their blatant acts of defiance which
and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land embolden other armed groups in Mindanao, have
and to maintain public order and safety in resulted in the deterioration of public order and
Mindanao, to the great damage, prejudice, and safety in Marawi City; they have likewise
detriment of the people therein and the nation as compromised the security of the entire Island of
a whole."222 Mindanao."228

3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display 9) "Considering the network and alliance-building
the groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic activities among terrorist groups, local criminals,
State and their capability to deprive the duly and lawless armed men, the siege f Marawi City
constituted authorities - the President, foremost - is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal:
of their powers and prerogatives. "223 absolute control over the entirety of Mindanao.
These circumstances demand swift and decisive
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display action to ensure the safety and security of the
of force, but a clear attempt to establish the Filipino people and preserve our national
groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their integrity."229
planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or
province covering the entire Mindanao."224 Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to
him that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable
5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and purpose of which was to remove from the allegiance to
power; the recruitment of young Muslims to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to
further expand their ranks and strengthen their deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and
prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there Weighing the superiority of the evidence on hand,
was probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is from at least two opposing sides, before she can
being committed and that public safety requires the act and impose martial law or suspend the writ
imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege unreasonably curtails the President's emergency
of the writ of habeas corpus. powers.

A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to Similarly, substantial evidence constitutes an
conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. unnecessary restriction on the President's use of
216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that her emergency powers. Substantial evidence is
actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that the amount of proof required in administrative or
there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose quasi-judicial cases, or that amount of relevant
of which was the removal from the allegiance of the evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the as adequate to justify a conclusion.
deprivation of the President from performing his powers
and prerogatives, was reached after a tactical I am of the view that probable cause of the
consideration of the facts. In fine, the President existence of either invasion or rebellion suffices
satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. and satisfies the standard of proof for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the writ.
standard of probable cause for a valid declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of Probable cause is the same amount of proof
habeas corpus. As Justice Carpio decreed in his Dissent required for the filing of a criminal information by
in Fortun: the prosecutor and for the issuance of an arrest
warrant by a judge. Probable cause has been
x x x [T]he Constitution does not compel the defined as a 'set of facts and circumstances as
President to produce such amount of proof as to would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
unduly burden and effectively incapacitate her man to believe that the offense charged in the
from exercising such powers. Information or any offense included therein has
been committed by the person sought to be
Definitely, the President need not gather proof arrested.'
beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard
of proof required for convicting an accused In determining probable cause, the average man
charged with a criminal offense.x x x weighs the facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
xxxx evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the highest
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
quantum of evidence, and to require the
crime has been committed and that it was
President to establish the existence of rebellion
committed by the accused. Probable cause
or invasion with such amount of proof before
demands more than suspicion; it requires less
declaring martial law or suspending the writ
than evidence that would justify conviction.
amounts to an excessive restriction on 'the
President's power to act as to practically tie her
hands and disable her from effectively protecting Probable cause, basically premised on common
the nation against threats to public safety.' sense, is the most reasonable, most practical,
and most expedient standard by which the
President can fully ascertain the existence or
Neither clear and convincing evidence, which is
non-existence of rebellion, necessary for a
employed in either criminal or civil cases, is
declaration of martial law x x x230
indispensable for a lawful declaration of martial
law or suspension of the writ. This amount of
proof likewise unduly restrains the President in c) Inaccuracies, simulations,
exercising her emergency powers, as it requires falsities, and hyperboles.
proof greater than preponderance of evidence
although not beyond reasonable doubt. The allegation in the Lagman Petition that the facts stated
in Proclamation No. 216 and the Report are false,
Not even preponderance of evidence, which is inaccurate, simulated, and/or hyperbolic, does not
the degree of proof necessary in civil cases, is persuade. As mentioned, the Court is not concerned
demanded for a lawful declaration of martial law. about absolute correctness, accuracy, or precision of the
facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands of the
President in responding to an urgent situation.
xxxx
Specifically, it alleges that the following facts are not true relevant statement, which is an ·exception to the hearsay
as shown by its counter-evidence.231 rule, applies in cases "where only the fact that such
statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity
thereof is immaterial."240 Here, the question is not
whether such statements were made by Saber, et. al., but
rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary to
the view of petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no
application here.

e) There are other independent

facts which support the finding that,
more likely than not, rebellion exists
and that public safety requires it.

Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements

are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these
alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts
showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists,
and public safety requires the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
To be precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate
statements are only five out of the severa1 statements
bulleted in the President's Report. Notably, in the
interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the
second day of the oral argument, petitioner Lagman
admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal
knowledge of the other incidents cited.241 As it thus
stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to
the reliability of the other incidents, which by themselves
are ample to preclude the conclusion that the President's
However, the so-called counter-evidence were derived report is unreliable and that Proclamation No. 216 was
solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with without sufficient factual basis.
neither the authors nor the sources shown to have
affirmed the contents thereof It was not even shown that Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the
efforts were made to secure such affirmation albeit the bases for the President's imposition of martial law and
circumstances proved futile. As the Court has consistently suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly
ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, inaccurate, simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.
and are thus without any probative value, unless offered
for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter X. Public safety requires the declaration of
asserted.237 This pronouncement applies with equal martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
force to the Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
online news articles238 as basis for their claim of Mindanao.
insufficiency of factual basis.
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling
Again, it bears to reiterate that the maxim falsus in uno, out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law
falsus in omnibus finds no application in these cases. As or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the
written Report indubitably showing the presence of an privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there
actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and
the declaration and/or suspension, the finding of the public safety requirement. In his Report, the President
sufficiency of factual basis, stands. noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG
and the Maute Group were directed not only against
d) Ruling in Bedol v. government forces or establishments but likewise against
Commission on Elections not civilians and their properties.242 In addition and in
Applicable. relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were
issued;243 road blockades and checkpoints were set
Petitioners, however, insist that in Bedol v. Commission up;244 schools and churches were burned;245 civilian
on Elections,239 news reports may be admitted on hostages were taken and killed;246 non-Muslims or
grounds of relevance, trustworthiness, and necessity. Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were
Petitioners' reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court forced to join their group;248 medical services and
in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of independent delivery of basic services were hampered;249
reinforcements of government troops and civilian declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
movement were hindered;250 and the security of the the writ of habeas corpus; the public safety requirement
entire Mindanao Island was compromised.251 must likewise be present.

These particular scenarios convinced the President that b) As Commander-in-Chief, the

the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked President receives vital, relevant,
public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law classified, and live information which
and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In equip and assist him in making
the last paragraph of his Report, the President declared: decisions.

While the government is presently conducting legitimate In Parts IX and X, the Court laid down the arsenal of facts
operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the and events that formed the basis for Proclamation No.
seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the 216. For the President, the totality of facts and events,
continued implementation of martial law and the more likely than not, shows that actual rebellion exists and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that public safety requires the declaration of martial law
the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion is and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
completely quelled.252 corpus. Otherwise stated, the President believes that
there is probable cause that actual rebellion exists and
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for public safety warrants the issuance of Proclamation No.
the declaration of martial law and suspension of the 216. In turn, the Court notes that the President, in arriving
privilege of the writ f habeas corpus have been properly at such a conclusion, relied on the facts and events
and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has included in the Report, which we find sufficient.
sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to
believe that rebellion exists and that public safety requires To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and
the martial law declaration and the suspension of the the Report are far from being exhaustive or all-
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. encompassing. At this juncture, it may not be amiss to
state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has
XI. Whole of Mindanao possession of documents and information classified as
"confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in
the Proclamation or Report for reasons of national
a) The overriding and
security. These documents may contain information
paramount concern of martial law is
detailing the position of government troops and rebels,
the protection of the security of the
stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and
nation and the good and safety of the
operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. , In
public.
fact, during the closed door session held by the Court,
some information came to light, although not mentioned
Considering the nation's and its people's traumatic in the Proclamation or Report. But then again, the
experience martial law under the Marcos regime, one discretion whether to include the same in the
would expect the framers of the 1987 Constitution to stop Proclamation or Report is the judgment call of the
at nothing from not resuscitating the law. Yet it would President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During the
appear that the constitutional writers entertained no doubt oral argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that "the
about the necessity and practicality of such specie of assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the
extraordinary power and thus, once again, bestowed on call of the President."255
the Commander-in-Chief the power to declare martial law
albeit in its diluted form.
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on
intelligence reports and classified documents. "It is for the
Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of President as [C]ommander-in[C]hief of the Armed Forces
the writ of habeas corpus are necessary for the protection to appraise these [classified evidence or
of the security of the nation; suspension of the privilege of documents/]reports and be satisfied that the public safety
the writ of habeas corpus is "precautionary , and although demands the suspension of the writ."256 Significantly,
it might [curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for the respect to these so-called classified documents is
purpose of defending and protecting the security of the accorded even "when [the] authors of or witnesses to
state or the entire country and our sovereign people".253 these documents may not be revealed."257
Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as a "form of
In fine, not only does the President have a wide array of
immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential
information before him, he also has the right, prerogative,
internal enemies" "especially in areas like Mindanao."254
and the means to access vital, relevant, and confidential
data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-
Aside from protecting the security of the country, martial Chief of the Armed Forces.
law also guarantees and promotes public safety. It is
worthy of mention that rebellion alone does not justify the
c) The Court has no machinery Chief's powers; further curtailment of
or tool equal to that of the Presidential powers should not only
Commander-in-Chief to ably and be discouraged but also avoided.
properly assess the ground
conditions. Considering the country's history, it is understandable that
the resurgence of martial law would engender
In contrast, the Court does not have the same resources apprehensions among the citizenry. Even the Court as an
available to the President. However, this should not be institution cannot project a stance of nonchalance.
considered as a constitutiona1 lapse. On the contrary, this However, the importance of martial law in the context of
is in line with the function of the Court, particularly in this our society should outweigh one's prejudices and
instance, to determine the sufficiency of factual basis of apprehensions against it. The significance of martial law
Proclamation No. 216. As thoroughly discussed in Part should not be undermined by unjustified fears and past
VIII, the determination by the Court of the sufficiency of experience. After all, martial law is critical and crucial to
factual basis must be limited only to the facts and the promotion of public safety, the preservation of the
information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. In nation's sovereignty and ultimately, the survival of our
fact, the Court, in David v. President Macapagal- country. It is vital for the protection of the country not only
Arroyo,258 cautioned not to "undertake an independent against internal enemies but also against those enemies
investigation beyond the pleadings." In this regard, "the lurking from beyond our shores. As such, martial law
Court will have to rely on the fact-finding capabilities of the should not be cast aside, or its scope and potency limited
[E]xecutive [D]epartment;"259 in turn, the Executive and diluted, based on bias and unsubstantiated
Department will have to open its findings to the Court,260 assumptions.
which it did during the closed door session last June 15,
2017. Conscious of these fears and apprehensions, the
Constitution placed several safeguards which effectively
d) The 1987 Constitution watered down the power to declare martial law. The 1987
grants to the President, as Constitution "[clipped] the powers of [the] Commander-in-
Commander-in-Chief, the discretion Chief because of [the] experience with the previous
to determine the territorial coverage regime."261 Not only were the grounds limited to actual
or application of martial law or invasion or rebellion, but its duration was likewise fixed at
suspension of the privilege of the writ 60 days, unless sooner revoked, nullified, or extended; at
of habeas corpus. the same time, it is subject to the veto powers of the Court
and Congress.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety Commissioner Monsod, who, incidentally, is a counsel for
requires it, [the President] may x x x suspend the privilege the Mohamad Petition, even exhorted his colleagues in
of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any the Constitutional Convention to look at martial law from
part thereof under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution a new perspective by elaborating on the sufficiency of the
grants to the President the discretion to determine the proposed safeguards:
territorial coverage of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the MR. MONSOD. x x x
entire Philippines or only a part thereof under martial law.
Second, we have been given a spectre of non sequitur,
This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that that the mere declaration of martial law for a fixed period
it is the Executive Department, particularly the President not exceeding 60 days, which is subject to judicial review,
as Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, is going to result in numerous violations of human rights,
classified, and live information necessary for and relevant the predominance of the military forever and in untold
in calibrating the territorial application of martial law and sufferings. Madam President, we are talking about
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas invasion and rebellion. We may not have any freedom to
corpus. It, too, is a concession that the President has the speak of after 60 days, if we put as a precondition the
tactical and military support, and thus has a more concurrence of Congress. That might prevent the
informed understanding of what is happening on the President from acting at that time in order to meet the
ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the problem. So I would like to suggest that, perhaps, we
period of application, which is 60 days, unless sooner should look at this in its proper perspective. We are only
nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial looking at a very specific case. We are only looking at a
scope or area of coverage; it merely stated "the case of the first 60 days at its maximum. And we are
Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the looking at actual invasion and rebellion, and there are
assessment of the President. other safeguards in those cases.262

e) The Constitution has Even Bishop Bacani was convinced that the 1987
provided sufficient safeguards against Constitution has enough safeguards against presidential
possible abuses of Commander-in- abuses and commission of human rights violations. In
voting yes for the elimination of the requirement of prior It has been said that the "gravamen of the crime of
concurrence of Congress, Bishop Bacani stated, viz.: rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government;"266 and that by nature, "rebellion is x x x a
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, just two sentences. The reason I crime of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action,
vote II yes is that despite my concern for human rights, I that cannot be confined a priori, within predetermined
believe that a good President can also safeguard human bounds."267 We understand this to mean that the precise
rights and human lives as well. And I do not want to unduly extent or range of the rebellion could not be measured by
emasculate the powers of the President. Xxx263 exact metes and bounds.

Commissioner Delos Reyes shared the same sentiment, To illustrate: A contingent armed with high-powered
to wit: firearms publicly assembled in Padre Faura, Ermita,
Manila where the Court's compound is situated. They
overpowered the guards, entered the Court's premises,
MR. DE LOS REYES. May I explain my vote, Madam
and hoisted the ISIS flag. Their motive was political, i.e.,
President.
they want to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine
government a part of the territory of the Philippines,
x x x The power of the President to impose martial law is particularly the Court's compound and establish it as an
doubtless of a very high and delicate nature. A free people ISIS-territory.
are naturally jealous of the exercise of military power, and
the power to impose martial law is certainly felt to be one
Based on the foregoing illustration, and vis-a-vis the
of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented by the
nature of the crime of rebellion, could we validly say that
Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is limited to
the rebellion is confined only within the Court's
60 days; 2) Congress can revoke it; 3) the Supreme Court
compound? Definitely not. The possibility that there are
can still review as to the sufficiency of factual basis; and
other rebels positioned in the nearby buildings or
4) it does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.
compound of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) or the
To repeat what I have quoted when I interpellated
Manila Science High Schoo1 (MSHS) could not be
Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the power to impose
discounted. There is no way of knowing that all
martial law is dangerous to liberty and may be abused. All
participants in the rebellion went and stayed inside the
powers may be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But
Court's compound.
it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands
in which this power will be more safe and at the same time
equally effectual. When citizens of the State are in arms Neither could it be validly argued that the armed
against each other and the constituted authorities are contingent positioned in PGH or MSHS is not engaged in
unable to execute the laws, the action of the President rebellion because there is no publicity in their acts as, in
must be prompt or it is of little value. x x x264 (Emphasis fact, they were merely lurking inside the compound of
supplied) PGH and MSHS. However, it must be pointed out that for
the crime of rebellion to be consummated, it is not
required that all armed participants should congregate in
At this juncture, it bears to stress that it was the collective
one place, in this case, the Court's compound, and
sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that
publicly rise in arms against the government for the
sufficient safeguards against possible misuse and abuse
attainment of their culpable purpose. It suffices that a
by the Commander-in-Chief of his extraordinary powers
portion of the contingent gathered and formed a mass or
are already in place and that no further emasculation of
a crowd and engaged in an armed public uprising against
the presidential powers is called for in the guise of
the government. Similarly, it cannot be validly concluded
additional safeguards. The Constitution recognizes that
that the grounds on which the armed public uprising
any further curtailment, encumbrance, or emasculation of
actually to6k place should be the measure of the extent,
the presidential powers would not generate any good
scope or range, of the actual I rebellion. This is logical
among the three co-equal branches, and to the country
since the other rebels positioned in PGH, MSHS, I or
and its citizens as a whole. Thus:
elsewhere, whose participation did not involve the
publicity aspect of rebellion, may also be considered as
MR. OPLE. The reason for my concern, Madam engaging in the crime of rebellion.
President, is that when we put all of these encumbrances
on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an
Proceeding from the same illustration, suppose we say
actual invasion or rebellion, given an intractable Congress
that the President, after finding probable cause that there
that may be dominated by opposition parties, we may be
exists actual rebellion and that public safety requires it,
actually impelling the President to use the sword of
declares martial law and suspends the writ of habeas
Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just declaring a
corpus in the whole of Metro Manila, could we then say
revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with
that the territorial coverage of the proclamation is too
the invasion or the insurrection. x x x265 (Emphasis
expansive?
supplied)

To answer this question, we revert back to the premise

f) Rebellion and public safety;
that the discretion to determine the territorial scope of
nature, scope, and range.
martial law lies with the President. The Constitution grants Thus, by the theory of absorption, the crime of murder
him the prerogative whether to put the entire Philippines committed in Makati City, if committed in furtherance of
or any part thereof under martial law. There is no the crime of rebellion being hypothetically staged in Padre
constitutional edict that martial law should be confined Faura, Ermita, Manila, is stripped of its common
only in the particular place where the armed public complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion. This
uprising actually transpired. This is not only practical but all the more makes it difficult to confine the application of
also logical. Martial law is an urgent measure since at martial law only to the place where the armed public
stake is the nation's territorial sovereignty and survival. As uprising is actually taking place. In the illustration above,
such, the President has to respond quickly. After the Padre Faura could only be the nerve center of the
rebellion in the Court's compound, he need not wait for rebellion but at the same time rebellion is also happening
another rebellion to be mounted in Quezon City before he in Makati City.
could impose martial law thereat. If that is the case, then
the President would have to wait until every remote corner In fine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial
in the country is infested with rebels before he could scope of martial law in direct proportion to the "range" of
declare martial law in the entire Philippines. For sure, this actual rebellion and public safety simply because
is not the scenario envisioned by the Constitution. rebellion and public safety have no fixed physical
dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies
Going back to the illustration above, although the precise measurements; hence, the determination of the
President is not required to impose martial law only within territorial scope of martial law could only be drawn from
the Court's compound because it is where the armed arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have
public uprising actually transpired, he may do so if he sees considered these limitations when it granted the President
fit. At the same time, however, he is not precluded from wide leeway and flexibility in determining the territorial
expanding the coverage of martial law beyond the Court's scope of martial law.
compound. After all, rebellion is not confined within
predetermined bounds. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and
public safety is not limited only to the place where there is
Public safety, which is another component element for the actual rebellion; it extends to other areas where the
declaration of martial law, "involves the prevention of and present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not
protection from events that could endanger the safety of intended merely to prevent the escape of lawless
the general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy
damage, such as crimes or disasters."268 Public safety is reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from
an abstract term; it does not take any physical form. different parts of Mindanao. Thus, limiting the
Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there
measured by metes and bounds. is actual rebellion would not only defeat the purpose of
declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof
Perhaps another reason why the territorial scope of ineffective and useless.
martial law should not necessarily be limited to the
particular vicinity where the armed public uprising actually g) The Court must stay within
transpired, is because of the unique characteristic of the confines of its power.
rebellion as a crime. "The crime of rebellion consists of
many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex The Court can only act within the confines of its
net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance power.1âwphi1 For the Court to overreach is to infringe
of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are deemed upon another's territory. Clearly, the power to determine
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion."269 Rebellion the scope of territorial application belongs to the
absorbs "other acts committed in its pursuance".270 President. "The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation
Direct assault,271 murder,272 homicide,273 arson,274 without violating the principle of separation of powers,
robbery,275 and kidnapping,276 just to name a few, are and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican
absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in system."281
furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge."277 Jurisprudence also teaches that not To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the
only common crimes may be absorbed in rebellion but competence and logistical machinery to determine the
also "offenses under special laws [such as Presidential strategical value of other places in the military's efforts to
Decree No. 1829]278 which are perpetrated in quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be
furtherance of the political offense".279 "All crimes, engaging in an act of adventurism if it dares to embark on
whether punishable under a special law or general law,
a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds
which are me e components or ingredients, or committed of martial law. To be blunt about it, hours after the
in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of proclamation of martial law none of the members of this
rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate Court could have divined that more than ten thousand
crimes in themselves.280 souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan
de Oro and that the military would have to secure those
places also; none of us could have predicted that
Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City or that the rights of the citizenry. It does not render the
his wife Ominta Romato Maute would be apprehended in presidency impotent and, at the same time, it allows for a
Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling that vigorous representation of the people through their
the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would Congress when an emergency measure is in force and
launch an attack in Cotabato City. The Court has no effect.284
military background and technical expertise to predict
that. In the same manner, the Court lacks the technical h) Several local armed groups
capability to determine which part of Mindanao would best have formed linkages aimed at
serve as forward operating base of the military in their committing rebellion and acts in
present endeavor in Mindanao. Until now the Court is in a furtherance thereof in the whole of
quandary and can only speculate whether the 60-day Mindanao.
lifespan of Proclamation No. 216 could outlive the present
hostilities in Mindanao. It is on this score that the Court With a predominantly Muslim population, Marawi City is
should give the President sufficient leeway to address the
"the only Islamic City of the South."285 On April 15, 1980,
peace and order problem in Mindanao. it was conferred the official title of "Islamic City of
Marawi."286 The city's first name, "Dansalan," "was
Thus, considering the current situation, it will not serve derived from the word 'dansal', meaning a destination
any purpose if the President is goaded into using "the point or rendezvous. Literally, it also means arrival or
sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot"282 by coming."287 Marawi lies in the heart of Mindanao. In fact,
attempting to impose another encumbrance; after all "the the Kilometer Zero marker in Mindanao is found in Marawi
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the City thereby making Marawi City the point of reference of
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is essentially an all roads in Mindanao.
executive act."283
Thus, there is reasonable basis to believe that Marawi is
Some sectors, impelled perhaps by feelings of patriotism, only the staging point of the rebellion, both for symbolic
may wish to subdue, rein in, or give the President a and strategic reasons. Marawi may not be the target but
nudge, so to speak, as some sort of reminder of the the whole of Mindanao. As mentioned in the Report,
nation's experience under the Marcos-styled martial law. "[l]awless armed groups have historically used provinces
However, it is not fair to judge President Duterte based on adjoining Marawi City as escape routes, supply lines, and
the ills some of us may have experienced during the backdoor passages;"288 there is also the plan to
Marcos-martial law era. At this point, the Court quotes the establish a wilayat in Mindanao by staging the siege of
insightful discourse of Commissioner Ople: Marawi. The report that prior to May 23, 2017, Abdullah
Maute had already dispatched some of his men to various
MR. OPLE. x x x places in Mindanao, such asMarawi, Iligan, and Cagayan
de Oro for bombing operations, carnapping, and the
xxxx murder of military and police personnel,289 must also be
considered. Indeed, there is some semblance of truth to
the contention that Marawi is only the start, and Mindanao
Madam President, there is a tendency to equate
the end.
patriotism with rendering the executive branch of the
government impotent, as though by reducing drastically
the powers of the executive, we are rendering a service to Other events also show that the atrocities were not
human welfare. I think it is also important to understand concentrated in Marawi City. Consider these:
that the extraordinary measures contemplated in the
Article on the Executive pertain to a practical state of war a. On January 13, 2017, an improvised explosive device
existing in this country when national security will become (IED) exploded in Barangay Campo Uno, Lamita City,
a common bond of patriotism of all Filipinos, especially if Basilan. A civilian was killed while another was
it is an actual invasion or an actual rebellion, and the wounded.290
President may have to be given a minimum flexibility to
cope with such unprecedented threats to the survival of a b. On January 19, 2017, the ASG kidnapped three
nation. I think the Commission has done so but at the Indonesians near Bakungan Island, Taganak, Tawi-
same time has not, in any manner, shunned the task of Tawi.291
putting these powers under a whole system of checks and
balances, including the possible revocation at any time of c. On January 29, 2017, the ASG detonated an IED in
a proclamation of martial law by the Congress, and in any Barangay Danapah, Albarka, Basilan resulting in the
case a definite determination of these extraordinary
death of two children and the wounding of three
powers, subject only to another extension to be
others.292
determined by Congress in the event that it is necessary
to do so because the emergency persists.
d. From March to May 2017, there were eleven (11)
separate instances of IED explosions by the BIFF in
So, I think this Article on the Executive for which I voted is
completely responsible; it is attuned to the freedom and
Mindanao. These resulted in the death and wounding of or armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
several personalities.293 Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.
e. On February 26, 2017, the ASG beheaded its kidnap
victim, Juergen Kantner in Sulu.294 In determining what crime was committed, we have to
look into the main objective of the malefactors. If it is
f. On April 11, 2017, the ASG infiltrated Inabaga, Bohol political, such as for the purpose of severing the
resulting in firefights between rebels and government allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government to
troops.295 establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the
other hand, the primary objective is to sow and create a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
g. On April 13, 2017, the ASG beheaded Filipino kidnap
among the populace in order to coerce the government to
victim Noel Besconde.296
give in to an unlawful demand, the crime is terrorism.
Here, we have already explained and ruled that the
h. On April 20, 2017, the ASG kidnapped SSg. Anni Siraji President did not err in believing that what is going on in
and beheaded him three days later.297 Marawi City is one contemplated under the crime of
rebellion.
There were also intelligence reports from the military
about offensives committed by the ASG and other local In any case, even assuming that the insurgency in Marawi
rebel groups. All these suggest that the rebellion in City can also be characterized as terrorism, the same will
Marawi has already spilled over to other parts of not in any manner affect Proclamation No. 216. Section 2
Mindanao. of Republic Act (RA) No. 9372, otherwise known as the
Human Security Act of 2007 expressly provides that
Moreover, considering the widespread atrocities in "[n]othing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment,
Mindanao and the linkages established among rebel restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized
groups, the armed uprising that was initially staged in powers of the executive branch of the government." Thus,
Marawi cannot be justified as confined only to Marawi. as long as the President complies with all the
The Court therefore will not simply disregard the events requirements of Section 18, Article VII, the existence of
that happened during the Davao City bombing, the terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his
Mamasapano massacre, the Zamboanga City siege, and extraordinary power of proclaiming martial ' law or
the countless bombings in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Sulu, and Basilan, among others.298 The Court cannot After all, the extraordinary powers of the President are
simply take the battle of Marawi in isolation. As a crime bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of Congress
without predetermined bounds, the President has can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers.
reasonable basis to believe that the declaration of martial
law, as well as the suspension of the privilege of the writ Besides, there is nothing in Art. 134 of the RPC and RA
of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, is most 9372 which states that rebellion and terrorism are
necessary, effective, and called for by the circumstances. mutuallty exclusive of each other or that they cannot co-
exist together. RA 9372 does not expressly or impliedly
i) Terrorism neither negates repeal Art. 134 of the RPC. And while rebellion is one of
nor absorbs rebellion. the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the
other as they have different elements.300
It is also of judicial notice that the insurgency in Mindanao
has been ongoing for decades. While some groups have Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of
sought legal and peaceful means, others have resorted to martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
violent extremism and terrorism. Rebellion may be habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region.
subsumed under the crime of terrorism, which has a
broader scope covering a wide range of predicate crimes. At the end of the day, however ardently and passionately
In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which we may believe in the validity or correctness of the varied
terrorism can be committed.299 However, while the and contentious causes or principles that we espouse,
scope of terrorism may be comprehensive, its purpose is advocate or champion, let us not forget that at this point
distinct and well-defined. The objective of a "'terrorist" is in time we, the Filipino people, are confronted with a crisis
to sow and create a condition of widespread fear among of such magnitude and proportion that we all need to
the populace in order to coerce the government to give in summon the spirit of unity and act as one undivided
to an unlawful demand. This condition of widespread fear nation, if we are to overcome and prevail in the struggle
is traditionally achieved through bombing, kidnapping, at hand.
mass killing, and beheading, among others. In contrast,
the purpose of rebellion, as previously discussed, is
Let us face up to the fact that the siege in Marawi City has
political, i.e., (a) to remove from the allegiance to the
entered the second month and only God or Allah knows
Philippine Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the
when it would end. Let us take notice of the fact that the
Philippines or any part thereof; (ii) any body of land, naval,
casualties of the war are mounting. To date, 418 have
died. Out of that were 303 Maute rebels as against 71
government troops and 44 civilians.

Can we not sheathe our swords and pause for a while to

bury our dead, including our differences and prejudices?

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS sufficient factual bases

for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 and
DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the
consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice