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Flixborough Disaster

The Flixborough disaster occurred on June 1, 1974 at a chemical plant in England. An explosion and fire destroyed the plant, killing 28 people and causing over $160 million in damage. The disaster was caused when a temporary bypass pipe installed to replace a leaking reactor failed, releasing tons of cyclohexane vapor that ignited. The bypass was poorly designed and installed without adequate engineering review or testing. Additionally, the plant had an excessive inventory of cyclohexane and lacked proper controls for process safety management.

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185 views

Flixborough Disaster

The Flixborough disaster occurred on June 1, 1974 at a chemical plant in England. An explosion and fire destroyed the plant, killing 28 people and causing over $160 million in damage. The disaster was caused when a temporary bypass pipe installed to replace a leaking reactor failed, releasing tons of cyclohexane vapor that ignited. The bypass was poorly designed and installed without adequate engineering review or testing. Additionally, the plant had an excessive inventory of cyclohexane and lacked proper controls for process safety management.

Uploaded by

Bayu Putra
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Flixborough Disaster (England)

• 1 June 1974
• Caprolactam manufacturing plant – raw material for nylon 6
• Explosion and fire in the reactor section
– 28 deaths
– >US$160 million in damage

Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
The Process
• Uses cyclohexane, which has properties similar to gasoline.
Under the process conditions (155 C, 7.9 atm) the cyclohexane
volatiles immediately when depressurized to atmospheric
condition

• The process consisted of six reactors in series. Cyclohexane


was oxidized to cyclohexanone and then to cyclohexanol using
injected air in the presence of a catalyst.

• The liquid reaction mass was gravity-fed through the series of


reactors. Each reactor normally contained about 20 tons of
cylohexane.

Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Flixborough Disaster
Temporary Modifications

• Six reactors in series – each reactor slightly lower than the one
before for gravity flow
• 28-inch-diameter connecting pipes for expansion
• Reactor 5 removed as a result of a crack (March 1974)
• 20-inch by-pass temporarily dog-leg installed
– Calculations were done to check pipe large enough for the flow nad
withstand the pressure as a straight pipe
– No calculation took into account the force arising from the dog-leg shape
– Bypass assembly was supported by a scaffolding structure
– No pressure testing before it was fitted
• Bypass failed 2 months later

Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Flixborough: Before and After

Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
What Went Wrong?
• Temporary pipe was not properly supported – rested
on scaffolding
• Temporary pipe was installed without a safety review or
adequate supervision by experienced engineer.
– Bellows allowed “squirm” or free-to-rotate
– No professionally qualified engineer
– Those who designed and built it did not know how to design
large pipes required to operate at high temperature and
gauge pressure
– No knowledge on highly-stressed piping
• The plant site contained excessively large inventories
of dangerous compounds
Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety
The Flixborough Disaster
28 death, injuries, extensive plant damage, and housing and building damage

WHY?

WHY
The ignition and rapid acceleration of deflagration of a massive ?
vapor cloud formed by the escape of cyclohexane [2]

WHY
? Control room was too close to process
Rupture of bypass assembly (to replace leaking Large inventory of cyclohexane area and was not withstand to explosion
reactor) with the discharge of tons cyclohexane
(20-in hypothesis)
WHY? WHY?
WHY?

Sudden pressure rise in reactor 4 Substandard bypass assembly Reaction was slow; low Poor control
design [6] and installation conversion room design
Poor plant lay out
WHY? WHY? WHY?

 No qualified engineer Decision to use high inventory


The stirrer was removed from reactor 4 Less know how on designing large pipes WHY?
process
The presence of water in the unstirred operated at high temperature and
reactor pressure and on highly-stressed piping
Continued circulation of hot cyclohexane No pressure testing
Lack of N2 inhibited reducing of pressure No safety review [6]

WHY? WHY? WHY?

Lack of Control in Lack of Control in Lack of Control in Lack of Control in


Process Safety Management Process Safety Management Process Safety Management Process Safety Management
Inadequate System for: Inadequate System for: Inadequate System for: Inadequate System for:
Process Safety Information Process Safety Information Process Hazard Analysis Process Hazard Analysis
Operating Procedure Management of Change
Process Hazard Analysis Mechanical Integrity
Pre Start Up Safety Review
Process Hazard Analysis

The Flixborough Disaster Causes with Five Whys Questions


Lack of control in process safety management led to the accident

Process Safety for Student Indonesian Institute for Process and Safety

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