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2 - ZeroSum - Part 2

Here are the key steps to play the game: 1. Shuffle the 8 cards (4 red, 4 black) and deal them face down 2. Toss a coin to decide who picks color first 3. Players simultaneously choose 1 card each from their color without seeing each other's choice 4. Compare cards - if rules are met, that color wins 5. Record result and remove cards, then repeat from step 3 until all 30 rounds are completed 6. Tally wins for each color to determine the overall winner

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Abhinav Singla
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54 views15 pages

2 - ZeroSum - Part 2

Here are the key steps to play the game: 1. Shuffle the 8 cards (4 red, 4 black) and deal them face down 2. Toss a coin to decide who picks color first 3. Players simultaneously choose 1 card each from their color without seeing each other's choice 4. Compare cards - if rules are met, that color wins 5. Record result and remove cards, then repeat from step 3 until all 30 rounds are completed 6. Tally wins for each color to determine the overall winner

Uploaded by

Abhinav Singla
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Zero Sum Games

… Representation of zero sum games


… Dominance and saddle point
… Pure vs Mixed strategy
… Graphical and Swastic method
… Property of Indifference
… Linear Programming vs two person zero sum games
No saddle point (Motivation for mixed strategy)

Player 2
Left Center Right
Top 0 -2 2 -2

Player 1
Middle 3 4 -3 -3
Bottom 2 3 -4 -4
5 4 2
Player-2 switches
It is not a stable situation
to Center
It is not in the interest of either
player to consistently stick to the
same strategy.
Player-1 1 would switch
chooses Top to Middle Opponent takes advantage if the
strategy is known.
Better to keep him guessing.
2 switches How  Mixed Strategy
to Right
Pure vs. Mixed Strategies

• When it is optimal to consistently use a single strategy, it


is a pure strategy.
• Using pure strategy is NOT optimal when the saddle point
does not exist.
• Must use a mixed strategy
a probabilistic mixture of two or more strategies.
Each time a strategy is randomly chosen using specific probabilities
for each strategy.
The opponent cannot predict the strategy.
• MiniMax Theorem
If Mixed strategies are permitted, the set of mixed strategies that is
optimal according to Minimax/Maximin criteria, provides a stable
solution with v’ = v” = v (the value of the game), so that neither
player can do better by unilaterally changing his or her strategy.
• Which strategies should be used and with what
probabilities to get optimal result?
Mixed Strategies

• Consider a cricket match where a Batsman and a Fast Bowler


have to decide their respective strategies
• Batsman can either play on Front Foot (FF) or Back Foot (BF)
• Bowler can either bowl Short Pitch (SP) or Good Length (GL)
• Assume Batsman uses FF strategy with probability p and BF
strategy with probability 1-p.
• What value of p yields the best expected payoff?
• What is the Batsman’s payoff for a given value of p?
….It depends on the strategy used by Bowler.
Bowler
Bowler’s Expected
GL SP strategy Payoff
Batsman

FF (p) 3 -1 GL 3p - 2(1-p)

BF (1-p) -2 2 SP -p + 2(1-p)
Bowler’s strategy
GL SP

Batsman’s 3p-2(1-p) = -p+2(1-p) =


Expected Payoff 5p-2 2-3p

optimal
GL
SP
p=0 p=1
p = 1/2

Lower envelope
(as maximizing the minimum payoff)
What does Bowler do?

• Similarly Bowler uses GL with probability q and SP with


probability 1-q.
• What value of q yields the best expected payoff?
• What is the payoff for a given value of q?
….It depends on the strategy used by Batman.

Bowler Batsman’s Expected


strategy Payoff
GL (q) SP (1-q)
Batsman

FF 3 -1 FF 3q - (1-q)

BF -2 2 BF -2q + 2(1-q)
Solution for Bowler
Batsman’s Batsman’s Expected
strategy Payoff
FF 3q-(1-q) = 4q-1
BF -2q+2(1-q) = 2-4q

Upper envelope
(as minimizing the maximum loss)
optimal
FF
BF
q=0 q=1
q = 3/8
All strategies at a glance

Bowler

GL SP q-mix

FF 3 -1 3q - (1-q) = 4q-1
Batsman

BF -2 2 -2q + 2(1-q) = 2-4q

3p-2(1-p) -p+2(1-p) 3pq-2(1-p)q-p(1-q)+2(1-p)(1-q)


p-mix
= 5p-2 = 2-3p = 8(p-1/2)(q-3/8) + 1/2
Alternative approach: Analogous to Nash Equilibrium

Best response curve approach:


• A Nash equilibrium is a ‘mutual best response’. So a Nash
equilibrium occurs where the best response functions
cross
… To find the Nash equilibrium, put the best response functions
together
Response Function: Given a mixed strategy of one player,
what is the best response of the other.
Finding best response function analytically

When 1 is using p-mix and 2 is using q-mix


Expected payoff of player 1:
= 3pq-2(1-p)q-p(1-q)+2(1-p)(1-q)
= 8(p-1/2)(q-3/8) + ½

p<½q=1 q < 3/8  p = 0


p>½q=0 q > 3/8  p = 1
Mutual best response curve

q q < 3/8  p = 0
q > 3/8  p = 1
1 p<½q=1
p>½q=0

3/8
Nash Eq

p
0 1/2 1
Opponent’s Indifference Property

• Batsman’s equilibrium p is where Bowler’s best-response curve has


its vertical segment implying Bowler is indifferent among all his
strategies pure and mixed as his payoff will remain constant
regardless of his q-mix
• Bowler’s equilibrium q is where Batsman's best-response curve has
its horizontal segment implying Batsman is indifferent among all his
strategies pure and mixed as his payoff will remain constant
regardless of his p-mix
• Thus each player's equilibrium mixture is such that the other player
is indifferent among all his mixes. We call this the opponent's
indifference property.
• If either player deviates from his/her optimum strategy, the other
player takes advantage by switching to a pure strategy.

E(p,q) = 8(p-1/2)(q-3/8) + ½
Solving using opponent’s indifference property

Bowler

GL SP q-mix

FF 3 -1 3q – (1 – q) = 4q – 1
Batsman

BF -2 2 –2q + 2(1 – q) = 2 – 4q

3p – 2(1 – p) –p + 2(1 – p)
p-mix
= 5p – 2 = 2 – 3p

Using property of indifference

For optimal p-mix: For optimal q-mix:


5p – 2 = 2 – 3p 4q – 1 = 2 – 4q
 p = 1/2  q = 3/8
Player 2
Another Example
Left Center Right
2 3 6
Player 1

Top p
Middle 1-p 3 1 -1
2p+3(1-p) 3p+1(1-p) 6p-1(1-p)
= 3-p = 1+2p = -1+7p

3-p

1+2p p = 2/3

p=0 p=1
-1+7p

Lower envelope
(as maximizing the minimum payoff)
 Game: Red vs Black 

• Rules:
…Two people have to play against each other.
…Pick up 8 cards – Black and Red: King, Ace, 2 & 3
…Decide which color the players take by coin toss
…Both players have to choose one card and play
simultaneously to win
…Red wins if both choose K or cards with different numbers
…Black wins if one player chooses K or players choose card with
same numbers
…Repeat 30 times and submit the final sheet

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