No Daylight: U.S.

Strategy if
Israel Attacks Iran

JINSA’s Gemunder Center Iran Policy Project | July 2023

Co-Chairs: Ambassador Eric Edelman and General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)
DISCLAIMER:

The findings and recommendations contained in this publication are solely those of the authors, who
participated in this policy project strictly in their personal capacities.
 Policy Project Members and Staff
Co-Chairs
Ambassador Eric Edelman GEN Charles Wald, USAF (ret.)
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Former Deputy Commander of United States
European Command

Members
Elliott Abrams Lt Gen Henry Obering, USAF (ret.)
Former U.S. Special Representative for Iran Former Director of the Missile Defense Agency

VADM John Bird, USN (ret.) Steve Rademaker

Former Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet Former Assistant Secretary of State for
ArmsControl and Nonproliferation
Gen James Conway, USMC (ret.)
Former Commandant of the Marine Corps Maj Gen Lawrence Stutzriem, USAF (ret.)
Former Director, Plans, Policy and Strategy at
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret.) North American Aerospace Defense Command
Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S Air Ray Takeyh
Force Headquarters Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations
Larry Goldstein
Founder and Director of Energy Policy Roger Zakheim
Research Foundation, Inc. Former General Counsel and Deputy Staff
Director of U.S. House Armed Services
Committee

Staff
Michael Makovsky, PhD Ari Cicurel
President & CEO Assistant Director of Foreign Policy

John Hannah Zac Schildcrout

Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow Policy Analyst

Blaise Misztal Yoni Tobin

Vice President for Policy Policy Analyst

Jonathan Ruhe
Director of Foreign Policy

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 3

 Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary..................................................................................... 5

A. Recommendations................................................................................. 8

II. Iran Advances as U.S. Retreats.................................................................... 11

A. Plan A Is Dead, Long Live Plan A........................................................... 11

B. Iran’s Buildup to a Breakout................................................................. 12

III. “On the Horizon” Now: Israel Warns of Action........................................... 13

IV. U.S. Actions Will Determine Iranian Response........................................... 14

V. Recommendations: Last Best Chance to Prevent a Nuclear Iran.............. 18

A. The Day Before...................................................................................... 19

1. Robust U.S. Diplomatic Preparations........................................... 19

2. Tangible U.S. Support for Israel.................................................... 20

3. Coordinate Objectives with Israel................................................ 21

4. Ensure Ready and Resilient Regional Defenses........................... 21

B. The Day Of............................................................................................. 22

C. The Day After......................................................................................... 22

Endnotes................................................................................................................. 24

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 4

 I. Executive Summary
Weakness is provocative. Despite warning of an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine,
the United States did little ahead of time to prepare its partner in Kyiv to withstand this
aggression. Even if it expected only a brief conflict and a decisive Russian victory, the
U.S. failure beforehand to equip Ukraine’s self-defense, or communicate to Moscow
that American support for Ukraine would be lethal and unwavering, helped invite and
prolong the war. Washington must learn from this costly lesson and immediately start
preparing to blunt Iranian retaliation in the likelihood that, absent possible American
intervention, Israel acts militarily to stop Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold,
which like the Ukraine war would pose critical strategic and economic challenges for
the United States.

If Israel is forced to take matters into its own hands against Iran, it would in many ways
mark the failure of three decades of U.S. policy. Since at least George W. Bush, succes-
sive presidents from both parties have explicitly pointed to a nuclear Iran as a direct
national security threat to the United States, and solemnly committed to act in order
to prevent this outcome. Instead, American leaders have concluded deeply flawed
nuclear agreements, consistently signaled their desire to leave the region, enforced
sanctions erratically at best, and failed to demonstrate the military capabilities and
political will to uphold U.S. redlines against Iranian aggression. When combined with
Israel’s acuter threat perception and smaller window for action that stem from its far
greater proximity and vulnerability to the Iranian nuclear threat, its keen sensitivity to
historical threats to destroy it and the Jewish people, its profoundly limited strategic
depth, and the Iranian regime’s history of threatening its extermination, Washington’s
inaction will have left Israel with no choice but to strike Iran’s nuclear program on its
own.

American officials might disapprove, or even resent, such Israeli action, believing
erroneously that containing a nuclear Iran is preferrable to the risks of preventing it
militarily. Indeed, the current belief among American leadership appears to be that U.S.
– and Israeli – action should be avoided, or at least delayed if at all possible. According
to Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, America’s top Air Force officer in the Middle East, the
United States “would pause … before jumping into any kind of military action” and try
to avoid being seen as “complicit” in an Israeli strike – even if Iran retaliated against
U.S. targets in addition to Israeli ones.1

In the immediate aftermath of an Israeli strike,

the interests of the United States and Israel will
be aligned, and both will be best served by close
cooperation to ensure a less bloody, narrower, and
shorter conflict.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 5

 Should Israel act, however, such concerns should be laid aside. The reality is that in the
immediate aftermath of an Israeli strike, the interests of the United States and Israel will
be aligned, and both will be best served by close cooperation to ensure a less bloody,
narrower, and shorter conflict. This does not mean, however, that American policymakers
can merely await such an outcome; instead, they should cooperate now to maximize
Israeli deterrence, and its military effectiveness if deterrence fails, while also position-
ing the United States, Israel, and other Middle East partners to counter ensuing Iran-led
escalation and defend abiding U.S. interests in maintaining regional stability.

Iran and its proxies surrounding Israel – including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and
Yemen – possess sizable arsenals of increasingly lethal and long-range attack drones,
rockets, and cruise and ballistic missiles capable of overwhelming or evading regional
air and missile defenses. Lebanese Hezbollah alone possesses more than 100,000 un-
guided rockets and at least 100 precision guided munitions which can exploit Israel’s
lack of strategic depth and inflict potentially catastrophic damage on its military bases,
critical infrastructure, and major conurbations.2 Even as it cools current tensions with
Gulf neighbors, Tehran continues threatening vital maritime chokepoints, international
shipping, naval vessels, and offshore energy infrastructure across the region, and it
retains the ability to ramp up the scale and tempo of these operations significantly with
its array of swarming fast-attack torpedo and missile boats, surface ships, anti-ship
drones and missiles, mines, and special forces.

Continuity of Official U.S. Policy to Prevent a Nuclear Iran

President Year Statement

The United States and Israel “are united in our objective

George W.
2005 to make sure that Iran does not have a [nuclear]
Bush
weapon…. All options are on the table.”3

“I’ve made the position of the United States of the

America clear: Iran must not get a nuclear weapon. This
is not a danger that can be contained, and as President,
Obama 2013
I’ve said all options are on the table for achieving our
objectives. America will do what we must to prevent a
nuclear-armed Iran.”4

“We will deny the [Iranian] regime all paths to a nuclear

Trump 2017
weapon.”5

The United States will “never to allow Iran to acquire a

Biden 2022 nuclear weapon, and it is prepared to use all elements of
its national power to ensure that outcome.”6

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 6

 If past is prologue, the extent to which Tehran unleashes these capabilities in retalia-
tion against Israel will correlate directly to the amount of daylight it perceives between
Washington and Jerusalem. The more Iran’s leaders are convinced that their retaliatory
actions risk a punishing U.S. intervention against Iran itself, which Tehran certainly wish-
es to avoid, the likelier they are to limit their response and seek to prevent a wider war.
Tehran’s momentous decision to agree to a ceasefire of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, and
its freezing of key elements of its nuclear program in 2003, are signal examples of such
Iranian restraint in response to perceived direct military threats from the United States.

The extent to which Tehran retaliates against Israel

will correlate directly to the amount of daylight it
perceives between Washington and Jerusalem.

Therefore, in preparing for the growing possibility of an Israeli strike, U.S. policymakers
should be guided by the basic principle that the closer America stands by Israel, the
more likely that, in the best case, Iran will be deterred from taking the last remaining
steps toward the bomb, and, in the worst case, that an Israeli strike will be as effective
as possible and the ensuing conflict will be contained – all vital U.S. interests. Immedi-
ate and unwavering U.S. support for Israel on the day of a strike and strong pressure
on Tehran and its proxies, especially Hezbollah, in the days after holds out the best
prospect of blunting an inevitable Iran-led response that otherwise could impose sig-
nificant casualties and extensive damage to Israeli infrastructure and society. Simply
put, the United States should follow the president’s own words about countering Iran’s
nuclear weapons program, as related by the U.S. ambassador to Israel earlier this year:
“Israel can and should do whatever they need to deal with it and we’ve got their back.”7

Staunch support for its close Israeli ally would also help restore badly damaged U.S.
credibility across the globe. Many of America’s friends and adversaries around the world
and in the Middle East, including Egypt and Jordan – and especially Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain – will gauge the value of our national commitments
worldwide in no small part on how we treat Israel, a longstanding partner viewed as
having a much closer bond to the United States than many of our formal treaty allies.
Should Washington be perceived as reluctant or half-hearted in support of Israel on
an issue of such longstanding and vital importance to the interests of both countries –
stopping the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon – doubts that other U.S. partners have
about the dependability of their U.S. security assurances will multiply exponentially.
As a leader of one of America’s closest Arab partners recently told some members of
this group, U.S. failure to fully support an Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear program
“would be one of the greatest catastrophes ever.”

Conversely, the more the United States seeks to distance itself from Israel, the more
challenging an Israeli campaign will be and the greater the likelihood of a more bloody,
wider, and longer conflict that could expand across the region – which will in all likeli-
hood eventually require U.S. intervention anyway on far costlier terms. Indeed, Amer-
ican failure to support Israel in a military campaign to defang its archenemy of its

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 7

 capability to eliminate the Jewish state’s very existence would lead to much harsher
Iranian retaliation and a wider regional conflagration.

Failing to back such a close partner as Israel in its moment of major vulnerability and
conflict, especially after Israel effectively carried out longstanding U.S. policy, would
shred America’s global credibility and destroy, in a matter of days, decades worth of
hard-won goodwill that could take many decades more of lengthy and arduous work
to rebuild. The impact would be devastating and long-lasting, both in the region and
worldwide. Watching us abandon Israel, our Arab partners would hedge toward our
adversaries in Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow – each of whom would be emboldened to
ramp up their threats to U.S. interests in the Middle East and around the world. From
America’s perspective, the impact on Iran’s ongoing regionwide aggression, and on
China’s calculus toward Taiwan, would be devastating.

Failing to back such a close partner as Israel in

its moment of major vulnerability and conflict,
especially after Israel effectively carried out
longstanding U.S. policy, would shred America’s global
credibility.

A. Recommendations
The United States must treat any Israeli military campaign to prevent a nuclear Iran
as consistent with its own longstanding (but unfulfilled) Iran policy and as justified by
Israel’s sovereign right to defend itself against a clearly articulated existential threat.
As National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said in May, “we have made clear to Iran that
it can never be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon. As President Biden has repeat-
edly reaffirmed, he will take the actions that are necessary to stand by this statement,
including by recognizing Israel’s freedom of action.”8

Building on and amplifying this, Washington should make plain – to friends and foes
alike – that it stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Israel in deterring and mitigating Ira-
nian-led escalation to a major regional conflict. Rather than being purely reactive,
American policymakers urgently must anticipate and act “the day before” to help
prepare Israel to be as maximally effective as possible, as well as “the day of” and
“the day after” to deëscalate any ensuing conflict and undergird U.S. credibility and
interests both in the Middle East and globally.

Day Before

Consistent statements by the Biden administration and Congress in favor of Israel’s

“freedom of action” against Iran, as well as declarations that the United States is ensur-
ing Israel has the tools it needs to maximize its effectiveness against the Iranian nuclear
threat, will reduce daylight between the two countries, rebuild waning U.S. credibility,

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 8

 and bolster shared deterrence. Working with European partners to reimpose United
Nations sanctions on Iran via the “snapback” mechanism while fast-tracking delivery
to Israel of key platforms and munitions – KC-46A refueling tankers, precision guided
munitions (PGMs) such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and GBU-39/B small
diameter bomb (SDB) and bunker buster bombs, attack aircraft like the F-35I and F-15EX,
and missile defense capabilities – would further clarify and concretize U.S. support for
Israel’s freedom of action. As illustrated by the Ukraine conflict, supplying such systems
and capabilities is far simpler prior to conflict than during it. Support for Ukraine also
underscores the more fundamental challenge, both generally and in terms of backing
Israel, in ensuring the U.S. defense industrial base has proper capacity and wartime
mobilization ability to provide sufficient supplies for military partners. This will require
intensifying the administration’s existing efforts to shore up the U.S. defense industrial
base and incentivize industry to invest in additional manufacturing capacity to allow
it to surge production of key munitions and military systems.

Consistent statements by the Biden administration

and Congress supporting Israel’s freedom of action
against Iran will reduce daylight between the two
countries, rebuild waning U.S. credibility, and bolster
shared deterrence.

In addition to making its own statements and preparation in support of Israel, the
United States should actively coordinate with its partner ahead of any potential strike
on Iran. Washington should make clear to Jerusalem that it will support it following
a strike, and will work to coordinate the objectives and response of each partner in
such an eventuality. The United States and Israel will have broadly aligned interests
– avoiding a broader war – but they should ensure they are on the same page on stra-
tegic questions that a strike will prompt, including how best to ensure Iran’s nuclear
program remains shut down and how to deal with the continuing threat that Hezbol-
lah’s arsenals pose to Israel.

In coordination with key Middle East partners, the United States also must proactively
prepare to defend its own forces and assets in the region. Backed up by U.S.-led show-
of-force combined exercises featuring fighter, bomber, and tanker aircraft like those
recently conducted between U.S. and Israeli units, this should include public joint
statements from the United States and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries un-
derlining the inviolability of their access to military bases in GCC countries, their shared
commitment to defend forces deployed to and operating from those bases, and their
readiness to bolster those forces as needed to counter potential Iran-led threats. U.S.
leadership also is needed now to accelerate progress toward more genuinely integrated
regional air and missile defense, and protection of key maritime chokepoints. As in the
run-up to any potential conflict, Congress should pass a resolution signaling America’s
deep support for Israel’s right to act in self-defense in fulfillment of the vital U.S.-Israeli
common interest in preventing a nuclear Iran.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 9

 Any U.S. threats to Iran on the “day of” or the “day after” would immediately gain
credibility if the United States begins the “day before” to respond more consistently
and forcefully to any further Iran-backed attacks on U.S. forces or other assets in the
Middle East. Iran should have no doubt of American resolve.

Day Of

The American government’s paramount priority for the day of an Israeli strike must
be to make abundantly and immediately clear in public statements, and at the Unit-
ed Nations, that it views Israel’s decision to act as consistent with longstanding U.S.
policy to prevent a nuclear Iran and that, consequently, the United States stands with
Israel and fully supports its security and self-defense needs. Explicitly reversing recent
comments from American officers in the Middle East, the United States must commu-
nicate unambiguously (if also privately) to Iran and its Hezbollah proxy that it will not
tolerate retaliation that would inflict severe damage against Israeli civilian population
centers or critical infrastructure, or would in any way threaten the sea lanes upon
which Israel’s economic viability depends, and that any such escalation would be met
with an immediate and forceful U.S. response. Through private channels, American
diplomats also should make clear to Hezbollah that the United States will not restrain
Israel’s response in the event that Hezbollah chooses to unleash its massive arsenals
on Israel. Such a warning could help convince Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah to
prioritize his, and his organization’s, survival over any Iranian dictates.

In tandem, Tehran should be put on notice that any effort to retaliate against U.S. troops,
citizens, or interests in the region, or to strike the core political and economic interests of
America’s Gulf partners, will be met by a severe U.S. military response, including against
vital interests of the Iranian regime itself. Tehran must be left with no illusions that it can,
whether directly and/or through proxies, unleash a destructive retaliation against Israel,
and/or the United States or its other partners in the region, without prompting a heavy
American military blow that could weaken the regime’s ability to survive.

Looking ahead, and leveraging Tehran’s continuing desire to avoid direct engagement
with U.S. forces, American officials also should convey to the Iranian regime that any
subsequent efforts to reconstitute or escalate its nuclear program would trigger U.S.
military action, whether unilaterally or in coordination with Israel and/or others.

Day After

In the immediate aftermath of an Israeli strike, and even if it already pre-supplied Isra-
el’s defense needs in certain regards, the United States must conduct an immediate and
comprehensive resupply effort for Israel’s self-defense, prioritizing air and missile defense
interceptors, PGMs, ammunition, and spare parts. As an operational backstop and another
unmistakable signal of support, the United States should – consistent with existing opera-
tional planning with United States European Command (EUCOM) – be prepared to deploy
Patriot systems to Israel under American control in a timely manner, in order to assist in
Israel’s air defense and send to Iran an unmistakable message of U.S. commitment.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 10

 As feasible, the United States also should rotate additional guided-missile destroyers
and frigates to Middle Eastern waters to help counter one of Iran’s most likely, and
most formidable, means of escalation and retaliation: aggression against commercial
maritime traffic – particularly energy transport – through the Strait of Hormuz and
nearby waters. The U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean should help ensure the se-
curity and freedom of movement of merchant ships that supply Israel with essential
goods, thereby freeing up the Israeli Navy to counter any Iranian and/or Hezbollah
actions against Israel’s offshore energy infrastructure and other defensive activities. The
United States also should promptly deploy additional assets to the region, including
bomber and fighter aircraft, to underscore American warnings that Tehran must avoid
retaliating intensively or widening the conflict. Iran should be under no illusions about
Washington’s resolve to fulfill its threats.

Finally, the United States should have a plan – developed and advanced in coordination
with Israel, its other regional partners, and other allies – for how to end the tensions
that an Israeli strike will create. In the days after a strike, even if U.S. actions can contain
Iranian retaliation, it will be important to offer Tehran a diplomatic off-ramp that will
bring any fighting to a conclusion. Ideally, this plan should consider how to transition
to a better solution to Iran’s nuclear program rather than allowing Tehran to return to
the nuclear threshold once again.

II. Iran Advances as U.S.

Retreats
This task force issued a report in May 2022 calling on the Biden administration to boost
Israeli capabilities as the best remaining roadblock between Tehran and the bomb.9
In the year since, Iran’s nuclear program has advanced further still, becoming more
difficult to detect and neutralize as time goes on, while the United States has continued
clinging to failed diplomatic endeavors. The result, as the top U.S. military officer in
the Middle East, Gen. Michael Kurilla, acknowledged to the Senate: “I know right now,
when I look at [Iran], I believe they are undeterred.”10 These conditions all increase the
likelihood and urgency of Israeli action against Iran’s nuclear program.

A. Plan A Is Dead, Long Live Plan A

Already a year ago, Tehran called the Biden administration’s bluff by blowing past multiple
negotiating ultimata that it must rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
without triggering any change in U.S. posture.11 Despite President Biden admitting in
late 2022 that the JCPOA was dead, six months later his administration was reportedly
actively seeking to revive talks with Tehran.12 This refusal to take “no” for an answer has
only confirmed, for Israel and Iran alike, that the administration has no Plan B.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 11

 More generally, the Biden administration has communicated its reticence to pivot to
pressure, and its willingness to abandon partners, by accelerating its predecessors’
retrenchment from the Middle East. This was clearly evident in the precipitous nature
of its Afghanistan withdrawal, followed shortly thereafter by its conspicuous inaction
while Iranian proxies attacked American forces in Syria. Revealingly, since it took office,
the Biden administration has responded with force only four times to over 80 such
attacks against U.S. forces in the Middle East.13 Further weakening the U.S. position,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley seemingly walked back America’s long-
standing redline when he said the United States would not permit Iran a “fielded nu-
clear weapon” – an alarming caveat indicating the regime could assemble, or at least
possess, every component of a nuclear weapon without triggering any U.S. response.14

Iran has been emboldened further by the political daylight between Israel and the Unit-
ed States, as evident by the tense relations between President Biden and Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu since the latter returned to office over six months ago.15

B. Iran’s Buildup to a Breakout

Iran’s nuclear expansion has snowballed exponentially in tandem with America’s
evaporating credibility; it will expand even more significantly in the foreseeable future.

Tehran assiduously built up its nuclear program following the November 2020 U.S.
election and the covert killing of leading Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh,
before ramping up even more sharply in the past year. Having doubled its 20 percent
and 60 percent enriched uranium stockpiles, its production rate for 60 percent enriched
uranium, and the enrichment capacity of its active fleet of advanced centrifuges, by
May 2023 Iran’s breakout time was effectively zero, giving it the capacity to produce
five weapons’ worth of fissile material in one month.16 As a close adviser to Supreme
Leader Khamenei boasted, “we can easily produce 90 percent enriched uranium [and]
Iran has the technical means to produce a nuclear bomb.”17

As Iran relies increasingly on better centrifuges that need less space and time to pro-
duce a bomb’s worth of uranium, over time it can more easily disperse and hide the
necessary equipment for a breakout. Indeed, it is already finishing and hardening new
subterranean enrichment and centrifuge-manufacturing sites even more immune
from military attack.18

The more Iran advances and hides its nuclear program, the more prompt detection
becomes key. And yet Tehran has concertedly rolled back its compliance with Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, shutting off cameras and other
monitoring devices at its nuclear sites, thereby shrinking the outside world’s margin
of error for assessing where and when to prevent a nuclear Iran.19 Israel thus faces a
closing window for detecting and neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program; with each sub-
sequent Iranian nuclear advance an Israeli strike becomes progressively more difficult.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 12

 III. “On the Horizon” Now:
Israel Warns of Action
A growing confluence of factors increasingly is pushing Israel forward in preparing its
most credible threats of military action against a nuclear Iran in more than a decade.
First, Israeli leadership was jolted by two significant recent Iranian nuclear develop-
ments. In February, Tehran’s foray into 84 percent enrichment, aggravated by Ameri-
ca’s shrug in response, prompted Israel to ramp up military preparations and convey
to its American and European partners that any further Iranian enrichment above 60
percent now constituted Israel’s redline.20 Netanyahu then added a sense of urgency,
saying that stopping Iran requires “credible military action. The longer you wait, the
harder that becomes. We’ve waited very long.” That same day Defense Minister Gallant
warned that Tehran “has almost reached the red line.”21

This timeframe for Israeli action condensed further with Gen. Milley’s Congressional
testimony in March, in which he estimated Iran would need only “several months” to
produce a nuclear weapon.22 Gone is the sanguine scenario of a two-year cushion for
Israeli intelligence to discern a specific “go” order from the Supreme Leader to build
a bomb. Now Israeli officials speak of dispersed, lower-level progress in parallel with,
not sequential to, Iran’s enrichment advances, that is more advanced than previously
thought and harder to detect. This increased uncertainty offers Israel far less time to
respond to indications of key Iranian advances.23

A growing confluence of factors increasingly is

pushing Israel forward in preparing its most credible
threats of military action against Iran’s nuclear
program in more than a decade.

Second, the Israeli security cabinet reflects its prime minister in being more unified,
hawkish, and exigent on Iran than any of its predecessors, including the unprecedented
situation for Prime Minister Netanyahu where he is no longer the most hawkish mem-
ber in his own security cabinet.24 Right after the November elections, the incoming
national security adviser laid down a marker by stating that Netanyahu “will act, in
my assessment, to destroy the nuclear facilities in Iran” if U.S. diplomacy fails.25 Nor is
it merely the current Israeli government that is persuaded of the need to act against
Iran’s nuclear program. In April, opposition leader Yair Lapid reinforced this shared
sense of purpose when he said publicly, “on this, there is no coalition or opposition in
Israel. Everybody’s on the same note.”26

Third, several recent events combined to raise concerns that Israel’s military option
might be a wasting asset. In April, Iranian proxies in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and
Lebanon launched a multifront assault that sought to gauge and erode Israel’s deter-
rence amid its persistent internal turmoil and strains with the United States.27 In the

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 13

 wake of these attacks, Israeli military intelligence warned for the first time in years of
eroding deterrence and rising risks of major escalation with Hezbollah.28 Simultane-
ously, Tehran seeks to acquire billions of dollars’ worth of advanced Russian combat
aircraft, air defenses, military radars, attack helicopters, missiles, and other systems to
defend its nuclear infrastructure and bolster its retaliatory capabilities against Israel.29
Jerusalem took the threat seriously enough to send high-level officials to Moscow in
May to try to dissuade Russia from such consequential sales, especially in light of the
imminent expiration in October of the UN embargo on key weapons transfers to and
from Iran.30

Recent statements and actions from top Israeli officials underscore this rising sense
of alarm and urgency. Perhaps most noteworthy, in late May the Chief of General Staff
of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Gen. Halevi – the country’s highest-ranking military
officer, and one noted for his generally understated demeanor – warned that “there are
possible negative developments on the horizon that could prompt action.”31 Shortly
thereafter the IDF kicked off a massive two-week nationwide exercise simulating its
expected scenario in a looming confrontation with Iran, including strategic long-range
Israeli airstrikes and prolonged, intense multifront conflict with Hezbollah and other
Iranian proxies.32 During this drill Prime Minister Netanyahu noted how, in light of
revived U.S. talks with Iran, “we are confident we can handle any threat on our own”
and reiterated Israel is “committed to acting against the Iranian nuclear program.”33

IV. U.S. Actions Will

Determine Iranian
Response
The Biden administration’s wholehearted pursuit of diplomacy, to the exclusion of any
corresponding U.S. pressures that would boost the prospects for successful talks, now
leaves Israeli military action as the sole viable option to uphold America’s enduring
bipartisan interests to prevent a nuclear Iran and maintain Middle East stability. But just
as American policymakers appear to prefer endless talks and the growing possibility
of a nuclear-capable Iran over the prospect of an American – let alone Israeli – strike,
so too will their inclination likely be to avoid any involvement in the Israel-Iran conflict
that will follow. Such American passivity, however, would be a major strategic blunder.

In addition to its ever-expanding nuclear program, Iran has also amassed the capability
to wreak tremendous devastation on Israel and the region. Whether, when, where, and
how Tehran unleashes its rockets, drones, missiles, and proxies in the aftermath of an
Israeli strike on its nuclear facilities will be determined by what the United States does
on the day of, and the days after, such a strike.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 14

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The current belief among American leadership appears to be that U.S. action or in-
tervention should be avoided, or at least delayed. According to Lt. Gen. Alexus Gryn-
kewich, America’s top Air Force officer in the Middle East, the United States “would
pause … before jumping into any kind of military action” and try to avoid being seen
as “complicit” in an Israeli strike – even if Iran retaliated against U.S. targets in addi-
tion to Israeli ones.34 But rather than American involvement triggering escalation, it is
American silence that would embolden Iran’s response while staunch American sup-
port for Israel would blunt it. Continued U.S. self-deterrence on this front could raise
the risks of Iranian escalation against American targets. This trend already is evident
in recent Iran-backed attacks on U.S. targets in Syria, intended to convince the Biden
administration to pressure Israel to wind down operations against Iran’s expanding
regional military footprint.35

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 15

 Iran’s escalatory options and multifront capabilities are extensive and threaten to
impose serious costs not just on Israel, but also on the United States and other targets
regionwide. These include sizable arsenals of increasingly lethal and long-range attack
drones and cruise and ballistic missiles capable of overwhelming or evading regional
air and missile defenses – in the hands both of Iran and its proxies surrounding Israel
and the rest of the region in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen. Lebanese Hezbollah
also possesses more than 100,000 unguided rockets and at least 100 precision guided
munitions which, in combination with the above projectiles, can exploit Israel’s lack
of strategic depth and inflict potentially catastrophic damage on its military bases,
critical infrastructure, and major conurbations.36 Iran and certain proxies also pose
acute threats to vital maritime chokepoints, international shipping, naval vessels, and
energy infrastructure across the region through combinations of swarming fast-attack
torpedo and missile boats, surface ships, anti-ship drones and missiles, mines, and
special forces. Iran-backed militias also can threaten to launch ground incursions into
Israel, and to attack U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria.

The extent to which Tehran unleashes these capabilities in retaliation against Israel
would correlate directly to the amount of daylight it perceives between Washington
and Jerusalem. The more Iran’s leaders are convinced that their retaliatory actions
risk large-scale U.S. intervention against Iran itself, the likelier they are to limit their
response and seek to prevent a wider war.

In an ideal scenario for Iran and its proxies, they would mass their firepower entirely
against Israel without any fear of U.S. involvement, whether that be restocking and
fortifying Israeli armories, warning Iran against certain thresholds of escalation, and/
or readying and deploying U.S. forces in the region. Western efforts in 2021 and early
2022 to dissuade the Russian invasion and tamp down tensions, by holding back mili-
tary support for Ukraine while seeking to deter Russia by disclosing intelligence about
Moscow’s intentions, offer a cautionary tale since these actions arguably incentivized
escalation by isolating Kyiv, causing military aid to be delivered belatedly, piecemeal,
and incompletely, and helping confirm for Putin his mistaken belief that he would face
only minimal costs for such aggression.

Just as Western inaction may have led Russia to believe it could invade Ukraine at low
cost, an initial American failure to clearly back Israel would be perceived in Tehran as
greenlighting a harsher Iran-led response. Hesitation by Washington in order to see,
as Lt. Gen. Grynkewich put it, how things play out would only persuade Iran it will not
face any serious consequences for laying waste to Israel, beyond what Israel itself can
muster. Left to fend for itself against an Iranian onslaught, Israel would be forced to act
not only against Iranian nuclear facilities but also against the munitions and launchers
of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran’s other regional proxies, many of which are illegally
hidden among civilians, that imperil its populations and infrastructure. This would un-
leash an inherently destabilizing escalatory spiral that could engulf the broader region
and draw in U.S. forces regardless – and under much less favorable circumstances than
if the United States proactively boosted shared deterrence with Israel.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 16

 Graphic Source: DIA, D3 Design
37

Because America’s friends and adversaries gauge the value of our commitments world-
wide in no small part on how we treat Israel, a longstanding partner in many ways closer
to the United States than many of our formal treaty allies, abandoning Israel in such
circumstances also would undermine U.S. credibility more globally in the eyes not of
only Iran, but also China, Russia, and others. As a leader of one of America’s closest Arab
partners recently told members of this group, U.S. failure to fully support an Israeli strike
to destroy Iran’s nuclear program “would be one of the greatest catastrophes ever.”

This in turn would encourage key partners in Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle
East – including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – to engage in hedging
activities with America’s enemies and create vacuums to be filled by Beijing, Moscow,
and Tehran. At the same time, the worse the conflict in the Middle East resulting from
Iranian escalation, the more U.S. resources and attention would be pulled from com-
peting strategic demands in Indo-Pacific, Europe, and elsewhere.

The aftermath of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear program need not be so dire, how-
ever. The more firmly the United States stands behind Israel, and the more quickly and
resolutely Washington signals it will not tolerate Iranian retaliation, the less bloody
Tehran’s response will be. American credibility certainly has sagged, yet as throughout
its history, Tehran has been reliably deterrable by credible threats of overwhelming
force that the United States uniquely can bring to bear. By threatening to impose serious
costs on any Iranian attempt to escalate or regionalize its retaliation, clear American

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 17

 rhetorical and material support for Israel can exploit Tehran’s ingrained fear that only
the United States is capable of overpowering its military forces and ultimately toppling
the regime. This fear compelled abrupt and momentous changes in Iranian aggression
in 1988, when it agreed to end the Iran-Iraq War once it thought Washington would
intervene decisively on Iraq’s side, and in 2003 when it froze key parts of its nuclear
program in the wake of lightning U.S. campaigns to overthrow the Taliban and Sadd-
am Hussein. Similarly, and despite routinely full-throated warnings against Israel, the
same basic logic of deterrence could dissuade Hezbollah and its leader Hassan Nas-
rallah from automatically heeding Tehran’s demand to retaliate massively for Israeli
action against Iran’s nuclear program. Nasrallah remains keen to avoid a replay of the
surprisingly forceful Israeli response to Hezbollah’s abduction of two IDF soldiers in
2006, especially now that the terrorist group increasingly has political equities – and
vulnerabilities – inside Lebanon that would be jeopardized by any decision to plunge
the already unstable country into a major conflict on behalf of Iran.38

Clear and immediate U.S. support for Israel’s efforts to prevent a nuclear Iran would also
help rebuild American credibility, not only with Tehran and other adversaries, but also
vital partners and allies in the Middle East and elsewhere who fear being left alone to
deal with China, Russia, or Iran. With such reassurances, America’s longstanding Arab
partners could even boost their own tacit or informal support for Israel against any
Iranian retaliation, or at least leave Tehran isolated in the aftermath of Israeli military
action. And by mitigating Iranian escalation, a strong U.S. posture backing Israel also
will limit the risks of yet another major Middle East conflict that would further con-
found America’s efforts over the last decade to reduce its risk exposure and resources
in the region.

V. Recommendations: Last
Best Chance to Prevent a
Nuclear Iran
Partially in the hopes of dissuading Israeli action, the Biden administration is allowing
considerable daylight between itself and Israel on Iran’s nuclear program. But if push
comes to shove the United States must treat any Israeli strike as consistent with its
own longstanding (but unfulfilled) Iran policy, and thus make clear – to friends and
foes alike – that it stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Israel in deterring and mitigating
Iranian-led escalation to a major regional conflict. The more closely the United States
supports Israel in the aftermath of military action, the more likely the intensity and
duration of any ensuing hostilities will be minimized.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 18

 Given this strategic context, the United States should approach the prospect of Israeli
military action through the prism of statements and actions it must take “the day
before” to help prepare Israel to be maximally effective, as well as “the day of” and
“the day after” to deëscalate any ensuing conflict and undergird U.S. credibility and
interests in the Middle East and globally.

A. The Day Before

1. Robust U.S. Diplomatic Preparations

For starters, the United States must avoid telegraphing what it will not do to support its
partner, publicly downplaying the viability of military options, or seeking to assuage
Tehran by creating distance between Washington and Jerusalem. Official U.S. comments
that recent exercises with Israel were “not about planning any kind of joint U.S.-Israel
strike against Iran’s nuclear program” – true or not – certainly were counterproductive
in this light.39

Instead, the Biden administration must amplify National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan’s
public, but largely standalone, statement in May that Iran “can never be permitted to
obtain a nuclear weapon” and that President Biden “will take the actions necessary
to stand by that statement, including by recognizing Israel’s freedom of action.”40 Con-
sistent statements like these, as well as declarations that the United States is ensuring
Israel has the tools it needs to maximize its effectiveness against the Iranian nuclear
threat, will reduce daylight between the two countries, rebuild waning U.S. credibility,
and bolster shared deterrence.

At the same time, American diplomats should work with their British, French, and Ger-
man counterparts to reimpose six previous UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCR)
and accompanying sanctions on Iran, by utilizing the “snapback” provision spelled out
in UNSCR 2231 (2015) that instantiated the JCPOA. Continuing to promise Tehran that
its egregious violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will face no such penalty
merely incentivizes further nuclear advances while also complicating future detection
of these moves. This problem also will worsen over time, as UNSCR 2231 stipulates an
end to UN sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile program in October 2023 – and with it,
any prohibition on supplying such weapons to Russia and other U.S. adversaries – as
well as the termination of all UN, U.S., and EU sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program by
2025. In tandem with pursing “snapback” to isolate Iran diplomatically and penalize
it for severely degrading the global nonproliferation regime, American diplomats also
must make clear now to Iran’s UN backers, China and Russia, that it will veto any action
in the Security Council to delegitimize Israel’s self-defense in the event of an Israeli
strike. Preparation for blowback by Iran and its supporters in the UN General Assembly
or other international forums should also be made by coordinating a diplomatic cam-
paign, in partnership with like-minded countries, to mount a robust defense of Israel.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 19

 2. Tangible U.S. Support for Israel

To concretize U.S. support for Israel’s freedom of action and maximize the effective-
ness of potential Israeli military action, the United States should fast-track delivery
of key platforms and munitions to Israel, many of which already are under contract.
As illustrated by the Ukraine conflict, supplying such systems and capabilities is far
simpler prior to conflict than during it. Support for Ukraine also underscores the more
fundamental challenge, both generally and in terms of backing Israel, in ensuring the
U.S. defense industrial base has proper capacity and wartime mobilization ability to
provide sufficient supplies for military partners. This will require intensifying the admin-
istration’s existing efforts to shore up the U.S. defense industrial base and incentivize
industry to invest in additional manufacturing capacity to allow it to surge production
of key munitions and military systems. Specific priorities include:

KC-46A aerial refueling tankers: The United States must expedite delivery, currently
scheduled for 2025, of two of the four KC-46As purchased by Israel in 2021, and fast-
track training for Israeli pilots. By upgrading its aging tanker fleet, these platforms
would bolster Israel’s ability to operate more effectively at long range and with larger
payloads, while also being interoperable with U.S. aircraft stationed in the Middle East.
Notably, both houses of Congress already have expressed support for training Israeli
pilots on the KC-46A prior to delivery, and for forward-deploying U.S. KC-46s to Israel
as a stopgap until delivery of the tankers Israel already has purchased.41

Multirole aircraft: The United States should work with Israel to expedite transfer of
U.S.-made F-35I, F-15 EX, CH-53K, C-130, and/or SH-60/MH-60 aircraft. As with KC-46As,
these capabilities are vital to upgrade Israel’s aging fleets for both long-range missions
to neutralize Iranian capabilities and for defending against Iran-led retaliation – all the
more so as Tehran appears set to acquire advanced Russian air defenses and combat
aircraft in the future. Indeed, Israeli planners expect fully 20 percent losses of air plat-
forms in any campaign to neutralize Iran’s nuclear capabilities. In addition to swiftly
transferring aircraft for which Israel already has arranged procurement, the United
States should explore options to provide F-15 aircraft to Israel via the Excess Defense
Articles (EDA) program.

Precision guided munitions (PGM): The United States must fast-track PGM production
and subsequent deliveries to Israel, given the physical scale and complexity of the Iranian
nuclear and conventional challenges, the need to minimize collateral damage, and the
IDF’s planning constraints that stem from the sheer draw on its U.S.-procured stockpiles
due to years of ongoing operations to roll back Iran’s regional military footprint. Foremost,
this means updating and replenishing America’s prepositioned weapons stockpile in
Israel, known as WRSA-I, with Joint Direct Attack Munition kits (JDAM), GBU-39/B small
diameter bombs (SDB), and potentially bunker buster munitions and air-to-air missiles, to
fulfill the depot’s official purpose of supporting Israel in an emergency such as wartime.
Simultaneously, the Pentagon can shorten delivery times for Israeli PGM procurement
via the Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF), which enables the United States to
pre-purchase these weapons in advance of their sale to Israel.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 20

 Air and Missile Defenses. In light of the massive rocket, drone, and missile firepower
at the disposal of Iran and its proxies ringing Israel, the United States also should see
to it that Israel has adequate batteries and interceptors for its Iron Dome, David’s
Sling, and Arrow air and missile defense systems – all of which are co-produced with
the United States.

3. Coordinate Objectives with Israel

In addition to making its own statements and preparation in support of Israel, the
United States should actively coordinate with its partner ahead of any potential strike
on Iran. Washington should make clear to Jerusalem that it will support it following
a strike, and work to coordinate the objectives and response of each partner in such
an eventuality. Both the United States and Israel will have broadly aligned interests –
avoiding a broader war – but they should ensure that they are on the same page on
strategic questions that a strike will raise, including how best to ensure Iran’s nuclear
program remains shut down and how to deal with the continuing military threats that
Hezbollah poses to Israel.

4. Ensure Ready and Resilient Regional Defenses

In coordination with key Middle East partners, the United States also must proactively
provide for the defenses of its own forces and assets in the region. Even in the absence
of any potential Israeli military action, these steps are urgently needed now to counter
Iranian aggression and advance regionwide security cooperation by signaling continued
U.S. commitment to Middle East stability. Building on recent first steps, the United States
must accelerate progress toward more genuinely integrated regional air and missile
defense (IAMD) against drone and missile threats from Iran and its proxies in Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen – most urgently by establishing a common operating picture
(COP) that includes Israel and as many Arab partners as possible – and protection of
key maritime chokepoints. Building on increasingly frequent and operationally focused
U.S.-Israeli exercises that culminated in Juniper Oak early this year, the United States
should capitalize on Israel’s reassignment to U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) area
of responsibility by conducting additional large-scale combined exercises that can
enhance U.S.-Israel readiness to counter Iranian nuclear and regional threats.

These efforts should be combined with sustained messaging from Washington’s high-
est levels (including the president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense) on the
importance the United States attaches to IAMD as part of its enduring commitment to
the security of its traditional partners.42 American officials must also expand on initial
successes toward integrated maritime defenses against Iran’s threats to shipping and
naval forces in the Strait of Hormuz and other vital waterways.43 Through accompanying
contingency planning, additional combined exercises, and strategic communications
under CENTCOM’s auspices to enhance U.S.-led readiness and deterrence, the United
States also can demonstrate its continued commitment to uphold Middle East stability and
rebuild effective defense cooperation with longstanding regional partners to counter Iran.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 21

 B. The Day Of
The Biden administration’s paramount priority for the day of an Israeli strike must be
to make abundantly clear that it views Israel’s decision as consistent with longstanding
U.S. policy to prevent a nuclear Iran and that, consequently, the United States stands
with Israel, fully supports Israel’s security and self-defense needs, and will take what-
ever steps necessary to deëscalate the situation and dissuade Iran from triggering a
major regional conflict.

As with any national security emergency, the administration should immediately

inform Congress of ongoing U.S. engagement and anticipated authorities or funding
required for a U.S. response. In addition to working with the administration to advance
next steps for U.S. action, Congress should also pass a resolution signaling America’s
enduring commitment to support Israel’s self-defense.

American officials also must communicate to Tehran that the United States is prepared
to defend and respond forcefully, by itself and/or with Israel and others, to Iran-led
retaliation that imposes serious costs on Israel and/or seeks to expand the conflict by
targeting U.S. and/or other assets around the region. As part of this policy, the United
States should make clear it will view any Iranian missile launch in response to Israeli
action as a potential attack on U.S. targets, and will take all available measures to
intercept or otherwise defend against such launches. Such declarations and redlines
will be inherently more credible in close linkage with the above U.S. steps and signals
to maximize the effectiveness of potential Israeli action.

Given the acute threats to Israel posed by Lebanese Hezbollah in particular, and to
leverage the complex political and strategic calculations inside Lebanon that could
limit Hezbollah’s appetite for risking a devastating conflict at the behest of Tehran,
American diplomats also should work through back channels to dissuade the group
from joining Iran-led retaliation against Israel. Tehran must be left with no illusions that
it can, whether directly or through proxies, unleash a destructive retaliation against
Israel and/or United States or its other partners in the region without drawing in a
punishing American military blow that could weaken the regime’s capability to survive.

C. The Day After

As crucial as vocal U.S. support for Israel will be on the day of any strike, it will be
imperative for the United States to sustain concrete support for Israel the day after,
both to disincentivize Tehran from escalation and to deny or mitigate its retaliation
in whatever forms it ultimately takes. As it has done successfully with the sustained
resupply effort for Ukraine, Congress should ensure the White House sustains support
for Israel in the wake of military action, and the Biden administration should coordinate
closely with Congress on any military operation in order to ensure expedient delivery
of funding. Congress should also leverage its good offices to engage directly with allies
and partners to provide required assistance to Israel and reenforce U.S. messaging to
adversaries, particularly with respect to escalating behavior.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 22

 Equally important, American leadership must continue communicating this support
publicly to signal enduring U.S. commitments to its key partners and to regional sta-
bility and deëscalation. Most crucially, the United States must conduct an immediate
and comprehensive resupply effort for Israel’s self-defense, prioritizing air and missile
defense interceptors, PGMs, and spare parts and ammunition. These efforts must con-
sciously avoid a repeat of the aftermath of the 2021 Gaza conflict, in which President
Biden’s full rhetorical support for Israel was not remotely matched by any expeditious
resupply for Israel’s dwindling air defense interceptor stocks.44

It will be imperative for the United States to sustain

concrete support for Israel the day after, both to
disincentivize Tehran from escalation and to deny or
mitigate its retaliation.

As an operational backstop and another unmistakable sign of support, and consistent

with existing operational planning through EUCOM, the United States should be prepared
to deploy Patriot systems to Israel under American control to assist Israel’s air defense
and send an unmistakable message of U.S. deterrence and commitment to its partner.
As feasible, the United States also should rotate additional guided-missile destroyers
and frigates to Middle Eastern waters to help counter one of Iran’s most likely, and most
formidable, means of escalation and retaliation. The U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterra-
nean should help ensure the security and freedom of movement of merchant ships that
supply Israel with essential goods, thereby freeing up the Israeli Navy to counter any
Iranian and/or Hezbollah actions against Israeli offshore energy infrastructure and other
defensive activities. The United States also should promptly deploy additional assets to
the region, including bomber and fighter aircraft, to underscore American warnings that
Tehran must avoid retaliating intensively or widening the conflict. Iran should be under
no illusions about Washington’s resolve to fulfill its threats.

Finally, the United States should have a plan – developed and advanced in coordination
with Israel, its other regional partners, and other allies – for how to end the tensions
that an Israeli strike will create. In the days after a strike, even if U.S. actions can contain
Iranian retaliation, it will be important to offer Tehran a diplomatic off-ramp that will
bring any fighting to a conclusion. Ideally, this plan should consider how to transition
to a better solution to Iran’s nuclear program rather than allowing Tehran to return to
the nuclear threshold once again.

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 23

 Endnotes
1. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “US Gen. suggests deliberate response in simulated Iranian proxy attack,”
Jerusalem Post, March 1, 2023, https://www.jpost.com/international/article-733045
2. JINSA Hybrid Warfare Task Force, “Israel’s Next Northern War: Operational and Legal Chal-
lenges,” Jewish Institute for National Security of America, October 29, 2018, https://jinsa.org/
jinsa_report/israels-next-northern-war-operational-and-legal-challenges/; “Report: Hezbol-
lah possesses several dozen precision missiles,” Jewish News Syndicate, February 22, 2022,
https://www.jns.org/report-hezbollah-possesses-several-dozen-precision-missiles/
3. “President Bush says ‘all options are on the table’ regarding Iran’s nuclear aspirations,” Asso-
ciated Press, August 13, 2005, https://www.9news.com/article/news/president-bush-says-all-
options-are-on-the-table-regarding-irans-nuclear-aspirations/73-344706047
4. Barack Obama, “Address to the People of Israel,” March 21, 2013, https://millercenter.org/
the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-21-2013-address-people-israel
5. The White House, “President Trump Announces Iran Strategy,” October 13, 2017, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/president-trump-announces-iran-strategy/
6. The White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14,
2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/07/14/the-jeru-
salem-u-s-israel-strategic-partnership-joint-declaration/
7. Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve
got their back’,” Times of Israel, February 19, 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_
entry/us-envoy-nides-israel-can-do-whatever-they-need-on-iran-and-weve-got-their-back/
8. “Keynote Address by National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan,” Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, May 4, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/keynote-ad-
dress-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan
9. JINSA Iran Policy Project, “Time for Plan B on Iran,” Jewish Institute for National Security of
America, May 25, 2022, https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/iran-project-report-release-may-2022/
10. “Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing On Posture Of USCENTCOM And USAFRICOM
In Review Of The Defense Authorization Request For FY24 And The Future Years Defense
Program,” Central Command, Department of Defense, March 17, 2023, https://www.centcom.
mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/3332606/senate-armed-services-committee-hearing-on-pos-
ture-of-uscentcom-and-usafricom-i/
11. “Infographic: Time (Keeps on Never) Running Out for Iran Nuclear Talks,” Jewish Institute for
National Security of America, July 28, 2022, https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/time-never-run-
ning-out-for-iran-nuclear-talks/
12. Ariel Kahana, “Exclusive: US likely to ratchet up pressure on Iran in wake of talks’ failure,” Isra-
el Hayom, January 3, 2023, https://www.israelhayom.com/2023/01/02/exclusive-us-likely-to-
ratchet-up-pressure-on-iran-in-wake-of-talks-failure/; Barak Ravid, “Biden adviser discussed
possible outreach to Iran on nuclear program with Oman: sources,” Axios, May 30, 2023,
https://www.axios.com/2023/05/30/iran-nuclear-program-oman-outreach-deal-mcgurk
13. Ari Cicurel, “Deadly Iranian-linked Drone Attack in Syria,” Jewish Institute for National Securi-
ty of America, March 24, 2023, https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/deadly-iranian-linked-drone-at-
tack/
14. Laurence Norman and Michael R. Gordon, “Iran Could Produce Nuclear Weapon in Several
Months if It Decides to Do So, Mark Milley Says,” Wall Street Journal, March 23, 2023, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/iran-could-produce-nuclear-weapon-in-several-months-if-it-decides-
to-do-so-mark-milley-says-ecd38f07

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 24

 15. David Biller, “Iranian warships in Rio de Janeiro stirring concern abroad,” Associated Press,
March 2, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/iran-ships-brazil-us-navy-rio-de-janeiro-2b6d98a-
ca758c040e5e75293a05d9db9
16. David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker, “Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and
Monitoring Report – May 2022,” Institute for Science and International Security, June 6, 2022,
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/analysis-of-iaea-iran-verification-and-monitor-
ing-report-may-2022/8; David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso, “Updated
Highlights of Comprehensive Survey of Iran’s Advanced Centrifuges – March 2023,” Institute
for Science and International Security, March 21, 2023, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/
detail/updated-highlights-of-survey-of-irans-advanced-centrifuges-March2023/8
17. Parisa Hafezi, “Khamenei adviser says Tehran ‘capable of building nuclear bomb,’ Al Jazeera
reports,” Reuters, July 17, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/khamenei-ad-
viser-says-tehran-capable-building-nuclear-bomb-al-jazeera-2022-07-17/; Report by the
Director General, “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” IAEA Atoms
for Peace and Development, Board of Governors, September 7, 2022, https://www.iaea.org/
sites/default/files/22/09/gov2022-42.pdf
18. Jonathan Ruhe, “Iran’s Nuclear Advances While U.S. Diplomacy Dithers,” Jewish Institute for
National Security of America, February 28, 2023, https://jinsa.org/jinsa_report/iran-nucle-
ar-advances-while-us-diplomacy-dithers/; Jon Gambrell, “An Iranian nuclear facility is so
deep underground that US airstrikes likely couldn’t reach it,” Associated Press, May 22, 2023,
https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-natanz-uranium-enrichment-underground-proj-
ect-04dae673fc937af04e62b65dd78db2e0
19. Blaise Misztal and Jonathan Ruhe, “Iran Continues Blocking Nuclear Inspectors,” Jewish
Institute for National Security of America, September 20, 2021, https://jinsa.org/jinsa_re-
port/iran-continues-blocking-nuclear-inspectors/; Jon Gambrell and Philipp-Moritz Jenne,
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el-attack-iran-military-preparations-a-message-to-the-us-tehran

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 25

 27. Jonathan Ruhe and Ari Cicurel, “Israel Faces Multifront Escalation,” Jewish Institute for
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jpost.com/middle-east/article-744444

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 26

 39. Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. proposed conducting joint military planning with Israel on Iran,”
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us-should-draw-in-israel-regional-players-for-directed-energy-development/

No Daylight: U.S. Strategy if Israel Attacks Iran 27