IPC-1792_TOC
IPC-1792_TOC
IPC-1792
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Table of Contents
1 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.4 United States Department of Defense (DoD) . . 5
1.1 Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 OPERATIONAL MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.1 Industry Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3.1 Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.2 Key Elements of This Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3.2 Normal Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 IPC Product Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3.3 Cyberattack Detection at the Factory . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Relation Between IPC Classification and 3.4 Cybersecurity Incident in the Supply Chain . . . . 6
Urgency of Cyber Incident Impact Detection . . . 2
4 REQUIREMENTS FOR CYBERSECURITY FOR
1.2.2 Risk Assessment and the Urgency of
FACTORIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Cyber Incident Impact Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4.1 Factory Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 Levels of Cybersecurity Management . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.1 Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Definition of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.2 Cybersecurity Detection Requirements . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Order of Precedence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.3 Requirements for Normal Operation . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.1 Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.4 CIQA Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.2 Clause References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.5 Cybersecurity Incident Response
1.4.3 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1.6 Supply Chain Cybersecurity Incident
1.6 Terms And Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Response Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6.1 Certified Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1.7 Response Time Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6.2 Certified Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2 Cybersecurity Service Provider Requirements . . 9
1.6.3 Cyberattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2.1 Cybersecurity Diploma Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6.4 Cybersecure Factory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2.2 Cybersecurity Auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6.5 Cybersecurity Audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2.3 Cybersecurity Supply Chain Manager . . . . . . . . 9
1.6.6 Cybersecurity Auditor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3 Digital Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6.7 Cybersecurity Certification Authority . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.1 General Requirements for Digital Certificates . . 9
1.6.8 Cybersecurity Diploma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.2 Architectural Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6.9 Cybersecurity Diploma Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.3 Basic Description of Data Type . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.6.10 Cybersecurity Incident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.3.1 JSON Schemas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.6.11 Cybersecurity Intrusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.3.2 CMS Signed Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.6.12 Cybersecurity Supply Chain Manager . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.4 Digital Diploma Interface (Data Structure) . . . 11
1.6.13 Digital Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.4.1 Common Structures and General
1.6.14 Final Certified Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.6.15 Supplier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.4.1.1 Version information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.6.16 Supply Chain Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3.4.1.2 Digital Diploma (Factory) Specific
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.6.17 Supply Chain Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3.4.1.3 Key Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.6.18 Uncertified Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3.4.1.4 Date of issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.6.19 Declaration of Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3.5 Interface (Data Structure) of Product/Material
2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Digital Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 IPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.3.5.1 Common Structures and General
2.2 International Organization for Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Standardization (ISO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.3.5.2 Version Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 National Institute of Standards and Technology 4.3.5.3 Factory Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
(NIST) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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IPC-1792 November 2022
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November 2022 IPC-1792
1.1 Purpose As technologies related to Smart Cities and Internet of Things (IoT) advance, there is an increased risk that
cybersecurity incidents will have serious impacts on society. Many cyberattacks are enabled through unauthorized manipulation of
smart devices during manufacture, which creates opportunities for third parties to exploit vulnerabilities. The intent of this standard
is to eliminate the opportunity for the manipulation of software and hardware throughout the end-to-end manufacturing process,
ensuring that products are built as intended by the original designer. Application of this standard provides continued assurance
against evolving cybersecurity threats in end-products as technology advances.
The use of this standard helps companies identify those products that may have been affected as a result of a cybersecurity incident
during manufacture, ensuring all products released into the market are free from any risk of tampering related to hardware and
software content.
This standard represents guidance to the various entities in the electronics manufacturing supply chain to provide a continuous
cybersecurity focus, building on existing and evolving information technology (IT). Procedures and requirements provide
manufacturing companies the ability to manage the effects of cybersecurity incidents, should they occur within their organization
or upstream in the supply chain, with propagation of information in a timely manner, downstream in the supply chain.
Adoption of this standard enables companies to ensure appropriate practices and procedures related to required data management
are established that identify the impact of Cybersecurity Incidents, involving, for example, preventing the leakage or alteration
of critical information, to secure the product owner’s supply chain. In the event of any cybersecurity incident, methodologies
described in this standard identify the specific potential effect to the supply chain and how to minimize effects.
1.1.1 Industry Background The electronics manufacturing supply chain is multitiered, with multiple companies supplying
individual products that ultimately create the final end-product for the customer. This distributed supply chain presents numerous
opportunities where information related to and used by manufacturing operations can be intercepted and used for unauthorized or
unlawful purposes, potentially significantly compromising the safety of the end-product. It is vital that each entity in the supply chain
is able to provide assurance that such information has not been tampered with, intercepted or stolen, via interoperable exchange of
information without compromise of privacy with other members of the supply chain as required. Should any cyberattack events be
discovered, whether from outside of the secure environment or from within, it is essential to have documentation that proves how
such attacks and any potential consequences have been addressed, as this allows the product owner to determine who is responsible
for effects of the incident and which corrective actions have taken place.
The manufacturing supply chain is increasingly being targeted by individuals and entities seeking to obtain product-related
information, with the intention of disrupting manufacturing operations, creating cloned or counterfeit products or to introduce
Trojan horses that undermine the security in end-products. Supply chain risk is a key contributor to overall security risk with,
for example, procurement of hardware or software that has been compromised, either by the creation of counterfeits or by being
illegally obtained, or where the source has been subject to industrial espionage.
Product owners should expect their products to be manufactured in a secure supply chain and that the capability exists to detect
and take appropriate action should a cybersecurity incident occur. To meet this expectation, the whole supply chain needs to be
secured, as it is only as strong as its weakest participant. Failure to do so has been documented in numerous cases of cybersecurity
breaches that have had serious consequences.
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IPC-1792 November 2022
This standard describes a mechanism for assurance that products have been manufactured in an environment where no adverse
effects of any cybersecurity incidents have occurred, ensuring the quality and reliability of products.
1.1.2 Key Elements of This Standard
The key elements within this standard include:
• Requirements related to the early determination of the potential impact of a cybersecurity incident
• Requirements related to the identification and relationship of certified materials and certified products throughout the supply
chain, such that the extent of the effect of any incident can be easily and readily communicated in a timely manner
• Requirements for third-party validation for a company adopting this standard
• Requirements for the creation and receipt of a Digital Diploma at the time of certification
• Description of how to generate a Digital Certificate for each production unit as it is shipped
• Requirements relating to how Digital Certificates are stored and used to identify the extent of the potential effect of a cybersecurity
incident
To facilitate the adoption of this standard, the ability to correctly associate specific instances of material consumption with the
specific product being assembled is needed (see 3.1 and 4.1.3). IPC-1782 provides guidance about what is required for material
traceability during assembly, with different levels of precision associated with the IPC product classification.
1.2 IPC Product Classification IPC standards recognize that electrical and electronic assemblies are subject to classifications,
determined by intended end-use. Three general end-product classes have been established to reflect differences in manufacturability,
complexity, functional performance requirements, and verification (inspection/test) frequency. It should be recognized that there
may be overlaps of equipment between classes.
CLASS 1 General Electronic Products: Includes products suitable for applications where the major requirement is function of the
completed assembly.
CLASS 2 Dedicated Service Electronic Products: Includes products where continued performance and extended life is required,
and for which uninterrupted service is desired but not critical. Typically, the end-use environment would not cause failures.
CLASS 3 High Performance/Harsh Environment Electronic Products: Includes products where continued high performance or
performance-on-demand is critical, equipment downtime cannot be tolerated, end-use environment may be uncommonly harsh,
and the equipment must function when required, such as life support or other critical systems.
1.2.1 Relation Between IPC Classification and Urgency of Cyber Incident Impact Detection Response times related to activities
required in this standard are defined according to whether there is specific urgency, or whether the normal rapid response will
suffice.
IPC Product Classifications assist in the determination of how urgent the reporting of a cybersecurity incident may be, though there
is not a direct relationship between them. In practice, the urgency of reporting depends on how large an impact may occur as a
result of the attack on a product based on the most significant use cases. Consideration should be made that there can be many uses
of products, including simple ones (e.g., removeable storage drives), where the impact can be extremely varied depending on how
and where the device is used, as well as the context of the data stored. This can lead the customer to request a response level that
may not be consistent with the IPC Product Classification.
Table 1-1 provides a guide as to how to respond to customer request, including consideration of IPC Product Classification.
Table 1-1 Guide for Response Levels Based on IPC Classification
1.2.2 Risk Assessment and the Urgency of Cyber Incident Impact Detection To complement guidance from the customer request
and IPC Product Classification, a business risk assessment can also help determine the level of requirements for an urgent level of
response to cybersecurity incidents. The required level can then be based on the degree of risk that customers and suppliers will
accept for the potential use of materials and final products. Approaches to risk assessment may vary by industry and region. Risk
assessment of an industry, product or key material can be an essential tool, using a typical risk assessment matrix as shown in
Table 1-2.