CASE NO.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot
be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law
is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

TAADA v. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446, APRIL 24, 1985

FACTS:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure
of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the
necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish
in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and
effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that
publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general,
he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be
dismissed. And on the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general

orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is
necessary before its enforcement?

HELD:

Yes, publication is necessary before enforcement ofpresidential decrees, letters of

instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2
does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as
class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code
provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith,
or at least as soon as possible.Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements
and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the
people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.
CASE NO. 2

ESPIRITU v. CIPRIANO
G.R. No. L-32743, FEBRUARY 15, 1974

FACTS:

The plaintiffs were the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendants since 1954.
In January, 1969, the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis, and the plaintiffs
increased the rent to P30.00 a month. Since then, the defendants have not paid the rent
although it remained in possession of the property. The Court of First Instance of Rizal
dismissed the case and denied its reconsideration relying on the authority of Republic Act 6126,
entitled "An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling
Is Located For One Year And Penalizing Violations Thereof." Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A.6126 may be held applicable in the case at bar.

RULING:

The court ruled that the case at bar is not covered by R.A. 6126. Established and
undisputed is the fact that the increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January,
1969,while the law in question took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a
half after the increase in rentals had been effected.
The law being a "temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation", it had a limited
period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that "No
lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall, during the period of one year from March 31, 1970,
increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of
this Act." Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective on March, 1970, up
to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by the express mandate of the
Act itself had a retroactive application.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given
retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being
remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction
thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must
be held to mean what it plainly says.

CASE NO. 3
Case Digest Topic: Waiver

TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant, vs. AMADO DEL ROSARIO as

Commissioner of Civil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA as Secretary of Finance,
MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
respondents and appellants.
G.R. No. L-17915, JANUARY 31, 1967

FACTS:

This is a proceeding in quowarranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. The controverted position is that of Assistant Regional
Revenue Director II, Manila, which became vacant on August 24, 1959, upon the
promotion of its occupant, Alfredo Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was appointed in
his place, and it is this appointment that is being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M. Castro in
this proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors waived their rights to the position
by their failure to complain against Toledo's appointment.

RULING:

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the eight other Assistant
Revenue Regional Directors does not amount to a waiver on their part. Waiver
must be predicated on more concrete grounds. The evidence must be sufficient and clear to
warrant a finding that the intent to waive is unmistakable. Castro himself, when he testified,
could not categorically state that the eight others were not interested in the position. 6 Not
having shown either seniority in rank among the nine Assistant Revenue Regional Directors
outside the Manila District or waiver on the part of those who were senior to him Castro have
failed to establish a clear right to the office which would entitle him to oust respondent Toledo.

CASE NO. 4
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation and application of law, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Where the law is clear, it must be applied according to its unambiguous provision. It must be
taken as it is devoid of judicial addition and subtraction.
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and COURT OF TAX APPEALS
77 SCRA 469

FACTS:

Acting Commissioner of Customs NorbetoRomualdez, Jr. held that private respondent

Manila Electric Company was not exempt for shipment of insulating oil from the payment of the
Special Import tax under the Republic Act No. 1394. Manila Electric Company claims that
insulating oils are exempt from the Special Import Tax not only by virtue of Section 6 of
R.A.1394, which exempts equipment and spare parts for use in industries but also under
Paragraph 9, Part 2 of Meralcos franchise, which expressly exempts insulators from all taxes of
whatever kind and the nature in consideration for the payment of the percentage tax on its gross
earnings. As stated under par. 9, the grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real
estate, buildings, plant (not including poles, wires, transformers, and insulators), machinery and
personal property as other persons are or may be hereafter required by law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the insulating oil come within the meaning of the term insulator?

HELD:

Yes. Insulating oil are used for cooling as well as insulating, and when used in oil circuit
breakers, they are required to maintain insulation between the contacts inside the tank and the
tank itself.

In the case of Republic Flour Mills v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the court held
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, it is true that in the construction of tax statutes tax exemption(and
deduction are of this nature) are not flavored in the law, and are construed strictissimijusis
against taxpayer. However, it is equally a recognized principle that where the provision of the
law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the courts seeking the legislative
intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS, INC. v. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-28463, MAY 31, 1971

If petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded
from the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic
consideration. It is desirable then that the gates to such efforts at undue restriction of the
coverage of the Act be kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would not respect for, but
defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. That kind of approach in statutory construction has
never recommended itself. It does not now.
FACTS:

The Republic Flour Mills, Inc., domestic corporation, primarily engaged in the manufacture of
wheat flour, being the petitioner, has assailed to the High Court its petition to exclude its
products from being liable to the wharfage dues that are required by law as provided by section
2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code that "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles
imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines exported from the
Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage" One category
refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are exported. The
petitioner contended that coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the
Philippines, they are merely waste and not the products, which is the flour produced.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law.
2. Is the petitioner liable for the wharfage dues on its exportation of bran (ipa) and pollard
(darak) as they are not "product of the Philippines."

HELD:

Yes, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed as deemed proper by
Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code that "There shall be levied, collected and paid on all
articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines exported
from the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage" One
category refers to what is imported. The other mentions products of the Philippines that are
exported. As long as the goods are produced in the country, they fall within the terms of the
above section.

It stressed that "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them." Petitioner ought to have been aware that deference to
such a doctrine precludes an affirmative response to its contention. The law is clear; it must be
obeyed.

CASE NO. 5
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official
capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) v. PRIMETOWN
PROPERTY GROUP, INC.
G.R. No. 162155, AUGUST 28, 2007

FACTS:

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. Yap, in his letter to Arturo
V. Parcero, Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), claimed that they are
entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor
and materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables.
However, despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate to BIR. On May 13, 1999, Elizabeth Santos (Revenue Officer)
required the respondent to submit additional documents to which the respondent complied with,
however, it was not acted upon prompting them to file a petition for review in Court of Tax
Appeals on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the 2-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund (Sec. 299, National Internal Revenue
Code). CTA provided that the 2-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Article 13 of
the New Civil Code. Since respondents filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and
year 2000 was a leap year (731 days), hence, beyond the reglementary period. It was appealed
to Court of Appeals which reversed CTAs decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition was filed within the two-year prescriptive period.

HELD:

Yes. Article 13, NCC provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be
equivalent to 365 days. On the other hand, Sec. 31, Chapter VIII, Book I, EO 292
(Administrative Code of 1987) provides that year shall be understood to be twelve calendar
months (month designated in the calendar regardless of the number of days it may contain). EO
292 impliedly repealed Art.13, NCC, however, implied repeals are not favored. The test is
whether (1) the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former and (2)
they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled which is present in the case at bar. For that
reason, Sec. 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent
law, governs the computation of legal periods. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary
period.