1

WAR & STRATEGY

Armed Forces War College
National Defence University
22 November 2018
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“If you want peace, understand war”

Liddell Hart
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Introduction
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Introduction

War
Understanding of War
Conduct of War under
under Academician
Paradigm Practitioner Paradigm

Strategy
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Aim

To present an overview of Theory of War, Military

and Operational Strategy with a view to laying down
foundation for higher Professional Military Education
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Sequence
Part I - Theory of War
• Conflict and War
• Evolving Nature of Conflict
• Generations, Levels and Types of War / Warfare
• Nature and Character of Future War

Part II – War Initiation and Termination

• War Initiation Strategy

• War Termination Strategy
• Notion of Victory

Part III – Strategy

• Military strategy; evolution and elements

• Principal Notions of Operational Art
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Part 1
Theory of war
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Conflict
 Conflict and war are often used interchangeably which
may not be correct
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Conflict
 A political process in which engaged parties have
incompatible attitude
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Conflict
 A disagreement through which parties involved
perceive a threat to their

needs interests concerns

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Conflict
 War is only a consequence of the conflict
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Conflict
 Conflict could have many forms, it is only one form of
the conflict which qualifies to be called as “War”
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Conflict Spectrum
Cooperation Competition Divergence

Conflict

Gray Zone / Hybrid War War

Coercion
Ltd Conventional Nuclear
War War War
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Evolving Nature Of Conflict And

Character Of Future War
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Evolving Nature of Conflict

 Phenomenon of globalization, emergence of proxies /
NSAs and technological advancement - the nature of
conflict has transformed
 Challenges to Sovereignty of a state have widened;
from direct to indirect and from physical to cognitive
 Pre-eminence of non-kinetic warfare over kinetic
application of force, preference of soft / smart power
over hard power and economic interdependence of
states - transforming challenges to state sovereignty
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Evolving Nature of Conflict

 Emergence of proxies (non-state actors) have forced
the militaries to be more frequently employed on the
inner front in a completely different mode
 Besides coercive diplomacy and sanction regime,
‘Lawfare’ is a recent means with the intent to further
own interests
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War
 State of armed conflict between nation states

Collective
Destruction
aggression

High Casualties
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War
‘Continuation of political intercourse / policy by other
means. War is thus an act of force to compel our
enemy to fulfill our will’

Clausewitz
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War vs Warfare

War – A national undertaking

involving people, government,
military and paramilitary forces
encompassing violence aggression
and destruction

Warfare – Set of Techniques and actions

used to conduct war
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War
Brutal form of politics
War
Resolve issues in international
relations
Amass military power for defence and
deterrence
Project in support of foreign and
defence policies

Two World Wars typified this approach to the instrumentality of war

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War
 More than 150 x conflicts and about 600 x battles in
Western Europe alone since late 18th century
 Approximately 90-95 % known societies remain engaged
in war
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War
 Magnitude of destruction and resultant miseries
tempted strategist to formulate theories on war
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Generations, Levels and

Types of War
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Generations of War
Military
Living through War - enduring
development –
exponential times enigma -???
continous process

Watersheds - Five generations of warfare

5th GW
4th GW
SCW /
rd
3 Warfare
Gray / Hybrid GW
Proxies
2nd GW
Manpower Firepower Maneuver Warfare
1st GW
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Levels of War

Strategic Level

Operational Level

Tactical Level
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Levels of War
• All Elements of
National Power National Strategy
applied towards
achievement of GRAND / Defence Policy
objectives NATIONAL
• Within Military, STRATEGIC
military strategy LEVEL Military Strategy
(Joint Services) or
minimum at Theatre Strategy
Service Level
• Selection of
Normandy instead OPERATIONAL
LEVEL Operational strategy/
of South France /
(COMMANDS & Campaign Planning
elsewhere in
WW-II CORPS)

TACTICAL
LEVEL
(CORPS, DIV Tactical Planning
& BELOW)
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Levels of War
National Strategy

GRAND / Defence Policy

• Planning, conduct NATIONAL
and sustaining STRATEGIC
LEVEL Military Strategy
major operations
• Within Military –
Service, Command Theatre Strategy
& Corps Level
• Plan for invading OPERATIONAL
beaches at LEVEL Operational strategy/
Normandy was at (COMMANDS & Campaign Planning
Operational Level CORPS)

TACTICAL
LEVEL
(CORPS, DIV Tactical Planning
& BELOW)
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Levels of War
National Strategy

GRAND / Defence Policy

NATIONAL
STRATEGIC
LEVEL Military Strategy

Theatre Strategy

• Military capability OPERATIONAL

applied in the field LEVEL Operational strategy/
to attain operational (COMMANDS & Campaign Planning
objectives CORPS)
• Within Military at
Corps & Division
TACTICAL
Level
• Battles on the LEVEL
(CORPS, DIV Tactical Planning
beaches of
& BELOW)
Normandy were
tactical
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Types of War
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Asymmetric War
 Conflict between
populations of drastically
different levels of military
capability or size
 Guerrilla tactics used to
overcome gaps in
technology and force size
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Civil War
 Forces in conflict belong to the same nation or
political entity vying for independence
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Protracted War
 To maintain the support of population and draw
enemy deep inside where population can bleed them
 Through Guerilla warfare
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Limited War
 Military actions carried out to gain limited objectives
within limited space with limited resources in limited
time

Hybrid Warfare
Gray Politico Sub
Peace No Peace Ltd All Out Nuclear
Zone Military Conven
(Competition) No War War War War
Conflicts Coercion War
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Conventional War
 Direct clash between the opposing armed forces
 Military takes the leading role
 Attempt to reduce opponent’s military capability
 Declared war and no use of nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons
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Gray Zone Conflict

 First appeared in 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
 Deliberate multidimensional activities by a state actor
just below the threshold of aggressive use of military
 National and subnational instruments - without
crossing the threshold of overt conflict
 Adversaries may employ proxy forces
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Hybrid War

Irregular Hybrid
Conventional
Counter- Conventional,
Limited /
Terrorism / Irregular,
All Out War
Counter- Criminality,
Insurgency Cyber

 Preferred choice of adversaries

 Lexicon ‘Hybrid Warfare’ is new - warfare dates back
to antiquity
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Hybrid War
“Any adversaries that simultaneously employs
a tailored mix of conventional weapons,
irregular tactics, terrorism in the same time and
battle space to obtain their political objectives”
Frank Hoffman
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Hybrid War
 Combination of various tools, from terrorism,
criminality, cyber-attacks, and insurgency to limited
use of military instrument
 Asserts itself in diplomatic, informational,
economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement /
legal and military domains
 Response lies at the national level, which has to be
synergized across all EoNP
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Clausewitzian Trinity of War

People
Primordial violence,
hatred and enmity

S
t
a
t
e Trinity
Subordination of War my
A r
to policy

Chance and probability

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Clausewitzian Trinity of War

People

Balance
Government
Military

“Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a

balance between these three tendencies, like an object
suspended between three magnets”
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Nature and Character of War

Nature of War – violent, interactive and
fundamentally political

Clausewitz was first to identify that

war’s nature does not change rather only
its character
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Nature and Character of War

“Nature of war is constant while every war exhibits

a new and unique character”

Liddell Hart
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Nature and Character of War

"Many people confuse the nature of war with its
character. The former is universal and eter­nal and does
not alter, whereas the latter is always in flux"

Collin S Gray
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Dominant Character of Future War

 War remains in the realm of uncertainty
 Hypotheses
• Nation’s geography & past : guide on its future
• Future war over land, sea, air, space & cyber space
• Future war: regular & irregular - often happening
simultaneously
• Proxies / Violent Non State Actors
• Ends have changed i.e. territory to ideology
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Dominant Character of Future War

 Hypotheses
• Conflicts are enduring as threat become
amorphous
• Enhanced role played by technology particularly in
information domain
• Battle space has taken new shape
• Importance of winning over population assumed
new dimensions giving significance to media
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Characteristics of Future War

 Short duration, very high tempo
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Characteristics of Future War

 Increased jointness
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Characteristics of Future War

 Accuracy, lethality and stand-off capability of weapons
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Characteristics of Future War

 Deeper combat zones and wider affected area
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Characteristics of Future War

 Operations – Non-linear & multi-dimensional
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Characteristics of Future War

 Ascendency for network centric force
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Characteristics of Future War

Coersion

Asymmetric

Sub Conventional

Limited Conventional

 Integrated National Response

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Characteristics of Future War

 Nuclear overhang denies space for conventional war
Limited space – Short duration, limited objectives,
high intensity with chances of abrupt ending
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Characteristics of Future War

 State against proxies; character of conflict will change
– aims continue to be political, duration may extend
exponentially
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Characteristics of Future War

 Onus of response on an integrated national effort
 Requires whole of the nation approach &
Comprehensive National Security Policy and effective
strategy
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Part II
War Initiation &
Termination Strategy
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War Initiation & Termination

Initiation Termination

Consideration of wide Attainment of politico

range of variables War
War military objectives
prior war initiation and visualized end
state
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War Initiation Strategy

The achievement of those actions and

objectives, both political and military, which lead to
the initiation of hostilities while maintaining moral
high ground - shifting onus of aggression on the
enemy - while achieving surprise
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War Initiation-Key Requirements

Legality Use of violence under
established laws

Legitimacy

Korean War 1st Gulf War

Opportunity

Compulsion
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War Initiation-Key Requirements

Legality

Support or popular opinion

Legitimacy
irrespective of legality

Afghan War 1965 War

Opportunity

Compulsion
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War Initiation-Key Requirements

Legality

Legitimacy

1971 War
Opportunity Fleeting or self-created
opportunity

Compulsion
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War Initiation-Key Requirements

Afghan War

Legality

Legitimacy

Opportunity Vietnam War

A war of necessity to
Compulsion safeguard nation’s vital
interests
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War Termination Strategy

“Victorious warriors win first and then go to war,

while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to
win”
(Sun Tzu)
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War Termination Strategy

“The achievement of those actions and objectives,

both political and military, which lead to the conclusion
of hostilities with a purpose of achieving an environment
favourable to own national interests”
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War Termination Strategy

Cessation of active armed hostilities

Peace Agreement

Attempts to resolve the conflicting aims over which the

battle has been waged
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When War is Terminated?

One party attains its objective and deters other party
from further fighting

One side incapable of continuing fight and believes that it may

eventually lead to defeat
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Possible War Termination Strategies

• By capitulation, extermination or expulsion

• Negotiation / mutual agreement or by using

leverage’s

• By intervention of a third party

• Threat of Escalation / coercive threat of

unacceptable damage including threat of or use
of nuclear weapons
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Possible War Termination Strategies

Non Advantage of
achievement of Non termination
Cost of war
objective within attainment of greater
outweighs
resources objective by
benefits
expansion of
war

Optimal war termination

strategy should persuade enemy
of one or more aspects

Providing a semblance of “face saving” to the enemy may help ending the conflict
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Notion of Victory
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Notion of Victory

Linked to War Termination Strategy

Difficult to discern due to

NoV constraints on conduct of war

Defining prior to war - complex

Side controlling escalation and war termination has favourable NoV

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Notion of Victory

Post war situation relatively better

than the pre-war
Perception of victory through media as an enabler
alone, may NOT be sustainable

NoV Psychological notion of victory

predicated on physical domain
Significant loss of spaces and men and
material would retain their significance
Final test of NoV - acceptance with domestic
populace and international audience
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Part III
Strategy
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Strategy

“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is

not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is
the acme of skill...... What is of supreme importance in war is
to attack the enemy’s strategy [not the enemy’s forces]”
(Sun Tzu)
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Strategy
 Plan to achieve one or more goals under conditions of
uncertainty
 Term used in 6th Century by Romans
 Comprehensive way to pursue ends through various
means
 Resources available to achieve goals are limited
 Setting goals, determining actions to achieve goals and
mobilizing resources to execute actions
 Senior leadership tasked with formulating the strategy
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Hierarchy of Strategic Planning

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Hierarchy of Strategic Planning

National Purpose

National Interests

National Aims/Objectives

National Security Policy

Def Def Aim

Other National Policies
Policy (Politico-Military)

Military Strategy Military Aim

Op Strategy

Op Plan
•Lays down operational policy
Peace Time Activities
•Analyses environment and aim of conflict Emergency or
•Prescribes theGovt
Political posture to beLevel
adopted (i.e. offensive
Document or Imminence of war
defensive) specifying the main and auxiliary theaters / zones
•Forces available, their development and organization
National Security General
•Allocates tasks/msn
Committee National Security Policy Mobilization
•Distributes forces commensurate with the task (including
logistical resources) War Directive (For
Defence Strategic
Min of Defence
•Articulates command impending scenario)
Policy Directive
•Visualizes overall time and space framework
Joint Joint Operational
•Coordinates
Joint with Military
Staff other agencies
Strategic / Directive (for relevant
Headquarters Strategy
Military JHs)
Directive
Service Operational Concept of
Services Strategy Directive Operations
Headquarters
(Op Strat) (For relevant Hs)

Command/ Fleet Operational Operational Concept of

/Zone of Strategy Instructions Operations
Operation / Corps (For relevant Hs)

77
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Components of Strategy

Diagnosis Identification of problem

/ issue / challenge

GuidelineObjectives set

Action Plan To achieve these objectives

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Military Strategy
 In military theory,
“Utilization of nation’s forces, during both peace
and war through large scale, long term planning and
development, to ensure its security”
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Military Strategy

“The Employment of Battles to gain the ends of War”

Clausewitz
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Military Strategy

“Art of distributing and applying military means to

fulfill the ends of policy”

Liddell Hart
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Military Strategy
 Both gave the pre-eminence to political aims over
military goals
 Military strategy is a sub-branch or offshoot of grand
national strategy
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Basic Elements
• Political leadership must lay
down a clear Politico-military Aim
• Hardware or the resources available
• for
Waystherepresent the employment Strategy
military commander
•• Resources Ends
Strategist's are
Translates the seldom
intent, hissufficient,
scheme
politico-military of
(Objectives)
which
aim to necessitates,
manoeuvre,broadand the either
strategic tailoring
objectives
artistry with which the
to
the be strategy
achieved
objectives
military through
oris artfully an
modifying
implemented
employment strategy and a
• the
Sunways
Tzu says ‘It is not important what you
development strategy
have but how you use it’

War
Means
(Resources) Ways
(Strategy)

Military Strategy = Military Objectives + Military Resources +

Military Strategic Concepts
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Operational Strategy

> Operational
Common Sense + Analysis

> Ends Ways Means

Intellectual Domain
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Operational Art
 Term Operational Art formalized in US military
doctrines by mid 1980s
 Ordinarily Operational Art or strategy is directed
towards achieving the strategic goals in a theatre of
war or operations, by employing the resources placed
at its disposal
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Operational Art
 Op Art employs the forces provided by military
strategy
Op Art

COG

Notions TSR BAL DISLOCATION En’s

PARALYSIS
Will
Culminating Pt

Steer, sequence & synchronize employment of military forces, in

most economical manner
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Principal Notions of Operational Art

and Strategic / Operational Effects
 Principal Notions of Operational Art 88

and Strategic / Operational Effects

 Principal Notions of Operational Art
• Centre of Gravity (COG)
• Balance
• Culminating Point
 Strategic / Operational Effects
• Main. Dislocation and Paralysis
• Aux. Dispersion, Distraction, Division, Isolation,
Fixation and Containment
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Principal Notions of Operational Art

 Intimate linkage b/w key Notions / Concepts of

Operational Art
 Operational Art works to create Effects through
application of Principal Notions within a TSR
framework
 Effects and Notions are interlinked and mutually
inclusive / reinforcing
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Centre of Gravity (COG)

“Out of dominant characteristics of belligerents, a

COG develops, the hub of all power and movement, on
which everything depends”

Clausewitz
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Centre of Gravity (COG)

“COGs are the characteristics, capabilities or

locations from which a military force derives its freedom
of action, physical strength or will to fight”
NATO
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Centre of Gravity (COG)

“COG is physical or moral entity that is the primary

component of physical or moral strength, power and
resistance. It does not just contribute to strength but it is
the strength”
NDU Op Strategy Folder
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Identifying COG
 COG is that element of adversary’s force:-
• Represents the power center / base
• Direct impact on impending operations
• Cannot be replaced immediately
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Principal Ways of Defeating COG

 COG vs COG – Clausewitz
dir approach
Superior forc Critical
es Req
Critical Critical
Req Vuln

C of G Critical C of G
Critical
Req
Req

Critical Critical
Req Vuln
 95

Principal Ways of Defeating COG

 Make COG irrelevant – Dislocation
in time and space Critical
Req
 Indirect approach; Sun Tzu, Liddell Critical
Isolation Critical
Hart Req Vuln

Operational Critical Critical

C Imbalance
of G
Critical
Strategy Req
Req

Critical Critical
Isolation
Req
Co

Vuln
rre
ct
M
nv

Ti
m Dislocation
r

e
an an
d d
Space Imbalance
Bal
firep
owe
r
 96

Principal Ways of Defeating COG

 Strip COG of support it needs to Critical
Req
be successful – Target CRs / CVs Critical Critical
Req Vuln

Operational
Strategy Critical C of G
Critical
Req
Req

Critical Critical
Req Vuln
 97

Warden’s Five Ring Model

 Theory of military strategic attack based on five levels

of system
 Attack each ring to paralyse the enemy
 Engage as many rings as possible
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Misc Aspects of COG

 Multiple COGs do exist in a system of force
 COGs exist at every level ie Strategic & Operational
 COG for each approach and different phases
 At operational level COG lies in one of the most
decisive component
 Closely linked with Operational Design – Operational
Design cannot be complete without dealing with COG
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Balance

 Basic act of op strategy is to establish balance of own

forces while attempting to undo balance of opposing

forces

 Relates to dispositioning of forces, correct assessment,

grouping and tasking

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What is Balance in a System of Force ?

 Established when a system of force is so disposed that
its major components can mutually concentrate in time
& space to respond to a threat posed to any one
component, earlier than it succumbs to enemy’s
pressure
 Time taken by supporting formation to reach
beleaguered formation is shorter than latter’s resistance
capacity, force would be balanced in time & space
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Balance
Resistance Capacity 15 Hrs

10 Hrs
A B

10 Hrs 10 Hrs

C
 102

Balance

RC-25 Hrs

A 10 Hrs RC- 40 Hrs

10 Hrs
30 Hrs

C
RC- 40 Hrs
 Balance 103

Resistance Capacity-20 Hrs

10 Hrs
A B

10 Hrs
30 Hrs

C
A force in a state of imbalance is prone to dislocation
 104

Summing Up - Balance
 Throw enemy off balanced while maintaining balance
 Imbalance is not perpetual and may be regained
 Force articulation / disposition / protection etc –
emanate from Notion of balance
 Variants / contingencies - meant to ensure balance
 Stratagem / Surprise aimed at creating imbalance in
opponent’s system of forces
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Summing Up - Balance
 Effects (both Main and Auxiliary) – aimed at targeting
balance of system of enemy’s force
 Leverage, flexibility and options reside in balance

In a nutshell “BALANCE” is a superior / overarching

Operational Concept or Notion which is the centerpiece
of Operational Art
 106

Culminating Point
“Every offensive op will sooner or later reach a
point where strength of the attacker no longer
significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond
which continuation of offensive op risks over-extension,
counter attack, and defeat. In operational art, this
point is called “Culminating Point”
 107

Culminating Point
 Culmination point is relevant to offensive and
defensive operations
 Offensive - it is point at which attacker’s combat
power no longer exceeds that of defender
 Defensive - it is when the defending force can no
longer go on counter offensive or defend AOR
successfully
 Interrelated Components of 109

Operational Strategy
Culminating
Notions COG Balance
Point

Relative
TSR Time Space
Strength

Effects Dislocation Paralysis

Operational Common Sense

 110

Conclusion
 111

Conflict Spectrum
Cooperation Competition Divergence

Conflict

Gray Zone / Hybrid War War

Coercion
Ltd Conventional Nuclear
War War War
 112

Clausewitzian Trinity of War

People
Primordial violence,
hatred and enmity

S
t
a
t
e
War
Subordination rmy
to policy A

Chance and probability

 113

Levels of War
National Strategy

GRAND / Defence Policy

NATIONAL
Dr. Harry Yarger’s Model

STRATEGIC
LEVEL Military Strategy

Theatre Strategy

OPERATIONAL
LEVEL Operational strategy/
(COMMANDS & Campaign Planning
CORPS)

TACTICAL
LEVEL
(CORPS, DIV Tactical Planning
& BELOW)
 114

Hierarchy of Strategic Planning

National Purpose

National Interests

National Aims/Objectives

National Security Policy

Def Def Aim

Other National Policies
Policy (Politico-Military)

Military Strategy Military Aim

Op Strategy

Op Plan
 115
Peace Time Activities
Emergency or
Political Govt Level Document Imminence of war

National Security General

Committee National Security Policy Mobilization

Defence Strategic War Directive (For

Min of Defence impending scenario)
Policy Directive

Military Joint Joint Operational

Joint Staff
Strategy Strategic Directive (for relevant
Headquarters
Directive JHs)

Service Operational Concept of

Services Strategy Directive Operations
Headquarters
(Op Strat) (For relevant Hs)

Command/ Fleet Operational Operational Concept of

/Zone of Strategy Instructions Operations
Operation / Corps (For relevant Hs)

115
 116

Strategy is the Interplay of

Ends
(Objectives)

Means
(Resources) Ways
(Strategy)
 117

Thank You
 118

Q&A
119
 Ethics of War
120

 Just war theory (jus bellum iustum) a doctrine, a

tradition
 Justifiable through a series of criteria, all of which

must be met for a war to be considered just

 Split into two groups: "the right to go to war’' (jus ad

bellum) and ‘'right conduct in war’' (jus in bello)

 Ethics of War
121

 First concerns the morality of going to war

 Second with morality of conduct within war

 Third category of Just war Theory ; Jus post bellum -

dealing with the morality of post-war settlement and

reconstruction i.e human security

 Ethics of War
122

 A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on

its original motivation. It must comply:-
 Use of more violence is essentially required, will
constitute an unjust war
 Govt declare war, however, people have right to
depose govt that is waging an unjust war
 Once war begun, there remain moral limits to
action
 All options for dialogue and negotiations
 Expansionist wars, wars of pillage or wars for glory,
all are unjust