Case Comment -S.P. Sampath Kumar v.

Union of India

Case: S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India

Citation: (1987) 1 SCC 124
Court; Supreme court of India
BENCH

BHAGWATI, P.N. (CJ)

KHALID, V. (J)

OZA, G.L. (J)

DUTT, M.M. (J)

DATE OF JUDGMENT 09/12/1986

Introduction
S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India[1]is an important case in the judicial history of
India. The case mainly concerns with the constitutional validity of Section 28 (1) of
the Administrative Tribunals Act of 1985 (hereby referred to as ‘Act’). The said act
established Administrative tribunals under the purview of Article 323-A which
envisages a tribunal system for effective and fast-track disposal of cases considering
that the High Courts are already over-burdened, and as it is said, ‘Justice delayed is
justice denied’. This act however, empowered exclusive tribunals, i.e., those which
don’t come under the jurisdiction of judicial review of High Courts. The power of
judicial review has been granted by the Constitution through Article 226 and 227.
Section 28(1) of the Act, in essence, deprived the High Courts of this power and
thus, was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. This article aims to
inform the readers about this case and then, critically analyse the same.

Background of the case

The 42nd Amendment of the Indian Constitution, brought in Clause (1) of Article 343-
A in 1976. This clause authorised the parliament to establish administrative tribunals
by the means of law which would be concerned with adjudication of complaints
involving disputes with respect to recruitment and other conditions of the service of
public officials. Clause 2 (d) of the same Article envisaged that the disputes and
decisions of these tribunals won’t be subject to the jurisdiction of any court of the
nation, expect the Apex court (under article 136 of the Constitution). However,
Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 even excluded the Supreme
Court from exerting any sort of power under (Article 32 of the Constitution) over
these tribunals. The Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance,
1986 amended the 1976 Act, such that the Supreme Court was allowed to retain its
original jurisdiction (Article 32), as well as, its appellate jurisdiction (Article 136).
Section 6 of the Act lays down the criteria for the posts of Chairman, Vice-Chairman
and Judicial Members and Administrative members of the tribunals.

Main legal issues concerned

The main questions as were raised by the writs and framed by the
court are-
1. Is the abrogation of the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution, in service matters, as are mentioned in section 28 of the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (which is the impugned Act) and the conferring of
the exclusive jurisdiction in such service matters in the Administrative Tribunal to be
constituted under the impugned Act, subject to exceptions in favour of the ambit of
the Supreme Court Court under Articles 32 and 136, is void and unconstitutional in
any particular event?
2. Are the provisions of the impugned Act being invalidated by the composition of the
Administrative Tribunal and the mode of appointment of Chairman, Vice- Chairmen
and members, and do they have the effect of introducing a constitutional infirmity?

Arguments advanced
The petitioners contended that the 1985 Act was ultra vires to the principles and
provisions of the Indian Constitution. They further said that the Section 28 of the Act
which excluded the tribunals from the jurisdiction of High Courts’ judicial review
under Article 226 and 227, thus abolishing it, was unconstitutional and thus, void.
They further contended that the mode of appointment eligibility criteria, and the
composition of the tribunal as laid down by the Act, were outside the scope of Article
323 (A) and thus, they were also void and unconstitutional.
The respondent, i.e., the government of India through the learned Attorney General
of India, on the other hand assured the Court that minor anomalies would be
amended, the power granted under Article 32 would be retained and at every seat of
High Court, a bench of the tribunals would be set up. The Learned Attorney General,
carried the instructions of the Central Government and hence, filed a memorandum
assuring the Court that Section 2 of the Act would be suitably amended, and the
officers and servants in the employment of the Apex Court, and the staff members of
the subordinate judiciary would be excluded from the purview of the Act. The same
memorandum also articulated that the Government would certainly arrange for the
establishment of tribunal benches at the seats of each High Court on the basis that
the 'sittings' would also include 'circuit sittings' and that the further details would be
worked out by the respective Chairmen or the Vice-Chairmen.
Judgment
The Court held and observed the following. Since according to the provisions of the
Act, the tribunal is supplanting the positioning of a High Court, then in essence, the
Chief Justice of an HC should have the same standing as the Chairman of a tribunal.
If we go by this logic, the Chairman should be equally experienced. Thus, the person
taking this position up should have either been a judge at any High Court or the Vice-
Chairman of such a tribunal for minimum 2 years. The then eligibility criteria, i.e.,
someone who has been the Secretary to the Government of India, was hence held
insufficient. If such a person is made the head of an administrative tribunal, it would
render the entire alternative process inefficient, owing to his lack of judicial or legal
knowledge. In furtherance of this observation, the Court struck down Clause (c) of
s.6(1).
The Apex court, while pronouncing this judgement, relied heavily on the case
of Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,[2] which talks about the
functions of Article 323. It was noted in this case that if by the means of a
constitutional amendment, the jurisdiction of High Courts is limited without providing
any alternate and equally efficacious resort, it would lie outside the purview of the
Constitution. The Court observed, in the present case, that for administrative
tribunals to be useful, thorough legal training and knowledge is essential, which is
also why it struck down Clause (c) of Section 6 (1). Furthermore, it defined and
changed the eligibility criteria for other positions. The Court also observed that the
provisions of the Act, essentially totally insulates the judiciary by preventing all
judicial interferences and this lack of the check-and-balance system is contrary to the
basic structure of the Constitution. However, they also noted that the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, does not totally bar judicial review as it still
save the appellate and original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Analysis

Originally, there was no mention of tribunals in the Indian Constitution. This idea
came into existence only after the report submitted by the 14th Law Commission of
India which basically recommended establishment of systems that would reduce the
backlog of the High courts of the country, so that the citizens can easily access
justice. It however, also cautioned against “executive-adjudication” and emphasized
that these tribunals must not supplant the High courts. The power to adjudicate
service disputes was taken away from the civil courts, and was then vested in
administrative tribunals by the Article 323A of the Constitution. The 1985 Act was in
conformity with Articles 343A and 343B and immediately attracted legal cases
question its constitutional validity. The apex court, at various instances, has held that
the power judicial review granted by 226 and 227 must not be abrogated by the
tribunals. This case did not concern with the tussle between the executive and the
judiciary but the decision does seem to be in contrast with the basic doctrine of the
Indian Constitution which includes the system of checks and balances to ensure that
all the organs are working properly and are none of them is monopolising power.
This case was overturned a 7-judge bench in the case of L. Chandrakumar vs.
Union of India[3]. The latter judgement was much-needed and has ensured that the
executive doesn’t dominate the judiciary or diverts from the legal and constitutional
track. In absence of such a judgement, the tribunals would have gained unrestrained
power and the Executive would have acted however it may have pleased.

Ratio of the case

The exclusion of the jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226 and 227
in service matters, as provided by Section 28 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, and the conferring of exclusive jurisdiction in such
matters to Administrative Tribunals, subject only to exceptions in favor of
the Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 136, was held void and
unconstitutional. This was because it compromised the basic structure of
the Constitution by depriving the High Courts of their constitutional role as
guardians of fundamental rights and effective adjudicators in service
matters.

Furthermore, the composition and appointment criteria of the

Administrative Tribunals, as laid down by the Act, were found to be
constitutionally deficient. The eligibility criteria for the Chairman of the
tribunals, which allowed for the appointment of individuals lacking judicial
or legal knowledge, was struck down by the court. The court emphasized
the importance of ensuring that individuals

appointed to such positions possess adequate legal expertise to

effectively adjudicate matters.

Additionally, the court noted that while administrative tribunals were

intended to expedite the resolution of disputes and reduce the burden on
High Courts, they must not completely insulate the judiciary from judicial
review. The Act's provisions, which prevented any judicial interference
beyond the appellate and original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, were
found to be contrary to the principles of checks and balances inherent in
the Constitution.

Overall, the court's ratio in this case underscored the need to balance the
objectives of expeditious dispute resolution with the preservation of the
judiciary's role as the ultimate arbiter of justice and protector of
fundamental rights
Conclusion
In today’s chaotic world, the existence of an effective and functional legal system
would not have been possible without the establishment of specialised tribunals in
various parts of the country. They act as a fast-track alternative to the already over-
burned High Courts. However, this does not mean that they should be left
unsupervised as this could have grave consequences on the functioning and the
synchrony between the three major organs of democracy. The judgement by the
Supreme court violated the basic structure of the Constitution, by disregarding it by
ousting the jurisdiction of the High Courts and excluding its power of jurisdiction, and
thus needed to be overturned.
References:
[1] S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 124.
[2] Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 1 SCR 206.
[3] L. Chandrakumar vs. UOI, (1997) 3 SCC 261.