NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY

REASONABLENESS OF DELEGATED
LEGISLATION - JUDICIAL SCRUTINY

An Administrative Law Project

Submitted To: Submitted by:

MRS. SUSHMA SHARMA RAKESH MALIYA

2016 BA LLB 45

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
- STATEMENT OF PROBLEM …………………………………………………3
- OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY………………………………………………....3

- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY……………………………………………….3

- HYPOTHESIS…………………………………………………………………...3

- INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................4

- THE NEED FOR DELEGATED LEGISLATON……………………………..6

- OBJECTION AGAIST DELEGATED LEGISLATION……………………..7

- JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION..........................8

- WEDNESBURY STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS................................11

- DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY............................................................12

- FINALITY CLAUSE............................................................................................13

- FINDINGS & CONCLUSION............................................................................18

- BIBLIOGRAPHY……………............................................................................20

2
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM –

 What are Delegated legislation?

 Can there be judicial review over administrative action?

 What are different rules of reasonableness?

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY –

The objective of the study is to know the reasonableness of the delegated legislation or the
administrative actions.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY-

This projects assessment is based on the doctrinal approach .

HYPOTHESIS

The Delegation of administrative actions appears to be limited in nature through judicial scrutiny
on reasonableness

3
 INTRODUCTION

Delegated legislation also referred to as secondary legislation, is legislation made by a person or

body other than Parliament. Parliament, through an Act of Parliament, can permit another person
or body to make legislation. In short, delegated legislation means the exercise of legislative
power by an agency that is subordinate to the legislature. This subordinate body acquires the
power from the act of the legislature. Power is transferred from the principal lawmaker to the
lower body, which may be the executive, cabinet, council of minister, or a specific administrative
agency, by the mechanism of delegation. Generally, delegation refers to the act of entrusting
another authority or empowering another to act as an agent or representative. By the same token,
delegation of legislative powers means the transfer of law-making authority by the legislature to
the executive, or to an administrative agency. In line with the power granted to them by the
legislature administrative, agencies can issue rules, regulations and directives, which have a
legally binding effect.

Indian Judiciary in the past six decades has done a marvellous job of protecting citizens' rights,
liberty, dignity and the Rule of Law against all obnoxious odds by controlling the abuse of
administrative discretions and arbitrary actions.

The administration equipped with rule-making powers overwhelms the ‘little man ‘by trampling
upon his liberty and property. The judiciary has been instrumental in channelizing the unbridled
administrative powers to achieve the basic aim of any civilised society, “growth with liberty”.
There are also certain legislations which were challenged on constitutional scale and were
subsequently struck down by courts partly or wholly. In Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of
India  1the Supreme Court struck down an Act on the ground of excessive delegation of
legislative powers.

The power of Public Law Review exercised by the Supreme Court and the High Courts through
writs of certiorari , prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus under articles
1
(AIR 1960 SC 554),
4
337, 136, 226 and 32 of the Constitution are used as a shield for the protection of citizens against
the wrongs done by the Executive. Similarly, the Private Law Review exercised by ordinary
courts through injunction, declaratory action and suit for damages protects the people against
wrongs done by public authority or a private party.

It is a privilege to the people that the judicial review available under articles 32, 226, 337 and
136 cannot be barred by any finality clause contained in any statute. In Deokinandan
Prasad v. State of Bihar  2the Supreme Court held that section 23 of the Pension Act, 1871
which provides that the suits relating to matters mentioned therein cannot be entertained in any
court, does not bar the constitutional modes of judicial review.

In Durga Shanker v. Raghuraj3 the apex court held that section 105 of the Representation of the
People Act which made every order of the Election Tribunal final and conclusive does not bar
constitutional modes of judicial review. Similarly, in Illuri Subhayya Chetty v. State of Andhra
Pradesh 4the Supreme Court held that the provision of section 18A of the Madras General Sales
Tax Act, 1939, that no suit can be instituted in any civil court to set aside or modify the
assessment made under the Act, does not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court. Not only this,
article 217(3) of the Constitution  in cases of dispute relating to age of a judge holds the order of
the President as final but the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J.P . Mitter  5 held that the
constitutional mode of judicial review is not barred.

Indian courts are full of admirers who respect their ingenuity and integrity. Among the three
organs of the government, people repose more faith in judiciary.

In Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India 6 Justice Krishna Iyer had rightly
observed, “But when corruption permeates the entire fabric of the government, legality is the
first casualty”.
2
(1971 2 SCC 330),

3
 (AIR 1954 SC 520)

4
(AIR 1964 SC 322),

5
(AIR 1971 SC 1093)

6
(AIR 1981 SC 344)
5
The administration equipped with tremendous powers of rule-making in the form of Rules,
Regulations, Orders, Bye-Laws, Directions and Schemes mostly indulge in improper exercise of
discretion adversely affecting the common man and inviting judicial review. Today the State is
seen everywhere fighting the citizens like a ‘cantankerous litigant'.

In early eighties, the Supreme Court adopted a pro-active approach by developing Social Action
Litigation (SAL) or Public Interest Litigation (PIL) for which credit goes to Justice P. N.
Bhagwati. According to him PIL is a litigation which is not intended for the benefit of one
individual but for the benefit of a group of persons, who are victims of exploitation or oppression
or who are denied constitutional rights but cannot come to the court because of their ignorance,
poverty and destitution. Ever since, the judiciary has been servicing the society by entertaining
PILs on crucial social issues, at times even taking ‘suo moto'  actions, thereby inviting criticism
from various corners to the extent of terming ‘judiciary is over-stepping others' domain'.

THE NEED FOR DELEGATED LEGISLATION

Despite the ever-increasing volume of primary legislation, the complexities of governing a

sophisticated society (and even a developing society) demands the delegation of some legislative
functions to inferior bodies such as ministers and administrative agencies. Clearly parliament
does not have time or resources to enact every single piece of legislation that is needed in the
form of primary legislation, which can be fully debated and scrutinized in accordance with
legislative procedures. The result is delegated legislation- legislation produced by an  ‘inferior
body’ which nevertheless has the force of law.

Tackling the complexities of modern administration in an efficient and efficient manner demands
an atmosphere of complexity. Parliament has to follow strict legislative procedures to make a
single law. Hence, it will be far from being flexible without delegating some of its powers to the
executive.

OBJECTION AGAINST DELEGATED LEGISLATION

The fact that delegation is indispensable and inevitable due to practically convincing needs, it
has not been a bar to theoretical challenges and criticisms against it. The main constitutional
6
objection raised against delegation of rule making power to administrative agencies has been the
doctrine of non delegability of power, which holds that power delegated to one branch may not
be re delegated to another. People elect their representatives based on their fitness, knowledge
and ability to represent their interest. Hence, it is a generally accepted rule that this mandate
bestowed by the people cannot be delegated to another individual or organ, which does not stand
in a direct relation to the people. It is a cardinal principle of representative government that the
legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other body or authority.

One of the most commonly cited sources of the rule of non delegation is the common law maxim
delegates potestas non potest delegari which means that a delegate can not further delegates his
power. Simply, the maxim indicates that power that has been delegated originally may not be
redelegated.

The maxim was originally invoked in the context of delegation of judicial power and implies that
in the entire process of adjudication, a judge must act personally except in so far as he is
expressly absolved from his duty by a statue. Therefore the basic principle underlying the
maximum is that discretion conferred by the statute on an authority must be exercised by that
authority alone, unless a contrary intention appears from the language, scope or object of the
statute. Generally, it implies that, since the people delegated legislative power to the lawmaker,
executive power to the prime minister and cabinet and judicial power to the courts, none of the
institutions may redelegate its power to any other authority.

Another objection to delegation of power is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. In

America, the doctrine of separation of powers has been raised to a constitutional status. The U.S.
Supreme Court has observed that the doctrine of separation of power has been considered to be
an essential principle underlying the constitution and that the powers entrusted to one department
should be exercised exclusively by that department without encroaching up on the power of
another.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

7
The field of administrative law is broadly identified as the law relating to the control of executive
powers. It cannot be readily studied in water-tight compartments and needs a working knowledge
of many principles, precedents and statutes. The main premise of course is that the functioning of
the various ‘agencies and instrumentalities of the state’ should demonstrate a clear commitment
to fairness, impartiality and proportionality while maintaining effective checks against
arbitrariness and discrimination. While these theoretical premises may lend an air of uncertainty,
the courts are frequently called in to give them practical shape when they exercise ‘judicial
review’ over the decisions of government departments, administrative agencies, statutory
corporations, regulatory authorities and quasi-judicial authorities among others.

The phrase ‘judicial review’ has of course gained prominence since it has been exercised in
many different forms. Black’s Law Dictionary defines judicial review as “a court’s power to
review the actions of other branches of government, especially the court’s power to invalidate
legislative and executive actions as being unconstitutional7”.

In mediating the relationship between the state and its citizens, the Courts have given due
weightage to principles such as proportionality, reasonableness and fairness. Furthermore, the
principles of natural justice have also been recognised as dimensions of ‘personal liberty’ and
thereby applied to a wide variety of administrative settings.

For example, the rule of ‘audi alterem partem’, i.e. ‘no man should be condemned unheard’ had
historically evolved in the context of criminal proceedings, wherein it was recognised that the
accused should be given a fair hearing which would give an opportunity to contest charges and
rebut the prosecution’s submissions.
However, with the passage of time the ‘right to a fair hearing’ has also been allowed in the
context of administrative proceedings where parties are likely to face adverse civil consequences.
In State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei8, it was held that administrative orders which involve
civil consequences have to be passed consistently with the rules of natural justice. Irrespective of
the fact that any statute provides the option of a hearing or not, ordinarily such an opportunity

7
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edn. at p. 864
8
AIR 1967 SC 1269
8
must be given to the party unless the same is expressly excluded by the applicable statute. In
fact, the various dimensions of ‘audi alterem partem’ such as the right to receive adequate notice
of a proceeding that may result in adverse consequences, the opportunity to file responses in
support of one’s positions and the right to be informed of all relevant materials have become
essential features in most administrative processes.

Through decisions such as Maneka Gandhi’s case9 and Brojo Nath Ganguly’s case10, the
Supreme Court had taken the lead in strengthening the ‘right to a fair hearing’. Any exceptions to
this norm need to be backed up by statutory provisions that clearly show a ‘compelling state
interest’ which justifies the denial of a person’s right to be heard in an administrative proceeding.

In many administrative decisions and orders, proper reasons are not adduced for a given course
of action, for instance actions such as those relating to dismissals from service, the awarding of a
contract of the selection of a bidder from among several competitors. The absence of reasoned
orders and the proper maintenance of records adds to the burden of courts who are later called on
to examine such decisions. Sometimes, considerations of expediency may only permit the
decision-makers to produce a brief record of reasons for choosing a particular course of action.
However, the promotion of such practices is an effective check against arbitrariness and it makes
it easier to resolve grievances that might arise in the future. In Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of
India Ltd. v. Union of India 11, it was noted that a reasoned order is an essential requirement for
the delivery of justice.

In Delhi Development Authority v. M/s UEE Electricals Engg. Pvt. Ltd 12, the Supreme Court
made the following observations: “One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds
on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is
“illegality”, the second “irrationality”, and the third “procedural impropriety”. Courts are slow to
interfere in matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any
9
(1978)

10
(1986) 3 SCC 156

11
AIR 1976 SC 1785

12
(2004) 11 SCC 213
9
vulnerability such as, lack of fairness in the procedure, illegality and irrationality. Whether action
falls in any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in this regard would not be
sufficient. The law is settled that in considering challenge to administrative decisions courts will
not interfere as if they are sitting in appeal over the decision. He who seeks to invalidate or
nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by the
authority of its powers. It cannot be overlooked that burden of establishing mala fides is very
heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than
proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of
credibility”.

WEDNESBURY STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS.

Up to 1947 the law in England was that the courts could interfere only with judicial or quasi-
judicial decisions and not with administrative decisions. This legal position changed after the
famous decision of Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn.13 which recognised that courts could indeed examine the process by which administrative
decisions were arrived.

The Wednesbury standard has often been misunderstood to mean that any administrative
decision which is regarded by the Court as unreasonable can be struck down. However, the
court’s primary concern should be with the fairness of the process by which an administrative

13
(1947) 2 All ER 680
10
decision is made and not necessarily with the substantive outcome of the same. A decision is
unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense if:-

- Firstly, it is based on wholly irrelevant material or on wholly irrelevant considerations,

- Secondly, it has ignored relevant materials which should have been taken into
consideration
- Lastly it is so irrelevant that no reasonable man could ever have arrived at the same.

This test made it clear that ordinarily an administrative action cannot be struck down merely
because the judge disagrees with the final outcome of the administrative act. There must be a
substantial degree of unreasonableness in the manner in which such an act took place. However,
the application of the Wednesbury standard has been haphazard and there are competing views
on its proper application.

DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY
The ‘doctrine of proportionality’ is another important basis for exercising judicial review. This
entails that administrative measures must not be more drastic than what is necessary for attaining
the desired result. The doctrine operates both in procedural and substantive matters. This
principle contemplates scrutiny of whether the power that has been conferred on an executive
agency is being exercised in proportion to the purpose for which it has been conferred.

Thus, any administrative authority while exercising a discretionary power will have to
necessarily establish that its decision is balanced and in proportion to the object of the power
conferred. The doctrine of ‘legitimate expectations’ which has traditionally been used in
litigation between private parties, has also been recognised in the public law setting.

11
In the U.K., this concept made its appearance in Schmidt v. Secy. of State 14where it was held
that an alien who had been granted permission to enter the U.K. for a limited period had a
legitimate expectation for being allowed to stay for the permitted period. This doctrine is based
on the premise that a person may have an expectation of being treated in certain way by an
administrative authority even though he has no legally protected right to receive such treatment.
In this respect, Wade has emphasized the importance of this doctrine in the following words:15

“In many cases legal rights are affected, as where property is taken by compulsory purchase or
someone is dismissed from a public office. But in other cases, the person affected may have no
more than an interest, a liberty or an expectation … a ‘legitimate expectation’ which means
reasonable expectation, can equally well be invoked in any of many situations where fairness and
good administration justify the right to be heard.”

However, it must be kept in mind that the legitimacy of a particular expectation and the related
claim is a question of fact which can be decided in light of larger public policy related concerns.
It is open to the government to frame and reframe its policies, which may result in denying
certain individuals or a class of persons the benefits which they had been previously receiving.

All of these concepts have of course been discussed at length in numerous judgments and
textbooks. However, the purpose of a forum such as this is to have a free and informed
discussion on long-

FINALITY CLAUSE

The News Agency reports show that the Constitution 24th Amendment Bill which was passed
by the Parliament in its last session has been ratified by more than half of the State Assemblies.
This seeks to arm the Parliament with the power of amending the fundamental rights and thus
14
(1969) 1 All ER 904

15
Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, 7th edn. (Oxford University Press, 1994)
12
fills the void created by the famous Golak Nath case. The important significance of this fact is
that it would usher in Constitution 25th Amendment Bill during the current session of the
Parliament which seeks to bar the jurisdiction of the court in matters relating to the compulsory
acquisition of private property with a view to accelerate the pace of progress by rapid
implementation of the directive principles contained in Article 39, clauses (b) and (c) for which
the present Government stands committed to the people.

Instead of going into the ethics of the proposed 25th Constitution Amendment Bill which is a
political issue, it is proposed to confine to a limited aspect which poses an important question,
viz. can the proposed Amendment bar the jurisdiction of the courts absolutely in matters
involving property right? The whole strategy of the 25th Amendment Bill is to oust the
jurisdiction of the courts in determining any question pertaining to the legislation affecting
property rights if they stood in the way of the implementation of the directive principles of state
policy.

The statement of objects and reasons clearly indicates that the proposed amendment seeks to do
away with the consequences of the Supreme Court Decision in Bank Nationalisation case 16 in
which the Court held that the word 'compensation' in Article 31(2) means the "just equivalent" in
money of the property compulsorily acquired. The main thrust of the judgment was that it made
'compensation' and the "relevancy of the principles for compensation" justiciable issues. In the
case the Court went on to hold that the law which seeks to acquire property must also satisfy the
requirements of Article 19(1)(f). Consequently the proposed amendment seeks to replace the
word 'compensation' with the word 'amount' and also makes Articles 14, 19 or 31 inapplicable in
such cases.

The object of this provision was to give the President final say in any dispute relating to the age
of a judge and to that the jurisdiction of the courts was expressly barred. But even here the
Constitution Fifteenth Amendment Act did not succeed in abolishing judicial review. Justice J.P.
Mitter successfully persuaded the High Court of Calcutta and the Supreme Court to review the
order of the President of India under Article 217(3) deciding the question of his age. Justice D.D.
Basu of the Calcutta High Court who heard the petition said "the jurisdiction of this Court to

16
1970(1) SCC 248: (1970) 2 SCR 500.
13
interfere — is not barred by the finality clause under Article 217(3)" 17. The same view was taken
by the Supreme Court when it heard the case on certificate granted by the High Court under
Article 132. Hon'ble Shah, C.J. (as he was then), who delivered the judgment observed:

"Notwithstanding the declared finality of the order of the President the Court has jurisdiction in
appropriate cases to set aside the order."18

It becomes clear from the above discussion that no attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts
even by amending the Constitution can bar judicial review so long as Articles 32 and 226 are in
the Constitution. Any provision which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts shall be construed in a
manner that will not affect the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
Even after the passing of the proposed amendment the courts would not be lacking in power in
matters of judicial review if the 'amount' fixed or the principles laid down by the Parliament for
fixing the amount have no relevance to the property acquired. Replacing the word 'compensation'
with 'amount' will not solve the problem because the idea of compensation is always there when
the property is compulsorily acquired. The 'amount' which the Parliament will fix will not be an
end in itself but a means to an end which is 'compensation' or 'just equivalent'. It is true that in
such cases the Court will not sit in appeal over the decision of the Parliament but it will certainly
interfere where it can be shown that either the decision of Parliament in fixing the amount is not
based on relevant consideration or that there is a lack of good faith.

The experiences of other countries are not very much different. In England where Parliament is
supreme and the exercise of the power of judicial review can be barred by ordinary legislation,
Parliament has miserably failed in ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. Overruling the
Lockwood doctrine in Yaffee case,19 the courts in England asserted their powers even in the face
of "finality clause" of the Parliament.

17
1971(1) SCC 404

18
1971(1) SCC 404 p. 411.

19
R. v. Minister of Health ex parte Yaffee, (1930) 2 KB 98
14
In ex parte Gilmore Denning, L.J., clearly stated: ". . . it makes the decision final in fact but not
in law”20.In U.S.A., Article III of the Constitution limits the exercise of judicial review by the
Supreme Court to 'cases' and 'controversies'. This bars the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
cases which do not arise in the course of actual litigation between interested adverse parties. But
even in true cases presented to the courts for decision, not all constitutional issues are determined
by the Court. Certain issues have, by their very nature, been considered inappropriate for
decision by the courts. These questions, it is considered, can be suitably determined by the
political branches of the Government. These limitations have always been considered by the
courts not one barring jurisdiction but of self limitation.

The Supreme Court in U.S.A. has always asserted its claim to review a constitutional amendment
even in the face of the argument that the whole process of constitutional amendment presents
such issues which are political and hence inappropriate for judicial review. Though in America
no attempt has been made by any constitutional amendment to bar the jurisdiction of the courts,
if it is done it is bound to meet the same fate which it has met in India.

The proposed 25th Amendment Bill further provides in Article 31-C: "no law containing a
declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy (Directive Principles of State Policy in
Article 39-B and C) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give
effect to such policy"21.  This again poses a question whether the 'certificate' of the Parliament or
the State legislature as the case may be shall be so conclusive as to bar complete judicial
scrutiny? The courts have power to interpret the provisions of Article 39-B and C, like any other
provision of the Constitution and in such a situation the courts would not hesitate to exercise
power if the petitioner claims that the law has no relevance to Article 39-B and C. This would be
a jurisdictional fact which the courts would decide. The Constitution of America provides that

20
R. v. Medical Appeal Tribunal ex parte Gilmore, (1957) 1 QB 574

21
News agency reports indicate that on the recommendation of the Law Commission the Centre may modify some
of the provisions of the proposed Constitution 25th Amendment Bill in this behalf. It has been pointed out by the
Commission that the powers given to the State to enact legislation overriding fundamental rights and making it non-
justiciable, by declaring it to be in pursuance of the Directive Principles of State Policy embodied in Article 39-B
and C, is too wide and likely to be misused. The fact that a fundamental right may be violated or superseded by a
simple majority in a State Legislature is likely to arm a State Government with arbitrary powers, which is not the
objective of the 25th Amendment Bill. This authority should rest only with Parliament to ensure a certain amount of
uniformity and to do away with avoidable overlapping.
15
after the required numbers of States have ratified an amendment, the Secretary of State shall
proclaim it to be a part of the Constitution. This gave rise to a question, whether the 'certificate'
of the Secretary of State shall be so conclusive as to bar judicial scrutiny. It would be error to
think that the courts would not disregard the 'certificate' of the Secretary even if there is any error
of law or fact in the Secretary's declaration. In the same manner to refuse an aggrieved party the
right to challenge the 'certificate' issued under proposed Article 31-C would be refusing to
uphold the Constitution.

No one denies that in India the process of change must be smoothened so that the pace of
progress may be accelerated and for this purpose obstacles shall have to be removed. But an
attempt to bar the jurisdiction of the courts by constitutional amendments in order to quicken the
pace of progress is not a right solution of the problem. A true solution would lie not in the "25th
Amendment" but in the changed attitude of the judiciary which must come from the judiciary
itself. No branch of the Government is supreme under the Constitution. Every branch of
Government is supreme within its limited sphere. A true democratic Constitution can function
only in an atmosphere of co-operation and understanding and not in distrust and misgivings
among various branches of the Government. Today when the complexion of the Supreme Court
has much changed one can has much changed one can hope a more pragmatic and functional
approach to the whole problem. 

16
 CONCLUSION

The scope of delegated legislation in administrative matters is a constant source of debate in the
Supreme Court and the high courts. Though the recent Supreme Court judgements tried to settle
the issue, the attack on administrative and policy decisions continues unabated.

One of the most significant developments of the present century is the growth in the legislative
powers of the executive. Measured by volume, more legislation is produced by the executive
government than by the legislature. The increase in quantity and quality of delegated legislation,
if not supplanted by clear procedures and effective controlling mechanisms, may ultimately
result in arbitrariness and abuse of power, which in turn leads to injustice and violation of liberty.
That is why it is regarded by many as a “necessary evil.” It was considered a danger to the
liberties of the people and a devise to place despotic powers in few hands. It was said that
delegated legislation preserved the outward show of representative institutions while placing
arbitrary and irresponsible power in new hands.

In a definitive pronouncement, the court stated that the discretion conferred on the administrative
authorities, when affecting public interest, must be exercised objectively, rationally, intelligently,
fairly and non-arbitrarily. It should not be taken in undue haste, disregarding procedure, nor
should it be beyond the powers conferred by the legislation concerned.

In , the Supreme Court dealt with the registration of brand names of Indian Made Foreign Liquor
for supply of alcohol in the capital (Ugar Sugar Works Ltd v Delhi Administration). It ruled that
administrative action should not be motivated by mala fides, and not be unreasonable, unfair or
arbitrary. Moreover, the fact that the policy would affect certain business interests would not be
an adequate ground for interfering with the policy decision.

22
In Ramana Shetty v International Airport Authority of India dealing with tenders for
restaurants, the Supreme Court stated that the administrative authority was equally bound by the
norms, standards and procedures laid down by it for others. Disregard of those standards would
invalidate its action unless it was based on some valid principles that are neither irrational nor
unreasonable nor discriminatory.

22
[1979],
17
On the other hand, there are an equal number of judgements that warn the courts to keep away
from policy matters, starting from the bank nationalisation case. The Constitution bench of the
Supreme Court stated there that it was not for it to consider the relative merits of different
political theories or economic policies.

In more recent times, the court stated in Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India that when
two or more views are possible and the government adopts one, the court would not sit in appeal
over such a decision. The courts cannot run the government nor can the administration indulge in
abuse or non-use of power and get away with it.

The courts must act within their judicially permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law and
harness their power in the public interest, the Constitution bench said. This decision was
followed by the Balco Employees Union v Union of India, which further emphasised this view.
The court has not entirely shut out judicial review in all instances.

Therefore, the debate is bound to continue, especially because politicians and bureaucrats tend to
abuse their power and influence in diverse ways. These judgements hang as a Damocles sword
over them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

18
BOOKS REFERRED:

 Administrative law – I.P. massey

 Sathe, S.P. , Administrative Law, 7th edn. (Lexis Nexis, butterworth)

 Lectures on administrarive law – C.K. Takwani

 Constitution of india (bare act)

WEB SOURCES REFERRED:

 http://www.ebc-india.com

 http://persmin.nic.in

 http://www.manulawbooks.in

19